An evaluation of the role of fire extinguishers
A report considering the role of a fire extinguisher in human terms identifying the gap between policy assumptions and the evidence from real fires. It considers the implications arising from this and makes a number of recommendations to create an evidence base and enhance current fire safety policies/advice.
A report considering the role of a fire extinguisher in human terms identifying the gap between policy assumptions and the evidence from real fires. It considers the implications arising from this and makes a number of recommendations to create an evidence base and enhance current fire safety policies/advice.
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233. Training in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong> <strong>extinguishers</strong> is a discretionary and not mandatory requirement, and its<br />
contribution towards reducing <strong>the</strong> potential risk <strong>of</strong> using one or enhancing <strong>the</strong> ability to tackle a<br />
<strong>fire</strong> is not clear. In fact, available studies and research find high rates <strong>of</strong> untrained people safely<br />
and effectively using <strong>extinguishers</strong>. This issue matters because some guidance states that<br />
extinguisher access should be restricted or even denied where those present are not trained.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> evidence about <strong>the</strong> public ability, <strong>fire</strong> characteristics and increasing FRS response times,<br />
this seems hard to justify practically or ethically. Options exist to make relevant information more<br />
accessible to everyone and not just via formal courses. Alternatively, real-time and on demand<br />
support could be given to reduce any risks. But <strong>the</strong>ir potential for use by untrained personnel is<br />
not a viable justification to deny <strong>the</strong> public access to <strong>extinguishers</strong>.<br />
Recommendations 5 and 6<br />
234. Social science and customer perspectives need to be better represented in <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> safety sector,<br />
informing both guidance and practice, including those in relation to <strong>fire</strong> <strong>extinguishers</strong>.<br />
235. The requirement for, and <strong>role</strong> <strong>of</strong> training in relation to <strong>extinguishers</strong> needs to be reviewed. <strong>An</strong>y<br />
claims made about <strong>the</strong> critical <strong>role</strong> <strong>of</strong> training should be supported with evidence or rescinded.<br />
Research and data<br />
Findings<br />
236. The <strong>fire</strong> sector attracts little and sporadic academic interest, resulting in many knowledge gaps or<br />
thin evidence.<br />
237. Data collection represents institutional interests and <strong>the</strong>re is little data relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
customer/public experience. This is compounded by data silos resulting from multiple<br />
stakeholders.<br />
Discussion<br />
238. The recognition that <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> sector attracts limited academic interest is not new but is reemphasised.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> demise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national facility, <strong>the</strong>re have been many attempts to create a<br />
research strategy and capability, but none have been realised. This increasingly places <strong>the</strong><br />
effectiveness and credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sector at risk and undermines any aspiration to be<br />
demonstrably evidence-based. It also leaves <strong>the</strong> sector unable to meaningfully exploit new and<br />
transformative technologies such as AI and machine learning. More importantly, it leaves <strong>the</strong><br />
public exposed to avoidable risks and harm through <strong>the</strong> failure to collate, assess and disseminate<br />
knowledge.<br />
239. Institutionally biased and siloed data collection means <strong>the</strong> public experience is almost invisible to<br />
policymakers and o<strong>the</strong>r pr<strong>of</strong>essionals. In place <strong>of</strong> knowledge, assumptions are made. Good<br />
practice would, as a minimum, see <strong>the</strong>se made explicit as <strong>the</strong>y represent unverified beliefs and<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore cannot be relied upon. Better still, <strong>the</strong> opportunity to collect relevant data through<br />
routine activities (including dwelling/HMO <strong>fire</strong>s) should be exploited to both inform and<br />
evaluate interventions.<br />
240. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> sector is not unique in facing <strong>the</strong>se challenges, and, if <strong>the</strong> will were<br />
<strong>the</strong>re, quick progress would be possible by learning from o<strong>the</strong>r sectors. Concepts such<br />
as <strong>the</strong> ‘What Works’ centres may be replicable in part or at reduced scale.<br />
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