The Intelligence Review | volume 3 | issue 5 |

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Background The Iranian nuclear program was launched in the 1950s with help from the US through a program known as Atoms for Peace (NTI 2017). This came after the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, which was orchestrated by the US Central Intelligence Agency. Following the coup, the US-backed Reza Shah Pahlavi returned to power in Iran (BBC 2014). The US then supplied Iran with uranium to enrich, and helped it build its first nuclear reactor, the so-called Tehran Research Reactor, in 1967 (Davenport 2018). Throughout the next decade, Iran drastically increased its nuclear capabilities by signing nuclear technology contracts with foreign entities, sending nuclear scientists to be trained abroad and securing fissile materials for enrichment (NTI 2017). In 1974, Shah Pahlavi announced an ambitious plan to construct several nuclear power plants and ramp up the country’s nuclear energy production exponentially (Davenport 2018). However, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 ousted Shah Pahlavi and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran (BBC News 2014). The Iranian Revolution and subsequent seizure of the US embassy in the capital Tehran greatly damaged relations between Western nations and Iran, and was particularly detrimental for US-Iranian relations. US assistance with Iran’s nuclear program was abruptly terminated (Davenport 2018). The new leader, Khomeini, was initially opposed to nuclear energy because he saw it as being haram (forbidden) in Islam, and consequently issued a fatwa or religious ruling that outlawed it. Consequently, Iran’s nuclear program experienced a period of significant dismantlement (NTI 2017). In 1984, Khomeini seemingly softened his position on nuclear power and began seeking help from abroad to complete a number of unfinished nuclear energy projects (NTI 2017). By the late 1980s, US intelligence agencies had developed firm suspicions that Iran was using its peaceful nuclear program as a front for a clandestine nuclear weapons program (NTI 2017). During that period, the US used its geopolitical weight to pressure other countries not to assist Iran in developing its nuclear program (NTI 2017). However, the US was unable to prevent Russia from enhancing Iran’s nuclear capabilities, as Moscow and Tehran entered a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992. In 1995 this deal was supplemented by a follow-up agreement that was more robust in terms of physical and technological nuclear assistance (NTI 2017). 22
In 2002, an Iranian separatist group revealed to the international community that Iran was operating undeclared nuclear facilities near the city of Natanz in central Iran (Davenport 2018). This triggered the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to adopt a resolution in 2003, which called on Iran to suspend all enrichment activities (Davenport 2018). The Iranian government agreed to comply with IAEA demands, but in 2005 the IAEA declared that Iran was still not in compliance. On June 6, 2006, the P5+1 offered Iran the initial framework of an agreement that provided incentives for the Islamic Republic to curtail —and eventually eliminate— its nuclear activity (Davenport 2018). The P5+1 are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, namely the US, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France, plus Germany. In August of 2006, Iran rejected the P5+1 offer and proceeded to continue to expand both its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, despite harsh economic sanctions levied upon it by the international community (Davenport 2018). In 2010, Iranian nuclear capabilities suffered a major setback following a cyberattack in the form of a computer virus known as Stuxnet, which targeted its nuclear facilities at Natanz (Davenport 2018). Despite this, Iranian efforts to advance the country’s nuclear program continued. This resulted in more economic pressure being applied by the international community: for example, the EU passed legislation that banned its 28 member countries from importing Iranian oil after July, 1, 2012 (Davenport 2018). On April 14, 2012, having ostensibly succumbed to economic pressure, the Iranian government met with officials representing the P5+1 in Turkey to negotiate a deal (Davenport 2018). These negotiations resulted in the signing of the JCPOA on July 15, 2015 (Davenport 2018). This agreement between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran, imposed restrictions and regulations on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for economic relief measures (NTI 2017). Recent Developments Throughout his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump criticized the JCPOA and articulated his intentions to pull the US out of the deal. During a campaign speech at a pro-Israel conference in Washington, candidate Trump stated: “My number-one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran” (Begley 2016). Nearly a year following his election, President Trump delivered another a speech in which he announced his decision to decertify the JCPOA and threatened to 23
Page 1: The current state of Al-Shabaab in
Page 4: European Intelligence Academy www.e
Page 7 and 8: Table of Contents Foreword page 7 D
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The Research Institute for
Page 11 and 12: 9
Page 13 and 14: Introduction Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Page 15 and 16: precision, astuteness and analytica
Page 17 and 18: The Current State of Al-Shabaab Bla
Page 19 and 20: AMISOM announced its exit strategy
Page 21 and 22: group’s armed force is more than
Page 23: Will the P5+1 Continue to Support t
Page 27 and 28: In March of 2018, President Trump m
Page 29 and 30: References Cited BBC News (2014)
Page 31 and 32: Will Rising Tension Persist in Rela
Page 33 and 34: Two months after coming into office
Page 35 and 36: References Cited Baczynska, G. (201
Page 37 and 38: Which is the Most Powerful Drug Car
Page 39 and 40: to capitalize on: first, its access
Page 41 and 42: Conclusion The CJNG shows no sign o
Page 43 and 44: 41
Page 45 and 46: Will US-Cuba Relations Improve in 2
Page 47 and 48: with companies associated with the
Page 49 and 50: of the Cuban Revolution and not shi
Page 51 and 52: US Department of State (11 April 20
Page 53 and 54: Special Report: Middle Eastern Ling
Page 55 and 56: The primary concern here was the co
Page 57 and 58: Available Data One of the most inte
Page 59 and 60: References Cited Babbin, J. (2014)
Page 61 and 62: 59
Page 63 and 64: Biographical Notes on Contributors
Page 65 and 66: JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associat
Page 67: 67

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