An evaluation of the role of fire extinguishers

97. Instead, they need different interventions to keep them safe, and are better served by enhanced
fire prevention measures or automated protection in the event of a fire, e.g. sprinklers. However,
they are excluded as potential extinguisher users for the purpose of this report.
98. Literature and guidance do not adequately recognise that this is a relatively small and specific risk
group. Instead, there seems to be an implicit assumption that everyone starts with an equal risk of
dying in a fire, and only an intervention of some sort prevents them all from that fate. This can be
seen where fire safety messaging to the general public still relays the ‘Fire Kills’ message
suggesting everyone is at risk of this outcome.
99. Fortunately, most people encountering a fire will avoid any injury or will be exposed to a low, and
often considered risk of a minor injury at worst. This is not a matter of luck but due to a
combination of their own abilities and to the low level of risk presented by most fires.
100. This is even allowing for the fact that compared to other fire types attended by the FRS, accidental
dwelling fires are responsible for a disproportional number of injuries. They account for between
8% and 20% of all fires but are responsible for between 58% and 70% of all fire-related injuries and
deaths. This trend has been consistent for many years and suggests a failure of policy for this
group. Whilst the likelihood of having a dwelling fire has decreased, the potential for it to cause an
injury has not altered. This may again suggest the need to rethink the current reliance on a
professional response model rather than an integrated model that works with the public by design.
101. However, the total number of injuries has been falling for many years. Dwelling fires attended by
the FRS in 2018/19 accounted for 5,239 non-fatal injuries compared to 5,458 in the preceding year
and 7,455 in 2008/09. This is at least partly explained by the decrease in the overall number of
dwelling fires which has led to a related drop in injuries. Unlike fatalities, the circumstances leading
to an injury are rarely, if ever, recorded meaning little is known about how they are incurred
102. As the FRS only attends 20%–30% of all dwelling fires, its data does not provide a true or full
means by which to assess the risks associated with a dwelling/HMO fire. For that, the EHS and BCS
are useful additions as their random sampling means that it includes both fires attended by the
FRS and those dealt with by the public. Their data identifies that between 89% and 93% of the
dwelling fires resulted in no injuries at all. Where an injury occurred, it was most likely to be due to
smoke inhalation with burns/scalds being another reported, but lower frequency type of injury.
103. Headline injury trends from 2018-19 FRS data identify that there were 2 fatalities in communal
living premises and 279 non-fatal casualties.
104. A 2015 study identified that there was a disconnect between the government/FRS and the public
in terms of what they referred to as ‘risk tolerance’. This was most evident in attitude to injuries.
Official policy seems to place avoidance of any injury as its highest priority and assumes this to also
be the public’s main motivation and enough to dictate any response to the discovery of a
dwelling/HMO fire. However, the same study found that almost all those who incurred a minor
injury accepted it as a reasonable cost in relation to pursuing or achieving their personal priorities.
Further, they stated, in hindsight, they would do the same again.
105. This willingness of the public to accept minor injuries to protect loved ones, the home or
its contents is understandable. This may, on the face of it, seem problematic for
services trying to avoid this outcome. But the literature and data show these to be well
established behaviours which policy makers need to work with, rather than against.
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