Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...

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(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.— (1) IN GENERAL.— The report required under subsection (a) shall set forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward sustainable long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, as specified in paragraph (2), and shall include performance standards and progress goals, together with a notional timetable for achieving such goals. (2) PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS SPECIFIED.— The performance indicators and measures of progress specified in this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF mission requirements and contributions from individual NATO ISAF countries, including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on operations, and unfulfilled commitments. (B) An assessment of military operations of the NATO ISAF, including of NATO ISAF countries, and an assessment of separate military operations by United States forces. Such assessments shall include— (i) indicators of a stable security environment in Afghanistan, such as number of engagements per day, and trends relating to the numbers and types of hostile encounters; and (ii) the effects of national caveats that limit operations, geographic location of operations, and estimated number of civilian casualties. GSDDPC29 with PUBLIC LAWS (C) For the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and separately for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) an assessment of the following: (i) Recruitment and retention numbers, rates of absenteeism, vetting procedures, and salary scale. (ii) Numbers trained, numbers receiving mentoring, the type of training and mentoring, and number of trainers, mentors, and advisers needed to support the ANA and ANP and associated ministries. (iii) Type of equipment used. (iv) Operational readiness status of ANSF units, including the type, number, size, and organizational structure of ANA and ANP units that are— 127
(I) capable of conducting operations independently; (II) capable of conducting operations with the support of the United States, NATO ISAF forces, or other coalition forces; or (III) not ready to conduct operations. (v) Effectiveness of ANA and ANP officers and the ANA and ANP chain of command. (vi) Extent to which insurgents have infiltrated the ANA and ANP. (vii) Estimated number and capability level of the ANA and ANP needed to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate United States forces and other coalition forces, including defending the borders of Afghanistan and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Afghanistan. (D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Afghanistan and the extent to which it is composed of non-Afghan fighters and utilizing weapons or weapons-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan. (E) A description of all terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and any efforts to disarm or reintegrate each such group. (F) An assessment of security and stability, including terrorist and insurgent activity, in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. (G) An assessment of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, for the twelve-month period following the date of the report required under subsection (a). (H) For reconstruction and development, an assessment of the following: (i) The location, funding (including the sources of funding), staffing requirements, current staffing levels, and activities of each United Statesled Provincial Reconstruction Team. (ii) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Afghanistan, including— (I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and 128
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Cover Image: An Afghan National Arm
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2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPER
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8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
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The relationship between ISAF and t
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lost territory and influence in the
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key elements of the insurgency rema
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 8
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Caldwell (US Army), who had been in
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Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the en
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Despite progress, the ANSF will con
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Figure 3: Ministry of Defense and G
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Figure 4: Ministry of Interior Capa
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2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENT
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ates fluctuated throughout the repo
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Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength
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and growth of a Special Operations
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AAF CAPACITY The NATO Air Training
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such as the Afghan National Civil O
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and NCOs will need to meet the need
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partnered with ISAF SOF in high-ris
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The ANP remains under-equipped as a
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Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Rel
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Figure 13: ANA Partnering Status Cy
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Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Oper
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Figure 18: ANA Kandak Assessment Fi
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Funding for police salaries, as wel
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force integration process, ITAG was
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3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION Fi
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The insurgency is funded from a var
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4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERA
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By the end of the 2011 fighting sea
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in the provincial capital of Lashka
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continued transition process. Force
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Figure 22: ALP Disposition (as of M
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of negotiation. The advisory group
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Together, coalition forces and the
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In November 2011, the Executive Boa
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ASGP-II is a multi-donor project th
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activities of the ROLFF-A in suppor
Page 84 and 85: facilities to full Afghan Governmen
Page 86 and 87: INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFO
Page 88 and 89: criminal network that operated in t
Page 90 and 91: (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 83
Page 92 and 93: Improvements in facilities have led
Page 94 and 95: Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Provin
Page 96 and 97: development in key sectors that hav
Page 98 and 99: development. The program employs ma
Page 100 and 101: number of registered women-owned bu
Page 102 and 103: Figure 25: Quarterly Comparison of
Page 104 and 105: information obtained through the JW
Page 106 and 107: crew members to fly and maintain Mi
Page 108 and 109: and military operations by analyzin
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Page 112 and 113: Pakistan continues to seek a stable
Page 114 and 115: Further, on February 17, Iranian Pr
Page 116 and 117: 8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
Page 118 and 119: Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks
Page 120 and 121: A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS EIAs -
Page 122 and 123: RC-WEST From October 2011 - March 2
Page 124 and 125: RC-NORTH From October 2011 - March
Page 126 and 127: RC-SOUTH From October 2011 - March
Page 128 and 129: A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACK
Page 130 and 131: Annex B: Congressional Legislation
Page 132 and 133: (ii) Clarify the chain of command,
Page 136 and 137: (II) unemployment and poverty level
Page 138 and 139: CNJC Afghan Counternarcotics Judici
Page 140 and 141: RC-N Regional Command North RC-S Re
Page 142: 135
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