79. This quantified modelling approach and resultant timings are very influential on thinking, policy and <strong>the</strong> planning <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong> safety services. For example, <strong>the</strong>y underpin <strong>the</strong> assumptions made in <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong> cover by <strong>the</strong> FRS. However, in relation to dwelling/HMO <strong>fire</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> evidence from real <strong>fire</strong>s does not seem to accord well with <strong>the</strong> models in predicting <strong>fire</strong> behaviour. It has been seen that many <strong>fire</strong>s do not develop beyond <strong>the</strong> item first ignited, and <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> larger <strong>fire</strong>s is decreasing. 80. As <strong>the</strong> data shows <strong>the</strong> trend in <strong>fire</strong> development to be dynamic (e.g. <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> size is decreasing), test <strong>fire</strong> conditions and modelling should be regularly reviewed, and cross-referenced to real <strong>fire</strong> data to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir representativeness and appropriateness. This should include <strong>the</strong> known influence <strong>of</strong> human behaviour and activity in relation to <strong>fire</strong> behaviour. Many tests fail to incorporate this and present a potentially false model in which <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> and building alone are presented as <strong>the</strong> key and unconstrained determinants <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong> development. This can lead to worst case and atypical results being misrepresented as a standard and common scenarios. This has serious and <strong>of</strong>ten harmful repercussions on subsequent thinking and practice. The average FRS response time is increasing 81. In England, <strong>the</strong> average response time to primary <strong>fire</strong>s in 2018/19 was 8 minutes and 49 seconds. This is an increase <strong>of</strong> 11 seconds since 2017/18 and 33 seconds since 2013/14. 82. The latest published average response time for a dwelling <strong>fire</strong> in England is 7 minutes and 47 seconds which is a one-second improvement on <strong>the</strong> previous year but an increase <strong>of</strong> 18 seconds since 2013/14, and a significant increase from <strong>the</strong> 5 minutes and 33 second average recorded in 1994/95. 83. The response time is a longstanding and important measure for <strong>the</strong> FRS, which is used as a proxy for effectiveness. It is assumed that <strong>the</strong> quicker <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional emergency response, <strong>the</strong> better <strong>the</strong> outcome, and this is a key factor for planning emergency cover. 84. However, caution is suggested in <strong>the</strong> application and interpretation <strong>of</strong> this measure, as it is, in many ways, misleading and insufficient on its own. It assumes that <strong>the</strong> public, on becoming aware <strong>of</strong> a possible or actual <strong>fire</strong>, immediately call 999. Studies refute this, demonstrating that <strong>the</strong> public are active and calling 999 is <strong>the</strong>ir penultimate action, although in <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> dwelling/HMO <strong>fire</strong>s <strong>the</strong>y do not need to do so. 85. There is also an assumption or expectation that, <strong>the</strong> public, having called 999 and exited <strong>the</strong> dwelling/HMO, will wait passively until <strong>the</strong> FRS arrives. Again, studies demonstrate this to be untrue, with <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong>ten remaining active, including re-entering <strong>the</strong> property. As data is not routinely collected on <strong>the</strong>se public actions and interventions, it is not possible to fully understand <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>fire</strong> development and <strong>the</strong> response time. 86. A fur<strong>the</strong>r caveat is that <strong>the</strong> response time simply means <strong>the</strong> first appliance arrived at <strong>the</strong> scene. For a dwelling/HMO <strong>fire</strong>, at least two appliances will typically be mobilised, and <strong>the</strong> time until <strong>the</strong> full required attendance is at <strong>the</strong> scene is not published. As such, <strong>the</strong> response time does not provide any insight into how long after arrival after <strong>the</strong> first appliance it takes for <strong>the</strong> FRS to have sufficient resources present to carry out any meaningful interventions. This is compounded by <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> any published data regarding <strong>the</strong> post-arrival 17 activity and performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> FRS.
87. As set out above, <strong>the</strong> correlation between response time and specific outcomes is questionable and not established by <strong>the</strong> available data, which fails to provide a complete picture. That is not so much an argument against <strong>the</strong> response time, but recognition that on its own, it provides little in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> meaningful information to predict <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> a dwelling/HMO <strong>fire</strong>. O<strong>the</strong>r important data is required to achieve this. 18 6
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