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Inside NOV <strong>22</strong>, 2018 .qxp_Layout 1 11/21/18 9:36 PM Page 8<br />
WWW.DAILYHERITAGE.COM.GH<br />
DAILY HERITAGE THURSDAY NOVEMBER <strong>22</strong>, 2018 11<br />
Politics<br />
Do not mind anything that anyone tells you about<br />
anyone else. Judge everyone and everything for<br />
yourself —Henry James<br />
2019 budget commendable<br />
• Continued from page 3<br />
We note that just as it happened in 2017<br />
and 2018, total revenue and grants has once<br />
again been over-projected, high above what<br />
can possibly be collected, resulting in a<br />
small but artificial difference between total<br />
revenue and grants and total government<br />
expenditure. In 2019, the government has<br />
projected to increase total revenue and<br />
grants by as much as GH₵12.1 billion,<br />
compared with increases of GH₵7.5 billion<br />
in 2017 and GH₵7.1 billion in 2018.<br />
Thus, while government was able to increase<br />
total revenue and grants by a total of<br />
GH₵14.6 billion in both 2017 and 2018, it<br />
has projected to increase total revenue and<br />
grants by GH₵12.1 billion in 2019 alone.<br />
Again, in 2018, nominal GDP growth was<br />
16.3% and revenue growth was 17.9%.<br />
However, in 2019, despite the projected fall<br />
in nominal GDP growth to 15.3%, revenue<br />
growth has been projected at 25.8%. Given<br />
this obviously over-optimistic projection, it<br />
is hard to see the revenue increase in 2019<br />
being realized. After all, the government<br />
has proposed to implement similar revenue<br />
enhancing measures in 2019 as it did in the<br />
past two years.<br />
It is important to point out that fiscal<br />
expansion has been a common characteristic<br />
of the country’s fiscal policy whenever<br />
the country leaves an IMF program, which<br />
has normally led to high fiscal deficits and<br />
macroeconomic instability. The IFS therefore<br />
cautions government that it has to be<br />
careful not to derail the fiscal gains made in<br />
the past two years, since the consequences<br />
could be unpalatable. In this regard, the IFS<br />
recommends that in 2019 the government<br />
should continue to pursue the expenditure<br />
policy it pursued in 2017 and 2018, i.e.<br />
aligning expenditures with actual revenue<br />
collections, so as to avoid fiscal<br />
overruns.We have more to say below on<br />
what the policy direction should be post-<br />
IMF program.<br />
Domestic Revenue Mobilization<br />
IFS made domestic revenue mobilization<br />
one of the key points in its pre-budget<br />
statement. It has to be said that revenue<br />
performance has been generally disappointing<br />
in the past few years, with actual collections<br />
consistently falling short of targets.<br />
Indeed, Ghana’s tax effort leaves a lot to be<br />
desired. The tax/GDP ratio was 11.3% in<br />
2016, 11.9% in 2017 and is projected to be<br />
12.6% in 2018. These ratios are significantly<br />
below the potential of the country as well<br />
as the average ratio of about 25% for low<br />
middle-income-country peers. IFS has written<br />
and spoken extensively on the revenue<br />
quagmire, citing a number of reasons, including:<br />
the near-exclusion of the informal<br />
sector from the tax net, high level of exemptions,<br />
pervasive evasion, overly-generous<br />
incentives offered to the extractives and<br />
free-zones companies, under-taxation of<br />
real properties, illicit financial flows, and<br />
other fraud and corruption. The Institute<br />
has stressed the need to address these<br />
lapses in the context of a comprehensive<br />
strategy involving reforms in policies, systems,<br />
administration and enforcement.<br />
The Institute is pleased to note that<br />
measures are being taken in the 2019<br />
budget in several of the areas it has been<br />
drawing attention to. The Institute particularly<br />
recognises and welcomes the following<br />
proposed measures:<br />
Major institutional reforms within GRA<br />
to make it more effective and efficient and<br />
plug sources of irregularities and revenue<br />
leakages;<br />
Intensified tax compliance, including by<br />
checking import undervaluation, avoidance<br />
of tax payment on warehoused goods, nonissuance<br />
of VAT receipts and other irregularities;<br />
Using legal actions to retrieve overdue<br />
tax liabilities;<br />
Accelerated automation of tax administration<br />
systems;<br />
Engaging more creative strategies and<br />
new approaches to broaden the tax net to<br />
rope in individuals and businesses that continue<br />
to operate outside the net;<br />
Using TIN to get more persons<br />
and businesses on the tax radar;<br />
Increased formalization<br />
through the National Identification<br />
Scheme database<br />
as a tax<br />
administration tool;<br />
and<br />
Government<br />
partnering with,<br />
and resourcing,<br />
MMDAs to enhance<br />
local-level<br />
revenue mobilization,<br />
including<br />
in the area<br />
of property registration<br />
and valuation.<br />
IFS is also<br />
pleased to note the<br />
Minister’s expressed<br />
displeasure with the<br />
growing incidence and<br />
magnitude of tax exemptions,<br />
which the Institute has<br />
continually drawn attention to. As<br />
the Minister acknowledged, the exemptions<br />
are subject to gross abuse and irregularities.<br />
The decision to draft a policy to be<br />
passed into law to regularize the exemptions<br />
is, therefore, a step in the right direction<br />
and should be fast-tracked.<br />
Another area that IFS has focused on<br />
extensively is the under-taxation of the<br />
mining sector as a result of the overly-generous<br />
rebates offered to mining companies<br />
in the original agreements signed with<br />
them. The Institute has called for a review<br />
of these agreements to bring taxes paid by<br />
the companies in line with the current high<br />
profits being generated in the industry and<br />
with international standards and practices.<br />
Here, the Minister only indicated the intention<br />
to aggressively enforce existing legislations<br />
and regulations to improve tax<br />
compliance, as well as plans to capitalize the<br />
exemptions granted them into additional<br />
government equity in the concessions.<br />
While these steps are welcome, they still fall<br />
short of what IFS has been calling for, viz.<br />
a complete overhaul of the existing agreements.<br />
It is noted that in light of the aforementioned<br />
and other initiatives to boost<br />
taxes, the tax/GDP ratio for 2019 is projected<br />
to be 13.1%, which is 0.5 percentage<br />
points above the projected 2018 figure of<br />
12.6%. The 2019 ratio is still nowhere near<br />
Ghana’s potential or that of its peers. Even<br />
more disappointing is the fact that over the<br />
medium term, the tax/GDP ratio is projected<br />
to rise marginally to only 13.3% in<br />
2020 and then thereafter retrogress to<br />
12.9% in 2021 and further to 11.9% in<br />
20<strong>22</strong>.These figures suggest that Ghana is<br />
still not getting it right when it comes to tax<br />
collection and that more innovative measures<br />
are needed to further scale-up the effort<br />
in that regard. Without sustained effort<br />
to this end, not only will long-term fiscal<br />
sustainability be elusive, but also economic<br />
growth will be seriously compromised while<br />
the vision of “Ghana beyond aid” will remain<br />
a dream.<br />
Expenditure Control and Rationalization<br />
IFS has continuously pointed to the importance<br />
of ensuring that we spend whatever<br />
revenue we collect prudently and<br />
efficiently so as to maximize the benefits to<br />
the Ghanaian people and promote national<br />
development. The<br />
Institute<br />
has<br />
• Ken Ofori-Atta,<br />
Minister of Finance<br />
articulated<br />
extensively<br />
the presence of rigidities—in the<br />
form of earmarked funds, wages and debt<br />
service—that virtually hold the budget<br />
hostage and leave little or no fiscal space to<br />
address critical development and social outlays.<br />
With this limited fiscal space, the Institute<br />
stressed in its pre-budget press<br />
conference the overriding need to restrict<br />
consumption spending, including relating to<br />
travel, entertainment, subsidies, free allowances,<br />
etc. The Institute further suggested<br />
that public sector reforms that had<br />
been long delayed should be carried out as<br />
a matter of priority. The reforms should include<br />
right-sizing of the sector to reduce<br />
what is obviously an over-bloated pay roll,<br />
plagued by, among others, large numbers of<br />
ghost names and other irregularities. The<br />
Institute also called for reexamination of<br />
some of Government’s policy initiatives, especially<br />
the consumption-based ones, such<br />
as nursing trainee allowances, teacher<br />
trainee allowances and some components<br />
of the FSHS policy, with the aim of<br />
streamlining them so as to reduce costs<br />
while exploring other non-Government<br />
funding options.<br />
It was the Institute’s expectation that<br />
the 2019 budget would entail a serious<br />
strategy of expenditure rebalancing in favor<br />
of productive capital spending to enhance<br />
long-term growth. In the budget, CAPEX<br />
is projected to be 2.5% of GDP. However,<br />
while this is up on the figure of 1.8% for<br />
2018, it is the same as the figure of 2.5%<br />
for 2017 and less than 3.6% for 2016. It has<br />
to be recognized here that the CAPEX line<br />
in the budget does not include grants to<br />
other Government units for capital projects.<br />
Thus, total capital expenditure will be<br />
higher (it comes to some 4.1% in 2019). Yet<br />
still, we can also look at major expenditure<br />
lines in the budget that fall under recurrent<br />
expenditure to compare with CAPEX. For<br />
example, wages/GDP for 2019 is 5.6% of<br />
GDP, compared with 5.9% for 2018,5.6%<br />
for 2017 and 5.6% for 2016. Goods & services<br />
for 2019 is 1.8% compared with 1.5%<br />
for 2018, 1.0% for 2017 and 1.5% for 2016.<br />
Interest payment is 5.4% for 2019 compared<br />
with 5.0% for 2018, 5.3% for 2017<br />
and 5.4% for 2016. Clearly, these individual<br />
recurrent expenditure items as well as their<br />
total (12.5% in 2016, 11.9% in 2017, 12.4%<br />
in 2018 and 12.8% in 2019) have generally<br />
been trending upwards over the period,<br />
while CAPEX appears to have stagnated.<br />
This calls for further expenditure rationalization<br />
and rebalancing to give increasing<br />
weight to CAPEX to drive growth and<br />
jobs. The medium-term budget shows<br />
CAPEX increasing over the 2019<br />
figure of 2.5% to 3.3% in 2020 and<br />
then falling slightly to 3.1% in<br />
2021 and further to 3.0% in<br />
20<strong>22</strong>.While the medium-term<br />
figures seem to be in the right<br />
direction, they could even be<br />
scaled up further with continued<br />
rationalisation of expenditure.<br />
Infrastructure Development<br />
and Financing<br />
As noted in our introduction,<br />
infrastructure development is one<br />
of the strategic pillars of the 2019<br />
budget, which recognises efficient infrastructure<br />
as a prerequisite to drive the<br />
government’s industrialisation and agricultural<br />
modernisation programmes. To begin<br />
with, and as stated earlier, the central government<br />
capital budget is to be scaled up in<br />
2019 to GH¢8.5 billion, rising to GH¢13.0<br />
billion after including capital spending by<br />
other government units. The higher spending<br />
will benefit roads, railways, ports (air<br />
and sea), hospitals, ICT, and sanitation infrastructure<br />
development, among others.<br />
Other initiatives to develop infrastructure<br />
are the Sinohydro infrastructure for<br />
bauxite arrangement, which is planned to<br />
take off in 2019; securitization of the<br />
GETFund to the tune of US$1.5 billion to<br />
provide education infrastructure; and creation<br />
of a Sovereign Century Fund as a vehicle<br />
to raise bilateral long-term<br />
concessional financing for commercial infrastructure<br />
projects, including Public-Private<br />
Partnership (PPP) investments.<br />
Another critical announcement in the<br />
budget is the development of standardised<br />
designs and costs for infrastructure projects<br />
in education, health and roads to ensure<br />
standardised public construction and value<br />
for money.<br />
While we support the prominence given<br />
infrastructure in the 2019 budget, we believe<br />
there is a need to anchor Ghana’s infrastructure<br />
development in a long-term<br />
national infrastructure plan, which will<br />
identify, cost, and prioritize the country’s infrastructure<br />
requirements on a long-term<br />
basis to meet the demands of a modern,<br />
middle-income economy. The infrastructure<br />
plan itself should be based on a long-term<br />
national development plan.<br />
We also want to draw attention to a recurring<br />
practice in the country whereby various<br />
amounts which are borrowed to<br />
finance infrastructure are not captured in<br />
the budget. The increase in such extra-budgetary<br />
borrowing activities has important<br />
fiscal and debt sustainability implications<br />
for the country. There is the need therefore<br />
to control the growth of these activities and<br />
to widen the coverage of the fiscal accounts<br />
to incorporate these transactions. We believe<br />
that it would be appropriate—and indeed<br />
prudent—to align these borrowings<br />
strictly with the budget cycle. The IFS intends<br />
to examine this issue more closely to<br />
come up with necessary reform proposals<br />
to enhance fiscal transparency and longterm<br />
debt sustainability.<br />
Exiting the IMF Financial Program and<br />
Legislating Fiscal Responsibility<br />
Ghana has an unenviable history of fiscal<br />
indiscipline manifested in recurring<br />
deficit overruns that increase borrowing<br />
and debt. The indiscipline tends to escalate<br />
in election years due to spikes in expenditure<br />
in those years. The response to the<br />
usually ensuing macroeconomic instability<br />
has been to seek an IMF financial bailout.<br />
The bailout is normally accompanied by a<br />
program that prescribes strict policy conditionalities<br />
geared to restabilising the economy<br />
and placing it on a path of sustainable<br />
growth.<br />
Over the past three years or so, Ghana<br />
has been on an IMF program that has<br />
served as an anchor for the economy, with a<br />
brief interruption in 2016. The program<br />
has generally ensured prudent conduct of<br />
fiscal policy.<br />
Government has indicated its intention<br />
to exit the program at the end of 2018. Exiting<br />
the program means that we are going<br />
to free ourselves from the conditionalities<br />
that anchor fiscal policy. We have been here<br />
before. In fact, Ghana has sourced IMF financial<br />
assistance 16 times in its history.<br />
This is precisely because we have failed on<br />
our own to exercise the needed fiscal discipline<br />
that the IMF program usually imposes<br />
on us.<br />
Government has indicated that it plans<br />
to legislate fiscal responsibility after the<br />
IMF program.. Furthermore, the mediumterm<br />
budget deficit profile provides indication<br />
of Government’s commitment to<br />
enduring fiscal discipline and macroeconomic<br />
stability. It has to be emphasized that<br />
it is only by entrenching macroeconomic<br />
stability that we can place the economic on<br />
a path of sustained strong growth, job creation<br />
and prosperity for all Ghanaians.<br />
Government has indicated its intention to<br />
pass a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), in<br />
line with what it states to be its commitment<br />
to “ensuring irreversibility of the<br />
macroeconomic gains.”The FRL will allegedly<br />
encompass a fiscal rule that will<br />
place the budget deficit within a 3-5%<br />
band. There is available empirical evidence<br />
that suggests that a deficit within that range<br />
is likely to ensure long-term fiscal and debt<br />
sustainability. The West African Monetary<br />
Zone, of which Ghana is a member, also<br />
specifies a deficit ceiling of 3% for the<br />
membership. The envisaged fiscal deficit<br />
band of 3-5% would, therefore, appear to<br />
have a justified basis from that standpoint.<br />
The medium-term deficit profile—4.2% in<br />
2019, 3.7% in 2020, 3.2% in 2021 and 3.1%<br />
in 20<strong>22</strong>—also seems to be in line with the<br />
planned rule.<br />
In principle, IFS welcomes the passage<br />
of the FRL. It is a subject that the Institute<br />
has taken keen interest in since it was first<br />
mooted by the Vice President in 2017. In<br />
due course, the Institute will make its views<br />
known on the FRL and its key components<br />
— the fiscal rule and Fiscal Council —<br />
based on its own analysis and international<br />
best practices so as to contribute to the<br />
process of entrenching fiscal discipline and<br />
sustainability in the country.