Section one India at the crossroads: understand<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>multi</strong>ple transformations
Bridg<strong>in</strong>g identities: India as a positive power? Sunil Khilnani India has long aspired to play a <strong>role</strong> <strong>in</strong> redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the global order. Its aspirations stem from its vast human scale, its depth as a civilisation and a normative legitimacy that Indians believe they have amassed, first through their non-violent freedom struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st British rule under Mahatma Gandhi’s leadership, and second by build<strong>in</strong>g a state that despite many perturbances, rema<strong>in</strong>s a secular constitutional democracy: one of modernity’s few large-scale triumphs outside the west. If political legitimacy has <strong>in</strong>spired India’s global ambition, a deficit of economic and military power has tempered it. Initially, India had to devise alternative def<strong>in</strong>itions of power – by, as Jawaharlal Nehru put it <strong>in</strong> the mid-1950s, adopt<strong>in</strong>g a negative sense of power as resist<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, India refused to participate <strong>in</strong> Cold War alignments; it avoided treaties (such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty); and it kept away from markets and <strong>in</strong>ternational trade. All these structures it saw as skewed <strong>in</strong> favour of the powerful. The Gandhian idea of boycott def<strong>in</strong>ed India’s stance towards the global order. Yet now, as its economic power accumulates, India needs a positive conception of power. It is evident that India is on an economic growth path: sav<strong>in</strong>gs rates are currently over 35% of GDP and ris<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>vestment is up, and its demographic “youth bulge” has still a decade or so to go before it feeds <strong>in</strong>to the work<strong>in</strong>g population. The global recession has certa<strong>in</strong>ly depressed India’s near double digit growth Through a billion voices: India’s <strong>role</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>multi</strong>-<strong>polar</strong> <strong>world</strong> 13 rates achieved s<strong>in</strong>ce 2004; but with a less exportdependent economy and with a more regulated, less globalised f<strong>in</strong>ancial system, India has shown some agility <strong>in</strong> recover<strong>in</strong>g. Economic growth is enabl<strong>in</strong>g greater social expenditure – and more weapons purchases (recent defence budgets have <strong>in</strong>creased by over a third, to nearly $30 billion). None of this means that India is about to become a “superpower” – as some over-excitable commentators like to imag<strong>in</strong>e. But as its conventional power expands, does India have a comparably evolv<strong>in</strong>g outlook of what it wishes to do <strong>in</strong> the <strong>world</strong> – and prevent the <strong>world</strong> from do<strong>in</strong>g to it? Analysts <strong>in</strong>variably lament India’s lack of a “grand strategy” or “strategic vision”. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, it lacks anyth<strong>in</strong>g like Ch<strong>in</strong>a’s government-devised “peaceful rise” doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Yet this lack of an all encompass<strong>in</strong>g vision could be advantageous. For it is testimony to India’s open society and to the diverse def<strong>in</strong>itions of national <strong>in</strong>terest and identity enabled by its democratic structures. As India’s 28 regional states, its many social groups, and its unequal economic classes use democratic channels to register a voice <strong>in</strong> their government’s policies and actions, India’s <strong>in</strong>ternational objectives will be, <strong>in</strong> part, shaped <strong>in</strong> arenas far beyond the m<strong>in</strong>isterial corridors of Lutyens’ imperial Delhi. Def<strong>in</strong>itions of Indian national identity and <strong>in</strong>terest are emerg<strong>in</strong>g through robust democratic contest – not through the rarified debates of policy “wonks” or the diktat of leaders. Take for example the recent bruis<strong>in</strong>g debate over the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement: what looked like (and was) public cacophony actually helped to ref<strong>in</strong>e the terms that Indian negotiators pressed for and f<strong>in</strong>ally achieved. In devis<strong>in</strong>g and def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the k<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>in</strong>ternational power India seeks, India will need to def<strong>in</strong>e what it wants power for, and how that power will address the particular challenges India faces <strong>in</strong>ternally, with<strong>in</strong> its neighbourhood and the wider Asian region. As India’s global <strong>in</strong>volvement deepens, it will need to confront three critical issues, each requir<strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>in</strong>ct Bridg<strong>in</strong>g identities: India as a positive power? | Sunil Khilnani