The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas - El Camino ...

110 The Person
The early Franciscan school often used this definition, and it is still the
primary one for St Bonaventure.36 St Thomas was quite well aware that
God is eminent in dignity or, rather, ‘surpasses every dignity’. He does not
oppose the Master’s definition, but it is only interesting to him as an evocative
allusion; it does not have the wealth or precision of that of Boethius.
The third traditional definition comes from Richard of Saint-Victor: a
person is ‘an incommunicable existence of divine nature’.37 Richard substituted
this definition for Boethius’, because, in his opinion, Boethius’ definition
leads one to conceive the divine substance as a person and thus creates a
confusion between the common substance and the distinct Three in God.
This is why Richard’s definition indicates what distinguishes the persons (the
principle of ‘individuation’), that is, the ex-sistere (indicating directly the
origin from another; holding his existence from someone) which is incommunicable
(the distinct singularity and irreducible singularity of the person).
In addition, Richard replaced the adjective ‘reason’ with a conditioning
quality, ‘divine’. The accuracy of Richard’s criticisms is debatable, since for
Boethius divine substance is not an ‘individual substance’ in the meaning
which his definition of person gives it,38 and the note of incommunicability is
expressed by the notion of ‘individual’. However that may be, very many
theologians united around Richard’s objections. In every quarter, even
amongst those who retained Boethius’ definition, the criticisms attracted
great attention. One still finds traces of them in Albert, who judges that ‘as
Boethius defines it, the person does not fit into God, unless one explains
substance in the sense of existence, as Richard puts it’.39 Bonaventure, who
was likewise receptive to Boethius’ definition, explains that it applies as much
to creatures as to God, whereas Richard’s applies exclusively to God: the
Franciscan master concludes that one can say that Richard’s definition uses
language ‘more appropriately’.40
nobilitatem pertinens’ (I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8). St Albert the Great observed that ‘The
masters got their definition by way of a comparison with social values or civil functions’ (Albert,
I Sent. d. 25, a. 1 in fine).
36 See Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 1.
37 Richard of Saint-Victor, De Trinitate, Book IV, ch. 22 (SC 63, pp. 280–283): ‘naturae
divinae incommunicabilis exsistentia’. This definition has lately given rise to several anachronistic
interpretations of Richard’s idea. For the Victorine, the definition is based on the concept of
nature and also implies the notion of substance, for ‘the word existence signifies substantial
being’ (Book IV, ch. 23; SC 63, pp. 282–283); cf. N. Den Bok, Communicating the Most High: A
Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the theology of Richard of St. Victor (1 1173), Paris and
Turnhout, 1996.
38 Cf. Schlapkohl, Persona, pp. 150–151, 155. 39 Albert, I Sent. d. 25, a. 1.
40 Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Although the Scotist definition of person is not
identical to Richard’s, Duns Scotus takes over Richard of Saint Victor’s definition and his
critique of Boethius (see Schlapkohl, Persona, pp. 155–169; F. Wetter, Die Trinitätslehre des
Johannes Duns Scotus, Münster, 1967, pp. 272–273).