The Intelligence Review | volume 3 | issue 5 |

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school for these critical languages, and government-funded criticallanguage programs became more prevalent (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2003:16). Despite these efforts, however, the IC still lacks personnel with these critical language abilities, and this gap needs to be closed. In the domain of American national security, Middle Eastern languages such as Arabic are even more important now than they were nearly 20 years ago, but there have been only small gains in the education of these languages (Zakaria 2011). Background On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda operatives flew planes into the Twin Towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a field in Pennsylvania, killing approximately 3,000 people. Al-Qaeda and their actions on that day changed the way the United States operated as a world actor. Not only did it turn American foreign policy to what is now known as the “Bush Doctrine” (Record 2003:1), but it introduced a new war —the “Global War on Terrorism”. This war was the Bush administration’s way of declaring that they were going to do everything possible to rid the world of terrorism. In the IC, this effort was far more geographically specific. It started with a rise in priority for Middle Eastern linguistics (Babbin 2014). Before 9/11, terrorism was not the primary focus of American politics or intelligence, nor was the Middle East the primary regional focus. The extent of America’s foreign policy in the Middle East concentrated on topics such as trying to estimate Iran’s missile capabilities (Central Intelligence Agency 1997:1). After 9/11, terrorism became the top priority of the government and the intelligence community, and the Middle East became the focus of almost all intelligence agencies and security-minded politicians. The main shift after 9/11 was a new concentration on non-state actors. Before that, the US had mainly focused on single state-actors such as Russia and China. Concentrating on state-actors was well-understood: these actors had set boundaries, set rules, and set methods of communication. Then, 9/11 happened, and the IC had to transition from a Cold War mindset to dealing with randomized groups of people with no national boundaries, no set rules, and unorthodox methods of communication (Perez 2016:3). 52
The primary concern here was the communication. The IC had very limited numbers of personnel with proficiencies in Arabic, let alone less prominent Middle Eastern languages, like Farsi. Immediately following 9/11 and going into the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the US IC needed to start gathering intelligence on these non-state-actors. This was made very difficult by the lack of personnel able to translate intercepted communications from speakers of these languages (Central Intelligence Agency 2013:8). Ever since then, the US IC has been actively recruiting personnel just for Middle Eastern language capabilities. Promoting Language Capabilities Over the past few years, there has been an increase in scholarships and programs for people learning critical languages for national security purposes. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), created after 9/11 to help improve the effectiveness of the IC, has created several language programs that have been receiving national attention for their effectiveness. One of these is the Boren Scholarship. It is a program that pays for students to travel abroad to learn critical languages. In return, students work in a national-security position for a set amount of time upon their return to the US. Another initiative that is still growing and gaining applicants is STARTALK. This is a program for middle and high school students to learn critical languages over their summer breaks. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2010). These government programs do have a limit, however. Only a small number of people can obtain these scholarships and get into the programs. That is why the government endorses a number of language schools all over the country. This way students can attend those schools and have a connection with agency recruiters. For example, both Middlebury College in Vermont and the University of Maryland do this. In order to be accepted into one of these language schools, applicants have to write an essay about how they intend to blend their language abilities with national security. These colleges are directly endorsed by government agencies that send scouts to these locations to actively look for outstanding students with critical-language capabilities (Middlebury Language Schools n.d.; University of Maryland n.d.). The Critical Language Incentive Programs within the US IC also help to encourage IC personnel to learn a Middle Eastern language. Most US intelligence agencies have them, and they provide bonuses and 53
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The current state of Al-Shabaab in
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Page 7 and 8: Table of Contents Foreword page 7 D
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The Research Institute for
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Page 13 and 14: Introduction Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Page 15 and 16: precision, astuteness and analytica
Page 17 and 18: The Current State of Al-Shabaab Bla
Page 19 and 20: AMISOM announced its exit strategy
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Page 23 and 24: Will the P5+1 Continue to Support t
Page 25 and 26: In 2002, an Iranian separatist grou
Page 27 and 28: In March of 2018, President Trump m
Page 29 and 30: References Cited BBC News (2014)
Page 31 and 32: Will Rising Tension Persist in Rela
Page 33 and 34: Two months after coming into office
Page 35 and 36: References Cited Baczynska, G. (201
Page 37 and 38: Which is the Most Powerful Drug Car
Page 39 and 40: to capitalize on: first, its access
Page 41 and 42: Conclusion The CJNG shows no sign o
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Page 45 and 46: Will US-Cuba Relations Improve in 2
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Page 51 and 52: US Department of State (11 April 20
Page 53: Special Report: Middle Eastern Ling
Page 57 and 58: Available Data One of the most inte
Page 59 and 60: References Cited Babbin, J. (2014)
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Page 63 and 64: Biographical Notes on Contributors
Page 65 and 66: JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associat
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