The Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

ailable and non-bailable offenses were defined. The King's judges often subverted the
provisions of the law. It was held that an individual may be held without bail upon the
Sovereign's command. Eventually, the Petition of Right of 1628 argued that the King did
not have such authority. Later, technicalities in the law were exploited to keep the
accused imprisoned without bail even where the offenses were bailable; such loopholes
were for the most part closed by the Habeas Corpus Act 1679. Thereafter, judges were
compelled to set bail, but they often required impracticable amounts. Finally, the English
Bill of Rights (1689) held that "excessive bail ought not to be required."
However, the English Bill of Rights did not determine the distinction between bailable
and non-bailable offenses. Thus, the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to mean
that bail may be denied if the charges are sufficiently serious.
The Supreme Court has also permitted "preventive" detention without bail. In United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the only limitation
imposed by the Excessive Bail Clause is that "the government's proposed conditions of
release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil." In Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Supreme Court declared that a bail amount is "excessive" under
the Eighth Amendment if it were "a figure higher than is reasonably calculated" to
ensure the defendant's appearance at trial.
The incorporation status of the Excessive Bail Clause is unclear. In Schilb v. Kuebel,
404 U.S. 357 (1971), the Court stated in dicta: "Bail, of course, is basic to our system of
law, and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to
have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." In McDonald v. City
of Chicago (2010), the right against excessive bail was included in a footnote listing
incorporated rights.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas
Excessive Fines
In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909), the Supreme Court held that
excessive fines are those that are "so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law". The Court wrote in its syllabus:
The fixing of punishment for crime and penalties for unlawful acts is within the police
power of the state, and this Court cannot interfere with state legislation in fixing fines, or
judicial action in imposing them, unless so grossly excessive as to amount to deprivation
of property without due process of law. Where a state antitrust law fixed penalties at
$5,000 a day, and, after verdict of guilty for over 300 days, a defendant corporation was
fined over $1,600,000, this Court will not hold that the fine is so excessive as to amount
to deprivation of property without due process of law where it appears that the business
was extensive and profitable during the period of violation, and that the corporation has
over $40,000,000 of assets and has declared dividends amounting to several hundred
percent
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