Section two Susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g economic globalisation: build<strong>in</strong>g a fair regime
Institutional imbalances: can globalisation be susta<strong>in</strong>ed? André Sapir The current wave of globalisation has much <strong>in</strong> common with the wave which swept the <strong>world</strong> at the end of the 19th century. Both are driven by two factors: technological change and political decisions to open up markets. Likewise both create vast economic opportunities and wealth, but also trigger huge economic and political tensions with<strong>in</strong> and across borders. Today we see such domestic tensions manifest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the west as labour markets and welfare systems are bruised and <strong>in</strong> some cases battered by the global f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisis. International tensions are simultaneously <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g as the ga<strong>in</strong>s and pa<strong>in</strong>s of globalisation are hotly contested amidst the excesses of market liberalism and the cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g hurdles fac<strong>in</strong>g the Doha round. The question that follows is: will this wave of globalisation lead, like the previous one, to an era of global conflict and division? Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first wave of globalisation tensions arose ma<strong>in</strong>ly between established colonial powers (primarily Brita<strong>in</strong>, France and Russia) and new, aspirational nations (ma<strong>in</strong>ly Germany and Japan). The colonised nations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ch<strong>in</strong>a and India, were simply too weak economically and politically to be autonomous actors dur<strong>in</strong>g this period. A comb<strong>in</strong>ation of domestic and <strong>in</strong>ternational tensions, predom<strong>in</strong>antly with<strong>in</strong> and between European powers, is what eventually led to World War One (WWI) and the concomitant disruption of the first wave of globalisation. Through a billion voices: India’s <strong>role</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>multi</strong>-<strong>polar</strong> <strong>world</strong> 27 This time around, there are two major differences which can save us from the spirall<strong>in</strong>g descent <strong>in</strong>to global conflict and collective despair. The first is the respective <strong>role</strong> of the centre and the periphery. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Angus Maddison, the economic historian, at the start of the first wave of globalisation <strong>in</strong> 1870 the two largest emerg<strong>in</strong>g countries, Ch<strong>in</strong>a and India, still accounted for about 30 per cent of <strong>world</strong> GDP (measured <strong>in</strong> purchas<strong>in</strong>g power parities), down from their previous historical level of about 50 per cent that had prevailed up to 1820. When the first period of globalisation was brought to a close by the outbreak of WWI the comb<strong>in</strong>ed weight of Ch<strong>in</strong>a and India had fallen to barely 16 per cent, and it cont<strong>in</strong>ued to decl<strong>in</strong>e thereafter, stay<strong>in</strong>g below 10 per cent from about 1940 until 1980. From the end of the 19th century till late <strong>in</strong> the 20th century, the centre specialised <strong>in</strong> manufactured goods while the periphery was conf<strong>in</strong>ed to the <strong>role</strong> of producer and exporter of raw materials. As recently as 1975, develop<strong>in</strong>g countries accounted for only 9 per cent of <strong>world</strong> manufactur<strong>in</strong>g exports, and manufactur<strong>in</strong>g goods accounted for barely 16 per cent of these countries’ total merchandise exports. The second wave of globalisation, which commenced around this time, has fundamentally altered patterns of production and trade, with large parts of the periphery assum<strong>in</strong>g centre stage. By 2005, develop<strong>in</strong>g countries already accounted for 45 per cent of <strong>world</strong> manufactur<strong>in</strong>g exports and manufactur<strong>in</strong>g accounted for two-thirds of their total exports. The second difference between the current and the earlier wave of globalisation concerns <strong>in</strong>stitutions. The domestic and <strong>in</strong>ternational confrontations that brought the first wave of globalisation to an end happened <strong>in</strong> an environment where nations lacked adequate <strong>in</strong>stitutions to resolve conflicts. It took WWI, the great depression and WWII for countries, ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> Europe and the United States, to set up domestic welfare states and <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions of global economic governance, such as the World Bank, the Institutional imbalances: can globalisation be susta<strong>in</strong>ed? | André Sapir