Fla. Stat, (1981) - Florida State University College of Law

More documents

Recommendations

Info

officers who had their guns. dram, IT, 207-2081 with Xs gun drawn, told him to put his hands upr and handcuffed hjm. (T. 208) After he was handcuffed, a uniformed officer searched him, (T, 208-2091 Before the defendant was placed in the back seat of a patrol car, he was told that he was under arrest. (T, 200, 209). a patrol car and sat there while Bradley talked to Spencer Hance, who was also at the junkyard. (T. 200). After talking With Hance, Bradley went back to the patrol car, sat in the front seat, and began talking to the defendant. (T. 200-201). Bradley approadxd the de€endant The defendant was placed in the back of It is undisputed that neither Detective Bradley my anyone else had advised the defendant of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U,S. 436, (1966). (T. 201-202, 210). The detective sumnarized the facts of the aggravated assault incident as he knew them. (T. 209-210). response to this s m , against him in trial. (T. 201, 203-204-1650). the defendant made the statements that were introduced In Miranda, supra, the~supreme Court of the kited States established the procedural safeguards to be eng3loyed prior to the admission into evidence of any statmts of an accused Made while in police custody: (W)e hold that when an individual is takm into cus2;ody or otherwise deprivd of his freedm by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective mans are adopted to mtify the person drf his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following rneasures are rquired, He must lx warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to m i n silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will hz appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires, Ibid, at 478-479. The prosecution in the lower court contended that there was no questioning of the defendant, so the statmmts were admissible wen though no M.iranda warnings were given. (T, 216-217), Such an argument ignores the fact that Wanda is not limited to express questionb-ig by plice of a suspect in custody. Page -64- In
The United States Supre court has stated the test ta be applied under such circumstances: Tt is clear therefore that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Mirmda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custdy is subjected to interrogation. l'Interrogation'', as oonceptualized in niranda opinion, must reflect a measure of cqdsion above a n m d that inherent in custody itself. We conclude that the Miranda safeguards c m into play whenever a person in custdy im&d to either express questioning or its functional equivalent, mat is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those nomlly attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should knaw are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response f m the suspect. m e Island v. - Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689- 90 (1980). - The term "incriminating respnse" means any response, inculpatory or exculpt~ry, that the prosecution may seek to intrduce at trial. Innis, supra, at 1689, footnote 5. Here, Detective Bradley did not advise the defendant of his rights when the defendant was arrested, handcuffed, searched,and placed in a patrol car. He instead walked away and interviewed a witness, then returned and began speaking to the defendant. He did much mre than sinply advise the defendant he was under arrest for aggravated assault. as he believed them to be. "reasonably likely" to elicit an incriminating response. He gave the defendant a sum~lry of the facts %is is previsely the sort of statemnt that is confronted by a description of the c r h he has been arrested for, will nomlly be to deny, explain, or adnit one or mre of the facts described, The reaction of sawone advised of his rights could the defendant be expected to make an intelligent decision as to whether to respond to the allegations made by the detective, Without being told that any response will be used against him, the average Only after being citizen would feel corrrpelled to give sane respnse. A similar interrogation tactic was utilized by a &ice officer in - Jon& - v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla, 2nd D,C.A. 1977). In J?n?s, the defendant, after being'advised of his rights, asked to talk to his attorney. The officer
Page 1 and 2:
RPPEAL FffQM THE CIRCUIT COURIT OF
Page 3 and 4:
V TRIAL COuIiT EXRED IN FAILING TO
Page 5 and 6:
UNRELATED O??F'ENSE AS EVIDENCE OF
Page 7 and 8:
ACEEY. mm, 33tlTo~7"T% (Fla. 4th ;D
Page 9 and 10:
c?JME3IEV. smm 345 So. 2 d m CURRYV
Page 11 and 12:
i%W'HW v. STATE j// So'.' 2d 7807Fl
Page 13 and 14:
MCMILLANV. smm 4119 So. 2d 1-la. 3r
Page 15 and 16:
0 PRamCE v. STATE 337 So, 2d 7 n l
Page 17 and 18:
mmv, STATE 2d =la. 1st D.C.A, 1982)
Page 19 and 20:
0 INTRODUCTION The appellant, Fbber
Page 21 and 22:
of Other Crbs, Wrongs, or Acts. (R.
Page 23 and 24:
0 (T. 1128-1129).crooVer said nothi
Page 25 and 26:
0 going to kill "the mther fucker",
Page 27 and 28:
this would alleviate any problem be
Page 29 and 30:
took out his knife and stabbed Padg
Page 31 and 32: (T, 1342-1343). mng's rmther disapp
Page 33 and 34: he said it, "nobdy paid any mbd to
Page 35 and 36: told the defendant to "back off". (
Page 37 and 38: and said, Yh ny God". (T. 1260). tw
Page 39 and 40: out of the cay. and walked around b
Page 41 and 42: WHEXFER THE THE JUHI UPON THE LAW Q
Page 43 and 44: IX X WHlTIWB THE TRIAL ERRED IN m I
Page 45 and 46: XVIII WHEXfER THE TRUG COUW: FBRED
Page 47 and 48: they were afraid of being killed by
Page 49 and 50: ut munsel could not argue it becaus
Page 51 and 52: to the co-defendant, who continued
Page 53 and 54: participate in the killing, 2. If t
Page 55 and 56: Brother Caps. (T. 1185) (4). the de
Page 57 and 58: So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
Page 59 and 60: EXPW AND JTETIFY PLEA BARWWNG WITH
Page 61 and 62: type of rebuke counsel received. on
Page 63 and 64: utilized the stature of his office
Page 65 and 66: likewise improper for the State Att
Page 67 and 68: Payment of mney to a witness for an
Page 69 and 70: the prosecutor informed a juror onc
Page 71 and 72: the fiream or threatened Padgett wi
Page 73 and 74: from the operation of discowry rule
Page 75 and 76: I resides. Stanley, supra; - Florid
Page 77 and 78: Pernutting the reputation testby. o
Page 79 and 80: little probative value w kn it is c
Page 81: - The fact that a defendant refused
Page 85 and 86: 'BE general rule is that statements
Page 87 and 88: The general rule is that a witness'
Page 89 and 90: any person the defense "expects to
Page 91 and 92: CR, 6167 T, 58-7 Penalty (R. 16-31
Page 93 and 94: Sheppard's necklace and ring me tak
Page 95 and 96: (-TT* 1032, 10491. An execution-sty
Page 97 and 98: (5) W ilm Urgmn, the defendant's si
Page 99 and 100: The defense also argued for mitigat
Page 101 and 102: mitigating circumstance in a capita
Page 103: CFRI'IFICATE OF SERVTCE I HEREBY CE
show all

Fla. Stat, (1981) - Florida State University College of Law

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?