Ethnocentric vs. Regiocentric Consolidation in the Aerospace and

82 designed to move from “an industrial age to an information age military” with fundamentally
joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects
across the battle-space. 83 Industrial-age warfare in WWI and WWII was characterised by large-
scale battles. Achieving quantitative superiority by out-producing the enemy in terms of tanks,
ships, planes, bombers, etc. was key to victory. In contrast, victory in information-age wars is
dependent on the combination of superior intelligence / reconnaissance information and the timely
projection of accurate, massive firepower. 84 Information-age warfare leverages aerospace
technology to first gather intelligence (through satellites, etc.) and then strike from a “safe”
distance. 85
Kosovo may well be the first war won through air power only. 86 In Afghanistan, America
maximised the accuracy of its air strikes by inserting special forces with Afghan militias to allow
for the targeted, laser-guided destruction of enemy forces. In Iraq, the Pentagon launched massive
aerial bombardments followed by armoured Blitzkrieg operations. However, while airpower played
a crucial role in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, subsequent counterinsurgency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the importance of having “boots on the ground” to
stabilize a country after the high tech / high-intensity fighting is over. The future role of airpower in
(US) military strategy continues to be the subject of heated debate. 87 Proponents of air power will
also need to show how it can effectively contribute to the fight against terrorists and WMD 88
proliferation.
82 RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) is “a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which
either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies in a dominant player, or creates one or more new
core competencies in some dimension of warfare, or both”. Hundley (1999) p. xiii
83 DoD (2003) pp. 9-11
84 “Arguably the most important single proposition influencing contemporary American strategic thought in both
official and unofficial circles is the identification of information as the key factor in military operations”. Freedman
(2006) pp. 16-17
85 The political vulnerability of Western leaders to troop casualties coupled with clear Western air superiority have
created the “temptation of air power” as a “virtually risk-free military option”. Freedman (2006) pp. 61-65
86 During the 1991 Gulf War only 10 percent of the bombs used in the US-led coalition air campaign were precisionguided
weapons; during the 1999 Kosovo War 90 percent of the bombs were guided by laser or GPS satellites. See
(Byman & Waxman, 2000) for a more cautious and nuanced assessment of airpower’s role during the Kosovo War.
87 “The US would not be the first apparently unbeatable military power to find itself undone by an inability to take
seriously or even to comprehend enemies that rely on their ability to emerge out of the shadows of civil society,
preferring minor skirmish to major battle, accepting no possibility for decisive victory but instead aiming to unsettle,
harass, demoralise, humiliate and eventually to wear down their opponents”. Freedman (2006) pp. 5-6
88 WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction
32