Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...

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ASGP-II is a multi-donor project that supports the Afghan Government in the area of subnational governance and state building at the national, provincial, district, and municipal levels. The program is run by the UNDP with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as the Afghan implementing partner. The program was funded with $83.6 million provided by the European Community, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. ASGP II, however, has not been able to report any tangible results besides funding National Technical Assistance in the IDLG. The second installment of the PBGF, a modification to the original contractual agreement with The Asia Foundation, was put into effect on October 25, 2011. The PBGF is an 18-month program funded at $45.5M. The program is currently funded jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom is conducting a review to determine its involvement in PBGF after the end of the Afghan fiscal year (March 21, 2012). This program has provided each of the 34 Provincial Governors a budget of $25,000 per month to cover operational expenditures as well as fund small-scale community outreach projects. The PBGF II was planned to be expanded with a Provincial Councils Fund and financial system pilot in coordination with the IDLG and MoF. However, due to limited funding, the second and third components have yet to be implemented. The DDP is a governance and development program created to improve government presence and service-delivery capacity at the district level. The DPP covers 32 districts throughout Afghanistan. Partnering with both the IDLG and MoF, the program is funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France, with variations on how it is implemented. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July pending accountability of expenditures and a request for IDLG and MoF to satisfy several additional agreed-upon conditions. Restoration of funding for the program is contingent on the outcomes of an ongoing technical assessment, an upcoming financial audit, and discussions leading toward a renewed commitment for sufficient program implementation from both the IDLG and MoF. Overall, sub-national governance programs are a critical element to developing and improving the effective extension of governance from Kabul to the provincial, district, and village level throughout Afghanistan. The cumulative effect of these programs will improve the ability of the Afghan Government to respond to the needs of the local population, and increase support for and the credibility of the Afghan Government. SNG programs continue to face challenges, however, including funding, procedures, and coordination of activities to enhance governance in the medium and long term through capacity building at the sub-national level. The practice of donors’ geographically ear-marking funds remains prevalent, causing spending to be highly uneven across provinces. Years of limited discretionary funding at the central government level and plentiful donor funding at the provincial level has distorted the budget formulation process. The operational and management (O&M) budget is not proportional to the development budget, and this imbalance is amplified by off-budget infrastructure projects that do not account for future O&M. 73
5.3: RULE OF LAW The United States and coalition partners conduct a broad range of programs that promote the rule of law (RoL) in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DoD) rule of law efforts include: field support to civilian rule of law teams; training judges, prosecutors, and corrections officials; providing necessary infrastructure for courts and prisons; and training MoI police forces in many aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to community policing. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides broader governance and economic development support, and the Department of State (DoS) provides funding for modernizing court administration and developing transparency in the prosecutorial process. Other agencies like Justice, Treasury and Commerce provide subject matter experts to advise and train key members of Afghanistan’s rule of law effort. Overall, progress in rule of law continues to be mixed. The main challenges include a lack of access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of the human rights protections guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, pervasive corruption, insufficient transparency, and unsatisfactory protection of justice facilities and personnel. The shortage of human capital and lack of political will on the part of the Afghan Government to continue to sustain programs and facilities which have been put in place to maintain security and stability as coalition forces draw down is also a key challenge going forward. RoL breakdowns may be both a cause and consequence of conflict among Afghans. Taliban justice systems often fill – however brutally – community needs for swift adjudication to maintain order. In doing so, it establishes a shadow authority that not only challenges the legitimacy of the Afghan central government, but invites warlord and criminal competition for power and engenders further instability. However, because of the continued weakness of the Afghan Government, Taliban justice remains a marketable commodity, as segments of the Afghan populace view Taliban systems as better than no resolution at all. To fulfill the requirements of security and sustainability, security transition must include RoL, and transition from military to civilian support must end with the full ownership of all aspects of the justice sector—police, courts, and prisons—by local, provincial, and national Afghan stakeholders. The rule of law mission is shared among several military and civilian rule of law actors – U.S. military (specifically the Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) and the Regional Commands), NTM-A, IJC, Regional Commanders, the U.S. Government, coalition civilians working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), UNAMA, a variety of NGOs, Afghan officials from relevant ministries, and other justice officials. While NATO policy authorizes UNAMA to take the lead on all civilian governance and rule of law issues, their capacity is extremely limited, even in those regional commands led by coalition partners, such as RC-W (Italy) and RC-N (Germany). In RCs under the control of the U.S. military, limited coordination with UNAMA occurs, and the lead on rule of law activities is jointly shared between the U.S. Government civilian agencies and the military actors referenced above. In an attempt to provide greater unity of effort across all communities, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission – Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) at the June 2011 Defense Ministerial. NROLFSM-A was intended first to complement and eventually to assume responsibility for much of the liaison and coordination 74
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Cover Image: An Afghan National Arm
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2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPER
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8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
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The relationship between ISAF and t
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lost territory and influence in the
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key elements of the insurgency rema
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 8
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Caldwell (US Army), who had been in
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Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the en
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Despite progress, the ANSF will con
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Figure 3: Ministry of Defense and G
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Figure 4: Ministry of Interior Capa
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2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENT
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ates fluctuated throughout the repo
Page 30 and 31: Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength
Page 32 and 33: and growth of a Special Operations
Page 34 and 35: AAF CAPACITY The NATO Air Training
Page 36 and 37: such as the Afghan National Civil O
Page 38 and 39: and NCOs will need to meet the need
Page 40 and 41: partnered with ISAF SOF in high-ris
Page 42 and 43: The ANP remains under-equipped as a
Page 44 and 45: Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Rel
Page 46 and 47: Figure 13: ANA Partnering Status Cy
Page 48 and 49: Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Oper
Page 50 and 51: Figure 18: ANA Kandak Assessment Fi
Page 52 and 53: Funding for police salaries, as wel
Page 54 and 55: force integration process, ITAG was
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Page 58 and 59: 3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION Fi
Page 62 and 63: The insurgency is funded from a var
Page 64 and 65: 4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERA
Page 66 and 67: By the end of the 2011 fighting sea
Page 68 and 69: in the provincial capital of Lashka
Page 70 and 71: continued transition process. Force
Page 72 and 73: Figure 22: ALP Disposition (as of M
Page 74 and 75: of negotiation. The advisory group
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Page 78 and 79: In November 2011, the Executive Boa
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Page 86 and 87: INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFO
Page 88 and 89: criminal network that operated in t
Page 92 and 93: Improvements in facilities have led
Page 94 and 95: Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Provin
Page 96 and 97: development in key sectors that hav
Page 98 and 99: development. The program employs ma
Page 100 and 101: number of registered women-owned bu
Page 102 and 103: Figure 25: Quarterly Comparison of
Page 104 and 105: information obtained through the JW
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Page 108 and 109: and military operations by analyzin
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Page 114 and 115: Further, on February 17, Iranian Pr
Page 116 and 117: 8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
Page 118 and 119: Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks
Page 120 and 121: A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS EIAs -
Page 122 and 123: RC-WEST From October 2011 - March 2
Page 124 and 125: RC-NORTH From October 2011 - March
Page 126 and 127: RC-SOUTH From October 2011 - March
Page 128 and 129: A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACK
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Annex B: Congressional Legislation
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(ii) Clarify the chain of command,
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(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORM
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(II) unemployment and poverty level
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CNJC Afghan Counternarcotics Judici
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RC-N Regional Command North RC-S Re
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