The Audacity of Hope

near the number of Arabic-speakers needed to build trust with the local population. We
needed to improve cultural sensitivity within U.S. forces, develop long-term
relationships with local leaders, and couple security forces to reconstruction teams, so
that Iraqis could see concrete benefits from U.S. efforts. All this would take time, he
said, but he could already see changes for the better as the military adopted these
practices throughout the country.
Our escort officer signaled that the chopper was ready to take off. I wished the major
luck and headed for the van. Mark came up beside me, and I asked him what he’d
learned from his conversation with the senior officer.
“I asked him what he thought we needed to do to best deal with the situation.”
“What did he say?”
“Leave.”
THE STORY OF America’s involvement in Iraq will be analyzed and debated for many
years to come—indeed, it’s a story that’s still being written. At the moment, the
situation there has deteriorated to the point where it appears that a low-grade civil war
has begun, and while I believe that all Americans—regardless of their views on the
original decision to invade—have an interest in seeing a decent outcome in Iraq, I
cannot honestly say that I am optimistic about Iraq’s short-term prospects.
I do know that at this stage it will be politics—the calculations of those hard,
unsentimental men with whom I had dinner—and not the application of American force
that determines what happens in Iraq. I believe as well that our strategic goals at this
point should be well defined: achieving some semblance of stability in Iraq, ensuring
that those in power in Iraq are not hostile to the United States, and preventing Iraq from
becoming a base for terrorist activity. In pursuit of these goals, I believe it is in the
interest of both Americans and Iraqis to begin a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops by the
end of 2006, although how quickly a complete withdrawal can be accomplished is a
matter of imperfect judgment, based on a series of best guesses—about the ability of the
Iraqi government to deliver even basic security and services to its people, the degree to
which our presence drives the insurgency, and the odds that in the absence of U.S.
troops Iraq would descend into all-out civil war. When battle-hardened Marine officers
suggest we pull out and skeptical foreign correspondents suggest that we stay, there are
no easy answers to be had.
Still, it’s not too early to draw some conclusions from our actions in Iraq. For our
difficulties there don’t just arise as a result of bad execution. They reflect a failure of
conception. The fact is, close to five years after 9/11 and fifteen years after the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the United States still lacks a coherent national security policy.
Instead of guiding principles, we have what appear to be a series of ad hoc decisions,
with dubious results. Why invade Iraq and not North Korea or Burma? Why intervene
in Bosnia and not Darfur? Are our goals in Iran regime change, the dismantling of all
Iranian nuclear capability, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, or all three? Are we
committed to use force wherever there’s a despotic regime that’s terrorizing its