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Ethnocentric vs. Regiocentric Consolidation in the Aerospace and

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share with <strong>the</strong> [US] congruent <strong>and</strong> reciprocal policies <strong>in</strong> export controls, <strong>in</strong>dustrial security,<br />

<strong>in</strong>telligence, law enforcement, <strong>and</strong> reciprocity <strong>in</strong> market access.” 173<br />

Due to wide-spread US doubts about <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of Europe’s defence export <strong>and</strong> technology<br />

transfer regimes, any attempt by European companies to make direct <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> vast <strong>and</strong><br />

highly lucrative American defence market is generally viewed with a mix of suspicion <strong>and</strong> hostility.<br />

The Committee on Foreign Investment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States (CFIUS) is <strong>the</strong> key <strong>in</strong>stitution to<br />

evaluate <strong>the</strong> potential impact of any FDI on America’s national security posture. 174 In <strong>the</strong> aerospace<br />

sector, <strong>the</strong> Pentagon normally takes <strong>the</strong> lead <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r FDI / M&As <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g an<br />

American company could potentially underm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> country’s military-technological position by<br />

creat<strong>in</strong>g new vulnerabilities <strong>and</strong> dependencies. CFIUS reviews <strong>in</strong>volve an analysis of how <strong>the</strong><br />

planned transactions would affect <strong>the</strong> American aerospace <strong>in</strong>dustry’s ability to <strong>in</strong>dependently meet<br />

<strong>the</strong> country’s national defence requirements. CFIUS can ei<strong>the</strong>r be notified by any of <strong>the</strong> parties<br />

<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> planned transaction, or it may itself decide to review <strong>the</strong> FDI / M&A. Once CFIUS<br />

has been notified, at least three Committee members must decide with<strong>in</strong> 30 days that a formal<br />

review of <strong>the</strong> case is warranted. If <strong>the</strong> answer is ‘yes’, CFIUS has ano<strong>the</strong>r 45 days to review <strong>the</strong><br />

transaction <strong>and</strong> make a recommendation to <strong>the</strong> President on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> operation should be cleared<br />

or blocked. F<strong>in</strong>ally, it is up to <strong>the</strong> President to decide with<strong>in</strong> 15 days whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> transaction can go<br />

ahead or not. While <strong>the</strong> vast majority of CFIUS decisions across <strong>the</strong> different <strong>in</strong>dustry sectors are<br />

made ra<strong>the</strong>r quickly, large-scale (aerospace) M&As consume significant time <strong>and</strong> resources <strong>and</strong><br />

tend to attract unwanted political attention from members of <strong>the</strong> US Congress prone to lobby<strong>in</strong>g by<br />

<strong>in</strong>terested third parties.<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, European aerospace companies generally face tough obstacles to sell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir products on<br />

<strong>the</strong> lucrative US defence market. The Pentagon’s acquisition policy favours American over<br />

European / foreign companies, whose management, technology base, production facilities <strong>and</strong><br />

supply cha<strong>in</strong>s are at an elevated risk of potential political <strong>and</strong> economic pressure / <strong>in</strong>terference by<br />

foreign governments <strong>and</strong> companies. This ‘Fortress America’ approach is partly mirrored by a<br />

‘Fortress Europe’ defence acquisition policy. However, European defence markets are generally<br />

much more open to US companies than vice versa – not least because American A&D companies<br />

can often deliver proven high technology products at more competitive prices <strong>and</strong> delivery dates<br />

than <strong>the</strong>ir rivals from Europe <strong>and</strong> elsewhere. In addition, advanced arms sales do always have an<br />

173 AECA section 38<br />

174 CFIUS, formed <strong>in</strong> 1975, is chaired by <strong>the</strong> Treasury Secretary <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> Secretaries of Defense, State <strong>and</strong><br />

Commerce, <strong>the</strong> Attorney General, <strong>the</strong> OMB Director, <strong>the</strong> USTR, <strong>the</strong> Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Economic Advisers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> several o<strong>the</strong>r government representatives.<br />

46

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