Fla. Stat, (1981) - Florida State University College of Law

likewise improper for the State Attorney to place himself in a testhnial
capaciq and give evidence to the jury as to how many cases he prosecutes,
in an effort to dispel the indication of coached witnesses. (T. 2252).
See Richmnd v. State, 387 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980); G l a s m
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v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1979); Rmani v. State, 429
So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1983).
5). It is inproper for the prosecuting attorney ta carmvent upon the role
or tactics of defense counsel in an effort to cast doubt on the integrity
of the defense. Cmhran v. - State, 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st. D.C.A. 1973);
Smon v. State, 352 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977); --
Rx!d v. State,
333 So. 2d 524 (Fla, 1st D.C.A. 1976). Here the prosecutor accused
defense counsel of intentionally giving a vague opening statmt and then
mnstructing the defendant's testbny around the state's case. (T. 2140-
2141). The court magnified the error by describing the corrsn3nt as
"proper". (T. 2141). The prosecutor made a very similar xgurrutnt in
Hufham v, State, 400 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981). Unlike the
present case, reversal was not required inHufhm because of the lack of
proper objection; the argument was ruled to be hrpro,w. Id., at 136.
See also, Dyson v. US., 450 A. 2d 432 (D.C. 1982).
_I
?he State Attorney continued his personal attack upon defense counsel
by characterizing counsel's summation (which was delivered without object-
ion) as inproper conduct for a lawyer, stating that defense munsel had
deliberately disobeyed an order of the court, and arguing that counsel
had gone too far "in his zeal to get this killer off". (T. 2253). In
carter v. - State, 356 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 19781, the prosecutor
accused defense counsel of trying to mislead the jury and of being
''ahmst criminal" herself. In reversing the conviction, the appellate
co&'s language is equally relevant here:
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