HSSE Management Tours - BG Group

HSSE Management Tours: 

Asset Integrity Guide 

Design & 

Build Integrity 

Identify & 

create Barriers 

Asset 

Integrity 

Operate with 

Integrity 

Working within 

the Barriers 

Sustain 

Integrity 

Maintain Barriers 

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2

Contents 

1 

2 

Introduction 

• HSSE Management Tours: 


• How to Structure Your Asset Integrity 

Management Tour 

• Asset Integrity Overview 

Managing Integrity 

• Topic 1 - Maintenance of Barriers 

• Topic 2 - Integrity Communications 

• Topic 3 - Performance Management 

• Topic 4 - Planning and Resourcing 

• Topic 5 - Corporate Safety Culture 

• Topic 6 - Management of Change 

• Topic 7 - The Safety Case 

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Key Integrity Barriers 

• Topic 8 - Operating within the Envelope 

• Topic 9 - Pressure Safety Valves 

• Topic 10 - Pressure Vessels 

• Topic 11 - Piping (incl. small bore piping) 

• Topic 12 - Structural Integrity 

• Topic 13 - Process Control 

• Topic 14 - Alarm Management 

• Topic 15 - Leak and Fire Detection 

• Topic 16 - Emergency Shutdown & Blowdown Systems 

• Topic 17 - Control of Ignition Sources 

• Topic 18 - Fire Protection 

• Topic 19 - Escape, Muster and Evacuation 

Summary 

• HSSE Management Tour Briefing Cards 

1

• Asset integrity (process safety) differs from 

occupational safety (personal safety) because it 

focuses on the hazards that are more likely to result 

in major accidents (gas explosions, jet fires, ship 

collisions, etc.) affecting large numbers of personnel 

rather than incidents affecting individual workers 

(slips, falls, struck-by incidents, electrocution, etc.). 

• The management of occupational safety and asset 

integrity has both similarities and differences, but 

it is important to understand that management 

of one does not assure management of the other. 

Robust systems need to be in place to manage both, 

and the workforce should understand that both are 

important to the success of BG Group. 

• This handbook is intended to provide senior 

personnel with a basis for discussing asset integrity 

topics during a HSSE management tour. Historically 



1 

Introduction 

HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide 

these tours have been dominated by occupational 

safety observations and discussions, and so the 

purpose of this handbook is to broaden the scope 

so that asset integrity is also discussed during 

such visits. 

• This handbook should be used in conjunction with 

the “HSSE Management Tours: A Guide” handbook, 

which contains general guidance for planning and 

performing a HSSE Management Tour. 

2

1 Introduction 

HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide (continued) 

• Each topic in this handbook provides a broad 

overview of the subject area and suggested initial 

engagement questions. The language is deliberately 

plain to provide a level of comfort and confidence for 

users regardless of their background. The questions 

are structured in an open way to provide the basis for 

an open discussion with employees. 

• Open discussions on asset integrity issues offer the 

potential to understand perceived problem areas and 

identify opportunities for improvement. An attitude 

of openness and honesty is required in discussions 

and the desire to listen to, and discuss, an individual’s 

issues is critical to avoid any potential filtering or 

‘good news only’ responses. 

3

1 

Introduction 

How to Structure Your Asset Integrity 

Management Tour 

• Prior to the tour it will help to familiarise yourself 

with the safety case for the facility. This will provide 

a good overview of the facility, the processes, the 

associated hazards and the way in which the risks are 

managed. It will help you to decide what your focus 

areas will be. 

• You should review the topics in this book prior to 

the tour and select a few topics that you plan to use 

(some of the topics may be selected by the organiser 

to ensure good coverage over several tours). Choose 

some topics from the “Managing Integrity” section 

and some topics that relate to typical barriers that 

are relevant for the facility (based on what you have 

learned from the safety case). 

• BG Groups incident reporting system (Synergi) can 

also be used to see what recent incidents an asset 

may have had. 



4

1 

Introduction 

How to Structure Your Asset Integrity 

Management Tour (continued) 

• During the tour you should ensure that you speak 

to a range of people with different responsibilities 

for asset integrity. It is recommended to conduct 

visits to supporting departments in an asset 

(e.g. maintenance, engineering, contracts and 

procurement, human resources) as well as the 

operating plant and its personnel. The questions 

that you choose should be relevant to the people 

you are speaking to (their particular responsibilities 

and their level in the organisation). 

• You should take the opportunity to inquire about 

specific activities that are ongoing during your tour, 

and in particular to ask about any activities that 

are not a part of what is considered as “normal 

operations”. 

• A significant difference between occupational 

safety and asset integrity is that very often the 

deficiencies in asset integrity are not visible, and 

so these can only be uncovered by having the right 

conversations with the right people. 

• Following visits and discussions, any identified 

concerns or issues should be fed back to the 

relevant line manager or the organising manager 

for consideration. 

5

1 

Introduction 

Asset Integrity Overview 

• Asset integrity (also referred to as “process safety”) 

is the ability of the asset to perform its required 

function effectively whilst safeguarding life and 

the environment. Good asset integrity is critical to 

our business, as a loss of asset integrity can have 

catastrophic effects, leading to major accidents 

that result in multiple fatalities as well as very large 

economic, environmental and reputational damage 

(for example Macondo, Texas City, Piper Alpha, etc). 

• Asset integrity management is all about the 

prevention and mitigation of unintentional releases 

of potentially dangerous materials or energy. For BG 

Group, this means safely transporting hydrocarbons 

or energy from source to final destination without 

loss of containment or other hazardous event. In the 

event of a loss of containment or other hazardous 

event, systems need to be in place and be available in 

good working order to detect and control the event as 

well as mitigate the effects. 



• Asset integrity management can be visualised as a 

series of control measures or barriers, which either 

prevent the hazard from being realised, or limit the 

effects of the incident if the hazard is realised. These 

barriers are depicted in the “swiss-cheese” model (see 

Figure 1) and each contains a mix of plant, people and 

processes. 

• Each barrier is a high level functional grouping of 

safeguards and controls selected to prevent, or limit 

the effect of, a major accident or environmental 

event. A barrier may therefore include a number of 

safety critical systems, and safety critical elements 

(SCE). 

• Physical plant barriers include, for example, 

systems provided for emergency shutdown, relief 

and blowdown, fire protection and evacuation. 

The presence of the physical plant barriers alone 

is not sufficient; these require competent people 

6

1 

Introduction 

Asset Integrity Overview (continued) 

and effective processes to ensure that they are 

correctly specified and that their ongoing suitability 

is assured. People and processes include internal 

procedures and work practices; for example 

operating procedures or training and experience. 

• The effectiveness of an assets integrity controls 

is a function of the quantity and the quality of 

the barriers which are used to protect against a 

major accident. No barrier is perfect – the design 

limitations, and the potential for barriers to fail 

or be by-passed is represented by the holes in 

the barrier (swiss-cheese) model. Asset integrity 

programs are primarily focussed on assuring the 

ongoing suitability, and improving, the barriers. 

• Another way to visualise the role of barriers is by 

the use of bow-tie diagrams (see Figure 2). Bow-tie 

diagrams combine fault trees (the left hand side) 

and event trees (the right hand side). The left 

hand side of the diagram shows all the causes (or 

threats) with the potential to cause the hazardous 

event (top event). The top event is the release of the 

hazard, e.g. the release of a flammable gas stored 

under pressure. The right hand side of the diagram 

shows all the potential consequences (or end 

events) that can result from the top event. Taken 

together, the two sides show the links between 

the causes and consequences (for each chosen 

hazardous event) and the role of the barriers which 

prevent the event (left hand side) or control or 

mitigate the consequences (right hand side). 

• Bow-tie diagrams provide a powerful visual 

representation of the role of the barriers in 

managing the hazards and are used in BG Group 

safety cases for this purpose. 

7

1 

Introduction 


Figure 1 – The Concept of Barriers 

THREATS/ 

CAUSES 

Primary Containment 

Plant 



Prevention Detection Control Mitigation Emergency Response 

Structural Integrity 

Mechanical Damage 

Prevention 

Critical Process & 

Equipment Monitoring 

Leak & Fire Detection 

People Processes 

e.g. Fire & Gas Detection e.g. Training & Competence e.g. Safe Working Practices 

TOP 

EVENT 

Ignition Control 

Safe removal of 

Inventory 

Shutdown System 

Layout 

Secondary Containment 

Passive Fire Protection 

Fire Suppression 

Emergency Alarms & 

Communications 

Escape Evacuation 

Muster & Rescue 

Emergency Power 

& Lighting 

Emergency Response 

Arrangements 

IMPACTS 

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1 

Introduction 


Figure 2 – Bow-Tie Diagram 

THREATS / CAUSES 

PREVENTION 

Barriers to eliminate and prevent causes 

of hazardous event 

e.g. Overpressure protection, 

collision warning system 

TOP 

EVENT 

Realisation of the hazard 

e.g. Loss of containment, 

ship collision, etc 

DETECTION, CONTROL, MITIGATION 

and EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

Barriers to control consequences and effects 

Barrier Barrier 




Barrier Barrier Barrier 

Barrier 





Sequence of failures leading to 

realisation of the hazard 

e.g. Fire and gas detection, 

escape and evacuation 

Sequence of failures leading to 

escalation of the hazard 

IMPACTS / CONSEQUENCES 

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Topic 1 – Maintenance of Barriers 

• All equipment placed into service on a plant will 

undergo some form of physical degradation, 

resulting in diminished performance and eventual 

failure over time. 

• Maintenance activities seek to safeguard 

equipment performance and integrity by 

appropriate intervention. To do this successfully 

requires an understanding of the deterioration 

mechanisms such that the correct maintenance, 

testing activities and frequencies are established 

and carried out by competent persons. Equipment 

is classified as safety critical if their performance is 

deemed to be necessary for ongoing plant safety 

and effectiveness. 

• In reviewing a maintenance management system, 

it is of vital importance that activities are carried 

out in accordance with the plans. A high ratio of 

planned maintenance to corrective/breakdown 

maintenance (planned maintenance should be 



significantly greater) is a good indicator of an 

effective maintenance management system. 

• The presence of significant backlogs, especially 

of safety critical equipment, is symptomatic of a 

problem. A system for the approval of continued 

operation if integrity cannot be fully maintained 

(degraded barriers, inhibits, deferrals) should be in 

place, including escalation up to and including the 

AGM where necessary. 

• Procedures relating to maintenance should be 

clearly understood and carried out to the desired 

quality. Sound maintenance implementation 

requires adequate budgets and resources as 

well as numerous support activities including 

logistics, warehousing, planning, contracts and 

operational support. Maintenance and inspection 

activities should also address the integrity of 

temporary equipment. 

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Topic 1 – Maintenance of Barriers 

1. Tell me how maintenance of equipment is 

planned and executed on this plant? Who 

carries it out (core crew or 3rd Party)? What 

about temporary equipment? 

2. How does the system for classifying 

equipment and work order criticality 

work? 

3. How do we know how effective our 

maintenance management system is? 

4. How are maintenance backlogs monitored 

and managed? 

Questions 

5. What is the process for the approval 

of continued operation in the event 

of degraded barriers, inhibited safety 

functions, or backlog of safety critical 

maintenance? 

6. How is training and competency of 

maintenance personnel assured? How 

are 3rd party personnel included in this 

process? 

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Topic 2 – Integrity Communications 

• Asset integrity requires facilities to be designed, 

constructed, operated and maintained effectively. 

This requires significant amounts of written and 

face to face communication. 

• As well as construction drawings and 

documentation, all maintenance and inspection 

history data (material wall thickness, function 

test results etc) must be kept for assessment, 

trending and fault analysis. Such information must 

be available and appropriately communicated 

to the correct personnel such that analysis and 

appropriate actions can be taken to prevent failures 

and incidents. 

• It is essential that all asset integrity incidents and 

near-misses are identified and reported and that 

the potential for a major accident to have resulted 

from these incidents is recognised. A mature 

incident reporting system would consider an unrevealed 

failure of a barrier to be a high potential 

incident, even if that barrier had not been called 



upon to operate; the concern is that it would not 

have worked when required if an accidental event 

had occurred. 

• Having identified incidents and near-misses, rootcause 

failure analysis should be applied and the 

results of these analyses need to be communicated 

appropriately to ensure that learning and 

improvements can be implemented. 

• The critical aspects in a functional integrity 

communication system are: 

– Goals, objectives and responsibilities for asset 

integrity are clear and have been communicated 

– Flow paths for integrity information, data and 

decisions are understood 

– All unplanned events are rigorously analysed and 

learning applied 

– Integrity data, documents and other relevant 

information is updated, shared and managed 

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Topic 2 – Integrity Communications 

1. How do we ensure that information 

from inspection (and maintenance) is 

communicated to the right personnel? 

2. How well do you think information flows 

up and down the management chain? How 

could this be improved? 

3. Are integrity related data and documents 

readily available for those who need it? 

How do we ensure they are up to date? 

4. How do you identify asset integrity related 

incidents and near-misses? What defines a 

high-potential incident or near-miss? 

Questions 

5. How do we determine the causes of 

unplanned events/failures when they 

occur? What type of personnel undertake 

these investigations? 

6. Do we have a mechanism for capturing 

lessons and applying them to our 

operations? Have you applied the findings 

from incidents outside this site, from 

elsewhere in BG or the industry? Can you 

provide an example? 

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Topic 3 – Performance Management 

• As with many processes, asset integrity 

management is founded on the concept of 

continuous improvement. To do this, systems must 

be in place to measure current performance and 

underlying trends (to allow improvements to be 

identified). 

• Performance management within asset integrity 

is based upon the notion of having appropriate key 

performance indicators (KPIs) which provide clear 

measurement of critical aspects of the integrity 

management system. A process for analysis and 

review of the KPIs should be in place along with a 

mechanism for driving further improvements. 



• The critical aspects in a performance management 

process are: 

– Ensuring that relevant KPIs are used (measurable, 

and in areas that do need improvement) 

– Implementing a regular process of performance 

review and improvement 

– Having clear plans for performance improvement 

(where required) 

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Topic 3 – Performance Management 

1. Can you tell me some of the KPIs used to 

measure asset integrity performance? Do 

you report all of the required BG Group AI 

KPI’s and if not, why not? 

2. How is KPI performance reviewed and 

communicated? 

Questions 

3. How does your role impact any of these 

KPIs? Which KPIs are most relevant to your 

role? 

4. Do you see KPI performance results and 

trending on a regular basis? How do the 

results of these KPI’s influence the way you 

work now and going forward? 

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Topic 4 – Planning and Resourcing 

• Good asset integrity requires a clear vision of 

the objectives that will maintain or improve the 

integrity performance. These goals need to be 

translated into clear plans at various levels and the 

plans must be supported by systems that provide 

the required resources. This approach forms the 

basis of BG Group aims to operate all Assets under 

a process of Integrated Activity Planning and 

Scheduling (IAPS). 

• Integrated planning has to be done at multiple 

levels but must be consistent with the overall asset 

goals that have been set. Resources, which may 

consist of people, budgets, logistics, materials etc, 

are a crucial link in the integrity chain and if not 

available at the correct time and place will cause 

delays in risk reduction activities. 



• Within planning and resourcing, the key areas are: 

– Having sound documented plans in place at all 

levels and for various timescales, from long-term 

strategic goals through to daily executable work 

– Management of the planning process to ensure 

fulfilment and adjustment of the plans based 

upon actual performance 

– Provision of adequate resourcing to ensure that 

activities can be done within the required time 

periods 

– Prioritisation and alignment of activities 

across functions to ensure that maintenance 

opportunities (e.g. during unplanned 

plant shutdown) are always taken and 

that maintenance activities are prioritised 

appropriately with respect to other activities 

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Topic 4 – Planning and Resourcing 

1. What clear asset integrity improvement 

goals and targets have been set for this 

facility? 

2. How do you input to plans and how do you 

manage delivery against plans? 

Questions 

3. What are the major resource restrictions 

you have in fulfilling your plans? 

4. How do you manage the various resource 

requirements that you need to ensure 

successful completion of planned 

activities? 

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Topic 5 – Corporate Safety Culture 

• The development of a strong corporate safety 

culture on a plant is just as important to asset 

integrity as is the design of sound facilities and 

development of the right work processes. 

• The safety culture which is driven by the shared 

values at all levels of management and employees, 

serves to reinforce subconscious beliefs and 

therefore decision making related to asset integrity 

at all levels. 

• Many integrity failures (up to 80%) have their root 

either in part or wholly in human factors. Against 

that background, it is clear that significant benefits 

would be derived from ensuring that there is a 

strong safety culture which is clearly understood at 

all levels and which translates into consistent and 

positive behaviour. 



• A workforce that is convinced the organisation 

fully supports safety and asset integrity as a core 

value will tend to do the right things, in the right 

way, at the right time - even when no one else is 

looking. The perception of risk across all levels at a 

plant is also a good insight into the overall culture. 

Do they feel they are safer than other plants or 

do they recognise that they operate with a higher 

than typical level of risk; how well do the workforce 

feel that this is being managed? Has an abnormal 

increased risk become the accepted normal 

condition? 

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Topic 5 – Corporate Safety Culture 

1. What messages do you get from asset 

management about the importance of 

asset integrity? 

2. Can you describe any occasions when 

you felt there was not a suitable long 

term commitment to asset integrity? (For 

example where other shorter term targets 

have been over-emphasised?) 

3. Where are asset integrity responsibilities 

defined and documented? 

Questions 

4. Are you (or plant personnel) comfortable in 

reporting equipment failures, incomplete 

work or other asset integrity shortcomings 

on site? 

5. Where do you think that attention would 

best be directed to improve the process 

safety culture on the plant? 

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Topic 6 – Management of Change 

• It is necessary to carry out changes on operating 

plants over time. This results in engineering, 

procedural and organisational modifications. 

• Because changes can have impacts on many other 

aspects of the operation, they can introduce new 

or unintended risks. It is therefore critical that a 

comprehensive review of the potential change 

impacts is undertaken before implementation. 

• The management of change process seeks to 

ensure that the potential impact of any change is 

fully understood, and that any risks associated with 

the change are mitigated appropriately. The critical 

aspects in a functional management of change 

process are: 

– Having a robust process that is documented 

and approved that applies at all levels (from 

day to day operations through to major plant 

modification) 



– Ensuring that all changes follow the process 

– Having suitable quality arrangements in place 

for design, construction, commissioning and 

handover phases of all engineering modifications 

– Ensuring that the risk assessment of any change 

has the correct level of validity by including the 

relevant operational, engineering and technical 

safety personnel in the review process 

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Topic 6 – Management of Change 

1. Tell me how we identify, approve and 

implement engineering changes / 

improvements to the plant? 

2. Do you think we get good design, 

construction and commissioning of 

modifications? 

3. How are you involved in identifying 

and assessing the risk of any proposed 

changes? 

Questions 

4. What are the main challenges experienced 

in getting necessary changes implemented 

quickly (e.g. procedures)? 

5. How good are we at managing procedural 

and organisational changes? 

6. How do you deal with assessing the changes 

required in day to day tasks – changing the 

way we have to operate something or when 

carrying out a predefined activity controlled 

by a permit? 

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Topic 7 – The Safety Case 

• All BG operated facilities are required to 

have a safety case in place. The safety case 

documents the process that has been followed 

for the identification of major accident hazards, 

assessment of the risks and the control measures 

that are implemented to manage these risks. By 

doing this, the safety case provides a justification 

for the continued safe operation of the facility. 

• The safety case should provide a description of: 

– The facility and the processes that it operates 

– The major accident hazards that are present 

– The HSE management system that is in place 

– The measures in place to manage the major 

accident hazards 

– The safe operating envelope for the facility 



• The safety case should be a living document. It 

should be prepared, and regularly reviewed and 

updated as required, with the involvement of the 

workforce. The content of the safety case should be 

effectively communicated to the workforce as part 

of their first induction to the facility, and should 

also be utilised in subsequent training sessions, 

operational risk assessments, tool box talks, etc. 

• It is important that the safety case is a true 

reflection of the way in which the facility is really 

operated and that the key assumptions made in the 

safety case remain valid. 

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Topic 7 – The Safety Case 

1. What are the major accident hazards at 

this site? How can we be sure that we have 

identified them all? 

2. Can you explain to me how the facility 

Safety Case has been communicated to you? 

Do you understand its purpose? 

3. Can you describe how the Safety Case is 

used at the facility? 

Questions 

4. How do you ensure that the Safety Case 

remains valid? What do you see as your role 

in this process? 

5. Have you been involved in the review of any 

part of the Safety Case, and if so, how? 

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Topic 8 – Operating within the Envelope 

• The key objective of operations is to ensure that 

the plant is operated safely and effectively within 

the limits of the design. In order to achieve this, 

competent operations personnel need to be 

provided with the required information, tools and 

training to understand and operate the plant. 

• The operating environment changes over time; 

reservoir conditions change, networks grow, third 

parties may be connected. 

• Operational procedures need to be accurate, 

understandable, followed in practice and updated 

appropriately. All the required operational 

support systems should be in place. In addition, 

a clear corporate safety culture which empowers 

operators to make the correct decisions under all 

circumstances is essential. 



• Safe operations is therefore the end result of having 

well trained operators with the correct support 

systems in place and represents a crucial link in 

attaining asset integrity assurance – the operators 

are a key part of the barriers (Figure 1). 

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Topic 8 – Operating within the Envelope 

1. Describe the key operating procedures that 

you follow to safely operate this plant. Are 

these easy to understand? Do you follow 

them strictly or have actual operating 

practices “evolved” since the procedures 

were written? How do we ensure that our 

procedures are up to date? 

2. Where is the operating envelope for the 

plant defined? Are there any areas where 

we are having problems operating within 

that envelope? 

3. How is the training and competency of 

operations personnel undertaken 

and assured? 

Questions 

4. What makes you believe that you are 

empowered to take quick corrective action? 

(e.g. in the event of an asset integrity 

related failure or in discovering a potential 

pending failure) 

5. How do we make sure that shortcuts 

(or ‘workarounds’) do not develop in the 

way we operate this plant? How do you 

recommend operating changes to improve 

safety or production? 

25

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Topic 9 – Pressure Safety (Relief) Valves 

• Pressure safety or relief valves represent the last 

line of defence in a pressure protection system 

and are intended to safely dispose of hydrocarbons 

from a pressurised containment system when a set 

(high) pressure is reached. 

• The critical issue for pressure safety valves (PSVs) 

is ensuring that the periodic inspections and 

tests have been carried out to prove that they will 

operate when required, i.e. at the right pressure. 

Failure to carry out the prescribed testing could 

potentially lead to the PSV failing to function on 

demand and so it is important to determine if there 

are any overdue inspection and testing activities. 

In the event that tests are deferred there should be 

a structured system in place for the management 

of deferrals that is appropriately approved by the 

Asset Technical Authority. 



• It is also important to ensure that the required tests 

are carried out by suitably certified personnel using 

suitably certified equipment. 

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Topic 9 – Pressure Safety (Relief) Valves 

1. Tell me how PSVs are managed on this 

facility? 

2. What would we do, if it was not possible to 

carry out a test at the required time? 

3. How do we ensure that PSV testing is 

carried out correctly (calibration, competent 

personnel, records etc?) 

Questions 

4. Have we ever had a PSV fail to function 

when tested? If this occurred, how would 

we resolve this problem? Do we have any 

spares? 

5. Who, in this asset, is the Technical 

Authority for PSVs and what are their 

responsibilities? 

27

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Topic 10 – Pressure Vessels 

• Pressure vessels are key components in a 

pressurised containment system. Vessels facilitate 

hydrocarbon processing such as separation, mixing, 

distillation, reaction, etc. 

• The critical issue for pressure vessels is ensuring 

that the periodic inspections have been identified, 

carried out to the full requirement, results assessed 

and that there are none overdue. Vessel failure 

usually occurs as a result of material degradation 

(from corrosion or erosion, etc.) and it is critical that 

inspections take place in order to understand the 

status of the vessels’ structural integrity. 

• There are several inspection techniques ranging 

from non-destructive testing (NDT) methods 

such as ultrasonic inspections and radiography to 

external visual or internal inspections. 



• All deferred inspections need to be done against 

the background of an agreed and robust system for 

management of deferrals that is suitably approved. 

Just as critical, is ensuring that the required tests 

and inspections are carried out appropriately and 

abnormal results are assessed by a competent 

person. 

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Topic 10 – Pressure Vessels 

1. Tell me how we determine where, how 

and when we carry out pressure vessel 

inspections? 

2. What happens when an inspection can’t 

be carried out as planned? At what 

level in your organisation are deferrals 

approved? 

3. How do we ensure that pressure vessel 

inspections are carried out correctly (right 

type, calibration, procedures, competent 

persons, etc?) 

Questions 

4. How are results of inspections considered 

and what might result if abnormal results 

were reported? (e.g. lower than expected 

wall thickness or major loss of coating) 

5. What parts of the vessel do we inspect – is it 

just the shell? What about the flange faces, 

bridles, supports, etc? 

29

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Topic 11 – Piping (Incl. Small Bore Piping) 

• Piping systems represent the conduit in a pressure 

containment system by which hydrocarbons 

and other contained fluids are transported for 

processing. They form critical components of a 

pressurised containment system and are usually 

the weak point in the process as a result of material 

degradation through a range of mechanisms, 

predominantly corrosion (internal or external) or 

erosion processes. 

• The critical issue in facility Piping systems is 

ensuring that the periodic inspections have been 

carried out. Because they are usually very complex, 

it is best to analyse and categorise piping systems 

using criticality (susceptibility to failure and likely 

consequences of failure). The inspection program is 

then driven by the derived criticality. 

• Some important areas are: 

– Small bore piping (< 2”) is thin walled and 



more susceptible to damage, and failure due to 

vibration. A register of small bore piping with a 

prescribed program of inspection is best practice. 

– Piping joints are particularly vulnerable. Flanges 

should be subject to a flange management 

programme to provide assurance of their quality. 

– Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is a key risk 

leading to piping failure. An assessed and 

documented inspection programme is needed. 

– Likely or expected internal corrosion mechanisms 

that relate to the fluids within the facility should 

be captured in a corrosion risk register. 

– Temporary repair of piping by various means 

(engineered clamps or wraps) may be allowed 

at site, however these repairs must be closely 

monitored whilst in place, be recorded on a 

register, have a maximum defined life and a clear 

priority for permanent repair. 

30

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Topic 11 – Piping (Incl. Small Bore Piping) 

1. Please explain how we ensure that piping 

on our facility is in good condition 

2. Have we had any piping systems failures? 

Do you know what caused them (e.g. 

damage, vibration in small bore piping, 

corrosion?). What have we done to prevent 

recurrences? 

3. What do we do to minimise the risk of 

flange leaks or failures? 

Questions 

4. Which areas might be prone to Corrosion 

Under Insulation (CUI), or internal corrosion, 

on this site? How do we manage and 

minimise these risks? 

5. Is there a procedure for temporary repairs 

to pipework? Do you know how many 

temporary repairs you have, and how the 

permanent repairs are prioritised? 

31

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Topic 12 – Structural Integrity 

• Critical structures are those which are required 

to retain the overall integrity of the facility or 

to provide support for safety critical functions 

(for example large hydrocarbon vessels, control 

building, offshore accommodation, offshore 

helideck, etc.). Structures are also critical if their 

collapse could damage process equipment, causing 

significant hydrocarbon release and escalation of 

the event. 

• The critical structures are required to resist the 

loads imposed on them by events including storms, 

earthquakes, fires and explosions. 



• Critical structures will be periodically examined 

for signs of corrosion or other degradation, 

coating defects, etc. This will usually be as part 

of a risk-based inspection program, where the 

results of inspections will be used to determine 

future inspection requirements based on projected 

corrosion rates. 

• Corrosion protection systems also require periodic 

inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure 

continuing protection. 

32

3 


Topic 12 – Structural Integrity 

1. How is structural integrity assured on this 

facility? 

2. Can you explain how structural inspections 

are prioritised? Is there a clear distinction 

between critical and non-critical structures 

on this facility? 

3. How are the results of inspections used to 

optimise the inspection process? 

Questions 

4. If significant defects and degradation (i.e. 

corrosion of steel structures, breakdown 

of concrete structures) are identified 

in structures, who decides what the 

appropriate action should be? 

5. Are you aware of any structural issues on 

this facility at the moment, and what is 

being done to resolve them? 

33

3 


Topic 13 – Process Control 

• Process plants are usually controlled by complex 

process control systems which are essential to 

safely manage the fluid processing in the plant. 

• There are many control loops in any given 

plant. Each loop typically consists of three main 

components: 

– The sensor picks up data from the process (e.g. 

temperature, pressure, etc.) 

– The controller analyses the data from the sensor 

and sends signals to: 

– The final control element (e.g. control valve, 

shutdown valve, etc.) which carries out required 

functions on command 



• As with other active systems, the process control 

system functionality must be tested and analysed 

periodically to ensure it will function as and when 

required. The critical aspects in a functional process 

control loop are: 

– A robust process for system function testing 

– Ensuring that function tests are actually carried 

out and the results recorded for analysis 

– Review of results and follow up on any 

deficiencies found 

• Certain testing activities will require isolation of 

one or a number of devices, and it is therefore 

important to fully understand what functions are 

being withdrawn in this period and that any risks 

and loss of operability are fully assessed. 

34

3 


Topic 13 – Process Control 

1. How do we ensure functionality of the 

process control systems? 

2. What happens when we find deficiencies in 

the system as a result of testing? 

3. How are records from the testing of 

the process control system maintained 

and reviewed? 

Questions 

4. What problems have there been with the 

process control systems? Are there any 

modifications planned/ongoing to resolve 

these issues? 

5. Are there currently any control loops on 

manual control? If so, why is this? Can you 

explain the process for management of 

process control over-rides. 

35

3 


Topic 14 – Alarm Management 

• Alarms are placed within process plants to alert 

operators when specified process conditions (e.g. 

level, pressure, temperature) exceed specified 

values. Typically alarms are sent via the control 

system to the control room so that appropriate 

action can be taken. 

• A problem that is faced in the industry is that of 

managing the number of alarms received by the 

control room operator. Having too many alarms can 

result in reduced efficiency and in many instances 

has been a critical factor in hiding integrity 

incidents until much too late. Managing this 

phenomenon, referred to as ‘alarm flooding’, is key 

to minimising risks. 



• The critical aspects of alarm management are: 

– There is a clear hierarchy and system for 

prioritisation of alarms (design) 

– The number of alarms handled by the operator 

is measured and actions are taken to eliminate 

“nuisance” and other non-essential alarms 

– Having a plan to rationalise the alarm handling 

process (where this is needed) 

36

3 


Topic 14 – Alarm Management 

1. Can you explain how alarms are received 

and responded to? 

2. How are alarm rates measured and 

managed? What is the current normal rate? 

How does that change when an unplanned 

shutdown or plant upset occurs? 

Questions 

3. Who has responsibility for ensuring alarm 

rates are at a reasonable level? 

4. If the operators are currently overloaded, 

what plans are there to improve the 

situation? 

37

3 


Topic 15 – Leak and Fire Detection 

• One of the key objectives of asset integrity 

management is to ensure that the hazardous fluids 

remain within the confines of the pressurised 

containment system. However, if a leak occurs, 

then it has to be detected as quickly as possible to 

allow remedial actions such as equipment isolation, 

power supply shutoff or process shutdown to be 

taken. 

• Various leak detection systems (flammable gas, 

toxic gas, fire, smoke) are provided on facilities to 

initiate actions, either automatically or through 

alarms, and thus mitigate possible effects of any 

releases. 



• Leak detection has to function as required, when 

required. Thus such systems and their components 

are subject to periodic testing to confirm 

functionality. The function of operating personnel 

is also to be vigilant for the lower level ‘weeps’ and 

‘seeps’ that could escalate if unchecked. 

• Certain plant operations and maintenance may 

require that one or more leak detection devices are 

inhibited for a short time, and it is important to 

understand the degree of cover that remains during 

this time and that the risks have been assessed 

correctly. 

• Construction work may result in long term inhibits 

(more than one shift) and it may be appropriate to 

revise the safety case for such activities. 

38

3 


Topic 15 – Leak and Fire Detection 

1. What systems do we have to detect leaks, or 

fire, on this plant? Can you briefly describe 

how they work? 

2. How do we ensure that our leak/fire 

detection systems are reliable and will be 

available when needed? Do we measure 

this somehow? Is any of the testing 

overdue? 

3. How do we keep a record of all leaks 

and seeps? How is the output from this fed 

back into the system so that they 

are resolved? 

Questions 

4. How are flowline or pipeline leaks detected? 

How can we ensure such systems are 

working properly? 

5. Do you know if any of these systems are 

inhibited at the moment? What is the 

associated risk? How long have the inhibits 

been in place? 

39

3 


Topic 16 – Emergency Shutdown (ESD) 

and Blowdown Systems 

• Emergency shutdown systems are installed on 

plants to provide a mechanism to shut down the 

plant safely in the event of an emergency. ESD is 

usually triggered automatically if some key process 

parameter has been exceeded or a fire/gas release 

has been detected, or may be manually initiated if 

personnel believe that they are no longer able to 

ensure safe control of the plant. 

• Blowdown systems provide a means to rapidly 

depressurise the plant by removing the gas 

inventory to a safe location (e.g. a flare). 

• These systems are required to be functional when 

called upon to take action. In order to do this 

end-to-end tests of the systems (including sensors, 

control system and final control elements) have to 

be conducted periodically to ensure that the system 

is robust and ready to respond if/when required. 



• The key areas in ensuring ESD and blowdown 

system functionality are: 

– A robust process(s) for system function testing of 

all components 

– Ensuring that function tests are actually carried 

out and the results recorded for analysis 

– Review of results and follow up on any 

deficiencies found 

• Certain testing activities may require one or a 

number of devices to be isolated, and it is therefore 

important to fully understand what functions are 

being withdrawn in this period and that any risks 

are fully assessed. 

40

3 


Topic 16 – Emergency Shutdown (ESD) 

and Blowdown Systems 

1. How do we make sure that ESD and 

blowdown systems will work when 

needed? 

2. What happens when deficiencies are found 

in the system(s)? 

3. Can you describe to me where testing 

records are kept and what is done 

with them? 

Questions 

4. Who is technically responsible for the ESD 

and blowdown systems? How do they get 

involved? 

5. Are there any parts of these systems 

isolated at the moment and what is the 

reason? Is this a recent change? 

41

3 


Topic 17 – Control of Ignition Sources 

• Potential ignition sources at hydrocarbon handling 

facilities must be strictly controlled. Areas of the 

plant where there is the potential for a hazardous 

(i.e. flammable) atmosphere to be present must 

have suitably rated electrical equipment. This 

may be intrinsically safe (incapable of providing 

enough energy to cause ignition) or explosion 

proof (sealed to prevent gas ingress, referred to as 

“Ex” equipment). The emergency shutdown (ESD) 

system will isolate all non-essential electrical 

equipment in the event of a major gas release, but 

equipment that is required to continue to function 

in an emergency must be appropriately rated. All 

electrical equipment requires periodic inspection, 

testing and maintenance to ensure that it is 

not damaged or degraded such that its rating is 

compromised. 



• Earth bonding is provided on equipment to prevent 

sparks due to stray current or static build-up. 

Lightning protection systems are provided to earth 

the currents from lightning strikes. Hot surfaces 

may also cause auto-ignition of flammable gas/air 

mixtures and so maximum surface temperatures 

are controlled in hazardous areas. Earth bonding 

and insulation materials require periodic inspection 

to ensure their integrity. 

• The activities of personnel present potential 

ignition sources. Non-sparking tools must be 

used. Hot work must be strictly controlled by the 

permit-to-work system. All temporary and portable 

equipment must be inspected and certified before 

being brought onto site, and either periodically 

recertified or removed. 

42

3 


Topic 17 – Control of Ignition Sources 

1. If a gas release were to occur, what would 

be the most likely ignition sources present 

at this facility? 

2. How is the ignition potential from electrical 

equipment controlled? 

Questions 

3. How is hot-work managed to reduce the 

ignition risk? 

4. How is the risk of ignition by temporary or 

portable equipment items managed at this 

facility? 

43

3 


Topic 18 – Fire Protection 

• Fire protection systems are provided to mitigate 

the effects of fires, should they occur. These include 

passive and active systems. 

• Passive fire protection systems include fire rated 

divisions (fire walls), and passive fire protection 

coatings (typically used on structures, supports, 

etc.) and jackets or enclosures (typically used on 

critical valves or vessels). Although the passive 

systems are inherently more reliable than active 

systems, they still require periodic inspection to 

ensure that they are not degraded or damaged in 

any way that might cause them to fail prematurely 

during a fire event. 



• Active systems include firewater deluge systems, 

sprinkler systems, gaseous flooding systems, 

hydrants, monitors and mobile and portable 

fire extinguishers. These are provided in various 

locations on the facility, dependent upon the 

specific nature of the fire hazard. These systems 

and their components are subject to periodic 

inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure 

their functionality in accordance with established 

performance standards. 

• If fire protection systems are unavailable or 

(wholly or partially) impaired for any period of 

time this may mean that the consequences of 

a fire in the event of a major accident could be 

much worse. Therefore in the event of 

unavailability or impairment a risk assessment 

should be carried out. 

44

3 


Topic 18 – Fire Protection 

1. Which areas of this facility present the 

greatest fire hazard and why? 

2. What are the principle means of 

fire protection in these areas of the 

facility? 

3. How do we ensure that passive fire 

protection measures will be effective? 

Questions 

4. How do we ensure that our active fire 

protection systems will function as, and 

when, required? 

5. What manual fire fighting measures do 

we have at this facility? What training has 

been provided in their use, and when should 

these be used? 

45

3 


Topic 19 – Escape, Muster and Evacuation 

• All facilities are required to have emergency 

response plans in place and make suitable 

provisions for escape, muster and evacuation of 

all personnel at the facility in the event of a major 

accident. These arrangements and provisions are 

critical to preventing loss of life in the event of an 

integrity failure. 

• Escape, muster and evacuation provisions may 

typically include escape routes, emergency 

communications, H 2S escape sets, life-jackets, lifeboats, 

etc. The provisions required must be based 

on a specific assessment of the hazards at the 

facility, the particular environment and the number 

of personnel present. Some facilities (such as 

offshore platforms) will require specially designed 

muster locations to protect personnel from the 

effects of the accidental event while mustering 

takes place and a decision to evacuate is made. 



• All emergency response facilities must be kept 

ready for use at all times. As such they must be 

periodically tested and re-certified for use. It is 

critical that this is carried out by organisations 

and personnel with the required equipment, skills 

and qualifications. In the event of unavailability or 

impairment a risk assessment must be carried out. 

• The critical issues to be reviewed in examining the 

management of emergency response are: 

– A structured and documented system for 

maintenance and recertification of emergency 

response equipment exists 

– Implementation of appropriate drills and tests at 

defined intervals to ensure personnel are familiar 

with the emergency response arrangements and 

to enable continuous improvement. 

– Records are kept for examination and review 

46

3 


Topic 19 – Escape, Muster and Evacuation 

1. What are the arrangements for escape and 

muster at this facility? How is it ensured 

that the muster points provide protection 

against the effects of major accident 

events? 

2. Tell me how we ensure that life-saving 

appliances will work when needed? 

3. How do we ensure that only 

certified personnel inspect and repair 

these units? 

Questions 

4. Tell me about the emergency response 

training you have received. How is this kept 

current and up to date? 

5. Tell me about the last emergency 

response drill, exercise or test that you 

were involved in. 

47

4 

Summary 

HSSE Management Tour Briefing Cards 

• These cards are designed to provide senior 

personnel with a basis for discussing asset integrity 

based topics during HSSE management tours. 

• Useful principles to remember are: 

– Questions are “open” to generate discussion - 

use them as a starting point of conversations 

– Only use a few questions (2 or 3) with 

each person 

– Avoid reading cards during discussions 

– The objective is to discover individual’s roles 

and concerns, and understand their reality ‘on 

the ground’ regarding asset integrity or other 

safety issues 

– Any identified issues should be fed back to 

the relevant line or organising manager for 

consideration 



48

4 

Summary 

HSSE Management Tour Briefing Cards (continued) 

• Related documents and tools which may also 

be referred to include: 

– BG Safety Behaviours 

– BG Asset Integrity Management standard 

and guideline 

– BG Safety Case standard and guideline 

– BG Asset Integrity Toolkit (https://www.bgassetintegrity.com/content/#) 

– BG Safety Engineering and Asset Integrity 

Community (via BG Connect) 

Comments and suggestions on these 

briefing cards are welcome. If you have 

any questions or comments, email 

box.assetintegrity@bg-group.com 

49

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This booklet is part of a training programme that asset 

managers and senior supervisors should undertake to 

aid them in conducting successful HSSE management 

tours. The details on how this training should be 

delivered can be found in the BG Guideline, Guide to 

HSSE Management Tours, BG-GL-HSSE-EFF-524. 



70

www.bg-group.com 

BG Group 

Thames Valley Park 

Reading 

Berkshire 

RG6 1PT 

United Kingdom 

Tel: +44 (0) 118 935 3222 

Fax: +44 (0) 118 935 3484 

Registered in England & Wales No. 3690065 

© BG Group 2011 

Published June 2011 

71

HSSE Management Tours - BG Group

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