Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...

2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS
The manning resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified in the Combined Joint
Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify
campaign plan force requirements. The training mission continues to suffer from shortages of
instructors.
In the wake of the high profile attack on NATO mentors at the MoI on February 25 th , 2012,
ISAF temporarily withdrew mentors while commanders conducted force protection assessments
and validated that appropriate security measures were in place. That process was conducted
expeditiously, and mentors have returned to duty, with additional security protocols in place.
The ANSF continues to face a shortage of NATO/ISAF trainers. The total number of required
trainers is currently 2,774 – reflecting a slight adjustment since September 2011 when the
requirement was 2778. This change is due to the elimination of 457 positions and the addition of
453 different positions. These changes are indicative of the evolution of the NTM-A mission as
Afghans take responsibility for some additional tasks. The percentage of trainers in-place or
pledged currently stands at 84 percent with a shortfall of 448 positions. The shortfall of absent
trainers previously stood at 26 percent, but a Force Generation Conference hosted by NTM-A
and SHAPE in January 2012 substantially lowered the shortfall to 16 percent. Figure 6
illustrates the current status of the CJSOR.
As the campaign supports Transition, establishing the ANSF’s self-training capability is a critical
milestone. As a result of the “Train the Instructor” program, the ANA now has 1,913 certified
Afghan instructors, of which 453 are Master Skills Instructor Course trainers. The ANP has 879
certified trainers. Additionally, due to the substantial changes associated with the drawdown of
U.S. military forces in 2012, CJSOR focus has been to develop the next version of the statement
of requirements by identifying when and where trainers will be needed in the future. Employing
this approach will prevent other countries from sending personnel to accomplish a task that has
been discontinued.
Figure 6: CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 11.5, as of March 31, 2012) 9
Requirement In-Place Pledged Shortfall
2,778 1,916 418 440
2.4: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH
The ANA continued to make steady progress towards its goal of assuming full responsibility for
security across all of Afghanistan from ISAF by the end of 2014. The ANA is on-pace to meet
its current growth targets and has steadily increased its capability ratings. The number of
partnered operations continued to increase along with the percentage of these operations that
were led by Afghan forces. While progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANA,
some units, such as the Afghan National Army Special Forces, have made impressive strides,
and are now very capable. Progress has been slower in other areas, such as in developing the
ANA logistics capabilities, or the development of the Afghan Air Force.
9 The United States currently sources 1,409 non-CJSOR trainer positions.
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