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Ethnocentric vs. Regiocentric Consolidation in the Aerospace and

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company “blend<strong>in</strong>g strategic <strong>in</strong>terests with regional <strong>in</strong>tegration / national sensitivity”. 9 Hayward<br />

co<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>se concepts of ethnocentric <strong>vs</strong>. regiocentric A&D <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>in</strong>tegration dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> crucial<br />

1997-1998 period: after <strong>the</strong> BMD merger but before <strong>the</strong> creation of EADS. Like <strong>the</strong> creation of<br />

BMD <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, Europe’s transnational EADS merger can also be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by a<br />

predom<strong>in</strong>antly realist analytical framework. By pool<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir major A&D assets <strong>in</strong>to one company,<br />

France, Germany, <strong>and</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> were try<strong>in</strong>g to foster <strong>the</strong> creation of an economically <strong>and</strong><br />

technologically competitive European champion that would be able to survive <strong>the</strong> onslaught of <strong>the</strong><br />

emerg<strong>in</strong>g American mega-primes.<br />

For <strong>the</strong> French <strong>and</strong> German private sector A&D firms (Lagardère <strong>and</strong> DCX 10 ) negotiat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />

EADS deal, <strong>the</strong> merger was primarily about improv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir relative <strong>in</strong>ternational competitiveness<br />

by ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> critical mass necessary to realise economies of scale that could only be reached by<br />

go<strong>in</strong>g beyond <strong>the</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g “national champions”. Nei<strong>the</strong>r French nor German<br />

bus<strong>in</strong>ess leaders <strong>in</strong>volved had any <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> EADS merger foster a “Fortress America”<br />

<strong>vs</strong>. “Fortress Europe” trade confrontation. Escalat<strong>in</strong>g protectionist sentiment on both sides<br />

potentially risked severely hurt<strong>in</strong>g EADS’s bottom l<strong>in</strong>e. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, corporate A&D leaders <strong>in</strong><br />

Germany, France, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> UK shared a strong desire to ga<strong>in</strong> access to <strong>the</strong> lucrative American<br />

defence procurement market.<br />

From <strong>the</strong> perspective of Europe’s political leaders, especially those <strong>in</strong> France <strong>and</strong> Germany, <strong>the</strong><br />

rapid ethnocentric consolidation of <strong>the</strong> US A&D <strong>in</strong>dustry appeared to be part of America’s<br />

ambition to preserve its post-Cold War superpower status <strong>and</strong> prevent <strong>the</strong> rise of any potential peer<br />

competitors (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g NATO allies). Several factors both external <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal to <strong>the</strong> EU<br />

(European Union) spurred <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent’s two lead<strong>in</strong>g powers – <strong>the</strong> Franco-German eng<strong>in</strong>e – to<br />

venture <strong>in</strong>to a political, strategic, <strong>and</strong> military territory (i.e., <strong>the</strong> EADS merger) where nei<strong>the</strong>r one of<br />

<strong>the</strong>m, nor any o<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, had gone before. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1990s, with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

threat gone <strong>and</strong> America emerg<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> world’s sole superpower, one witnessed transatlantic<br />

tensions over a number of issues, rang<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> ICC <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kyoto Protocol to <strong>the</strong> EU’s attempt<br />

to build its own security <strong>and</strong> defence capability outside of NATO. The ESDP effort, <strong>in</strong> particular,<br />

raised American suspicions that Europe was no longer merely a major economic competitor –<br />

someth<strong>in</strong>g that had already triggered US concerns <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s <strong>and</strong> 1970s – but was now also try<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to position itself as a strategic competitor <strong>and</strong> possible counterweight to Wash<strong>in</strong>gton.<br />

idea (especially regard<strong>in</strong>g a potential merger with BAe) as <strong>the</strong> military had a strong <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> foster<strong>in</strong>g more<br />

competition for US defence bids <strong>in</strong> an effort to get “more bang for <strong>the</strong> buck”. Hamre (2007)<br />

9 Hayward (1999) p. 9<br />

10 DCX = DaimlerChrysler Corporation<br />

14

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