Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
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SECTION 4 – SECURITY<br />
4.1: THE INSURGENCY<br />
The Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgency is composed of a syndicate of semi-aut<strong>on</strong>omous groups, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, <strong>and</strong> Hezb-e Islami Gulbudd<strong>in</strong>. The <strong>in</strong>surgency is also supported<br />
by various transnati<strong>on</strong>al terrorist groups such as al Qaeda <strong>and</strong> the Islamic Movement of<br />
Uzbekistan, as well as Pakistan-based militant groups such as Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>er Nazir Group. The primary actor with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency is the Taliban, led by the<br />
Senior Shura 22<br />
<strong>in</strong> Quetta, Pakistan, <strong>and</strong> the spiritual leader Mullah Omar. Overall, these groups<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> symbolic relati<strong>on</strong>ships <strong>in</strong> pursuit of overlapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
Amid major setbacks <strong>and</strong> the loss of several senior leaders <strong>in</strong> Pakistan result<strong>in</strong>g from aggressive<br />
U.S. counterterrorism efforts, al Qaeda’s <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the Afghanistan <strong>in</strong>surgency has been<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed. As al Qaeda has been degraded, it has become reliant <strong>on</strong> a shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g cadre of<br />
experienced leaders primarily <strong>in</strong>side a Haqqani-facilitated safe haven <strong>in</strong> North Waziristan. Al<br />
Qaeda c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek safe haven <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> has a small presence <strong>in</strong> Kunar <strong>and</strong><br />
Nuristan Prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The terrorist group c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to derive some benefits from its engagement<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g exploitati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>cidents for propag<strong>and</strong>a, pers<strong>on</strong>nel recruitment, <strong>and</strong><br />
tribal c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s that it could use to re-establish future safe havens. Al Qaeda views c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan as <strong>in</strong>tegral to its global image <strong>and</strong> relevance.<br />
Although the specific area of operati<strong>on</strong>s for each group associated with the <strong>in</strong>surgency varies, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency generally tends to operate al<strong>on</strong>g the border with Pakistan, primarily <strong>in</strong> the Pashtunmajority<br />
areas of southern <strong>and</strong> eastern Afghanistan, as well as <strong>in</strong> Pashtun communities <strong>in</strong><br />
northern Afghanistan. The majority of <strong>in</strong>surgent comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> fighters operate <strong>in</strong> or near<br />
their home districts, <strong>and</strong> low-level fighters are often well <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the local populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Out-of-area fighters comprise a relatively small porti<strong>on</strong> of the <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
Taliban senior leaders rema<strong>in</strong> capable of provid<strong>in</strong>g strategic guidance to the broader <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />
<strong>and</strong> channel<strong>in</strong>g resources to support operati<strong>on</strong>al priorities. Pakistan-based senior leaders<br />
exercise vary<strong>in</strong>g degrees of comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol over the generally decentralized <strong>and</strong> locallybased<br />
Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgency. With<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>surgent leadership structures vary by prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
In general, a two-man team composed of a shadow governor <strong>and</strong> a military comm<strong>and</strong>er lead<br />
governance efforts <strong>and</strong> military operati<strong>on</strong>s at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, <strong>and</strong> also oversee district-level<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent leadership <strong>and</strong> lower-level military comm<strong>and</strong>ers. Most shadow governors still reside <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan.<br />
To recruit, <strong>in</strong>fluence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>timidate the Afghan populace, the <strong>in</strong>surgency uses a simple but<br />
effective messag<strong>in</strong>g strategy. Capitaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> the lack of basic services <strong>and</strong> government<br />
assistance at the village level, the <strong>in</strong>surgency encourages farmers to plant poppies as a means of<br />
clos<strong>in</strong>g the resource gap experienced by most rural Afghans. The <strong>in</strong>surgency also cultivates <strong>and</strong><br />
exploits popular percepti<strong>on</strong>s of the Afghan Government as corrupt, unresp<strong>on</strong>sive, <strong>and</strong><br />
un<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the plight of rural Afghans <strong>in</strong> order to recruit local Afghans to jo<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />
or to turn to shadow governments <strong>and</strong> courts to resolve issues.<br />
22 “Council” (religious c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>)<br />
54