REMEMBRANCE IN TIME - Index of

Part I 

REMEMBRANCE 

IN TIME 

♦ COMMUNIST REGIMES – REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE 

♦ POLICIES OF COMMUNIST REGIMES 

♦ CONDEMNING COMMUNISM 

♦ EUROPE UNITED – REMEMBRANCE, RESPECT AND OPENING 

♦ EUROPEAN PROJECT “PAST MEMORY FOR A FUTURE OPEN 

SOCIETY” 

Part II 

Proceedings of the International Symposium 

COMMUNIST REGIMES – RECENT MEMORY FOR AN OPEN 

SOCIETY (in Romanian language)/ 

Lucrări susţinute la Simpozionul Internaţional 

REGIMURILE COMUNISTE – MEMORIE RECENTĂ PENTRU O 

SOCIETATE DESCHISĂ 

Editors: Elena HELEREA 

Gabriela MAILAT 

Florentin OLTEANU 

Transilvania University Press of Braşov 

2012

© 2012 EDITURA UNIVERSITĂłII TRANSILVANIA DIN BRAŞOV 

Adresa: 500091 Braşov, 

B-dul Iuliu Maniu 41A 

Tel:0268 – 476050 

Fax: 0268 476051 

E-mail : editura@unitbv.ro 

Toate drepturile rezervate. 

Editură acreditată de CNCSIS 

Adresa nr.1615 din 29 mai 2002 

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE 

• Liviu Alexandru SOFONEA – Braşov Subsidiary of CRIFST, Braşov, Romania 

• Florentin OLTEANU – Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania 

• Violeta PETROVA – St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko, Bulgaria 

• Szilvia SZASZ – Emlekpont Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary 

• Corneliu PINTILESCU – Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania 

TYPE SCRIPT AND LAYOUT 

Livia SÂNGEORZAN 

Maria BĂLAN 

Corina POP 

Zenovia PERCEC 

TRANSLATION 

Simona STEFONI 

Viviana MOLDOVAN 

Mihaela POPESCU 

Marciana STREZA 

ISBN 978-606-19-0134-0 

Tipărit la: 

Tipografia UniversităŃii 

Transilvania din Braşov 

B-dul Iuliu Maniu 41A 

Tel: 0268 – 476050 

Past Memory for a Future Open Society 

EU Project No. 520719-EFC-1-2011-1-RO-EFC-REM 

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects 

the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which 

may be made of the information contained therein.

CONTENT 

PART I 

1. COMMUNIST REGIMES – REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE 

THE GULAG – THROUGH THE EYES OF A SURVIVOR 

Péter BÁLÓ 

Museum Emlékpont, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary........................................................ 11 

ARCHIVAL FILES – RESEARCH SOURCES ON THE ISSUE 

OF RELIGIOUS-ABODE LIQUIDATION THROUGHOUT MSSR 

Manole BRIHUNEŢ 

National Museum of Ethnography and Natural History of Moldavia, 

Chişinău, Republic of Moldova ..............................................................................................15 

THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TORNYAI JÁNOS MUSEUM AND THE 

ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN HÓDMEZŐVÁSÁRHELY 

DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD (1945-1989) 

Viktor CSÁNYI 

Tornyai János Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary ................................................. 25 

THE GROUP OF IMMIGRANT ANARCHISTS THAT ACTED IN THE 

VICINITY OF PAVEL BANYA VILLAGE, KAZANLAK DISTRICT IN 

1953-1954 (DOCUMENTS FROM VELIKO TARNOVO STATE ARCHIVE) 

Lora DONCHEVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ............................ 31 

BULGARIAN LABOUR CAMP LITERATURE GENRE AND MEMORY 

Vladimir DONEV 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ............................ 43 

THE ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S COURT THROUGH SOME CASES 

OF HÓDMEZŐVÁSÁRHELY 

Csilla GÁL 

Museum Emlékpont, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary........................................................ 51 

LIVING BESIDE THE BERLIN WALL 

Lars HANEBERG 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany ................................................ 59 

HOMO JURIS - PROFESSOR ALEXANDRU HERLEA (1907-1979) 

Elena HELEREA 

Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania ................................................................. 67 

iii

A LIFE DEDICATED TO ROMANIAN UNITED CHURCH AND NATION – 

PRIESTS AND TEACHERS DR. AUREL LELUŢIU (1914 - 1980) 

Laura-Mihaela LELUŢIU 1 , Ovidiu-Constantin SAVU 2 

1 Transilvania University of Braşov, 

2 Casa Mureşenilor Museum of Brasov, Romania .......................................................... 77 

ASPECTS OF THE „CREATIVE RESISTANCE” IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA 

Manuela MARIN 

Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania ......................................................... 85 

A TYPICAL AGENT STORY FROM THE KADAR PERIOD 

Tamás MÉSZÁROS 

Museum Emlékpont, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary ....................................................... 93 

ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUCTURES IN THE COUNTY OF BIHOR: 

ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT ROMANIA (1947-1950) 

Gabriel MOISA 

University of Oradea, Romania ..................................................................................... 99 

SECRET COLLECTION, SPECIAL COLLECTION 

Daniel NAZARE 

George Bariţiu County Library of Braşov, Romania .................................................. 103 

THE DESTINY OF A VISIONAR – 

PHISICIAN DOCTOR ŞTEFAN ODOBLEJA (1902-1978) 

Ştefan ODOBLEJA jr 

,,Ştefan Odobleja” Foundation, Turnu Severin, Romania .......................................... 109 

IMAGES FROM THE ROMANIAN GULAG - RADU BERCEA 

Lucreţia OLTEANU 

Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania................................................ 115 

BULGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM SEPTEMBER 9, 1944 

UNTIL NOVEMBER 10, 1989 ABOUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE STATE POWER IN BULGARIA 

(1878-1912) 

Petko St. PETKOV 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria .......................... 125 

THE INTERROGATION STAGES, STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES OF 

THE SECURITATE (1948-1964). CASE STUDY: THE CLUJ REGIONAL 

DIRECTORATE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE 

Corneliu PINTILESCU 

Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania ....................................................... 131 

THE IMAGE AND BEYOND THE REAL-UNREAL COMBINATION IN 

THE RECONSTRUCTIONS ON THE COMMUNIST REGIME 

Nikolay POPPETROV 

National Academy of Art, Sofia, Bulgaria................................................................... 137 

iv

ROMANIA’S BAPTIST CHURCHES UNDER THE PERSECUTION OF THE 

COMMUNIST REGIME. REPLY AND RESISTANCE ACTIONS 

Marius SILVEŞAN 

Baptist Theological Institute, Bucharest, Romania ...................................................... 143 

THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH OF ROMANIA – DIFFERENT FORMS 

OF ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE 

Sergiu SOICA 

Romanian Academy, George Bariţiu History Institute, Cluj-Napoca, Romania ................... 153 

OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES OF THE LEGIONARY MOVEMENT DURING 

NOVEMBER 1947 – MAY 1948 

Ilarion ŢIU 

Christian University of Bucharest, Romania ............................................................... 159 

THE CHANGEOVER IN BULGARIA IN 1947 AS A FORM 

OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION 

Daniel VACHKOV 

Institute for Historical Studies – BAS, Sofia, Bulgaria ............................................... 167 

VAE VICTIS! RETALIATION, REVENGE AND COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT 

(THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY BETWEEN 1944 AND 1948) 

Gábor VINCZE 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary ........................................................ 171 

THE LITERARY CREATION AS AN ENDURANCE FORM IN ROMANIA 

DURING COMMUNISM - KNOWN CASES OF CENSORSHIP (1966-1971) 

Ion ZAINEA, Carmen UNGUR-BREHOI 

University of Oradea, Romania ...................................................................... 179 

2. POLICIES OF COMMUNIST REGIMES 

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AS A REGULATOR IN THE FIELD OF 

MONUMENTAL ARTS DURING THE SOCIALISM PERIOD 

Anelia ALEKSANDROVA 

National Academy of Art, Sofia, Bulgaria .............................................................................187 

PRIMATES OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH FROM R.S.S.M. AND SOVIET 

RELIGIOUS POLITICS DURING 1945 – 1962 

Romeo CEMÎRTAN 

National Museum of Etnography and Natural History of Moldavia, 

Chişinău, Republic of Moldova ..............................................................................................193 

TABĂRA NUNNERY UNDER THE SOVIET IDEOLOGY DOMINANCE 

Liliana CONDRATICOVA 

Institute of the Cultural Patrimony, Institute of Encyclopaedic Studies of Moldavia’s 

Academy of Sciences, Chişinău, Republic of Moldavia ........................................................203 

v

THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 

OF BULGARIA, REFLECTED IN THE CONSTITUTION 

DRAFTS BY THE OPPOSITION (1946–1947) 

Lora DONCHEVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ...............................213 

STATE INTERVENTION IN THE PERSONAL AND CULTURAL LIFE OF THE 

BULGARIAN TURKS DURING THE YEARS OF COMMUNIST REGIME 

Iliyana GANCHEVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ................................217 

THE OPERATIONS OF THE ROMANIAN RIVER FORCES 

DURING THE EVACUATION OF BESSARABIA (28-30 JUNE 1940) 

AND ITS LIBERATION (22 JUNE – JULY 1941) 

1 Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO, 1 Florin STAN, 2 Dan Ionel CIOCOIU 

1 Romanian Naval Museum, Constanţa, 

2 Major Staff of the Romanian Navy, Constanţa, Romania ...............................................223 

THE LENINIST ALIMENTARY DICTATORSHIP – THE MODEL 

FOR STALINIST HUNGERS OF 1931-1933 AND 1946-1947 

Vadim GUZUN 

Romanian Academy, George Bariţiu History Institute, Cluj-Napoca, Romania ................233 

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AS A TOOL IN THE HANDS 

OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITY 

Anka IGNATOVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria....................................243 

DIFFERENT GENERATIONS, DIFFERENT SHARED MEMORIES 

(a study of Turkish minority in Bulgaria memories) 

Margarita KARAMIHOVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ................................255 

DEMOCRATIC MACEDONIA – OUTSIDE` THE GRASP OF TITO 

Milen MIHOV 


BULGARIA AND THE BULGARIANS IN THE IDEOLOGY 

OF YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS 

Milen MIHOV 


ASPECTS AS REGARDS THE TRANSYLVANIAN SAXONS’ DEPORTATION 

FROM ŢARA FĂGĂRAŞULUI TO USSR 


Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania .........................................................275 

PRELIMINARY CONDERATIONS RELATED TO THE STRUCTURE 

OF THE AGRICULTURAL ESTATES IN FAGARAS COUNTY IN 1950 


Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania .........................................................285 

vi

MISSION OF THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, LANGUAGE 

AND LITERATURE IN RSS MOLDAVIA (1946–1953) 

Lidia PRISAC 

Institute of the Cultural Patrimony of Moldavia’s Academy of Sciences, 

Chisinau, Republic of Moldavia............................................................................................291 

PRIVATE PROPETY AS BASIC VALUE OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. 

BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE DURING THE TIME OF THE TARNOVO 

CONSTITUTION 

Nikolai PRODANOV 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria ...................................301 

PREPARATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HELD IN 1946 

Cristina ROMAN 

IICCMER, Bucharest, Romania .............................................................................................305 

STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT IN HUNGARY AND IN HÓDMEZŐVÁSÁRHELY 

Szilvia SASS 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary.............................................................. 313 

FALSIFICATION IS DEFENDED BY ANOTHER FALSIFICATION 

Mladen SRBINOVSKI 

Skopje, Republic of Macedonia ..............................................................................................321 

ROMANIA ECONOMIC OPENING TO THE WEST AND EXTERNAL 

DEBT CRISIS OF THE 80’S 

Liviu ŢĂRANU 

CNSAS, Bucharest, Romania ..................................................................................................325 

MONASTERY CLOSING CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT 

SOVIET MOLDAVIA (1944–1962) 

Ion XENOFONTOV 

Institute of Encyclopaedic Studies of Moldavia’s Academy of Sciences, 

Republic of Moldavia ..............................................................................................................331 

CELEBRATIONS AND RITUALS OF THE STUDENTS AT 

UNIVERSITY OF VELIKO TARNOVO (1963-1989) 

Mariya ZHELYAZKOVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo................................................... 341 

3. CONDEMNING COMMUNISM 

VALUABLE PIECES OF THE SAXON CIVILIZATION 

IN THE PATRIMONY OF THE FĂGĂRAŞ COUNTY MUSEUM 

Elena BĂJENARU 

Ţara Făgăraşului Museum, Făgăraş, România.................................................................... 347 

vii

8th AMENDMENT TO THE STASI RECORDS ACT OF 2011 

Jens BIENERT 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germania.......................................................351 

POSSIBILITIES TO RESEARCH COMMUNISM IN SEVERAL 

EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 

Péter BLAZOVICH 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary...............................................................359 

PERMANENT EXHIBITIONS IN BULGARIAN MEMORIAL MUSEUMS: 

POST-COMMUNIST NARRATIVES 

Vera BONEVA 

State University of Library Studies and Information Technologies, Sofia, Bulgaria ......... 365 

COJOCARU COMMISSION 

Viorica OLARU-CEMÎRTAN 

International Free University of Moldavia, Chişinău, Republic of Moldavia ....................371 

THE MUSEUM OF SOCIALIST ART IN BULGARIA AND ITS PUBLIC RESPONSE 

Anka IGNATOVA 


PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CASES OF ACCESS TO STASI FILES 

Brita A. MESTER, Sabrina ERKELING 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany ....................................................... 395 

THE MEMORY OF JOSIP BROZ TITO IN THE FORMER 

YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 

Milen MIHOV 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria................................... 403 

ZSUZSANNA LORÁNTFFY, COMENIUS AND FĂGĂRAŞ SCHOOL 

Florentin OLTEANU 1 , Elena HELEREA 2 , Viviana MOLDOVAN 3 

1 Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation Făgăraş, 2 Transilvania University of Braşov, 

3 Theoretical High School, Codlea, Romania ........................................................................407 

THE MEMORIAL MUSEUMS SITUATION AFTER THE 1990’S 

IN ROMANIA – MUSEUMS DEVOTED TO THE COMUNIST PERIOD 

Rozalinda POSEA 1 , Ovidiu SAVU 2 

1 History County Museum, Braşov 2 Casa Muresenilor Museum of Brasov, Romania ........415 

RESEARCH OF THE COMMUNIST PERIOD IN HÓDMEZŐVÁSÁRHELY – 

SOME LOCAL VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME 

Zoltán PRESZTÓCZKI 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary.............................................................. 425 

THE POST WAR ROMANIAN MILITARIES FROM EXILE 

AND CONDEMNATION OF COMMUNISM 

Mihaela TOADER 

Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory 

of the Romanian Exile, Bucureşti, România ..........................................................................429 

viii

THE MUNICH AGREEMENT OF 1938 SEEN THROUGH THE EYES 

OF MOHANDAS GANDHI, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU 

AND OTHER INDIAN INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICIANS 

Tobias WEGER 

Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, 

Oldenburg, Germany .............................................................................................................. 437 

4. EUROPE UNITED – REMEMBRANCE, RESPECT AND OPENING 

THE RETALIATION AFTER THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 

ACCORDING TO NEW HISTORICAL RESEARCH – AN OUTLINE 

Péter BENCSIK 

University of Szeged, Hungary ..................................................................................................445 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 

OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC – 

A COMPARISON 

Christina BICK 


EUROPEAN EVOLUTION: FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 

AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 

Christina BICK, Lars HANEBERG 


ABOUT TEACHING HISTORY - 2012 

Zoltán FARKAS 

SZTE Ságvári Endre Gyakorló Gimnázium, Hungary ............................................................ 467 

WIDENING THE PUBLIC ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS 

IN BULGARIA IN THE TIME OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 

Anka IGNATOVA 


INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SOVIET 

UNION DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD AND NOWADAYS 

Anasztázia KEREKES 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary .................................................................477 

EUROPE - UNITED IN FREEDOM AND DIVERSITY? 

Gregory MOUANGA 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany ..........................................................483 

EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES – PROBLEMS 

AND PERSPECTIVES 

Violeta STOYCHEVA 

St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria................................... 489 

ix

ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN THE BALTIC STATES – 

ON WINNERS AND LOSERS 

Rolf WINKELMANN 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany .......................................................499 

5. EUROPEAN PROJECT “PAST MEMORY FOR A FUTURE OPEN 

SOCIETY” 

LIFE WITHOUT FREEDOM – 

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN VELIKO-TARNOVO – BULGARIA 

Violeta STOYCHEVA 


A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE. MEMORY, UNITY AND DIVERSITY – 

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN OLDENDURG – GERMANY 

Jürgen TAEGER 

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany ..........................................................517 

MEMORY, RESPECT AND OPENNESS – 

THE EVENT ORGANIZED IN FĂGARAS – SAMBATA, ROMANIA 

Elena HELEREA 1 , Florentin OLTEANU 2 

1 Transilvania University of Braşov, 

2 Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania .......................................................523 

REMEMBRANCE IN TIME. MEMORIAL MUSEUMS – 

THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN HÓDMEZŐVÁSÁRHELY - HUNGARY 

Szilvia SASZ 

Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezővásárhely, Hungary................................................................. 535 

OPENNESS - A NEW WEB DEVELOPMENT USING MODERN WEB 

TECHNOLOGIES 

Livia SANGEORZAN, Elena HELEREA 

Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania .............................................................. 543 

x

PART II 


COMMUNIST REGIMES – 

RECENT MEMORY FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY (in Romanian language) 

PARTEA II 

Lucrari susţinute la Simpozionul Internaţional 

REGIMURILE COMUNISTE – 

MEMORIE RECENTĂ PENTRU O SOCIETATE DESCHISĂ 

CUPRINS 

DOSARELE DE ARHIVĂ – SURSE DE CERCETARE A PROBLEMEI 

LICHIDĂRII LĂCAŞELOR DE CULT DIN RSSM 

Manole BRIHUNEŢ 

Muzeul de Etnografie şi Istorie Naturală din Chişinău, Republica Moldova ...... .......549 

COMISIA COJOCARU 

Viorica OLARU-CEMÎRTAN 

Universitatea Liberă Internaţională din Moldova, Chisinau, Republica Moldova.......561 

ÎNTÂISTĂTĂTORII BISERICII ORTODOXE DIN R.S.S.M. ŞI POLITICA RELIGIOASĂ 

SOVIETICĂ ÎN PERIOADA ANILOR 1945 – 1962 

Romeo CEMÎRTAN 

Muzeul Naţional de Etnografie şi Istorie Naturală a Moldovei, Republica Moldova.. 573 

FUNCŢIONAREA MĂNĂSTIRILOR DE MONAHII HIROVA 

ŞI TABĂRA SUB DOMINANTA IDEOLOGIEI SOVIETICE 

Liliana CONDRATICOVA 

Institutul Patrimoniului Cultural, Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice al Academiei 

de Ştiinţe a Moldovei, Republica Moldova................................................................. .585 

CONDAMNAREA JUDICIARĂ A CRIMELOR COMUNISMULUI – 

CROCHIU DE ACT NORMATIV 

Iuliu CRĂCANĂ 

Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Bucuresti, România ........ 601 

ACŢIUNILE DE LUPTĂ ALE FORŢELOR NAVALE FLUVIALE 

ROMÂNEŞTI DESFĂŞURATE PE TIMPUL EVACUĂRII BASARABIEI 

(28-30 IUNIE 1940) ŞI ELIBERĂRII ACESTEIA (22 IUNIE-IULIE 1941) 

Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO, Florin STAN, Dan Ionel CIOCOIU 

Muzeul Marinei Române, Constanţa, România ................................................... .......611 

xi

DICTATURA ALIMENTARĂ – FACTOR DECISIV ÎN DECLANŞAREA 

FOAMETEI DIN RUSIA ŞI UCRAINA SOVIETICĂ, 1918-1923 

Vadim GUZUN 

Academia Română, Bucureşti, România................................................................ .......622 

HOMO JURIS – PROFESORUL ALEXANDRU HERLEA (1907 – 1979) 

Elena HELEREA 

Universitatea Transilvania din Braşov, România................................................. .......643 

O VIAŢĂ DEDICATĂ BISERICII UNITE ŞI NEAMULUI ROMÂNESC – 

PREOTUL ŞI DASCĂLUL DR. AUREL LELUŢIU (1914 – 1980) 

Laura-Mihaela LELUŢIU(1), Ovidiu-Constantin SAVU(2) 

Universitatea Transilvania din Braşov, România 

Casa Mureşenilor - Museum of Brasov, România ...................................................... 653 

ASPECTE ALE „REZISTENŢEI CREATIVE” ÎN ROMÂNIA COMUNISTĂ 

Manuela MARIN 

Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, România.................................................. 663 

CAZUL „TITOIŞTILOR” SÂRBI: PROMOTORI, APOI ŞI VICTIME 

ALE COMUNISMULUI ROMÂNESC 

Andrei MILIN, Miodrag MILIN 

Academia Română - filiala Timişoara, Muzeul Satului Bănăţean din 

Timişoara, România .................................................................................................... 672 

STRUCTURI ANTICOMUNISTE ÎN JUDEŢUL BIHOR: 

ORGANIZAŢIA ROMÂNIA INDEPENDENTĂ (1947-1950) 

Gabriel MOISA 

Universitatea din Oradea, România............................................................................ 684 

FOND SECRET, FOND SPECIAL 

Daniel NAZARE 

Biblioteca Judeţeană George Bariţiu, Braşov, Romania ............................................. 688 

DESTINUL UNUI VIZIONAR – 

MEDICUL DOCTOR ŞTEFAN ODOBLEJA (1902-1978) 

Ştefan ODOBLEJA jr. 

Fundaţia ,,Ştefan Odobleja”Drobeta – Turnu Severin, România............................... 693 

CONSIDERAŢII PRELIMINARE PRIVIND STRUCTURA 

PROPRIETĂŢII AGRICOLE ÎN ŢARA FĂGĂRAŞULUI (1950) 


Fundaţia Culturala Negru Vodă, Făgăraş, România ................................................. 699 

SITUAŢIA MUZEELOR MEMORIALE DIN ROMÂNIA DUPĂ 1990. 

MUZEE CONSACRATE PERIOADEI COMUNISTE 

Rozalinda POSEA(1), Ovidiu SAVU (2) 

(1) Muzeul Judeţean de Istorie, Brasov, România. 

(2) Muzeul Casa Muresenilor, România. ..................................................................... 707 

xii

INSTITUTUL DE ISTORIE, LIMBĂ ŞI LITERATURĂ 

SI FABRICAREA ŞTIINŢIFICĂ A „POPORULUI MOLDOVENESC” 

ÎN RSS MOLDOVENEASCĂ (1946–1961) 

Lidia PRISAC 

Institutul Patrimoniului Cultural al Academiei de Ştiinţe a Moldovei, Chişinău, 

Republica Moldova ..................................................................................................... 719 

PREGĂTIREA ALEGERILOR PARLAMENTARE DIN ANUL 1946 

Cristina ROMAN 

Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria 

Exilului Românesc, Bucureşti, Romania .................................................................... 738 

BISERICILE BAPTISTE DIN ROMÂNIA SUB PERSECUŢIA 

REGIMULUI COMUNIST. ACŢIUNI DE RĂSPUNS ŞI REZISTENŢĂ 

Marius SILVEŞAN 

Institutul Teologic Baptist, Bucureşti, România.......................................................... 745 

BISERICA GRECO-CATOLICĂ DIN ROMÂNIA – 

DIFERITE FORME DE REZISTENŢĂ ANTICOMUNISTĂ 

Sergiu STOICA 

Institutul de Istorie „George Bariţiu” al Academiei Române, 

Cluj-Napoca, Romania ............................................................................................... 766 

DESCHIDEREA ECONOMICĂ A ROMÂNIEI SPRE OCCIDENT 

ŞI CRIZA DATORIEI EXTERNE DIN ANII ‘80 

Liviu ŢĂRANU 

Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, Bucureşti, 

Romania........................................................................................................................ 786 

ACTIVITĂŢI DE OPOZIŢIE ALE MIŞCĂRII LEGIONARE 

ÎN PERIOADA NOIEMBRIE 1947 – MAI 1948 

Ilarion ŢIU 

Universitatea Creştină „Dimitrie Cantemir“ din Bucureşti, România ...................... 792 

MILITARII DIN EXILUL ROMÂNESC POSTBELIC 

ŞI CONDAMNAREA COMUNISMULUI 

Mihaela Toader 

Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, 

Bucureşti, Romania ................................................................................................................808 

COMPLOTUL” DIN BATALIONUL 27 VÂNĂTORI DE MUNTE. TENTATIVĂ 

DE REZISTENŢĂ ANTICOMUNISTĂ SAU ÎNSCENARE JUDICIARĂ? 

Constantin VASILESCU 

Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, 

Bucureşti, Romania ..................................................................................................... 817 

xiii

CAMPANIA DE ÎNCHIDERE A MĂNĂSTIRILOR DIN MOLDOVA SOVIETICĂ 

(1944–1962) 

Ion XENOFONTOV 

Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice al Academiei de Ştiinţe a Moldovei, 

Republica Moldova ..................................................................................................... 840 

CREAŢIA LITERARĂ CA FORMĂ DE REZISTENŢĂ 

ÎN ROMÂNIA COMUNISTĂ. CAZURI SEMNALATE DE CENZURĂ 

Ion ZAINEA, Carmen UNGUR-BREHOI 

Universitatea din Oradea, România ............................................................................ 857 

xiv

PART I 

1. COMMUNIST REGIMES – REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

THE GULAG – 

THROUGH THE EYES OF A SURVIVOR 

Péter BÁLÓ 1 

The below article has been made upon an interview with a Hungarian survivor of the 

GULAG – Mrs. Pintér. She spent eight and a half years in captivity, in several Soviet 

force-labour camps. My aim is to commemorate her and those millions of nameless 

people, becoming the victims of the communism. 

Mrs. Pintér was born as Magdolna Rohr, on the 24 th of December, 1928. Her father 

worked as a clerk at a law firm, while her mother was a housewife, bringing up the 

children. 

She went to Bátaszék to primary school and then she maturated in Budapest. She was 

educated in a religious way, attended church school. She stayed in Budapest during the 

WWII, being an eye-witness of bombing the capital, the lack of food – all these things 

left a serious mark in her soul. 

Her personal tragedy started on the 23 rd of September of 1945, when two Soviet soldiers 

appeared in their flat with a civil translator and they asked her to go with them. She was 

promised that they only wanted to talk to her. Getting in the street they pushed her in a 

car. Afterwards she was taken to a later demolished building to the Üllıi Str. (Budapest), 

and her interrogation has started. The interrogators asked her about her friends and the 

actions they had done together, but due to the lack of any such actions, the young girl 

couldn’t reply any of the questions. Then the Soviet officer took his pistol and threatened 

Magdolna with killing her on the spot. After the inefficient interrogation she was 

accommodated in an unheated room of the building, furnished only with a bed. The next 

day her interrogation continued, and then she could have some information to find out, 

why she has been captured by the Soviet authorities. It became clear, that a friend of hers 

wanted to leave Hungary, but he was caught at the Austrian-Hungarian border, and in his 

notebook they found the name of two English pilots, and also the name of Magdolna 

Rohr. That could be the base of the charges. 

Being aware of her innocence Magdolna kept on denying the charges. One day a 

reinforced guard took her and the other prisoners, kept in the building to Szombathely, 

where they were accommodated under inhuman circumstances, in a coal-cellar. The next 

station was Eisenstadt that is situated in Austria. Among the poor supply with meal the 

night-interrogations have started. In the evenings a Russian woman was put in her cell, 

who constantly asked questions, but as she was innocent, she couldn’t answer any of 

1 Emlekpont Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary.

12 

Remembrance in Time 

them. This problem was “solved” by the Soviet officers by creating Russian-language 

confessions including false information. She couldn’t even read those confessions, but as 

she and the others were promised to go home if they sign those documents, all of them 

signed the false confessions. 

Soon she was delivered again, again not home to Budapest, but to Balatonfüred. There, 

after a trial without any legal background she was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 

After the sentence had been pronounced, Magdolna was taken to the prison of 

Sopronkıhida, to an unheated cell for two, where there were fifteen prisoners closed at 

the same time. The only fortune of hers – among the many afflictions – was that she and a 

woman from Ukraine was appointed to wash the officers’ clothes for a better supplement. 

She shared the extra food with the other prisoners, which meant an advantage for her later 

fate. 

Following Sopronkıhida she was taken to Lemberg (today Lvov – in Ukraine). The 

journey by train, full of suffer, longed for three weeks, under inhuman conditions. There 

was only a hole cut in the floor of the overcrowded compartment. The prisoners could 

relieve themselves only through those holes; their sustenance was miserable and they 

were constantly suffering of thirst. 

It meant a serious mental shock for her that after arriving at the Lemberg camp, and 

having an obligatory bath, men shaved women’s hairs among the rude and vulgar 

comments of the guard. She spent only several days in Lemberg, and then she was taken 

to the Donbass camp – situated in the coalfield of Donbass (Ukraine), where she worked 

in the agriculture – on a potato-field. As it was usual at the similar places, the life was 

directed by criminals, so the violation and brutality, many times leading to murders, was 

an everyday phenomenon. However, there were some prisoners, whom she had formerly 

known from the Sopronkıhida prison, where she had shared her extra food with them. 

These prisoners protected the new-coming, weak young girl being unversed about the 

local circumstances: she could be the first, to get food, and one time they even got back 

her stolen clothes. 

Soon she was entrained again, and after a journey, longing for several weeks she was 

taken to Irkutsk and then to Taiset (Russia today). During the journey she became 

seriously ill – became malarial, and she arrived in Siberia half-dead. Thanks to the 

treatment by a well-intentioned doctor originated from Georgia, who could get medicine 

for her, she got better. For her luck she was assigned to the camp kitchen as the assistant 

of another Hungarian prisoner. Thanks to the relatively hearty meal she strengthened and 

when she fully recovered, she became a seamstress in another camp. 

But not that camp was the last station – she was delivered to several further camps, 

where the weak girl had to fulfil the hardest physical works: she participated in woodcutting, 

structural erection, and worked at the building of the Trans-Siberian railway – 

putting down the rails – under awful weather-conditions, and getting food with poor 

calorie. Officially, if the temperature was lower than -42 ºC, the prisoners were not taken 

to work, but in the reality they had to work even at -50 ºC, she had to work 12 hours a

Péter BÁLÓ: The Gulag – Through the Eyes of a Survivor 13 

day, putting 6,5 m long logs on trucks. They had to build barracks for themselves, and 

they could have a bath only every three-four weeks. There was no medical service or 

even the basic medicine, so the diseases and epidemics were frequent. If somebody 

couldn’t work for his state of health, or refused working – for example for a religious 

reason – could be killed or trussed to a tree. There were many mosquitoes in Siberia in 

the summer, which could cause serious injuries in such cases. 

The prisoners were guarded according to strict regulations: if any of them fell out of the 

march column, was shot down. Due to the above reasons the mortality was extremely 

high. 

The nationality of the prisoners was different; Magdolna told that at the camps she met 

Latvians, Lithuanians, Polish, German, Russian, Ukranians and even Coreans. 

It helped her survival that she learned Russian language, could adapt to the local 

circumstances, and she learned how to save her strength. Several times they could have 

the same logs measured by the supervisors twice, so one day they had to work very hard, 

but the next day they only imitated the wood-cutting, so they could get the ration after the 

execution the norm at 100%. 

The turn in her fortune came in 1953, after Stalin’s death, when their guard informed 

the Hungarian and German prisoners that they could go home. After the plenty of suffer 

and false promises they didn’t believe the soldiers, but one day they were entrained again, 

and after a journey longing for several weeks they arrived in Lemberg (Lviv). There they 

spent six months, as Mátyás Rákosi, the communist dictator of Hungary considered them 

to be persona non grata. In the end he was forced to let them in the country on Soviet 

pressure. Later on the leaders of the communist party still took them unwanted in 

Hungary. When after the inhuman suffers the train, delivering the survivors from the 

GULAG passed the Soviet-Hungarian border (on the 3 rd of December, 1953), the 

members of the State Security Authority (SSA) – the political police of the ’50-s – 

invaded the train, and the prisoners were seized. They were accommodated in Sóstó-fürdı 

near Nyíregyháza, in a camp, guarded by the SSA. They couldn’t even get in contact with 

their relatives. Several weeks later they received 10 HUF to buy train tickets, and finally 

could go home. 

The delight to see her parents and friends, after so many years, was unutterable. Later 

the pleasure was shadowed by the fact that in the Socialist system of Hungary she was a 

secondary citizen. She was not allowed to talk about her “experience” in the Soviet 

Union, and hardly could get a passport. Up to her rehabilitation in 1976 her certificate of 

moral included the record of her being a criminal. Despite she was officially dispensed 

from any crimes – she never committed -, the services of state security detected her until 

1989. Furthermore, she has been still suffering from the health-effects of her captivity: 

cardiac failure because of the hard physical work, joint gout due to the cold weather in 

Siberia, not to mention the mental consequences, which are not possible to forget. 

After coming home she got married with Károly Pintér, whom she had met in Tajset in 

1946 for the first time. Later they were taken to different camps, so lost each other for 

years. They met each other again on the way back in Lemberg in 1953.

14 


Due to the monstrosities the GULAG prisoners went through, and the further afflictions 

of them after getting home, it was quite prevalent that they got married with other former 

GULAG prisoners – only those, surviving the camps could understand each other. 

Magdolna Rohr and her husband became the members of the GULAG Foundation. She 

has been trying to protect the interests of the formers prisoners of the GULAG and works 

for the public commemoration of the victims.

ARCHIVAL FILES – RESEARCH SOURCES ON 

THE ISSUE OF RELIGIOUS-ABODE 

LIQUIDATION THROUGHOUT MSSR 

Manole BRIHUNEł 1 

Lately, the attention of the researchers in history was drawn by numerous previously 

secret files, which highlighted the various problems faced by the Moldavian church 

during the communist regime. Due to the archive documents, to the memoirs of the 

participants in the events, to the literature, we may outline a few church-closing stages. 

This way, in 1918–1940, the liquidation of the parish churches on the left of the Dniester, 

the adaptation of the buildings to the household needs, the book burning and the icon 

destruction are on a high scale. After 28 June 1940, the first attempt to close the 

Bessarabian monasteries occurs, the monastic community from Frumoasa being 

abolished. 

After the possibility of religious-establishment reopening, in 1941–1944, the Moldavian 

church faces the second massive liquidation wave on churches and monasteries, 1944– 

1963. The greatest “boom” in the fight against faith was registered in 1959–1960. Some 

communities specifically resisted, especially the nuns from Răciula. Every church and 

monastery had its special fate, thorough liquidation files; ideological, economic and 

political reasons of coercion and misrepresentation being invoked. The archival files 

assist the researcher involved in studying the issue. They often allow completing the 

information as regards the liquidation modality, the use of the kolkhoz building in the 

locality, the difficult faith of the parish priest or monastery abbot, who were even housearrested 

or sentenced to 15 prison years (abbess of Răciula monastery). A special interest 

is shown by having modified the architectural aspect of the churches, monasteries, abbeys 

and monastic cells. At the same time, due to the archival files and appended images, the 

aspect of irrecoverably destroyed cult edifices could be identified. 

From the beginning, note that at present the researchers refer to the files regarding the 

Soviet period, within the collection of the National Archive of the Republic of Moldavia 

(NARM) and of the Archive of the Social-Political Organizations of the Republic of 

Moldavia (ASPORM), which also stand for the vast majority of the documents. The 

access of the historians and theologians to the files from the collections 2848, 3305, 3046 

from NARM and the collection 51 from ASPORM became possible thanks to the 

democratization process in the country, they having been recently declassified and 

opened for research. An issue occurred once with the open access to the secret files is 

their adequate and appropriate treatment, resorting from several factors - political, 

economic, religious or cultural. The memory and memoirs of the persons who have gone 

1 National Museum of Ethnography and Natural History of Moldavia, Chişinău, Republic of 

Moldova.

16 


through the ordeal of the intimidation, persecution etc. are especially helpful in restoring 

the history of the church life during the soviet period. The discussions with the 

clergymen, monks and nuns of the liquidated monasteries, simple peasants who managed 

to keep an icon or liturgical book, while all treasures were thrown into the fire, 

substantially extended our research topic. 

Moreover, numerous documents on the church and monastery functioning during the 

Soviet period are kept in the current archive of Moldavia’s Metropolitan Church; which, 

although not so quantitatively large, provides precious and concrete information for the 

approached theme. 

Starting from the currently available sources to the researchers in history, we intend to 

outline a few issues related to the ecclesiastical history and art, whose restoration during 

those troubled times, was exclusively possible on the basis of the archival files within the 

aforementioned collections. This way, the value of the archival documents rises once with 

the information submitted in the files, varying from simple letters of the villagers lest 

their church should be closed, to reports of the soviet administration, as regards the field 

activity, the ideological work etc. In the holy naivety that transgressions are made by the 

local administration without the knowledge of the supreme leadership, some abbesses of 

the convents to be liquidated signed letters, with the mention they would be “obedient and 

committed”. Cases were documented when applications were written to the address of the 

commander Kliment Voroşilov or Nikita Hruşciov, in the hope the issue of the religiousabode 

liquidation will be solved and in the telegram of condolence, in 1953, at Stalin’ 

death, the latter had been valued by the clergy and parishioners from MSSR as “loved 

leader, wise edifier of the people’s good, learner” and, respectively, the “lack of words to 

express the deep regret and sorrow that overwhelmed the whole country ...” (signed 

Nectarie, bishop of Chişinău and Moldavia) [1]. 

Besides, for every newcomer in the monastery, the fullest biography was collected in 

order to be subsequently used for intimidating the monks and their relatives. These small 

SV detected in the archival funds similarly display a compartment not enhanced so far by 

researchers; but which draws special attention in terms of monastic-congregation 

dynamics, age categories, gender, studies, social-economic status held in society etc. 

The issue of the cult-establishment liquidation, with details on the ideological work, on 

the preparation of the monastic congregation, on the infiltration of the trustful persons for 

the denigration of the monks is very broadly submitted in the archival files. In the reports 

signed by the most hateful representatives of the soviet ideology, the commissioner for 

the Orthodox Church’s issues, P. Romenski, and A. Oleinic, insert victorious phrases of 

the type “... I deem that Călărăşăuca convent, in the result of the activity deployed by the 

party and soviet organs, of the collaboration with the workers and dwellers from the 

neighbouring villages, but also of the discussions with some more loyal representatives of 

the monastic congregation, was liquidated” (signed A. Oleinic, 20 June 1961) [2]. One of 

the main steps included the discussions with the young and full of force monastery 

dwellers, to the purpose of leaving the monastic congregations, of being employed to the 

kolkhoz and the factory workers’ perspectives, considering that the elderly and sick 

monastic congregation can be more easily dissolved, invoking the impossibility to work 

the land, the lack of funds, the various diseases etc [3]. 

In the first stage, certainly, the fate of all those having left the monasteries or the 

churches was comfortable; however, moments are known, due to the archival files, which 

confirm that the former monks were difficultly employed and the soviet authorities were

Manole BRIHUNEł: Archival Files – Research Sources on the Issue of Religious-Abode … 17 

immediately told whether “the priest X. read to the pupils a biology lesson regarding the 

lifestyle of the bees” or that in GrinăuŃi village, Briceni, the former deacon activated as 

music teacher within the local school. Or how, during the Easter holidays, a baking 

factory produced some “spring cake”, using the grandparents’ recipe for the traditional 

Easter cake or how some villagers refused to undergo medical procedures, the doctor 

being a former priest [4]. This chapter was being worked upon very insistently, the people 

being obliged through various modalities to sign church-closure petitions, the priest’s 

expulsion from the village, the refuse to activate with the clergymen. 

The compartment letters and petitions signed in the hope that the faith would be saved 

is completed by reports aiming the monastic community’s economic, cultural, dynamic 

activity; data on the monastery leadership or on the church priest. Thus, those information 

allowed restoring the picture as regards the drastic diminution of the monastic agricultural 

fields, vineyards and orchards, the intimidation of the clergymen and monks, the burning 

of the holy books and the devastation of the precious ornaments. Moreover, the soviet 

authorities watched very closely the functioning of the churches and of the monasteries, 

the smallest income signalled from selling candles or from officiating Christian 

sacraments (baptism, wedding or funerals, according to the rules) warned the local 

organs. For instance, in 1954 it was noted that the production of the diocesan factory of 

candles from Chişinău increased, that the church incomes from selling candles rose, much 

as the church attendance (which often became too small for all parishioners), which facts 

much disturbed the party activists, who did not fail to come immediately with some 

recommendations [5]. Thus, only at Răciula monastery, on its dedication day and other 

Christian holidays, above 3000 persons from the nearby villages gathered. The church 

restoration, on the expense of the congregation, which donated money and construction 

materials or personally participated in the repairs, was likewise a difficult problem for the 

authorities [6]. 

In fact, the material situation of MSSR’s holy establishments, which started to improve 

in early 1950, as we note from the archival files, conditioned new repressions on the 

church, generated by the decision of MSSR’s Council of Ministers from 16 October 1958, 

no. 1159, which stipulated the reduction of the number of churches and monasteries 

through their liquidation [7]. In this context, some litigations are mentioned, as regards 

the buildings and the land ownership of the churches and monasteries, which were 

constrained to wilfully give up, to the benefit of the local kolkhoz, the arable land and its 

outhouses. Thus, in 1949, the abbot of Pripiceni-Curchi monastery laments the 

confiscation of the mill by the kolkhoz, and the incomes of this mill were used for 

supporting the monastic congregation and the church. It was a similar constraining 

measure, the archives displaying numerous proofs on the Soviet authorities’ related 

debauchery. 

We mention on this occasion that, overall, these fields are pre-eminently reflected in 

most contemporary publications on the activity of the MSSR’s church during 1944–1991. 

Therewith, compartments exist which were only fragmentarily elucidated, in studies of 

another profile. In this context, our intention is to highlight the church and monastery 

liquidation modality in the light of the architectural monuments destruction, the formation 

of specialized commissions, which confirmed the precarious situation of the edifices and 

respectively, recommended their closure and destruction. Moreover, the absence of the 

parishioners and of a priest facilitated putting the churches out of evidence; thereafter, the 

act on the seriously damaged situation of the building came naturally, followed by the

18 


demolition and use of building stones by the local administration. Another variant, in case 

the walls were not very deteriorated, was the dismantling of the towers, crosses and the 

use of the building as stable, barn, garage. Moreover, an important factor was the priest’s 

removal from his office, by Moldavia’s supreme church authority; the bishop of Chişinău 

and Moldavia, Venedict, permanently informing the commissioner P. Romenski as 

regards the signed acts. This way, it was noted that, although a priest or hieromonk was 

removed from office, he continued to officiate (the reasons are not explained; but 

considering that, in 2-3 years, the church would be put out of evidence), we well realize it 

was a first step in liquidating the church or the monastic congregation. Moreover, so as 

not to form a stable parishioner congregation, not to interact etc., the priests were very 

often transferred from one parish to another, sometimes even twice a year, being sent to 

officiate from a Northern parish to a Southern village and inversely. 

Furthermore, the value of the liturgical garments and ornaments being known, the cases 

of church and monastery robbery were frequent, and the absence of the precious treasures 

and other necessary materials for officiating the services was similarly invoked as reason 

for closing some churches (St, Demetrius Church from Orhei, Holy Virgin’s Protection 

Church from CineşeuŃi village, Rezina etc). 

Thus, after reviewing the subjects open to research on the basis of the detected archival 

files, we intend to thoroughly analyze the closure, dismantling and destruction of the 

ecclesiastical patrimony and church architecture. We will exemplify with the information 

taken from a few archival files, which confirm that, during the soviet debauchery, the 

church patrimony was drained not only through burning the liturgical books or the 

precious ornaments, but also through liquidating the churches as cult edifices. In this 

context, the archival files also shed light upon some stages in liquidating the churches. 

This way, in January 1960, an act was elaborated, which analyzed the situation of the 

church from Gârlea village, Costeşti. A group of construction workers, led by the village 

soviet deputies determined that “the church is in wood; the walls are very crooked, 

internally leaning, distorting the central axis, which may inevitable lead to the wall 

collapse; the ceiling is rotten and might collapse; the wooden floor is rotten and broken in 

several places; most wooden beams are cavity-eaten; the roof suffered a lot and is about 

to collapse”. The commission decided very simply the fate of the old wooden church: 

because of the damaged situation, it is impossible to exploit the building and, 

respectively, it will be closed”. We note on this occasion that the church buildings, 

especially the wooden ones, built no later than the beginning of the XIX-th century 

(according to the architectural legislation, in the XIX-th century, erecting wooden cult 

edifices was practically forbidden), were often damaged on purpose. Namely, through the 

authorities’ indifference, the lack of funds and construction materials for 

repairing/restoring the churches, the edifices were destroyed [8]. The old, historical 

buildings of MSSR’s churches suffered from “technical inadequacy for exploiting”, 

whereas the buildings in a good technical state – churches, cells, abbeys – were unreluctantly 

exploited as cultural clubs, hospitals, stables and barns, which has conditioned 

along the decades their destruction, through the distortion of the architectural originality, 

the removal of the church painting and the change of the roofs etc. 

The years 1944–1960 brought the most serious prejudices to the original ecclesiastical 

architecture. To our great luck, some files possess small photographic annexes, genuine 

testimonies of the church aspect, shortly before their demolition. The architecture of the 

religious edifices denotes original buildings, arched windows, interesting metallic grills


on the windows, the cornice decoration in a geometric style, the crosses crowning the 

church domes – all underwent the wrath of time. In 1953, a group of experts in 

construction drew up a report on the conservation state of the stone church in RăscăieŃi 

village, Olăneşti. Invoking that, during World War Two, the church much suffered from 

the artillery attacks, the building-liquidation conclusion was again reached, without 

proposing the restoration and the repair of the edifice, much as a former illustrious 

example of the ecclesiastic architecture from the XIX-th century [9]. At the time of the 

final destruction of the church, the walls were practically torn down, the windows 

removed, the iconostasis devastated, the roof broken. The bell building on two levels was 

better kept: although the walls suffered a lot, the plaster completely fell, the cross still 

crowned the bell tower. 

The same fate was shared by the church in Palanca village, Olăneşti, which, in 1953 

was abolished and respectively demolished. The cruciform building, built in stone, the 

arched windows at the top and some pseudo-windows in the side walls, and other 

decorative elements, possess obvious wear signs, the roof being covered by grass, and the 

walls – in a proportion of 60-70%, torn down [10]. The expertise commission submitted 

the following documents: technical act on the damage state of the church; the decision of 

the village soviet of 29 June 1953; the decision of the soviet of Olăneşti district from 16 

July 1953 and three external and internal images as demonstration of the state of the 

church. The decisive role in demolishing the church from Palanca was played by the 

commissioner in the Russian Orthodox Church’ issues, P. Romenski, who personally 

examined the church and decided to use the construction materials for building a cultural 

club and the local maternity house. The church was therefore destroyed and vanished as 

ecclesiastic art monument dating to XIX-th century. 

Another church from the same Olăneşti district, Purcari village, was situated at 18 m 

from the local school. Lest it should collapse over the school building, the commission, 

consisting in the local administration and a few constructors, decided to liquidate the 

building and to use the remaining stone for the local soviet administration’s purposes 

[11]. Commissioner P. Romenski’s role is again obvious, who personally assessed the 

building and decided its dismantling with the subsequent use of the construction 

materials. The technical certificate of the church as regards the situation in 1953, reported 

the following: the church has not operated since 1944; the roof and vault are rotten; the 

doors and windows are missing; the walls are creaked; the parishioners do not raise the 

problem of repairing the church; the repair is not appropriate, considering its damaged 

state [12]. 

Often, among the main reasons invoked for dismantling churches, mentioned was made 

of the military operations, which aggravated the situation, without naming the atrophic 

factor, the soviet authorities’ indifference and intentions to further damage the buildings, 

refusing their reparation and restoration, which facts also conditioned their liquidation as 

religious edifices. A single small-format image of the church was kept, which allows us 

to restore overall the originality of the cult architecture: it was built in stone and brick, top 

semicircular windows, sophisticated metallic grills; the wall edges are decorated with 

geometric motifs; the window decoration is very interesting, forming a top serrated frame 

harmoniously completing the window. 

In some cases, the archival file also kept the dimensions of the churches to be destroyed. 

This way, the church from Copanca, Tiraspol, was built in stone, length of 25 m and 

width of 8 m.; the roof was missing, the walls have numerous cracks that may collapse

20 


the entire building [13]. For more than 10 years, the church had not been repaired, being 

left to its fate; therefore it was decided to demolish the building and to use the 

construction materials for building other local social-cultural objectives. 

Although numerous buildings were destroyed, some archival-file information show that 

cult-edifice demolishing was allowed only after noticing their seriously damaged state, 

with obvious dangers for the surrounding buildings. In such a situation, the church from 

Calfa village, despite the special liquidation commission, having signed a first notice on 

its seriously damaged state, the building was not demolished. The church from Calfa was 

built in stone and brick, in cruciform plan, the flattened bulb-shaped dome is crowned 

with a metallic cross. The building belongs to the steeple-attached churches, with top 

arched windows, with octagonal roof, with missing cross on the steeple [14]. The length 

of the church is 25 m., the width 8 m. 

Completely another fate, having reached their dismantling, was shared by the churches 

in other villages. This way, the church from Furceni village, Orhei, according to the 

appended photograph, does not show obvious signs of damage; however, its closure was 

called for. Starting from the decisions of the commission for the damage state of the 

buildings and the impossibility of their use by the community as cult objectives, the 

reconstruction of the buildings was insisted upon (through dismantling the towers and 

erecting a new roof in slate sheet, usually in 2-4 nuances; removing the crosses, 

devastating the interior of the churches etc.), thereafter, the use of the buildings as barns 

for keeping grains [15]. Similarly, the church from Pohărniceni village, Orhei, the 

widowed picture of the devastated iconostasis being appended in the archival file [16]. 

The illustrative material appended to the file allows, also in this case, determining the 

architectural-constructive particularities of the church: the walls erected in rough, not 

polished, stone, the roof virtually missing at the moment, with grass in some places etc. 

The report of the commission of expert constructors highlighted that in the church from 

Pohărniceni village, the roof was missing; the floors were utterly destroyed; the windows 

and doors were broken, destroyed; similarly, the walls present obvious wear traces, are on 

the way to collapse; the building plaster suffered as a result of the military operations 

from 1944. The verdict was the toughest: no opportunity for restoration and repair, 

therefore the option was chosen for demolition. 

The technical evaluation of the church from Selişte village, Orhei, determined the 

following parameters of the building: total surface of 161,6 m.p., the stone foundation is 

carved on a clayey soil; it has a depth of 1,8 m. the stone walls have a depth of 75 cm., 

are practically deformed, they possess numerous cracks and enormous holes [17]. The 

Northern and Eastern walls are leant on the vertical, being on way of sliding; the church 

windows and door are collapsed. The steeple suffered in a percentage of 80 %, the roof is 

missing, the supportive walls are torn down etc. Consequently, the commission’s report is 

as following: the fundamental walls of the church are not subject to restoration; the 

immediate demolition, especially of the steeple building, is necessarily called for. 

In 1954, massive demolition also took place in case of the monastic churches. 

Therewith, the letter of the commissioner in the Orthodox Church’s issues, P. Romenski, 

submits the demolition of the church of Hâncu monastic complex, where a rest house is 

placed, because “it hinders the formation of a park in the centre of the house” and the 

stones will be used to build a new housing [18]. A special part, as one can see in 

promoting the new lifestyle, was played by this very council in the Orthodox Church’s 

issues, which decided the demolition, closure and liquidation of the churches,


monasteries. This way, if in demolishing the church of Hâncu monastery, this council 

agreed and had no objections; then in the case of the church of Hârjauca monk monastery, 

mention was made that “the council does not agree to demolish the church, considering 

this decision still unprofitable, it is necessary to temporarily abstain [from demolishing 

churches – n.n. – M.B.]” [19]. The cell block from HârbovăŃ monastery suffered during 

the liquidation of the monastic complex. The negative impact is so great that, even after 

two decades since its reopening, the two-levelled cell block in stone, with a two-nuanced 

roof, covered with slate sheet, remains in a desolate, seriously damaged state, with 

leaning walls. The unfettered use, during the soviet years, of the church buildings, the 

dismantling of the towers, steeples, crosses and crucifixions, the levelling of the 

cemeteries where the great founders and important clergymen found eternal rest, stood for 

steps purposely taken by the soviets to destroy faith. Likewise, to the chapter of the 

monastic buildings which suffered from the soviet authorities, łipova hermitage belongs. 

Although the hermitage church was officially declared archaeology and history 

monument [20], all religious buildings and household annexes of the monastic complex 

passed, in 1949, to the use of MSSR’s Ministry of Education, the church being placed 

under State protection [21]. 

Not only the religious buildings, but also the wayside crosses, the crucifixions placed at 

crossroads, near the fountains, were targeted by the atheist authorities. Such complaints of 

the population as regards the wayside-cross desecration or reports of the local 

administration on the cult-piece destruction were similarly detected in the sheets of the 

archival files. Thus, in Suhuluceni village, Teleneşti, a roadside-cross was built which, 

unfortunately, by 1954 came into a serious state and the triptych founders’ offspring 

decided its renewal. The wayside cross was renewed, repaired and installed not on its 

former place, but in a dweller’s yard, not to disturb the circulation on the road. However, 

the drunken activists ruined the triptych glass, desecrated it, destroying all holy figures in 

wood with a hatchet. The wayside cross was taken to the river, broken and destroyed. The 

following day, the guilty ones proposed the sum of 3500 roubles for settling the conflict, 

but the triptych founders refused, seeking justice from the district authorities [22]. At the 

same time, numerous reports and applications exist for transferring the roadside crosses 

and crucifixions closer to the church or cemetery; because, situated near the cultural 

houses, they were often defamed and destroyed. A similar transfer took place in Pelenia 

village, BălŃi, when the metal triptych was removed from the centre near the church [23]. 

Also, in Mileştii Mici village, Ialoveni, the soviet administration tried, by the 1960s, to 

destroy the crucifixions, deemed remnants of the past, to erase them from the hearth of 

the village, respectively from the villagers’ memory. This fact only partially succeeded, 

as the Christians transferred the triptychs to the village graveyard. Unfortunately, not 

being placed in their natural place, whence the absence of the protection means and their 

occasional maintenance, the crucifixions in wood have gradually reached into a 

deplorable state. In fact, St. Nicholas church from Mileştii Mici was dispossessed of its 

treasures, on 7 June 1951, the representative of the deputy soviet executive I.F. Goldştein 

transmits, to the benefit of the orthodox community from Mileştii Mici, both the building, 

and the liturgical inventory. In this commissioning Contract, an inventory list is 

appended, which includes pieces of valuable cutlery, old books, icons etc. Subsequently, 

in 1962, the closure of the abode followed [24]. In fact, the situation with the church 

liquidation and its asset dispossession was specific not only for the years 1944–1962, as 

such cases were also reported by the 1980s. Thus, another blow was received by the

22 


parishioners from Mileştii Mici on 8 September 1981, when the director of the museum 

from Văsieni village, Cutuzov (currently Ialoveni), together with the main curator, drew 

up an act, with no. 88, whereby 19 church-patrimony pieces were passed to the balance of 

the so-called museum of the Native Land from Văsieni village, “so as to be displayed in 

the museum exhibition”. This inventory list included, as follows, three icons of Jesus 

Christ and of God’s Mother (in a satisfactory state), Jesus Christ’s icon (one piece), icons 

dedicated to the saints Nicholas, Paul, John, Peter, Andrew, to God Father, to the Holy 

Trinity (all in good or satisfactory state), a great chandelier and a baptismal font, both 

well kept; four pieces belonging to the liturgical garment, all in a deplorable state [25]. 

We mention that most churches and monasteries were measured and inventoried, 

supplying precious data as regards the liturgical inventory and the church garments, the 

holy books, the maintenance state of the buildings. Such an inventory referred to Holy 

Trinity church from CucuieŃi village, Râşcani [26]. The church was in stone, with a single 

altar, the roof in metallic slate, the graveyard surrounded by a stone wall. 

A series of archival files do not supply also information as regards the building 

assessment, their price in certain stages. This way, from the inventory file of the year 

1946, we determined that the church from Antonovca village, Olăneşti, dedicated to Saint 

Nicholas, was in stone, covered with black metal. It was destroyed in a percentage of 

50%. It was assessed to the sum of 25 000 roubles. 

Another church was closed in that period, namely from Tomai village, Ceadâr-Lunga, 

the commission similarly determining the damaged state of the building. However, in this 

case, two members of the commission, engineers-technicians, refused to sign the act on 

the demolition of the building and reported to the commissioner in the Orthodox Church’s 

issues on the satisfactory state of the building, on the necessity to make repairs and on the 

possibility to further officiate divine services [27]. 

The files may be classified apart, referring to the functioning of the religious abodes in 

the districts to the left of the Dniester, which had reached under the dominance of the 

soviet ideology ever since 1918. This way, the church from Lunga village, Dubăsari, was 

built in 1897; and, in 1936, the church building was transferred for opening there a 

pioneer club. The roof was demolished, the towers were removed, the cross was melt 

[28]. In 1942, the church returned to its mission, being functional until 1948. In 1952, the 

local kolkhozniks decided, in their meeting, to transfer the desolate church building under 

a cereal barn. But, in 1956, the villagers collected above 12 thousand roubles for restoring 

the church, officiating the divine service, also asked a priest’s appointment for the church 

in Lunga village. 

The church from Nezavertailovca village, Slobozia district, in 1952, according to the 

technical certificate, was not used because of the age of the building, which reason was 

also invoked at closing the building and using it in household purposes. According to the 

report of the commission for evaluating the situation, mention was made that “the 

building does not have the aspect of a church, the steeples are missing, the wooden 

crosses being placed directly on the old roof; it has not functioned for more than three 

years; the yard is in disrepair, the orchard trees, broken; therefore, the parishioner 

congregation who would attend this church are missing; the priest and the deacon are not 

in the village; only the so-called church starosta works, who did not show empowerment 

acts, that is the minutes of the meeting held by the congregation where she was chosen in 

this office; similarly, neither the revision commission, nor the church committee, 

consisting in 20 persons, function.” [29].


References 

1. National Archive of the Republic of Moldavia (as follows: NARM), collection 2848, 

inv. 10, file 518, f. 29-30. 

2. Archive of the Social-Political Organizations of the Republic of Moldavia (as follows 

ASPORM), collection 51, inv. 21, file 235, f. 9. 

3. ASPORM, collection 51, inv. 20, file 21, f. 41. 

4. ASPORM, collection 51, inv. 19, file 5, f. 76-77. 





9. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 518, f. 69-71. 



12. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 518, f. 99. 



15. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 531, f. 7a-8. 

16. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 531, f. 8a. 




20. In 1947, according to the decision of MSSR’s Council of Ministers, in the list of the 

history and architecture monuments, the following religious edifices were included, 

but the status of monument allowed anyhow their liquidation and demolition: church 

Măzărache, St. Elias, St. George, Old Cathedral (Chişinău); church in stone of 

Căuşăni; architectural complex of the new Cathedral with steeple (Chişinău), 

monastic complexes from Hârjauca, Căpriana, Suruceni, Saharna, Rudi, Japca, 

Călărăşăuca, łipova and Butuceni. 


22. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 531, f. 85 


24. ANRM, collection R – 3046, inv. 2, file 193, f. 3-6. 

25. Personal archive M. BrihuneŃ. 







Notes 



3. ASPORM, collection 51, inv. 20, file 21, f. 41.

24 













15. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 531, f. 7a-8. 

16. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 531, f. 8a. 




20. In 1947, according to the decision of MSSR’s Council of Ministers, in the list of the 

history and architecture monuments, the following religious edifices were included; 

however, the status of monument allowed anyway their liquidation and demolition: 

church Măzărache, St. Elias, St. George, Old Cathedral (Chişinău); church in stone of 

Căuşăni; architectural complex of the new Cathedral with steeple (Chişinău), 

monastic complexes of Hârjauca, Căpriana, Suruceni, Saharna, Rudi, Japca, 

Călărăşăuca, łipova and Butuceni. 




24. NARM, collection R – 3046, inv. 2, file 193, f. 3-6. 

25. Personal archive M. BrihuneŃ. 




29. NARM, collection 2848, inv. 10, file 518, f. 17-21.

THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 

TORNYAI JÁNOS MUSEUM AND 

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH 

IN HÓDMEZİVÁSÁRHELY DURING THE 

COMMUNIST PERIOD (1945-1989) 

Viktor CSÁNYI 1 

The first decades of the Hódmezıvásárhely museum 

The idea of the necessity of a local museum in Hódmezıvásárhely emerged at the end 

of the 19th century for the first time. In 1892, when the reformed church changed the 

interior furniture of the Vásárhely reformed old temple, the cassettes, painted by 

carpenters from Gyula were removed and given to the Museum of Applied Arts. In the 

consequence János Tornyai wrote in the local newspaper, that if the town had had a local 

museum, those valuable cassettes could have stayed in Vásárhely (KISS 1958, 7). 

The foundation of the Hódmezıvásárhely museum was highly supported by the 

industrial and agricultural exhibition organized in 1904. According to suggestion of the 

artists of Hódmezıvásárhely – mainly János Tornyai – a relaxing room has been 

furnished for the visitors of the exhibition. They put there different ethnographic and 

folk-art objects. A part of these objects were lent by János Tornyai, who had got a serous 

ethnographic and folk-art collection. After the exhibition had closed, the artists succeeded 

to convince the city leaders to base the local museum (NAGY 2001). In 1904 the city 

committee accepted the plan of the foundation of the museum, and in 1905 they issued a 

decree to establish it (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 13). 

In the beginning it was a constant problem to find the right place for the collection. 

Within some years the objects were replaced to different rented rooms. At the same time 

Lajos Kiss – who later became an excellent ethnographer – collected the object in a 

persistent way. In 1912 Lajos Kiss moved to Nyíregyháza, however, he wrote his works, 

inspired by his experience, and collections: “The life of a poor man” (1939); “Famous 

markets in Vásárhely” (1956), “Art life in Vásárhely” (1957) and “Weekdays in 

Vásárhely” (1958). After Lajos Kiss had left, clerks of the city were appointed to deal 

with the management and administration of the museum. 

In 1914 the city bought the two-storey house, formerly owned by the eye-specialist 

Dr. József Imre, at 16 Szentes Street (Szántó Kovács Str. today) for the purposes of the 

museum. The building also gave place to the city library. The firs professional 

ethnographic exhibition – open for the public – opened in 1928. It was directed by Károly 

Cs. Sebestyén, the vice-director of the museum of Szeged (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 21-22). 

1 Tornyai János Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary.

26 


1936 was a highly important year from the point of view of the growth of the 

collection, when the limner János Tornyai donated all his works, owned by him (562 

paintings and 361 graphics). 2 

The museum life during the communism (1945-89) 

In the WWII nor the city or the museum was seriously damaged, but the chaotic postwar 

years caused significant damages. According to the agreement of the coalition parties 

in 1945 the building of the museum was given to the Social Democratic Party. The 

collection of the museum was quickly delivered to different buildings of the Party (to the 

house on Mária Valéria Street and then to the house of Ernı Nagy on the Kálvin Square) 

without any register by political prisoners. During the delivery many objects were 

damaged, and several ones disappeared (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 28). 

On the 1 st of February 1946 the poet Miklós Gallyasi was appointed to be the new 

director of the museum. He was the director up to 1957. In 1948 the museum could move 

back to its former building, and after the library had been removed, it became a separate 

institution. When the buildings in the neighbourhood were nationalised, the museum 

could also get the former Korda-house (18, Szentesi – today Dr. Rapcsák András – 

Street), so it could expand. Under the wings of Miklós Gallyasi the museum became the 

centre of the local fine arts. Furthermore, Gallyasi was able to convince and involve to the 

work of the Vásárhely museum, like József Korek (the vice-chief director of the 

Hungarian National Museum), Lajos Kiss (ethnographer, awarded with Kossuth-prize) 

and Éva Bodnár historian of art (monographer of Tornyai). 

It is an important milestone of the history of the museum to open the first Autumn 

Exhibition in 1954. Since that year it has been organized every autumn (DÖMÖTÖR 

2004, 36-37). 

From the point of view of archaeology the permanent archaeological exhibition – 

opened in 1949 was a very important event. It was made by János Banner with the 

cooperation of József Korek and Mihály Párducz; and it could be visited till 1969. That 

was the first permanent archaeological exhibition in the country (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 29- 

31). During the management of Miklós galyasi Elemér Zalotay (from 1952 to 1953) and 

then, between 1954 and 1958 Gyula Gazdapusztai was the archaeologist of the museum. 

Miklós Galyasi directed the museum up to 1957, when he was imprisoned for his 

activity in the revolution of 1956. After that Zoltán Szelesi from Szeged and then Béla 

Osváth was appointed. Later János Vígh was mandated. 

From 1961 to 1991 János Dömötör - a historian of culture - managed the museum. During 

that period – from 1963 to 1998 the archaeologist of the museum was Katalin B. Nagy. In 

1963 the centre of the museums of Csongrád county became the Móra Ferenc Museum in 

Szeged. The Tornyai János Museum belonged to that county organisation up to 2006. 

The new permanent archaeological exhibition – titled “The arts of the Neolithic and 

the Brass Age” – opened in 1970 and it was disassembled after 34 years – in 2004. The 

scenario was made by Dr. Ottó Trogmayer – the former director of the Csongrád county 

museum, and by Katalin B. Nagy – the archaeologist of the Vásárhely museum. The 

exhibition was designed by László Boreczky. In the downstage of the exhibition the 

2 More about the inheritence of János Tornyai at DÖMÖTÖR 1963.

Viktor CSÁNYI: The Brief History of the Tornyai János Museum … 27 

embossed map of the city was placed, also showing the archaeological sites of 

Hódmezıvásárhely. On the walls they placed the terracotta enlargements of the ornaments of 

several artefacts made by Erzsébet Fülöp – a painter. The door leading to the ethnographical 

exhibition was surrounded by two brass relieves, representing the process of pottery-making 

(TROGMAYER-KONCZ-PALUCH 2005, 6). The first room of the ethnographical 

exhibition represented the local pottery culture. In the next room there were different pieces of 

furniture: bride-chests, shelves, benches, mirror-tables, chairs. The “bench of the clericals”, 

remaining from the former furniture of the old reformed church represented the high level of 

the joiners’ knowledge of the 18th century. The third room was filled with embroideries and 

fretworks (case for razor blades, mangle, rock, gingerbread-puppet…etc). Furthermore, a 

memorial room was separated for Lajos Kiss – ethnographer. 

In the 1970’s the museum expanded with new sites. With the support of the town they 

bought the Kovács-farm, situated near the road 47, where the farm-museum of Kopáncs 

has been established. The museum bought the house and workshop of Sándor Vékony – 

pottery master, situated at 101, Rákóczi Str. The name of the new place of exhibition 

became the Csúcs Pottery house, and it still exists nowadays (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, pages 

92-94). In 1975 the museum – supported by the National Office of Monuments – bought 

the Papi wind mill that was fully furnished. The windmill was renewed between 2009 and 

2012 at last. 

In 1966 a county decision was made to establish a permanent exhibition of fine arts. 

The task of the planned Alföldi Gallery was to collect, store, process and give to the 

public the artworks being made in the region. A plan for the three-storey gallery has been 

made. The gallery was planned to represent several permanent and temporary exhibitions, 

and to have a restore-workshop, too. It would have been situated on the territory between 

the Town Hall and the hospital. However, the plan has not been realized, and another 

possibility to have the new museum in the building of the old high school. According to 

the design made by László Tarnai, the building was restored by the Construction 

Company of Csongrád County. In 1985 a permanent exhibition of the fine arts of our 

region was opened in four rooms. Along the Vásárhely artists, other centres of fine arts of 

the Great Plain (Szolnok, Kecskemét, Szeged, Debrecen) could also get a role in the 

exhibition (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, pages 95-97). 

Starting from the 1970’s it was a project of high importance to write the monograph of 

Hódmezıvásárhely, in which the experts of the museum also participated. The first 

volume, published in 1984, introduced the history of the town up to 1849 (NAGY 1984). 

The second volume included the period up to the revolution of 1918, and it was published 

in 1993 (NAGY 1993). 

Archaeological researches in Hódmezıvásárhely before the WWII 

The archaeological researches started at the end of the 19 th century in 

Hódmezıvásárhely, just as the other territories of Hungary. The first authentic archaeological 

data from our territory is from 1753. A poetic chronicle written by Benjámin Szınyi – a 

reformed clerical of Hódmezıvásárhely – is about the foundation, the place and the history of 

our town (BANNER 1957, p. 133)3. When a summarizing map was made for the exhibition 

3 There were similar notes from 1750 in the Petrák-chronicle, written in Szentes (ZALOTAY, 

1932, p. 52).

28 


of the archaeological congress in 1876, it already included the Nagytatársánc (a system of 

fortifications) of Hódmezıvásárhely and the fortification of Szılıs, too. Furthermore, several 

objects were represented (FUTÓ 1897, p. 157). 

After that several archaeological excavations were started in the countryside of the 

town. In the reality historical researches of Vásárhely, made by Sámuel Szeremlei were 

the ones, drawing the attention on the excavations. The purpose of Szeremlei was to 

complete the poor written sources, so they focused on the medieval churches of the 

former Vásárhely and its environment. Between 1893 and 1896 there were several 

smaller excavations by Antal Varga and Imre Oláh – two teachers of the local highschool. 

The process was lead by Sámuel Szeremlei and Gyula Tergina (supervisor for 

public education). They discovered the base of 12 medieval churches in the surroundings 

of Vásárhely (BANNER 1957, p. 135). In 1892 Sándor Farkas discovered funds from the 

Prehistoric and the Migration Period, excavating along the Tisza River, and in the 

countryside of Batida. The archaeological funds have been taken to the storing room of 

the high-school 4 . Later on the people of Vásárhely took the funds they discovered also to 

the high-school. The storing room was opened for the public in 1898 (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 

p. 9). 5 The materials of the storing-room were firstly arranged by Géza Nagy. 

Between 1896 and 1928 there were only a few funds taken to the storing-room. The 

valuable funds of the wasted part of the Gepids’ cemetery of Kishomok and the funds 

discovered during the excavations, made later, were saved by Ferenc Móra, who took 

them to the Szeged Museum. 

From the aspect of a separate archaeological museum collection 6 it was highly 

important that Dr. János Banner archaeologist and university professor – the director of 

the Archaeological Institute of the Szeged University – organized regular excavations 

near the town. He was supported in his activity by the town with a yearly amount of 1.000 

pengo. The independent archaeological department of the museum was established in 

1930, lead by János Banner. As a result of the excavations by János Banner one of the 

most significant collections of 40.000 Neolithic funds was formed. In the collection there 

are numerous funds known even by the international registers (for example the Venuses 

of Kökénydomb, the Venus of Gorzsa, the Altar of Kökénydomb, etc.). Among the 

excavations the site of Hódmezıvásárhely-Szakálhát Diószeg farm (BÁLINT-BANNER 

1935), the Hódmezıvásárhely-Kotacpart Vata farm Á(BANNER 1932; 1933; 1943) and 

the Hódmezıvásárhely-Kökénydomb (BANNER 1930; 1940; 1942) has to be 

emphasized. 7 

On the excavations – along János Banner – there also participated Alajos Bálint, Mihály 

Párducz, József Korek, István Foltiny, Benedek Banner high-school director and 

university students. The archaeological excavations were continued by Mihály Párducz – 

the student of Professor János Banner – in the 1950’s. 

4 The teachers of the high-school started to organize the storing-room in 1858. 

5 In 1982 the silver and golden coins of the building of Nagytakarék were also given to the high- 

school (VV 1982. 10.6.). 

6 More details about the establishment of the Archaeological Department of the Museum can be 

found at BANNER 1934. 

7 The complete list of the excavations, held between 1929 and 1944 can be found at KISS 1958.

Viktor CSÁNYI: The Brief History of the Tornyai János Museum … 29 

Archaeological researches in Hódmezıvásárhely after 1945 

Unfortunately, I cannot detail every archaeological excavation in Hódmezıvásárhely 

and its environment executed for 50 years, so I would like to emphasize the significant 

excavations and the published monographs. 

The excavations between 1945 and 1955 were summarized by Gyula Gazdapusztai in 

his manuscript. 8 

The funds of the Roman Empire on the Great Plain, and the artefacts of the Sarmatians 

were processed by Mihály Párducz in his monograph of three volumes, published 

between 1943 and 1950 (PÁRDUCZ 1942; 1946 and 1950). 

The summary of the funds of the period of the Hungarian Conquest of the Carpathian 

Basin were made by István Dienes in 1954. 9 

In the 1960’s the central task of the Hungarian archaeology was determined by the 71 st 

paragraph of the Coordination Committee: it was the research of the medieval villages of 

the Great Plain. As a result – thanks to the discovery of the villages from the medieval 

and the Bronze Age at the site of Hódmezıvásárhely-Barczi rét (meadow) – the 

archaeological collection of the museum increased by 400 objects (DÖMÖTÖR 2004, 

p.51). 

In the 1950’s and 1960’s a significant settlement and a cemetery of the Copper age 

was under discovery near the barrack in the South of Hódmezıvásárhely. In that very 

territory Elemér Zalotai found pits and graves from the Sarmatian Age 10 in 1951, and 

graves from the Copper Age were discovered by Gyula Gazdapusztai in 1963 

(BOGNÁR-KUTZIÁN 1972, 202). Later in the Ipoly Str. Katalin B. Nagy registered four 

graves from the Middle Copper Age. 11 These four graves supposedly, belonged to the 

same cemetery, which was used from the Early Copper Age and extended also for the 

Middle Copper Age (KOREK 1984, p. 156). The latest excavation on the site was 

executed by Katalin Tóth in 2001 and 2002. She discovered another male deceased in 

foetal position, and some further objects of the Sarmatian settlement and cemetery from 

the period of the Roman Empire. She also found the part of a settlement from the Early 

Neolithic Period (Körös Culture), another one from the Early Copper Age (Tiszapolgár 

Culture), a further one from the Protoboleraz horizon and the last one from the Árpádian- 

Period (TÓTH 2008). 12 

Between 1966 and 1969 István Bóna and Margit Nagy uncovered 92 graves of a 

Gepidian cemetery from the 6 th century in the sand-mine of the Lenin Tsz in 

Hódmezıvásárhely-Kishomok. These graves gave many interesting data about the burial 

customs of the Gepids (BÓNA-NAGY 2002, 34-189). 13 

The most important archaeological excavations of the period in question were the 

Gorzsa Cukormajor site under the leadership of Ferenc Horváth, and the Székkutas- 

Kápolnadőlı site under the leadership of Katalin Bokorné Nagy. 

8 More data for the ancient history of Hódmezıvásárhely (The excavations of the Tornyai János 

Museum between 1945 and 1955). Manuscript. TJM RégAd.: pages 390-2010. 

9 TJM RégAd.: pages 6-90. 

10 TJM RégAd.: 11-90. 

11 TJM RégAd.: 142-2001. 

12 TJM RégAd.: 174-2002> 175-2002. 

13 TJM RégAd.: 128-131-2000.

30 


Katalin B. Nagy, just as the majority of archaeologists of the countryside, faced with 

several archaeological periods, and with her excavations she increased the number of the 

funds from not the Prehistoric, but rather the later periods. Her most significant 

excavation was executed between 1965 and 1985, at the site of Székkutas-kápolna dőlı, 

where there was a cemetery of 555 graves uncovered, mostly from the Avarian Period. 

This is the only fully uncovered cemetery in the South-Great Plain from the Late Avarian 

Period (B. NAGY 2003). 14 

Regarding to the Neolithic Age the most important excavations were made by Ferenc 

Horváth – an archaeologist from Szeged – in the surrounding area of Hódmezıvásárhely. 

In Gorzsa-Cukormajor he excavated a late Neolithic tell-like settlement from the Tisza 

Culture between 1978 and 1996. Furthermore, Ferenc Horváth executed an authentication 

excavation in Hódmezıvásárhely-Kökénydomb, and he has also uncovered a part of a 

settlement on the Tére-part from the Culture of Linear Pottery of the Great-Plain. 

Naturally there were many other excavations, mainly small rescue-excavations. 

Perhaps, the best known one of them was the golden treasure from Hódmezıvásárhely- 

Szikáncs, which was found in 1963. 15 At first, all of the 1439 golden coins from the 5 th 

century were taken to the Hungarian National Museum. Later the Tornyai János Museum 

got five Theodosius coins back. 

We have to emphasize also the researches, made on the site of Misán-farm in 

Hódmezıvásárhely-Nagysziget. In 1957-58 Gyula Gazdapusztai found there burials from 

the 10-11th centuries. Katalin B. Nagy and László Révész continued the excavation of the 

cemetery between 1982 and 1985 (RÉVÉSZ 1996, p. 308-311). 16 

From the aspect of a better discovery of the history of Hódmezıvásárhely the 

excavations done in the city centre were of high importance: lead by Katalin B. Nagy and 

Éva Pávai there were excavations near the Old Church of Vásárhely in 1989/90 17 . 

Another site has been uncovered in Hódmezıvásárhely-Bocskai Str. by Katalin B. 

Nagy. 18 They discovered funds from the 17-18 th century at both sites, and parts of 

settlements, with a number of pottery-pieces. 

Thanks to the excavations of the recent years the Archaeological Collection of the 

Tornyai János Museum continuously increased, and nowadays there are more than 

150.000 artefacts stored compared to the 48.736 pcs in 1989. 

14 

TJM RégAd.: 178-194-2003). 

15 

The detailed processing was made by Katalin Bíróné Sey (BÍRÓNÉ SEY 1976). 

16 

TJM RégAd.: 150-158-2001. 

17 

The documentation of the excavation: TJM RégAd.: 145-2001; 148-2001. Orsolya Lajkó: The 

analysis of the funds from the site of Hódmezıvásárhely-Old Church. Thesis. Szeged 2000. TJM 

RégAd.: 136-2001. 

18 

TJM RégAd.: 143-2001.

THE GROUP OF IMMIGRANT ANARCHISTS 

THAT ACTED IN THE VICINITY OF PAVEL 

BANYA VILLAGE, KAZANLAK DISTRICT IN 

1953-1954 (DOCUMENTS FROM VELIKO 

TARNOVO STATE ARCHIVE) 

Lora DONCHEVA 1 

Abstract: Important place in modern historiography takes the issue of political repression and 

forms of resistance against the imposed communist regime in Bulgaria in the period of 1944-mid- 

50s of the twentieth century. The problem studied in this report focuses on participants in the 

group of anarchists – immigrants, acted in the region of Pavel banya, Kazanlak, at the end of 

1953-the spring of 1954. The statement, based on the studies in CA-V. Tarnovo documents 

attempts to clarify the reasons which prompted the three anarchists (Hristo Nestorov, Doncho 

Karaivanov, Miliu Ivanov) to take risky action for the return to Bulgaria to participate in the 

resistance against the regime, to reveal new details concerning the organization missionto be 

presented perspective of the only survivor (D. Karaivanov) for reasons for the failure of the case 

started. The information in accessible documents give reason to conclude that the lack of 

consistent, of clear and decisive position of emigrant union to actively participate in the fight 

against communist rule in Bulgaria is the catalyst that accelerates the decision of three of them to 

explore other possibilities for the realization of the goal - return to the country and organizing a 

common resistance against the existing communist regime. The absence of objective information 

about the situation in Bulgaria among immigrants, and the weaknesses and gaps in the 

organization of return anarchists determine the failure of the group. 

In recent years, the interest in exploring the topic of political repression and forms of 

resistance to the imposed communist regime in Bulgaria in the period 1944 – mid – 50’s 

of the twentieth century is increasing. The events and activities of the group of immigrant 

anarchists in the region of Pavel banya village, Kazanlak, at the end of 1953 and the 

Spring of 1954 are also a part of the serial attempts to counteract actively to the 

established totalitarian system. Despite different parts of this topic are discussed in the 

modern historiography, important issues related to disclosure of the persons, views and 

activities of the immigrant anarchists, the reasons for their relations with American 

intelligence, the role of the Bulgarian political emigrants in carrying out their mission still 

remain unexplained. Among researchers interested in the topic was Plamen Stefanov. He 

followed the chronology of events since the landing of paratroopers to the dismantling of 

the group in March 1954 1 . Publications of Anka Ignatova 2 , that present the actions of 

Internal forces in March 1954 on disposal and liquidation of „Gorani” anarchists in the 

region of Pavel banya village also contribute to the topic. These publications also prove 

1 St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria.

32 


the existing of forms of armed resistance to the imposed communist model of governance 

in the country and explain the role that was assigned to the Internal troops to protect the 

regime and to suppress any attempt to oppose the government. The stated authors placed 

in science literature the theme for the anarchists’ role in the political life of Bulgaria after 

September 9 1944, their relationship to the established power and their involvement in 

resistance to the imposed regime 3 . 

In the private archive group of Vesel Momchev stored in State Archive - Veliko 

Tarnovo, are collected documents, memoirs, and periodicals related to the history of the 

anarchist movement in Bulgaria. Among them are those that relate to immigrant anarchist 

group active in the region of Pavel banya village, Kazanlak, in 1953-1954. These 

documents describe the organization of immigrant anarchists in Paris (Union of Bulgarian 

Overseas Anarchist) and the relations between its members and the team led by Hristo 

Nestorov, and also contain information about life and views of the group participants, 

preparation and implementation of the mission in Bulgaria. Most of these documents are 

memories of Hristo Nestorov 4 , leader of the team, of relatives and his followers, his 

letters and notes related to the organization of anarchists in France published in the 

newsletter "In defense of anarchy", issued in Paris. Documents for the mission in 

Bulgaria by Doncho Karaivanov 5 , the only one who managed to escape from the 

blockade in the region of Pavel Banya village, are also kept in the group. Among the 

archival materials are copies of some records of interrogations of captured Milyou 

Ivanov 6 by State security, posts in that newsletter "In defense of anarchy", dedicated to 

him, and a copy of the verdict of the supporters of the anarchists. Of particular interest are 

documents related to Hr. Nestorov, not only because they are most like quantity, but 

because of his personal qualities and devotion to the ideas of Anarchy he enjoyed a high 

prestige among the anarchists in Bulgaria and abroad and also was a great leader and of 

group of anarchists that acted in the region of Pavel banya village. 

Chronology of events related to the preparation of the group and its arrival in Bulgaria is 

generally known. In the autumn of 1952 Hr. Nestorov, D. Karaivanov and M. Ivanov assisted 

by Yanko Dishliev contacted with U.S. intelligence agencies and passed six-month courses in 

radio telegraphy and methods of illegal opposition. After an unsuccessful attempt to be 

transferred to Bulgaria in the spring of 1953, in September the same year, they were parachuted 

into the region of Pavel banya, Kazanlak. Then they established relations with their relatives 

who assist them with food and weapons. They spent winter in a dugout in the Kavak dere area 

south of Pavel banya. But their presence was not unnoticed. On March 22 1954 Minister of the 

Interior decided to conduct an operation to eradicate the group. The operation was to be held 

by forces of the Second and Third Operational Regiments of Internal troops and the Minister 

prepares the necessary documents. On March 25 and 26 1954 a military operation for 

capturing the so called “Parachute-diverse group” was held by parts of the Internal troops and 

State Security parts also. The count of participants in the large operation was a total of 1676 

soldiers, 108 of them were officers. The result of the operation was: one saboteur captured, one 

killed (referred to be the "chief" of the group); one automatic gun, three ordinary guns, three 

portable radios and money also confiscated. Loss of the Internal troops, according to saved 

documents were one severely wounded by a grenade, and according to other documents - one 

private wounded who died later, and one wounded officer 7 . The publication of P. Stefanov 

stated that Hr. Nestorov "exploded two grenades, which were hidden under his body, killing 

and injuring over 10 people" 8 . Only D. Karaivanov, along with his wife Emilia, managed to 

break the blockade, cross the border and return to Paris. 

The purpose of this scientific report is to clarify the reasons and the motives that 

prompted the three anarchists to take risky action of returning to Bulgaria to participate in

Lora DONCHEVA: The Group of Immigrant Anarchists … 33 

the resistance against the regime based on the research of papers stored in the Archives 

“V. Momchev ". The report also aims to reveal new details about organization of the 

mission and to present the view of the only one that survived (D. Karaivanov) about the 

reasons that caused failure. 

Increasing repression against the opposition in Bulgaria after 1947 increased the count 

of Bulgarian political emigrants in Western Europe. In 1950 in Paris was found the Union 

of Bulgarian Overseas Anarchist – an organization of the Bulgarian anarchists that 

emigrated from Bulgaria after the strike upon their movement on the eve of the Fifth 

Congress of the BWPc (Bulgarian Workers’ Party – communists) in December 1948. The 

establishment and operation of the Union were accompanied by the existence of serious 

organizational and ideological differences among its members. Gradually two groups 

were formed in the organization - led by Georgi Hadjiev 9 and led by Ivan Rachev 10 . 

Generally, the conflicts between them were focused on the methods of management of 

the Union, the ideas for cooperation with other immigrant political circles and ways and 

means to combat the communist regime in Bulgaria. 

The issue of political cooperation in the fight against the communist regime in Bulgaria 

was the subject of many discussion among immigrant anarchists in Paris in the first half 

of 1952. Part of the participants were categorically against cooperation with other 

political parties and organizations. There was also controversy between those who speak 

in favor of cooperation. During the process of seeking a common position on 

controversial issues, G. Hadjiev presented his project for Declaration on the liberation 

struggle of the Bulgarian people (the first draft of the Declaration he made during his stay 

in Constantinople, and after the establishment in Paris he offered it for discussion in the 

emigrant organization). Second project is presented by a group of anarchists that emerged 

around I. Rachev (project was written on February 16 and completed on February 24, 

1952). In May 1952, the official Declaration was adopted. It contained some of Rachev’s 

suggestions. "Current methods of struggle which are more passive and defensive rather 

than proactive and offensive, will not overthrow Bolshevism" was said in the Declaration. 

It called for organizing and unifying of "all the forces of internal resistance, and all 

progressive forces of Bulgarian emigration." Planned was coordination with agrarians, 

socialists, people that rejected Fascism and Bolshevism while each of the anti fascist and 

anti Bolshevik sectors keep their "full organizational and ideological independence". 

Concerning international cooperation, apart from definition of the circle of anarchist, 

socialists, agrarians and “all other progressive anti fascist and anti Bolshevik circles”, it 

was stated: “No cooperation with foreign countries that may have colonial, national, 

political, economic or social claims upon our country or people in the future”. 

Despite his participation in drafting of the Declaration, I. Rachev retained overall 

critical assessment about the document. He said “In its current form it is not my belief 

and action and I'm not satisfied and committed, although it lies at the root of my project". 

Rachev accused G. Hadjiev that following his "self-seeking, and megalomaniac appetites 

for power" he organized "smear campaign" and caused shock not only “upon the friends 

who accept the ideas of anarchism and cooperation in the name of liberty, understanding 

the hidden dangers that arise from it” but also upon “those of us who are against any kind 

of cooperation” 12 . 

Disputes on cooperation were also intertwined with various opinions on the methods of 

struggle against Bolshevism. I. Rachev and his followers openly blamed the "boss" (G. 

Hadjiev) for not seeking cooperation for “any revolutionary struggle against Bolshevism,

34 


or releasing our friends, relatives, people and our country from the Bolshevik occupation 

and tyranny". They also reminded that even in Bulgaria he has abandoned guerrilla 

movement "as a tool and a form of struggle for the overthrow of Bolshevism". They 

indicated that Hadjiev has chosen a week position "for verbal struggle against 

Bolshevism, as if war is not a struggle and there may be an anarchist, to put the point on 

the war and denies other forms and types of resistance, being satisfied with a purely 

military work and struggle”. The charges against G. Hadjiev were that "he wants to 

implement and to use any cooperation with those communities and individuals to make 

personal career and authoritarian "anarchist" party" 13 . 

The analysis of these ideological disputes and different positions in resolving the 

important issues shows that they turned to personal conflicts. I Rachev and his associates 

accused G. Hadjiev in an effort to establish a party, subject to him, despite all anarchist 

principles and ideals. According to them, in the discussion of making decisions G. 

Hadjiev attempted to “insert authority principles that impose the will of the majority over 

the minority and turns the organization to a tool in the hands of the majority, the ordering, 

commanding and dominant part of the organization and the “boss” himself” 14 . 

Being a man of action, alien to empty talks, Ch. Nestorov also spared no criticism upon 

G. Hadjiev saying about him: “He is not a honest man. He thinks one, but speaks another. 

He wants to impose his views while he is not talking honestly to his friends being 

hypocritical and “slippery”. These maneuvers of him annoy me” 15 . 

He set out his opinion about the status, goals and objectives of the organization of 

anarchists in the appeal "Let’s be sober" written on July 24 1952 and read at a meeting of 

the Paris Group on 15 August same year. He made a genuine and sincere determination: 

“The way we go is fatal! The chief stalks his opponents, they stalk him, and we are just a 

few jingos. This is the whole tragedy". Hr. Nestorov, as well as I. Rachev, believed that 

problems in immigrant anarchist movement are due to differences in the movement that 

existed in Bulgaria and continued to extend abroad. He also considered persecution of the 

anarchists and lack of responsibility by the so called “chiefs” to be one of the main 

problems of the organization... “These people scream now to lead a group but each one 

thinks himself to straightforward, orthodox, first class”. Nestorov was clear that full 

knowledge of the classic authors does not mean you're an anarchist. He said: “Deeds 

shows who is who” and “We deny ourselves in our deeds. We know the ideals but we 

don’t know their behest”. Hristo Nestorov called ideals to be the unifying point, leaving 

the ambition and vanity in achieving fraternity. Revealing the defects in the community 

of immigrant anarchists and the ambition to overcome them were in the context of the 

objectives of the struggle against the communist regime. He clearly declared his position: 

“Don’t you think that people-shadows behind the Iron Curtain stare at us with their eyes, 

stare like martyrs. They are waiting! Bu who they are waiting for... us! We cannot betray 

them. They are reaching out their weak hands for us. Great martyrs! We are the spark that 

keeps them alive... We have to know what we will do because people behind the Iron 

Curtain are waiting for our decisions tomorrow! We have to choose our roles in 

tomorrow's bloody theater on whose stage oppressed and oppressors will act. We must 

stand sentinel and guide the people’s fight and concentrate their indignation in that fight. 

This has to be our position. This is the point of our existence. This is the behest of our 

ideals“ 16 . Hristo Nestorov combined the idea of acts that support fight against communist 

rule with the needs of cooperating with members of other immigrant political 

organizations. A letter to friends on November 19, 1950 spoke of a meeting between


members of the National committee and Dr. G. M. Dimitrov. Nestorov defined the words 

of the agrarian leader as “small talk”. He summarized the meeting as: “He (Dimitrov) 

didn’t tell us anything, but only cried up what the National committee did”. The letter 

also reveals Nestorov’s expectations of the meeting: “We were just waiting for him to 

talk about our common deeds. We dropped him a hint that we are ready for joint 

coordinated actions to help our people in the country and release them from the severe 

situation...” Nestorov declared that “"it would be great to do something for the martyrs 

behind the curtain" 17 . In his memoirs I. Rachev also confirmed the willingness for active 

cooperation. He noted that soon after his arrival in Paris in February 1951, the Americans 

were interested and wanted to talk to him. I. Rachev was adamant that his answer could 

only be positive and said: "... in the interest of the struggle for the liberation of the 

Bulgarian people, I'm willing to talk to anyone, but I cannot be a whip or a gun in 

anyone’s hands" 18 . 

These facts, showing serious conflicts between immigrants anarchists, were directly 

related to the orientation of I. Rachev’s group about organizing an armed group to be 

transferred to Bulgaria and join the opposition. They upholded their views in ideological 

disputes within the organization revealing the motives for undertaking this difficult and 

risky task. As a result of the conflict among immigrants anarchists in September 1952 

Bogdan Stefanov (one of Nestorov’s aliases) and I. Rachev were excluded from the 

organization. Despite the common declaration which recognizes the need of more 

intensive actions in overthrowing the communist regime and the unification of all forces 

of resistance within the country, a decisive step towards deepening the crisis in the 

anarchy movement among the emigration was made. According to the facts stated in the 

bulletin, "In defense of anarchy” as early as August 20, 1952 a letter to the associates 

abroad was prepared. This letter reported their exclusion as a result of the unanimous 

decision of the organization in Paris. Although they said in the Declaration on the 

Bulgarian liberation that they reject any cooperation with the fascists, as a reason for the 

exclusion was stated as “dishonest behavior against the organization" consisting of 

cooperation "with the reactionaries and fascists to create a guerrilla movement in 

Bulgaria" led by Damian Velchev 19 . Nestorov and Rachev were accused in negotiating 

with “Zveno” in October 1951 and signing a declaration of cooperation with them in 

February 1952. In October 1952 the journal "Our way" published an official 

announcement that "Bogdan Stefanov and I. Rachev are excluded from the organization 

of the anarchists abroad”. This was because their activities are “incompatible with the 

moral and the principles of the anarchists”. The same issue reported that a “group of 

ideological friends” observed Doncho Karaivanov’s behaviour in Yugoslavia. They 

concluded that “his behavior is not in harmony with the movement he claims he belongs 

to” and D. Karaivanov "cannot and should not belong to the same ideological 

backgrounds and should no longer engages them" 20 . 

The active member of the anarchy organization in Paris in 1951 Ivan Drandov said that 

the exclusion of Rachev and Nestorov is due to their “cooperation with the U.S. Secret 

Service at the Embassy in Paris for military training to conduct fight against Bolshevism 

in Bulgaria" 21 . Drandov claimed that this happens through a monarchist-fascist officers 

without the knowledge of the organization. 

What was the position of the excluded? There is a document titled "Why I oppose the 

exclusion of Bogdan?" from 1952. In this document I. Rachev reasonably rejected all 

allegations against Hr. Nestorov. He criticized the lack of consistency among those who

36 


seek his exclusion from the organization. He refered to the “supporters of cooperation 

with the agrarians, socialists and other democratic and progressive parties, movements 

and individuals who believed and blamed Bogdan as a traitor for his cooperation with the 

Americans and “Zveno”. Rachev asked them if they know that along with the agrarians, 

members of the Bulgarian National Committee were also the members of “Zveno” as 

Vasil Yurukov and Prof. Dolapchiev. He noted that there are “dictatorial, reactionary, 

anti-popular, anti-anarchy, Bolshevik and fascist elements and acts in BAPU (Bulgarian 

Agrarian People’s Union). He concluded with the rhetorical question: “Doesn’t the ideas 

and actions of anarchists as G. Hadjiev, Dinyu Dinev, Zhelyazko Milanov contain 

authoritarian, totalitarian, dictatorial, anti anarhistic elements"? I. Rachev found strange 

that "opponents of any cooperation with the Americans and others” consider it 

worthwhile to receive U.S. grants to live, study, visit cinemas and theaters, to drink coffee 

or wine in Strasbourg, Paris etc. But at the same time they declared as a terrible crime and 

betrayal taking weapons, clothes and food from the Americans and "Fascists". Moreover 

this was the beginning of fighting and dying without any derogatory statements and 

commitments to renounce our ideas and our right to live according to them freely and 

criticize others' ideas and actions". His clear position was: “Bogdan has not committed 

any offense or betrayal of the ideas, organization, friends, associates and movement. If he 

has done something, he has said and done it himself and with the knowing of our friends 

but not against any people and institutions and without involving them in any conflict 

situations” 22 . 

The ambition of H. Nestorov to seek and establish connections with other immigrant 

communities and thereby to materially, financially and military provide mission in 

Bulgaria was unconditionally supported by I. Rachev, but not by all the other immigrant 

anarchists. The evaluation of the critics of the three in Nesterov’s group was expressed in 

the opinion of I. Drandov who called them "national heroes of the U.S. office” 23 . Despite 

the negative attitude of some of the anarchists immigrants, Hr. Nestorov, D. Karaivanov 

and M. Ivanov were convinced of the need to take immediate, decisive action to return to 

Bulgaria and participate in the fight against the communist regime. They connected with 

associates of U.S. intelligence, pass a special training course and then were transferred to 

Bulgaria in September 1953. 

Some of the documents stored in the private archive group of V. Momchev relate to the 

group Anarchists in Bulgaria. Among them is a report from July 1954 24 by D. 

Karaivanov. He and his wife managed to escape the blockade, leave the country and go 

back to Paris. The report describes the activities of the three emigrants from the parachute 

descent near the village of Pavel banya, Kazanlak, and the events of March 24, 1954, 

when an operation for their detection and eradication was deployed. The detailed 

statement of the facts related to the preparation and implementation of the mission aims 

to be a basis for the conclusions of D. Karaivanov regarding the dramatic turn of events 

that led to the tragic end of H. Nesterov and M. Ivanov. The report of D. Karaivanov 

reveals that that prior to the organizing of the team another action was planned but was 

never held. It was planned to be again under the leadership of Bogdan (Hr. Nesterov), but 

with two other young men 25 . 

According to the original plan, the entry in Bulgaria from Greece should have taken 

place in May-June 1953, but it did not happen. Heavy rains and flood of the Dospat river 

didn’t allowed the transfer of the group in Bulgaria. Meanwhile the American instructor 

Radley indicated another reason for postponing of the action. He stated that another


leader of a group was injured and captured while crossing the border and feared that this 

leader could betray the illegal channel. After an unsuccessful attempt to enter Bulgaria in 

the spring of 1953 the U.S. side offered participants in the group to be trained for a 

parachute drop. On September 22, 1953, three anarchists paratroopers landed their 

parachute in "Patereshtitsa" ((Patareshka Meadow) in the Balkan Mountains, north of 

Kazanlak. Among the reasons for the failure of Mission D. Karaivanov first set the period 

for transfer of the group which was in Autumn. Then in the mountains there were still 

shepherds and loggers and the paratroopers would hardly remain unnoticed. D. 

Karaivanov put few main points in his analysis. First he clearly stated that he and M. 

Ivanov were strongly opposed to their parachute descent in Autumn (which was the 

American suggestion) because of the people in the mountain during this period. But 

Bogdan (Hr. Nestorov) agreed with Radley because of his desire as soon as possible to 

settle in the area where the group will act as soon as possible 26 . One of the main problems 

set by D. Karaivanov was the question why "Patereshtitsa" was chosen for the landing 

despite it was not suitable for that. The first intention was a parachute drop over the hill 

"Banyanka" but plans changed because of the people there that could cost the disclosure 

of the mission. The second reason he saw in the fact that due to overweight, one of the 

containers detached from the parachute and crashed, losing valuable equipment for the 

mission. D. Karaivanov described the losses in details: “the backpack with my camera 

and dynamo, some spare parts for it, some food, clothes and my binoculars, with food 

Bogdanov’s backpack full of food and clothes along with his binoculars, butter, box of 

sugar, coffee, salt, rubber boots, two flaps, a couple of Schmeisers, a shotgun and a 

semiautomatic “Mauser” rifle. He said that they fail to find the other container. Later they 

found out that it fell “in front of a shepherd’s cottage and was plundered by two 

Karakachan brothers”. The result of these mistakes was the rapid spread of the news 

about the paratroopers: “ ...news soon became an open secret that spread throughout the 

county. Everyone was happy that paratroopers have come except us, because the secret of 

our arrival was compromised" 27 . Among the reasons for the failure D. Karaivanov 

indicated poor weapons as he says "lack of arms reflects the spirit and hence the action". 

He believed that: "if we had guns, we would have had another defense tactics as a group". 

He also concluded that the crash of the container not only marked their presence, but also 

deprived them of the opportunity to establish contact through the air or to defend 

themselves, which would have undoubtedly changed the events that happened to the 

group" 28 . Last but not least Karaivanov considered that the failure is mainly due to the 

poor organization of the mission by Radley. He expressed his outrage at Radley’s 

comments after his return to Paris. The only one survived member of the group said that 

the statement of Radley whereby containers should not be heavier than 60 kg., conflicted 

with his previous statements about the parachutes and their bearing capacity of 200 kg. 

Karaivanov directly stated that Radley was trying to avoid committing his mistakes. The 

Bulgarian said: “Radley is trying to impute his mistake to others”. D. Karaivanov was 

outraged by the way the causes of the failure of the group are described. He admitted that 

if he had failed to return "the victims of others' mistakes and problems in the organization 

would be too easily blamed for their own demise" 29 . 

In conclusion he was categorical: "Our mission failed. It was compromised from the 

very beginning" 30 . According to him, "if the organizer of the campaign, was a little more 

careful and skillful" events would likely have been otherwise 31 .

38 


The information in official documents (Ministry of Interior - MI) and the report of the 

only survivor were inconsistent on some issues related to the activities of the group. Thus, 

according to a report of the Ministry of Interior, published in the press, "the enemy group 

have not found any base for subversion or support among the population in the country". 

According to the weapons of the group, the report states that the group was “equipped 

with a large quantity of weapons, including a pistol with a suppressor". Besides that the 

group also possessed “4 portable radio stations with broadcasting transmitters RT-3, 

receiver type "RR-2B", "Babel" and "Bede" radio codes, encrypted tables, topographic 

maps, amount of 50 000 Bulgarian levas, 60 gold Turkish liras, high calorie food, vials of 

poison, clothing and other items". Official information is that saboteurs had maintained 

radio contact with the reconnaissance center in Paris and informed the "American masters 

about hopeless and critical situation in which they have fallen, and asked them for 

help" 32 . 

D. Karaivanov said for the weapons of the group: “Bogdan has a 9 mm gun with three 

magazines, one “Mauser” 7/65 mm pistol with two or three magazines, one “Beretta” 

7/65 mm gun with one magazine (later given to Emilia), a few 9 and 7/65 mm ammo, two 

English and one small Italian bombs and a knife. Karaivanov stated that his equipment 

was almost the same as Bogdan’s except his “Beretta” had its barrel twisted because of 

the container crash but had 6 extra magazines for Schmeiser. M. Ivanov had the same 

weapons, but "two English bombs plus a Russian gun given by the supporters along with 

three round magazines with 72 ammo and a straight with 23 ammo in it". Emilia, 

Karaivanov’s wife had the “Beretta" given by Bogdan and some spare ammo 7/65 mm. 

ammo and a hunting knife" 33 . 

As for the equipment that they had, D. Karaivanov said he jumped with the French 

apparatus for transmitting and receiving, and Bogdan – with the small one (other 

equipment was damaged due to the separation of container from the parachute and crash 

to the ground). In his report Karaivanov spoke about an unsuccessful attempt to establish 

radio contact on December 18, 1953 and for an established “incomplete and unclear 

contact with the Paris headquarters" a little later 34 . 

On the other hand, the statement in the official documents that paratroopers anarchists 

have not found any support among the local population, is in contradiction with the fact 

that in September 1954 eight people (from Pavel Banya and Gabarevo villages) were 

brought to trial. They were charged in “giving an asylum to persons who have joined the 

country's enemies and formed an armed group which aims to overthrow the people's 

democratic power through rebellion" 35 . 

In his report D. Karaivanov explained his conviction that finding the second container 

by the two Karakachan brothers was the main reason for revealing the presence of 

paratroopers in the area to the security forces. The circumstances about the disclosure of 

the group are more detailed in the National Security files and periodicals. A report of the 

National Security from May 20, 1955 states that there was a search in the area north of 

Kazanlak regarding spreading "enemy propaganda materials" from an "enemy" aircraft on 

22 September 23, 1953. During this search clothes and other belongings were found. 

Initial information that people were not dropped by a plane was refuted by an agent who 

gave information about the emerging M. Ivanov to the local Police Department. Along 

with that information, a National Security agent in Razlog obtained data for local people 

who have found the parachutes and other items during their stay as loggers in Kazanlak 

region. Then the security forces started an operation on detecting persons landed in this 

area in the autumn of 1953. The analysis of a hand-written note found there shows that its 

author is M. Ivanov. National Security agents gradually revealed the identity of the 

paratroopers and focused on their efforts in searching and capturing them near Pavel


Banya village 36 . A record appeared in the press 37 . In the record a scout described the fact 

of capturing the group in a documentary and artistic narrative style. The exposed version 

was basically according to facts established by the security forces. 

The tragic fate of paratroopers anarchists generated a doubt of treachery among 

anarchists immigrants from I. Rachev’s group. They connected the leak of information 

that reached Bulgarian authorities for the upcoming mission with the name of D. Hadjiev. 

Rachev said in his memoirs that Hr. Nestorov had shared with him his suspicions that D. 

Hadjiev was an agent of State Security. They both came up with that conclusion 

independently of each other. Bogdan thought that the boss was recruited by National 

Security in the summer of 1948 when he was arrested and then released. According to 

them both: "When Hadjiev was arrested he was very scared for his life and therefore 

accepted the offer to serve National Security. He was promised by the agents to be 

released immediately and be allowed to go to France through Turkey" 38 . On this occasion, 

I. Drandov wrote that in order to avoid arrest and trials in Bulgaria they used their 

Bulgarian correspondent B. Yanev, to "alerted for the arrival of the "heroes" in order to 

avoid future relations with the "revolutionaries" of the U.S. office". This was adopted by 

opponents as an act of betrayal, but he concludes that "all Bulgarian emigration in Paris 

knew about the mission and that’s why the Bulgarian Embassy also found out about it, 

through its agents" 39 . Among the archive files there is an issue of "P. Maznev” anarchy 

group in Debelets of 1991, which is an interview with Stefan Nikolov of Smochan 

village, who worked as an agent of Internal troops. He claimed that G. Hadjiev was in 

touchs with agents at the embassy in Paris and the leak for Hr. Nestorov’s group came to 

the Bulgarian authorities through this channel 40 . 

What are the summaries and conclusions that can be made based on the facts? Studied 

documents are an evidence for the reasons which made the three immigrant anarchists to 

participate in that dangerous mission organized with the assistance of the U.S. 

intelligence. The main motives for this are the lack of concern and activities by the 

immigration in order to support the resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria. 

Amid the conflicts among the immigrant anarchists and the differences in views upon the 

way of fight against communist rule Nestorov is deeply convicted that more action rather 

than theoretical disputes is needed. He chooses the way to Bulgaria to assist in creating an 

organized resistance movement in the country. Although the group leader H. Nesterov is 

described as a controversial figure in the archives, indisputable fact is that among the 

anarchists within the country and abroad he is known as a brave, uncompromising 

anarchist who shows his devotion to the ideas of anarchism. 

Available information shows that the mission of immigrant anarchists was doomed from 

the very beginning. Not only the negative attitude of some of the anarchists immigrants 

and some gaps in the organization in Bulgaria, but the lack of objective and accurate 

information about the situation in the country, determined the failure of the mission. 

According to Stoyan Tzolov, convicted in the trial against anarchists in 1948, "these 

dedicated and brave comrades ... had no precise idea of the real situation here and the 

complete uselessness of such an action ..." 41 . Studied documents do not give final and 

comprehensive answers to all questions related to the mission of the three anarchists. The 

betrayal thesis, thanks to which National Security gets information about the arrival of the 

group remains unclear. Details of the activities of paratroopers during the period 

September 1953 - March 1954 in an attempt to create an organized resistance movement 

against the Communist government also have to be analyzed in details. Still there is a 

lacks of sufficient information about the role of immigration beyond the anarchists’ 

community in the preparation and organization of the mission as well as contacts between

40 


the group of Hr. Nestorov and American intelligence, that supported the preparing and 

transferring of the group to Bulgaria. 

As a conclusion it should be noted that the objective and thorough analysis of the 

imposition of a communist regime and acts of resistance against it in Bulgaria in the 

second half of the 40's - early 50-ies of XX century requires a comprehensive study 

according to the participation of anarchists in political events after September 9, 1944 in 

Bulgaria and their place in the life of the Bulgarian political emigrants. 

References 

1. Стефанов, Пл. Горяните анархисти в Павелбанския район 1952–1954 г. – В: 

Българската опозиция и организираната съпротива в България 1944–1954 г. 

Материали от научната конференция в Сливен, юни 2000 г., Сливен, 2001, 193– 

199. [Stefanov, Pl. (Sliven 2001) The “Goriani” Anarchists in the Vicinity of Pavel 

Banya Village 1952–1954. – In: Bulgarian Opposition and Organized Resistance in 

Bulgaria 1944–1954. Proceedings of the conference in Sliven, June 2000, pp. 193– 

199]. 

2. Игнатова, А. Документи за горянското движение, съхранявани в Централен 

военен архив – гр. В. Търново. – В: Европа между Средновековието и 

съвременността. Юбилеен сборник в чест на проф. дин Радослав Мишев. 

Изследвания по случай 60 години от рождението му. В. Търново, 2009, 435-445. 

[Ignatova, A. (V. Tarnovo 2009) Documents of the “Goriani” Movement from the 

Central Military Archive - Veliko Tarnovo. – In: Europe between the Middle Ages 

and the Modern Times. Collection in honor of Prof. Radoslav Mishev on the 

Occasion of His 60th Anniversary, pp. 435-445]; Знакови акции срещу горяните 

(по документи от архивните фондове на Вътрешни и Гранични войски в 

Държавния военноисторически архив) – доклад, изнесен на Националната 

конференция „Съпротивата срещу комунистическия режим в България (1944– 

1989 г.), 23–24 март 2011 г. (под печат). [(March 2011) Significant Campaigns 

against the “Goriani” (on documents from the archive funds of Internal and Border 

Troops in the State Military Archives) – a paper presented at the National Conference 

“The Resistance against the Communist Regime in Bulgaria (1944-1989), in the 

press]. 

3. There is a lack in the Bulgarian historiography of comprehensive research on the 

history of the Anarchist movement in the country. One of the most comprehensive 

presentations of the history of anarchism in Bulgaria is D. Daskalov’s book 

“Anarchism in Bulgaria” (1995). 

4. Hristo Dimitrov Nestorov was known by the aliases Shtako (in Gabarevo), Itsata 

(called by friends), Gancho (a partisan name as a commander of the Tazhenski 

combat detachment), Bogdan Stefanov, Dobrin, Strahil (as an immigrant in Italy and 

France). He was born on March 3, 1903 in the village of Gabarevo, Kazanlak district. 

In 1928, he was arrested in Sofia for the robbery of the Standing Committee in Sofia. 

He received a life sentence, which he served in prisons in Sofia, Vratsa, Pazardzhik, 

Stara Zagora. He was pardoned in January 1940. Nestorov was one of the first 

partisans in Bulgaria, who in 1940 founded the Tazhenski detachment. In the summer 

of 1944 he left the detachment wandering alone in the mountains to September 9, 

1944. After the establishment of the government of the Fatherland Front there was an 

attempt Nestorov to be arrested and executed but his friends anarchists in Gabarevo 

helped him escape. He joined the Communist Party and was appointed commandant


of the Gabarevo district with the rank of lieutenant. In 1946, he quit the Bulgarian 

Workers’ Party – communis. On June 18, 1948, he emigrated with Panteley 

Dzhumakov to Italy crossing the Turkish border. Later he settled in Paris. In 1953, 

together with M. Ivanov and D. Karaivanov Nestorov managed to make a parachute 

jump near Pavel Banya. Nestorov was killed on March 1954 during a campaign of the 

Internal troops. 

5. No biographical data for Doncho Karaivanov was found in the examined documents. 

The only information that gives an idea of Karaivanov’s immigrant life are the 

memoirs of Ivan Rachev who wrote that in early 1951, D. Karaivanov with three 

Bulgarians were in prison in Kovachitsa, Yugoslavia. – See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 

1450, оп. 4, а.е. 117, л. 45 [Veliko Tarnovo State Archives, f. 1450, op. 4, a.u. 117, 

p. 45]. 

6. Milyu Ivanov Ivanov was born on April 1, 1922 in the village of Pavel Banya, 

Kazanlak district. He studied at the Mechanical Technical School in Kazanlak, where 

he fell under the influence of anarchism. According to the memoirs of S. Tzolov in 

December 1948, during a mass arrest of anarchists M. Ivanov managed to cross 

illegally the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border together with Tr. Marulevski, I. Drandov and 

others. – See Цолов, С. Спомени, 461–462 [Tsolov, S. Memoirs, pp. 461-462]. 

According to the information in “In defense of anarchy” newsletter, M. Ivanov and 

Tr. Marulevski together with others, illegally left the country in May 1950. M. Ivanov 

originally stayed in a camp in Niš and then moved to work in Kragujevac, where he 

remained until November 1950. He was a student at the Physics and Mathematics 

Faculty of the Belgrade University for a short period. He moved through camps and 

prisons in Yugoslavia, Austria, Germany and France. He settled in Paris. As a 

member of Nestorov’s group, he returned to Bulgaria in the autumn of 1953 and was 

wounded and captured during the operation carried out by the Internal Forces and 

State Security in March 1954. The first trial, held in the autumn of 1954 against him 

ended with a 20-year sentence. The second trial in 1955 sentenced him to death. 

7. (V. Tarnovo 2009) Documents of the “Goriani” Movement from the Central Military 

Archives - Veliko Tarnovo, pp. 439–440. 

8. Stefanov, Pl. Op. cit., p. 197. 

9. Georgi Hadjiev was born on April 16, 1906 in Gorna Oryahovitsa, V. Tarnovo 

district. He was influenced by the ideas of anarchism as a high school student in 

Veliko Tarnovo. Hadjiev emigrated after the coup in June 9, 1923. In 1930 he took a 

diploma in agronomic sciences in Toulouse, France. In 1931 he returned to Bulgaria. 

During the Spanish Civil War, he moved to Spain where he represented FACB 

(Federation of Anarchist Communists in Bulgaria). He returned in Bulgaria during 

World War II and worked as an agronomist in Burgas until 9 September, 1944. In 

December 1948 he crossed the Turkish border illegally and then settled in France. He 

is one of the founders of the Union of Bulgarian Overseas Anarchists. The journal 

“Our Way” was published under his leadership. 

10. Ivan Rachev was born on January 26, 1902 in the village of Pavel Banya, Kazanlak 

district. He finished the Pedagogical School in Kazanlak in 1920 and graduated at 

Sofia University in 1929 with first major in natural history. He was a teacher for 

about 20 years. In 1945, he was convicted for anarchist ideas and was sent to the 

camp in Dupnitsa. He left Bulgaria on February 13, 1949. Rachev spent 13 months in 

Yugoslavia and nine months in Italy. In February 1951 he settled in France. 

11. See Хаджиев, Г. Вчерашни, днешни и утрешни проблеми. С., 1991, 173-175 

[Hadjiev, G. (1991) Yesterday’s, Today’s, and Tomorrow's Problems, pp. 173-175].

42 


12. See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 1450, оп. 4, а.е. 149, л. 24 [Veliko Tarnovo State Archives, 

f. 1450, op. 4, a.u. 149, p. 24). 

13. Ibid., л. 26-27 [pp. 26-27;. 

14. Ibid., а.е. 118, л. 9-10 [a.u. 118, pp. 9-10]. 

15. Ibid., а.е. 151, л. 152 [a.u. 151, p. 152]. 

16. Ibid., л. 168-171 [pp. 168-171]. 

17. Ibid., л. 149-150 [pp. 149-150]. 

18. Ibid., а.е. 17, л. 40 [a.u. 17, p. 40]. 

19. Ibid., а.е. 118, л. 34 [a.u. 118, p. 34]. 

20. Ibid., оп. 5, а.е. 108, сп. „Наш път”, октомври 1952 г. [op. 5, a.u. 108, Our Way 

Magazine, October 1952]. 

21. See Дръндов, И. Документи за историята на Съюза на българските 

безвластници в чужбина – СББЧ от 1950 до 2000 г. Франция, 2000, 13-14 

[Drandov, I. (France 2000) Documents for the History of the Union of Bulgarian 

Overseas Anarchists from 1950 to 2000, pp. 13-14]. 

22. See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 1450, оп. 4, а.е. 110, л. 1-4 [V. Tarnovo State Archives, f. 

1450, op. 4, a. u. 110, pp. 1-4). 

23. Drandov, I. Op. cit., p. 16. 

24. See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 1450, оп. 4, а.е.120, л. 1-16. (с. 10-12 – по номерацията 

на доклада) [V. Tarnovo State Archives, f. 1450, op. 4, a.u. 120, pp. 1-16 (pp. 10-12 

of D. Karaivanov’s report)]. Several pages from D. Karaivanov’s report are missing. 

25. Ibid ., л. 11 [ p. 11]. In his memoirs I. Drandov mentions the names of Ivan Mutev and 

Hr. Shumulzhiev who quit the group (See Drandov, I. Op.cit., p. 14). 


1450, op. 4, a.u. 210, pp. 1-2). 

27. Ibid., л. 3-4 [pp. 3-4]. 

28. Ibid., л. 13 [p. 13]. 

29. Ibid., л. 14 [p. 14]. 

30. Ibid., а.е. 120, л. 9 [a.u. 120, p. 9]. 

31. Ibid., л. 14 [p. 14]. 

32. See Отечествен фронт, бр. 3243, 4 февр. 1955 [Fatherland Front Newspaper, issue 

3243, Feb. 4, 1955]. 

33. See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 1450, оп. 4, а.е. 120, л. 8 [V. Tarnovo State Archives, f. 

1450, op. 4, a.u. 120, p. 8]. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid., а.е. 123, л.19-20 [a.u. 123, pp. 19-20]. 

36. See АМВР, ф. 2, оп. 1, а.е. 1292, л. 26-27 [the Ministry of Internal Affairs Archives, 

f. 2, op. 1, a.u. 1292, pp. 26-27]. 


1450, op. 4, a.u. 123, pp. 23-29]. 

38. Ibid., а.е. 118, л. 62 [a.u. 118, p. 62]. 

39. Drandov, I. Op.cit., p. 15. 

40. See ДА–В. Търново, ф. 1450, оп. 5, а.е. 100, л. 4-8 [Veliko Tarnovo State Archives, 

f. 1450, op. 5, a.u. 100, pp. 4-8]. The memoirs of St. Nikolov about his work in the 

Internal Troops were published in Демокрация, бр. 244–247, 4–7 дек. 1990 

[Democracy Newspaper, issue 244-247, Dec. 4-7, 1990]. 

41. Tsolov, S. Op. cit., p. 451.

BULGARIAN LABOUR CAMP LITERATURE 

GENRE AND MEMORY 

Vladimir DONEV 1 

Abstract: In the article the author explores the genre peculiarities of prose written in encampment. 

Dostoyevsky’s House of the Dead transforms the sense of Dante’s carmen horrendum as a genre, 

giving it a new functionality: the descent into hell as a moral allegory; the exemplum and personal 

trials in the narrator’s (diary) confessions and spiritual biography; the sinners’ portraits, full of 

naturalism, emotion and details with their mix of irony and grotesqueness; the consciousness of 

the metaphysical aspect of life. The specific character of the genre is analyzed in the book "Belene. 

The Story of Concentration Camp Bulgaria" (2003), by Stefan Bochev, the most important 

representative writer of this literature in Bulgaria. 

In debates on literature of the recent past in Bulgaria were used phrases such as: of the 

Nations Republic of Bulgaria literature, socialist realism, socialist realism canon, 

official literature, alternative literature, illegal literature among others. In this paper 

under antitotalitarian literature we do not mean the literature "near", "although", but 

“against” official literature and the theory and poetics of socialist realism with all the 

changes in its development during the socialist period 1946-1990. This is another 

literature in its political orientation, values and ideological strain, distributed through 

illegal channels, bearing the risk of direct repression and threat to the writer’s life. 

Genres of antitotalitarian literature are the labour camp prose and poetry, prison 

literature, emigration literature of the period to 10. XI. 1989, literature of the Bulgarian 

Turks, written against the policy of renaming and expatriation of this minority in the last 

years of socialism. Under the "alternative literature" are outlined the different degree and 

form of deviations from the norms of official literature - behaviors, styles, poetics, ideas 

and fictional achievements in the framework of the socialist realism, conflicts, debates on 

aesthetic issues in the then literary process. The alternative literature is unfolded in a 

broad field between the official and antitotalitarian literature. It is complementary to the 

products of socialist realism. 

In this text we will examine two aspects in the poetics of labour camp memoirs - the 

status of the witness-narrator and the genre peculiarities from the perspective of literature 

as it would highlight the artistic merit of some memoirs of communist regime in Bulgaria 

and would look for their place in the prose tradition. 

According Ivaylo Znepolski memories of experiences cannot be classified as literature, 

although the autobiographical elements imply chronological narrative and intrigue. They 

cannot be attributed to historical reading. The renowned researcher of communism in 

Bulgaria compares them with various other genres such as oral history, socio-anthropological 

inquiry, and autobiographical narrative diaries. In the spirit of the argument for the dissolution 

of the big stories (Francois Lyotard), the author points out that small stories about the socialist 

past also have their place in maintaining two basic narratives of socialism - progressive- 


44 


egalitarian and, the second, the interpretation of the socialism as a totalitarian governance, 

inflicted irreparable damage on the Bulgarian mentality, traditional community and social 

structures. In the perspective of Foucault is seen also the theme of the historical archive as a 

complex network of discourses, events, attitudes. 

Subjective status of the speaker in the memories is interpreted in the function of the 

witness in the theoretical works of Giorgio Agamben. The witness speaks for those who 

are silent. The narrator of memories manifests their subjectivity, but occupies the space of 

other suffering individuals. This builds the specific authority of the one who remembers 

"to speak only on behalf of a lack of ability to speak". The subject of the narration 

appears as the representative of a community - family, kin, friends and followers. There is 

a discrepancy between the subject of the action and the subject of narration, a distance 

between the person who has experienced certain events and remembers them in the 

present, the action in real life and in the story. Another common feature of storytelling is the 

large scale of representation - quality that reveals the trend autobiographical narratives to 

extend beyond a certain era and to be compared to previous historical periods. 

Besides these valuable theoretical and methodological observations we are interested in 

the sources for occurrence of fictional into the camp memoirs. The questions that arise are 

related to the discursive presentation of a concentration camp experience, where there are 

tracks of archetypal matrices, mythologemes, fictional stories remain in the "archives of 

spoken things". Memoirs are created not only through biographical illusion (Pierre 

Bourdieu) or modal biographies (Giovanni Levi), revealing the common in the experience 

of the witnesses. In this "archive" we may include also plot cores with their literary 

variations, where they sprout treatments, reminiscences and allusions to the characters 

and motives of carmen horrendum, to form the modern horror song - camp memoir and 

prose fiction. In many narratives with autobiographical basis occurs artistic model of the 

camp experience through the story of the descent into hell and its allegorical basis. This is 

One Day of Ivan Denisovich and The Gulag Archipelago of Solzhenitsyn, the memory 

book Is This a Man of Italian writer Primo Levi, to some extent the memories Another 

World of Polish writer Gustav-Herling Grudzhinski, in Kolyma Tales of Varlam 

Shalamov, despite the different experiences of the authors in their confrontation with 

fascist and repressive Stalinist system. 

In the genre of labour camp memoirs emerges the powerful fictional interpretation of 

Dante’s carmen horrendum by Dostoevsky in The House of Dead which from the XIX 

century became a generator of active dialogues with later works of the corresponding 

genre, thematic and compositional similarities. It is not to forget the similar psychological 

mechanism in the response to the extraordinary suffering, which is formed in the matrix 

of mythological descent to hell of human suffering, but by updating the story in an 

existential and fictional experience of labour camp prose in the twentieth century. 

In the memoirs of Stephen Bochev some of these dialogues speak up and this makes us 

look at the fictional layer in their structure. In a broader perspective, we meet with the 

notion of a particular type of literariness in Dostoevsky's The House of Dead, which 

genre particularity includes the allegorical plot, the personal experience as a kind of 

example in the confession and the spiritual biography of the narrator, the vision and the 

awareness of the metaphysical aspects of experience, gallery of portraits of "sinners" and 

"violators", filled with naturalism, emotion and specific features, the controversy of moral 

values, the role of irony, satire and the grotesque in fictional mixture of the narrative. 

The subjective status of witness can be analyzed in the expanded role of the speaker - 

the narrator expresses a polemical moral position, makes national and sociological 

observations woven into one of the variants of the plot of hell - the descent into the depths

Vladimir DONEV: Bulgarian Labour Camp Literature Genre and Memory 45 

of people's suffering. The representation of the inhuman suffering in the camps is created 

through its literary treatment in the "archive" of inherited discourses. In his memoirs 

Bochev uses a language of feuilleton and allegory, a dialogue with the dystopian fiction, 

there are some expanded metaphors in the text of the whole book, lyricism and fine 

feeling for nature in contrast with the wolf nature of human relations in the camp and the 

tyranny of the era. Segmentation of the episodes is not only according to the principle of 

single camp scenes, the writer seeks the inner meaning behind the specific case, the 

allegory of survival, using attractive tittles, provoking the reader to follow and join 

excerpts from autobiographical memory story as memoirs fictional synthesis. 

Stefan Bochev was born in 1910. In the autumn of 1929 he arrived in Zurich, where he 

studied law and attended the faculties of literature, philosophy and history. At the end of 

September 1930 in Geneva, enrolled law and graduated in 1933, specializes in University 

of International Studies (1934-1936). In the autumn of 1934 became a correspondent of 

the Washington Post for Geneva. By the autumn of 1933 he is the only Bulgarian 

journalist accredited to the League of Nations in Geneva. In 1938 he was chief of cabinet 

under Georgi Kiosseivanov mandate. In the period 1939-1941 he was a diplomat in 

Stockholm and then two years in Switzerland. In the autumn of 1945 came back to 

Bulgaria, leaving his wife and child abroad. He acts as the first legation secretary in Sofia 

(Oct. 1945 - Dec., 1947). In October 1946 participated in the memorable opposition rally, 

organized by Nikola Petkov (leader of the farmers in Bulgaria, who was killed by 

communists in 1947), which is stamped after the communist government. He was fired 

and thrown into the labour camp on the island of Persin in 1949. The first imprisonment 

is 18 months - from May 1949 to November 1950. Briefly he is freed, then he is sent 

back to the labour camp until 1953 (after Stalin's death and movement of the political 

layers in the Communist dictatorships of the Soviet bloc). In the era of socialism he worked as 

a porter, builder, "intellectual potter" - translator in enterprises of the socialist economy. 

From the viewpoint of the generation the author belongs to the generation of Bulgarian 

diplomats born in the years between 1885-1910, which can be imagined as a collective 

civil and cultural type (or mentality) in the Bulgarian public history. These are important 

names in Bulgarian "bourgeois" diplomacy as Peter Neykov, Stoicho Moshanov, Stefan 

Popov, Evgeni Silyanov, Stefan Gruev, Stefan Gechev and others. All of them, despite 

their brilliant diplomatic training and education, democratic beliefs, impressive erudition, 

broad knowledge of literature, history and culture, end their career with political 

dismissals after 9. IX. 1944. Some of them wrote their memoirs before 10. XI. 1989, but 

tailored to varying degrees with the official view at the time of socialism and the 

inevitable self-censorship. Those who survived after repression are transformed into inner 

emigrants who were hidden from the public eye, and they practiced very unusual 

professions in contrast with their vocation and career in the diplomatic area before 9. IX. 

1944. This is the case with Stefan Bochev. After 10. XI. 1989, he describes his life before 

the establishment of communist dictatorship in his book My Portrait as a Journalist and 

Diplomat (2009), and the labour camp experience in the volume Belene. The Story of 

Concentration Camp Bulgaria (2003). 

Bochev defines the genre of his memoirs as "symphony", "cacophony", "litany for the 

destruction of Bulgarian human beings." This is an autobiographical narrative in first person 

using the same plot for the intelligent who descend into the depths of people's suffering like 

the plot in Dostoevsky’s The House of Dead, but reaching insights and lessons into the 

controversy with the mentality of the socialist society, diplomatic, political and sociological 

analyzes of the Bulgarian fate. The main purpose of the narrative about the Bulgarian

46 


concentration camps is the call to true. Stefan Bochev understands that the path to truth is 

extremely difficult in Bulgaria. He believes that the individual and all people must face it, in 

order to say the true. This should be done without malice, in the spirit of trying to understand 

the other party, that of the oppressors. The author is clearly aware that his story is part of the 

Bulgarian destiny, so he does not pretend to have a higher position of his experience, he 

shares the historical experience of his generation. This is the power of high awareness of the 

mission of the story. The witness does not judge and does not justify the participants, he 

argues indirectly with different views, but tries to explain the reasons for the tragic events 

drawing lessons for the generation from them. 

The narrator leads the reader to associations with Dante's Inferno, when he thinks over 

the genesis of evil in the Bulgarian political-historical destiny and bitterly noted that in 

Dante's "imaginary view of the afterlife" the convicts receive a sentence by the Lord, 

while the Bulgarian executioners surpass their Soviet teachers in the forms of lawlessness 

and misery, to which they subject the prisoners. On the island of Persin The House of 

Dead is read not because the sufferings are like those in the novel by Russian writer, on 

the contrary - with "sighs of envy" Solzhenitsyn talks in his The Gulag Archipelago about 

the light regime of convicts in Russia and Bochev was also impressed by the "slow, 

walking pace" of the prisoners who could buy boiled beef and cakes when they have a 

break. He is amazed by the fact that Dostoevsky had the opportunity to pay to the cook 

for a special menu, which happened not to bribe, but by rule. 

The plot of the descent into hell repeats the scheme in The House of Dead where the 

nobleman approaches to the lives of his people in order to suffer with them. Stefan 

Bochev, diplomat and journalist with a brilliant opportunity for personal achievements 

abroad, after the establishment of communist dictatorship in our country, refuses to 

remain in Switzerland and nobly returns home to experience the terror of the communist 

regime. Purity and idealism, high sense of duty and responsibility to the people, sincere 

pain for Bulgarian fate rise in his prayers to God, in which the writer thanked for his 

meetings with wonderful ordinary Bulgarians during their endurement. Honesty, humility 

and patriotism can be found in his preference not to speak of "my country", "my people", 

but to feel himself as part of a common destiny. 

One of the highlights is the polemics with the mentality of the socialist society in 

Chapter 51 "We are not heroes." Bochev´s dispute is colored by the irony to the ideology, 

power and mentality of the socialist society. This is a direct clash with the values taught 

in anti-fascist fiction, memoirs and official versions of the historical struggle of the 

communists to power. The people are separated from their "heroes". 

The indirect dispute is based on excellent historical reasoning and diplomatic 

preparation, showing that the author has thought over his arguments. Here Bochev 

appropriately reminds the alliance between Germany and Soviet Union about the division 

of Europe, an alliance between fascism and socialism through the Molotov-Ribbentrop 

Pact of August 24, 1939, which turns both countries in allies in the war. By June 22, 1941 

in Bulgaria there are no guerrillas, fighting against the "Nazi", "Hitlerism", "Nazi 

Germany" because the two forces are allies. He rightly points out that the "heroes" of the 

so-called "anti-fascist struggle" won after the entry of the Red Army in Bulgaria. The 

power cannot be defined as "people’s" because there is no free vote. In the controversy 

there are comparisons with ancient names, witty verbal games are included - "you free 

your red herring and try to sell their green caviar", "unique five-year course in truth" 

(about the experience at the camp on the island of Persin), "he eated all his lifetime crabs 

with beer and red caviar and vodka ", "black caviar is not a healthy diet " (about the life of


a famous socialist author of criminal and spy novels in Bulgaria Bogomil Rainov) and others. 

In the genre mixture of Bochev’s text there is a series of feuilletons that reach the best 

examples of Bulgarian antitotalitarian journalism - "What if Abracadabra is wrong?", 

"Enraged hen", "Russian salad". Bochev uses the language of satire and feuilleton in the 

worst periods of his life - in the brief release of the two stays on the island of Persin. The 

political repression on him and his parents is so strong that reality is perceived as a 

schizophrenic split. He recognizes that under the weight of experience, his subconscious 

gives birth to allegorical dream-feuilletons in order to be able to withstand the 

immensurable psychological burden. 

The allegory is unfolded also in the diary of the island of Persin, which has a special 

function in the genre of the memoirs (Persin Island is the largest Bulgarian island in the 

Danube River, which was built one of the first concentration camps in Bulgaria in 1949. 

There are gathered politicians, officers, employees, diplomats, peasants - all who 

disagreed with the Communist dictatorship of the new government. The camp was 

officially closed in 1953 after Stalin's death, but in practice was used until 1985-1989, 

when Todor Zhivkov's regime expelled the Bulgarian Turks. On the island there was a 

farm and the inmates dig strengthening dikes along the river around the town of Belene). 

Humor and irony compare human and animal features in a space with a divine nature, 

which at the same time represents the labour camp hell. On one hand the life in the camp 

is filled with funny scenes of bull fights between citizens and calves, while citizens are 

learn how to raise cattle. The analogy between human and animal herd is unfolded in 

different definitions of "hegemony of the big stick" named as the "centralism", "ordinary 

tsarism" for the "four-leg cousins" that the inmates herdsmen try to appease. On the other 

hand, the nature awakens a sense of lyrical beauty and majesty of creation, even in hellish 

conditions of life there is tendency to confessions, essay fragments and philosophical 

attitude to the world. In chapters such as "The talking bush" and "God of the frogs and 

worms" can be seen similarities with the stories of the famous Bulgarian narrator 

Radichkov as "The fragile ax". These fragments expresses philosophy of equality 

between man and animal, the fragile harmony in the natural world, questions of the 

microcosm of worms, frogs and place of "their god" - the man in the universe. 

An expanded metaphor of the Danube River and Island Persin has been used in a similar 

way as Solzhenitsyn expand his basic fictional analogies - the metaphor of the 

archipelago of camps and cancer metastases in Soviet society. Bochev expresses also a 

religious sense of the world as Solzhenitsyn (Bochev was a Protestant and his father 

Petko Bochev suffered from the measures of State security, not only because he was 

chairman of the Chamber of Commerce before 9. IX. 1944, but because of the cases 

against the Bulgarian Protestants). Similarities are found in the role of narrator, who is not 

just a witness, but an analyst and polemicist, seeking higher meaning in the ordeal. The 

island as a topos awakes mythological and literary reminiscences of different levels. 

In the whole text the infernal space of the camp is actually structured by expanded 

metaphors in the architectonics of the whole Belene. The Story of Concentration Camp 

Bulgaria - "Barn along the Danube" (first part), "Danube near the barn" (Part Two) "Barn 

with trams" (Part Three ). The titles of three parts play with different points of views of 

the socialist camp reality. The part "Barn along the Danube" compares the great river and 

camp on the island of Persin (the word "barn" gradually associated in the story with 

Orwell’s Animal Farm, Bulgaria becomes "animal farm"). The second part "Danube near 

the barn" looks at the whole country, the third part "Barn with trams" sarcastically refers 

to the capital city as a mixture of apparently modern, but in essence unclean living space. 

Several metaphorical meanings can be identified in the group of images river-island-time

48 


in the memoirs. Several major plans are accumulated in the entire corpus of memoirs. 

The approach of comparing the communist dictatorship with the distant human past and 

return back to the barbarism of the achievements of civilization is offered by Solzhenitsyn 

more in the preface to the first volume of Archipelago, which describes an incident in 

1949 - an example of primitive thinking of the homo sovieticus. That year in the journal 

Nature of the Russian Academy of Sciences releases a document how during the 

excavation of the Kolyma River in a frozen prehistoric stream were found representatives 

of the fossil fauna of several thousand years. The discoverer of the frozen remains 

ignored the requirements of ichthyology, melt the meat, bake it in a fire and eat it. Stefan 

Bochev describes a similar case in the chapter "What on earth was that?", in which those 

people digging the channels along the Danube unexpectedly discovered trident if "it is 

taken out of the hands of the Greek god Poseidon as a present by the artists of the 

Renaissance". One of the inmates found a stone ax from the Neolithic period, but broke 

one end. Finding of thousands of years is destroyed by a modern troglodyte. "And all 

night I, the troglodyte of the Twentieth Century, talk with them, the troglodytes, created a 

prototype thirty thousand years ago" - the author concludes sadly. 

The digging of the dikes along the Danube reminds the slavery building of Belomor 

Channal in The Gulag Archipelago. Several thousand prisoners on the island of Persin are 

naked, "three thousand black human monkies", "picture of the Stone Age." "The local 

troglodytes" use techniques from the Neolithic period. The villagers assemble constructions 

without nails, with hand-made tools use "wooden nails", materials "tied with ropes of twisted 

thin flexible willow branches". Bathing in camp Persin is worse than in Nazi camps in the 

memories of Primo Levi in his book Is This a Man. The Germans allowed the prisoners to 

bath in one or two weeks, while on Persin Island this was allowed once in 4-5 years. 

"Neolithic" analogy is unfolded throughout the whole text of the narrative. 

In the first association with Ancient mythology the Danube is compared with the waters of 

Styx, "the river of hate" in the kingdom of Hades. The Persin Island happen to be Isle of the 

Dead, the Buried Live. In a second aspect the narrator, returning from the world of the living 

to the Island of dead, perceives the Danube as Acheron River, one of the five rivers in the 

underworld of Hades, called "the river of pain" in which the deity carries the souls of the dead 

in its boat. The third reference to the ancient Greek mythological associations is related to the 

mission of memoirist. The river Danube turns into Lethe, the river of oblivion, where the 

chronicler immerses his pen to convey the memory and the experience for the generations. 

Biblical associations are related to a myth of God’s path and judgment. Chapter 136 

"Outbreak" is a hymn of faith and admiration at the strength of nature with impressive 

spring pictures. Dunabe symbolizes the nurturing and renewing power of the life. 

An important aspect of the construction of the space of the hell in the text is that it may 

be realized as heaven for the wonderful nature, faith and fortitude. In the chapter "The 

congress of Persin" Bochev says that the only place where you can talk freely in Bulgaria 

at the time of socialism, are the camps because there still exists disobedience. In 

"Paradise is here" inner vision of the narrator transforms hell into heaven. This is the 

function of the vision as a genre and attempt of the religious consciousness to rise above 

the burden of the labour camp life. 

Bulgaria's image moves away from Renaissance tradition in which the country is 

represented as a weeping woman. Bochev associated Bulgaria with Virgin Mary pointing 

to "the Way, Truth and Life". The picture expresses atmosphere of an all-pardoning and 

peacemaking religious feeling. Oxen, cornfield, floating in a sea of golden waves Marie 

reminds interpretation of the classical Bulgarian writer Jordan Yovkov to the vision and 

the image of Jesus in the short novel The Reaper. Meanwhile, the colours, the suspension 

of time and motion in the scene trigger fictional elements, some moments remind


paintings of Bulgarian artist Vladimir Dimitrov-The Master. At another point by the 

power of internal vision and symbolic understanding of reality tormented parents look 

like angels, "the skinny shoulders of my father were wings". The place, where the writer’s 

comrades were killed, radiates "concentric circles light - waves of radiance". 

For the first time in Bulgarian prose Stefan Bochev builds artistic image of the Danube 

as an area of misery and suffering of the political victims of the communist regime. In 

2005 came the novel by Atanas Lipchev Quiet White Danube on the published memoirs 

of victims, creating a true artistic picture of the physical and psychological abuse on the 

victims and their relatives in socialist Bulgaria. The good chosen title, however, remains 

only a metaphor, in the work lacks an image of the great river and the traces of a personal 

touch to the beauty of nature with a flair for lyrical coloring, hidden allegory behind 

plastic landscape and its pictorial force, philosophical perspectives. Ancient mythological 

code after Bochev is used by Emil Andreev in his story “The Island of Drunks” (1999), 

only in parodic plan. The Danube is a "mythical border to the next world", but ancient 

heritage is perceived as "pure local, Thracian-Greek nonsense", Kerkeneza - "island of 

drunks" - becomes a space for "an escape" in this and the hereafter life of the characters. 

Labour camp prose depicts as reversed certain motifs in the so called September Literature, 

in which the Danube is a place of the dead rebels victims during September uprising of 1923 - 

beginning of the civil conflict in Bulgaria during the twentieth century (for example the ballad 

“Drowned” (1925) by Asen Raztsvetnikov). Characters and motifs also from the anti-fascist 

literature (which is one of the leading genres of socialist realism in Bulgaria) unconsciously or 

ideologically motivated are imitated with an opposite sign. This is the case with the memories 

of Jordan Valchev, which sometimes can be read as a quote to the works of anti-fascist prose 

of another famous Bulgarian writer Yordan Radichkov. 

Jordan Valchev (1924-1998) is one of the most talented Bulgarian writers. He debuted 

as an author of military stories with his book Battles (1947), dedicated to Bulgaria's 

participation in the second phase of the war as ally of the Soviet Union, USA and 

England. Because of a press review grading his stories as filled with "abstract humanism" 

and not with communist ideology, he was imprisoned (1952-1953) and sent to the camp 

Kutsiyan. Detained and investigated several times in false allegations by State Security 

until 1989. His camp memoirs are published in three books With the Dossier Forward 

(1993), Man on Trial (1994), Kutsiyan (1994). Along with Yordan Radichkov he is 

considered as one of the representatives of magical realism in Bulgarian literature with 

the collection We Were Born Dragons (1968). 

Jordan Valchev describes a case with some political prisoners in 1958 in his book With 

the Dossier Forward. Those sentenced to death were taken by car with a legend "Bread 

and bakery products", taken from a nearby plant for bread. This led the writer to use a 

metaphor for the victim as bread, when Communist torturers executed death sentences. 

This case is a quote of the collection of anti-fascist stories by Radichkov Gunpowder 

Primer which presents the image of Angel Koloff, a helper to the communist resistance. 

Kalburov, the traitor in the memories of Valchev, can be read as a mirror image, duplicate 

of the character Leko Aleksov in Radichkov’s book. 

In another memory Valchev tells about one of his detentions by State Security because 

of suspicion of illegally distributed copies of his story "The corporal who went on the 

square“, written by a true story from October 1944. In this work is recreated the story of a 

corporal who formed up his battery against the bulding of the communist militia, turned 

their guns and prepared to shoot in defense of charismatic captain patriot Pramatarov. 

The story of brave corporal is the opposite of "quiet" heroism shown by the character in 

the story "Soldier" by Radichkov, when he spreads the truth about the communist

50 


guerrillas saying that they are "people’s protectors", not robbers. 

The notion of "the beautiful island" leads us also to literary reminiscences with genres 

of utopian and dystopian fiction. This is the Island of Thomas More, but also the fulfilled 

totalitarian utopia on the island of Persin. The author debunks it in different ways - with 

export truths and analyzes about the camp system and the strains in the new society, by 

polemical and journalistic moments, but also with the artistic skills of the grotesque, 

allegorical approach inherent in George Orwell's dystopian fiction. Stefan Bochev’s 

memoirs used some expressive means of dystopian fiction because socialist realism is 

commensurated with utopia, and the labour camp literature became its genre antipode. At 

several places the author mentions that Orwell's books influenced him greatly, which 

triggers imaging analogies with the famous novels Animal Farm and 1984. 

The novel Animal Farm processes the myth about the new order established in the 

society after the rebellion of the animals and the book ends with a grotesque image of 

pigs to feast with their enemies - men, but we cannot distinguish human from animal 

traits. Similar ideas could be found in Bochev’s work and the reminiscences provoke the 

reader’s mind to develop the analogy suggested in the text. 

As Orwell presents the primitivism of the new doctrine called animalism and Bochev 

exposes the ideological and moral foundations of communism. The Dream of Major 

(according to some researchers an allegorical image of Karl Marx and Lenin) for a new 

society without the people’s power motivates the beginning to rebellion among the 

animals. The dream is used also in feuilletons by the writer in the body of the whole text. 

The leader in the animal farm is called Napoleon (Joseph Stalin), the same name has one 

of the guards and he is characterized by means of satire by narrator. 

The text provokes additional associations for comparisons describing the mill that is 

built with exhausting labor and reduced rations by the animals in the farm and the digging 

of canals and hard labour in the camps. In the camps (as the writers Vladimir Svintila and 

Stefan Bochev remember) and in cities permanently sound broadcasting systems, which 

washed the minds of prisoners and "free" people with press releases and reports of 

success on the background of the heroic-tragic music that we know from cinema reviews 

of the 40s and 50s. Animals are required to sing the hymn "English Livestock". Inmates 

perform a special march of repentance and partisan songs, but once John Major Strihinov 

dares to throw in the faces of militiamen the version "Your red flag is blood". Fear numbs 

citizens everywhere in the big barn Bulgaria. The new government in the farm founds an 

animal committees: "committee for egg production", for cows - "union of clean tails", 

committee on "rehabilitating the wild comrades" (in order to domesticate rats and 

rabbits), "movement for white wool" among others. The analogy with the socialist 

government is the official organizations and the various satellites of the Bulgarian 

Communist Party in public life. The impetuosity of the horse Boxer resembles the 

enthusiasm and overdone standards by the illustrious builder Ferdо Simeonov – agent of 

the communist party to whom the nation pays a whacking. The thefts are common practice in 

the socialist economy, just like Chief Napoleon and his followers benefit in the farm. 

With high water flow of the narrative, fictional features and genre updates Stefan 

Bochev’s memoirs sound particularly relevant today and are among the greatest examples 

of labour camp literature.

THE ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S COURT 

THROUGH SOME CASES OF 

HÓDMEZİVÁSÁRHELY 

Csilla GÁL 1 

After the end of the Second World War, in the beginning of 1945 the National 

Government started the justificatory processes with an order of the Ministry of the 

Internal Affairs. This was the 15/1945 order. The primary aim of the order was to create 

new administrative elite which supports the newly designed political system and 

government. This meant that each and every active or retired but yet working employee 

had to go to court to get through the justificatory process. The justificatory process 

affected the employees of the faith-based schools, institutions, offices and the industrial 

and trade companies supported by the state, social organizations. The number 1146/1945 

order was to act in the case of the intellectuals and the ones owning authority certificate 

(like traders…). Later further orders were added to these (concerning the attorneys…) 

It was examined during the justificatory process whether the public servant’s activities 

after the first of September 1939 had been violent to the Hungarian people or not. The 

organization of the justificatory committees was declared by the number 1080/1945 

order. This contained that a centre had to be created in each and every region. The 

committee was formed from the members of the Hungarian National Independent Front 

which contained five parties) and from the delegates of the National Trade Unions 

Council. In addition to these there were two other delegates in the committee: a citizen 

having a profession related to law and a person from the workplace concerned who had 

been justified before and they had the right to consult. The head of the committee was 

chosen from the delegates by themselves. 

Against the verdict of guilty/ condemning decision of the committee one could turn to 

the special councils that worked in the centers of jurisdiction regions. 

The justificatory councils and processes ended in 1948. The processes were waived by 

the 5000/1946 order but the processes started again few months later. 

In Hódmezıvásárhely there were three committees, however we can find two letters in 

the archives which were addressed to the viceroy (at that time the viceroy was Ferenc 

Karácsonyi), in which the Hungarian Railways and the Ministry of Education asked for 

the acceleration of the justificatory processes and they even asked for the creation of a 

new committee for this reason. 

The three committees here in Hódmezıvásárhely started the processes on the 23rd of 

February, in 1945. It was not typical here in Hódmezıvásárhely to specialize according to 

different professions but the cases of those employees working fot the same employers 

were handled at the same time. 


52 


This presentation contains cases which were negotiated by the No. 1 committee and the 

primary aim of this presentation is to show whether there were some kind of logic in the 

justificatory processes or the decisions were made on a subjective basis. 

The constant/permanent members of the No.1 committee were as follows: 

József Dékány: a delegate from the Independent Small Holders Party. He was a well 

known person here in Hódmezıvásárhely. He had been a government commissioner 

responsible for flood control since the 1940s, had been member of the local/municipal 

board, and vice-mayor of the city. In 1946 the Independent Small Holders Party called 

back its members. 

Sándor Szenti: carpenter, craftsman (who had done the first three classes of the 

elementary school and one in higher elementary school), who was a delegate of the trade 

unions and who had been in most of the cases the head of the committee. It’s worth 

mentioning here that he was accused of having been the member of the Arrow-Cross 

Party (a right-wing political party during the Second World War). He claimed in his lawcase 

that he was challenged by István Fejes to join the party what he had refused and then 

he went to participate in fortification works. It’s thought-provoking that in his own lawcase 

he was the head of the committee. By the nomination of the Hungarian Communist 

Party he had been the member of the local board since the 23rd of July in 1945 following 

Mihály Pótári who had passed away before. 

Imre Molnár: He also often was the head of the committee however he was a 

supplement member on the list of the Hódmezıvásárhely justificatory committees. 

János Kis 

János Haraszti 

and János Vad 

Besides the above temporary members we have on the list the following supplement 

members who were not detached to certain committees but they were probably grouped 

according to the party that they followed or were the members of. ( I said probably 

because I did not find any data concerning it). 

Diószegi Ferenc, Papp Lajos, Karácsonyi Sándor 2 , Tóth Ferenc, Albert Imre 

Kis Lajos, K. Tóth Sándor, Molnár Imre, Tóth János, Félix János 

Borsi János, Benke Imre, Vata Ernı, Imre Ernı, Pálffy-Palócz János 

Lévai János, Bangó János, Bereczki Ferenc, Sápi Imre, Szabó Kálmán 

Koska János, Szıke Imre, Kiss Bálint, Csucs Imre, Angyal Sándor 

Nagy János, Zombory István 3 , Kristó János, Molnár András, Hódi Sándor 

2 Karácsonyi Sándor 1944-45-ben az FKGP pártelnöke, az 1944. ıszén megalakuló közgyőlés FKGP-s 

küldöttje volt. 1945. januárjában az MNFF határozatot hozott arról, hogy nyilas pártok tagjai nem 

lehetnek a demokratikus pártok és a Nemzeti Bizottság tagjai; a volt kormánypártok (Nemzeti Egység 

Pártja, Magyar Élet Pártja) vezetıi szintén nem lehetnek NB-tagok, sem demokratikus pártok vezetıi. 

Karácsonyi Sándor elismerte, hogy eljárt a nyilasok győléseire, bár a pártnak nem volt tagja. A 

kommunista Oláh Mihály azonban olyan állítólagos nyilas titkári jelentéseket olvasott fel, amelyeken 

Karácsonyi Sándor neve szerepelt. A NB alelnökét felszólították, hogy tisztázza magát.2 Mivel ezt 

Karácsonyi Sándor nem tette meg, kizárták a Nemzeti Bizottságból. 2 Karácsonyi Sándor ugyanakkor 

tagja maradt a törvényhatósági bizottságnak, a várostanácsnak, sıt pártja az igazoló bizottságba is 

tagként delegálta. A baloldal egyébként már 1944. novemberében támadta ıt azért, mert MÉP-vezetı 

volt, illetve mert társaival „a nagybirtokot és a nagybirtok révén a mindenkori kormányt igyekeztek 

szolgálni” – BENCSIK 3., 7. o.

Csilla GÁL: The Activity of the People's Court Through Some Cases 53 

Mohos Sándor, Kurucz János, Kormány Lajos, Kovács Sándor, Dávid Balázs 

I chose some of the files which I found interesting to present- the reason for me having 

chosen them is that these cases were representative ( we have some cases like that) and 

there are cases which are interesting because of the punishment or the reasoning itself. 

Károly Kis (7th July 1909): he was the teacher of the Reformed/Calvinist Girls’ 

Grammar School and was the general director of the Trade Dance School. 

As he had been the member of the Turul Fellowship Society he was warned and the 

only reason for not having been punished that he had not have an office/position in the 

society. 

Imre Bereczki (29th June 1889): worked for the Hungarian State Police- he was a 

retired sergeant-major. Balázs Dávid made a registration in his case by the police and he 

reported that Berecki had claimed in October 1944 near the mortuary of the hospital: „I 

have already said that these damned communists want this. They want to be viceroys and 

mayors – and Balázs Dávid can clearly understand this. In the low-case Mihály Demeter 

(interpreter) made a confession who had heard of these things only from Balázs Dávid- 

and Sándor Varga, mechanic who on the whole justified the things that were said about 

Bereckzi. Who also reported Sándor Orosz’s words who worked at the hospital as 

caretaker and who had been present when those words had been said, but he claimed that 

he did not remember any of those words. 

Imre Berecki said at the court that his words sounded totally differently, there had not 

been concrete references to people and he only had said those thing because of the terrible 

sight of the dead and what he exactly said then was: lots of people expect the people to 

decay this way to be able to occupy their offices and positions. The head of the committee 

was Imre Molnár but Sándor Szenti was also a member of the committee who had an idea 

that based ont he confessions heard in the court that the suspect acted in a way which 

requires to be examined by the justificatory committee. …He proposes that the suspect 

should have been provided with the 20 % of his fee while the process is taking place. 

It is true that the committee accepted Sándor Szenti’s recommendation unanimously but it 

is typical that he was the one who initiated. 

Finally his post was taken away from him and he was deprived of his rights and claims. 

They were ’grateful’ in a way because they took into account his state of health and his 

age and because of this they decided that they would not take him into custody/would not 

arrest him. 

3 Zombory István a helyi SZDP vezetı személyisége, 1945 elıtt a polgárırség vezetıje, majd 

1945. januárjától áprilisig rendırkapitány Vásárhelyen.

54 


Sándor Papp (20th January 1907) – he was a doctor at Hungarian Railways and at 

OTBÁ. In ’Népújság’, a local paper he declared on the 3rd of October in 1942. in an 

article titled ’Old memories tempt’ that he considers himself as a right wing politician. 

In his law-case ont he 9th of June in 1945 he referred to the fact in vein that there was a 

mispresentation of his words by the journalist but the committee decided that it was not 

necessary to hear the journalist in front of the committee. 

The other accusation against Sándor Papp was that as a leading but not so significant 

figure of the National Association of the Hungarian Doctors wrote a petition in the 

question of restricting the Jewish doctors’ activities. The accusations concerning his right 

wing thinking were justified by a private letter found in his file. According to his words 

he pled the gentle line of the Turul. 

His case was sent to the Szeged court and he was deprived of his job. The head of the 

committee was Sándor Szenti and Imre Molnár during the two law-cases. 

Imre Csáki worked at the tax office. He declared that: I was obliged (in written form) at 

the time of the Jews’ deportation to take part together with the police officer, the 

gendarmerie as the deputy of the city and as court reporter I had the task to register the 

valuables arrested/confiscated by the police force and to give it to the forces and later I 

had to be a local witness during the inventories. 

Despite the fact the he was only doing his duty his case was cent to the Szeged court. In 

this case the head of the committee was Imre Molnár. 

Mrs. Béla Vajda, Rózsa Uzoni (28th August 1901) was the director of the Calvinist 

Girls’s Secondary Grammar School here in Hódmezıvásárhely. The committee accused 

him of having been the member of the Turul Fellowship Society. She denied the 

accusations. Her confession was supported by one of her colleagues (Klára Gyırffy). The 

other accusation against her based on an article published in the school journal with the 

title „National education”. However she was not the author of the article she was accused 

with having been responsible for publishing it as being the publisher and allowed this 

article to be published. First this case was also sent to the Szeged committee but later this 

decision was terminated and she was allowed to work in the public sphere but she was 

found as unable to serve as a leading figure and for this reason she was excluded from 

advancement for five years. 

Imre Molnár was the head of the committee. 

László Kádár (Hmv.,1910.11.29.) he was the bible class teacher of the Calvinist Girls’s 

Secondary Grammar School. He was accused because of an article published in the 

school journal with the title „National education”. He wrote in his article about the 

eastern block. In his law case he explained the subject of his article and he claimed that 

he had not have the possibility for proof-reading. He justified his peace supporting and 

anti-nazi ideas by giving a picture about his career. An interesting point in his case is that 

Károly Keppinger, the head of the local Volksbund justified his confessions.


At the end of the law-case it was sent to the Szeged committee but after then it was 

discussed again. Finally he did not have to leave his public position but his was declared 

as being unfit for fulfilling a leading position and he was excluded from advancement for 

five years. 

The head of the committee was Sándor Szenti. 

Andor Lencse 1896.11.29.) – director and teacher of the local Calvinist Church’s Léva 

street school. As he had been a leading figure of the local Arrow-Cross Party he was 

declared as being unfit for fulfilling a leading position. 

Lajos Hohe and his wife – traders. According to the accusations Lajos Johe had been 

the founder, leader and organizer of the local Volksbund and he was the member of the 

Arrow-Cross Party, as well. Their case was passed on to the Szeged committee. 

Andor Telek 1890.10.10.) – textile trader. He was reprimanded because he invigorated 

the Dálnoki-government, however, as he had defined himself, he had been a left- wing 

person. His case was passed on to the local board. 

Jakab István Mélykúti – shoemaker. He was the member of the Arrow Cross Prtay. His 

case is interesting because that the Szenti - committee deprived him of his craftsman - 

certificate and passed on his case to the Szeged court. The Szeged court terminated his 

process and gentled the judgment. Mélykúti was reprimanded and his franchise was taken 

away for five years. The reasoning was as follows: ’It is not in interest of democracy to 

augment the number of the unsatisfied but to save the guilty people for democracy.’ 

Sándor Illés: His case is interesting because first he had been justified even if there had 

been prosecution against him before. ( Imre Kertész had prosecuted him because as he 

claimed Sándor Illés had robbed from the Halász-shop and he had been on the part of the 

German. ) After the justification he called Imre Kertész to account because of prosecuting 

him again and he added to the story that Illés had sweared at the communists. 

Unfortunately we do not have information about how the story ended. I did not find the 

case on the list of the Szeged court but we do not have the decision in his file. 

Sándor Paulovits (Póla, 1895.08.01) – There was two prosecutions against him 

according to which he talked to certain people in an anti-communist tone. First, when the 

church raised the price of the field rental and the tenants complained he said: ’what does 

this communist band want here? Then in the public-service office he used anti-communist 

words. However he denied the accusations in his law-case and the church justified that he 

did not have anything to do with razing the rental and with the tenants his punishment 

was not gentle. According to the judgment, the public-servant has to be looked at, as he 

had died on the very day when the order became effective. Sándor Szenti was the head of 

the committee.

56 


Imre Tóth (1888.03.06.) – detective group leader. There were more prosecutions against 

him according to which he made anti-communist statements. In his law-case there 

appeared a witness who gave evidence in favor of him. First the committee ordered his 

retirement. It’s worth having a look at the reassign: 

However the committee did not find incriminating data against the suspect in the 

testimonies which could refer to anything harmful for the society but it was assessed that 

the suspect is unable to serve the public here in the democratic Hungary. It was assessed 

as a fact by the committee that the suspect made public service in 1919 which service was 

continuous for the next 30 years and was so adequate that he got in the detective group 

leader position. As the function of the committee is to find reliable servants for the 

democratic system it is clear that a servant who had been appropriate for the previous 

system would be as appropriate for the present one. 

But after the above judgment he got a more gentle one on the 11th of May in 1945: he 

was decapitated from his position and he was looked at as he had died on the very day of 

the when the order became effective and this way his family could get his pension. And 

what paradoxical is, that the next sentence sais: the public servant deprived of his rights 

can not serve in the public sphere anymore and can not be placed in a leading position in 

the private sphere and finally, he can not be given a public commission. 

László Erdei – paper discount trader. He was reprimanded because he had been the 

member of the Baross Alliance and he prosecutes two Jewish mongers because of having 

overrun the closing time. (It is clear from his case that it is yet not about the restricted 

opening hours of the Jewish shops but about breaking the agreement which had been 

contracted between the paper-traders of the town). 

Dezsı Falábú – was the teacher of the Bethlen Secondary Grammar School. He was 

accused that he had joined János Szatmári’s statement in an article published in the 

Népújság on the 1st of June in 1944 and that he had made statements against the people. 

Actually the Calvinist charity orphancy had been laid in the place where the Jewish 

ghetto was to be designated. That is why he asked for not placing the ghetto there in that 

building – so he only wanted to stand for the interest of the church and the children (who 

had lived in that building). The committee passed on his case to the local board and he 

died because he had had health problems with his heart before and could not suffer the 

torture. His sisters turned to the committee in his case in vein it rejected their request. 

Zoltán Ivánka – doctor. He was accused that he had examined the Jewish women 

inappropriately. The head was again Sándor Szenti and the committee passed on his case 

to the local board and there they slandered him. Finally he was deprived of his position 

and even his pension was taken away from him.


Imre Bodrogi (1902.05.01.) – mechanic. He was sentenced to transference and it was in 

the judgment that he was unable to fulfill a leading position. The reason was that he had 

not helped his workers sufficiently and that he called them communists. (The workers 

prosecuted him). 

Sándor K. Nagy (1895.05.03) - militiaman. He was deprived of his position and was 

prosecuted because he, in his confession, made a statement in the State Security 

Department of the Additional Headquarters with which he prevented the prosecutor to 

make an anti-German and anti-war protestation. 

András Cseh (1887.12.19.) - Roman Catholic prepend. As for he served the previous 

system according to the accusation, he was relocated and was found unable to serve in a 

leading position. 

Mihály Rébék Nagy - 1887.05.22.) – gendarmerie. He was deprived of his job because 

he said that he was a security person hunting down spies and this way he did not let 

people to tell their opinion freely. 

Gábor Olasz Vitéz – local primary treasurer. He was relocated and was defined as 

unable to fulfill a leading position because he – according to the accusation he had 

transported the city’s money to Budapest (following a written order). He appealed against 

the decision and the first judgment was altered but he was not rehabilitated. 

Leander Keltanik – assistant carpenter and craftsman (Királymezı, 1883)- He had been 

member of the Volksbund since 1943. His case was passed on to the local board however; 

he wrote it in his confession, that he had joined the Volksbund because they had promised 

him to help. 

János Ökrös – craftsman preparing last. Miklós Kerekes prosecuted him and according 

to the accusation he was the member of the Arrow-Cross Party and pro-German. 

Kerekes’s reasoning was as follows: He also prosecuted me because I am a Jew. I had 

been in a business relationship with him in 1942 and when we were to square accounts 

with each other he threatened me with deportation instead of paying and he also had 

prosecuted me. 

Sándor Braczkó – saddler. He was member of the National Front in 1939 and during the 

elections in 1939 he had collected nomination forms for the Front and he had been an 

intimate member of the party. After the National Front had collapsed he was a member of 

the Arrow-Cross Party. According to the accusation he took part in transporting war 

material to Germany. His case was passed on to the Szeged court and it was forbidden to 

him to work as a craftsman.

58 


The No. 1 justificatory committee made decisions in 865 locals’ case. 761 persons were 

justified and against 104 persons started legal proceedings, and 17 cases were passed on 

to the Szeged local board. 

12 % of the cases ended with a verdict of guilty and the primary reasons were as follows: 

- the person concerned was the member of the Volksbund/ the Arrow Cross Party / 

Turul Fellowship Alliance made an anti-communist statement (in the majority of 

the cases the witnesses had personal conflict with the suspect) 

- or he participated in anti-Jewish activities (in theory or truly). 

It is interesting that in the cases were the Turul Felloship Alliance was concerned the 

suspects were reprimanded or they were defined as unable to fulfill leading positions 

while in more subjective cases, for example making anti-communist statements the 

punishments were stricter.

1. Introduction 

LIVING BESIDE THE BERLIN WALL 

Lars HANEBERG 1 

The Berlin Wall was constructed by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) starting 

on 13 August 1961. It completely cut off West Berlin from surrounding East Germany 

and from East Berlin. [1] The wall separated the city into two parts for more than 28 

years. There appeared many curiosities. Streets and the S-Bahn are broken, stations of the 

U-Bahn are closed and even cemeteries are not spared. 

This incisive event for Germany and Europe had a direct impact on not only the states 

and politics but also the people. People in the East and the West were affected by it – and 

so was my family, who lived over 20 years at the iron curtain. This paper examines the 

main elements of the history with a personal perspective of a child and adolescent who 

lived at the Berlin Wall. 

2. Construction of the wall 

At night of the 13th August 1961, a Sunday, the division of Germany and particularly of 

Berlin was accomplished in a cloak-and-dagger operation. Almost 15.000 construction 

workers – strictly supervised by the GDR Border Guards – started to build the “Iron 

Curtain” that divided Europe during the Cold War. 

That night my parents travelled by train from Austria to Berlin. The journey was 

interrupted by an unscheduled stop at Prague. My parents were surprised to see Czech 

policemen enter the train and force all GDR citizens to get off the train. Not before the 

arrival of the railway station in West Berlin they were informed about the construction of the 

Berlin Wall. The very next day many colleagues of my parents were absent – all the border 

crossers from East-Berlin. None of them ever returned to work. The family separations were 

even more terrible. At that time no telephone contact at all was possible. Written contacts 

were controlled by the eastern side constantly. Only after the passport agreement in 1963 

people from West-Berlin were allowed to visit their relatives in the east. [2] 

The Berlin Wall was officially labeled by the GDR authorities as "Anti-Fascist 

Protection Rampart“, a very prominent example of the ideological GDR neologism. The 

Government claimed the wall to have been built as a protection of the population from 

fascist elements; thereby implying that West Germany had not been fully de-Nazified. [3] 

In practice, the Wall served to prevent the massive emigration and brain-drain that took 

place in the GDR during the post-World War II period. The West Berlin city government 

referred to it as the "Wall of Shame" [4], condemning the Wall's restriction of the 

freedom of movement. 

1 Chair of Accounting and Corporate Governance, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, 

Germany.

60 


The overall length of the Berlin wall amounted to 155km. On the border from East- to 

West-Berlin the wall was 43.1km long [5]. At the beginning the Berlin Wall was just a 

barbed wire fence and was replaced successively by a 3.60m tall concrete wall. 

Fig. 1: Our backyard in 1975: The first generation of the Iron Curtain was no more than a fence 

3. The wall in our garden 

In 1967, my parents – along with my two sisters – moved in to Neuruppiner Straße 91, 

a semi-detached house in the outskirts of West-Berlin directly at the German-German 

border. The construction of these buildings just 20 meters away from the wall was 

promoted by the government of West-Berlin in order to demonstrate the non-acceptance 

of the wall. 

I was born in 1976 and my room was in the attic with two windows allowing a constant 

view on the wall and even above where I could see and especially during the nights also 

hear the patrolling frontier guards. 

Fig. 2: View on the "Todesstreifen" 

In Kleinmachnow, on the other side of the border there were several single-family 

houses in a restricted area, where very faithful and privileged supporters and members of 

the GDR regime lived. They even possessed a telephone – a rare relict in GDR times. 

For me, our house felt like the safest place on earth. On the “west-side” there were the 

US-American patrols and on the “eastern-side” the members of the heavily armed 

People's Police along with their constantly barking dogs. My sisters and me we were 

taught to avoid any contact with the (East-German) neighbor`s children beyond the wall.

Lars HANEBERG.: Living beside the Berlin Wall 61 

The patrols on the eastern side were constantly composed of new members avoiding that 

any friendships between the soldiers could have been established. 

One night in summer 1988 we heard some shooting, dog's barking and loud 

complaining of GDR soldiers just behind our garden. From my room in the attic we could 

see how a young man with raised hands (behind him various members of the People's 

Police with pulled weapons) was led away after a failed attempt to escape across the wall. 

The police alarmed by us and an American military patrol twitched only helplessly the 

shoulders. Three months later the arrested refugee was redeemed by the west. 

This was by far not the only attempt to escape from eastern neighbors of our street. 

Karl-Heinz Kube, only 17 years old, was shot on December 16 th 1966. In total four 

persons died in our adjacency trying to escape to freedom. 

Fig. 3: Memorial to the Victims of the Wall at Neuruppiner Straße 

»In October 1962, a group of five men started to dig a tunnel from Neuruppiner Straße 

157 over to a house in Kleinmachnow in order to allow a few families to escape to the 

West. But the escape plans had been betrayed to the East German authorities. One of the 

diggers was captured by the Stasi and faced a show trial where he received a life sentence 

for committing "most severe crimes against peace and freedom for the German people". 

After 4 years in prison he was released to the West on the basis of some buy-out 

arrangement with the West German government. Until today it is not known how the 

escape plan could have been compromised and by whom. But there remains another 

puzzle. The East German secret service Stasi had planned to blow up the tunnel and to pin 

the blast to the diggers blaming them to carry out sabotage acts in the East. But at the 

moment when the sole digger knocked at the Kleinmachnow house and the last was being 

ordered, it turned out that the firing cable had been cut. Could it be that there has been 

another kind of traitors within the Stasi or rather a secret hero?« [6] 

From the foundation of the GDR in October of 1949 until the opening of the borders on 

9th November 1989, nearly 3 million citizens of the around 17 million citizens fled from 

East to West. A total of 95.000 people escaped between the building of the Wall and 

September 1989. Approximately 900 GDR citizens paid with their life for their attempt to 

escape over the internal German border. [7]

62 


Although I lived in spitting distance to the GDR there was only very few contact with 

East German people. My enemy's picture as a child was very clear; my footballs which 

were shot by accident from our garden into the East never came back. The few occasions 

when I met East German people were when we used the Transit-Route, a highway which 

connected West Berlin with the Federal Republic, by crossing the GDR territory. With 

the members of the People's Police I was not allowed to change a word. For holiday trips 

where we had to use the transit road, absolute silence was announced at the border 

inspection points. Newspapers and comics like Mickey Mouse were forbidden as western 

propaganda; hence it was not allowed to be taken on trips via the transit road. 

As a children I used to wave to the children in the East German cars. For us, the 

hostility was an adult affaire. At the restaurants of the transit roads one might not talk 

with East German people; my uncle – who just did once – was interrogated hour after 

hour for it. In general, we had to plan up to six hours for the trip by GDR for every 

holiday trip, where nowadays it takes three hours. 

I was always very annoyed that the GDR was more successful in sport than Western- 

Germany. At that time we did not know to what extent doping was used within the GDR 

(also against the resistance of the active) in order to uphold the eastern predominance in 

sport vis-à-vis the West Germans. At that time sports, notably the Olympic Games had a 

very political dimension where not only athletes competed but entire ideological systems. 

4. The fall of the iron curtain 

As a child I believed that the wall would stand forever, like Party leader and head of 

state Erich Honecker promised in January 1989: »The Wall will remain so long as the 

conditions that led to its erection are not changed. It will be standing even in 50 and even 

in 100 years, if the necessary conditions are not removed.« [7] 

In September 1989 thousands of citizens of the GDR sought refuge in the West- 

German embassies in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest. The reasons were dissatisfaction 

with restrictions on travel, limited rights of expression, lack of political freedom and the 

shortage of consumer goods in comparison with the West. All this had caused 

disillusionment - and determination. The most emotional moment for me these days was 

when Foreign Minister Genscher stepped on the balcony of the German embassy in 

Prague to announce an agreement on the refugees' voyage to West Germany and the 

crowd cheered on the keyword »Ausreise«. 

Despite the fact that the GDR was suffering a brain-drain with thousands of young 

refugees, even in October 1989, nobody expected a total breakdown of the GDR. For me 

it was unimaginable that the GDR authorities would agree to any substantial reforms 

within the GDR or the opening of the borders. The Tienanmen Square was still in mind 

and a Chinese model of solution was feared. I remember the pictures of the East German 

Television showing the celebration of the 40th national holiday on October 7 th , when a 

hundred thousand young people marched past Erich Honecker and Michael Gorbatschow. 

A famous legend says it was that day Gorbatschow told Honecker that »those who are 

late will be punished by life itself« [8].


Meanwhile demonstrations were staged all over East Germany. Initiators were mostly 

people wanting to leave to the West. This was the start of what Germans generally call 

the "Peaceful Revolution". It was very interesting to follow the events watching both, 

western and eastern television. I felt very glad, even amused, when Erich Honecker, the 

longtime leader of East Germany, finally had to resign on 18 October 1989. It was a big 

satisfaction to watch this at DDR 1, the loyal national television which still broadcasted 

loyal to the party principles. 

In the evening, East Germany witnessed the largest protest demonstration since the 

uprising of June 17, 1953. The police had to withdraw in face of the overwhelming 

masses, who cried again and again: »We are the people!« [9] I did not understand the 

message of the keywords but my parents explained me that it tells the authorities that they 

have forfeited the right to act in the name of the people. 

Only in the morning hours of the 10th November my father informed me very deeply 

moved about the opening of the borders during the night before. Instantly I realized that 

something really important occurred. On the one hand I was very disappointed that I 

missed this opening of the gates by oversleeping. On the other hand I was confused about 

my parents’ enthusiasm. My skepticism towards the former archrival was huge. I did not 

distinguish between the authorities and regular citizens. Thus, I could not comprehend the 

fraternization that took place everywhere. Nevertheless I supported the idea of a fast 

reunification, first of all, because of the sport. 

That day at school we were informed that any participation in demonstrations or trips to 

the wall would be sanctioned by severe disciplinary measures. In our history lesson we 

read Robespierre instead of discussing the historical events which took place hardly 10 

km away from us. During my entire school life the revolution in the GDR was never at 

the agenda. 

Fortunately my parents encouraged me to discover the “Wild East” and to eyewitness as 

they said, historical events, like the opening of the Glienicke Bridge. The bridge 

connected the US-occupied sector of West-Berlin with Soviet-occupied Potsdam, which 

was in East Germany and was used during the cold war to exchange captured spies. At 

the opening unimaginable scenes happened. 

Fig. 4: Welcoming of the new citizens at the Glienicke Bridge in November 1989

64 

Fig. 5: For the East German border troops this was a day of defeat 


In the following weeks hundreds of thousands of people came over to visit West-Berlin. 

Not only East Germans, but people from everywhere in the world came to Berlin in order 

to witness the historical events. To every "east citizen" a welcoming payment of 100 DM 

was afforded. The shops in the west, notably for fruits, electronic entertainment and 

pornography were overcrowded. Most of the “Ossies” could be identified by their 

multicolored clothes, coiffures, and by their accents and vocabulary, the latter still to this 

day. 

At this time, the West Germans had a feeling of superiority. The enthusiasm and 

patriotic sentiments culminated when Germany won the World Cup in 1990. But the 

disillusionment followed very soon on both sides of the wall. 

5. The wall in our heads 

After the fall of the Berlin wall many of the symbols of the German Democratic 

Republic were removed. However, some East Germans began to feel nostalgia for certain 

aspects of their lives in East Germany. Ostalgie particularly refers to the nostalgia for 

aspects of the way of life and culture in the former GDR, which disappeared after the 

reunification. Next to nostalgia for everyday aspects of life, Ostalgie was also inspired by 

the absence of unemployment and poverty in the GDR. Indeed, Ostalgie could be inspired 

by the longing of the Ossies for the social system and the sense of community of the 

GDR. Before 1990, there was no unemployment or poverty in the eastern part of 

Germany. 

During his campaign for Chancellor in 1991 Helmut Kohl had promised „blossoming 

landscapes" [10]. The dissatisfaction of the former GDR citizens began when they 

noticed that the economic level of West Germany could not be reached within short-time. 

The reunification was not a merger between equals; it was rather a takeover where the 

little partner was incorporated at any costs. Hence, Ossies considered themselves as 2 nd 

class-citizens and they were given the impression that they were unproductively and that 

they believed in the wrong God for 40 years.


Unfortunately, at the same time at the West, a snobbish Victor’s justice spread itself and 

I noticed that the general attitude towards the Ossies was quite pejorative. They were 

judged as lazy and there were at least subliminal allegations that finally everyone 

cooperated with the Stasi. 

The notion “Ost” is still often added to describe something cheap or inferior. Anything 

that reminded of the GDR was condemned and quickly exchanged. First of all the ossies 

replaced their clothes and cars by new western products, credit-financed in many cases. 

But also socialist buildings like the “Palazzo Prozzo”, erected to seat power and seat of 

the parliament of the GDR were demolished because it was regarded as a symbol of 

Socialism. In the course of urban De-Socialism, even the traffic lights in the east were 

replaced by western models. 

Only few things, like the “Sandmann”, a child production from the GDR-Television, 

survived the process of cultural westernization which took place after the reunification. 

Altogether, there stayed very few heritages from GDR-times. Exceptions hereby were the 

sportsmen from the former GDR, who were very welcomed in order to improve the 

German medal balance. 

The East German people had very quick forgotten to remember their heroes: the civilrights 

activists who dared to raise their voices and Michael Gorbatschov, the man who 

changed the world for me. 

References 

Fig. 6: View in our backyard, 1986 and 2012 

1. Marck, J.: Over the Wall: a once in a lifetime experience, NYT Magazine, November 

1999. 

2. Berliner Protokoll über die Ausgabe von Passierscheinen an Westberliner für 

Verwandtenbesuche vom 17. Dezember 1963, printed in: von Münch, I. (ed.), 

Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1968, pp. 395-398. 

3. Fragen an die Geschichte der DDR, Junge Welt Berlin, 3. Auflage, 1989, pp. 144- 

151. 

4. Benjamin, D.: Wall of Shame 1961-1989, Time Magazine, Nov. 20, 1989, 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959086,00.html, Accessed 19.09.2012.

66 


5. Flemming, T., Koch, H.: Die Berliner Mauer: Grenze durch eine Stadt, be bra verlag, 

Berlin, 2000. 

6. Veigel. B.: Wege durch die Mauer – Fluchthilfe und Stasi zwischen Ost und West, 

Edition Berliner Unterwelten, 2. Auflage 2011. 

7. Hertle, H., Nooke, M.: Die Todesopfer an der Berliner Mauer 1961–1989. Ein 

biographisches Handbuch. Ch. Links, Berlin 2009, p. 22. 

8. Honecker, E.: in a speech on the 19.01.1989, quoted in: http://www.chronik-dermauer.de/index.php/de/Chronical/Detail/year, 

Accessed 18.09.2012. 

9. Gorbatschow, M.: quoted in: Plog, U: Wer zu spät kommt denn bestraft das Leben, 

FAZ 06.10.2004, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/15-jahre-danach-wer-zu-spaetkommt-den-bestraft-das-leben-1191290.html. 

Accessed 19.09.2012. 

10. Bauernkämper, A., Sabrow, M., Stöver, B. (ed.): Doppelte Zeitgeschichte. Deutschdeutsche 

Beziehungen 1945–1990, Bonn 1998, p. 35. 

11. Köster, T.: Distel und Zottelwicke in blühender Landschaft, in: faz.net, 26.Februar 

2009, p. R8.

HOMO JURIS 

PROFESSOR ALEXANDRU HERLEA 

(1907-1979) 

Elena HELEREA 1 

Memento 

The relations of cooperation in the human society are, in a state of law, regulated by 

judicial, moral, religious, technical and others, either shaped spontaneously or drafted, in 

order to give coherence and consistency to the community life. The normative order 

which is always social, too, reveals more dimensions, one of which being the judicial one. 

Thus, this constitutes the ground for the natural quality of the man as Homo Juris, which 

underlines the moral dimension of man’s quality, a natural one also, as a moral being. We 

consider that initially the judiciary, the morality, religiosity and technicity stick together 

and evolve together, set up as a cultural unity, induced by the same axiological horizon - 

values and principles. 

The judicial laws are as compulsory for Homo Juris as the moral ones for Homo 

Moralis, and as those specific to Homo Ludens. However, the judicial law is either 

imperative (prohibitive), either permissive, outlining certain freedom areas, through 

which liberty itself is consecrated. 

Homo Juris is a law topic which enters into legal relations with specific rights and 

obligations in respect of the laws that gets involved into judicial that involve rights and 

obligations according to current laws: the members of a society, only, collaborate and cohabit 

in a judicial law that renders the dimension of that society as far as collaboration 

and cohabitation is concerned. The collaboration is granted through the prescriptive 

organization of the facts and documents of the law subject closely related to property, 

cohabitation being guaranteed by organizing prescriptive societal manifestations of the 

natural and legal persons [1]. 

Homo Juris is not recognized, respected and appreciated in all societies. This is proven 

both during the beginning of the communist regime in Romania and by the work and the 

destiny of Alexandrul Herlea, Ph.D in Law. His tragic destiny is exemplary for people of 

such moral greatness, whose aim has been to protect above life the law and rule of the law. 

The activity of professor Alexandru Herlea 

The evocation of the professor of civil law at the Commercial Academy in Cluj - 

Brasov, Alexander Herlea, in the seventh edition of the International Symposium called 

“Communist Regimes – Recent Memory for an Open Society” was chosen for several 

reasons. 

1 Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania.

68 


Virgil Ierunca in the radio show: “About Alexandru Herlea”, broadcast on Radio Free 

Europe in February 1981 and published later, in 1994, in “Memoria” magazine states that 

[2]: “ He had chosen professor Herlea because he is a common case of the nationalpeasant 

scholar who was to pay for his belief in democracy, for his involvement in 

promoting it, with many years of prison, a payment due also to the fact that he was a 

generous scholar, a legal advisor and a historian – a “cosmopolitan” as Stalinists used to 

say – by being a collaborator with Western cultural centers. If we add that he had an 

“unhealthy” social origin, we clearly understand why Professor Herlea would become a 

victim of the Stalinist janissaries“. 

When considering the topic of the presentation I was also touched by professor 

Alexandru Herlea’s connections to Brasov and its university education, and also by his 

Transylvanian origins. 

Alexandru Herlea descendes from an old family from Ardeal, a very active one in the 

religious, political and cultural life of those times. I would mention here bishop Vasile 

Moga, and many other high ranking clergymen in this family, the deputies in the 

Transylvanian Diet Grigore Ratiu, Ioan Ratiu, Ioan Balas, the memorandists Nicolae 

Herlea and Rubin Patita, officers Theodor Stanislau, baron Gheorghe Balas and Remus 

Herlea, lawyers and senior officials Iosif Pop, Gheorghe Balas, Dominic Ratiu, Zaharie 

Munteanu, Constantin Moga, Alexandru Herlea, personalities of education and culture: 

Ioan Moga, Moise Fulea, Gheorghe Dima, Lucian Blaga, Dorin Pavel. 

However, the main reason for this presentation at this symposium is the manner in 

which injustice worked in Romania during Communism and the destructive role of the 

so-called Securitate. These are the aspects that I will insist on. 

Under the influence of his family tradition, even from an early age, professor Herlea 

takes an active part in community life, fighting for an evolution based on the high values 

of liberty, democracy, justice and social justice. 

Being a strong personality, Alexandru Herlea would fight on diverse areas. 

Politically, he belongs to the left wing of PNT, candidate in a number of elections – a 

secretary of the group of deputies from Hunedoara, running for the Parliament (1932). 

Opposing with all his heart to all kinds of totalitarian manifestations, he gets involved in 

exposing any totalitarian tendencies of the right-winged activists, which were widely 

present in the political life at the end of the ’30s and during the war. In Brasov he is one 

of the most active members of a group of Democrats gathered around the magazine The 

Country of Tomorrow led by Victor Jinga, the dean of the Commercial Academy, where 

Herlea was a professor of civil rights. This group drafted, in the spring of 1944, a 

manifesto entitled: “Project of principial and programmatic statements”, in which they 

denounced war and all kinds of totalitarianism and presented a project about the political 

and social organization of Romania following the war. It is envisaged a society based on 

the great values listed above, with a free market economy where cooperative play an 

important role. 

As a journalist, Alexandru Herlea takes an active role in many publications of that time, 

writing articles concerning the important political, social, economical topics of the day. 

He is the editor in chief of “The Message” newspaper in Orastie and a member in the 

managerial board of the Press Syndicate in Ardeal and Banat.

Elena HELEREA: Homo Juris Professor Alexandru Herlea (1907-1979) 69 

As a lawyer, he conducts a unrelenting campaign to defend the small landlords in 

Apuseni Mountains, abusively dispossessed of their land by “Mica” company. The 

“Mica”trial in which Alexandru Herlea was a barrister, pleading for them even in the 

Court of Cassation an Justice, and who had a great impact revealing the corruption of 

some judicial organisms and of some important politicians of the time. May I be allowed 

to compare today those trials to the situation of Rosia Montana. Defending Rosia 

Montana is an action that continues the defense of the great values of the Romanians for 

which A. Herlea fought for all his life. The powerful commitment of his son, professor A. 

Herlea junior, in defense of Rosia Montana does nothing else but prove his commitment 

to his family tradition. 

As a scientist, researcher and professor [3], Alexandru Herlea is a renowned specialist 

in property and history of law in Transylvania. Among his works I mention: 

- “The Gold Mines in the Apuseni Mountains and the State’s Authority over these 

Mines” (1940), 

- “Property Documents in Transylvania” (1943), 

- “ A Misconception of Medieval Agricultural Property” (1944), 

- “Real Estate Advertising” (1947), 

- “Humanist Elements in the Romania of the Old“, 

- “Jurisdiction in Transylvania and primitive samples“, 

- “International relationships between the populations in the Romanian countries”, 

- “Jurisdiction in Transylvania in the 16 th century”, 

- “The historical circumstances of the approved Constitutions and their sociopolitical 

effects on the Romanian population.” 

The last ones would be published only after his death in a book called “Studies on the 

History of Law” (1983) [4] with the effort of his wife, teacher Silvia Herlea. 

“Aprobatae Constitutiones” is a fundamental work for the historiography of 

Transylvania that Alexandru Herlea translated and analyzed, published only after 1998, a 

year after the issue of the third volume of “Studies on the History of Law” [5]. All these 

were published by Dacia Publishing House in Cluj under the supervision of Liviu Marcu 

and Valeriu Sotropa. Some of his works were published abroad, such as ”Sur l'histoire de 

la condition juridique de l’enfant en Roumanie”, published in Brussels, in «Recueils de la 

société Jean Bodin» (1977). 

Having a PhD certification in judicial sciences and economic and political sciences, 

Alexandru Herlea was not isolated in an ivory tower, but on the contrary, he was a great 

educator and extremely involved in research. Besides being a permanent professor at the 

civil law department at the Commercial Academy in Brasov, he had organised a 

prestigious seminar work until 1947, when he was fired at the first ”cleansing” of high 

education institutions. 

After his retirement (since the end of his second detention until his retirement, he 

occupied a humble position of documentary searcher at the Institute of History of 

“Nicolae Iorga” Academy) in 1974, he created “The Association of comparative history 

of institutions and Law” that he affiliates at the “Association d'histoire du droit 

international et des Institutions” in Paris and “Jean Bodin” company in Brussels and 

founded the French magazine “Recherches sur l'histoire du droit et des Institutions” 

that still continues nowadays. The association joined together a large number of 

former political prisoners, including Corneliu Coposu that, in this context, could for 

the first time speak in public after leaving prison, he was grateful for it to Herlea [6].

70 


Among the members of the association, former political prisoners, I mention Victor Jinga, 

Alexandru Constantinescu, Ovid Sachelarie, Petre Strihan, Ion Jovin, Constantin Bucşan, 

Corneliu Albu, Vasile Netea, Tudor Voinea, Salvador Brădeanu, George Fotino, Romulus 

Vulcănescu, Alexandru Valimărescu. 

The trial in Braşov and his first imprisonment 

Let us consider now the two trials in which Alexandru Herlea was sentenced to a total 

amount of 25 years of prison. 

Known as a center-left winged sympathisant, Alexandru Herlea was many times offered 

the opportunity to collaborate, offers made by Petru Groza and Mihai Ralea. He denied 

their proposals, valiantly denouncing the communisation of Romania and the Soviet 

occupation. 

In the spring of 1949 he answers the request of the National Committee in exile led by 

general Rădescu to draft a document in which to analyze the political, social and 

economical situation in the country. This requirement is sent from Paris to Victor Anca 

who informs some national leaders such as Eugen HaŃeganu, Dumitru Gerota, Ion 

Lugoşianu, Bibi Popescu, Vasile Munteanu, Gabriel Tepelea and asks Victor Jinga and 

Alexantru Herlea to issue the document. The written document is later sent to Paris from 

where it is required supplementary information to the document. This requirement is 

intercepted by the Securitate (they violate the diplomatic case of the Embassy of France, 

through which the communication took place) and the supplement drafted by Herlea and 

Jinga is also spotted before it is sent. The Securitate organize 2 trials, one in Bucharest, 

with Victor Anca as main defendant, and the other one in Brasov with Victor Jinga and 

Alexandru Herlea as main defendants. Victor Anca is sentenced to 10 years of prison and 

the other members of his group to up to 7 years. In Brasov both Herlea and Jinga are 

sentenced to 5 years each and the other members of the group are sentences to lesser 

sentences. The relative leniency of the Military Court in Brasov was due to the panel 

chairman colonel Lazar, who did not obey to the orders of the Securitate to sentence them 

to 15 years in prison, as a result, he would be fired and arrested. 

The 5 years in prison are spent by Herlea in a jail from Brasov (1 year) and 4 years at 

the Danube – Black Sea Canal, 3 of which in the camp in Peninsula – Valea Neagra. 

When still imprisoned in Brasov, he is severely beaten up by a member of the Securitate 

called Mayer who hurts him very badly. He would have surgery, without anesthesia, 

using an improvised surgery knife, only a year later at the Canal by the imprisoned 

physician Achile Sari. One could see professor Herlea’s bright appearance in different 

publications about the Canal who behaved with great dignity and courage. “The Last Will 

from the Morgue” by Remus Radina, “Graves without crosses” by Cicerone IoaniŃoiu [8] 

and the writings of Nicolae Carje and Alexandru Bratu are to be mentioned here. 

During this period of time professor Herlea’s family would also be persecuted. His wife, 

a high school teacher and a university assistant, is fired from education and forced to 

divorce him in order to find work in a factory. The family, the mother and the two 

children, the younger one being seriously ill, would be evicted in 1952. The sick boy 

would die a few years later, in 1957.


The second imprisonment 

After being released from prison, in August 1954, Alexandru Herlea worked for a year 

as stone carver, the only job he was allowed to take. In the fall of 1955 he became the 

chief of the judicial office (a newly established position) of the GOSTAT in Brasov 

Region. He would organize this office for which he summoned 17 lawyers, excellent 

professionals, most of them former political prisoners. He would later on draft a study for 

the Ministry of Agriculture on the real property of the state, adopted by it as the 

theoretical ground for territorial organization. 

Following the period of imprisonment, Professor Herlea would still be closely 

monitored by Securitate, which would do everything in its power to get him in prison 

again. It was a necessary condition so that it should justify its existence and keep the 

atmosphere of terror in the Country, especially following the Hungarian revolution in the 

fall of 1956. 

The first attempt to re-arrest Herlea was in the spring of 1958 when Securitate would 

ask a clerk of Agricola Bank (Mitan) to declare that he had stolen the 100.000 lei (which 

he had forged and for which he would have been sentenced to death, according to the 

law), on obeying to Herlea’s order, who was interested in undermining the national 

economy. The set-up being too evident (professor Barba, from the Polytechnic Institute in 

Brasov, chief accountant, refused to sign the document, finding it too absurd). The 

Securitate prepares a different scenario. 

Many people are being arrested and they persuade Ilie Piso, a priest from Zărneşti, and 

dr. Gogonea from Sibiu to declare that Herlea had organized a activity to overthrow the 

existing regime. A group of 18 defenders is set up, having Herlea as leader, Eugen Lazar, 

as assistant of the national-peasant party and Malusel, as legionary assistant. 

The investigation is led by the Securitate officers Urzica and Alexandrescu, who would 

not only employ set-ups, but also torture morally and physically. Both of them would 

uncrown their carriers as generals, and benefit from the unfair retirement retribution after 

December1989, retribution given to all security officers. One of them, who is still alive 

today, still enjoys all these privileges, whereas all former political prisoners would be 

given humble financial compensations, on the grounds of the state’s lack of funds. 

However, there is enough money to pay for the huge retirement retributions of the 

criminals. 

But, going back to the trial. Herlea is subject to brutal pressure to force him to declare 

that he took action according to Mihai Popovici’s order (one of the main vice-presidents 

of PNT), and thus create the proper scenario for a great national trial. Professor Herlea 

would not give up, and then, two years later, the trial of the 18- people group started in 

Brasov. The prosecutor would ask for a death sentence for Herlea. But the latter would 

save a decisive alibi which he would not divulge until the day of the trial, being fully 

aware that the Securitate would be able to change everything, everytime. But the file 

drafted by Securitate stated that the meeting for the of the counter-revolutionary 

organization took place in the summer of 1954, on the priest Piso name day (Saint Elijah 

– July, 20 th ) in Zărneşti. Herlea was released from his imprisonement at the Canal, in 

August 1954, being in prison on that very day. However, he is sentenced to a 20-year 

imprisonment, despite the obvious set-up. Later on, dr. Gogonea, who was in prison with 

Herlea (seriously ill at the moment) in Jilava, would revise his false testimony and inform 

the prosecution that he had lied concerning Herlea. Still, father Piso refused to take back.

72 


Throughout the trial, many defenders manifested a moral and dignified attitude. Lawyer 

Malusel, economist Lazar, the two vice-leaders of the group, in spite of the torture, would 

not make false testimonies and would not be part of the Securitate wicked games. They 

were both sentenced 18 years of prison each. Those that could not abide the physical and 

moral torture, and did not take back their false statements in court, were also “rewarded” 

with a few years in prison. 

The same day when Herlea’s trial took place in the Military Court in Brasov, there was 

another political trial taking place, whose leading figure was professor Victor Jinga. He 

had been accused of nothing else than making propaganda against the state and was given 

only a 10-year imprisonment. 

From his prison file 

Below, professor Alexandru Herlea’s prison file is presented, extracted from the site of 

the Institute of Investigation of Communism Crimes and the Memory of Romanian Exile 

[9]. 

Herlea Al. Alexandru, born on the 24 th of June, 1907, in Vinerea, Alba, son of 

Alexandru and Dora, living in Orăştie, Huneadoara, accountant, university 

professor, without wealth,doctor in Law, married to Silvia, one son, PNł, arrested 

on the15th of August of 1949, P. Or. Stalin (15.10. 1949), condemned by Military 

Court Stalin (541/50) to 5 years imprisonment for conspiracy, Poarta Albă 

(20.02.1951), Valea Neagră, Poarta Albă (6. 05. 1951), Valea Neagră (13. 05. 

1951), Poarta Albă (26. 11.1953), released from prison on 13.08.1954. Living in 

Braşov, S. Pârvulescu 7 Street, solicitor of Trust GAS Braşov (university 

professor), without wealth, arrested on the 16 th of March, 1959, Codlea 

(22.03.1961), sentenced by the Military Court Reg. III Cluj (68/1961), to 20 years 

for conspiracy, Jilava (8.08.1961), Văcăreşti (21. 08.1962), Jilava (27.10.1962), 

Văcăreşti (14.11.1962), Jilava (29.12.1962), released on the 16 th of January, 1963, 

pardoned D. 5/ 1963. [FJ]. 

Pro Memoria 

Of a great sensitivity, Alexandru Herlea was the poet too. Shortly before his death, he 

published to the printing house "Litera" three issues of poems entitled "la portŃile 

gândului / The gates of thought", "Pe puntea întrenbărilor / On the deck of questions" and 

"Cronica nelinistilor / Chronic of anxiety". Over a thousand poems have been confiscated 

by Security and have not yet been found. How they were seized many other scientific 

manuscripts which have not been recovered. But there is, fortunately, a few manuscripts, 

and memories that Alexander Herlea wrote towards the end of life and which are in 

possession of his son. 

To sum up, I would like to underline that professor Alexandru Herlea, a dignified 

descendent of his family, was a scholar of great value, an example of exceptional fighter 

for national identity and for the great values of the European civilization. His scientific 

prominence and his humanism have made a great impact on those who had the honor of 

meeting him.


Acknowledgments 

I would like to thank Prof. dr.ing. Alexandru Herlea junior 2 , the son of the professor, 

who provided me with invaluable documentation, ranging from publications to the 

CNSAS files. This allowed me to create this presentation to this form. Former Minister of 

European Integration, Mr. Alexandru Herlea junior, has played an important role in the 

process of opening the negotiations of Romania’s integration in the European Union, and 

which, by surpassing the vicissitudes of history, would finally return to the great 

European family they should have never deserted. 

I would like to thank also to Prof. Florentin Olteanu, president of Negru Vodă Cultural 

Foundation from Făgăraş, who provoided me with many nformation on the calvary of 

deportation and inprisonment in Romania. 

Bibliography 

1. Gheorghe Mihai: Homo juris – Patrimonium technicus. Sesiunea CRIGFST Medias, 

2012 (to be published). 

2. Virgil Ierunca: Despre Alexandru Herlea. Evocare la postul de Radio Euriopa Liberă, 

februarie 1981, Memoria, Revista gandirii arestate, Editată de FundaŃia Culturală 

Memoria, sub egida Uniunii Scriitorilor din Romania, Nr. 12. 

3. Traian Dumitrescu, Valeriu Mircea: The monographies and biographies of academic 

staff of Academy of Higher Commercial and Industrial Studies /Monografiile si 

biografiile corpului profesoral al Academiei de Inalte Studii Comerciale şi 

Industriale şi al ISEP-ului Brasov (1927/1929 – 1948 si 1948-1950). Vol. 3, ASE 

Bucuresti. 

4. Alexandru Herlea: Studies on law history. State organization /Studii de istoria 

dreptului. Organizarea de stat. Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1983. 

5. Alexandru Herlea: Studies on law history /Studii de istoria dreptului. Vol.3. Editura 

Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1997. 

6. Flavia Bălescu (born Coposu): Letter to Alexandru Herlea junior /Scrisoare către 

Alexandru Herlea junior, Bucuresti, 1996. 

7. Remus Radina: Testament in morgue /Testamentul din morgă. Editura Jurnalul 

Literar, Bucureşti, 2008. 

8. Cicerone IoniŃoiu: Graves without cross /Morminte fără cruce. Jon Dumitru Verlag, 

Munchen, 1982. 

9. Prison sheets /Fişe de penitenciar, 

http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/fise_detinuti_politici/ 

2 Alexander Herlea Junior donated to the Library of Transilvania University of Brasov his father's 

library, which contains many of his publications.

74 

Iconography 


Fig. 1. Personal sheet of Prof. Alexandru Herlea, obtained from CNSAS, at the first 

imprisonment, in 1949.


Fig. 2. Personal sheet of Prof. Alexandru Herlea, obtained from CNSAS, at the second 

imprisonment, 1959.

76 


Fig. 3. Professor Alexandru Herlea, before the first imprisonment, 1949.

A LIFE DEDICATED TO ROMANIAN UNITED 

CHURCH AND NATION - PRIESTS AND 

TEACHERS DR. AUREL LELUłIU (1914 - 1980) 

Introduction 

Laura-Mihaela LELUłIU 1 , Ovidiu-Constantin SAVU 2 

History of the Greek Catholic Church in Romania or the United Church of Rome, as he 

was also known originated and first plans to set up in the late seventeenth century. From 

social and political issues of Transylvanian Romanians, the appearance of this cult, 

separated from the Orthodox, Romanian, has its beginnings in the seventeenth century 

Transylvania and the beginning of the next century. Basically, in terms of the rite does 

not change hardly to Orthodox worship, celebrates are the same, only the hierarchical 

superior is seen in the Pope of Rome, and instead of the Holy Spirit during the service, 

the word Holy Spirit. 

For over two centuries the Greek-Catholic Church in Transylvania played an active role 

in terms of religion, culture and education among Romanians in the province. Blaj 

schools, religious and administrative capital of the Greek Catholics after XVIII century, 

gave hundreds of thousands of priests, deacons, teachers, professors, who have direct 

contributed to the emancipation of Transylvanian Romanians. 

This period in history coincides with the lack of rights and freedoms of Transylvanian 

Romanians, for which they fought with plume, wrote memoirs and intelligence 

representatives Transylvanian Romanians. 

At the end of the Second World War, the situation in Romania, as well as the entire 

block of countries in Eastern and Central Europe came under Soviet political influence. 

At the end of 1948 the position and security of the Greek Catholic Church, the prelates 

and parishioners was seriously threatened by communist government policies that 

prohibit illegal acts Greek Catholic worship by "embedding" or "absorption" of , forced 

the cult Romanian Orthodox [1]. 

In Romania, before banning cult believers there were about 1.5 million Greek Catholics, 

1,725 churches, 1,594 priests, 34 canons, 75 priests, divided into five dioceses. 

In 1948 these bishops holders were John Suciu areas Alba Iulia and Fagaras, Julius 

Hossu for Cluj, Oradea FrenŃiu Valeriu Trajan, and Alexandru Ioan Rusu Lugoj Balan in 

Maramures. Also, there is a vicar general and Bucharest in the person of Basil Aftenie, 

which was named in 1940 for Alba and Fagaras, but remained in Bucharest. 

Romanian Greek Catholics still worked in underground after 1948, especially through 

the work of Bishop Vasile Suciu, Alexander Todea the future cardinal, and other priests 

and prelates less known . 

1 Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania. 

2 Casa Muresenilor Museum of Brasov, Romania.

78 


Those who opposed the forced incorporation among Romanian Orthodox were 

imprisoned in jail, placed under the supervision of Security or kept under house arrest 

regime [1], [5]. 

Our study does not aim to analyze subjective and biased situation and a historical 

reality, only to find, to discover, through documents and oral history studies, the work of 

a former catholic priest, Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu, originally from Fagaras area. Greek Catholic 

priest, Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu was closed in jail because of the continued celebration of 

religious worship was baptized and trained at major schools Blaj or Rome. 

In over 20 years of democratic change around 1989, produced in the countries of 

Central and Eastern Europe was asked the question, why did this iniquity, who belonged 

to the idea of abolishing religion united, Romania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia? ! 

This question was asked and the situation in our country. Were and are Romanian and 

foreign researchers who answered this question by studies and research done by them. 

We consider here the Andre Kom, a native of the Netherlands, which has a very objective 

study on "Unifying United Church Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948." Another 

research area has Volokitina Tatiana Russian researcher, and from us dealt with this area, 

among others, Cristian Vasile, Amrius Bucur, Marius Oprea, Ovidiu Bozgan, Lucretia 

Scurtu, Vasile Marcu and others. 

Greek Catholic Priest Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu activity 

During the seventh edition of International Symposium called „ Communist regimes - 

recent memory for an open society ”, we have chosen to present the Priest. Prof. dr. Aurel 

LeluŃiu for several reasons. First of all, the Priest and teacher Aurel LeluŃiu is a unique 

personality who was totally committed to the spiritual life of the city and the nation. His 

life was dedicated to the United Church and the Romanian people, and this simple fact 

determined destiny, so he becomes a victim of Stalinist show trials being and processes 

and then sentenced to several years in prison. 

Another reason for this communication finds its explanation in the fact that the evoke of 

Priest dr. Aurel LeluŃiu, my paternal uncle is a debt of honor to our family [2], [3]. 

Who was to become the Priest Aurel LeluŃiu, born on the 21 st of April 1914 in OlteŃ - 

Făgăraş, was the fourth son of the family Alexandru and Maria LeluŃiu. His father died in 

the First World War, therefore his uncle, Captain Alexandru LeluŃiu, took care of him 

afterwards. 

Thus, the young Aurel LeluŃiu, together with his brother John, under the care of his 

uncle, Captain Alexander LeluŃiu , reaches the Orphanage in Sibiu, followed by the years 

1928-1932 high school "Aurel Vlaicu" of Orăștie and high school "Gh Lazar "in Sibiu. 

Having recently obtained the baccalaureate, in 1932, at 18 years old, he was sent to 

Rome, where he studied for nine years, during the period 1932 to 1941. This fact is 

proved by the document no.135 of 26.10.1932 the Romanian Kingdom Parish Office, 

Viştea de Jos - Fagaras, signed by Father Nicholas Şandru. 

Through this document young Aurel LeluŃiu was announced that, "in order 

Reverendisimului James Popa, prepozit of Blaj, brought by Mr. A. sedge, reeve of 

Dragus, was invited on October 28, 1932, to be present at Blaj to go to study at the 

Institute of Propaganda Fide in Rome, accompanied by Rev. Dr. Augustine Tartar.”

Laura-Mihaela LELUłIU et al.: A Life Dedicated to Romanian United Church and Nation ... 79 

His great friend, Alexandru Todea, the future cardinal, would find him there in two 

years (1934) and would leave him in 1940, while Aurel LeluŃiu would remain one more 

year, obtaining two doctorates – one in Byzantine Theology, the other in Oriental 

Ecclesiastical Sciences, both acquired with maximum degree "magna cum laude 

probatus". 

On 25.03.1939, the Feast of the Annunciation, both were ordained deacons [4]. 

Whilst he was at Rome, his benefactor, uncle Alexandru died; in a letter sent home at 

OlteŃ, he expressed his conviction that everything happening to us proceeded from God’s 

will and therefore must be meekly received, as Jesus received his suffering and death on 

the Cross. 

Returned in the country, in 1942, he was appointed teacher of Religion at the High- 

School "Sfântul Vasile cel Mare" from Blaj, and the bishop Ioan Suciu appointed him 

professor of Moral Philosophy at the Theological Academy from Blaj (according to the 

document nr.3252 / 1947, signed by the famous Bishop Ioan Suciu). 

When, in January 1945, the vicar of Târgu Mureş, Iosif Pop, needed teachers at the 

High-School "Papiu Ilarian", the priest Aurel LeluŃiu promptly arrived there, serving the 

restoration of the Romanian education. 

Processes and imprisonment 

In 1948 the United Church persecution begins, it is not exempt any professor Dr. Aurel 

LeluŃiu Priest. Rev. Prof. Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu occupied before 1948, the post of director of 

community spirit Congregation of Our Lady of Blaj, but the same year he was arrested 

along with a group of nuns from here and went to the monastery Obreja near Blaj. 

Through a combination of circumstances, he escaped and hid until 1951, when he was 

arrested, brought to Bucharest , to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, judged and given life 

sentence by the Military Court of Bucharest, a sentence commuted thereafter to 25 years, 

whereof he executed 14. 

Release from prison of Gherla was made on 23 august 1964, under order no. 3950 of 

31.07.1964, stating that he was sentenced "because the crime of conspiracy," with the 

sentence no. 396/1952. 

In the release note from the Prison of Gherla, no. 3950 from 31 .VII. 1964, there is 

specified he was condemned for "conspiracy crime", through the sentence no. 396/1952. 

In the prisons, he was steadfast in faith and had a dignified behaviour. He was very hard 

on himself but very tolerant to other people [4], [5]. 

He passed through the prisons of Jilava, Sighet, Râmnicu Sărat, Piteşti and Gherla. 

Returned home, he settled in Blaj, where he daily oficiated the Holy Mass, with the 

participation of a great number of believers, despite the very severe surveillance of the 

Security, and he was the confessor of many intellectual families. 

After the release from prisons, he settled at Blaj, but simultaneously activated at OlteŃ 

and in Bucharest, being the superior of the Congregation of the Immaculate Heart. 

The priest Aurel LeluŃiu, together with the Greek-Catholic bishops, was also the coauthor 

of several memorials and reports towards the country’s government and towards 

the Holy See, drawn up in the hope of a dialogue with the State’s authorities, for the 

Greek-Catholic’s Church right to existence. 

Unexpected death of Fr Aurel LeluŃiu occurred on December 23, 1980, the station in 

Bournemouth, due to a heart attack.

80 


The conception of the Parent Aurel LeluŃiu, on the human being and his purpose is 

expressed in the article "Supreme Dignity" that he published in the newspaper "Unirea" 

from Blaj (23rdof January 1943): "Matter is something, spirit is someone. And, as in the 

human life, spirit or matter prevails, so the human being is someone or something is a 

person or a thing. The human being’s supreme dignity consists in love..." 

Priest and teacher of the United Church and son of the Romanian nation, which he 

served with dignity in the crucial moments of his history, the priest Aurel LeluŃiu died on 

the 23rd of December 1980. 

Memorandum 

In conclusion, in our study we wanted to evoke the personality of Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu, 

Priest and teacher, who has truly a life dedicated United Church (Greek Catholic) and the 

Romanian people. The humble priest Aurel LeluŃiu suffered in prison without 

succumbing to the pressures made for the transition to Orthodoxy. The Great Creator had 

endowed with a soul and a unique personality and spiritual qualities, being a model 

servant of hispeople, a fighter for national identity. 

Acknowledgements 

Many thanks to Mrs. Maria LeluŃiu my mother and my father's wife died Engineer 

Professor Aurel LeluŃiu, nephew Priest Professor Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu that besides the 

interview has provided us a rich material, a comprehensive documentation, so we may to 

achieve this communication. We also thank Mr. Engineer Emil LeluŃiu, my uncle and the 

nephew’s Priest Professor Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu that the interview provided me with a lot of 

data, information and life imprisonments about the Priest Professor Dr. Aurel LeluŃiu [2], 

[4]. 

References 

[1] Cristian Vasile: Între Vatican şi Kremlin - Biserica Greco-Catolica in timpul 

regimului comunis,, Editura Curtea Veche, București , 2003, ISBN 973-8356-89-X. 

[2] Interviu cu Doamna Maria LeluŃiu , soŃia Profesorului Inginer Aurel LeluŃiu, nepotul 

Preotului profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu 

[3]http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/biserici/preoti_grec 

o_catolici_3/ 

[4] Interviu cu Domnul Inginer Emil LeluŃiu , nepotul Preotului profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu 

[5] Iuliu CheŃan : Preotul profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu - "Un erou şi un martir uitat?" , 

"Unirea" nr. 6,7/ Blaj, 1995.


Iconography 

Fig. 1. Birth Certificate. 

Fig. 2. Photos in Rome.

82 

Fig. 3. Testimonium of Ph.D. Certificates. 

Remembrance in Time


Fig. 4. The certificate of ordination as priest. 

Fig. 5. A photo with the Priest Aurel LeluŃiu writing in his room.

84 

Fig. 6. A photo with the Priest Aurel LeluŃiu. 

. 

Fig. 7. Pictures taken after Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu leaving the prison 

Remembrance in Time

ASPECTS OF THE „CREATIVE RESISTANCE” 

IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA 

Manuela MARIN 1,2 

The problem in studying the masses within extreme right and extreme left regimes came 

to the attention of foreign historians after the Second World War, when the totalitarian 

model was formulated. Challenging this model’s assumptions regarding the nature of the 

relations between the masses and the political regimes and using the methods of social 

history in the context of the historical evolution of the Soviet Union in the interwar 

period, the revisionist school brought into discussion besides the topics concerning the 

social basis of Stalinism, the conflict between the center-periphery and the administrative 

weakness of the Soviet Union, as well as that of the resistance. Thus, the active forms of 

resistance came into the attention of the representatives of this school and especially those 

of the passive resistance of the population against the Soviet regime, analyzed in the 

context of the actions of different social classes (peasants, workers). If for active 

resistance, its forms are clearly defined (eg, demonstrations, protest meetings, strikes, 

petitions) and it places its subjects in open, direct opposition to authority, in the case of 

the passive resistance things are not always as clear. Obviously influenced by the works 

of James C. Scott, historians who have addressed this topic have made a distinction from 

two different perspectives: the first includes passive resistance as part of the behavior of 

subordinate classes / groups, while the second makes it clear that passive forms of 

opposition are characteristic to the category of ordinary people (related to this aspect, 

some authors even make a clear distinction between dissent, the specific form of 

intellectuals’ opposition and the passive resistance that characterizes the way in which the 

simple individual relates to the authoritarian political regime). 

Consequently, passive resistance refers to those forms of everyday resistance in the 

sense of the term provided by James C. Scott. They allow individuals to pursue their own 

interests in their current activity, manipulating, reinterpreting and adapting the official 

game’s rules, without providing justifiable grounds for a confrontation or direct 

intervention of the authority against which these acts of passive resistance are directed. 

Among these forms of passive opposition, James C. Scott has included delays in initiating 

actions (foot-dragging), negligence, sabotage, theft, concealment, false compliance, 

feigned ignorance, rumors, gossip, songs, jokes, gestures, etc. All these are part of what 

he called hidden transcripts. They represent those speeches, gestures, informal practices 

employed by subordinate groups that contradict, modify or reinterpret similar practices 

initiated in the public space and which characterize all their relations with those who they 

are subject to. In Scott's opinion, that specific interaction in the public space of the 

subordinated groups with those who behold the power and which contradicts their 

1 Research for this paper was supported by CNCS-UEFISCU, project number PN II-RU 410/2010.

86 


position expressed through hidden transcripts is called public transcripts. Because these 

two types of transcripts are the result of a process of domination, their content reflects the 

dynamic and constant struggle between those who are dominated and the dominating 

ones especially since the latter affect the transcriptions and condition the similar 

manifestations of those who are subordinated. However, the hidden transcripts, through 

their complexity (including those mentioned above as gestures, mimicry, hidden 

behavior, speech acts etc.) allow the subordinate groups to create a subculture that gives 

meaning to their passive forms of resistance regarding the official political line and at the 

same time to customize the ideate content of the social space as an expression of the 

indirect unofficial opposition towards the official transcript specific to the formal 

exercise of power relations. 3 

Trying to define resistance as part of the complex response that the society gave to the 

Stalinist regime, Lynne Viola stressed that there one cannot talk of only one resistance, 

but rather of resistances or acts of resistance, different in size and content having multiple 

meanings. This is due to the fact that the acts of resistance are influenced and at the same 

time illustrate the complexity of the society in which they emerged, with all the internal 

political and social divisions, along with all the conflictive forces acting within it. 4 

Sheila Fitzpatrick uses the term sedition (in Russian kramola) to describe various forms 

of everyday resistance in the Soviet Union from 1960 to 1970 years. However, the author 

notes that these forms of daily opposition of the Soviet citizens were their only real 

political acts, while the model of popular democracy of the Soviet Union assured them 

only a simulated participation in the political decision making process. 5 

In his monograph dedicated to the Soviet Magnitogorsk city, examining how socialism 

was not just built but also lived, Stephen Kotkin introduced the expression of creative 

resistance to characterize how people in that city in the middle of construction responded 

to official policies and to the manner in which they were implemented. This type of 

resistance is defined by those "little tactics of habit”, such as behavior, language, attitude 

employed by individuals to avoid or undermine the meaning of written and unwritten 

rules of appropriate behavior officially established. In other words, the creative resistance 

was an imaginative original reinterpretation of the official rules so that they served the 

interests of individuals, but at the same time they had to maintain the appearance of 

scrupulous compliance of official regulations. 6 

Applying the above mentioned to the subject of our study, we will analyze the 

resistance in communist Romania as part of everyday existence of subordinate groups 

which developed a series of specific acts of resistance. These acts through their diversity 

2 Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. 

3 

James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Yale University Press, New Haven, 

1990, p. XI-XII, 2-26. 

4 

Lynne Viola, “Introduction” in Lynne Viola (eds.), Contending with Stalinism. Soviet Power and 

Popular Resistance in the 1930s, Cornel University Press, Ithaca, 2002, pp. 1-14. 

5 

Sheila Fitzpatrick, „Popular Sedition in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union”in Vladimir A. Kozlov, 

Sheila Fitzpatrick, Sergei V. Mironenko, Sedition. Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union 

under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2011, pp. 1-24. 

6 

Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilization, University, Berkeley, 1995, pp. 

35, 154-155, 220-221.

Manuela MARIN: Aspects of the „Creative Resistance” in Communist Romania 87 

and complexity gave birth to a form of subculture specific to groups, reflected by the 

emergence and development of hidden transcripts. Also, the manner in which official 

transcripts (in our case, the official political and propagandistic discourse of Romanian 

Communist Party) influenced creatively the hidden content of these will be another focus 

of our analysis. 

Applying the above mentioned to the subject of our study, we will analyze the 

resistance in communist Romania as part of everyday existence of subordinate groups 

which developed a series of specific acts of resistance. These acts through their diversity 

and complexity gave birth to a form of subculture specific to groups, reflected by the 

emergence and development of hidden transcripts. Also, the manner in which official 

transcripts (in our case, the official political and propagandistic discourse of Romanian 

Communist Party) influenced creatively the hidden content of these will be another focus 

of our analysis. 

As I said before, the everyday acts of creative resistance were the result of the manner 

in which some people reacted to official policies and how their application had influenced 

the everyday existence. However, our analysis will not be a thematic one that identifies 

those decisions or official policies that have generated opposition from the population, 

but will concentrate on identifying and portraying its specific forms in the context of 

communist Romania. 

The first form of such a resistance was the one of political discussions. In this context, 

we should note that due to the centralized control of Romanian Communist Party 

(hereafter abbreviated as RCP) on the Romanian society, almost any topic of conversation 

acquired a political significance. One such topic was concerning the difficulties arising in 

the food supply of the population during the 1980s. The expression of the dissatisfaction 

of the population regarding the food shortages "in various places and circumstances 

starting from the queues for food … to the work place or even in organized meetings" 

was an action which implied a political stake as it denied the successful economic 

policies and made less credible the paternalist argument put forward by Romanian 

propaganda as a primary aim of the party-state’s activity. Thus, in an informative note 

was quoted a citizen’s testimony stating that "it got worse than during the war, we give all 

to to capitalists and still staying at queues in the cold", while another said that "it would 

be better if the state thought about the necessary supplies instead of throwing people at 

the parade". 7 In other cases, public remarks aimed at the significance of domestic 

political events. Thus, in a dialogue captured in another memo of the Securitate in Arad, a 

worker said that he does not even know when will be the Eleventh Congress of the 

Communist Party "because for months they only deal with Congress, the radio, at 

television and in the newspapers are filled with Congress news; it irritates you that much 

propaganda for nothing, that workers cannot expect anything good, but must keep quiet". 8 

Another citizen denied the democratic character of the socialist system and denounced the 

measures taken in this respect by the Romanian communist regime to maintain the 

appearance of a democratic participation of citizens in the political life: "it’s in vain to 

make expenses for election propaganda, because even if no Romanian would vote, those 

proposed will still be elected, and those who do not vote for the Communists, will be 

under surveillance and should expect who knows what from the police force". 9 

7 Arhiva CNSAS, D 13314, vol 20, f 4, 10. 

8 Arhiva CNSAS, D 13314, vol 20, f 153. 

9 Arhiva CNSAS, D 13 314, vol 20, f . 119 v.

88 


A second identified form of resistance is the subversive use of language. In this case, we 

will consider firstly what the Securitate identified as "documents containing hostile 

message". 

Thus, in the context of elections of deputies for people's councils, in a voting precinct 

was found a note "with a mentioning that denigrated the RCP", while in another ballot 

box, "on one bulletin was written the objection regarding the lack of opposition in 

elections". 10 Also, the members of Securitate have recorded that on the cover of the 

Cinema magazine in January 1989, two young men wrote on the faces of the Romanian 

presidential couple "ox and cow" as an expression of personal dissatisfaction with the 

political and economic situation in Romania. 11 

The proliferation of hate speech was also an example of subversive use of language. 

According to the documents prepared by Securitate, the target of such negative comments 

was the "superior leaders of the party and state". However, given the fact that Ceausescu 

was identified by the official propaganda discourse as the only party and state leader, we 

can actually say that his person was the principal target of expressions classified as 

"disparaging" or "libelous". Usually, this type of comments was influenced by the 

negative effects of the economic measures initiated by the Romanian communist regime 

led by Nicolae Ceausescu. For example, a retired man from the city Sebeş was recorded 

in the Security documents because he "made biased statements regarding the 

socioeconomic situation in our country and brought insults to the senior party and state 

leaders". 12 

In the category of documents with “hateful content" belong some letters written by 

various individuals to different bodies of the central party or state or, where appropriate to 

foreign radio stations, identified by Securitate as having a hostile attitude towards the 

communist regime in Bucharest. 

In one of his volumes of memoirs, Paul Niculescu-Mizil showed that during the 

leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu there was a system for studying and solving various 

letters sent by citizens. 13 Presented by official propaganda as a concrete and eloquent 

manifestation of the socialist democratic regime, this system of examination and 

resolution of "proposals, complaints and requests of the working people" was found in all 

local and central levels of party and government administration, of mass organizations 

and not in the least as part of the activity of the Romanian media. 

Within this system, the citizens were encouraged to contact the authorities with 

proposals of general interest, with allegations of deficiencies or irregularities in the 

activity of economic entities, with applications to solve personal problems, to denounce 

abuses by local officials and last but not least to express their views on current issues of 

domestic and foreign policy. This latter type of correspondence between citizens and 

authorities is relevant to the topic of this paper for three reasons. Firstly, these letters 

constitute an argument proving the existence and expression of personal views of various 

people on various topics through official channels. Secondly, a minority of those who 

10 Arhiva CNSAS, D 13314, vol 20, f. 53. 

11 Arhiva CNSAS, D 533, f. 32. 

12 Arhiva CNSAS, D 336, vol 2, f. 46. 

13 Paul Niculescu-Mizil, De la Comintern la comunismul naŃional. Despre Consfătuirea partidelor 

comuniste şi muncitoreşti, Moscova, 1969, Editura Evenimentul Românesc, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 

370.


addressed local authorities expressed views that questioned the performance of the 

Romanian communist regime and that of its leader. Thirdly, the letters were the most 

often used form of dissemination of documents containing ‘hateful content’ as shown by 

data from the internal documents of the central bodies of Securitate. 14 

Since the documents issued by the Securitate about this type of letters were mostly 

informative reports, they gives only general details regarding the motivation of their 

classification as documents of "hostile nature". Thus, a person sent in 1977 to the central 

bodies of the party and state and to some private individuals seven letters "in which they 

slander the party’s and state’s policy on the rights and freedoms of the citizens". 15 A 

professor of Romanian language and literature from Cluj sent two anonymous letters to 

“Flacăra” magazine and a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP during the 1983- 

1984s "whose content brought serious slander to the socialist system in Romania, while at 

the same time it derided some aspects of the economic and socio-political situation, using 

both offensive and indecent language". 16 In some cases, the letters’ signatories complete 

their "slander" and "hateful comments" with threats of acts of violence. Due to personal 

grievances, a worker from Sibiu sent a letter threatening with "acts of violence against the 

state leadership", while a priest in Cluj found it necessary to turn his threats towards the 

Romanian national broadcasting institution and to the editorial committees of Făclia and 

Scânteia newspapers. 17 

Letters of the Romanian citizens addressed to foreign radio stations (Radio Free Europe, 

Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle) entered from the Securitate’s point of view in 

the category of documents with “hateful content” for two main reasons. Firstly, the 

activity of these radio stations was considered to be hostile to the communist regime in 

Bucharest, because their programs were "systematically denigrating the Party and the 

Romanian state policy, the achievements in the construction of socialism ...", aiming at 

"undermining the state’s authority and the moral-political unity of the people ... 

incitement to disorder and protest". 18 Secondly, by their subject (by asking help for 

immigration, describing the difficult political and economic situation, the limitation and 

violation of rights and freedoms), these letters gave a touch of truthfulness and an 

argumentative basis for the criticism aimed by this media radio stations to the Romanian 

Communist regime. 

Starting from the above, including both types of letters among the creative resistance 

means of the population to the communist regime is justified for several reasons. Firstly, 

the simple man used a tool officially sanctioned, that of the system of studying and 

solving letters in order to articulate and express the different views on the official 

political line. Secondly, the formulation of different opinions based on information from 

external sources is in itself an act of resistance because it involves linking and comparing 

the information content of that officially distributed with that received through alternative 

channels of information. In this context, the awareness of the common people of the 

existence of a discrepancy between the official version and the one formed from personal 

experience and the information received from outside stand behind the articulation of 

14 Arhiva CNSAS, D16302, vol. 17, f. 31 f, f. 37 f. 

15 Arhiva CNSAS, D16302, vol. 17, f. 31v. 

16 Arhiva CNSAS, D8833, vol. 15, f. 380 f. 

17 Arhiva CNSAS, D 16302, vol. 17, f. 37 v, 39 v. 

18 Arhiva CNSAS, D16632, vol . 2, f. 189 f-v.

90 


their perspective on the current situation. Thirdly, the option to send a letter to a foreign 

radio station to make public a wish or a personal opinion contrary to the official political 

line represents also an act of resistance because it highlighted the individual’s refusal of 

resignation to the omnipotence of the communist regime. 

Humor was another form of people's resistance against the Romanian communist 

regime. Luisa Passerini's explanations on the causes of success of humor during the 

fascist regime apply also to the Romanian case. To avoid conflict with state authorities, 

the individual had to have a certain degree of self-control in his daily behavior. In this 

context, jokes and laughter have become the most conveniently means for ordinary 

people to relieve the psychological pressure caused by the required compliant external 

display of official conduct. 19 

The most popular form of humor in the communist era was the political joke. Political 

jokes were mostly about Nicolae Ceausescu, designated as "uncle Nicu", about his wife 

"LenuŃa" or about both of them. They invoked, as appropriate, ubiquitous figures in the 

daily life of ordinary people (such as policeman, the Securitate, the one in charge with 

propaganda, the party activist), they ridiculed party events (congresses, conferences, 

elections, working visits of Ceausescu) or represented a way of making fun of trouble as 

in the case of the unfortunate effects of the measures initiated by the Romanian 

communist regime (food crisis, energy crisis, the systematization of rural areas policy, 

etc.). The subversive potential of political jokes was confirmed also by the fact that the 

county bodies of the Securitate were concerned with identifying those people who 

popularized the "libelous and defamatory content jokes about some high personality of 

the state leadership" within the narrow bounds of family and friends. 20 

Two important elements recommended the inclusion of political jokes among the 

population's creative resistance to the communist regime. Firstly, under the guise of 

extreme irony and sometimes black humor, political jokes stressed even more the 

discrepancy between the reality presented by official propaganda and the real situation of 

ordinary people, doing this in a form accessible to a diverse and large numbers of 

audiences. Secondly, in the lack of alternative means of information, jokes offered a 

critical analysis of key internal developments. Thus, these forms of humor not only 

indirectly challenged the official policies and their alleged positive results, but they also 

contributed to the development of alternative views of daily reality different from those 

promoted through the official channels. 

To illustrate the above, we will analyze two such jokes. This is about the sale of stamps 

with the figure of Ceausescu, that were supposed to have been sold our very quickly. 

Therefore, the representatives of the counties would have come to Bucharest to ask for 

more. Only one county representative came back with the stamps complaining that they 

do not stick on the envelopes. Eager to prove the contrary, a post office worker explains 

that if you spit its back, the stamp sticks perfectly. The county representative slaps his 

forehead, having the following revelation: "Damn it! Here's why the stamp did not stick 

properly! They were spitting on the face". 21 Selling stamps with the figure of Ceausescu 

19 Luisa Passerini, Fascism in popular memory : the cultural experience of the Turin working 

class, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 86. 

20 Arhiva CNSAS, D 336 , vol. 2, f. 150 f, D. 337, f. 26. 

21 Călin-Bogdan Ştefănescu, Din bancurile politice ale românilor. 10 ani de umor negru 

românesc, Editura Paideia, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 16.


and the haste with which they would have sold out refers to his personality cult and the 

fact that the local party's leaders political survival depended on the dedication with which 

not only would they perform their task of promoting and supporting the party, but also of 

promoting the adulation of the supreme head of the RCP phenomenon. The figure of the 

party activist poorly equipped intellectually is even more hilarious as it is not only the 

subject of a collective farce staged by his subordinates, but he/she is also unable to 

recognize an act of protesting. 

Another political joke, which has different variants, has its main character Nicolae 

Ceausescu or his wife. The RCP leader is shown angry that he cannot find a particular 

pair of shoes, while Elena Ceausescu boasts with pride during an external visit with a 

unique pair. The reason is that those shoes would be Ceausescu's BA thesis. 22 Obviously, 

the joke alludes to the basic job of the RCP's leader, as a shoemaker, detail often omitted 

from his official biography. This is because being a shoemaker was not an appropriate job 

for a Communist leader because of its non-proletarian character. At the same time, this 

biographical omission was able to neutralize possible questions related to intellectual 

preparation of Nicolae Ceausescu, which was validated on a groundless basis by the titles 

and national and international academic awards that he had received throughout the period of 

his leadership. The existence of these jokes on the modest professional beginnings of the 

Romanian communist leader demonstrate the existence of popular counter image of Nicolae 

Ceausescu that questioned the main assertions of the Communist propaganda on his 

background before getting to the supreme function in the party. 

Another example of popular resistance to the Romanian communist regime was the 

creation of conspiratorial/subversive groups. Although most of the examples selected by 

the Securitate in its documents identified in the composition of these groups adolescents, 

yet there were cases in which adults were involved. From the data reports of the local 

Securitate’s bodies resulted that the tendency of most of these groups was to adopt a 

symbolic and a fascist-inspired organization (in fact Nazi). Thus, a group of 14 teenagers 

from Drobeta Turnu Severin used the Nazi salute amongst them, wrote on the board, on 

the textbooks expressions and fascist signs manufacturing at the metal workshop of the 

school a number of such signs. 23 A similar environment suggestively named "Swastika" 

was annihilated by the intervention of local Securitate’s authorities in Bihor County. 

Influenced by Sven Hassel novels, three members of the group, students in 12th grade in 

a school from Oradea, engaged in discussions praising the actions of the commando 

forces of the Gestapo during the Second War and inserted into their personal belongings 

and vocabulary specific Nazi symbols and words. 24 The Securitate’s investigations 

revealed that some hostile letters containing Romanian communist regime were signed on 

behalf of illegal organizations or groups. Continuing the example described above, the 

person who sent in 1977 seven letters denouncing violations rights and freedoms in 

Romania signed on behalf of an organization called "Făclia Moldovei". 25 

The inclusion of these groups/organizations in the category of creative resistance 

elements is justified for several reasons. The first aims to organize these groups even 

outside the legal framework controlled by RCP. The second reason concerns the 

22 Ibidem, p. 23, 65. 

23 Arhiva CNSAS, D 16302, vol. 17, f. 51 f. 

24 Arhiva CNSAS, D 8833, vol 15, f 203 f. 

25 Arhiva CNSAS, D 16302, vol. 17, f. 31 v.

92 


organizational characteristics of the groups. The fact that a part of the communist youth 

identified in the of Fascist model a more attractive manner for organizing their spare time 

than that proposed by the Communist Youth Union (hereafter abbrevited as CYL) was an 

evidence of the failure of the political education for this category of the population. This 

is because Fascism continued to be identified by the official propaganda as the 

ideological and historical enemy of communism in Romania. However, the existence of a 

specific hierarchical internal structure and of some specific elements of group 

identification undermined the standardization efforts promoted through the CYU 

organizations to create potential sources of obtaining the loyalty of its members outside 

the control of the RCP. And last but not least, the coagulation of entourages was able to 

intensify and diversify behaviors that questioned the official policy direction, such as 

listening and commenting on news from foreign radio stations or the illegal collective 

attempts to cross the border. In a political context other than that of the former Soviet 

bloc, the formation of such groups/organizations should have been classified as a 

manifestation of every citizen’s rights to meet or as a simple manifestation of adolescent 

rebelliousness, which tends to identify and also to distinguish itself in the manner of 

spectacular and adventurous formulas from the conformity of the adult world around 

them. However, for the reasons mentioned above, for the communist authorities and 

bodies of the Security the establishment of these groups represented in their differential 

and opposing potential, a minor threat, yet not insignificant in in the context of 

multiplying against the monopole power of the RCP. A final element of creative 

resistance identified by us aims the means used by ordinary people in relation with local 

authorities. Obviously, our attention will focus only on those types of interactions after 

which the individual would creatively instrumentalize the set of official regulations to 

achieve its purpose. For example, a group of inhabitants of a commune in Alba refused to 

vote had they not been provided with the much-needed has tanks. Most of the time, those 

who were identified as authors of "hostile documents" invoked in their defense the 

argument that they had been influenced by "the news heard on foreign radio stations" or 

that the material hardships or personal grievances had pushed them to such reckless acts. 

Also, drunkenness had always been a handy argument to explain the rapid and convenient 

personal actions against the Romanian communist regime. 26 

Our article focused on identifying and illustrating with data from documents issued by 

the Securitate’s bodies the main types of the population’s creative resistance acts against 

the Romanian communist regime. In this regard, we have identified in political 

discussions, documents containing “hateful content”, humor, the creation of 

conspiratorial groups and last but not least, the instrumentation for personal interest of the 

interaction with officials the particular expressions of resistance of the simple man to the 

omnipotence and omnipresence of the State-party. The examples above give a partial and 

nuanced image of the individual’s relations with the communist regime from Bucharest. 

In this type of relationship, the individual is found capable to formulate opinions contrary 

to RCP’s version of reality, to use the official sanctioned or unsanctioned channels in 

order to make them known and last but not least to adopt a course of conduct designed to 

question the organizational and educational structure of the communist regime. 

26 Arhiva CNSAS, D 337, f. 11 f, 20 f, D 393, f. 155, 212, D 429, f. 48 f-v, etc.

A TYPICAL AGENT STORY 

FROM THE KADAR PERIOD 

Tamás MÉSZÁROS 1 

Abstract: The agent’s task was to observe the Galyasi-, and Bibó circle. This can be supported 

according to the working-file, remaining from the period between April and August of 1968. His 

activity can not be reconstructed completely due to the narrow time-interval of the files. As the 

material is fragmented the historical work is basically putting together small pieces. Just as the 

case of “Gáspár Szabó” shows, we can not get a full picture about the working system of the 

Political Police of the socialist state. 

After the political turn in 1944/1945 the new, central state security authority was 

created from the Political Department of the Budapest Police Headquarters lead by Gábor 

Péter. 

In 1946 the State Security Department of the State Police (ÁVO) was created with an 

order of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. This was placed under the authority of the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1948 and this way a new authority came to existence. This 

was the State Security Authority of The Ministry of Internal Affairs. This authority 

became „independent” a year later and got out of control of the Ministry. 

Its original position was restored after Mátyás Rákosi’s downfall in 1953. 

The feared State Security Authority was dissolved by Imre Nagy on the 28th of October 

in 1956. The majority of its former members sought for the protection of the Soviets, 

while some of them were arrested by the revolutionists. After the 4th of November the 

former State Security members participated in the re-organisation of the police force and 

of the state security. 

The new structure of the state security system was formed between 1956 and 1962. The 

new leader figures of the communist party created a new state security system as a part of 

the police. The reason for this was that they learnt from the big mistake of Rákosi’s 

dictatorship. 

Before 1962 the II/5 Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for 

„averting the inner reactionary”. In 1962 the whole department was re-organized. The 

aim of this re-organisation was partially to eliminate the remains of the former „total 

averting”. 

The so-called III/III-4 Department of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs dealt with the 

„inner reactionary” 2 . 

1 Emlekpont Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary. 

2 Gábor Tabajdi-Krisztián Ungváry: The Withheld Past – The Party State and the Internal Affairs, 

Corvina, 2008. 46-49th pp.

94 


During the Kádár Regime the state security system was in control of the party, opposed 

to the „SDA” which was a state within the state. This meant that the county police 

superintendent or his assistant of the State Security had to inform the first secretary of the 

county, who forwarded the information to the responsible organs of the Hungarian 

Socialist Party and the main party leaders. 

The State Security employed agents in a great number to be able to control every step of 

the society. There were agents who became member of the network on voluntary basis 

but there were agents who had been blackmailed before becoming a member. 

The agents provided their reports mostly in written form. The majority of these reports 

were destroyed before the change of regime in 1989. 

In Hódmezıvásárhely, situated in South-East of Hungary there are plenty of materials 

of local agents regarding to the 1960’s. The researches, done in the Historical Archives of 

the State Security prove that the “consigners” were interested mainly in the information 

about the human-intellectuals and the artists. The temporary exhibition titled “Detected 

Arts” 3 was organized in 2012 according to the discovered reports. This is the first 

possibility, when the visitors of the museums in Hungary can get a view in the processes 

of the communist state security – through the reports about several local artists. 

The artists and writers of Hódmezıvásárhely grouped around two old masters. The 

political police identified these people and constantly controlled them. For their control 

they organized agents that belonged to the circle of friends around the masters. 

Agents appearing in our exhibition called ‘Detected Art’ 

„Gáspár Szabó”He mainly wrote his reports about young and independent 

intellectuals, and the members of the Galyasi- and Bibó circle. Miklós Galyasi had been 

the founder and first director of the Tornyai János Museum and Lajos Bibó was a wellknown 

playwright before 1944. 

A glimpse at a civilian’s biography of Vásárhely 

Gyızı Moldvay (Hódmezıvásárhely, 12th June 1925. – Hatvan, 4th August 1996) 

He was a poet, journalist and editor. He maturated at Gábor Bethlen High School in 

1944. 

He published his writings in two local papers, in ‘Vásárhely Népe’ and the ‘Vásárhelyi 

Független Újság’ between 1944 and 1951. He got his degree at Teachers’ Training 

College of Szeged in 1957. He became the director of the Petıfi Community Centre 

between 1952 and 1954, and later he was the editor of the ‘Vásárhelyi Szó’, a local 

journal between 1955 for 1956. 

Between 28th of October and the 14th of November in 1956 he was the editor of 

‘Vásárhelyi Nemzeti Újság’ (National Newspaper of Hódmezıvásárhely), the official 

newspaper of the revolutionists. Due to his activity during the revolution he was interned 

on the 17 th of December, 1956, but instead of starting a legal procedure against him he 

became free by the end of the year. 

3 Web: www.megfigyelt.hu (18th of September, 2012)

Tamás MÉSZÁROS: A Typical Agent Story from the Kadar Period 95 

His early arrestment can seem interesting, because Dr. Dezsı Kertész – the leader of the 

local Revolutionary Army Committee was arrested “only” on the 7 th of January, 1957, 

while Imre Gyáni – the president of the National Committee – was seized even later, on 

the 31 st of January, 1957. 

The question may rise: how was it possible, that Moldvay was seized earlier, than the 

other two people, who had had a more important role in the revolution; and how could he 

get off the trouble without any retaliation due to his activity as an editor. Dr. Kertész was 

sentenced to 7 years, and Imre Gyáni to 6 years imprisonment. Even more – Moldvay was 

not only let out from the internment camp, but he could even finish his studies at the 

college in 1957! To find the answer to the above question, the related documents of the 

state security should be examined. The file no. 6 4 - so his personal file could be found 

during the researches at the Historical Archives of the State Security. From this document 

it was discovered that Moldvay was recruited by the political police of Kádár with the 

code name “Gáspár Szabó” on the 30 th of December, 1956. 

The surviving data concerning ‘Gáspár Szabó’s’ file 

No. Number Shire Opening Closing Period Pages 

1 M-2899 Csongrád x 1958 x 0 

2 M-9922 

Borsod- 

Abaúj- 

Zemplén x 1960 

1956- 

1965 0 

3 M-20041 Csongrád x 1963 x 0 

4 M-23868 

Borsod- 

Abaúj- 

Zemplén 1959.03.30 1965.10.14 

1956- 

1965 335 

5 M-24631 x x 1966 x 0 

6 M-29097 Csongrád 1966.04.18 1968.08.29 

1966- 

1968 422 

Source: Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 

From the above data it can be seen, that the first three files after his recruitment have 

disappeared. The first file was opened in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County – situated in the 

north-east of Hungary, and however, that file disappeared, supposedly, the reports of that 

file also contained the name of the revolutionists in Hódmezıvásárhely. 

4 ÁBTL 2.2.2 – Network registers – „István Boldog/Gáspár Szabó”.

96 


His later life 

He became the director of a community centre in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County in 

1961 (up to 1964). Furthermore, he worked for the only radio station in Miskolc. He 

returned to Hódmezıvásárhely in 1965 and worked as a teacher till 1970. Later he moved 

to Heves County in 1971 and he settled down in Hatvan. He founded the Hatvan Gallery 

in 1972 and he was its director till the end of his life. 

After his recruitment in 1956 Moldvay – according to the instruction of the state 

security officer, dealing with his activity – made his environment believe, that he was a 

ridden person 5 because of his 1956 past, and he was pushed to the periphery of the society 

by the communist power. 

Those who were punished after the revolution and those artists and intellectuals who 

were against the official trends which were determined by the government, could easily 

trust in him. 

We can appreciate the work of Gáspár Szabó on the basis of the remaining Csongrádcounty 

file 6 . The documents, included in the file were issued between the 18 th of April, 

1966 and the 29 th of August, 1968. According to the reports it can be stated that by this 

period he became a professional agent – which is not a surprise, as he had been employed 

by the power for ten years. 

His agent-responsible was István Molnár who was a major and then a lieutenant-colonel 

of the Csongrád County Political Detective Department. 

One of the target persons of his reports was Miklós Galyasi, the museum director before 

1956, who was defined as an especially dangerous person. 

He was sentenced to a 1,5-year imprisonment, because of his article – a total innocent 

one – published in 1956, at the time of the Hungarian revolution. 

After his release he led a sequestered life in Hódmezıvásárhely. 

He was visited by young intellectuals and artists who wanted to find an authentic 

master. 

He was observed by several agents by the end of his life. 

Another target person was Lajos Bibó, a journalist, editor, and in the period between the 

two world wars he was also a celebrated playwright in Budapest. When after 1945 the 

communists asked him to write plays and novels in a left-wing tone, he didn’t do that. 

Due to his decision his career as a playwright broke, and he had to retreat to 

Hódmezıvásárhely and lived of manual work. Despite his neglect a group of the local 

intellectuals highly respected him and regularly visited him. 

He was observed by several agents just as Galyasi. 

The other young target persons were approached by Gáspár Szabó through Galyasi and 

Bibó, about whom he regularly made his reports. His agent-responsible also urged him to 

build further relationships with new persons, as the State Security planned to have a 

throughout information about the circle of Galyasi and Bibó. Gáspár Szabó wrote about 

5 This „legend” still worked after the transition. In the Vásárhely Encyclopaedia it was written that 

“After his short imprisonment he had to escape from his hometown.” Encyclopaedia of 

Hódmezıvásárhely. Bába Kiadó, Szeged, 2002. 123 rd page. 

6 ÁBTL 3.1.2 M-29097 „Gáspár Szabó”.

Tamás MÉSZÁROS: A Typical Agent Story from the Kadar Period 97 

several artist-painters, like Csaba Fejér, József Fodor, Zoltán Füstös, József Németh, 

Péter Erdıs, István Kurucz D., Ferenc Hézsı and István Lelkes. In several of his reports 

he wrote about Violetta Ferrari – an actress-celebrity of the period before 1956. She 

immigrated to West-Germany and became a famous actress there. He also gave 

information about two young local writers: Tibor Szenti and Ferenc Vincze. 

Along Bibó and Galyasi Csaba Fejér was one of the most important target persons, he 

was a painter, the member of the second generation of the Artistic School of Vásárhely. 

He introduced with his works the rural and agricultural world which was sentenced to 

death by the government. The agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs defined him as 

dangerous because of his riot personality. He did not get a state award from the 

government. Several agents were responsible for observing him. His way of thinking is 

definitely represented in the quote from a report of Gáspár Szabó about him, dated on the 

3 rd of May, 1967. 

“The members of the State Security just can not believe, they just can not resign 

themselves, that the painters of Hódmezıvásárhely are not organizing anything against 

them. They don’t want to do a counter-revolution. The reason for that is, that this is their 

obsession – said Csaba Fejér. They are seeking something that doesn’t exist. They are 

afraid of being retired if they can not find a conspiracy.” 7 According to the above quote 

Csaba Fejér knew about the observation of the local artists, and he thought, that it was 

pointless. The surviving members of the Galyasi – or Bibó circle all stated in the 

interviews made with them 8 that they didn’t plan to defeat the system, because it wouldn’t 

be realistic, after the pull down of the revolution of 1956. This statement is also supported 

7 ÁBTL 3.1.2 M-29097 „Gáspár Szabó”. Page 164. 

8 Emlékpont, Oral History Collection: I_145, I_187, I_189, I_190, I_191.

98 


by the reports of the circle around Bibó and Galyasi, made by other agents. The members 

were connected by their common intent to represent their own ways in their art. For this 

purpose they wanted to find the instruction of authentic masters, and the friendship of 

similar artists. For the power they became suspicious, because they didn’t follow the 

socialist-realistic style, imported from Moscow. The artists of Vásárhely insisted on their 

freedom in their art, however, they could see the limits, so they didn’t do anything against 

the system, being aware of the danger of such actions. 

Methods of agent reporting 

It was an important part of the activity of Gáspár Szabó that he appeared on different 

events and he wrote reports about them. He got a certain task from his agent-responsible 

when he travelled abroad ( e.g.: Austria…etc). 

The source of the most interesting information and date were the different meetings 

with friends, where he was not only a participant, but he also organized and hosted such 

events and gatherings. 9 

The maniac writer and intellectual 

Moldvay was the editor of several journals; he published a monograph and three books 

of poems. His reports are readable and interesting. He characterized his target persons ( 

friends acquaintances) in a sophisticated way. He wrote about the artists’ and writers’ 

opinion and statements as a real expert. 

He wrote more than 2000 pages between 1956 and 1968 (Two of his six files has 

survived and they are 335 and 422 pages long 10 ). 

In 1968 his agent-responsible recommended his exclusion, because of an incident in 

Novi-Sad. After his exclusion his file in Csongrád County was closed. However, from the 

4 th of January, 1974 he was employed by the Political Department of the Heves County 

Police, because in the meanwhile he moved there. 

He got his new code-name, “István Boldog” at this time, and we do not have any data 

concerning his working file from this period. 

After a while he became a secret commissioner instead of being an agent, but we do not 

have a certain date of his leaving the network. 

9 ÁBTL 3.1.2 M-29097 „Gáspár Szabó”. 

10 ÁBTL M-23868 „Gáspár Szabó”.

ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUCTURES IN THE 

COUNTY OF BIHOR: ORGANIZATION OF 

INDEPENDENT ROMANIA (1947-1950) 

Gabriel MOISA 1 

Abstract: The anticommunist group The Organization of Independent Romania was among the 

most active ones in Bihor between 1947 and 1950. It was certainly constituted sometime in late 

1947 and in the spring of 1948; its existence was precisely highlighted by the Security as having 

the centre in Oradea. Its first leader was Nistor Bădiceanu. The nucleus of this structure was 

formed by approximately twenty young men, all having around twenty years. The lack of 

experience of the members, caused mainly by their youth, led to the arrestment of several of them. 

As a result of the partially discovery of its clandestine activity, some of the leaders of the 

organization led by Nistor Bădiceanu were captured and arrested in June 1948. After ten month of 

inquiry in Security’s arrest from Oradea and Cluj, on the 24th of March 1949, the group was 

judged by the Military Court of Cluj. The punishments they received were very harsh and varied 

between two and six years. 

After the communist-regime installation in Romania, a series of anti-communist 

resistance centres took shape. In general, the mountain areas facilitated the proliferation 

of these groups; however their existence was more or less ephemeral, a consequence of 

the fact that they were systematically hunted by the new political regime from 

Bucharest. 

Today, more than a decade and a half since the events of December 1989, the Romanian 

historiography offers us a quite complex and rich image on the resistance movements 

against the regime, from various regions of Romania, however less on the ones from the 

area of Bihor, although they are not entirely lacking 2 . Nevertheless, the West of the 

country entered in the circuit of the organized anti-communist movements. The novel 

archive information allow us to certainly state that several resistance groups unfolded 

here their activity. In Bihor, the years we discuss about, at least four such organizations 

existed. 

1 

Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, 

University of Oradea, Romania. 

2 

G. Moisa, Colectivizare, rezistenŃă şi represiune în vestul României 1948-1951, Publishing 

House of the Museum of łării Crişurilor, Oradea, 1999, 176 p.; G. Moisa, Grupuri de rezistenŃă 

anticomunistă în lumea satului bihorean între anii 1948-1950, in Acta Musei Porolissensis, 

2000, 23, p. 309-315; V. Faur, A. Faur, O viaŃă de om sub "ochii" securităŃii, Publishing House 

of the University from Oradea, 2006, 154 p.; A. Faur, Căpitanul Ştefan Popescu - liderul 

grupului de rezistenŃă din sudul Bihorului (1946-1950), in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 

"George BariŃ" din Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p. 651-657.

100 


The first was the "subversive" organization entitled "Vlad łepeş II". It was signalled it 

pre-eminently unfolded its activity in the central-Southern part of Bihor and in the North 

of the county of Arad. Its chief was the advocate Constantin Militaru from Oradea 3 . The 

components of the organization were mostly State-apparatus clerks, unlocked officers, 

pupils, workers; and in the villages, especially the intellectuals of the local communities. 

Its ramifications comprised, beside Oradea, also the villages Vaşcău, PăŃal, Beliu, Ucuriş, 

Lunca, Câmpanii de Sus, Leheceni, Beiuş, Marghita and Sălard. 

The second anti-Communist resistance organization was signalled in the area of the 

mountains Codru-Moma and Bihor 4 . The principal connection and supply centres were 

the villages Susag, Craiova - today Craiva – from the county of Arad, Ucuriş and 

DumbrăviŃa de Codru from Bihor. The groups consisted, according to the Security’s 

reports, in political men – especially legionaries – who hid in the mountains, unlocked 

officers and intellectuals originating in the localities neighbouring the mountain. From 

here, they bobbed the village world in hopes of a revolt. 

The third resistance group acted in the area Vaşcău - Cărpinet and in the mountains 

Bihorului, being led by captain Ştefan Popescu. Former officer of the Romanian army, he 

gathered around him a series of inhabitants, who gave much trouble to the regime in the 

interval 1947-1950. Leading advocate of the National Peasant Party, Ştefan Popescu 

constituted an anti-communist group, who clandestinely acted, benefiting from real 

support from the local population 5 . 

Finally, the fourth resistance group was called Organization Independent Romania and 

was among the most active in Bihor during 1947-1950. It certainly came into being 

sometime in late 1947, so that, in the spring of 1948, its existence should be precisely 

signalled by the Security as centred in Oradea. Its first head was Nistor Bădiceanu. The 

first nucleus of this organization consisted in circa 20 youths, around 20 years old 6 . From 

the very beginning, it had ramifications throughout the county of Bihor, but also in the 

West of the county of Sălaj and in the city Satu Mare. Among its members, there are: 

Nistor Bădiceanu, group leader, originating in Chiraleu, county of Bihor, pupil at 

"Alexandru Roman" high-school of Oradea, Filip Ioan, from Beiuş, Domocoş Ştefan, 

from Oradea, LeucuŃa Gheorghe, from Oradea, Sarca Eugen, from Ghenetea (county of 

Bihor), Furtos Pavel from Sărsig (county of Bihor), Şerban Tiberiu, from Oradea, Haiaş 

Gheorghe, from Ghenetea (county of Bihor), Ardeleanu Sabin, from Ghenetea (county of 

Bihor), Rus Vasile, from Abram (county of Bihor), Cuc Aurel, from Hidişelul de Sus 

(county of Bihor), Coroiu Tănase, from Vaşcău, Mut Marius, from Satu Mare, Furtos 

Flaviu, from Sărsig (county of Bihor), Broşteanu Aurel, from Sărsig (county of Bihor), 

Ştreng Traian, from Sărsig (county of Bihor), Budaru Leontin, from AbrămuŃ (county of 

Bihor), Abrudan Lazăr, from MarŃihaz (county of Bihor), Costin Iosif, from AbrămuŃ 

(county of Bihor), Baciu Miron, from Bălaia (county of Bihor) and Molnar Leontin, from 

AbrămuŃ (county of Bihor). 

3 

Archives of the Romanian Information Service, Documentary Collection, File no. 4638 (as 

follows A.S.R.I ), f. 72. 

4 

Ibidem, f. 71 

5 

A. Faur, Noi documente despre grupul de rezistenŃă anticomunistă din sudul Bihorului (1946- 

1950), in Istoria - ca experienŃă intelectuală, Publishing House of the University from Oradea, 

2001, p. 393 – 409. 

6 

A. Brazdă, A. łărău, Revolte Ńărăneşti în documente şi fapte, Editura Imprimeriei de Vest, 

Oradea, 2006, p. 41.

Gabriel MOISA: Anti-Communist Structures in the County of Bihor … 101 

The group members’ lack of experience, mainly caused by the youth of its components, 

led to the arrestment of most of them. This was possible because of the traitor’s 

infiltration in the organization. Following the partial discovery of its clandestine activity, 

some of the leaders of the Organization Independent Romania led by Nistor Bădiceanu 

were caught and arrested in June 1948. After 10 months of inquiry in the Security’s cells 

from Oradea and Cluj, on the 24 th of March 1949, the group was judged by the Military 

Court from Cluj. The punishments were very harsh and they varied between two and six 

years. The hardest punishment was Nistor Bădiceanu’s, condemned to six years and half. 

Part of the organization survived however and in the fall of 1948 it regrouped under 

Vasile Furtoş’s leadership, originating in Sărsig. The command point was still in Oradea 

and had ramifications in the villages: Sărsig, Chiribiş, Ciutelec, Varviz, Ciuleşti, Bogeiu, 

Ghida, Săldăbagiu de Barcău, Marginea, Spinuş, Cenaloş, Ciuhoiu, Hăuceşti, Fegernic, 

Sarcău, Oşorhei, Nădar, Misca, Rontău, Făncica, AbrămuŃ, Sfârnaş, Sălard – county of 

Bihor - and Marca, Ip and PorŃi – county of Sălaj 7 . 

The first information on the activity of the organization, in the latter part of its 

existence, were received in late 1948 when, on the 27 th of December, the commander of 

the Security from Bihor, Czeller Ludovic, issued arrestment orders for 155 persons who 

might have belonged to this group. In Sălaj, on the same grounds, as members of the 

same group, only 21 were arrested 8 . Even in Satu Mare, confinements of persons who had 

belonged to the organization were signalled, counting 28, in the area Tăşnad - Carei, 

which proves that the group’s ramifications also extended in this county. 

The subsequent information related to the movement are on the line of regrouping its 

forces on the level of the above-mentioned villages. 1949 was the year when the actions 

deployed by this organization much intensified, in the context in which, starting with 

March, in Romania, the agriculture-collectivization process was launched on a broad 

scale. The information held by the Security’s forces all converged towards developing 

actions contrary to the regime, all very well coordinated and organized. The first elements 

leading to the conclusion of organizing "grand style" actions were received by the 

Security on the 11 th of May 1949, when a two-stage plan was known to exist for 

resistance to collectivization in the villages 9 . 

In the first phase, the logistics-related issues were to be solved through acquiring 

armament, with the support of Romanian army’s active officers and through organizing 

action groups; and in the second phase, the village-uprising, one after another, through 

the people who were part of the organization. Some State-apparatus clerks could be 

locally attracted, from the insurgents, and the organization managed to centrally draw 

closer some army elements; border, Security and Militia troops. On the 20 th of June 1949, 

part of the armament necessary for deploying the actions was acquired from military units 

from Oradea and Marghita 10 . The actions were launched on the 5 th of July 1949. 

Information exist that the Organization Independent Romania was connected to 

resistance groups in the area of the Apuseni Mountains, without their being very well 

documented. Anyway, the Security’s documents mention the existence of this possibility. 

7 A.S.R.I, Documentary Collection, file no.. 4638. 

8 Idem.,File no. 4640, f. 69. 

9 Idem, File no..4638 , f. 70. 

10 Ibidem.

102 


On the 21 st of June 1949, the preparations began for applying the agreed action plan on 

the field. The head of the Organization Independent Romania, Vasile Furtoş, in a 

conspiracy meeting in Teodor Molnar’s house from Chiraleu, member of the 

organization, decided to constitute the so-called sacrifice teams, which will circulate 

through all villages for launching the action itself. In the meeting, several leaders of the 

movement participated, who took their commitment they would go where they would be 

ordered to and that they would adequately fulfil the plans. The second day, however, 

Vasile Furtoş was arrested by the Security 11 . His confinement immediately after the 

meeting and the acquaintance with the details of the discussions in Teodor Molnar’s 

house indicated a traitor’s presence at the meting. 

On the spot, the action seemed compromised. Under these conditions, on the 25 th of July 

1949, at home at Nistor Pop from Sărsig, a few leaders of the organizations met. They 

decided to postpone launching the action for the 1 st of August 1949. Every action group 

was organized. In the first phase, 5 groups with 10 people were to exist, with the special 

mission of launching the actions in all villages. The action started therefore with circa 50 

people, whereto the village inhabitants had to join. In these sacrifice groups, inclusively 

students on holidays were part 12 . They had to ensure the guard of the upraised villages, 

through constituting pickets on the border of the localities so that, in the case of the 

apparition of the repression forces, the villagers should be informed and, to the extent of t 

he possibilities, to resist until the arrival of the reinforcement from the menaced 

settlements. 

The circumstances made that on the 1 st of August 1949 the action launch were taken 

ahead so that, on the 27 th -28 th of July 1949, it should be in full development in the Northeast 

of the county, and the member of the Organization Independent Romania should be 

in the middle of the subsequent violent events. There is about launching peasant riots 

caused by the initiation of the agriculture-collectivization process in early March 1949 

and everything that followed in the direction of the destruction of the Romanian village. 

13 . The arrestment following these events led to Vasile Furtos and several members of the 

Organization Independent Romania being incarcerated. From this moment, it disappeared 

from the scenery of the Romanian anti-Communist resistance. 

11 Ibidem, f .71 

12 Ibidem 

13 G. Moisa, Primele revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor generate de procesul de colectivizare a 

agriculturii, în Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea. Istorie-Arheologie, 1996-1997, 6-7, p. 311- 

326; Idem, Revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor cauzate de debutul procesului de colectivizare a 

agriculturii, in Acta Musei Porolissensis, 2003, 25, p. 515-529

SECRET AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS 

Daniel NAZARE 1 

Under the stipulations of the Armistice Convention concluded by Romania and the 

governments of the United Nations (Moscow, September 12, 1944), the censorship of the 

publications and manifestations of fascist type or bringing prejudice to the United Nations 

was introduced. In a short while, these measures were diverted by the authorities towards 

the communist-type censorship, with the Soviets’ support. After the installation of the 

Romanian Popular Republic, the communist censorship became all-powerful. Among 

other measures on newspaper issuing, radio news broadcasting, mail control etc., the 

library depuration was also ordered. A specialized commission had been given the task to 

organize and coordinate “the withdrawal from commerce and circulation (public libraries 

etc.) of all periodical or non-periodical publications, printed before the Armistice, which, 

through their content, might harm our good relationship with the United Nations and 

especially with U.S.S.R.“ 

On December 17, 1944, then on December 21, the same year, the readers were 

informed on the first lists with the “publications that were to be withdrawn from 

publishing houses, bookshops, public libraries etc.“ It was stipulated, at the same time, 

that only the “libraries with right of legal deposit and the libraries of the higher education 

institutions might keep these publications, inventoried, locked in special closets or rooms, 

under the direct responsibility of the heads of these institutions. They could only be 

consulted, to study purposes, with special authorization, given by the managers of the 

respective institutions, under their own responsibility“. This way, the Special Collections 

of the libraries appeared, abolished only after December, 1989. 

In Romania’s libraries, several lists are kept for the book depuration during 1945- 

1989: three volumes in 1945, one in 1946, a massive volume in 1948, accompanied by a 

supplement, as well one from 1949. In the foreword of the volume from 1948, the 

announcement was made that it would be followed by annual supplements and the 

necessity was stated for almost perfect depurations, so well done, that the books could 

only be found in some “official documentary” libraries, where they might be studied by 

the historians of the future. 

The supplement of 1948 is alphabetically structured, and not on languages, as the 

previous ones. In all volumes, we encounter however erroneously written titles, especially 

those in foreign languages. Romanian translations, in some cases approximate, were 

made only for those in Hungarian. 

1 George BariŃiu County Library of Braşov, Romania.

104 


In 1949, the leaflet was issued PublicaŃii nedifuzabile. Liste de circulaŃie internă 

(Publications not to Be Disseminated. Internal-Circulation Lists), which marks the 

passage to another stage: from forbidding the publications (1945) to rendering them 

secret (1949). Until 1949, one cannot speak of secret library collections, only about 

forbidden publication collections, because those during 1945-1948 had a pronounced 

public character. This way, in the titles of the lists from 1945-1946, the expression “out of 

circulation“ appears, in the one of the lists from 1948 the word “forbidden“, and in that 

from 1949, “not to be disseminated“. If the first indications only targeted the volumes, 

magazines and newspapers within institutions (inclusively from libraries), the one from 

1948 also incriminated those held in private homes, therefore the respective brochure was 

publicly disseminated through selling. 

The list with the publications withdrawn from circulation in 1945 has 1.828 titles, the 

one from 1946 – 2.538, and the one from 1949 – 7.694. 

The decree-law from May 2, 1945 explicitly mentioned what whose lists had to 

contain: “all periodical and non-periodical publications issued from January 1, 1917 until 

August 23, 1944, comprising legionary, fascist, Hitlerite, chauvinistic, racist or harmful 

passages to Romania’s good relations with the United Nations“. In 1948, supplementary 

specifications were brought. Some editions of the classical authors were thereby 

“forbidden for the fascist trend in which [sic!] their editing, commenting and presentation 

was made“. Likewise, there were forbidden, without other specification, “all textbooks 

previous to the year 1947, or which are not listed on the official board of the textbooks 

approved by the Ministry of Education”. The interdiction also targeted “any maps that 

include within the borders of the Romanian Popular Republic, territories that do not 

belong to it“, respectively Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, possessed by U.S.S.R, and 

Southern Dobrogea, ceded to Bulgaria. Similarly, “all calendars, popular almanacs etc. of 

any kind, from the period 1938/1944 were forbidden“. 

The index of the depurated works in 1948 comprised names such as Ion 

Antonescu, Maria Antonescu, Armand Călinescu, Octavian Goga, Iuliu Maniu, Pamfil 

Şeicaru, Al. Vaida-Voevod, Mircea Vulcănescu, members of the royal families, 

editions from Mihai Eminescu, Ion Creangă, I.L. Caragiale, other great writers of the 

XIX th -XX th centuries. 

These lists were used to withdraw from circulation, ironically, even some 

communist leaders’ works that could not be publicly forbidden. In the files, at the 

index, a series of titles were written that arouse perplexity as part of them cannot be 

retrieved also on other lists (especially those issued after 1950), they constituting 

therefore the local censors’ “original” contribution: Oaia de rasă Karakul (Karakul- 

Breed Sheep); Hrănirea vacilor de lapte (Feeding Dairy Cows); Plantarea pomilor 

roditori (Planting Fruit Trees); Mulgerea raŃională şi îngrijirea [!] laptelui în micile 

gospodării (Rational Milking and Milk Care [!] in Small Households); Ajutorul 

U.R.S.S. pentru România obŃinut de guvernul Groza (U.S.S.R.’s Help for Romania 

Obtained by Groza Government); Alimentarea cu apă a centrelor populate (Water 

Supply to Populated Centres); Să alegem pe cei mai buni oameni ai muncii în 

consiliile de conducere a [!] cooperativelor (Let’s Choose the Best Working People in

Daniel NAZARE: Secret and Special Collections 105 

the Management Boards of [!] the Cooperatives); Adevărata faŃă a democraŃiei 

burgheze dezvăluită de scriitorii noştri (True Face of Bourgeois Democracy Unveiled 

by Our Writers); Am văzut zorii comunismului (We saw the Dawn of Communism); 

Sărăcirea oamenilor muncii din Ńările capitaliste şi coloniale ca urmare a pregătirilor 

de război (Impoverishment of the Working People from the Capitalist and Colonial 

Countries because of the Preparations for War); IntoxicaŃiile animalelor domestice 

(Livestock Poisoning); Din munca pescarilor şi piscicultorilor (Of Fishermen and 

Fish Farmer Work); Ghivecele nutritive (Nutrient Pots); Creşterea şi folosirea boilor 

de muncă (Breeding and Using Labour Oxen); łesături pe gustul oamenilor muncii 

(Fabrics to the Taste of the Working People); Cum combatem râia neagră a cartofului 

(How to Combat Potato Wart); Jefuirea poporului român de către monarhie 

(Romanian People’s Robbery by the Monarchy); Cum s-au obŃinut producŃii de peste 

60 kg miere pe familii de albine (How 60-kg-Honey Yields per Bee Families Were 

Obtained); Combaterea ciorilor (Combating Crows) etc. 

Nicolae Iorga’s opus was largely put to the index (a Romanian author’s most titles) 

and many of his books were depurated, without the titles being retrieved on the 

aforementioned lists. In many situations, the censors were “creative“, inclusively with the 

synthesis of Istoria românilor (Romanians’ History) in 11 volumes (1936-1939), which 

had a different regime in Romania’s libraries: in some, all volumes were put to the index, 

in others only a part, in others not at all. The surprises do not however stop here. For 

instance, in the index from 1948, the book Neamul românesc în Basarabia (Romanian 

Nation in Bessarabia) is mentioned, only accessible in some libraries. We also have here 

the reverse situation: volume Neamul românesc în Bucovina (Romanian Nation in 

Bucovina) by the same author, omitted in all brochures, but moved to secret by local 

censors in some libraries. A sign as clear as possible that they operated not only with the 

brochures, accession books, catalogues and cards, but directly at the deposit shelves, 

through turning over the books. 

This fugitive reading, many times made by incompetent persons, led to the depuration 

of many works. Other strange cases: volumes both in the documentary collection, and in 

the secret/special one. In this situation, an astute reader could reach them faster, if he/she 

asked the shelf mark from the documentary collection. A series of libraries of some 

undesirable institutions (inclusively ecclesiastical) were actually flown into public 

libraries, the stamps on the books showing their origin. A part of these volumes look 

flawless today, despite their oldness, and the interdiction years made some of them 

remain with stuck pages. 

The documentary collections were formally abolished in 1968, but the secret 

(special) ones were maintained until 1989. The secret collection became special 

collection, however the essence remained the same. The instructions elaborated in 

1968 only recognize the current and special circulation collections, a classification 

also maintained by other norms from 1981. Previous to the year 1965, few undertook 

the risk to read the books moved to index, without benefiting from an access card to 

the special collection.

106 


It is worth mentioning that many books, previously moved to index, were reedited 

after 1965, however with justifying forewords and amputated passages. We 

remind thereof writings by N. Iorga, B.P. Hasdeu, Sextil Puşcariu etc, with 

eliminated fragments referring to Bessarabia, Bucovina, other books in which critical 

references to the Bolsheviks were made etc. The critical editions from the classics, 

other modern authors’ opuses appeared with “crochets“ (elimination signs). We are 

witnessing the gradual diminution of the control exercised over reading, although we 

would have expected, especially after 1971, for the measures to be increasingly 

harsh. The consultation becomes permissive, the foreign readers being pre-eminently 

restricted. 

The last decade of communism resembles the first in many respects, if we refer to 

the issuance of lists on “authors whose works would be withdrawn from the circuit 

of reading“. This way, in 1983 and 1988, lists with 36, respectively 152 forbidden 

authors were elaborated, those mentioned in the first list being also included in the 

second. 

In such a list “of the authors whose works would be withdrawn from the circuit of 

reading”, elaborated on July 28, 1983, were mentioned among others Gabriela Melinescu, 

Petru Popescu, Mariana Şora, Ion Caraion, Dumitru łepeneag, Dana CrivăŃ-Lovinescu, 

Gelu Ionescu etc. 

The transcendental-meditation scandal caused some yoga books to be moved to the 

index, and the list from 1988 contains even more books on the bridge game, reckoned 

“capitalist“. There was no unitary practice for marking in the files the passage of these 

books to the special collection, the operation being made in special times, without the 

consistency during the first two decades of communist regimes. It seems the local censors 

had not completely gone out of hand, but they also made confusions, leaving forbidden 

books to be consulted and moving others to the index, even by the same author, that were 

mentioned in no act. 

There are, in libraries, authors moved with their entire opus to the index, especially 

those present in the list of 1983, but also others with a single book, especially in the list 

from 1988. Priority was given to those left for the Occident, prohibited with their entire 

work. Sometimes even the bookstores withdrew late the books of the authors having left 

Romania. Books existed that were withdrawn from the circuit of reading, because of the 

licentious language, prejudicing some national sensibilities, anti-Semitism. 

In a country with no food left, especially after 1980, to deal with moving books to the 

index seemed a useless luxury. In reality, things were much more complicated. A series 

of documents were identified whereby the depuration of the books was asked for, but it is 

possible for part of the dispositions to have been verbal. Those who fulfilled such orders 

were maximum-trust people, enough scared not to divulge the operation.

Daniel NAZARE: Secret and Special Collections 107 

Nowadays, the books that, before 1989, people fought for in bookstores, because of 

the “lizards” sneaked into the texts are increasingly rarely read. Despite these fears, a 

library containing the forbidden works during communism would be useful, even if we 

won’t know soon how many such volumes were really depurated. 

As regards the censorship in libraries, it often remains clandestine, difficult to 

reconstruct by historians, in all likelihood a perfect murder. 

References 

1. *** 160 Years since the Establishment of the First Public Library in Brasov 

1835-1995 (160 de ani de la înfiinŃarea primei biblioteci publice la Braşov 

1835-1995). 1996. Braşov: Biblioteca “George BariŃiu”. 

2. Barthes, Roland. 1984. The Rustle of Language. Critical Essays (Le Bruissement de 

la langue. Essais critiques), IV, Paris: Editions du Seuil. 

3. Caravia, P., ed. 2000. Forbidden Reasoning. Censored Writings Romania 1945-1989 

(Gândirea interzisă. Scrieri cenzurate România 1945-1989), Bucureşti, Editura 

Enciclopedică, 2000. 

4. Chartier, R. 1998. Cultural Origins of French Revolution (Originile culturale ale 

revoluŃiei franceze), Timişoara, Editura Sedona. 

5. Chartier, R. 1997. Lectures and Lecturers in Old Regime France (Lecturi şi cititori în 

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Central Universitară ,,Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca). Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia. 

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Contributions to Romania’s Secret Library Collections. Case Study. ”Lucian Blaga” 

University Central Library Cluj-Napoca (Fond secret. Fond ,,S” special. ContribuŃii 

la istoria fondurilor secrete de bibliotecă din România. Studiu de caz. Biblioteca 

Central Universitară ,,Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca), Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia. 

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France’s Cultural History (Marele masacru al pisicii şi alte episoade din istoria 

culturală a FranŃei). Iaşi: Polirom. 

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Editura Pontica. 

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dileme, utopii)., 1997. Iaşi: Polirom. 

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(Cenzura comunistă şi formarea ,,omului nou”). Bucureşti: Editura Nemira.

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Century (Cenzura si bibliotecile în secolul XX), Amarcord, Timişoara. 1999. 

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scriitorilor români), D-L, Bucureşti: Editura FundaŃiei Culturale.

THE DESTINY OF A VISIONAR 

PHISICIAN DOCTOR ŞTEFAN ODOBLEJA 

(1902-1978) 

Ştefan ODOBLEJA jr. 1 

Abstract: This paper presents some aspects of the life and work of the visionary physician PhD 

Ştefan Odobleja. The communist regime stopped his further researches in the field of cybernetics. 

Recognition of his priority in the field of human and social psychology came posthumously. 

It is my duty, as President of the Foundation „Ştefan Odobleja" to present the life full 

of sour, obstacles, the moral and material humiliation that has undergone dr. Ştefan 

Odobleja author of ”The Consonant Psychology”. 

Life and Work 

Ştefan Odobleja was born on October 13, 1902 in the village Valea HoŃului (Stephen 

Odobleja today), the county Livezile from MehedinŃi, in a family of middle peasants. 

He studied at the elementary school in his native village, then the high school 

“Traian"of Turnu Severin 1 , and he was supported by his brother Dumitru 2 . 

Turnu Severin, at that time, was an appropriate framework 3 for young Odobleja, as he 

was a self-taught, many books, magazines and other publications, especially the 

avanguard, that all that was new in the world and belonged to the inventory of the town 

library. 

In Turnu Severin great personalities were invited to lecture in which they presented 

the newest publications and researches in various fields. The student Ştefan Odobleja 

never missed these conferences who asked many questions, and then made some research 

on the topics presented. 

After graduating from high school with the mention „very good " he works as a 

substitute teacher at the elementary school in the village Putinei, then in the county 

Halinga, and then at the Romanian-Turkish Primary School in Ada-Kaleh island. 

His destiny was changed when the “Traian” high school principal, Professor Theodor 

Costescu, met his former student reading quietly on the riverside of Danube 4 . 

Following the advice of Professor Theodor Costescu he took an exam at the Faculty of 

Military Medicine where he succeeded and received a scholarship. 

As a student, during 1922-1928, he reads a lot from different areas, going from 

hospital to hospital, making observations and coming to certain scientific conclusions 

which he published in scientific journals like 'The Medical-therapeutic Bulletin ", „The 

Military Health Magazine", „The Romanian Medical Movement ". 

1 Ştefan Odobleja Foundation, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Romania.

110 


In 1928 he passed his doctoral dissertation at the Institute of Forensic Medicine with 

the title, „Car Accidents ", under the guidance of Professor Mina Minovici. In the same 

year, he is assigned as regiment/military physician in the garnison Braila then Turnu 

Severin and Lugoj afterwards. 

In Lugoj he met important intellectuals with international relations, for example he 

met the typographer Auspitz who would publish his work, “La Phonoscopy "in 1935 and 

he would send this paper the Publishing House ,,G.Doine" in Paris. The work „La 

Phonoscopie "presented in 1937 at the International Congress of Military Medicine in 

Bucharest, is awarded the prize, ”General Physician Dr. Papiu Alexander", which is 

awarded to the most meritorious work written by military doctors. 

The International Congress of Military Medicine had among its participants military 

doctors from different armies, from the Soviet Union and the USA. These doctors, 

including Dr. W.S. Bainbridge, the head of the American delegation, a Navy doctor, have 

expressed their interest in the paper presented by Ştefan Odobleja. On this occasion, 

Ştefan Odobleja distributed to the congress participants an abstract in French, announcing 

the appearance of the work „The Consonant Psychology". 

In 1938, the first volume of " The Consonant Psychology " was published at the 

Maloin publishing house in Paris, and in 1939 the second volume. The emergence of this 

paper is announced in January 1941, and the prestigious international journal of 

psychology, „Psychological abstract ", heading 643, page 51, which is given a brief 

description of the content of the book. 

When the war started, Dr. Ştefan Odobleja is sent to the front. As a military doctor, he 

took part on the Eastern war front and then on the Western Front. He escaped with his life 

believing that an icon that he kept all the time with him protected and saved him out of 

the fiercest battle after which there were few survivors. After the war ended he is named 

physician at the Military hospital in Dej where he met the medical student Eva Ilies, 

whom he married 5 . 

His life as military doctor was difficult, with many obligations and injustice. Being 

concerned with the research, Dr. Ştefan Odobleja dreamt to practice medicine in a private 

office that could offer him peace of mind study. Or, the military medical status during the 

period 1945-1947, was particularly uncertain. 

In 1947 there is an ordinance to retire military personnel, who seemed advantageous to 

him as he was offered an important amount of money (which he used to acquire land to 

build a house in Turnu Severin) and a pension equivalent to 75% of his salary. 

In the same period, Dr. Ştefan Odobleja had a Transfer Order to the Military Hospital 

in Bucharest, being supported by Professor Dr. George Zapan, who appreciated Odobleja 

and wanted him to be the major contributor to research clinics in Bucharest. Between the 

two alternatives, Odobleja family chooses the settling in their native village. 

Thus, Dr. Ştefan Odobleja went to the Commissioner of Craiova, applied for the 

retiring and he settled in his native village. But dreams did not last long. Withdrawn in 

the countryside, his wife discovered, after the birth of the first child, that it was a big 

difference between Cluj and the life in a village, without electricity and asphalt. Therefore 

Ştefan Odobleja found himself left by his wife, having a child and a very small pension 

because the order was not enforced. He adapted to the country life, deprived of all 

facilities and in process of communization 6 . The association and the foundation of GAC 

started in the village. The peasants were depossessed by their lands, the animals taken to a 

common stable. The plows, the agricultural gear were thrown away at the village border.

Ştefan ODOBLEJA jr.: The Destiny of a Visionar Phisician Doctor Ştefan Odobleja … 111 

The new UTOS tractors made their way with their plows used in working large areas. 

People started to leave their houses and they became workers in the factories in Turnu 

Severin. 

In this atmosphere, Ştefan Odobleja, on his land of Turnu Severin, who had been 

occupied by the frontier soldiers, succeeded to build a shed which ends up as a living 

room. He didn’t succeed to build a house on the corner, whose design was made by the 

city architect Militescu and in this dream house he could have had his most wanted 

examining room. The town was closed, having the status of a frontier city, which is why 

he could hardly occupy that shed, firstly as a temporary resident and later on as a citizen 

of Severin. 

After 1956 

Given the scarcity/poverty of the medical care in the countryside, Ştefan Odobleja was 

very helpful for the villagers who appreciated their former playmate 7 . 

While living in the country he continuously maintained contact with the Library 

Bibicescu and he kept correspondence with the Romanian Academy and university 

personalities, he subscribed to „Healthcare Worker", „The Romania Literary',' The 

Contemporary 'and Nettle ". The Radio station, AURION "eased listening to the stations 

as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, and theater shows and" cheerful wave. " 

The favorite topics discussed were whether former army comrades and counter- 

Americans came from Hungary. All of these were causing him troubles as he has often 

been "visited" by the security organs. 

Ştefan Odobleja always went to theater, concerts of popular/traditional music. He met 

at the theater the journalist Ioan Stroe Oancea, a former political prisoner - on the grounds 

that he worked at the newspaper „Universe" with Pamfil Şeicaru. He introduced Odobleja 

into the literary club,, Danubius "of Turnu Severin, alongside young people as Elena 

Roman, Valeriu Armeanu and others. Here he presented the „Consonantic Psychology 

"published in Paris during 1938-1939, and they held discussions on this work. They got in 

touch with Radu Dumitru Popescu, President of the Writers' Union of Romania and great 

journalists, as Liviu łimbus, they broke the ice and bring to the public attention the work 

of Ştefan Odobleja. 

It followed long controversy between Ştefan Odobleja and Nicolae Mărgineanu from 

Cluj (he taught at Harvard University). He also made demands to the Romanian, he 

lectured and took part in the International Congress of Cybernetics and Systems in 1975, 

held in Bucharest. 

At the International Congress of Cybernetics and Systems, Romanian delegate initially 

did not allow Ştefan Odobleja to make a book exhibition nor to expose his work8. 

Since the History section was headed by Prof. Dr. Masturzo from Italy, he allowed Odobleja 

to present his work and gave him sufficient time for exposure. John Rose, the president of 

the Congress, accepted and published the work in the volume of the International Congress 

of Cybernetics and Systems. Odobleja published 4 pages in the papers of the Congress, not 

without constraints, because IC Birciu recommended him to abandon certain parallels 

between Norbert Wiener's cybernetics and the consonant psychology. 

Between 21 to 25 August 1978, the International Congress of Cybernetics and 

Systems took place at Amsterdam where they celebrated 30 years of cybernetics and they 

launched the medal „Norbert Wiener "for cybernetics. After lecturing the paper of Ştefan

112 


Odobleja entitled,, Diversity and Unity in Cybernetics" the participants chanted: ”in 

Romania, you have a golden man who deserves a statue of gold". The Romanian 

representative returns to the country and he told to doctor Ştefan Odobleja who was on 

his death bed : „Sir, I won, they chanted 40 years of cybernetics”. „Thank you, thank you, 

but for me, it is too late”. 

Two tears rolled down his cheeks afflicted by disease. On the morning of September 

4, 1978, at 4 o’clock in the morning, he left us, pointing to the ceiling following the 

agreement made with me, that is if he saw a different world, perhaps the world he thought 

it’d be more just than this one. 

After the 1978 Congress in Amsterdam, John Rose came to Romania and awarded 

Nicolae Ceausescu the „Norbert Wiener - 30 years" for scientific merit in cybernetics 9 . 

But nothing could stop the work Dr. Ştefan Odobleja assertion that surprised by its 

increasingly modernism in time. Odobleja's work is always current and soars into the sky 

where the place of great discoveries of the most intelligent human mind and illuminates 

our path to the future is. 

POST-SCRIPTUM 

About the social-economic moral (Fragments from “The Consonant Psychology” 

(pages 710-712) 

Ștefan Odobleja, the author of “The Consonant Psychology”, published in Paris in 

1938 (Vol. I) and in 1939 (Vol. II), in the chapter „The Social-Economic Moral” makes 

an analyses of the characteristics of liberal and social thoughts, underlining the difference 

between the two concepts: 

The liberal school The social school 

Individualist 

The human being is everything 

Free action 

Free competition 

Natural evolution 

Naturalistic therapy 

Orthodoxy, traditionalism 

Inequity between needs and values of 

rights and obligations 

Based on selfishness 

Based on love and hatred 

Excites ,exhales, dynamism 

Attractive work 

Ambition, activity 

Priority in qualities 

Priority in choosing the best 

Individual property can always be 

inherited 

Collective, cosmopolite 

Society is everything 

Constraints, leadership 

Rules, solidarity 

Artificial evolution 

Interference therapy 

Revolutionary, reforms 

Equity (needs, values, rights, obligations) 

Based on altruism 

Based on love 

Inhibits, stops, passive 

Hard work, imposed 

Indifference, neglectance 

The quantity comes first 

Priority of the majority 

Public functions for all citizens 

Social property 

Dr. Ştefan Odobleja makes some observations at the analysis of the two schools:

Ştefan ODOBLEJA jr.: The Destiny of a Visionar Phisician Doctor Ştefan Odobleja … 113 

- The social school estimates socializing the goods and abolishes the individual 

property. It is the school of public functions for all human beings, the humanity 

uniformization, equity for all life conditions, standarding the humanity (the socialeconomic 

ethics). It is a democratic school, to indoctrinate everybody. The social ideal 

is the one estimated by the majority, by poor, by unfortunate etc; 

- The ideal of love, of brotherhood, solidarity, altruism, equity. For the rich people it is 

a subversive school/current trying to undermine the state order: a revolutionary and 

reforming school, utopist and undoable; 

- The dictatorship of the majority - complex anomaly: dictatorship of ignorant, lazy, the 

dictatorship of mediocrity. Any socialist system can be achieved only in a world state 

mixed race, language, customs, traditions, habits. For now, this homogeneity is far 

from being achieved - if ever - the current state of humanity, on the one hand and 

science on the other hand, socialism is destined to fail. 

The history confirms that, whatever Dr. Ştefan Odobleja predicted in 1939 became real in 

1989, but we shall see at what costs he paid this prediction. 

Notes 

1 We should mention that the high school „Traian " was one of the most famous in the country, 

counting among its former students many personalities like: Stef Milcu, Serban Cioculescu, Iovit 

Popescu, Ionescu Şişeşti, who became members of the Romanian Academy. 

2 who died of typhus during World War I. 

3 With personal contributions, Theodor Costescu, former deputee of Mehedinti, built the Palace of 

Culture in Turnu Severin, inspired by La Scala of Milan. Having the support of his brother-inlaw 

I.C. Bibicescu, he donated both to the Palace of Culture and the town Library, which later 

became the Library Bibicescu. 

4 He used to relax swimming, being a good swimmer, getting the,, prana "- the cosmic energy 

which developed his emulation. 

5 With whom he had three children: Stefan (n.1947), Milena (n.1948 who died at baptism) and 

Dumitru (n.1949). 

6 I want to describe the life spent in the country at that time dominated by the Stalinist terror (1947 

- 1960): 

Not yet taken the measure of dispossession of peasants from their carts and horses gear, and 

although they still endured private property, there were collective works of plowing, digging, 

weeding, harvest, threshing, corn harvesting, to which were snapped with young at vignard 

harvest. In the village there was a rich cultural activity carried out by the school teacher, they 

sang in the choir and the village teacher was ranking the performances. There were celebrated 

with much importance and many festivities took part for the Holidays of Florii, Easter, 

Christmas and St. Mary at which all sons of the village took part. What Stefan Odobleja 

predicted began to appear among the personalities of the village, who were the priest, the 

teacher, five policemen as there was a border area, and in the forests around the village appeared 

a partisan named Trocan, which became legendary in the area and my father knew. At the 

community center started the meetings where you were obliged to attend, my father used to take 

me with him, it was interesting for me to observe the party activists combing their hair before 

speaking. Many party activists were recruited among the villagers, especially those who had a 

„healthy origin”. The first activist was Vasile Hoarca, he was named like that because he used to 

get drunk and slept in ditches gasping. Once they made him a party member, he used to walk 

around the village and patronized everybody: "Doctor, if you will not clean the ditch you will 

have to deal with me! Father/Priest if you don’t whiten the chandeliers, it will be bad for you!”

114 


People looked at him and they could not believe their eyes. In 1956 when Stalin died, the party 

activists Ianoş's Anica was dressed in mourning clothes and in the middle of the village she 

grumbled: "What will happen to us, now that Comrade Stalin died?" Among these stupid people 

the village was collectivized, and we witnessed some incredible scenes, such as taking away the 

land of the villagers, gathering the animals, the carts and horses. Children were withdrawn from 

school to work the land, the villagers began to migrate to the industry in Turnu Severin, they 

began to portion the bread, the villages were depopulated. 

7 He donated 450 volumes to the Library of the cultural center for the villagers to be able to inform 

about issues of horticulture, beekeeping, gardening and livestock. 

8 Both I.C. Birciu and Manea Manescu were obedient to the second cabinet-Elena Ceausescu - 

who, after having obtained the title of "the world famous scientist", did not want to hear about 

Romanian scientists of international value such as Coanda, Odobleja, Paulian. She would defend 

those who have been limited to the translation of some works from English into Romanian, 

having no interest to mention that a cybernetic work has appeared on Romanian soil. 

9 This award was a political deal to buy protection from the country leaders (Nicolae and Elena 

Ceausescu) to stop the recognition of Romanian scientists. We know that at that time, the two 

leaders of Romania were wrongly awarded with academic titles like, 'Doctor Honoris Causa' and 

world renowned Scientist ". 

Ştefan Odobleja – as physician PhD in Romania Army

ON THE EXHIBITION 

“IMAGES FROM THE ROMANIAN GULAG” 

LucreŃia OLTEANU 1 

The exhibition - Images from the Romanian Gulag 

Communism, having claimed to be a new civilization, superior to the Capitalist one, 

which it passionately denied, forced hundreds of millions of people to live within a 

closed, repressive and humiliating universe. On theoretical level, of the proclaimed 

purposes, Communism pretended to embody “absolute humanism”, a society whereof 

class distinctions disappeared and wherein people could live in complete freedom”. We, 

the ones having lived within this society, understood however that the new social system, 

communism, was a utopian concept. 

In Romania, the communist regime was a totalitarian system, based on an ideology 

hostile to open society, on the constant violation of the human rights through repression, 

intimidation and corruption and on the power monopoly exercised by a small group of 

individuals. 

The establishment of the communist totalitarianism was achieved through a frenzied 

anti-democratic campaign, marked by terror and repression, wherein the democratic 

values were eliminated from the society’s life and the opponents of the new “popular” 

regime had to endure the ordeal of the prisons, forced deportations and communist labour 

camps. 

The exhibition “Images from the Romanian Gulag” of the plastic artist Radu Bercea, 

reminds us the inferno of the communist prisons and camps. 

The artist’s experience – former political prisoner – has materialized in a series of 

remarkable works through their authenticity. 

The exhibition brings together a representative series of works with images displaying 

the ordeal of the opponents to the repressive regime. Arrest, identity loss, investigation, 

torture, political prisoners, the intellectual-communism’s number 1 enemy, punishment in 

detention, search, evening call, labour camp, “Ecce homo” victims, perpetrator figures, 

these are a few benchmarks of the nightmare experienced by “those whose youth was 

stolen”. 

Octav Bjoza, president of the Former Political Prisoners in Romania, in his turn former 

political prisoner, posits that the exhibition reminds the viewer of today, the harsh and 

inhuman world of the communist prisons and labour camps. We quote: 

1 Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania.

116 


“Among the visitors of various social categories and age, the most impressed are the 

former political prisoners, as they directly knew the terrible world so masterly evoked by 

Radu Bercea. 

In the torturers’ dehumanized figures, visceral-hatred contorted features, they recognize 

real people among their former oppressors. They will likewise recognize the degrading 

tortures, unimaginable for the civilized world, applied to the anti-communist political 

prisoners. 

In the communist prisons and labour camps, an extermination regime was consistently 

applied. The prisoners were malnourished, beaten, obliged to work beyond their powers, 

and deprived of elementary healthcare. These sad realities, which would forever 

disqualify the communist regime in Romania, very clearly transpire from Radu Bercea’s 

inspired works. The political prisoners he presents with infinite compassion and human 

solidarity are thin toothless men with indescribable suffering on their emaciated faces. 

The portraits of some intellectuals especially persecuted by their perpetrating rookies are 

particularly suggestive. 

The artist’s palette of themes is wide-encompassing. He displays the tortures and 

suffering of those devoid of liberty, he unfailingly catches the human-faced beasts’ 

figures, chosen by the authorities to repress the political prisoners; however he manages 

to present the mysterious dignity of death. 

Likewise, the author of successful caricatures also chooses aspects where the humour is 

sad and evokes painful realities whereof mention should be made of former perpetrators 

who have turned, through the course of things in Romania, prosperous businessmen”. 

The motto of the author Radu Bercea “Forgive, however not forget the past” proves the 

fullness of his far too noble soul, his wisdom, kindness and humanity, reminding us Jules 

Michelet’s statement: 

“May hatreds numb! Memories must however remain, so that so many misfortunes, 

suffering should never be lost to human experience” 

( Jules Michelet, History of French Revolution.) 

Radu Bercea – Destiny of a great plastic artist of Romania 

Born on the 29 th of August 1939, in Cuciuru Mare, Cernăuti, Bucovina, Rdu Bercea 

graduated the School of Plastic and Decorative Arts “Octav Băncilă” from Iaşi. 

In 1959, when he was only 19 years old, remarked and remarkable for his freedom of 

openly expressing the truth and his pro-Western beliefs, then, as evidence for his 

adhesion to subversive ideas and organizations, he was arrested and politically 

condemned to 20 years of forced labour and to 10 years of civil degrading for his “crime 

of conspiracy” against social order. He was granted amnesty through the decree of 1964, 

imposed by the international organisms of the “Human Rights” and UN. During 

detention, 1959 – 1964, he experienced the prisons and forced-labour colonies of the 

communist regime. 

After liberation, Radu Bercea, strong personality of rare sensitiveness, utterly and 

tirelessly dedicates himself to plastic arts, succeeding in accomplishing himself through 

art. Very mobile and creative, practicing unique various interesting genres and 

techniques, he achieves a variegated oeuvre with generous message. 

The talent and value of his creations consecrate him alongside the outstanding plastic 

artists of his time.

LucreŃia OLTEANU: Images from the Romanian Gulag - Radu Bercea 

Ever since 1964, he has participated in group or personal exhibitions (more than 200!) 

in Romania and abroad. He has displayed graphic and painting works in numerous towns 

of Romania: Gura Humorului, Suceava, Iaşi, Bucharest, Târgu Mureş, Reghin, ConstanŃa, 

Mamaia, Costineşti, Piteşti, Petroşani, Făgăraş etc. He has obtained numerous prizes in 

the national and international caricature saloons. 

Since 1986, he has benefited from numerous international participations: Japan, Italy, 

Turkey, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belgium, France, Brasilia, Mexico, Israel, Bulgaria etc. 

He has displayed his works in France, at the Cultural Centre from Port Marly, at Visinet 

Theatre from Paris, at the Economic House from Mafra, Brasilia, at the House of Culture 

from Rio Negro, at the Museum “Casa do Bucovina” from Rio Negro, Brasilia, at the 

Public Library Parana from Curitiba, Brasilia. 

He has personal works in private collections from Romania, USA, France, Italy, 

Austria, Brasilia and Israel. 

He has published caricatures in various local and central newspapers and magazines. 

He has illustrated volumes of poems and colouring books for children. He graphically 

rememorizes, in a series of exhibitions, the Romanian Gulag and he publishes the graphic 

volumes “Retina Memory of the Romanian Gulag”, “Testimonies from Inferno” and 

“Images from the Romanian Gulag”. The images from the Romanian Gulag constitute a 

testimony for the experiences of hundreds of thousands of Romanians during 

Communism, with troubling sequences from the prisons and labour camps. As regards the 

painful memory of the prison, master Radu Bercea testimonies that we must keep the 

memory of the past; however not let us overwhelmed “so as not to happen again”. Part 

of his works was donated to the Association of the Former Political Prisoners from 

Romania – Braşov and to the Memorial Museum from Sighet. 

Bibliography 

1. * * * Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in 

Romania: Final Report, p.1, Bucharest-2006. 

2. Octav Bjoza, Evocări ale suferinŃei (Evocations of Suffering), in: Album, Radu Bercea, 

“Imagini din gulagul românesc” (Images from the Romanian Gulag), pag.5, 6 

“Pastel” Publishing House,Braşov, 2010. 

3. Tiberiu Cosovan: Album “Memoria gulagului românesc” (Memory of the Romanian 

Gulag). 

4. Iuliana Popescu: ”Flori de spumă” (Foam Flowers). 

Note: 

In the frame of Openness project, an itinerant exhibition was organized, with the works of 

plastic artist Radu Bercea, showing the images from the Romanian Gulag. Cruel realities 

of life in the hell of communist prisons have sparked a great interest among visitors from 

Velico Târnovo - Bulgaria, Oldemburg - Germany, Hodmezovasarhely – Hungary, and 

Făgăraş – Romania. In the next pages there are shown 14 representative paintings of the 

great plastic artist Radu Bercea. 

117

118 


Stolen youth. Radu Bercea aged 19, on the 

moment he was arrested. 

TinereŃe furată. Radu Bercea la 19 ani, în 

momentul arestării sale. 

Gestohlene Jugend. Radu Bercea mit 19, als 

er verhaftet wurde. 

Открадната младост. 19-годишният Раду 

Берчя в момента на арестуването му. 

Towards the unknown. A whole family is 

taken into custody. 

Spre necunoscut. Arestarea unei familii. 

Ins Unbekannte .Verhaftung einer Familie. 

Към непознатото. Арестуването на цялото 

семейство. 

Political prisoner. Identities were replaced 

by numbers. 

DeŃinut politic. Identitatea este înlocuită 

cu un număr. 

Politischer Häftling. Seine Identität wird 

durch eine Nummer ersetzt. 

Политически затворници. Техните 

самоличности са заменяни от номера


119 

In the dark. The political prisoner, 

wearing blind goggles is taken to the 

questioning room. 

În întuneric. DeŃinutul politic este 

condus spre biroul de anchetă. 

In der Finsternis. Der politische 

Häftling wird mit schwarzen Brillen 

in den Verhörtsraum geführt. 

В тъмното. Политическият 

затворник, носещ очила за слепи, е 

отведен в стаята за разпит. 

Under questioning. 

La anchetă. 

Beim Verhör. 

По време на разпит.

120 


Torture and questioning. The political 

prisoner is held down and put through 

electrical shocks. 

Tortură în timpul anchetei. DeŃinutul 

politic este imobilizat şi i se aplică 

şocuri electrice. 

Folterung während des Verhöres. Der 

politische Häfling wird immobilisiert 

und es werden ihm Elektroschocks 

verabreicht. 

Мъчения по време на разпит. 

Политическият затворник е вързан и 

през тялото му преминава 

електрически ток. 


prisoner is beaten with sand filled sachets. 

Tortură în timpul anchetei. DeŃinutul 

politic este batut cu un saculeŃ umplut cu 

nisip. 


politische Häftling wird mit einem 

sandgefülltem Säcklein geschlagen. 


Политическият затворник е бит 

с торби, пълни с пясък.


121 


prisoner is suspended by his arms and rotated 

while beaten. 

Tortură în timpul anchetei. DeŃinutul politic 

este suspendat şi rotit, în timp ce este lovit. 


politische Häftling wird hochgehängt und 

gedreht, während ihm Schläge verabreicht 

werden. 


Политическият затворник е провесван на 

ръцете си и въртян, докато го бият. 

Torture and questioning. The political prisoer 

barely touches the ground with the toe tips. 

Tortură în timpul anchetei. DeŃinutul politic 

atinge solul doar cu vârfurile picioarelor. 


politische Häftling berührt den Fussboden 

nur mit den Zehenspitzen. 


Политическият затворник едва докосва 

пода с върха на пръстите си.

122 

Political prisoners. 

DeŃinuŃi politici. 

Politische Häfllinge. 

Политически затворници. 


Roll call at night. Present, present, absent 

(dead). 

Apelul de seară. Prezent, prezent, absent 

(mort). 

Abendappell. Anwesend, anwesend, 

abwesend (tot). 

Вечерна проверка. Присъства, 

присъства, отсъства (мъртъв).


God! Forgive our tormentors! 

Iartă-i Doamne, pe călăii noştri! 

Gott, vergib unsern Henkern! 

Господи! Прости на нашите мъчители 

The poster of the exhibition 

Radu Bercea - Images From The Romanian 

Gulag 

10 of July, 2012 

Făgăraş, Romania 

123

124 


The poster of the exhibition 

Radu Bercea - Images From The Romanian 

Gulag 

7 of May, 2012 

Oldenburg, Germany

BULGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM 

SEPTEMBER 9, 1944 UNTIL NOVEMBER 10, 

1989 - ABOUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE STATE 

POWER IN BULGARIA (1878-1912) 

Petko St. PETKOV 1 

Abstract: The present paper is a critical review of the historiography after September 9, 1944 

concerning the relations between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the state authority in 1878- 

1912 and the following conclusions can be reached: 

The interest and respectively the publications on the topic have different intensity over the years 

and depend on a number of factors such as the current socio-political situation, the personal 

convictions and personal professional qualities of the researchers, etc. 

The underestimation of the real spiritual functions of the church in free Bulgaria at the expense of 

the exaggerated and canonically untypical role of the Exarchate as a national-political institution 

is undeniable fact and unfortunately a permanent historiographic tendency which is present also 

in contemporary publications. 

The domination of the civil-historical approach to the topic (which can be defined also as antiecclesiastical) 

and the transformation of the national idea and national thought in a constant 

attribute of our historiography for the new Bulgarian history, leads to the fact that in the past as 

well as in the present even the church historians and apologists of Exarch Joseph I present his 

undeniable merits for the preservation of the Bulgarian in Macedonia and Southern Thrace as 

“real liturgical service”. 

In considerable part of the publications dealing with the topic, we face inexcusable lack of 

information, even ignorance regarding fundamental church rules and canonical requirements 

which partially makes senseless the otherwise assiduous efforts of some researchers to examine 

the complex, but not unexplainable directions of the relations between the church and the state in 

1878-1912. 

Although it has never been a priority for the historical science, the topic concerning the 

relations between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the state power, has been of great 

interest for a number of authors. The historians among them are not an overwhelming 

majority; a great part of the publications dealing with the problem are the work of 

amateur lovers of muse Clio, the clergy, jurists, etc. 

Like most sectors of humanities, the historiography after September 9, 1944 also 

undergoes considerable changes. During these years the problems connected with the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a whole are underestimated and ignored and the Bulgarian 

history from 1878 until 1912 is rewritten according to the new ideological dogmas and 

political expediencies. The sporadic interest in the relations between the Bulgarian 

1 St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo. Bulgaria.

126 


Orthodox Church and the state power in Bulgaria finds expression in ideologically 

modeled articles (sometimes whole collections like Orthodoxy in Bulgaria. Theoretical 

and Historical Enlightenment. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. S., 1974), subject entirely 

to the social and political situation of that time [1]. But here, like in any other 

periodization, one can find exceptions. Thus, for instance, some of the authors who have 

worked on the topic about the relations between church and state until 1944 continue to 

publish though more rarely and more difficult after this date. Here belong the publications 

of I. Snegarov. M. Arnaudov, St. Tsankov, G. Pashev which are characterized by the 

typical for the period between the wars comparatively balanced approach to the relations 

between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the state [2]. On the other hand, even after 

the “Big Change” in the end of 1989 many historians and other authors remained loyal to 

the philosophical and methodological ideas from the period till November 10 and 

continued to develop the world historiographic tradition of disparaging attitude towards 

the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the Principality of Bulgaria, and its connections with 

the state are examined through the eyes of the then politicians. This is obvious in the 

contents of the last two volumes of the Bulgarian academic history for the period 1878- 

1912 where “the best achievements” of the Bulgarian historical science are reflected [3]. 

An original historiographic phenomenon during the examined period is the production 

of Patriarch Cyril which, though not always dealing with the relations between the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the state in 1878-1912, strikes with respect because of its 

volume and the variety of themes [4]. At the same time even the clergy cannot or do not 

want to go out of what is permitted by the regime and by reiterating the political 

expedient suggestions on the topic with church phraseology, contribute to “sealing” these 

scientific problems. Thus they become part of the common trend of elementary and 

partial presentation of the real problems of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the period 

1878-1912 and of the actual parameters of its relations with the state power [5]. 

The scientific and spiritual feebleness of the research from that time is clearly expressed 

in connection with the interpretation of the problem of schism. Although after the last 

publications of I. Snegarov and St. Tsankov from the late 40s and the early 50s this topic 

has not been discussed, usually authoritative authors have published evaluations and 

opinions of the meaning of schism and its consequences. In the 20 th c. the first Bulgarian 

patriarch Cyril unequivocally and explicitly presents not the ecclesiastical but the secular, 

the national-political (apparently failed in 1945) conception of schism in the following 

way: „If we can talk about removing the schism between the Church in the Principality 

and the Tsarigrad Patriarchate, it would have remained later for the Bulgarian Church in 

Macedonia. As we have already said somewhere else, schism has extremely imposed 

itself due to the unwillingness of the Tsarigrad Patriarchate to cede the Macedonian 

eparchies to the Bulgarian exarchate. Article 10 of the sultan’s decree, which gave the 

Macedonian eparchies the possibility to determine themselves in accordance with the will 

of two thirds of the population for the Patriarchate or the Exarchate, was the only reason 

for declaring the schism. Could it be assumed that Bulgarian eparchies in Macedonia 

would give up article 10 of the Decree and would pass under the jurisdiction of the 

Patriarchate? This could not be even thought about and it would actually mean that 

Exarchate in Macedonia should be eliminated. And on the other hand assuming that the 

Orthodox people in Bulgaria should agree with removing the schism with such a great 

sacrifice as abandoning the Macedonian eparchies, is totally hopeless. It is amazing how 

some otherwise well-intentioned representatives of the church could reach another

Petko St. PETKOV: Bulgarian Historiography … 127 

impasse in their reflections about removing the schism having in mind the fact that they 

have known that it was impossible for the Bulgarian bishops to impose their narrow 

contracted views about such a fundamental ecclesiastical and public issue, even though 

they have been lead by church and peaceable motives and have believed that in this way 

they could even gain the sympathy and support of the Russian church and Russian 

diplomacy” [6]. This nationally and not ecclesiastically motivated cannonade could be 

answered with just one question which no one at that time dared to ask to Patriarch Cyril: 

And was not the schism removed in 1945 just after the Bulgarian state gave up all (not 

only the Macedonian) eparchies outside the country? 

During these decades one can observe a historiographic practice of inaccurate 

representation and interpretation of historical facts connected with the activity of the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church and some of its representatives [7]. This tendency reached 

the point where (without causing no official reaction from the then church authorities in 

Bulgaria), some famous historical figures – clergymen are misrepresented in literature, 

even in prestigious scientific journals. For example, in Metodi Petrov’s article Bishop 

Clement’s Government, published in Historical Review magazine in 1975 [8], there is a 

gross error of fact even in the title – at the time when he is a prime-minister of the 

Principality for the first time (November 1879 – March 1880) Clement is still bishop 

Branitski and only temporarily governing the Eparchy of Turnovo, which does not make 

him metropolitan bishop. The same mistake in another version can be found in several 

places in volume seven of the Bulgarian academic history where during the so-called 

Temporary Russian government, while debating in the Constituent Assembly and in the 

first years after 1879, people speak of Turnovo bishop Clement and metropolitan bishop 

Clement but he becomes such not until 1884 [9]. And this is to get to the continuing even 

today non-canonical naming of the first metropolitan bishop of Stara Zagora Methodius 

as “Methodius Kusevich”. This public neglecting of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, at 

that by the “erudite people”, as well as the disparaging attitude towards important 

historical facts are the basis of the continuing even today practice to talk and write (even 

in reviewed textbooks in Bulgarian history) about the clergyman Ilarion Makariopolski 

for the period 1858 when he becomes bishop and is conferred this title as late as this year. 

Perhaps this is the same reason for the inadequate conferring on the first Bulgarian prince 

not the title with which the First Great National Assembly has elected him, but with his 

last name Battenberg. 

Of course, during this long, almost half-a-century period, were published many valuable 

historical researches in which the problems of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its 

relations with the state were described more clearly; the authors tried to explain them 

even though the point of view remained civil and secular and quite often concealed 

atheistic and anti-ecclesiastical. Researchers like Zina Markova, Radoslav Popov, 

Stoycho Grancharov, Veska Nikolova, Andrey Pantev, Elena Statelova and others, have 

significant scientific achievements in this field [10]. Particular problems of the relations 

between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the Principality and the state authorities 

(monarchs, governments, and parliament) have been treated by the parties’ researchers 

[11]. 

One of the undeniable achievements of the historical science during these years, with a 

view to elucidating the problems, connected with the relations between the Bulgarian 

Orthodox Church and the state in 1878-1912, is the publishing of sources directly or 

indirectly connected with the topic. Documents from the personal archives of eminent

128 


clergymen and political figures [12], as well as memoirs [13] and subject documentary 

publications [14] have been released; besides archive funds have been critically presented 

[15]. But in the several documentary collections, prepared and published by the Synodical 

publishing house of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church there is a prevalence of publications 

about the national-consolidating and cultural-educating work of the Bulgarian exarchate; 

the topic of the complex and contradictory relations between the Bulgarian Orthodox 

Church and the state authorities in the period 1878-1912 is not elucidated in the 

documents (though there are such sources in the central and regional archives including 

the archive of the Church historical and archival institute) [16]. 

The brief review of the historiographic production from the mid 40s until the late 80s of 

the 20 th c. concerning the relations between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the state 

authority in 1878-1912, allows the following conclusions: 

1. The interest and respectively the publications on the topic have different intensity 

over the years and depend on a number of factors such as the current socio-political 

situation, the personal convictions and personal professional qualities of the 

researchers, etc. 

2. The underestimation of the real spiritual functions of the church in free Bulgaria at 

the expense of the exaggerated and canonically untypical role of the Exarchate as a 

national-political institution is undeniable fact and unfortunately a permanent 

historiographic tendency which is present also in contemporary publications. 

3. The domination of the civil-historical approach to the topic (which can be defined 

also as anti-ecclesiastical) and the transformation of the national idea and national 

thought in a constant attribute of our historiography for the new Bulgarian history, 

leads to the fact that in the past as well as in the present even the church historians 

and apologists of Exarch Joseph I present his undeniable merits for the preservation 

of the Bulgarian in Macedonia and Southern Thrace as “real liturgical service”. 

4. In considerable part of the publications dealing with the topic, we face inexcusable 

lack of information, even ignorance regarding fundamental church rules and 

canonical requirements which partially makes senseless the otherwise assiduous 

efforts of some researchers to examine the complex, but not unexplainable directions 

of the relations between the church and the state in 1878-1912. 

References 

1. Дамянов, С. Православната църква и българската национална революция. – В: 

Православието в България (Теоретико-историческо осветление). БАН. С., 1974, 

с. 153-191; Босев, Б. Православието в условията на капитализма в България. – 

В: Православието в България (Теоретико-историческо осветление). БАН. С., 

1974, с. 193-206; Джавезов, Ст. Православната църква и буржоазните партии в 

България. – Атеистична трибуна, 1985, № 3, 26-36. 

2. Снегаров, Ив. Българската екзархия. – Духовна култура, кн. 1, 1945, с. 1- 9; 

Кратка история на съвременните православни църкви (българска, руска и 

сръбска). Т. II, С., 1946; Цар Фердинанд (1887-1918) и Българската църква. - 

Духовна култура, 1946, кн. 8; Българска църковна история. Записки по лекциите 

на проф. Ив. Снегаров. С., 1947; Българската екзархия. Произход, същност и

Petko St. PETKOV: Bulgarian Historiography … 129 

значение. С., 1969; Арнаудов, М. Живот и дейност на екзарх Йосиф. С., 1965; 

Цанков, Ст. Варненски и Преславски Симеон. - Духовна култура, 1957, кн. 11- 

12; Пашев, Г. Християнската общественост според възгледите на Търновския 

митрополит Климент (В. Друмев). Принос към началата на християнската 

социология. - ГСУ, Богосл. фак., 24, С., 1947, с. 1-96; Търновският митрополит 

Климент (В. Друмев), църквата и държавата. - ГСУ, Богосл. фак., 26, С., 1949. с. 

1-33. 

3. История на България, Т. 7, С., БАН, 1991; История на България, Т. 8. България 

1903-1918. С., 1999. 

4. Пловдивски Кирил, Натанаил митрополит Охридски и Пловдивски (1820-1906). 

С., 1952; Кирил патриарх български, Екзарх Антим (1816-1888). С., 1956; 

Българската екзархия в Одринско и Македония след Освободителната война 

1877-1878. Т. I, кн. 1, кн. 2, С., 1970. По-конкретна и съвременна оценка на 

историографската продукция на патриарх Кирил в: Сборник в чест на Кирил 

патриарх Български. Пловдив, 2001, с. 73-78; 79-84; 92-99. 

5. 100 години от учредяването на Българската екзархия. Сб. Статии. Под 

редакцията на акад. Кирил Патриарх Български. С., 1971; Поптодоров, Р. 

Църква и държава през вековете. – В: Българската патриаршия през вековете. 

Отг. ред.: прф. д-р Ил. Цоневски. С., 1980, с. 148-159. 

6. Кирил патриарх български, Българската екзархия в Одринско и Македония след 

Освободителната война 1877-1878. Т. I, кн. 2, С., 1970, с. 237-238. 

7. Джавезов, Ст. Православната църква и буржоазните партии в България, с. 26- 

36. 

8. Петров, М. Правителството на митрополит Климент (1879-1880 г.). – 

Исторически преглед,1975, кн. 5. 

9. История на България, Т. 7, С., БАН, 1991, с. 33 (М. Петров – “митрополит 

Климент” за ВРУ); с. 101, 104 (Ил. Димитров – “търновския епископ Климент” 

– за второто правителство 1879-1880 г.); с. 120 (Ст. Грънчаров - “митрополит 

Климент” за “режима на пълномощията” 1881-1883 г.). 

10. Маркова, З. Българската екзархия 1870-1879. С., 1989; Попов, Р. Опит за 

вдигане на схизмата през 1896 г. – Векове, 1983, № 1, 26-36; България и Русия 

(1894-1898 г.). Политически отношения. С., 1985; Грънчаров, Ст. 

Политическите сили и монархическият институт в България 1886-1894. С., 

1984; Николова, В. Народната партия и буржоазната демокрация. Кабинетът на 

Константин Стоилов (1894-1899). С., 1986; Стателова, Е., А. Пантев, 

Съединението на Княжество България и Източна Румелия 1885 година. С., 

1985; Стателова, Е. Дипломацията на Княжество България 1879-1886. С., 1979; 

Пантев, А. “Българската криза 1886-1887”, българската общественост и 

европейската политика. - История и обществознание, 1986, № 4, с. 3-8. 

11. Гешева, Й. Идеология и програми на Консервативната партия (1879-1886 г.). - 

Истор. преглед, 1986, кн. 3; За отношенията на консерваторите към княз 

Александър Батенберг. – Военноисторически сб., 1988, № 1, с. 140-157; 

Стоянов, Ив. Либералната партия в Княжество България 1879-1886. С., 1989; 

Саздов, Д. Демократическата партия в България 1887-1908. С., 1987; Николова, 

В. Съединената легална опозиция в България (1893-1894). – Истор. преглед, 

1981, № 6, 69-79; Попов, Ж. Народнолибералната (стамболовистка) партия в 

България (1903-1920 г.). С., 1986.

130 


12. Васил Друмев, Съчинения. Т. 2. Критика, публицистика, речи, писма. Под ред. 

на Д. Леков и Ив. Сестримски. С., 1968; Литературен архив, Т. V. Из архива на 

Васил Друмев Климент Търновски. Ръкописи, материали и документи. Подбрал 

и подготвил Дочо Леков. С., 1973. 

13. Икономов, Т. Мемоари. С., 1973; Спомени на Екатерина Каравелова. Съст.: В. 

Филипова и Е. Кунчева. С., 1984; Спомени за Учредителното събрание 1879 г. 

Съст.: Е. Стателова, З. Маркова. С., 1979; Спомени за Съединението от 1885 г. 

Съст.: Е. Стателова и Р. Попов. С., 1980. 

14. Из архива на Константин Иречек. Т. I. Преписка с българи. Подбрал и 

подготвил за печат П. Миятев. С., 1953; Пасков, И., Ц. Билярски, Въпросът за 

схизмата в българо-гръцките отношения (1898-1912). – ИДА, 48, 1984, 117-140; 

Външната политика на България. Документи и материали. Т. 1. 1879-1886. С., 

1978. 

15. Флорова, В. Архивен фонд “Симеон митрополит Варненски и Преславски”. – 

ИДА, кн. 24, С., 1977, 323-331. 

16. Църковно-исторически архив. Т. І. С., 1981; Т. ІІ. С., 1986; Шопов, Й. 

Българската екзархия и националноосвободителното движение в Македония и 

Одринско 1878-1912 г. – Изв. на Бълг. патриаршия, Църковноисторическия и 

архивен институт и Центр. църковен историко-археол. музей. 1985, 326-350.

THE INTERROGATION STAGES, 

STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES OF THE 

SECURITATE (1948-1964). CASE STUDY: THE 

CLUJ REGIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR THE 

SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE 

Corneliu PINTILESCU 1 

The topic of the present study has been approached in numerous works and articles on 

the justice system as an instrument of political repression and manipulation in the 

communist regimes. One can mention here the already classic works of authors, such as 

F. Beck, W. Godin, Annie Kriegel, George Hodos and Robert Conquest, who approach 

the great show trials from the time of the “Great Terror” and the similar trials from 

Eastern Europe from 1948-1964. 2 Apart from focusing on the great “show trials,” another 

feature of these works is their use of mainly press sources as well as witness and victim 

accounts. Only after the political changes from 1989 did researchers have access to the 

archives of the former USSR (less to the judicial archives however). From among the 

works that were the result of this opening, one can mention those of Michael Ellman, 

David L. Hoffmann, Roberta T. Manning and Elizabeth A. Wood. 3 The opening of the 

archives of the former USSR was limited however. That is why these important works on 

the justice system as an instrument of repression in the Communist Bloc did not contain 

an analysis also from the perspective of the files based on which the respective trials were 

held. The present study tries to fill this historiographic gap. It will analyze the 

interrogation stages of the Securitate as well as the strategies and techniques that this 

oppressive institution widely used based on the source material from the criminal files 

held in the archives of the National Council for the Study of the Archives of the 

Securitate (NCSAS), which are related to the activity of the Cluj Military Tribunal 

between 1948 and 1964, as well as the interviews with victims and witnesses of the 

studied trials. Through strategies we understand the ways in which the inquiry was 

organized and developed of the inquiry in order to concoct a political criminal felony 

according to the existing legislation. 

1 Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. 

2 See F. Beck, W. Godin, Russian Purge and The Extraction of Confession, London, 1951; Annie 

Kriegel, Les grands procès dans les systèmes communists: La pédagogie infernale, Paris, 1972; 

George Hodos, Show Trials : Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954, New York, 1987; 

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror – A Reassessment, Oxford, 1990. 

3 See Michael Ellman, “The Soviet 1937-1938 Provincial Show Trails Revisited” in Europe-Asia 

Studies, vol. 55, No. 8, December 2003; David L. Hoffmann, “The Great Terror on the Local 

Level: Purges in Moscow Factories, 1936-1938” and Roberta T. Manning, “The Soviet 

Economic Crisis of 1936-1938 and the Great Purges” in J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning 

(eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, Cambridge, 1993; Elizabeth A. Wood, Performing 

Justice: Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia, Ithaca, 2005.

132 


The interrogation is the central piece in the criminal inquiry of the Securitate. The 

confessions obtained during the interrogation provide the essential data that are 

manipulated during the course of the trial. The material evidence and witness confessions 

were many times of secondary importance. The structure of the Securitate contained a 

special directorate called “Criminal investigations,” whose prerogative was the 

investigation of political crimes and their prosecution in court. 4 

The inquest strategy was closely connected to the centralized organization of the 

Securitate. An order of the General Directorate for the Security of the People (GDSP) 5 

from Bucharest to the Cluj Regional Directorate of the Security of the People demanded 

explanations for the arrests made without permission from the GDSP. 6 This document is 

one of the many proving that key-moments in an investigation, such as its initiation or the 

arrest of suspects, depended on approval from the centre. Moreover, due the nature of its 

rapports with the lower structures, the GDSP exercised tight control over the evolution of 

the investigation in general and the interrogation in particular. An order of the GDSP 

dated August 17, 1951, demanded from the Cluj Regional Securitate the arrest of a 

suspect, his interrogation according to a questionnaire attached to the order, and the 

dispatch of a copy of the obtained statement to Bucharest. 7 A month before, they had 

received a similar order demanding what kind of facts the investigation must establish 

upon completion. In this case, the main fact that the investigators had to establish was 

“the counterrevolutionary religious activities [of the suspects].” 8 The information on local 

events was successively transmitted from the county to the regional and then central 

level, by means of regular reports. Based on these reports, the GDSP decided on the 

initiation of an investigation concerning certain suspects. According to the received 

information, the Bucharest center decided on the arrest of the suspects or the interruption 

of the investigation. The importance of the GDSP in the development of criminal 

investigations was partly determined by the fact that it centralized the data collected from 

all over the country. That is why the local sections depended on the information provided 

by the Bucharest center. The GDSP benefited from this position and coordinated 

interrogations by means of its orders and guidance. In certain cases, the guidance of an 

investigation touched on details, by the dispatch of elaborated questionnaires for the 

suspects as well as information on the persons of interest and instructions on how 

investigators had to carry out their tasks. 9 

The used questionnaires clearly reveal the stages of the interrogation. They were lists of 

pre-established questions that later shaped the confessions of suspects. Without these 

questionnaires, which meant to guide suspects during the process of the establishment of 

their political guilt, the self-accusing statements given under duress risked being 

contradictory. Even so, the mixture of truth and fiction revealed contradictions that were 

4 See Marius Oprea, Banalitatea răului: o istorie a SecurităŃii în documente, Iaşi, 2002, p. 48. 

5 GDSS from March 30, 1951. Marius Oprea, op. cit., p. 49. 

6 NCSAS Archives (National Council for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate; CNSAS in 

Romanian), Criminal Fonds, file P 484, vol. 3, p. 66. Telegram no. 2343, from 18.10.1948: “you 

will send us complete accounts on those in custody / furthermore, you will report the reasons 

why you started to operation without asking for our permission first.” 

7 NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 389, vol. 2, p. 423. 

8 NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 389, vol. 2, p. 441. 

9 The Cluj Regional Directorate for the Security of the People was the main supplier of case files 

to the Cluj Military Tribunal. There were around one thousand trials per year.

Corneliu PINTILESCU: The Interrogation Stages, Strategies, and Techniques of the … 133 

later invoked in appeals. The effect of questionnaires was the standardization of 

statements in case the investigation targeted a group of suspects. If the investigators 

noticed discrepancies among certain pieces of information, they organized a confrontation 

in which all the suspects with divergent statements participated. The confrontation report 

signed by the participants confirmed the final version. The fact that most of the 

investigations usually targeted a group instead of an individual rendered the interrogation 

a complex action in need of a strategy. The officer leading the investigation at the local 

level was entrusted with the application of the strategy through the coordination of the 

group of investigators that worked on the case. 

The strategy determined the stages of the interrogation. In the preliminary phase, 

having an introductory character, the Securitate investigators asked a set of general 

questions through which they were investigating some leads on the political activity of 

the suspects and their possible crimes against the regime. These broad questions usually 

were: “What kind of subversive activities did you carry out against the regime?” or 

“What counterrevolutionary activities did you carry out?” This type of questions indicates 

the investigators’ intention to feel out the situation. 10 Investigators requested suspects to 

submit autobiographic accounts and lists of acquaintances in order to make their general 

evaluation. 

The starting point for any interrogation was the presumption of guilt. Since a person 

was under investigation by the Securitate meant that his/her guilt was self-evident. The 

only aspect left to be established was the kind of crime he/she committed, under what 

circumstances, and in what way. The questions asked as well as the concepts used during 

the interrogation undoubtedly prove that the Securitate conducted its investigation 

according to the existing penal legislation as well. Further evidence in this regard is the 

investigators’ stubborn efforts to give the offenses of suspects a political character – even 

if it was fictitious – in order to be able to prosecute them according to the legal provisions 

of the Romanian Penal Code. The aim of the interrogation was not the pursuit of truth, 

but the construction of a political guilt, which implied the commission of offenses that the 

regime valorized negatively from a political point of view and artificially connected to 

criminal offenses stipulated in the Penal Code. 

In the second stage of the interrogation, the investigators pursued certain leads 

according to the existing repressive policy and the information they had. They focused on 

the thorough investigation of these leads through the selection and accumulation of as 

many incriminating evidence as possible. The leading investigator issued guidelines 

concerning the separate investigation of the suspects after careful analysis of the 

biographic data and psychological profile of each of them. Those considered vulnerable 

from a biographical point of view or psychologically instable were subjected to intense 

pressure until they broke. Upon finishing the inquiry on the activity of the suspect, the 

investigators extended their investigation over the suspect’s acquaintances. Thus, they 

obtained incriminating statements on other people as well. This strategy assured the 

contamination of those who abetted or kept in contact with the suspect. 

In the third stage, the investigators synthesized the obtained confessions. The most 

important document was the final report of the investigation written by the leading 

investigating officer. Apart from the synthesis of all the obtained statements, this 

document gave new meanings to the deeds described in the statements, established the 

10 NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds - Cluj, file 5348, vol. 1, pp. 42-44.

134 


commission or non-commission of certain crimes, and decided for or against sending the 

case further for prosecution in a court of law. Although the existing legislation clearly 

stipulated that the establishment of an individual’s guilt or innocence was the prerogative 

of the courts of law, the aforementioned final reports of the Securitate already reached the 

verdict. These reports had a standard ending note saying: “In conclusion [...] they are 

guilty of …” 11 

Most of the trials from 1948-1964, whose aim was to legalize terror, involved groups of 

individuals. The individual trial of politically undesirable was a rare occurrence. This is 

why the investigation in general and the interrogation in particular targeted groups of 

individuals. The collective investigation of the repression subjects presented a number of 

advantages. The first was the efficiency of the investigation and sentencing process of an 

impressive number of individuals. The second advantage was that guilt was easier 

constructed through the reciprocal contamination of those involved. Collective guilt had 

additional seriousness and popular impact. A crime committed by a group of individuals, 

to whom the investigators added an organized character, became more serious that a 

crime committed individually. 

The need for the collective treatment of subjects had a strong influence on the 

interrogation techniques. The investigation of a group of individuals meant the 

involvement of an entire team of investigators. The team was lead by a leading 

investigation officer, who centralized the results and forwarded them to his superiors by 

means of reports. The isolation of the suspects from the same group was recommended in 

order to avoid their fraternization and access to information pertaining to the case. 

Suspects were usually held in custody in detention cells in the Securitate buildings. 

However, due to the limited space, their recommended isolation was difficult to put into 

practice. It became easier when there was a penitentiary nearby, where the suspects could 

be held in isolation. In order to prevent suspects from knowing the location of their 

detention place and communicating among themselves during transport, they were 

blindfolded with special tin glasses. 

In order to break the resistance of suspects and obtain their self-incriminating 

statements, the Securitate made recourse to physical and psychological pressures. The 

alternation and dosage of these pressures is a fact that many victims noted in their later 

testimonies. 12 Physical pressures did not involve only torture, which is one of the most 

frequent elements in the memoirs of former political prisoners, but also food and sleep 

deprivation, which led to the weakening of the suspects’ organism and obviously his 

resistance capacity. The use of torture was a two-edged weapon because after the signing 

of the self-incriminating statements the suspects recanted them. In certain cases, the 

suspect’s vacillation between admitting and recanting these statements undermined the 

result of the investigation. Here is an example of a piece of evidence that became 

unusable by the prosecution: “I admit that until January 25, 1950, I had not admitted to 

what Captain Desagă said about me, and on January 25 I said I had admitted only for fear 

of torture.” 13 

11 NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 484, v.1, pp. 10-11. 

12 See the examples from Herbert (Belu) Zilber, Actor în procesul Pătrăşcanu: prima versiune 

memoriilor lui Belu Zilber, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 47-51. 

13 NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 346, vol.1, pp. 6-7.

Corneliu PINTILESCU: The Interrogation Stages, Strategies, and Techniques of the … 135 

We will not insist on the torture techniques because this topic has been very well 

covered both in memoirs and the historical research. In many cases, the use of torture was 

unnecessary because the psychological methods, such as threats and blackmail, proved 

their efficiency. The psychological methods for the obtaining of confessions were based 

on a system of collecting and organizing information on the people who came under the 

scrutiny of the Securitate. During the investigation, the personal file of the suspect 

comprised a picture, personal data, the “identification elements,” “prior offenses,” “the 

result of the house search,” “the information resulting from his [and other peoples’] 

statements,” “confrontations,” “personal descriptions,” “conclusions,” and “proposals.” 14 

According to the biographical data and the description, guidelines were issued as to the 

manner in which the suspects would be approached during the interrogation. Descriptions 

were short and tried to note the weak points of the suspect 

Based on the information gathered from the suspects in custody, the leading 

investigation officer together with his superiors decided on which suspects the 

investigation should focus as well as on the manner in which the interrogation would be 

conducted. A note of the Cluj Regional Directorate for the Security of the People 

(CRDSP) to the GDSP in Bucharest, dated July 29, 1952 and referring to an 

investigation, made an evaluation of the interrogation work and put forward proposals. 

Those who showed resistance during the course of the investigation were proposed for 

internment in “work units,” 15 because they were considered “dangerous elements,” those 

who fell into the trap of the blackmail of the Securitate became informants, and those 

who confessed to their guilt were further investigated in view of their trial in a court of 

law. 16 

Manipulation was another method that was successfully used to obtain selfincriminating 

statements. Those who came into contact with the Securitate for the first 

time were unaware of its tricks. The investigation could begin in a non-violent and 

persuasive manner. The suspect was assured that he was brought in only for some 

routine questions. This way, the investigators obtained from the suspect confessions 

that in his view were not serious, such as the listening to Western radio stations and 

the voicing of critical remarks on the policy of the government or the Soviet Union. 

By starting from apparently unimportant details, the Securitate managed to construct - 

by means of additions, exaggerations, and reinterpretations – serious 

counterrevolutionary crimes. Another manipulation method was to make suspects 

believe that the Securitate knew everything on their life and they could not hide 

anything away from it. For instance, suspects were surprised by the mentioning of 

certain details from their personal life, which convinced them that the Securitate knew 

everything about them and resistance was futile. Furthermore, investigators made 

full use of the frictions that appeared within a group of suspects. In order to break 

the solidarity of the group, investigators would show to some suspects the damaging 

statements that the other suspects made on them or would promise their release or a 

lighter sentence in exchange of cooperation. 

14 

NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 290, vol.1, pp.72-75. 

15 

It was a form of labor camp. For details see Ion Bălan, Regimul concentraŃionar din România, 

1945-1964, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 79-82. 

16 

NCSAS Archives, Criminal Fonds, file P 389, vol.2, pp. 442-443.

136 


In conclusion, we underline that the interrogation strategies of the Securitate were 

influenced by its centralized way of functioning. In practice, this meant that the lower 

echelons of the Securitate gathered the information and sent it further to the higher 

echelons that centralized it at the regional or national level, took the important decisions 

concerning ongoing investigations, and offered guidelines on the manner in which these 

decisions had to be implemented at the local level. Although the evolution of 

interrogations varied from case to case, we can use three stages as a theoretical model in 

the analysis of an interrogation: a first stage when the accumulation of information was 

achieved horizontally (this stage began before the arrest), a second stage when, following 

certain options, the interrogation focused on certain suspects and issues, and a third stage 

when the investigating officers synthesized the obtained data and gave them coherence. 

For the obtaining of self-incriminating statements, physical and psychological pressures 

were used. Although physical torture is the most recurrent method mentioned in memoirs, 

there are many cases in which manipulation and blackmail proved sufficient. When 

comparing the methods of the Securitate with those of other security agencies from the 

Communist Bloc, we note the similarity among them. The creation of the Securitate 

according to the Soviet model and with the assistance of Soviet councilors is the 

explanation for the existence of these similarities. 

(translated from Romanian by Leonard Ciocan)

THE IMAGE AND BEYOND THE 

REAL - UNREAL COMBINATION IN THE 

RECONSTRUCTIONS ON THE 

COMMUNIST REGIME 

Nikolay POPPETROV 1 

Abstract: The text deals with some basic questions related to the study of the communist period as 

part of the Bulgarian history (as a matter of fact the period between September 1944 and 

November 1989) My assumptions have come about as a result of the observations and increased 

research interest made in the first decade of the 21 st C as well as the intensive appearance of 

sources (documents, memoirs, Oral History interviews), and the imposing of a definite, dominant 

image of the communist regime (both amongst researchers and society as a whole). At the same 

time, the communist period in Bulgarian history is present in the media agenda, it is being 

discussed and turned into political tools. The political attitudes and media agenda have a huge 

impact and intertwine with research assumptions. Both in society and amongst people and groups 

studying the past there are two clear conclusions to be made: in society resides (unjustified 

according to the majority of opinions) a nostalgia for the communist past and that it is necessary 

that we condemn that past. 

This paper summarizes observations (made in the period 2010-2012) on memoir literature, Oral 

History publications, historical research, as well as the media version on the topic of the 

communist period. 

1. I emphasize on terms like real and unreal and I intend to use these adjectives as far as 

the past is concerned for in the Bulgarian social space, a process is going on of an 

idiosyncratic evaluation of the communist period by setting up museums, erecting 

monuments of the victims, memoir publishing and political formulae promoting, which, 

due to their belonging to certain leading current figures and institutions are regarded as 

the definitive and final judgment about that past. In the research opinions of most of the 

Bulgarian authors prevails prejudice and too much axiology. Such an approach does not 

lead to sorting out and reconstruction of events, but to highlighting the past with current 

evaluations and misusing the past to gain personal and social conjuncture aims. The 

imposed evaluative approach leads to one additional consequence of overseeing or 

subreption of some aspects of the history between 1944-1989. 

The different accents on the history of the communist regime in Bulgaria greatly carry 

the hallmarks of extrapolation. The regime is often demonized (formally, but also actively 

and intentionally), the concepts of the regime are stylized, different persons are 

stigmatized and others hailed as heroes. The image that is presented in scientific research, 

memoirs, fiction or in the media shifts between total rejection, negligence and ridicule 

and (rarely) the positive (even as an exception: the affirmative) attitude. 

1 National Academy of Art, Sofia, Bulgaria.

138 


Different personal attitudes, social and political factors, the closeness to the times of 

communism, define the strong emotionality with some evaluations, the bias when 

choosing a standpoint, the way the material is presented, etc. This determines the 

ambivalence of the evaluations, the one-sidedness and/or the narrow-mindedness of the 

chosen standpoints, the publicist accents in texts claiming to be analytical and academic. 

2. There is a consensus amongst the authors of different research and other texts about 

the communist period on the following basic characteristics: 

- Ineffective economy (also defined as economic catastrophe) 

- Oppressive political system (the strongest being: massive bloodshed terror replaced 

by brutal police regime) – totalitarian regime/totalitarianism which breaks the 

flourishing development at the time, puts the country in the position of 

underdeveloped one by the basic European processes and destines the citizens to 

feeble and miserable existence. 

- Total ideology and manipulation of society, conducted social and personal life, 

suppressed personal initiative. 

At the same time, as one of the characteristics of the communist period, it is brought to 

the fore that there is a failure in the economic, social, educational and cultural spheres 

emphasizing on the examples of constant disagreement, opposition (and even resistance) 

against the regime. Perhaps as an exception should be treated the positive evaluations 

along the lines of: economic modernization, socially oriented system, certain rules and 

order, ensuring relaxed, stable and secure individual existence. 

3. One of the basic sources for recreating the image of the past (of major significance 

for the formation of media images and on the whole – of the widely spread social 

concepts) has been the different eye-witness stories. For about two decades of post- 

communist period a large number of memoir texts and media paraphrases have been 

created. Memoirs as a genre here could justifiably be seen as the field of active 

construction of the unreal. The picture that memoirs illustrate is a bi-polar one. On the 

one hand, the left activists stand those who express nostalgia for the communist regime 

essentially ignoring the negative aspects and present the communist period as a period of 

creativity, where the dark spots are something minor, unimportant. 

On the other hand there are those who are critical of some aspects of the regime, former 

supporters and servants but also representatives of chased groups and circles, i.e. the 

concepts of those bi-polarity representatives, whose initial standpoints have already been 

formed, give birth to the texts, whose main aim is to create a new biographic identity. 

This function is best carried out by bringing to the fore the negative aspects of the events, 

emphasizing on the suffering and, to a certain degree of hesitation, on the heroism of the 

victims. 

There are the same approaches to be spotted in the three groups of memoir texts – the 

obvious subreption of whole biographical paragraphs, boosting of some aspects of 

everyday situations, using evaluations directly linked to the environment with which the 

authors identify themselves up to the moment of producing the memoir text. A significant 

part of the texts represents the past with almost no shades of meaning, a leading approach 

is the demonization and its counterpart – heroism.

Nikolay POPPETROV: TheIimage and Beyond the Real-Unreal Combination 139 

As for interviews (including OH ones), it must be noted that the problem there has been 

the breaching of the requirements of the way they should be conducted. In a society like 

the Bulgarian one, where the image of the past is greatly influenced by current affairs, the 

outstanding presence of the interviewer alone (cases of interferences are possible) leads to 

distortions as a rule; the least being the respondent trying to say what the interviewer will 

like or approve of. 

4. The topic of the mythology reading of the past is one of the possible keys to the 

reconstruction of both the ways of perceiving the communist regime in the course of 

history, i.e. when it existed, and discoveries and thinking over the post-communist 

concepts of the regime and the clarification of the way they were formed (as well as 

explaining the reasons why the communist past is interpreted in one way or another). 

Creating and using myths (regardless of the time during or after the communist regime) 

has been initiated in order to: 

- impose convenient to the respective political power/environment concepts of a past, 

present and future; 

- explain events, situations and phenomena mainly when facts are unknown; 

- legitimize (and change a biography) in a process of heroization; 

- take part in current mass attitudes and a choice of standpoint (to win someone’s 

benevolence, to fit a person, process or event in the current concepts and behavior, 

etc). 

The last two reasons have been leading where most of the myths about communism after 

its fall were created. The only significant difference between the two myth situations (of 

the period between 1944-1989 and the period after that) has been that in the former, due 

to the autocratic ruling of the communist party the deliberate central creation and 

imposing (institutionalizing) of myth was taking a lead (it is one of the basic forms of 

presenting the past, present and future, also used as social mobilization) whereas in the 

latter, after the fall of communism, the process of myth creation was multi-directional, 

chaotic, often totally spontaneous and random. As far as myths are concerned, attention 

should be paid to the creation in times of communism of secret explanatory and 

restraining stories, typical of the underground culture of the regime. In post-communist 

conditions they are freely expressed, they are legitimized as one of the ways of truthful 

“reading of the past” greatly modified at the same time. Alongside their “officializing”, 

they turn, in the course of the new “reading” of the communist period, into a basic source 

for the image of that past created by the media. 

5. Creating unreal concepts reflects different horizons of perception. With a certain 

degree of conditionality, these can be presented as follows: 

- the horizon of those who have never accepted communism, their anti-communist 

dominated horizon (with certain modifications) still continues in times of postcommunism. 

- those who have changed their horizon to adapt to the era of post-communism and 

the leading paradigm, which is communism is a criminal regime i.e. they take 

advantage of a new horizon 

- the horizon of those who have been disappointed by post-communism and now they 

advocate the horizon of the nostalgic memory

140 


- the horizon of those who do not know communism (people born after 1980-1985); 

their horizon could be artificial, influenced by the environment and the leading 

paradigm, by the family/parents’ or the clique horizon; at best, they have built theirs 

through analyses and intuition. 

Between these horizons there are interceptions but at the same time their overlapping 

does not diminish the process of producing fictitious concepts, mythology stories and 

after all – the image of an unreal reality. 

The existence of horizons facilitates the distribution of different more often than not 

opposing but on the whole one-sided claims about the communist period. 

The different horizons form the historians’ attitude to the period in question. The 

research hypothesis are proved through manipulative presentation of facts, where a major 

argument is the regime’s assessment based on political views; these are often justified by 

a deliberate axiological argumentation (this in most of the observed examples does not 

allow a presentation of the true functioning of the regime). By the way, such research 

behavior is not an exception. The practice of the historical research of communism shows 

that for almost a quarter of a century (the late 1940s through early 1970s) the assessment 

of the “bourgeoisie period” of the Bulgarian history fall into the category of the axiology. 

(in this case: negativism). 

6. In my understanding, one cannot research (reconstruct) the communist regime, unless 

one first and foremost looks into its own logic, behavioral motifs, real aims and visions of 

the future, as well as their presentation in the public sphere. Such a research standpoint 

places in the middle the topic of reality and its package, the combination of personal 

goals and essence of the regime, utopist ideology and particular aims and real results and 

respectively – the image that the regime would like to create of itself. It is of great 

importance how the regime justifies its decisions and actions (i.e. what explanations and 

justifications it gives society). From such a research point of view we could distinguish 

the typical of ideology and regime behavior hypocrisy and cynicism. 

Secondly, I ask the question how motifs of behavior, aims and visions, connected with / 

stemming from the communist regime are perceived, assessed (especially totally 

confidentially), criticized in the course of history as well as the reasons why dissidents 

come out of the communist circles. This is the time to place the emphasis on the image 

(images) of the regime which are built and circulate in society throughout the existence of 

this regime. The existing in different periods concepts of the regime are greatly 

influenced by separate momentary facts depending on the audience before which they 

have been exposed and on the environment they originate from. 

In the context of the topic of the image and the concepts lies the usually dismissed by 

researchers question on the consensus between authorities and society. It comprises a 

general topic which includes both the attitude of the intellectuals towards the regime and 

the inclusion (in certain stages of its development) of separate social groups and bigger 

social circles. Consensus as a form of personal choice and social attitude expresses the 

condition necessity/need/forcefulness in which each individual or social groups fid 

themselves, as well as the fact that the regime rules. At the same time consensus is an 

expression of different forms of conformism.

Nikolay POPPETROV: TheIimage and Beyond the Real-Unreal Combination 141 

The research construction “consensus” could serve as a basis of the closeness 

between society (as a whole) and regime on such utmost for both parties issues such 

as the “Macedonian case” (after 1966) and the “Revival process” (renaming of the 

Turkish minority - 1985-1989). Ignoring both of these issues or bringing the latter to 

some isolated actions of the regime illustrates the process of constructing an unreal 

past. 

As far as the consensus status is concerned and the expressions of conformism, the 

question arises which social groups had what kinds of expectations from the 

communist regime and which of these expectations were met by the regime. Here 

comes the next logical question – of the “double” relationship between the masses 

and authorities: of the discrepancies and the closeness between them. It can be 

assumed, as some observations on individual or group behaviors witness, that in 

Bulgarian conditions there is the “opposite current” of masses and authorities, if I 

can say so, well-justified, although on another aspect of the history of the communist 

regime by Evgeniy Dobrenko. 

The reconstruction of the relationships between the masses and the regime by 

considering behavioral forms like consensus and conformism inevitably places on the 

focus such major questions like: 

- the circle of active supporters, fans, active and passive electorate of the communist 

regime; 

- the significance of the nationalistic attitudes to attract certain circles (but to change 

the image of the regime in these circles) towards the authorities and how many of 

the nationalistic highlights in the ideology and propaganda are used deliberately for 

the mobilization of the social vote and the creation of an agenda controlled by the 

regime. 

7. To sum up, the image of the communist regime, as seen in the media and the texts of 

its researchers, is severely deformed, accompanied by the deliberate stress on the separate 

elements. The analysis / attitude towards the regime (including the interpretation of the 

regime via myths) shows that the basic motifs for the widely used axiology and 

extrapolation can be totally impartial as well as biased, the result of processes of 

spontaneity, respectively – of deliberateness. The ratio between real and unreal features 

of events and processes from the past is taken over by the unreal. 

Unreal concepts are constructed, a process opposite to the reconstruction of the past by 

the different evidence available. This does not allow for major trends to be revealed, 

typical of the society of the communist period. As a result, publications grow in numbers, 

but the past serves more often as a reason for identification and the memory of it is 

modified according to the current agenda. The break with the past has not yet happened 

as has never done the re-thinking of the past just its partial study.

142 

References 


1. Baeva, I. E. Kalinova, N. Poppetrov. Die kommmunistische Ära im kollektiven 

Gedächtnis der Bulgaren – In: Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden und 

Osten Europas. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven. Hg. St.Troebst. 

Göttingen, 2010, p. 405-501. 

2. Brunnbauer, U., St. Troebst (Hg.). Zwischen Amnesie und Nostalgie. Die Erinnerung 

an den Kommmunismus in Südosteuropa. Köln – Weimar –Wien, 2007. 

3. Troebst, St. Diktaturerinnerung und Geschichtskultur im östlichen und südlichen 

Europa. Ein Vergleich der Vergleiche. Leipzig, 2010. 

4. Vukov, N. The „Unmemorable“ and the „Unforgettable“. “Museumizing” the 

Socialist Past in Post – 1989 Bulgaria.- In: Past for the Eyes. East European 

Representations of Communism in Cinema and Museums after 1989. Hg. O. 

Sarkisova, P.Apor. Budapest – New York, 2008, p. 307-334.

ROMANIA’S BAPTIST CHURCHES UNDER 

THE PERSECUTION OF THE COMMUNIST 

REGIME. REPLY AND RESISTANCE ACTIONS 

Marius SILVEŞAN 1 

Recent history, respectively of the communist period, arouses the interest of 

professionals and youth. To meet this desire, but also due to our interest in the stated 

period, through this study we intend to submit how the Baptist congregation responded to 

the pressures and persecutions exerted by the communist State. 

We consider the means by which it reacted to the official actions, which combined 

pressures, administrative harassment, juridical regulations, but also offering apparent 

advantages. The answers were nuanced, some being of obedience to the political 

authority (passive resistance), others were attempts to circumvent the constraints, through 

more or less open opposition (for instance, pastors who continued to officiate the baptism, 

although the communists forbade the baptism of those not proceeding from Baptist 

families), or through the self-interest interpretation of some regulations (name-change of 

the Sunday school in Bible time, or setting weddings on Sunday afternoons in order to 

gather the congregation in the traditional moment, even if religious services should have 

been officiated only in the morning). 

As a result of studying memoirs, of interviewing, of analyzing the available documents 

at the Central Historical National Archives, the Archive of the State Secretariat for the 

Cults, the Archive of the National Council for Studying the Archives of the Security, we 

take steps whereby we intend to open a path towards better knowing the role the Baptist 

congregation played in the resistance and opposition actions against the communist 

regime, and also to offer the youth who have not gone through the black period of 

communism, some testimonies about its significance. 

The installation of the communist regime in Romania brought about major societal 

changes, also determining new ways of relating between State and Church. Against the 

State’s intrusions and secularization actions 2 , which aimed at regimenting society, 

promoting atheism and marginalizing the religious in a private space, Romania’s Baptist 

Christian Churches 3 initiated a series of protest, resistance and contesting actions against 

the ideology and practices of the communist regime. 

1 Baptist Theological Institute, Bucharest, Romania. 

2 The Explaining Dictionary of the Romanian Language (DEX) defines the verb to secularize by 

referring to “putting out of the church’s ownership or constituency, assets, ranges of activity or 

cultural values, into the State’s property”, DEX online,http://dexonline.ro/, term secularize, 

(03.03.2011). 

3 R.P.R. respectively R.S.R.

144 


Regarding the regulation of the religious services 4 since 1954, up to 1962, the 

communist regime will impose another regulation, targeted on church assignment, in fact 

some worship-unit closure, a legislative initiative that determined the Baptist ministers’ 

opposition before and after the transposition thereof, through the threats undergone by the 

Baptist representatives. Ordinating deacons for refilling the pastors’ lack and suing some 

arbitrary decisions of the authorities stand for other modalities whereby we can speak of 

religious anticommunist resistance. By presenting herein the resistance and protest 

actions of the Baptist churches, we with to contribute to a better understanding of 

Romania’s former communist regime and of the way in which the Church, as society’s 

component part, answered the actions of the regime of communizing the peoples’ souls. 

Iosif łon deems that the “forms of resistance, from simple passivity, to overt 

disagreement and rejection manifestations, were the rays of light in that awful dark.” 5 In 

the opinion of the professor Daniel Mariş 6 , “Christian faith remained as last spiritual 

resource for making possible the resistance against the moral capitulation, for those living 

in Romania under the most repressive communist regime.” 7 

Without minimizing the role of the religious-resistance actions of the leaders or of the 

religious communities, we must mention that, in some cases, the liberty and success 

obtained by Church were apparent because, in fact, the State allowed certain relaxing 

moments so as to be used as a relief valve. On the other hand, one must also consider the 

external pressures undergone by the communist State from international organisms that 

advocate for the existence of religious freedom, as well as by international mass-media, 

as a consequence of the testimonies and messages of some religious leaders 8 compelled or 

determined by the authorities to leave the country. 

Resistance remains this way an admiration-worthy phenomenon for those having risked 

their own liberty to save or obtain others’ liberty. 

A first aspect we will dwell upon is the Baptist ministers’ attitude and their opposition 

against the regulation of the religious services. 

1. Baptist pastors oppose the regulation of the religious services 

Among the State’s actions targeted on variegated regulations of Baptism’s life, whereof 

the regulation of the religious services, the religious personnel was affected, its activity 

being reduced; therefore it would initiate various protest forms. 

In this case, the self-defence measures started from the Baptist Christian Churches’ 

leadership, as shown in a note of 23 August 1953, where the mention was made that 

Baptists did not issue a circular for reducing religious services on Sunday, “motivating 

that the believers of their religion do not work on Sunday.” 9 

4 

The regulation of the religious services stipulated that Evangelic churches were only entitled to officiate 

religious services on Sunday morning and Saturday evening. Exceptionally, a religious service was 

admitted on Sunday evening for Lord’s Supper, children blessing and other similar events. 

5 

Iosif łon, Confruntări, Ed. a 3-a, Editura Cartea Creştină, Oradea, 2009, p.7. 

6 

Professor and rector of the Baptist Theological Institute from Bucharest. 

7 

Daniel Mariş, “Change to a post-communist society in Romania, the effects upon Evangelical 

Christian communities” in Daniel Marius Mariş, Theological reflections upon the practice of 

faith: Extended essays in applied theology, Editura Universitară, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 41. 

8 

Among the religious leaders, we mention: Richard Wurmbrand, Iosif łon, Pavel Nicolescu, 

Aurel Popescu. 

9 

ASSC, collection Direction Studies, 1952, file 93, f. 11.

Marius SILVEŞAN: Romania’s Baptist Churches under the Persecution … 145 

A document of 26 May 1954 entitled Resolution as regards regulating the divine 

services on Sunday in R.P.R.’s Baptist Religious Cult 10 is extremely interesting, as it 

brings its own vision upon solving the issue of the divine-service regulation in Baptism. 

Beside the official position of the religious cult, a series of Baptist pastors and leaders 

opposed in their turn the new regulations imposed by the Ministry of Cults 11 . 

A first example is the one of the minister Ioan Rusu, general secretary of the Baptist 

religion, on whom we are informed to have gone to Arad “even when the Pentecostal 

leaders were summoned to regulate the new program. At Arad, Ioan Rusu met Ilie 

Lipovan, the Pentecostal elder of Hunedoara region, whom he urged not to introduce the 

new program as «the Ministry must give up»” 12 . 

Ilie Mârza, “Baptists’ president of the region 13 , summoned, on 25 June 1954, A. Z. 7a 

14 Aurel Pălăşan from Deva, whom he likewise urged not to introduce the new program. 

Pastor Pălăşan Aurel declined Mârza’s proposals, saying he makes the program required 

by the leadership of his religious cult. Attempting, on 26 June 1954, a last deal on the 

new program, Ilie Mârza categorically refused again” 15 to comply with the regulations 

imposed by the Ministry of Cults. As a consequence of his attitude, the proposal is 

submitted for him to be withdrawn the membership recognition within the committee of 

the Baptist Union, as well as the quality of Baptist minister 16 . 

Ioan łopa 17 , pastor of the Baptist Christian Church “Hope” from Bucharest, opposed in 

his turn “the regulation of the prayer hours”, for which, in 1955, he was withdrawn the 

recognition as pastor 18 . The minister łopa had permanently been in the attention of the 

10 Ibidem,1954, file 125, ff. 7-9. 

11 Especially in the beginnings of imposing this regulation, they did not want to apply it; therefore 

the State switched to repression. “After the imposition of the regulation was successful, at a 

certain time, the district and regional commissioners, especially those who had the opponents’ 

black lists, especially of the ones who, without fear, both pastors and members, have shown their 

opposition against the regulation, started punishing them. The pastors were dismissed or had 

their salaries cut by order of their commissioners. For some time, a great number of ministers 

were dismissed[..]. And some not dismissed pastors’ wages were quite significantly cut, by 

subjective order of the commissioners from the Ministry of Cults”, Alexa Popovici, Istoria 

baptiştilor din România:1856-1989, Ed. A 2 – a, rev., Editura UniversităŃii Emanuel din Oradea, 

Editura Făclia, Oradea, 2007, p. 750. 

12 ASSC, collection Direction of studies, 1954, file 125, f. 12. 

13 There is about Hunedoara region. 

14 Seventh Day Adventist. 

15 ASSC, Collection Study Direction, 1954, file 125, f. 12. 

16 Ibidem. 

17 “Mister łopa from Giuleşti church. He shows that, in the past, the churches were sealed and, 

after 23 August, they were opened by the Russians and the Bible was preached on the streets; 

today, they are applied the padlock because they do not agree [..] for their hands to be chained” 

Țopa, pastor at the Baptist Church from Giuleşti ward of Bucharest, refers to the religiousservice 

regulation, which stands for the Church what the hand chains stand for a condemned. 

ASSC, collection Study Direction, 1954, file 125, f.118. 

18 ASSC, collection Study Direction, 1955, file 128, f. 12.

146 


authorities, proved by his being mentioned, in 1958, within a document, beside other 

State-employed servers of the Capital’s Evangelical cults 19 . 

For breaching the religious-service regulations and disseminating religious publications, 

pastor Cure Simionhad been confined for five years 20 . 

2. Realization of separate religious services, such as small children blessing, 

mother’s day, harvest day 

Small children blessing, mother’s day, harvest day stood for festive occasions and as 

many opportunities for the Baptist churches to have religious service, usually on Sunday 

afternoon, when this was not allowed. Such services were opted for as the regulation 

mentioned that “services could only be held on afternoon during religious acts and small 

children blessing. Consequently, in greater churches, with more children, at divine 

blessing services, the church also gathered on Sunday afternoon, at the times chosen by 

the family who brought the child to be blessed. Thus, the opportunity was created to have 

divine services during the afternoon, very few Sundays existed without such religious 

services and the regulation had no breaching effect 21 . 

Another reply modality of the de Baptist churches and of the religious personnel to 

imposing the religious-service regulation was switching the weddings on Sunday 

afternoon or evening. “According to an old custom, the rule existed for weddings to be 

held during weekdays and not on Sunday, and most Baptist churches held weddings on 

Saturday and few of them on Thursday, so that Sunday should be only dedicated to divine 

services. But after imposing the regulation and because it was possible to hold divine 

services on Sunday afternoon, the weddings were shifted on Sunday, according to the 

regulation. It is known that in the Old Kingdom’s Baptist churches and before the regulation, 

the weddings were still kept on Sunday afternoon. However, after imposing the regulation, 

all churches from all country’s provinces shifted the weddings on Sunday.” 22 

Mother’s day and harvest day were used to the same purpose, the one of having divine 

services, when they could not be held otherwise. 

3. Deacon ordination in Baptist churches, modality of supplying the right to 

ordinate pastors 

Deacon ordination in churches was an answer modality from Baptist churches and 

pastors to the religious-service regulation, to the church assignment and to the religiouspersonnel 

dismiss 23 . “Churches had found out that for the deacon ordination no prior 

approval was required and, as the pastors’ coming in time so as to serve Lord’s supper 

19 He was pastor in str. I.C. Frimu and worked at the New Hospital Berceni, ASSC, collection 

Study Direction, 1958, file 122, f. 18. The Baptists’ highest percentage were State-employed and 

they belonged to the State, according to the document of the Baptist cult, Ibidem, ff. 18-19. 

20 Simion Cure, born on 17 January 1914 in Ilia, Hunedoara, was arrested on 17 August 1958 and 

condemned to 7 prison-years. He served his sentence in the prisons Timişoara, Arad, Aiud, 

Ostrov, Giurgeni, Periprava. He was freed on 1 August 1964. Daniel Mitrofan, Pigmei şi uriaşi, 

Editura Cristianus, Oradea, 2007, p. 68; criminal record of the National Administration-Archives 

of the Penitentiaries. 

21 Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor din România 1856-1989, p. 759. 

22 Ibidem. 

23 Ibidem, p. 753.


could not be counted 24 , they decided and proceeded to ordain one or two deacons whom 

they chose. For the ordination, neither publicity nor advertising were made some time 

before; only the pastor officiated the ordination act with an ordained elder, seemingly 

come to pay a visit.” 25 Because a small number of pastors had been approved, of the 

workload they had to perform 26 , of the religious activity restriction, the deacon became a 

sort of helping pastor, or supplying pastor.” 27 “In the beginnings of the regulation 

application 28 and of the reduction in the number of ministers, some pastors were left 

without jobs, so it was natural that, to their greatest part, they should become elected 

deacons, who fulfilled in fact all religious works. And it was no longer necessary for 

them to be ordained. Later, when, because of the deceases, the number of the pastors 

gradually diminished and at the studies of the Baptist Theological Seminary of Bucharest, 

only four youth were admitted, the deacon system had to be applied by churches” 29 . 

A case we refer to is the one of the pastor of the Baptist church from Ploieşti, Leric 

Ioan, whom the Ministry of Cults withdraws the recognition as pastor and the Baptist 

Union submits to the Ministry a memorandum requesting the reconsideration of the 

decision 30 . Meanwhile, he received his wages from the own funds of the church during 

1953 and in 1954, through his appointment as elder 31 without the approval of the Ministry 

of Cults 32 . 

4. Claims against arbitrary decisions 

An interesting case is the one of the pastor Herlo Teodor from Petroşani who, on the 

basis of the new provisions 33 of R.P:R.’s Penal Code, was sentenced in 1961 by the 

Popular Court of Petroşani town, “to 1 correctional prison year and 1 correctional 

interdiction year, consisting in the ones stipulated by - art. 58 point 2 and 3 penal code.” 34 

In reply to his sentence, Herlo Teodor appeals to the Regional Court of Deva, “which, 

through the penal decision 2.169/1961 from 13 oct.1961” discharged any penalty and 

passed penal expenses to the State 35 . 

5. Memoranda 

Memoranda were used as protest form against the State’s intrusions in the internal life 

of the churches, being addressed both to the institutions of the Baptist cult on central or 

local level, and to the local or central authorities. The protest must be understood in this 

case as a modality for drawing the attention upon some irregularities or for asking the 

return upon some decisions taken by commissioners or by the Department of the Cults. 

24 

Equivalent of the communion within Orthodox Churches. 

25 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

26 

The pastors from the rural environment had sometimes 5 or 6 churches to serve. 

27 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

28 

Reference to the religious-service regulation within Baptism during 1954. 

29 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor din România 1856-1989, p.754. 

30 

Ibidem, file 133. 

31 

Deacon 

32 

ASSC, collection Direction of Studies, 1954, file 133, ff. 1-2. 

33 

Pastor Herlo Teodor was accused of having continued to fulfil the function of pastor after his 

recognition had been withdrawn by the Department of Cults. 

34 

ASSC, collection Direction of Studies, 1962, file 69, f. 2. 

35 Ibidem, f. 1.

148 


Memoranda were addressed to the Baptist Christian Union, Ministry//Department of 

Cults, as well as other State’s institutions. 

Memorandum to the Baptist Christian Church of Buteni 

The memorandum was elaborated in February, 1953 by the pastor and members of 

the aforementioned church, whereby they complained that Balaban Ioan, who held the 

directorial position of the cultural centre from Buteni, district GurahonŃ had made the 

decision to forcedly unify the fanfare of the church with the one existing in the 

village 36 which would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the former 37 . Within the 

memorandum, mention was made that the action of comrade Baban Ioan was 

deliberate, an assertion proved both by his actions and attitude towards the Baptist 

church of Buteni during Antonescu’s time and by the fact that the unification decision 

was taken because the Baptists had not participated with their marching band to a 

feast during the month of the Romanian-Soviet Friendship 38 . The Baptists’ absence to 

the mentioned action was due to the fact that they were announced by the director of 

the cultural centre only a day before, which made it impossible for them to sing. 

Through the aforementioned memorandum, the Baptist church has grounded reasons 

wherefore “Baptist music cannot merge with other music.” 39 . Among the Baptist 

believers’ reasons, we mention: the musicians in the village “have variegated manners 

that render it impossible to weld the musical elements. These manners: swearing, scandal, 

drunkenness etc. are used to offend the Baptist believers. Thus, smokers repeatedly blew 

smoke in front of a Baptist believer to provoke scandal or make fun of him. Cases 

occurred when the musicians got drunk and used not only an indecent, but also offensive 

language.” 40 . 

The direct consequence of this memorandum was that the representatives of the 

Ministry of Cults researched on the spot and, in consultation with local organs, reached 

the conclusion that the decision of the director of the cultural centre to rather forcedly 

unify the two fanfares was erroneous 41 . Thus, through this memorandum and the 

commitment of the church to partake in the cultural activities organized within the 

respective village or district, the believers cancelled a decision deemed erroneous even by 

the political authorities. 

Memorandum of the Baptist church from Fizeş village 

The memorandum of the Baptist Christian Church from ReşiŃa district, Timişoara 

region, was elaborated to the purpose of infirming the accusations of the cult 

36 The memorandum has the following formula: “com. Balaban Ioan, director of the local cultural 

centre envisaged and initiated that from the music of the Baptist church and the one of the 

Orthodox church to make a fanfare of the cultural centre.” Ibidem, 1953, file, 139, f. 13. 

37 Ibidem, ff. 13-14. 

38 

Idem, 1953, file 139, f. 13. 

39 

Ibidem, f. 14. 

40 

Ibidem. 

41 

Ibidem, f. 11.


commissioner referring to the fact that the pastor in charge with their church received 

undue money for his activity 42 . 

6. Realisation of baptisms without the assent of the authorities 

Before submitting few of the new testamentary characteristics, we deem it necessary to 

present that baptism was a religious act realized with the State’s assent. This was in 

accordance with the confession of faith, the status of the Baptist cult of 1950, the Law for 

the general regime of the religious cults from 1948, as well as other normative acts which 

mentioned the citizens’ right to believe in something or nothing. 

Another important aspect to be specified is that the baptismal practice in secret for the 

persons not having received the assent of the authorities was not something characteristic 

during Communism only for Baptist churches. In fact, baptism in secret stood for a 

modality of answering the restriction of the religious life and the interdiction as regards 

the formation of the religious personnel, the requisition of the worship places, beating, 

arrests and other forms of repression. We speak thereby of maintaining religiosity as form 

of everyday culture, which was achieved both through intimate personal experience and 

through manifestations such as baptism 43 , weddings, as well as funerals with religious 

rituals 44 . 

So as to understand why baptisms were resorted to without the assent of the authorities, 

we reckon it necessary to submit a few characteristics of the baptism in the Baptist 

doctrine. This way, unlike Orthodox Church, where baptism is a sacrament and is 

administered to small children, within Baptist churches, baptism is a symbolic-value 

religious act, which stands for the former man’s death and the new man’s bringing to 

life 45 ; therefore it is administered to mature persons able to understand its significance. 

Usually, those who want to be baptized announce the pastor who, in his turn, informs 

and convokes the committee of the church, organ with administrative and decisional role, 

and together they examine from doctrinal and motivational standpoint the candidate and 

give or not their consent to the baptism. Baptism at free will stands for a clear 

conscience’s public testimony and at the same time for the administrative way whereby a 

person may become member within a Baptist church 46 . Given the importance of baptism, 

communist authorities wanted to control it. In a first phase, the cult commissioners 

required the pastors to let them know the date and place where baptism was to take place, 

motivating they were interested to participate when, in fact, they wanted to impede its 

occurrence. In rural areas, where baptisms were held at the river with great pomp 47 , the 

42 ASSC, collection Direction of Studies, 1954, dosar 140, ff. 1-11. 

43 Paul Caravia, “Introductive study” in Paul Caravia (coord.), Biserica întemniŃată. România între 

1944-1989, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest 1999, p. 8. 

44 Funerals constituted an opportunity of publicly manifesting one’s faith and proclaiming 

Christian values, both by the priests and by the pastors. 

45 “Through baptism, we confess having been buried with Christ and having been brought to a new 

life for Christ and for God. Therefore it is a sign of confessing the covenant in front of the 

invisible.” Interview with Victor Lazăr in Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania în 

timpul regimului comunist. Studiu de caz: baptiştii din judeŃul Cluj – Mărturii şi documente -, 

Editura Argonaut, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 210. 

46 Another modality for a person to become member of the Baptist Church is the transfer from 

another Evangelical church. In this case, the consensual baptism must be proven, too. 

47 A feast attended by a large number of people.

150 


condition imposed by the authorities was not to transform baptism into a feast partaken 

by numerous people. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the political detent during 1955- 

1956 48 , many baptisms were officiated at the river 49 and with great pomp. 

On the other hand, the religious commissioners not only limited themselves to 

transmitting orders to the Baptist pastors; but had also involved themselves, ever since the 

'50s, in limiting and impeding the manifestations whereto we referred before. 

After the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the communist regime gradually introduced a 

series of provisions aiming at a stricter control of the baptisms, to the purpose of limiting 

them. A first measure was to forbid Evangelical churches officiating baptisms to the river, 

compelling them thereby to build baptismal fonts. As not all churches had something like 

that, they had to build them if they were authorized to, or to go to another church. So as to 

minimize the number of baptisms, in 1960, the Department of the Cults decided, relying 

on a provision from the Law of the Cults of 1948, that the religious cult-change “must be 

stated to the civil registrar of the town halls and as, ever since 1949, the towns halls had 

no longer been elaborating such acts, we were forbidden to baptize candidates from other 

cults, as the conditions of the cult law cannot be fulfilled, as regards the cult shift.” 50 The 

restrictions were even further pushed so that, - pastor Bunaciu remembers-, “in order to 

officiate a baptism within the divine service, you had to inform the territorial 

commissioner, submitting the candidate list for the baptism and proving with the member 

registrar that their parents are Baptist believers.” 51 Therefore, the pastor was obliged to 

submit the candidate list for the baptism to the cult commissioner and, after the 

examination, those figuring as party members, as well as the intellectuals were erased 

from the list, the commissioner or the representative of the Security only consented for 

the persons not of the interest 52 for the State. 

In the context of these limitations and impositions, the Baptist pastors, together with the 

personnel of the other evangelical religions (Pentecostal, Evangelical Christian, 

Adventist) searched for solutions and methods that should allow them to officiate these 

religious acts and to fulfil their fate, as well as the “believers’ religious aspirations.” 53 

In order to understand how a newly testamentary baptism took place in 1948, when a 

religious-freedom liberty still existed, we deem it appropriate to present the baptism of 

48 

Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania, p. 38. 

49 

“The summer of the year 1956 was a religious-freedom summer, ever since1946 we had not had 

such a detent; everywhere outdoor baptism, evangelizations were held etc.”, Ioan Bunaciu, 

Bisericile Creştine Baptiste din România, p. 54. 

50 

Ibidem, p.55. 

51 

Ibidem. 

52 

“If they targeted someone who represented an interest for them, a person that they would have 

liked to co-opt, to do something with him, or simply to baffle you, they might have deleted 

persons on your candidate list for the baptism” Interview with Avram Faur in Denisa Bodeanu, 

NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania în timpul regimului comunist, p. 39. We mention that, beside 

the operative aspect mentioned by Avram Faur, for the Security, youths represented a citizen 

category that had to be directed to other values than the religious ones. Beside youth and 

children, intellectuals were permanently targeted by the Security. Therefore, youths and 

intellectuals stood for sensible categories that were many times forbidden the right to pass to 

Protestantism. 

53 

Interview with Ioan Mânzat in Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania, p. 40.


the pastor Huşanu Mihai 54 from Cluj. He recounts the following: “in 1948, on 15 August, 

I was baptized to Baptist faith […] with my mother. The baptism was done in Suceava 

river, by a pastor who had the right to officiate this, Silvestru Ungureanu. Therefore, at 16 

years old, I knew the faith, at 17 I was baptized” 55 As such a manifestation had no longer 

been allowed since late '50s, Mihai Huşanu, he himself become pastor, started to 

clandestinely officiate baptisms. 

“God gave me the courage and I baptized at night in the church. I prepared 

the water for the baptism in the church for the second day. A day or two 

before I tidily took the keys from the caretaker and told Georgescu Ioan: 

Listen, at 1 am, through this fence, look here, the plank is only superficially 

placed. You remove the plank out of the fence and nicely come through the 

back of the church … […] I told him: You come with nobody, you come with 

God, enough. I gave him white baptism shirt, entered with him in the water, 

in the baptismal font and asked him: Georgescu Ioan, do you believe in Lord 

Christ? Yes, I do. On the basis of your faith, I baptize you in the name of the 

Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. He got dressed and left. [… 

] So I did the baptisms. Others performed them at rivers. I also did a baptism 

in Someş river. Somebody said: I believe in Lord Christ ... Top-placed 

person. Do you baptize me? Yes. When? On the date of, come …As we set, 

we went to the end of Someş […] We entered Someş … I baptized him the 

great day and he left.” 56 

Another testimony is offered by Dragomir Bojan 57 who, being asked whether he 

remembers the moment of the baptism, recounts the following: 

“My baptism was in quite strange conditions. You probably know that in 

1954 … for the first time, the Department of the Cults 58 took some 

measures, some regulations 59 as regards evangelical churches. And then, 

that year, he took the decision for any baptism to be controlled. You had to 

be part of the Baptist Church, otherwise the pastor could not baptize you. 

Then he baptized me 60 at night in a river. Only a few testimonies were 

present, because in the church, officially, as baptism takes place nowadays, 

he could not baptize me.” 61 

54 Mihai Huşanu “he was born on 5 September 1931 in Unceşti village, Suceava county. He is 

Romanian, he graduated the Baptist Theological Seminary from Bucharest. He was Baptist pastor” 

at the Church Cluj Mănăştur from Cluj-Napoca and president of the Baptist cult between 1980- 

1984. Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania, p.177. 

55 Ibidem, p. 180. 

56 Interview with Mihai Huşanu in ibidem, p. 40. 

57 Dragomir Bojan was born on 29 October 1941 in Cluj-Napoca. He is Romanian and he 

graduated the Faculty of Philology from Cluj. He was Romanian teacher. In the year 2006 he 

was retired. Ibidem, p. 95. 

58 Department of the Cults is set up in the year 1957. Up to that moment, we speak of the Ministry 

of Cults . 

59 Dragomir Bojan refers to the regulation of the religious services on Sundays in the Baptist 

Christian Cult. 

60 At his batism, Dragomir Bojan had freshly graduated philology, was therefore an intellectual. 

61 Interview with Dragomir Bojan in Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania, p. 96.

152 


The baptism administered by the spiritual personnel was a statue-regulated religious act. 

Through its restriction, an intrusion was achieved in the internal life of the cult and an 

infringement of its status, as well as of a person’s right to choose one’s faith. Similar 

actions to the Baptist priests’ ones as resistance modality are found in the life of other 

cults, inclusively of the Orthodox one. 

The contesting and reply actions of the Baptist churches against the pressure of the 

authorities, whereto we referred to before, stand for manifestations known by the 

authorities. Similar cases are encountered at the Orthodox Church, as well as at the other 

evangelical cults and the authorities usually reacted through notifying those who went 

beyond what was allowed to them. The situation will change along the '70s, when the 

forms of open opposition against breaching religious freedom are much ampler and more 

profound, going beyond a discreet contestation of the regime. 

Conclusions 

The analysis of the relations between State and Church constitutes a necessary 

approach, however with many facets that must be analyzed. Through our study, we only 

enhanced the modalities and means used by the latter to exit the ideological restraint. 

Through the memoirs, baptisms, through continuing to realize religious services even 

when they were not allowed as a consequence of their regulation, as well as through the 

other forms of protest, and “secretly performed religious activities” 62 , the Baptists drew 

the attention of the Romanian authorities on the discriminations they underwent and they 

asked for the recognition of some legal rights stipulated in the cult-related legislation. The 

religious manifestations deployed therefore in a limited frame, in which, although the 

constitutions guaranteed religious freedom, the State led an atheist militant policy 63 which 

aimed at reducing the role of religion in the public space 64 . In fact, it was an application 

of Lenin’s principles, who militated for religion to become a private and not a public 

affair 65 . These contestation and reply modalities prove that during communism, no 

subordination of the Baptist Christian Churches to the State was succeeded. 

62 Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

63 „Comunismul afirmă că nu există Dumnezeu, şi nici Hristos”, Richard WurmbrandThe 

Wurmbrand Letters, Cross Publications, INC Pamona, California, 1967, p. 23. 

64 ViaŃa religioasă din România, EdiŃia a II-a, p. 11. 

65 For more details on the atheist policy of the communist regime, see chapter 1 in the framework 

of the present work, where we analyze, within a subchapter, the atheist propaganda and its 

manner of development through the Society for the Development of Science and Culture.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH OF 

ROMANIA – DIFFERENT FORMS OF 

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE 

Sergiu SOICA 1 

The Greek Catholic Church, having 1.5 million members, was condemned by 

Communism in December 1948 because its bishops and priests did not agree the new 

changes of the communist regime. The refusing to sign the declaration leads to the 

arresting of the hierarchs and priests of the Greek Catholic church. This church continued 

to function clandestinely. According to the Pontifical Register, in 1948 the Greek 

Catholic Church used to have 208 priests 2 . From these 208 priests we identified 39 priests 

who were against joining the Orthodox Church. These personalities of the Greek Catholic 

Church had a tragic destiny and showed a remarkable form of anticommunist resistance 

during 1948 and 1964, they passed by 26 places of detention and also by Danube-Black 

Sea Canal, Balta Brailei and by the lead mines from Northern Romania. Most of them 

started the journey in the communist prisons from Timisoara Penitentiary (22 priests) 3 . 

Other detention places were Sighet Penitentiary, Gherla, Aiud, Oradea and others. From 

1964 they were under controlled accommodation. 

1 George BariŃiu Institute of History of the Romanian Academy, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. 

2 Annuario Pontificio, Roma, Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1948. Cluj-Gherla p. 156; Făgăraş 

Alba-Iulia p. 180, Oradea p. 196, Maramureş 247 

3 According: http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/fise_detinuti_politici/fise_detinuti/

154 

Remembrance in Time

Sergiu SOICA: The Greek Catholic Church of Romania… 155 

The name of 

the working 

camp’s prison 

Priests of Lugoj Eparchy in communist prisons 4 

Priest 

Aiud Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Crişan Ioan [Dragşina, 

Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, 

Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş], Voştinaru Teodor 

[Lugoj]. 

Arad Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Delya Grigore [Folia, Timiş], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, 

Timiş], Toma Ioan (credincios greco-catolic) [Vermeş, Caraş- 

Severin]. 

Borzeşti Deheleanu Florea[Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga Axente [ParŃa, 

Timiş], Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Patachi Enea 

[Petroman, Timiş]. 

Botoşani Delya Grigore [Folia, Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş]. 

Balta Brăilei 

Lagăre de 

muncă: 

Giurgeni Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Toma Ioan 

[credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Ostrov Bele Ioan [Caransebeş]. 

Periprava Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], 

Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Pecican Petru [Arad], 

Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, 

Caraş-Severin]. 

Salcia Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan Alexandru 

[Geoagiu Hunedoara], Toma Ioan [credincios grecocatolic 

din Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Canalul Dunăre – Marea Neagră 

Lagăre de Capul Puni Emil [Deva], Puşcaşiu Virgil [Timişoara]. 

muncă: Midia 

Cernavodă Puni Emil [Deva]. 

Galeş Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Voştinaru 

Teodor[Lugoj]. 

Poarta Puni Emil [Deva], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj], 

Albă Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş]. 

Valea Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Patachi Enea 

Neagră [Petroman, Timiş], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj]. 

Caransebeş Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Silvăşan 

Trandafir [Ghelari, Hunedoara]. 

4 According: http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/fise_detinuti_politici/fise_detinuti/

156 


Cluj-Napoca Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Borda Vasile 

Codlea 

[Timişoara], Crişan Ioan [Dragşina, Timiş], Ghelner Traian [fiu 

de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj]. 

Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara]. 

C.T. Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Crişan Alexandru 

Bucureşti 

C.T. 

Văcăreşti 

[Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Paveloniu Valer [Orăştie, Hunedoara]. 

Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Crişan Alexandru 

[Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Paveloniu Valer [Orăştie, 

Hunedoara]ZasloŃi Corneliu [Lugoj]. 

Dej Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Ep. Ioan 

Ploscaru [Lugoj]. 

Deva Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Puni Emil [Deva], 

FormaŃiunea 

0616 K 24 

Ganga Axente [ParŃa, Timiş]. 

GalaŃi Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, Caraş- 

Severin], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş]. 

Gherla Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], 

Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Borda Vasile 

[Timişoara], Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan Ioan 

Jilava 

[Dragşina, Timiş], Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Delya 

Grigore [Folia, Timiş], Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din 

Păru, Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Ar Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Berinde Daniel Ştefan 

[Petroşani, Hunedoara], Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Crişan Ioan 

[Dragşina, Timiş], Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga 

Axente [ParŃa, Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan 

[Lugoj], Puni Emil [Deva], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş], Toma 

Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Lugoj Ep. Ioan Bălan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Deheleanu 

Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj], Sălăgean 

Dumitru [Lugoj], Tiut Vasile [Lugoj], Voştinaru Teodor 

[Lugoj]. 

M.A.I. Ep. Ioan Bălan [Lugoj], Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, 

Bucureşti Hunedoara], Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj], Puşcaşiu Virgil 

[Timişoara]. 

Malmaison Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj]. 

Oneşti Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga Axente [ParŃa, 

Timiş], Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Patachi Enea 

[Petroman, Timiş], Puşcaşiu Virgil [Timişoara]. 

Oradea Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Berinde 

Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Delya Grigore [Folia, 

Timiş], Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş].

Sergiu SOICA: The Greek Catholic Church of Romania… 157 

Piteşti Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Ep. Ploscaru 

Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Satu Mare Suciu Petru [Hunedoara]. 

Sibiu Dumitru Neda [Nevrincea, Timiş]. 

Sighet Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, 

Hunedoara], Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], Deliman Ioan [Arad], 

Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj], RaŃiu Iuliu [Timişoara], Sălăgean 

Dumitru [Lugoj], Tiut Vasile [Lugoj], Vezoc Iosif, [Lugoj]. 

Timişoara Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan 

[Caransebeş], Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], 

Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan 

Ioan [Dragşina, Timiş], Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], 

Delya Grigore [Folia, Timiş], Ganga Axente [ParŃa, Timiş], 

Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Ep. 

Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj], Patachi Enea [Petroman, Timiş], 

Puşcaşiu Virgil [Timişoara], RaŃiu Iuliu [Timişoara], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Sălăgean Dumitru 

[Lugoj], Vezoc Iosif [Lugoj], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj], Tiut 

Vasile [Lugoj], Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din 

Vermeş, Caraş-Severin], ZasloŃi Corneliu [Lugoj]. 

Uranus Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Mănăstiri 

Dragoslavele Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Căldăruşani Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], Deliman 

Ioan [Arad], RaŃiu Iuliu [Timişoara], Vezoc Iosif, [Lugoj]. 

Ciorogârla Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Curtea de Argeş Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj] 

NeamŃ Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], Deliman Ioan [Arad]RaŃiu Iuliu 

[Timişoara], Vezoc Iosif, [Lugoj],Teglasiu Ladislau 

[Timişoara]. 

Domiciliu 

Obligatoriu 

Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], 

Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Out of there priests of the Greek Catholic Church who were in the communist prisons, 

there are many other priests (106 priests) who, among 1948 – 1989, opposed the 

communist regime in various forms: they stayed hidden, they worked at various factories, 

hospitals, agricultural cooperatives, refused to accept the plans of the communist regime, 

as a form of anticommunist resistance.

158 


Another form of anticommunist resistance came from 32 priests who were sent into 

pension by force in the autumn of 1948. 

There are no many information about the Greek-Catholic priests from Banat who were 

imprisoned. The specialized studies made references only to the great personalities of this 

Church. A good example could be the labor camps, as a detention place for the Greek- 

Catholic priests, which are less known. The most research related to this topic have traded 

only the prisons of Sighet, Gherla, Aiud and several Orthodox monasteries where the 

Greek-Catholic priests were in forced domicile. Through the labor camps the communist 

regime followed the total isolation of the persons who were opposing to the communist 

regime. "The advantages" of the labor camps were many: redemption, reeducation and 

extermination of the opposant persons, the terrorisation of the population and free labor 

force 5 . In this respect, the prison of Timisoara can show us the mechanism of the transfer 

of the Greek-Catholic priests because here has begun the itinerary of the Greek-Catholic 

priests from Banat in the communist prisons. 

5 According to Dennis Deletant, Romania under the communist regime, Bucharest, Academia 

Civica, 2003, p. 113

OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES OF THE 

LEGIONARY MOVEMENT DURING 

NOVEMBER 1947 – MAY 1948 

Ilarion łIU 1 

Abstract: After the November-1946 elections, the leaders of the Legionary Movement decided to 

stop observing the protocol with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, negotiated in late 1945 by 

Nicolae Petraşcu with the Communist Party officials. The authorities initiated campaigns for 

arresting active legionaries, which caused a panic behaviour among the adepts of the 

organization. The leaders of the Movement were summoned to react as the communists, once 

having legally reached to power, wanted to repress the legionaries. On the other hand, Horia 

Sima, in Occident, wanted in his turn for the Legionary Movement to give up the neutrality 

politics. With American support, he disposed organizing within the country an information service 

in favour of the democratic powers. To this purpose, Eugen Teodorescu was sent in the country, 

with the mission of setting in motion a legionary network that should obtain whatsoever 

information on the Communist and Soviet activity in Romania. Consequently, in late 1947, the 

Legionary Movement manifested again as opposition force against the regime installed in 

Bucharest after the 23 rd of August 1944, paradoxically benefiting of USA’s support. The 

Americans were disposed to “erase” the legionaries’ extremist past, hoping they would find allies 

disposed to make active opposition within Romania’s borders. 


After the elections from November 1946, the communist authorities initiated visible 

opposition-intimidation measures. This way, through the Order no. 50.000 of the 12 th of 

February 1947 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, SiguranŃa (Romanian secret service), 

Police and Gendarmerie were authorized to arrest the citizens that would have manifested 

themselves as “instigators” 2 . In the appended instructions, the legionaries were also 

stipulated, which attests that the regime reckoned no longer valid the “neutrality 

agreement” adopted in December 1945. Arrestment for “anti-democratic manifestations” 

had been also operated in 1946; however they were rather intimidation measures, the 

arrested persons not having received liberty-privation sanctions. 

The authorities’ attitude determined some legionaries to make pressures on the 

“Country’s Commandment”. The legionaries who felt targeted by the government’s 

campaign of “confining the instigators” launched posters in the country’s capital and 

main cities, wherein there was the call “to action” against the communists. 

1 Department of Communication and Public Relations, Faculty of Political Sciences, Dimitrie 

Cantemir Christian University of Bucharest, Romania. 

2 Romania’s National Archives – Direction Central Historical National Archives (subsequently 

DANIC), Fund of the Gendarmerie’s General Inspectorate, file no. 27/1947, f. 280.

160 


The records of the Ministry of Affairs claimed that in the country approximately 48.000 

legionaries existed, whereof 12.400 had “degrees and functions” in the organization 3 . Of 

course, not all of them were active, but most of them were aware that, if the regime 

initiated a repression campaign of the organization, all individuals known to ever have 

been connected to the Iron Guard would be subject to inquiry. The precedent exists of the 

“sorting” from 1944-1945. In 1947, the most powerful organizations were in the student 

centres. For instance, in Bucharest, around 1.000 legionary students activated 4 . 

Even if they were aware something had to be done, Nicolae Petraşcu and Vică Negulescu, 

the most important leaders of “Country’s Commandment”, did not know where to begin, as 

they were faithful to the “neutrality agreement”. The first actions, quite frail, were initiated 

in early 1947, when the two decided to remake the connections between legionaries. In 

order not to compromise the action, it was decided for the legionary units to have new 

heads. In principle, they were appointed by Petraşcu, he nevertheless also let Vică 

Negulescu and Nistor Chioreanu make decisions. Anyway, any appointment had to be 

subsequently confirmed by Petraşcu 5 . The most significant action was changing the 

leadership of the legionary organization of the Capital, on the 1 st of March 1947. 

However, finally, the decisive impulse for initiating the Legionary Movement’s 

reorganization came from abroad, from Horia Sima. He sent Eugen Teodorescu in the 

country, to check the organization’s real situation. 

Teodorescu’s arrival in the country was not only connected to the dispositions received 

from Horia Sima, but also to initiating a contact between the Legionary Movement in 

exile and the American Secret Services. What had happened? Eugen Teodorescu, together 

with a group of approximately 40 comrades, was caught by the end of the war in 

Austria’s American-occupation area, somewhere between Linz and Salzburg. Through 

the engineer Caraion, who set up a “National Committee” of the Romanians from 

Salzburg, he managed to make acts to stay in Austria, on the grounds he had been 

confined in Nazi camps during War. In time, however, his legionary activity was 

disclosed by USA’s secret services. The Americans already prepared the recruitment of 

Germany’s former collaborators from Eastern Europe, who had somehow activated 

against the Soviet Union, in the end of the War. After gathering information, they arrested 

the potential collaborators, under various pretexts. It happened that way with Eugen 

Teodorescu, who was arrested in late March 1946, together with the advocate I.V. 

Emilian. The American military police brought him to CIC 6 headquarters from Linz, 

where he was interrogated by captain Lainet, head of the counter-sabotage service. The 

inquiry followed Teodorescu’s past in the Legionary Movement, the questions proceeding 

from a survey. He was set free, but he was called from time to time for other questions 

related to the Legionary Movement’s pre-war activity. 

After a few rounds of researches, Teodorescu was advanced the proposal to work for 

CIC. Taken by surprise, he wanted first Vasile Iaşinschi’s permission (confined in a camp 

at Salzburg at the time), as he still reckoned himself a legionary and needed a hierarchical 

3 

Ibidem, Fund Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – Administrative Political 

Department, file no. 4/1952, f. 13. 

4 

Archive of the National Council for Studying the Security’s Archives (subsequently ACNSAS), 

Fund Informative, file no. 181086, vol. 2, f. 136-139. 

5 

Ibidem, Fund Penal, file no. 431, vol. 1, f. 34-37. 

6 

Counterintelligence Corps – USA Army’s secret service during the Second World War.

Ilarion łIU: Opposition Activities of the Legionary Movement … 161 

superior’s assent for such an action. Cap. Lainet coldly answered him after the 

formulation of these arguments; therefore Teodorescu accepted the collaboration, lest he 

should be arrested. For the beginning, the Americans wanted to provide data on the 

Romanians in Linz, and then to leave for Romania in a mission, in order to study to what 

extent a legionary organization-based information services could be organized. 

In the spring of 1947, Eugen Teodorescu met Vasile Mailat, at Salzburg. Mailat handed to 

Teodorescu a note from Horia Sima, who commissioned him to leave for the country, to see 

the legionaries’ real situation. He had to communicate the “Commandment” to lay the stress 

on reorganization and any initiative with political character was forbidden – no one was 

allowed to politically employ the Legionary Movement through personal decision. 

The departure to Romania occurred at mid May 1947, Teodorescu being accompanied 

by Dragoş Hoinic. Through Traian Puiu, Hoinic’s brother in law, the two contacted at 

Vienna, Gheorghe (GhiŃă) Stoia, who dealt with the illegal trade between Austria and 

Hungary. After two weeks, Stoia facilitated their clandestine passage to Hungary. They 

took the train to Budapest, then to Beckesksaba, where they contacted the legionary Petre 

Lipovan’s relatives. One of his cousins carried them by motorcycle to a border village, 

crossing the frontier in Romania, at Salonta. They walked to Arad, wherefrom they took 

the train to Bucharest. Teodorescu and Hoinic met by chance, in Gara de Nord, NiŃă 

Ghimbăşanu, who led them to Vică Negulescu. At their sight, Negulescu wanted them all 

to go to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to legalize his situation. Teodorescu told him he 

wished to return to Austria, intending to speak first of all with Nicolae Petraşcu. 

The meeting occurred in a week, somewhere in the period June-July 1947, on the 

lakeside Tei in the Capital. Petraşcu submitted to Teodorescu the situation of the 

legionaries in the country, attempting to justify the circular from August 1945 and the 

“neutrality agreement”. Nicolae Petraşcu insisted for Horia Sima to be informed that he 

attempted to contact him to receive “absolution” and even to leave the country, however 

he did not succeed. At the end of the discussion, Eugen Teodorescu also communicated to 

Petraşcu the second component of his mission, respectively constituting a pro-American 

information service with the Legionary Movement’s support. After a few weeks, in July 

1947, Teodorescu and Hoinic returned in Austria 7 . 

As the new instructions from Horia Sima had very serious implications on the relation 

between the Legionary Movement and the authorities, the leadership nucleus of the 

“Country Commandment” reunited for discussions. The meeting took place in early 

August 1947, under the pretext of a trip in the Mountains of Făgăraş, at Bâlea Lake. 

Nistor Chioreanu went in Aurel Călin’s company, who also informed him about the 

meeting, and Nicolae Petraşcu made team with Vică Negulescu. Petraşcu broadly 

narrated them the discussion with Teodorescu. First, the legionaries in exile had 

information that, in 1948, in Romania, new elections were scheduled, under international 

surveillance, in order to avoid the scandal of counterfeiting the 1946-scrutiny. The 

Legionary Movement would have been authorized to submit lists in the new conjecture. 

Therefore, Horia Sima gave dispositions to the “Country’s Commandment” to initiate 

reorganizing the Legionary Movement, on counties, so that, when the electoral campaign 

began, it should be prepared for action. Sima’s instructions, brought through Teodorescu, 

recommended a prudent reorganization – only the skeleton to be constructed (county heads, 

possibly mesh heads), from trustful people that should be placed on the election lists. 

7 ACNSAS, Fund Penal, file no. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574.

162 


Petraşcu was not delighted with the received dispositions, claiming those in the exile 

did not “optimally see” the realities in the country. First, he did not want the Movement 

to provoke the communists (he also omitted that, after the elections, the authorities had 

taken manifold measures against the organization’s members). Finally, at the pressure of 

the other participants in the discussion, Petraşcu accepted to begin the reorganization, but 

he recommended his collaborators prudence in choosing their people 8 . 

In November 1947, Eugen Teodorescu’s come back in Romania. The “Country’s 

Commandment” decided, in parallel with the informative activity, to initiate a 

“subversive activity It was clear for everybody that, once with organizing the pro- 

American information service, the neutrality politics ended, and if the authorities 

discovered one of these activities – of “espionage” or “subversive”– the arrestment 

started. The responsibility of mobilizing the “fight”-potential nestles was incumbent on 

Nistor Chioreanu, who also had this responsibility in 1944-1945, after the parachuting of 

Germany’s teams. Chioreanu gave dispositions for the legionaries involved in this 

activity to be organized in 3-4-person teams, which should be prepared to take action 

whenever he would ask. However, as in 1944-1945, the legionaries from the nestles 

prepared for resistance had no armament, being advised to cope as they can 9 . 

But the action of the “Country’s Commandment” for mobilizing the “fight”-potential 

nestles did not give the expected yield. Firstly, most legionaries were not disposed to 

involve themselves in such a dangerous action, which would have them made compare in a 

military court for “undermining the State”. Only those known by the authorities for their 

extremist activities, who could be arrested anytime, pre-eminently involved themselves, as 

they had nothing to lose. Secondly, there was a serious resistance-financing issue. At his 

arrival in the country in the summer of 1947, Eugen Teodorescu had in his pocket a few 

dollars and Austrian schillings. The Americans who sent him in Romania were willing 

neither to finance a resistance action, nor to send armament. Likewise, Horia Sima had no 

possibility to send money in the country, as he illegally lived in Italy and very rarely showed 

up. The active legionary organizations, especially the Capital’s, gathered contributions 

mostly for helping the imprisoned comrades and their families. Only in February 1948 

Nicolae Petraşcu disposed a “battle” for collecting funds, to the purpose of financing the 

clandestine activity. Only 300.000 lei were collected, the action being hastily made 10 . 

2. Legionary Movement’s pro-American information service 

Both due to the enthusiasm lack for “subversive actions” and to the fund lack, the action 

of organizing an opposition “in the field” against the communist regime, in the autumn 

1947 – spring 1948, failed. The Legionary Movement’s “Country’s Commandment” 

focused its attention also on another activity during this period, respectively creating an 

information service for the Americans. 

After leaving the country, in July 1947, Eugen Teodorescu returned in Austria, so as to 

report his mission from Romania. At Salzburg, he met Vasile Mailat, Malner and a 

certain Auner (Austrian having left the camp from Glasenbach, who worked for the 

Americans, as Malner). With Mailat, he discussed the situation of the Legionary 

Movement in the country, so that the information should be forwarded to Horia Sima. 

8 Chioreanu, Nistor, Morminte vii [Living graves], Iaşi, Institutul European, 1992, p. 155-161. 

9 ACNSAS, Fund Penal, file no. 335, vol. 1, f. 536. 

10 ACNSAS, Fund Informative, file no. 151086, vol. 2, f. 50.


The discussion with Malner and Auner referred to the possibilities of founding a pro- 

American information service, among the legionaries. He transmitted the two that he had 

laid the bases of a small “kernel of informative network in Romania, which has also 

started working” 11 . As a matter of fact, he did not realize that, but he only disposed of a 

“report” drawn up by Vică Negulescu 12 . Then, Malner and Auner asked him a few 

informative notes on the situation in Romania: the mood, economics, law of agriculturalproduct 

collection, situation of the industry, Gheorghe Tătărescu’s memorial, possible 

resistance groups, Iuliu Maniu’s arrestment, king Mihai I’s situation, status of various 

political men, officers’ mood etc. Teodorescu was asked to elaborate a budget “per 

capita” framed in his informative network. He was to receive 1.000 dollars monthly, 

calculated in lei at the official currency, for a network of ten people. The notes drawn up 

by Eugen Teodorescu had to be signed “617“, and the ones written by his collaborators in 

the country with the subsequent figures to 617. Malner wanted Teodorescu to 

immediately leave for Romania, and to organize two deliveries of material monthly. 

Eugen Teodorescu however objected, claiming the time was too short and he would send 

a material monthly. Beside organizing the service and gathering material, he also had to 

arrange a wireless telegraphy connection (he was instructed to use this means of 

communications). After a week since his arrival at Salzburg, Teodorescu was introduced 

to a certain Terner, American information officer, who kept a civilian appearance. He 

studied the notes he had drawn up, being delighted with the information he could obtain 

through the legionary network. 

In early September, Eugen Teodorescu also had an important meeting on legionary line, 

with Traian Borobaru (Horia Sima’s close collaborator), who arrived at Salzburg. This 

meeting was organized by Vasile Mailat. Teodorescu submitted to Borobaru, the 

Legionary Movement’s situation in the country, as well as its connections with the chain 

Terner–Malner–Auner, that he had to communicate to Horia Sima. In the closing of the 

discussion, Borobaru communicated to Teodorescu that he will deal by himself with the 

information service, without involving Nicolae Petraşcu. The latter had to continue taking 

care of the Legionary Movement, the two activities – of reorganization and informative – 

being independent. Eugen Teodorescu had to remain in the country at most six months 

and thereafter return to Austria. If Petraşcu had to come abroad, he would be let this 

know through couriers. After this discussion, Borobaru went to Bavaria, returning in early 

October. Meanwhile, Teodorescu found out from Mailat that both Borobaru and Malner 

and Auner had discussions. It is not clear to what extent Horia Sima was involved in this 

information activity, however it is certain that Traian Borobaru worked with the 

Americans. The information in the country had to be sent to Vasile Mailat, who 

forwarded them. The informative service wherein the Legionary Movement was involved 

was connected to other American superior centres, passing over Salzburg. 

Eugen Teodorescu’s departure towards the country was scheduled in late October 1947. 

He received from Auner 1.000 dollars, plus sympathetic ink, so as to be used in writing 

the informative notes. As in the summer, he left Salzburg with Dragoş Hoinic, whom he 

gave 450 dollars. Thereafter the two went to Vienna, in order to contact GhiŃă Stoia, to 

the purpose of facilitating the illegal passage of the Austro-Hungarian frontier. 

Nevertheless, on the road, Hoinic got sick, Stoia replacing him in his mission towards 

Romania. They crossed the border between Austria and Hungary, at mid November, 

reaching to Bucharest on the same route as in June. 

11 Ibidem, Fund Penal, file no. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574. 

12 Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 431, vol. 1, f. 19-20.

164 


The day after their arrival in the Capital, they contacted Vică Negulescu, whom 

Teodorescu informed about Borobaru’s dispositions: The “Country’s Commandment” 

should deal with the reorganization and those arrived from Austria with the information 

service. For this last mission, he asked a contact, and Negulescu recommended Decebal- 

Corneliu Andrei (friend with Costache Oprişan, head of FdC and with many contacts in the 

Legionary Movement). Teodorescu and Andrei met after a few days, establishing a plan on 

how to work and how to report a material: military, political, economic, social information 

on important political men, on the activity of the Government and of the opposition, on the 

militaries’ mood etc. A horizontal network had to be organized – throughout the country, 

and a vertical one – on fields of activity. Every network head had to keep up contact with 

Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, who communicated afterwards with Teodorescu 13 . 

After Teodorescu’s arrival in Bucharest, Vică Negulescu called Nicolae Petraşcu and 

Nistor Chioreanu from Sibiu, for deliberation. The meeting took place in Nelu Rusu’s 

house. The discussions were adversarial, as Teodorescu could not prove he had an order 

from Horia Sima for organizing the espionage service. Unlike the first arrival, in the 

summer, Teodorescu really had no signal from Sima, only from Traian Borobaru (his 

secretary), who worked with the Americans in Germany. However, in 1947, not even 

Borobaru had regular contacts with Sima, who lived in Italy, hiding his identity. 

Consequently, because of the intricate situation, Teodorescu was advised to work discreetly 

and not to involve too much the Legionary Movement in the information activity 14 . 

After the meeting, Petraşcu and Chioreanu left for Sibiu, and Eugen Teodorescu 

remained in connection with Vică Negulescu, from the “Country’s Commandment”. He 

did not have frequent meetings even with this one, for conspiracy. He was however in 

permanent dialogue with Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, who, until mid-December, managed 

to gather by himself a few informative notes, after the model required by Teodorescu at 

his arrival in the country. They were transcribed with sympathetic ink and sent through 

GhiŃă Stoia in Austria. Stoia crossed the border illegally, on the route of his arrival in the 

country, being helped by Aurel Călin 15 . He arrived safely at Vienna, sending his 

information to Salzburg, to Vasile Mailat, through Gogu Gheorghiu 16 . 

On the other hand, the suspicion of the members of the “Country’s Commandment” as 

regards Teodorescu’s action was maximal. This way, after GhiŃă Stoia’s departure 

towards Austria, Vică Negulescu ordered Decebal-Corneliu Andrei to leave in Occident, 

in order to contact Horia Sima. He managed to cross the Romanian-Hungarian border, 

however he turned back for lack of money to continue his trip 17 . 

Returned to Bucharest, Decebal-Corneliu Andrei continued his activity of information 

collection. In early February 1948, from Austria to Romania, Dragoş Hoinic came, 

clandestinely crossing the frontier, by Beba-Veche. He had received instructions for 

Teodorescu from Gogu Gheorghiu, and sympathetic ink, as pills, from Vasile Mailat 18 . 

Hoinic met Vică Negulescu and Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, in the latter’s house. A scandal 

13 

Ibidem, Fund Penal, file no. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574. 

14 

Ibidem, f. 504-505. 

15 

Ibidem, f. 567-574. 

16 

Ibidem, loc. cit., vol. 2, f. 212-213. 

17 

Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 431, vol. 1, f. 19-20. 

18 

Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 335, vol. 2, f. 212-213.


sparked, as Eugen Teodorescu and GhiŃă Stoia had not managed to adequately use the 

sympathetic ink in December 1947, and the informative notes reached to Salzburg could 

not be read. In February 1948, problems with the sympathetic ink had appeared again, as 

they used wrongly the solving formula and it became unusable 19 . Finally, Dragoş Hoinic 

wrote the informative notes with regular ink, risking to be arrested for espionage, in case he 

was searched. Decebal-Corneliu Andrei supplied him with data on the situation of the oil 

production, the political reports in general and a few military information 20 . He left by late 

February, through the border Pilu (county of Arad), serving as guide also to the professor 

Dragoş Protopopescu. Before leaving, he met Nicolae Petraşcu, to whom he ordered to 

personally meet Horia Sima, or at least Traian Borobaru, to whom he should transmit the 

real situation in the country and should receive instructions for the future. Arrived at 

Salzburg, he sent the informative notes to Vasile Mailat, who put him into contact with 

Borobaru. Mircea Dimitriu participated in the discussion with Traian Borobaru 21 . 

After Dragoş Hoinic’s leaving to Austria, Eugen Teodorescu required a new meeting 

with Nicolae Petraşcu. The meeting was organized by Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, the 

chosen place being Domeniilor Park from Bucharest. Teodorescu was dissatisfied with 

not receiving support from Petraşcu. After this discussion, Eugen Teodorescu received a 

first important aid from the “Country’s Commandment”, through involving the Capital’s 

organization in the information-collection action. This way, Decebal-Corneliu Andrei 

contacted Mircea Nicolau, who appointed Luca Dumitrescu to collaborate to the 

operation. Andrei and Dumitrescu developed an information-collection network, 

according to the model brought by Eugen Teodorescu in December 1947. Therefore, in 

the framework of the Capital’s “RăsleŃi Body”, five informative teams were constituted, 

with numbers from 14 to 18. Each team consisted in five people, including their head. 

The team no. 14 was led by C. Diaconescu (recruited by Mircea Nicolau), the team no. 15 

was led by Cristian Petrescu (recruited by Luca Dumitrescu), the team no. 16 was led by 

Puiu Anastasescu (recruited by Luca Dumitrescu), the team no. 17 was led by Gheorghe 

Gall (recruited by Luca Dumitrescu), and the team no. 18 was led by Nonu Sassu 

(recruited by Mircea Nicolau). The team no. 14 started its activity in early March, the 

team no. 15 and the team no. 16 was constituted in late March and the team no. 17 and 

the team no. 18 were constituted in April. They were quite difficultly organized and they 

only had regular action in April 1947. On the occasion of the Easter, they were no longer 

complete and could not be subsequently reorganized. 

According to Decebal-Corneliu Andrei’s instructions, Luca Dumitrescu had to 

personally contact every head of team in order to pick up the information. In his turn, the 

head of the team was in direct contact with its four members. He talked to them orally 

and thereafter drew up the informative note, towards Luca Dumitrescu. He made a 

synthesis of the data he received, he thereafter submitted them to Decebal-Corneliu 

Andrei (he met him every 7-10 days). Luca Dumitrescu’s informative report had to have 

seven points: 1. news as regards the government’s activity; 2. PCR activity; 3. historical 

parties and opposition in general; 4. news on the Legionary Movement (within the 

organization and government’s attitude towards the Legionary Movement); 5. news from the 

Legionary Movement dissidents’ camp; 6. news on the resistance movements; 7. sundries 22 . 

19 

Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 431, vol. 1, f. 32. 

20 

Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 335, vol. 2, f. 220-221. 

21 

Ibidem, f. 212-213. 

22 

Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 431, vol. 1, f. 186-193.

166 


Many times, the information received from the members of the teams were speculative 

and they were collected from persons who did not necessarily have connections in the 

circles of the power or of the army. 23 . The information produced by Luca Dumitrescu’s 

teams were like: “Troop movements in Muntenia. (17 th of April). Through Braşov, a 10wagon 

train with Romanian militaries (circa 50 people in the wagon) passed. The train 

passed towards Predeal. A second lieutenant was noticed. The rest mostly consisted in 

officers. They are believed to be from an officer-school” 24 . 

The information gathered by Decebal-Corneliu Andrei through the “RăsleŃi Body” from 

Bucharest did not manage to reach Austria, to the American special services. In late April 

1948, Dragoş Hoinic left from Linz to Romania, possessing 620 dollars, sent by Vasile 

Mailat, through the intermediary of Gogu Gheorghiu. He had likewise received verbal 

and written information, sympathetic ink, as well as various addresses destined to Eugen 

Teodorescu and Nicolae Petraşcu. They did not reach their addressees, as Hoinic was 

arrested little after his illegal passage in Romania 25 . The entire information network fell 

during the following weeks. Not only because Hoinic’s arrestment, but also because of 

Eugen Teodorescu’s imprudence. He did not observe the rules of conspiracy and shortly 

after his second arrival in Romania, the authorities discovered his presence in the country, 

and also the information service in the Americans’ favour 26 . Following his track, the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs also discovered Luca Dumitrescu’s network. 

3. Conclusion 

In conclusion, the including of Legionary movement in USA’s plans of “ideological 

war” against Soviet Union shows that ex-wright wing extremist had an anti-communist 

image after War World II. But the United States has avoided direct support Legionary 

movement, like other political groups from Romania, fearing not to cause a diplomatic 

conflict that would have jeopardized relations with the Soviet Union. 

Legionary Movement relationship with the Communist Party had a predictable ending, 

but without distinction to other political groups: the prohibition by the authorities and 

arrested leaders and active members. 

References 

Original documents 

1. Archives of the National Council for Studying the Security’s Archives, Fund Penal: 

file no. 335, file no. 431. 

2. Archives of the National Council for Studying the Security’s Archives, Fund 

Informative: file no. 151086, file no. 181086, file no. 233979. 

3. Romania’s National Archives – Direction Central Historical National Archives, 

Fund Gendarmerie’s General Inspectorate: file no. 27/1947. 

4. Romania’s National Archives – Direction Central Historical National Archives, 

Fund Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – Administrative 

Political Department: file no. 4/1952. 

Memoirs 

1. Chioreanu, Nistor, Morminte vii [Living graves], Iaşi, Institutul European, 1992, 384 p. 

23 Ibidem, f. 216-228. 

24 Ibidem, f. 606-608. 

25 Ibidem, loc. cit., file no. 335, vol. 2, f. 212-213. 

26 Ibidem, Fund Informativ, file no. 233979, vol. 3, f. 165.

THE CHANGEOVER IN BULGARIA IN 1947 

AS A FORM OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION 

Daniel VACHKOV 1 

Undoubtedly, the most important and, in a sense, the most complex matter that any 

power should handle is the management of the public finances. It is from its ability to 

solve the current financial problems and take measures to ensure stable financial 

development that the management capacity of a government is judged. In a deeper sense, 

evaluated can be the overall attitude of a given government towards the power, its sense 

of responsibility before society and, in the long run in view of the long-lasting effects of 

its fiscal policy, also before the future generations. 

In this regard, the changeover carried out in Bulgaria in March 1947 cannot be 

considered as simply a chapter in our modern financial history. It is a telling example of 

the very essence of the emerging totalitarian regime in Bulgaria and of the way in which 

the power over the country was to be exercised and all kinds of problems were to be 

solved in the years to come. 

Yet, Bulgarian historiography has not provided so far a thorough research on the 

financial policies of the communist government in the early years of its rule, when, 

through various mechanisms, monetarist included, the government launched a campaign 

to establish full control over the economy and society. Of course, until the fall of the 

regime in late 1989, the total party prohibition on adequate analyzing its economic policy 

prevented this topic, very painful in itself, from even being raised for however cursory a 

discussion i . Let alone that, along with the financial aspects of the problem, it would 

inevitably have revealed in a completely different light the role of the Soviet troops in 

Bulgaria – i.e. would have attacked one of the fundamental myths on which the 

communist regime was based – the brotherhood and fair-minded assistance on the part of 

the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the maximum any research on that epoch was able to 

proceed was to calculate the enormous costs of Bulgaria’s participation in the final phase 

of World War II without analyzing their impact on its overall economic, financial and 

social development ii . In fact, not only was there a ban on the study of such issues, banned 

was also the use of terms such as ‘inflation’, ‘devaluation of the Lev’, and ‘price rises’ 

when referring to the socialist period. 

Following the change in 1989, the economic issues, like all sides of the Communist 

past, were subjected to a certain level of critical assessment. However, in this process the 

financial problems seem again to have been left a little behind, and it is only over the last 

five years, that several monographs dedicated specifically to them have been published iii . 

Of course, it is not possible, in such a short paper, to provide a comprehensive and 

thorough analysis of the state of the public finances in Bulgaria for the period after the 

end of World War II and the years immediately following it and the financial policy 

1 Institute for Historical Studies – BAS, Sofia, Bulgaria.

168 


pursued by the Fatherland Front government. Therefore, emphasis will be placed on only 

one element of this policy, namely the changeover of March 1947, in an attempt to 

outline its major economic, as well as social and political consequences. 

One of the most serious problems the regime that seized power on September 9th, 1944 

had to face was the fast growing inflation in the country. The process of devaluation of 

the Lev, which had started at the beginning of the war now, in the autumn of 1944, 

acquired proportions increasingly threatening the economy and society. In this respect, 

the most important role was still played by external factors, in particular, the inclusion of 

Bulgaria in active warfare and the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed on 

October 28 th , in Moscow. Within a few weeks there was a tremendous increase in the 

expenses of the state for the Bulgarian army, which took a powerful offensive in 

Macedonia and Serbia, as well as for the maintenance of the numerous Soviet troops 

located in Bulgaria iv . After the war ended in Europe in May 1945, despite the hopes of the 

government, and personally of the Prime Minister K. Georgiev, no relief occurred in the 

state payments to the command of the Soviet troops in Bulgaria. As a result of the 

fulfillment mainly of these commitments a colossal budget deficit was formed, which 

could not be covered in any way except through granting of credits from the Bulgarian 

National Bank – i.e. by increasing the money stock in circulation, lacking the necessary 

metal and commodity coverage. Despite the effects of the rationing and the measures 

aimed at regulating the prices, high prices grew rapidly. According to official data, the 

price index in 1945, compared to that in 1939, shows an increase of nearly six times; for 

most scarce products that could only be found on the black market the increase was 

twelve times v . Compared to these figures, the income growth lagged far behind; again 

according to formal statistics the increase in this field was about three times compared to 

the figures for 1939, which is indicative of a significant impoverishment of the 

population. 

Internal factors, such as the deep decline in production and trade from 1944 onwards, 

also strongly contributed to the unleashing inflation in the country. In 1945 the domestic 

product formed only half of that in 1943 – also a military year when the great twist at the 

fronts started. The shortage of raw materials and capital and the engagement of a 

significant part of the labor force in the army were the objective reasons for the 

development of an acute crisis. To these, however, added must be the effect of the 

measures taken by the new government – an extremely high taxation on private 

enterprises and strong political and psychological pressure on the business community – a 

policy that does not promote economic recovery and financial stability. The 

disadvantaged trade relations with the Soviet Union consisting, broadly speaking, of 

Bulgarian exports twice the size of the Soviet imports, and especially of extremely 

elevated course of the ruble, further exacerbated the shortage of goods and pushing up the 

prices in Bulgaria. 

In this situation, the government in Sofia had neither the capacity nor the courage to 

seek a way out of the severe financial situation, because it would have required to take 

adequate economic actions and to resist the external pressure coming from Moscow, or to 

seek help from the West. The regime reacted in what would become a typical way – by 

imposing a ban on public discussion. And the slightest manifestation of dissatisfaction 

with the existing situation was considered by the government as an opposition activity 

and as an attempt to sabotage the actions of the people’s Power, which was usually 

followed by corresponding repressions. Telling is the case of Professor Asen Hristoforov,

Daniel VACHKOV: The Changeover in Bulgaria in 1947 as a Form of Financial Repression 169 

a supporter of the regime, member of the so called ‘Zveno’ (Unit), considered a partner 

party represented in the ruling coalition. Only the fact that in March 1946, during a 

lecture he delivered to the economic society (later published in his magazine) he 

expressed a reserved criticism of the government financial policy and took the liberty to 

note that the maintenance of the Soviet occupation troops cost a lot more than the support 

of Germany before 1944, put an end to his academic career and soon after led him to the 

hell of being arrested, investigated and sent to the camp in Belene vi . The concrete 

example of the crackdown on Prof. Hristoforov shows eloquently that the new 

government did not need in-depth scientific analyses to solve economic problems and 

was ready to use its own methods of dealing with the crisis. So, in order to avoid the 

emerging total collapse of the state finances the regime resorted to drastic measures 

which no Bulgarian government had so far decided to impose. The idea was to sharply 

limit the amount of banknote circulation and thus control the inflationary spiral and create 

conditions for facilitating domestic government debt. However, all this had to be done at 

the expense of the cash resources of the population. 

After the peace treaty was signed, the government felt free to begin the implementation 

of his radical monetary policy. Observing complete secrecy, prepared was an exchange of 

the banknotes in circulation without resorting to denomination – i.e. seized were only the 

old banknotes, while the value of money was preserved. From 10 to 16 March 1947 

withdrawn from circulation were the banknotes of all emissions of 200, 250, 500, 1000 

and 5000 Levs and all 3% of treasury bills. The conditions under which the exchange was 

made were extremely severe for the citizens. From the old banknotes and treasury bills 

presented by the population exchanged were only 2,000 Levs per person (this is a 

negligible amount – less than $ 4 – my note D.V.) and the rest of the money went to a 

blocked deposit of the exchanger vii . Then the blocked accounts were charged, subject to 

the Law on the property tax specifically adopted for the occasion. The tax rates imposed 

under this law virtually provided the seizure by the State of a significant part of the 

population's money. The amounts of up to 15,000 Levs were exempt from taxation, while 

the tax rates above it quickly increased. For example, deposits of over 200,000 Levs 

(approximately $ 400) were taxed at 25%, and those over 2 million already at 70% viii . 

The results of the financial operation were as follows: the banks forcibly collected much 

of the money of the population; removed from use were the treasury bills which were 

previously used, due to their considerable volume, as means of payment; severely limited 

was the volume of banknotes in circulation. For the scale of the removal of monetary 

resources of the population informative are the official data of the BNB. Before the 

changeover, in circulation and in the banks there were 39 billion Levs in banknotes and 

31 billion Levs in 3% treasury bills. From the total of 70 billion Levs owned by the 

population and the state and private enterprises seized were 69 billion Levs. After the 

changeover, the entire amount of money in circulation was reduced to 21 billion Levs, 

which included only the new banknotes. The weights of the changeover were incurred 

mainly by the ordinary people; forcibly collected from them were more than 49.5 billion 

Levs ix . The main effect of the described government policy was to create conditions for 

stabilization of the finances at the cost of cruel elimination of the savings of the 

population and a drop in its purchasing power. 

Shocked by this government initiative, the western diplomats present in Bulgaria voiced 

strong protests against the way in which the changeover was carried out. Diplomatic 

correspondence provides descriptions of many cases where Bulgarian citizens resorted to

170 


foreign missions in order to save at least part of their savings, in the hope that foreigners 

would be allowed to exchange larger amounts than those stipulated in the Regulation. 

However, in the period of the changeover, the access to the embassies was closely 

guarded, and there were many cases where, even in the presence of diplomats, the militia 

harshly attacked anybody who tried to contact them. This brutal behavior induced formal 

expression of their disapproval on the part not only of representatives of western missions 

but also of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. The fact that the sole defenders of the basic 

civil rights in Bulgaria were only foreign nationals is an eloquent testimony that, in 

March 1947, Bulgarian society was already completely deprived of any opportunity to 

react against the repressive state policy and was placed in a position of total submission. 

i 

The problems of the financial policy of the communist regime are not considered even in basic 

research, such as Стопанска история на България 681 – 1981. (Economic History of Bulgaria 

681 – 1981) София, 1981 г. and История на финансовата и кредитната система на България. 

Т. I-III, ( History of the financial and credit system of Bulgaria, t. I-III). Варна, 1983 г. 

ii 

Исусов, М. Стопанските разходи на България в Отечествената война – Исторически 

преглед, 1969, 1, 52-67 (Isusov, M. The economic costs of Bulgaria in the Patriotic War - 

Historical overview, 1969, 1, 52-67). 

iii 

Вачков, Д., М. Иванов. Българският външен дълг 1944 – 1989. Банкрутът на 

комунистическата икономика. (Vachkov, D., M. Ivanov. Bulgarian Foreign Debt from 1944 to 

1989. Bankruptcy of the Communist Economics). София, 2008; Аврамов, Р. Пари и 

де/стабилизация в България (1948-1989). (Avramov, R. Money and de/stabilization in 

Bulgaria (1948-1989). София, 2008. 

iv 

Vatchkov, D. Détermination des clauses financières et économiques du Traité de paix de Paris 

avec la Bulgarie du 1947 et ses conséquences pour l’ économie bulgare de l’ après guerre - 

Bulgarian historical review, 2003, 3-4, p. 88 – 91. 

v 

Вачков, Д., М. Иванов. Цит. съч., с. 30 (Vachkov, Daniel, Marin Ivanov, op. cit. p. 30). 

vi 

Аврамов, Р. Двуизмерният талант (встъпителна студия) - В: Асен Христофоров. Избрани 

произведения и документи. (Avramov, R. Two-dimensional Talent (introductory study). - In: 

Asen Hristoforov. Selected works and documents). София, 2010, 35-36. 

vii 

ЦДА, ф.132, оп.3, а.е.11, л.14 (Central State Archives, f. 132, op. 3, a.u 11. p. 14). 

viii 

Държавен вестник от 8 април 1947 г. бр. 80, с. 4 (The State Gazette of April 8, 1947, issue. 

80, p. 4). 

ix 

ЦДА, ф.132, оп.3, а.е.11, л.15 (Central State Archives, f. 132, op. 3, a.u. 11, p. 15).

VAE VICTIS! 

RETALIATION, REVENGE AND COLLECTIVE 

PUNISHMENT (THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY 

BETWEEN 1944 AND 1948 

Gábor VINCZE 1 

The 20th century brought much suffer for the Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin. After 

the Great War (1914-18), the treaty of Trianon, due to which one third of the Hungarian 

people were tossed to be minority, and the further ordeals of the Second World War the 

Hungarians suffered even more. The most serious plague blew again the Hungarian 

minorities of the Carpathian Basin. 2 

Voyvodina/ In Hungarian Southland 

In autumn-winter of 1944 the Hungarian minority of 510.000 suffered the most. To 

represent the direct antecedents it is worth to get back to the summer of 1941. When in the 

beginning of April, 1941 the former Yugoslavia broke up (Croatia came out), Hungary 

occupied the Southern part of the Duna-Tisza Köze region (in Hungarian language Bácska, 

in Serbian language Voyvodina). In that territory the one third of the population was 

Hungarian, one third of them were German, and one third was Serbian. From the summer 

of 1941 a strong Serbian partisan movement was formed, directed by the Yugoslavian 

Communist Party lead by Tito. In January, 1942, the Hungarian Authorities tried to end the 

murders and the sabotage-actions by clean-ups and razzias near Titel and in Novi Sad. 

However, not only communist partisans or their supporters became the victims of these 

actions, but innocent Serbian and Jewish civils, too (the number of victims was about 

3.300). We have to mention that the people, responsible for the massacre were accused 

and sentenced – during the WWII! -, and the families of the victims were paid 

compensation. 

Just as the partisan-army lead by Tito marched in Voyvodina in October of 1944, the 

cruel revenge by the Serbians was inevitable. The majority of the massacres were 

executed during the military administration – introduced on the 17th of October 

according to the order of Tito. The murders were mostly executed by the troops of the 

feared communist political police – the OZNA, and sometimes by the corps of the 

partisan-army. In many cases the local vindictive Serbian citizens were the violators. 

Mostly they killed the people according to completed lists, but in several cases (mainly 


2 For extensional reasons I don’t detail the German minority’s fate.

172 


in small villages) it was the question of blind luck, whether to be taken away or to 

escape. The most Hungarians were executed in Sombor, about 3000 thousand people, 

Novi Sad approximately 1500 people, in Subotica cca 850 people. Besides, in three, 

partially Hungarian-populated villages of Šajkaška, there were 1200 Hungarian men 

killed, while the members of their family were taken to the near death-camp of Bački 

Jarak. When in the summer of 1945 the survivors became free, there were prohibited 

to return to their village. 

Later the Serbians reasoned the series of massacres: they told that it had been “only” a 

revenge for the massacre of January, 1942; and on the other hand they told that all the 

executed people were “war-criminals”. However, the Serbian part of Banat situated to 

East from the Tisza was not given back to the Hungarians in 1941, but it remained the 

part of Serbia, under German protectorate (there was German military administration), 

so the Hungarian population of that territory could not be responsible for the abuses by 

the Hungarian authority. Although, there were murders also in several Hungarian 

villages of Banat (for example János Gachal – the reformed bishop of Debeljača was 

killed). From the other hand they found “war criminals” also in settlements, where 

there had been no atrocities against Serbians between 1942 and 1944. Furthermore, 

many people, who were never found guilty, were put on the lists of war criminals, 

while many youngsters under 18 years, men over 60 years and even women were 

executed, who were apparently innocent. The situation was the same for the clericals, 

who were also killed. According to our information altogether 32 clericals were killed 

during the massacre. For example Krizosztom Körösztös, the Franciscan superior of 

Novi Sad was kidnapped and killed. Ferenc Takács – chamberlain of the pope, and 

abbot of Bačko Petrovo Selo – was shot to death after the mass. The 84-year-old István 

Virág the abbot of Horgoš was also killed. Dénes Szabó, a roman catholic clerical had 

been desperately tortured before he was killed. In some areas the Serbians were 

extremely brutal: in several cases their victims were pelted, the nails of others were 

torn off and some were buried alive. 

In the actual phase of the researches the number of the killed Hungarian citizens can not 

be accurately determined. According to the documents of the archives of Voyvodina, 

about 5000 victims could be identified until now; however, as per the researches of local 

history this number may exceed even the 20000. Due to the awful retaliation and the 

massacres, 90000 Hungarian citizens left the region between the autumn of 1944 and the 

spring of 1947. 

Transylvania 

In Romania, coming over the winners by the antifascist putsch of the 23rd of 

August, 1944, and afterwards declaring war on Hungary (its former ally) it seemed 

to be a suitable possibility for many people to see the back of the Hungarian 

minority of 1.700.000. For the mass-expulsion the government was not completely 

prepared, but they decided to remove the local leaders of the South-Transylvanian 

Hungarian community. Accordingly, in the last few days of August and in

Gábor VINCZE: VAE VICTIS! Retaliation, Revenge And Collective Punishment … 173 

the beginning of September the gendarmerie collected and deported the political 

leaders of the Hungarian minority and many clericals and intellectuals to several 

temporary camps (Făgăraş, Hălmagiu) and the internment camp of Tîrgu Jiu. (the 

estimated number of the interned Hungarians from South-Transylvania is several 

thousands). 

There was no legal base for the internment; it was executed according to the interior 

instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the Soviet-Romanian truce was 

signed in Moscow on the 12 th of September, 1944, obligating the Sănătescu-government to 

disarm and intern the Hungarian and German citizens of its territory, so the process continued 

referring to that. Not only the few Hungarian citizens of South-Transylvania were deported, 

but also the Romanian citizens of Hungarian or German origins. 

In the case of North-Transylvania (which belonged to Hungary in accordance with 

the 2 nd Verdict of Wien from 1940) they had more rights to refer to the above truce. 

However, the process was etnically discriminating in that territory, too: only the 

Hungarian citizens of Hungarian origin were deported, the ones of Romanian origin 

not. In autumn about 10.000-15.000 mainly Hungarian (and German) men of military 

age were collected, and taken to the feared camp of Feldioara. From the area of 

Tîrgu Mureş about 50 children and women were deported, but they could go home 

within several weeks. In the beginning the conditions in the camp were more or less 

bearable, but from the end of 1944, masses of prisoners died due to the 

overcrowding, the lack of food and the typhus-epidemic. Those who declared 

themselves as Romanian or became orthodox were let free. The estimated number of 

the people dying in the camp (without an authentic administration) was about 1500- 

2000. The survivors could become free only in the summer of 1945. 

Besides the mass-deportations we also have to mention the murders, commited by the 

paramilitary corps and the regular Romanian Army. 

In the beginning of September, 1944, with the permission of the general staff, corps were 

organized for the purpose of “pacification” behind the fron-line. The most feard corp was 

the Maniu guard (Regimentul de Voluntari Ardeleni „Iuliu Maniu”) lead by Gavrilă Olteanu 

a reservist captain, executing approximately 50 people, including a 16-year-old boy and a 

81-year-old woman. Two sekels were decapitated. The victims were accused with killing of 

injured Romanian officers, or hiding weapons – the accuse was not right in any cases. 

The regular Romanian army committed massacres in three villages of the hollow of Crişul 

Negru in the end of September: they killed 90 citizens, also children and old people over 60 

years. 

Finally, it has to be mentioned, that the anti-Hungarian measures had a legal cover 

from 1945. That year the legal actions against “war criminals” started in Romania. 

There – just as in several other countries of Europe in the period – the people’s 

courts were the institutions of political or/and ethnical revenge. There were people’s 

courts established only in three cities of Romania: Iaşi, Bucharest and Cluj. While in 

the first two cities real war criminals and people, participating in the pogroms 

against the Jews were judged, the court of Cluj operated as the institute of reckoning 

with the Hungarians: during its existence – according to the official Romanian data –

174 


445 Hungarians and 33 Romanians were sentenced to imprisonment, life 

imprisonment or death. (the majority of the Hungarian defendants were called to 

account in their absence – like the famous writer: Albert Wass 3 ). The above numbers 

make the conceptions feature of the judgement. 

Due to the information about the murders in the fall of 1944, and later the anti-Hungarian 

measures, 100.000 Hungarians left Transylvania for Hungary between 1944 and 1946. 

The Zakarpatia Oblast (Subcarpathia) 

Subcarpathia – that belonged to Czeczoslovakia between 1919 and 1939 – could be 

occupied by the Red Army as a result of heavy fights and it was not returned to Prague, 

because, due to an agreement between Benes and Stalin it became the part of the Ukrainian 

Socialist Republic (currently it belongs to Ukraine). The new regime change was 

legitimated by a “committee of people”, formed by the local Rusyns with the assistance of 

the Soviet invaders. On the 26 th of November, 1944 the committee declared the accession of 

Subcarpathia to the Soviet-Ukraine in Mukachevo. As there was a reason to suppose, that 

the Hungarian and the few German population would oppose to the establishment of the 

“Subcarpathian-Ukraine” and the “union”, in the middle of November the invaders decided 

to mop up the territory of these national minorities. For the first step on the 26 th of 

November they declared the collective sinfulness of the Hungarians and the Germans, also 

expressing, that they are the “eternal enemies of the Ukran nation”. 

In the meanwhile the collection of the Hungarian male population of the region was in 

process. It was basic that the victims follow the instructions of the authorities, not even 

thinking over to resist. In order to that the Soviet authorities used several ways of 

mystification. For example, the men of military obligation were ordered to check in at the 

authorities for a “certificate”, which would allow them to “move without any limitations”. 

Collecting the civil population they referred to send them on “malenkij robot” – “short 

work”. The people, checking in at the authorities, and the civil people ordered for “malenkij 

robot” were impelled to Svalyava by the NKVD in columns. In some places even women 

and boys under 18 years were collected to fulfil the planned headcount. 

The 90% of the deported people of about 40.000 were Hungarians, some of them were 

Germans, but there were even prisoners of Rusyn or Romanian origin, taken to refill the 

place of the deceased. However, it was clear, that the mass-deportation had an ethnical 

3 Ghiran Morariu – the prosecutor of Cluj Napoca gave an interview to the Libertatea in August, 

1946, declaring: since the existence of the people’s court convicted 445 Hungarian and 33 

Romanian defendants. There were several historians dealing with the litigation of Albert Wass at 

the people’s court. According to the files found at the County Archives of Cluj Napoca it can be 

stated, that it was a show trial. See: the studies of Károly Vekov – a historian of Cluj Napoca and 

Zoltán Nagy Mihály – a historian and archivist of Oradea. Károly Vekov: Facts and Documents 

related to a show trial. In: A gróf emigrált, az író otthon maradt. Wass Albert igazsága. Szabad 

Tér Kiadó – Czegei Wass Foundation, Budapest, 2004. 149-183. Zoltán Nagy Mihály: Adalékok 

Wass Albert népbírósági bőnperéhez. In: Korunk (Cluj Napoca), July, 2005. 

http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00458/00103/2005honap7cikk1060.htm


base. Firstly, the civils identifying themselves Rusyns, were let home. And if he was 

Hungarian, they didn’t even consider if he was the member of the communist party (in 

Subcarpathia the communist party was strong between the two world wars). 

In the camp of Svalyava the mortality rate was extremely high due to the unbearable 

conditions, the starvation and the typhus-epidemic. In a short time the men being able to 

work were transported to labour camps of Ukraine or even farther to the Ural. Those who 

stayed in Svalyava were let home in 1946 – in an awful condition: seriously ill and 

weakened. According to the estimations about 30% of the prisoners died on the road to 

Svalyava, or in the camp of Svalyava or other Soviet camps (there were even villages, 

where the mortality rate was 70%!). In Subcarpathia more Hungarian men died of the 

deportations than during the fights or in captivity. 

The Hungarian men were deported not only from the Subcarpathia, but there were 2.400 

men taken away also from the settlements populated by Hungarians, geographically 

connected to this region, near the rivers Uzh and Bodrog. Their fate was similar to the 

Hungarians from the Subcarpathia. 

Slovakia (in Hungarian – Upper Hungary) 

In 1945 the Hungarian minority of 800.000 got in the most hopeless situation, as the 

intention for their complete elimination raise to an official level: the government program 

of the 5 th of April, 1945 in Košice collectively depriving the Hungarians (and the Germans) 

from their citizenship. 

In 1943 the Czechoslovakian immigrant government in London, lead by Eduard Beneš 

decided to expel all the Germans and Hungarians from the reborn Czechoslovakia to be 

restored at the end of the WWII. However, in the spring of 1945 it became clear, that the 

western allies, the USA and Great Britain support only the collective relocation of the 

Germans, but not the Hungarians. So, Prague decided to remove the Hungarians with 

discriminative measures step by step: they ordered total confiscation of their property, the 

usage of the Hungarian language was prohibited on every level, and they introduced many 

other outlawry measures. Furthermore, in the spring of 1945, about 20.000 Hungarians 

were interned and about 32-36000 Hungarians were deported to Hungary according to false 

accusation of being “war criminals”. Several thousands of Hungarians were taken to force 

labour to Bohemia and Moravia. 

In November, 1945, due to the brutal persecution of the Hungarian minority of the 

Felvidék the Hungarian government of Budapest offered direct talks to Prague, but in 

December it became clear that the Czechoslovakians had not given up their plan to 

eliminate the Hungarian minority; they only changed their tactics: according to their 

offer the Slovakians of Hungary (their estimated number was 450.000 – with no base) 

would be “exchanged” to the Hungarians of Slovakia; they expel the “war criminals”; 

and those Hungarians remaining in Slovakia (who had been of Slovakian origin, but 

later were formed to Hungarians) would be reslovakizated. Of course, the Hungarian 

government lead by Ferenc Nagy could not accept the above offer, but forced by the 

Allied Commission partially lead by the Soviets, he had to sit at the conference table. 

Finally, the Ferenc Nagy-government – fearing from the further deportations; and

176 


hoping to ease the pressure on the Hungarian minority – signed the Hungarian- 

Czechoslovakian agreement of population exchange on the 27 th of February, 1946. The 

hopes of the Hungarian government were not fulfilled, because the deportations went 

on even after signing the agreement. Due to that the Hungarian partner started to 

obstruct the execution of the agreement. 

As an answer the government of Prague started further even more brutal deportations with 

the purpose of pressure: more than 43.000 people (whole families with babies and old 

people) were taken to force agricultural labour to Bohemia. (The deported people could get 

back to their homeland). 

The action was stopped only when Budapest agreed to fulfil the agreement. Due to it from 

the May of 1947 to the end of 1948 – 90.000 Hungarians had to leave for Hungary, while 

73.000 – identifying themselves Slovakians, but not having any ethnic consciousness, even 

hardly speaking Slovakian language, but hoping better living conditions in the houses of the 

expelled Hungarians – people moved to Slovakia. 

We cannot talk about mutually population exchange on a voluntary basis, because while 

the Slovakians of Hungary voluntarily moved to Slovakia, the Hungarians of Slovakia were 

forced to leave their homeland. 

Parallel with the execution of the population exchange the campaign of “reslovakization”. 

Due to the campaign 411.000 of the Hungarians in fear applied for their reslovakization and 

327.000 of them were validated. (They got back their citizenship, their property and they 

escaped from the expulsion or deportation. The majority of the reslovakizated could claim 

themselves Hungarian again from 1949.) Afterwards there were still 190.000 Hungarians to 

“expulse”, but the political situation was not suitable for that, so the plan could not be 

completely executed. 

∗∗∗ 

The 20 th century was the century of the formation of nation states – according to several 

historians and politicians. In fact we can be the witnesses of the aggressive attempt of the 

ethnically homogene nation states. The Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin became the 

victims of this ethno-politics after 1918 (that time 350.000 Hungarians were expelled from 

their homeland) and then, after 1944. 

At the end of WWII the Czech/Slovakian, the Romanian, the Serbian and the 

Ukranian (Soviet) leaders thought that the time has come to expulse the Hungarian 

(and German) minority, considered war criminals. If not all of them, but as many as it 

would be possible. The forced population exchange or the mass expulsion by the 

authorities was a relatively “civilized” form of the homogenization politics. The 

internments, the deportations and mainly the mob laws and the showdowns, the affrays 

and massacres done by the several corps, partisans and the army all targeted to execute 

the declared or withheld/denied ethnical homogenization. The only sin of the people 

executed without a legal verdict, or those who were interned or expelled, was that 

they were born Hungarian.


Comments 

1) The study was made according to the researching results of acclaimed and thoughtful 

historians of Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania. The majority of these studies 

unfortunately, haven’t been published in English. 

2) All the referred studies are based on thoughtful researches in the archives and 

partially oral-history-interviews. 

3) The chapter including the events in Romania was written according to the own 

researches of the author, and partially based upon the researches of Mihály Fülöp in 

Hungary and of Levente Benkı and Zoltán Nagy Mihály in Romania. The massdeportation 

of the Hungarian minority of South- and North-Transylvania and the 

activity of the Maniu-Guard was reconstructed according to archive files of Cluj 

Napoca and Bucharest. The anti-Hungarian judgement of the people’s court is proved 

by the processing of the contemporary archive files of Budapest and Cluj Napoca and 

the contemporary Hungarian press. (The author cannot detail the legal procedure 

against Albert Wass, due to the lack of space, but he gives the related bibliography in 

the footnote. One of the listed studies was issued in Cluj Napoca – it is available on 

the internet for anybody) 

4) The author – Gábor Vincze – regrets that the referred by him studies are not known 

by the Romanian historians – as the majority of these studies were published only in 

Hungarian language. So, he would like to draw the attention on a study that can be 

read in Romanian language, too: Mihály Zoltán Nagy – Gábor Vincze: Autonomişti şi 

centralişti. Enigmele unor decizii istorice. Transilvania de Nord din septembrie 1944 

până în martie 1945. Cluj, 2008. 

5) His final conclusion is the result of the thorough analysis of the events. He doesn’t 

state that only Hungarian people were pronounced to be collective criminals, but due 

to the lack of space he couldn’t detail the atrocities against the German minority (or 

the other national minorities in the USSR). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. Benkı Levente: Hideg napok Székelyföldön. (Adalékok a Maniu-gárda háromszéki és 

csíki útjához.) In Székelyföld (Kulturális folyóirat), 2012. no. 8. 76–92. 

2. Benkı Levente, Papp Annamária: Magyar fogolysors a második világháborúban I–II. 

Csíkszereda, 2007. 

3. Csorba Béla, Matuska Márton, Ribár Béla (szerk.): Rémuralom a Délvidéken. 

(Tanulmányok, emlékezések, helyzetértékelések az 1944/45. évi magyarellenes 

atrocitásokról) Újvidék, 2004. 

4. Dobos Ferenc: Magyarok a történelem senkiföldjén. „Málenkij robot” a keletszlovákiai 

Bodrogközben és Ung-vidéken. In Regio – Kisebbségi Szemle, 1992. no. 4. 

110–129. 

5. Dupka György: Their only crime was to be Hungarian. White book on the victims of 

the Stalinism in Transcarpathia, 1944–1946

178 


6. Fülöp Mihály – Vincze Gábor: Revízió, vagy autonómia? Iratok a magyar–román 

kapcsolatok történetérıl 1945–1947. Budapest, 1998. Revision or Autonomy? 

Documents on the History of Hungarian-Roumanian Relationship 1945-47. 

7. Gál Mária – Gajdos Balogh Attila – Imreh Ferenc [Vincze Gábor]: The White Book. 

Atrocities against Hungarians in the Autumn of 1944 (in Transylvania, Romania). 

Kolozsvár, 1995. 

8. Janics Kálmán: A hontalanság évei. (A szlovákiai magyar kisebbség a második 

világháború után 1945–1948) Bern, 1980. (The years of homeless situation. The 

Hungarian national minority after World War II, 1945-1948.) 

9. Matuska Márton: A megtorlás napjai. (The days of the revenge) Novi Sad, 1990. 

10. Mészáros Sándor: Holttá nyilvánítva. Délvidéki magyar fátum 1944–45. I. Bácska. 

Budapest, 1995. 

11. Nagy Mihály Zoltán, Vincze Gábor: Autonómisták és centralisták. Észak-Erdély a két 

román bevonulás között (1944. szeptember – 1945. március). Kolozsvár – Csíkszereda, 

2004. 

12. Sajti Enikı: Hungarians int the Vojvodina 1918–1947. Boulder – New York, Columbia 

Univerity Press, 2003. 

13. Szarka László (szerk.): A szlovákiai magyarok kényszerkitelepítésének emlékezete, 

1945–1948. Komárom, 2003. 

14. Tóth Gábor: „Az eltávolítás haladéktalanul végrehajtandó”. Deportálások a 

Kárpátalján a második világháború idején. Budapest, 2008. 

15. Vadkerty Katalin: A kitelepítéstıl a reszlovakizációig. (Trilógia a csehszlovákiai 

magyarság 1945-1948 közötti történetérıl.) Pozsony, 2001.

THE LITERARY CREATION AS AN 

ENDURANCE FORM IN ROMANIA DURING 

COMMUNISM - KNOWN CASES OF 

CENSORSHIP (1966-1971) 

Ion ZAINEA, Carmen UNGUR-BREHOI 1 

Abstract: The censorship of the years 1966-1971 shows a number of materials (volums, 

articles) that made references to the social realities, sometimes directly, other times 

through allegory. According to the censors’ accounts, these presented or tried to present 

a „distorted” image of reality, some failures, they amplify manifestations considered 

„singular”, offering to them a general critic note, calumnious, putting unprincipled 

relations, and negative practices on the credit of the social realities that generated them. 

Some satirized different social conditions, while others talked about the limits of human 

freedom, the freedom of creation of the artist, talked directly or only alludes to 

phenomena of constrain, control, censorship, protested against the guidance of art and 

literature, accentuated the lack of perspective, of the impossibility to claim the values, all 

due to social causes. 

The title of our study might seem, for some, ambitious, for others, probably not. 

Depends on whose side you are regarding the optional answers to the question: Was the 

literary creation an endurance form in Ceausescu’s Romania? We will try to answer 

below, from the perspective of the censorship institution: The Press and Print General 

Directorship/ The Press and Print Committee 2 . 

In Romania during communism, the censorship had ideological basis, its aim being, 

ultimately, the production of a literature that fits the ideological request and the will of 

the Communist Party. Talking about the mission of the writers and that of the artists, in 

his statement of The Work Deliberation with the Party’s Effective, regarding the field of 

ideology and that of the political and cultural-instructional activity, in July 1971, Nicolae 

Ceauşescu pointed out: “The ideological conception must be one and one alone: the 

revolutionary ideology and conception of the working class... For that purpose, we sustain 

the complete freedom of creation, for the total expression of imagination, but in the spirit 

of our conception about life and the world” 3 . 

1 Faculty of History, University of Oradea, Romania. 

2 Institution born in 1949, near the Cabinet Council, and destroyed in 1977. 

3 N. Ceausescu, Expunere la Consfătuirea de lucru cu activul de partid din domeniul ideologiei şi 

al activităŃii politice şi cultural-educative, din iulie 1971, Ed.Politica, Bucuresti, 1971, p. 12.

180 


So, writers had either to accept or to learn to accept the conditions and the suggestions 

of the board of the party and those made directly by Nicolae Ceausescu. To be published, 

they had two options: they either wrote about subjects and modes that fit the party, and of 

course, the censors, or they avoided or hiden the controversal and unfriended cases, if not, 

they had „to fight”, to negociate, to bargain with the censors 4 , this happening in the best 

case. 

Some divided the writers in “reds” and “whites”, the first ones, „the reds”, where the 

writers devoted to the system, and „the whites”, those that stand against it. It’s about an 

“endurance in specific forms, literary forms, not factionalism” – said Nicolae Manolescu 

– the factioneers didn’t come into question, some being under a ban, and some in exile 5 . 

Beyond what it is said and sometimes written, we have to keep in mind what the 

censorship institution says, what the censors write, what is their vision, what are their 

convictions. I’ve chosen as a reference, The Proceeding compiled by The Training- 

Control Directorship 6 , from November 30 1967, that analyses the country side’s 

publications during the period November 1966-November 1967. From its first lines, we 

find out that the number of political, social, scientifical, cultural and literary publications 

that appeared in the country side was growing continuously, answering more and more to 

the demand (s.n. -I.Z.) to „inform and guide” the mass of readers. There were also 

mentioned, as positive elements, the augmenting of the thematic diversity, and a 

qualitative improvement of the published materials, fact due mainly to the editorial 

offices, that tried to answer to the readers’ growing requests, for the content and the 

intellectual attitude. 

However, is still mentioned that many materials (s.n.- I.Z.) included in the pages of the 

named publications „continued to debate in a wrong way, even tendentiously” the argued 

problems, their appearance being considered unfitting. Many of the materials were 

„negative, calumnious”, because, trying to debate upon a „supposed enclosure” in the 

normal development of our values, presented „a distorted image of our reality”, 

transforming the particular into general. Others handled „in an inadequate way” 

(understood different than the oficial line) the origins of the Romanian language and the 

Romanian people, or moments of its history. There were also frequent the “unprincipled 

controversial” articles, the tone used giving here and there, a shade of personal dispute, 

the fact destroying the quietness and prestige of the magazines that appeared in. Anyway, 

the articles refering to the international events, where seen as „getting to a manner of 

reporting” that could strongly affect our country’s relations with other states 7 . 

Briefly, The Training-Control Directorship considered that the materials that dealed 

with censorship were many, so they were grouped in more categories: first were those 

that “debated in a wrong way, sometimes tendentiously” the problems approached, than 

were the “negative, calumnious” ones, that treated in a „wrong” manner historical issues 

or international aspects. The materials that dealed this kind of problems, or some similar 

ones, it is said further more in the proceeding, were „in their majority felt”, being 

4 Liviu Nistor, „Cenzură şi ideologie sub comunism”, in vol. Cenzura în România (Ilie Rad 

coordonator), Cluj-Napoca: Tribuna, 2012, p. 245. 

5 Nicolae Manolescu, „Albii şi roşii”, in România literară, 1995, no. 29, p. 2. 

6 Directorship in The Press and Print General Directorship, ruled by the director Ghircoiaş Victor 

7 The National Archives of Romania-Bihor Subsidiary (from now on AN-SJ BH), the fund The 

Press and Print General Directorship – Oradea Department (from now on DGPT-UO), folder 

9/1967, file 1.

Ion ZAINEA: The Literary Creation as an Endurance Form in Romania During Communism ... 181 

necessary „either to give up completely to their printing, or to make in part changes of 

structure”. In all the cases, we are told, before being discussed and solved with the 

editorial office, that „the observations have been presented to the regional committees 

of The Romanian Communist Party, for monitoring”. The problematic articles, whose 

solution interested first of all the guidance forums, were pointed out to the local organs 

of the party, these deciding „if they can appear in the initial form or with 

modifications” 8 . 

As we can see, this part of the paper reveals on one hand the fate of the so-called 

„wrong” materials, and on the other hand, aspects related to the work of control and 

procedure/subordination. We get the idea that those who made the control/the reading had 

the necessary experience, if they „sensed” (i.e. discovered) the majority of the materials, 

which, on the other hand, makes us think that existed also „leaks”. As for the 

procedure/subordination part, we find out that the observations were, first, presented to 

the regional committees of the party for monitoring, and then discussed and solved with 

the publising houses; those that interested the superior organs of the party were presented 

to the local organs of the Romanian Communist Party, who decided if those can appear in 

the initial form or woth modifications. 

After this general part, the paper deals with concrete cases, for each category of the 

presented problems. We shall also show the most significant cases. From the first 

category, the first because contains many cases, who were also very serious, is that of the 

materials that presented „a distorted image” of our realities. It was said, that „starting 

from the deficiencies of different fields of activity”, from „some singular actions”, some 

authors were „exaggerating, giving them a critic, general and denigration note”, putting 

unprincipled relations, negative practices on the social relations who would generate 

them. So, it was recognised the existence of some „minuses” and of some „actions”, even 

if „singular”, but also considered that some evil-minded authors were augmenting them, 

criticizing them in general, denigrating them, or worse, putting them on the social 

relations (therefore, socialists). A first example is offered by the pamphlet of Traian 

Cosovei The Deratization Project 9 . In his vision, our world had to be „desinfected” by the 

rats (in the pamphlet, the rats were the people, good and evil, grouped and labeled after 

their professions, characters, characteristics). „Small rats, middle rats, big rats, perched 

rats..., rats with nephews..., rats with big mouth, ...rats playing in a gear with millions of 

wheels..., rats-all-in-its-turn” 10 . 

Amplifying the criticism from the particular, isolated case to a general one, and then 

denigration was considered evident also in the pamphlet Zoodidactic by George 

Mihaescu 11 . Satirizing the abusive way of obtaining study certificates by some with high 

positions, unadvised regarding culture, outdated by the events and impelled by the daily 

demands of life, the author transfers as in a fable his opinion, in the fate of a common 

dunkey. This, in the past, had a raw live, working for masters, having no food or drinks, 

and nowadays becomes a Grand Old Man. Instead of enjoying that he is „the ruler of a 

yard and eats alone from the big rack”, he hasn’t any peace, because the pensioners 

gossip „he’s a fool dunkey and the duties go wrong, from this reason”. He finds the 

8 Ibidem, file 2. 

9 Was going to appear in the magazine Tomis (Constanta), no. 4, April 1967. 

10 AN-SJBH, fund DGPT-UO, folder 9/1967, file 2. 

11 Was supposed to appear in the no. 10/October 1967 of the same magazine Tomis.

182 


solution in getting with all means, except working, a study certificate. So, with some 

„dirty jobs”, he gets his first school diploma when „having some few more teeth left in 

his mouth”. „Bucking with his hoof in a headmaster’s desk”, he gets a general certificate 

of education, then he signs up for faculty (extramural). When close to graduate „he was 

pulled by the ears and taken who knows where” 12 . 

The article Marginals to an overture by Romulus Zaharia 13 , was claimed because 

presented too realistic, and not after the regime’s wish, the doctor’s situation; similar facts 

but related to professors, try to approach also Szilagyi Istvan in his article The Problems 

of the Countryside Teachers 14 . This kind of accounts „have been practised before” in 

materials regarding other fields of activity, such for example „Nowaday Oceanology” 15 

(where was criticized the lack of contribution of our country in the field of oceanologic 

explorations, underlining the fact that brought many benefits from others’ researches and 

discoveries), Cinematographic Repertoire facing the audience 16 (investigation made by 

St. Oprea regarding the Romanian cinematographic production, who had as a conclusion 

the fact that except the movie „The Dacians”, all others are at the bottom of the world’s 

contemporary cinematrography). Calumniouns accounts for the editing activity came 

from the narrator’s interview Ion Lancranjan, taken by Petru Sfetcu 17 . According to the 

author’s opinion, books fate in general was not determined by their value, but by the 

author’s position, by his situation. „If their author – it was said – is a boss somewhere, or 

is going to be a boss or a general, if he has high relations with some literary circles, very 

competent and able to cover ups, who guide an absent but very good „literary 

scholarship”, then obtaining the certificate of authenticity and constancy for the 

characters of different literary „creations”, those being poorly written, pauper or pratically 

gross, was vividly and for ever assured. Regarding the literary phenomenon from our 

country, the person interviewed was saying that „the analysis of this one is so badly 

made, that would be a shame for the writer who coult guide his activity following such an 

analysis” 18 . 

A second category contains those literary writings, prose and poetry, that debated the 

problems of the artistic creation and generated „the feeling of the lack of perspective, of 

the impossible way of value expression, hinting social causes” 19 . A part of these 

materials, through symbol, or directly, „stands up fiercely against the so-called freedom’s 

limitation”. It’s designated for start, the short story Only with the right (treacherous style) 

by Romulus Vulcanescu 20 . Using an allegorical form, it was considered that the author 

protested against the so-called compulsoriness for poets to write ordered lines, without 

content and truth. In the short story, all the poets are called at the „grand merchant of 

artistic products”, that for assuring the material daily standards, asked them to write lines 

in a certain way. Although he promises, demagogically, that they are free to write what 

they want and how they want, „the grand merchant” sets some rules, „in the agenda, 

12 

AN-SJBH, fond DGPT-UO, folder 9/1967, file 3. 

13 

From Tribuna (Cluj), no. 48/1 XII 1966. 

14 

From the magazine Utunk (Cluj), no. 10, 1967. 

15 

Tomis, no. 1/1967. 

16 

Cronica (Iasi), no. 39/30 II 1967. 

17 

From the rubric „Creation and contemporaneousness”, Tribuna’s magazine, no. 23/8 VI 1967. 

18 

AN-SJBH, fund DGPT-UO, folder 9/1967, files 4-5. 

19 Ibidem, file 6. 

20 From Iaşul literar, no. 9/1967.


alphabetically”, saying that there is a single censorship, a single judge: „me”, and a single 

penalty „pen life forbiddance”. When, shortly after, some poets try to write about truth, 

their right arm is plaster in gypsum. The rebellion attempt is late, because the gypsum 

falls, for some of them together with the arm, and for the others remains forever rigid. 

Against the guidance of art and literature, stands up N. Manolescu in the article 

Contemporaneity and artistic universe 21 , where he writes, among the others: „Any 

mixture in the inner atributes of literature is a disaster; literature must be left to evolve by 

itself, because – why is this thing so hard to get?- literature is made by writers, not by 

theoreticians”. The short story The Corridor by Dumitru Tepeneag 22 , was approached 

because the author „tried to demonstrate the nowadays man follows a checkpointed road 

with compulsory rules, being obligated to escape on a corridor without any perspective, 

full of obstacles and of the bleeding bodies of the sacrificed ones” 23 . Into a long corridor, 

with pieces of furniture, one upon another, the hero of the story agonizes desperately to 

get to the light, to the window. His efforts are useless, because at every step he hits the 

furniture with different destinations and a huge and massive stall, immovable. His despair 

is amplified by the terror made by the smell of „bruised, chopped books”. In the middle 

of such a heavy climate, he nostalgically remembers his childhood, when, on the same 

corridor, he had the opportunity to watch through a window a white horse, colored birds, 

green grass, everything in a vivid, shiny light, while now, prisoner in the wildwood of 

furniture, he can’t even get to the window, feeling himself no enough high and strong to 

destroy the obstacles on his way. 

Problems for censorship made also some materials on themes related to the origins of 

the language and of the Romanian people, the older or newer boundaries of the country. 

Many contained frequent references to territories that didn’t make part of Romania, and 

proved that the economical and cultural tradition of the inhabitants who lived here, 

showed their common origin with Romanians. It was mentioned the study The Roman 

Ruins from Komarovo by N. Gostar 24 , where the author confuted the soviet scientist’s 

opinion M.I. Smişko, that all the material tracks discovered at Komarovo, Cernauti 

region, could have aborigine origins, saying that on the contrary, the close study of those 

tracks prove Roman origin. The historiographer from Iasi added that there was a Roman 

castrum made with the purpose to defend the boundaries of Trajan’s Dacia and that only 

in the III-IV centuries appear the inhabitants’ tracks, overlapping them. 

Another category of notices materials of censorship referred to those who discussed 

about different contentious international problems, using often the symbol or an 

allegorical way of expression. Using as a comparison element the potato, the satire with 

the same title by Valeriu Sirbu 25 „condemn, with a cynical tone, the abusive dealing of 

the states by outlander forces”. The poet’s outrage, said the censors, was directed against 

the mixture of the great powers into the inner life of other countries, mixture that goes till 

the administrative separation of those and even to the control of the people’s ideas and 

conceptions, to hatred and hostility between brothers 26 . This is what the censors say. The 

21 From the magazine Cronica (Iasi), no. 2, 14.I.1967. 

22 From the magazine Orizont, (Timisoara), no. 7, 1967. 


24 From The Annales of the “Al. I. Cuza” University, Iasi, History series, 1967. 

25 From the magazine Tribuna (Cluj), no. 27, 6.VII.1967. 

26 AN-SJBH, fund DGPT-UO, folder 9/1967, file 12.

184 


author says it differently. He appeals to the story of a gardener, who, tired of so many 

flowers, decided to make an exceptional thing. He took a potato and divided it into two 

with a chalk, expressing a speech as a constitution, by which he decides that „although 

pieces of a whole, the two parts will never be called the same again” and forbidders „the 

sap and the food, even ideas to circulate from one part to another”. Not being able to 

predict what will happen in the future with the potato, the author exclaims ironically at 

the end: „I understand that the big bosses of the states/would share the country into 

two/It’s normally and just/But a simple gardener to do such thing with a potato/It is just 

too much”. 

At the same category was noticed the sketch My dam by Marin Sorescu 27 , that, said the 

censors, „suggests the idea that the battle for power is an unvoiced phenomenon of the 

human society, that in this battle for getting new luxuries and territories, the masses act as 

blind instruments, without reaction to the crimes and that the development of the society 

is made with imminent wars”. More to come, the paper, it was said, „mocks the idea of 

pacts at the round table for total or partial disarmament, these pacts being used with the 

purpose of covering the race for the munitions’ improvement” 28 . 

It was observed the story Pseudo tauro manie by Marin Porumbescu 29 ,, a burlesque 

fantasy, a parody of an imaginative performance of bullfight offert by a foreign group on 

our national Circus’ arena. Presenting the main heroes of this bullfight, the author, among 

other details, shows that the bull Spuryus, coming across the borders and passing through 

Moldavia, on all his itinerary made in our country he left deep marks. „With his nose 

forever red, has stable, bloodshot eyes..., heavy hooves with surrealistic stamps and some 

horns that terrify, imposing respect and fear”. Surprisingly, the bull Spuryus reacts only 

to yellow. The matador, named Escondido Sacha Sehohr Ubu, surnamed Ledykiler, 

coming from somewhere far away, from the east, is tall, thin, agile and with the walk of a 

cat, wears a yellow jacket, uses a yellow roulette, is saluted with yellow handkerchieves. 

There is also a smaller torero, with a more humble role in the fight, who also wears „a 

dirty yellow” roulette, and in the battle with the bull he only tries to angry it, to get it 

tired. The author shows in many details the fierce fight between the bull and the matador. 

At a certain moment, the small matador introduces a crosstree in its nose, and from 

Spuryus nose begins to flow wheat „as in Constanta’s silo”. At the end, looking inside the 

dock of the woundeds, the author ascertain that the bull and the matador are some madeup, 

disguised impostors, that the whole show (fight) was a trick. 

A part of the fault for the existence of many problematic materials from this category 

was considered to be because of the magazines’ editorial offices from the countryside, 

who introduced in their pages materials whose publishing wasn’t advisable in the given 

conjunction. As examples, were given more materials, Reflexes by Augustin Buzura 30 , 

who made some considerations upon the satire of A. Avercenko, whose short stories were 

populated with „idiots of all kinds”, emphasizing the special value of the social short 

stories, showing that „in a period as that in which lived the author, when the authorities 

tries heavily to restrict, to impose their way of thinking, the satirical literature was the 

only one who could reflect properly the period, and who, as a paradox, got the right to 

27 From Cronica, no. 21, 26.V.1967. 

28 AN-SJBH, fund DGPT-UO, folder 9/1967, file 12-13. 

29 That was supposed to appear in the magazine Ateneu (Bacau), no. 10/1967. 

30 From Tribuna (Cluj), no. 43, 26.X.1967.


appear exactly from those described, because foolishness fits pride in ample, declared 

gestures... Cehov, as Avercenko escaped all possible censorships because they knew how 

to gain over these real characteristics of the idiots” 31 . 

There were considered unfit other materials, such as the notes of V. Rebreanu, At S. 

Esenin’s tumb, where were blamed indirectly the sovietc authorities; in the same manner, 

the article Marasti, Oituz, Marasesti, by C. Ştefanache 32 , who contained harsh 

expressions against the German army, even during the visit of Willy Brandt in our 

country, or in the story The Refuge by Leonida Neamtu 33 , where are described in detail 

the terror and the panic that layed over the Romanian population when the soviet troops 

entered the country, in the year 1944, even in the moment of the aniversarry of the 

„liberation of the country”. A special chapter in our paper is represented by the materials 

(articles and studies) referring to the moments of our history and of the communist and 

proletarian movement, treated „one-sided, ill-suited or unreal”. It was nominated the 

study The Romanian Historiography about Romania’s participation at The First World 

War, by C. C. Giurescu 34 , connected to this it was mentioned that trying to clarify the 

character of Romania’s participation to this conflict and presenting works on this theme, 

appeared before and after August 23 1944, the author gives appreciations that signalized 

that from our country’s point of view this was a just, legitimate war, determined by the 

creation of a „rounded Romania”; he insisted on the king’s and of the prime minister’s, I. 

C. Brătianu, positive role, on the support promised by Russia for retaking Transilvania 

and on the desire to decide over Bucovina, following the nationalities’ criterion. 

Regarding the historiography after the Second World War till the end of the year 1963, 

Giurescu shows that appears a special aspect – sustained by V. Liveanu, G. Tudoran and 

others – according to it, Romania’ participation to the war had an imperialist character, 

fact confuted strongly by the author, showing the just appreciation of the First World 

War’s character, started to be made in our historiography only in „the last years” and 

especially after The Central Committee’s Declaration from the Romanian Communist 

Party from April 1964, quoting for this his articles and one of the academician C. 

Daicoviciu 35 . 

Furthermore, it was mentioned the article Beautiful death of Balogh Edgar 36 , who 

evoked the event happened at Cluj, during the fall of the year 1944. A great part of the 

work, re-edifies aspects of the antifascist resistance monument from Cluj led by „a group 

of Hungarian, Romanian (in small number) and Jews communists soon liberated from 

jail”. It was also written about the departure of a peace delegacy to Moscow, made out of 

communists, with the purpose to obtain the unite of Transilvania to Hungary. It was 

spoken about a certain Hegedus, arrived to Cluj from Budapest, to represent The 

Hungarian Revolutionary Communist Party, to handle the problem of the proclamation of 

the „Socialist Republic from Tisza”, idea that had as a goal the proclamation of a „soviet 

republic” even before the arrival of the Romanian troops in the region of Ardeal. This 

could not be edited. 


32 From Cronica (Iasi), no. 31, 7.VIII.1967. 

33 From Tribuna (Cluj), no. 33, 17.VIII.1967. 

34 Was going to appear in the Arges magazine, no. 7, iulie 1967. 

35 AN-SJBH, fund DGPT-UO, folder. 9/1967, files 17-18. 

36 From the Igaz Szö magazine (Tg. Mureş), no. 6 June 1967.

186 


Similar aspects regarding the censorship’s way to act upon the literary prints in the 

newspapers of that period are seen in The Central Press Printing Directorship’s notes 37 . 

We’ll show just a few aspects. The poem Requiem by its author Ana Blandiana, sent into 

print to the newspaper “The Contemporary”, is suspended. The Directorship states, 

without to many explinations, that in November 23 1966, “at our exigency, it was 

indicated to be suspended the poetry Requiem from a group of poems signed by Ana 

Blandiana, that was supposed to appear”. The poetry used many allegories and made 

references to departure, to death, but also to liberty, naively, abandonment. The poetry 

Our star from the newspaper „The sanitary laborer”, is modified, because „the author 

(unspecified) declares in images the symbols of the blazon: the sun, the abies’ forests, the 

bores, the sheaves, the star. Nothing was said about the tricolor”. Thereby, at the censors’ 

demand the poetry „was modified”. At the end of 1966, in “Students’ Life” was supposed to 

appear the chronicle 30 Dicember ’47 – the end of the year and the beginning of the century. 

The censor’s attention is directed upon two aspects rendered below 38 , that he doesn’t agree 

and that he pointed out to be easier for the editorial office to modify them: “the editorial 

office was adverted upon the following historical and political errors: a) that it isn’t almost a 

quarter century, but in fact it’s really a quarter century since the first event mentioned; b) that 

the insurgence isn’t, as said in the citation, the effect of the two previous events, but their 

cause, so it must be post before those two”. Once the mistakes solved, the author of the text 

accepted the corrections and „the editorial board modified it”. 

Conclusions 

We detect, according to these, that it was written and a lot, said the censors, in a different 

way than the indications, directions, official line asked; that the writers, the artists, especially 

those educated in the period betweens wars, proved to be adaptable to the new cultural 

politics, they being the censorship’s clients; that the writings called „problematic” by the 

censorship, kept in a form or another, so that we can recover them nowadays; that these 

don’t discuss upon the communist regime in general, but its elements, its aspects, such as the 

limited freedom, the system of values, aspects of the social life, types and characters, periods 

such as the dogmatism, the soviet model introduced in Romania, are harshly criticized, 

denigrated. More over, the censorship says, the critique was extended from the particular to 

the general, so, to the system, to the social relations that generate it; strong efforts were made 

for the recovery of the Romanian historical truth, older or more recent, of the place and role 

of the communist movement. It’s, without a doubt, this segment of the literary creation, a 

form of resistance, by the help of writing, during possible forms and limits. The regime 

controlled, supervised and punished writings through censorship, one of the communist 

politico-ideological instruments of the power. 

37 The Central National History Archives, The Press and Print Committee fund (1944-1977), 

folder 27/1967, files 2-4. The note is written in 18.1.1967, by Rosenzweig Moise. 

38 “Our memory records for almost a quarter of a century omits sensitive cover the most shocking, 

fundamental moments for a nation’s life: the entrance of Romania into The Second World’s War, 

the return of the weapons against Hitlerism armies, the liberation and the armed insurrection, the 

first democrat government, the agrarian reform, the electoral reform, the proclamation of the 

Republic, the nationalization act, and all those that followed and made its nowadays 

development”.

PART I 

2. POLICIES OF COMMUNIST REGIMES

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AS A 

REGULATOR IN THE FIELD OF 

MONUMENTAL ARTS DURING THE 

SOCIALISM PERIOD 

Anelia ALEKSANDROVA 1 

Abstract: Numerous State Institutions have established a National programme for new advance in 

the development of Bulgarian Architecture and Art Synthesis until 1990. In that programme, some 

particular measures for the realization of certain institutional requirements have been set up. A 

uniform art policy has been implemented for the construction of architectural sites, for the 

formation of architectural environment and accomplishment of art synthesis, as well as for the 

establishment of the look of towns and villages. For the accomplishment of Art Synthesis, a 

complete system has been established for planning, funding and conducting creative cooperation 

between architects and artists in producing pieces of Art tightly related to the architectural 

environment. That leads to a complete policy in ordering and producing Monumental Art works. 

Through the means of Art Synthesis the ideological and educational task of Mural-monumental 

Arts is completed and the artistic taste of man is shaped up. All those mechanisms for producing 

Monumental Art works during the Socialism period are aimed at the accomplishment of pieces of 

Art of high aesthetic and emphatic ideological impact in architectural environment. 

During the Socialism period a crucial importance is rendered to the development, 

humanizing and aesthetic modification of man’s “living environment”. The main role for 

the accomplishment of that goal belongs to architecture and its relation with other arts, 

including monumental forms. Architecture and Monumental Arts are considered to be “a 

powerful means for the formation of a harmonious living environment, for development 

of versatile personalities, for the spiritual and aesthetic evolution of people”. 1 

Through the years following the April Plenum /1956/ of the CC of BCP 2 , changes have 

taken place first in the development of Bulgarian Architecture, since a complex idea for 

the building of space living environment has been created. That has conditioned the 

creation in both interior and exterior spaces of a series of monumental works, providing 

synthesis with Architecture. The intensive pace and enormous scale of construction, the 

typification and industrialization are a prerequisite for a new type of creative solutions 

within Architecture. In the time of industrialized construction, problems connected with 

architectural compositions, their unity and variety, tradition and creative attitude, 

architectural image and art synthesis have received new contents. For the construction of 

“fully valuable, aesthetic and humanized living environment” a uniform policy has to be 

introduced for building architectural sites, for shaping the architectural environment and 

achieving art synthesis, as well as for building up towns and villages. That has led to a 

complete policy in ordering and producing monumental works. A uniform programme for 

aesthetic education of people and especially the youth has been established. 

1 National Academy of Art, Sofia, Bulgaria.

188 


For the realization of further advance in the development of architecture and its 

synthesis with other arts, the Politic Bureau of CC of BCP has issued a decree where the 

main tasks to Bulgarian socialist architecture /residential, industrial/ are traced out, and 

also the requirements in the field of territory and urban development, in the cultural and 

life style construction, of interior and design. 3 

The national character of architecture has been pointed out as its main feature, based on 

typification and unification, as well as the pursuit of beauty and perfection of the 

architectural look of the buildings in the residential areas. It is believed that architecture 

together with the monumental works should impersonalise the long-lasting love of 

Bulgarian people for beauty, and also perform an educational and aesthetic function. 

Socialist architecture should have ideological and artistic maturity and purity of style in 

architectural concepts. As far as the residential architecture is concerned, it should reflect 

the spirit of unity and friendly relationships inside the socialist community, “intimacy in 

exterior and interior spaces” 4 , optimistic and various plastic and colour decisions. Public 

buildings should reflect the humanism and democratic spirit of Socialism. In this respect, 

functionality and aesthetic character of interior spaces and furniture has been searched 

for, and the rich national tradition of popular life style has been harmonized with the 

dynamics and the achievements of modern materials and technologies. A complete 

system has been developed for the design of products based on uniform modules building 

up the architectural environment. Interior projects have been prepared for all public and 

repeatedly constructed buildings which are to be approved of together with the projects 

for the architectural sites. 

A series of governmental institutions, such as the Committee for Architecture and 

Public Works in accordance with the Committee for Culture, Committee for Science, 

Technical Progress and Higher Education, BAS 5 , UBA 6 , UAB 7 have been composing a 

programme for the realization of a new advance in the development of Bulgarian 

Architecture and art synthesis for the period until 1990. In that programme, some 

particular measures have been laid down for the compliance with certain institutional 

requirements. In the space development of living environment, a purposeful complex 

approach has been proposed for the solution of urbanization and public works issues, as 

well as of monumental and decorative elements. The accomplishment of individual 

artistic look for each town has been emphasized. A synthesis of architecture with other 

arts, also natural environment, cultural and historical monuments should be achieved to 

enhance the ideological and aesthetic effect of Architecture and to also produce high 

expressiveness and emotional power for the living environment. For the realization of 

that synthesis, a whole system of planning, funding and producing of art works, naturally 

related with the architectural environment, has been established. For the achievement of 

that task, funds are raised at the time of planning capital construction, and artists are 

attracted as assistants to design institutes and organizations for the design of Art 

synthesis. Those artists participate in Architectural Councils at the time of the projects 

evaluation. The Committee for Labour and Remuneration has established the post of 

“artist-in-chief” with the main design institutes in the big cities. That way, artists have 

started having an important role in shaping the living environment. 

For the achievement of possibly optimal art synthesis, special attention has been paid to 

the training of highly qualified professionals in the field of Architecture and Arts, 

especially in Monumental arts. With regard to that trend, the Higher Education 

Institutions have been implementing improvements in their curricula for higher

Anelia ALEKSANDROVA: Institutional Mechanisms as a Regulator ... 189 

effectiveness in carrying out synthesis between architecture and monumental arts. They 

have established teams of students from the HIAC and Nikolay Pavlovich HIA (currently 

NAA 8 ). Some recommendations have been made to the UAB and UBA for the 

elaboration of a plan for future development of mural and monumental arts, as well as for 

their involvement in the creation of the artistic look of cities, towns and villages. Special 

attention has been paid to the higher effectiveness of propaganda impact by mural and 

monumental works. The Committee for Culture together with the Committee for Science, 

Technological Progress and Higher Education and BAS recommend the launch of 

theoretical research and development of the problems of art synthesis. The UAB has been 

expected to continue the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries with 

respect to the programs of the creative unions for the development of Architecture and 

Art synthesis, as well as for organizing cooperation of Bulgarian architects and art 

professionals with their colleagues from the Socialist Block. For designing important 

public buildings the UAB is entitled to choose the designers. 

The UAB, UBA and the State Commissions for Fine and Applied Arts and Architecture 

– part of the Committee for Culture, have been appointed as a main state and public form 

of management of Art synthesis processes. Their prime task is to ensure the 

implementation of a uniform state policy for the complete elaboration of the architectural 

and artistic look of towns and villages, the so called total synthesis. The regional 

committees of BCP are the controlling body which is to monitor the architecture and 

construction organizations in the carrying out of large-scale architectural and monumental 

works and the accomplishment of synthesis between them. The party state bodies are 

those who should steadily observe and not allow utilitarian monumental works of dubious 

artistic quality to be produced. By the way, they should thoroughly support innovation 

and creative efforts for producing artistic and durable architectural and monumental 

works. Whether that support for creative innovation has been taking place is still 

uncertain, since a considerable part of the orthodox party staff does not follow the 

recommendations made. Innovative ideas are often accomplished with the support of 

individual members of those party bodies and through a lot of efforts and compromises. 

All those have conditioned the development of monumental arts during the Socialism 

Period, and they are directly bound with the specifics of the architectural environment. 

All party requirements to Architecture have been equally applied to Mural and 

Monumental arts. 

Art synthesis as a primary task to architects and artists is still on the agenda in some 

other party decrees, such as the one by the Council of Ministers on synthesis and design, 

in the decisions by the Tenth Congress of BCP, even the discourses by T. Zhivkov before 

the VIII Plenum of CC of the Comsomol in 1969. In them, the directives of the party for 

the development of Architecture, Monumental arts and Design as crucial factors for the 

creation of beauty for the man through Socialism have been presented 9 during Socialism, 

special emphasis has been placed on the category “beauty’, which according to views of 

the time should be available in every area, activity, environment, item or piece of art. 

Socialist art is by definition “addressed to the people”, which leads to contents and 

representational modifications of its structure. The mass industrialization of enormous 

complexes requires synthesis for their aesthetics. Through art synthesis Mural and 

Monumental arts perform their ideologically educational function and artistic taste of 

people has been formed.

190 


As a matter of fact, from the start of Socialism period the conditions for implementing 

Art synthesis have been laid down in numerous party documents. In a Decree by the 

Council of Ministers and its Regulations of 1949, the question about the need of 

ideologically aesthetical and culture state policy was put. 10 In 1948, the UBA establishes 

a permanent Art Council, in charge of ordering and designing pieces of art and regulating 

the ideologically aesthetic side of the works 11 . In the beginning, when the councils for 

Art and Culture with the Regional People’s Councils were founded, there was no clearly 

planned concept of the mechanisms of ordering, design, acceptance and control of pieces 

of monumental arts because of the fast pace necessary for their accomplishment. 12 That is 

why monumental works produced at the time when Art Councils made their first steps, 

were not concerned with any thematic plans. 

In Decree 142 by the Council of Ministers of 1959, the Committee for Architecture and 

Public Works and the Ministry for Education and Culture are pointed out as the bodies to 

annually designate the new buildings for producing Mural and Monumental art works. 

The instructions by the Council of Ministers have been underestimated by the Committee 

for Architecture and Public Works through a certain decrease in ordering activities. That 

has led to limitations on funds for planning, designing and producing Monumental art 

works which causes chaos in organizing stages through which each piece of art should 

pass. Subsidies for Monumental art have been reduced and redirected mostly to 

construction for finishing works. For the discontinuation of that practice, edicts have 

been made more particular and improved in the Regulations for Application of Territory- 

residential Organization, in the section on Architectural and Art Design. In the 

Regulations on Capital Construction, it is pointed out that with all buildings, regardless to 

their purpose, it is mandatory to allocate funds as much as 1.5-5 % of the total value for 

producing Mural-monumental art even in the preliminary construction financial 

documents. Those funds are to be used by the Ministry for Construction and Architecture 

and by the Committee for Art and Culture. The percentage determined might be increased 

in cases when a unique look for the building is to be searched for. Those particular cases 

should be accomplished only with a decision by the Ministry for Construction and 

Architecture. Through the Act on Territory organization financial matters concerning 

subsidizing durable pieces of Art are to be arranged. In preliminary financial documents 

on capital construction, there is also a provision for funds for producing durable pieces of 

Art in that architectural environment, and those funds amount to a percentage of the total 

value of the newly constructed building. That percentage value should be calculated with 

respect to the character of the site. Those legal edicts are supposed to arrange the 

architectural environment, as well as infrastructure projects, such as squares, motorways, 

etc. The State Commission for Design and Production should coordinate with the author 

spending general budget funds which are to finance the building construction. The UBA 

and UAB have been also entitled to arrange funding for Monumental art with capital 

construction sites, as well as the fees to the authors of those Art works. 

The State Commission with UBA and UAB is appointed to be the one and only body of 

competence to evaluate artistically and determine the amount of remuneration for 

monumental art works. It is to be managed by the chairperson of the Committee for Art 

and Culture. 

Sites of national importance should be funded by the Committee for Art and Culture. 

That is stipulated in the Regulations on Durable Monumental Arts. 13 In 1975, a National 

Programme and Conception for the future development of Monumental Arts was

Anelia ALEKSANDROVA: Institutional Mechanisms as a Regulator ... 191 

launched for several decades ahead. The decisions by the December Plenum of the 

Central Committee of the party have made it possible to construct an increased number of 

housing, nurseries and kindergartens, youth and pioneers centres. 14 That is a prerequisite 

for the creation of more Mural-monumental art works as a larger number of places for 

their production have been constructed. The involvement of Monumental art in the newly 

constructed buildings has been conditioned by the legal edicts issued by the State, which 

have come into effect. On these grounds, the artistic unions: the UBA and UAB, the 

Committee for Art and Culture, the Ministry for Construction and Architecture have been 

ordering the production of durable pieces of Art of high artistic quality at the same time 

with the construction of new buildings. 

With respect to the manner of ordering, the monumental pieces of art should be divided 

into two groups. 15 The first group includes monumental works produced through an 

independent subsidy by the Regional Councils for Art and Culture and the Committee for 

Art and Culture, which provides them with the status of independent sites. The second 

group covers monumental works created on the ground of Decree 142 of the Regulations 

on Territory-residential Organization, according to which those works should be included 

in the preliminary financial documents on building sites with their own cost report in the 

total cost sheet for the new building under construction. 

In conclusion we could say that the ordering process for design and accomplishment 

of Monumental art works as independent sites or as sites of capital construction has 

been carried out by the State Commissions through general or contact contests 

conducted by them. That has been organized on the grounds of the Regulations on 

monumental Art Works and on the Regulations on State Commissions with the UBA 

and UAB, and the fees should be determined according the Author’s Remuneration 

Rates. As far as planning and creation of Monumental art works are concerned, that is 

the responsibility of Regional Councils for Art and Culture, the Committee for Art and 

Culture or the investor on the grounds of Decree 142 of the Regulations on the 

Application of the Territory-residential Organization Act. 16 That way a National 

Programme on Creation of Art has been established, which is supposed to treat future 

monumental art works. In this programme, sites have been considered and discussed 

with regard to their character, according to their national and regional importance. The 

approval and acceptance of sites and Monumental art works involved should be carried 

out by the State Commissions with the Committee for Art and Culture, the UBA and 

the UAB with regard to their artistic qualities. Before that, those art works should have 

been approved of by the Art Council with the Regional People’s Council and the 

Regional Council for Art and Culture. There the Monumental works projects are to be 

introduced on a scale together with explanatory materials, photos of the environments, 

architectural drafts, models of the environment and the way the works are be situated 

in it. Those allow the Art Council to get a clearer idea for the use of the architectural 

space and the degree of accomplishing harmonious Art synthesis. The members of the 

Council also scrutinize the theme contents of the monumental art works and their 

artistic qualities. They should strictly monitor if the works comply with the party 

directives in ideology and aesthetics. If the Monumental works comply with the 

requirements, a report is made to suggest considering the project by the state 

commissions with the UBA and the UAB. Afterwards the projects with cost sheet

192 


paperwork, are to be approved of by the Ministry for Construction and Architecture 

and the Committee for Arts and Culture so that they be funded by BNB 17 . The body in 

charge of the quality artistic performance of the Monumental works is the established 

construction organization with the National Institute for the Monuments of Culture. 

All those mechanisms for the production of Monumental art works through the 

Socialism period have as a task to carry out the accomplishment in architectural 

environment of author’s pieces of art of high aesthetic and ideological impact. 


I would like to express my gratitude to my academic consultant Oleg Gotchev, 

Academician, Professor, PhD and to the Chairs Mural Painting and Science of Art for 

their assistance while the research was carried out. I would also like to thank Milen 

Mihov, Associate Professor, PhD, Boris Zhelev, Associate Professor, Yordan Parushev, 

Associate Professor, the Chairs Early-Modern and Modern Bulgarian History and Mural 

Painting at the VTU St. st Cyrile and Methodius for the opportunity they provided me 

with to take part in the scientific conference on the Project Past memory forr a future 

open society. (OPENNESS - 2011-3595/001-001) 

References 

1. Decree of Polit Bureau of CC of BCP of 28.06.1977, Sofia. 

2. Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party. 

3. Decree of Polit Bureau of Central Committee of BCP of 28.06.1977, Sofia. 

4. Ibidem 

5. BAS – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 

6. UBA – Union of Bulgarian Artists 

7. UAB – Union of Architects in Bulgaria 

8. NAA – National Academy of Art 

9. Berbenliev, P.: About the Synthesis of Architecture and Monumental Arts. Sofia, 

1978, p. 144-146. 

10. Regulations, State Newspaper N=140/1949. 

11. Pavlov, Al.: The System of ordering, design, acceptance and control over 

monumental art works with regard to the problems of synthesis. – In: About the 

synthesis of architecture with monumental arts. Sofia, 1978. 

12. Ibidem 

13. State Newspaper, N=26/1.05.1966. 

14. Pavlov, Al.: The System of ordering, design, acceptance and control over 

monumental art works with regard to the problems of synthesis. – In: About the 

synthesis of architecture with monumental arts. Sofia, 1978. 

15. Ibidem 

16. Ibidem 

17. BNB – Bulgarian National Bank

PRIMATES OF THE ORTHODOX 

CHURCH FROM R.S.S.M. AND SOVIET 

RELIGIOUS POLITICS DURING 1945 – 1962 

Romeo CEMÎRTAN 1 

Abstract: The anti-religious politics promoted by the Soviet State during 1945-1962 in RSSM, 

whose consequences consisted in dozens of priests or monks being murdered or sent in labour 

camps, in hundreds of churches being shut, in thousands of Christians being intimidated for their 

religious beliefs, was promoted both by the State competent organs and by the clergymen 

infiltrated by KGB in the Orthodox Church’s leading structure. Through analyzing the archive 

documents in this study, there is noted that the attitude and the contributions of the Orthodox 

Church primates from R.S.S.M towards the persecution of the religious feeling and of the national 

traditions by the Soviet authorities during 1945-1962 was anti-national and, many times, contrary 

to their status of Church leaders. Intimated or tempted by the worldly, the ecclesiastical hierarchy 

presented herein also showed spiritual weakness, forgetting many times that the Church’s reason 

of being is to preach the Gospel, as Christ the Saviour asked his Apostles after the Resurrection 

and, through them, their followers and the overall Church to share with the people, through the 

sacraments, the grace of salvation. However, despite the expectations of the atheist State, the 

Orthodox Church’s mission continued, being present and glorious in the souls of the hundreds of 

thousands of Moldovans, who remained faithful to the Apostles’ Church and to the Sacred 

Fathers. 

One of the Russian hierarchy’s multiple preoccupations in early after-War years also 

consisted in the setting up of the new dioceses throughout the Baltic Countries and 

Bessarabia. This way, invoking the historical and canonical law on the territory annexed 

to U.R.S.S., the Russian Church re-establishes the Diocese of Chişinău and in December 

1944 sends to the leadership of the diocese the bishop Ieronim Zaharov (December 1944 

– February 1947) 2 . With respect to this hierarch’ activity, we found in the files from the 

National Archive, a few important mentions for determining the relation between the 

Church and the State in R.S.S.M. in early after-War years. The attitude of the bishop 

Ieronim towards the leadership of the Soviet State, which is in perfect concordance with 

the Russian Church’s general policy in its relations with the atheist State, is clearly 

expressed in the telegrams sent by I. V. Stalin at certain anniversaries. For instance, on 

the 07.11.1945, Ieronim, the bishop of Chişinău and Moldova, sends a telegram at 

Moscow with the following content: “In the happy day wherein we celebrate 28 years 

since the Great Revolution of October, the day which was crowned with the eternal and 

1 

National Muuseum of Etnography and Natural History of Moldavia, Chişinău, Republic of 

Moldova. 

2 

Păcurariu Mircea, Bessarabia, aspects from Church’s and Romanians histories, Iaşi, 1993, p. 

125.

194 


victorious glory, the Moldavian Orthodox Diocese, freed from the claws of the fascist 

monster, greets you, Iosif Vissarionovici, as genial and eternal glory-shaded leader, and 

asks God to send you and the glorious red army you lead, and all those working for the 

good and glory of our Nation, many years in peace. On the occasion of this celebration, 

for helping the affected family of the red army’s heroes, we ask you to receive two 

thousand rubles – a modest present, expressing our joy” 3 . This appraisal is accompanied 

by a consistent material contribution, the Church’s contribution for supporting the State. 

The Soviet State understood that religion might be a profitable economic sector of the 

country. Therefore, on the occasion of celebrating the first year since the victory over 

fascism, the contribution of the bishop raises to 400 thousand rubles 4 , an enormous sum 

for the after-War years. Of course, these huge sums of money were gathered from the few 

hundreds of existing parishes, which activated in a country ruined by war and by the new 

leadership. The abusive collection of money and various bishopric-imposed taxes raised 

an adequate reaction from the believers and from the clergy. This way, on the 17.09.1946, 

the attorney P. Romenschii registered under the number 3578 a collective complaint of 

the believers against the abuses perpetrated by the bishop Ieronim 5 . What kind of abuse 

there is about, we find from the letter addressed to Stalin by a few priests and teachers 

from R.S.S.M. in the summer of 1946 6 . In this letter, they say that during the Romanian 

reign, the clergy was content and, at present, the church from R.S.S.M. is led by Ieronim, 

who is not cannonical. This bishop dares to shout at the priests and to insult them in the 

most shameless manner, calling them “thugs, liars, stupid”, chasing them through “get out 

of here!”. The priests show that Ieronim is corrupt, as “whoever of the clergy gives 

Ieronim one thousand rubles is received and gentler treated”, and the “the ordination of 

the young teachers on the priest degree costs from 5 to 10 thousand rubles”. There was 

also specified that the bishop “does not alow the priests to transfer from one parish to 

another or to leave the diocese”. Even if the patriarch Alexei I was informed about all 

these abuses, no measure was taken. The 15 priests having signed the complaint brought 

the explicit proposal: Ieronim should be transferred in Russia, and in Moldova another 

bishop should be chosen, gentler and worthier. As reaction to this complaint, the Council 

of Ministers from R.S.S.M., represented by I. Ivanov, addresses P. Romenschii in order to 

receive explanations as regards the clergy’s discontent attitude towards Ieronim. One 

asked to settle who were and what represented those who had complained, which were 

the reasons leading to the apparition of this discontent and whether it was true that most 

clergy from R.S.S.M. was discontent of Ieronim. 7 . Following the researches, it was noted 

that some priests did not even recognize the bishop Ieronim as local hierarch and 

officiated by themselves 8 . Cases were unveiled wherein some priests were deposed only 

because of having used during the service another language than Slavish 9 . 

As regards the language for officiating the divine service in R.S.S.M., in the first after- 

War years, we may note a confusing situation. Being component part of the Russian 

Patriarchy, the clergy of the Diocese of Chişinău was obliged to officiate the divine 

3 

National Archive of the Republic of Moldavia, as follows ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5, f. 118. 

4 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10, f. 97. 

5 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12, f. 175. 

6 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12, f. 109. 

7 

The address was registered with no. 3184, on the 23.08.1946, Ibidem, f. 148. 

8 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5, ff. 22 and 24. 

9 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10, f. 61.

Romeo CEMÎRTAN: Primates of the Orthodox Church from R.S.S.M. and Soviet Religious … 195 

service in Slavish, however most priests remained in Bessarabia under Soviet occupation 

did not know it and officiated as follows in Romanian or in the languages of the national 

minorities. In the Church administration, the spoken language was Russian, which 

remained unknown to many priests. Only from 1949, some letters and complaints were 

admitted, drawn up in Moldavian language, most of them being translated in Russian. 

Likewise, the Slavish-ization and the Russification of the clergy and of the believers was 

also done through the prayer books printed at Chişinău in old Slavish in 1946 10 . The 

forced imposition of the Slavish and of the Russian in the Orthodox church from 

R.S.S.M. was one of the main reasons for the discontent of the clergy and of the believers 

towards the pastoral activity unfolded by bishop Ieronim. 

Faced to a lot of compromising evidence, the Russian Patriarchy, under the State’s 

pressure, was compelled to replace the bishop Ieronim with the bishop Benedict Poleacov 

(February 1947 – June 1948). On this bishop’s activity in the diocese of Chişinău, we 

have found so far no relevant information. Considering the very short shepherding term 

and the period of bishop activity, which coincided with the organization by the Soviet 

authorities of the hunger among the autochthonous population to the purpose of 

determining them to accept the collectivization, we may suppose that the Republican 

authorities were unsatisfied by their collaboration with the bishop Benedict. Under the 

pretext of being a sympathiser of the inochentist movement of RSSM 11 , the Russian 

Patriarchy, at P. Romenschi’s insistence, replaces him with the bishop Nectarie Grigoriev 

(June 1948 – 9 th of March 1969). 

In order to improve and to enhance the relation between the Orthodox Church and the 

State, in favour of the latter, P. Romenschii receives an order from Moscow to involve 

himself more actively in the internal affairs of the Diocese from Chişinău. To this 

purpose, the bishop Nectarie was obliged to consult with the issues of the Russian 

Orthodox Church before making decisions in the missionary, pastoral or liturgical activity 

spheres. In time, the relation between P. Romenschii and the bishop Nectarie changed 

into an active and “fruitful” collaboration, presented by the former as “normal and 

professional attitude” 12 . Only over the year 1949, the bishop Nectarie was received 9 

times by the attorney P. Romenschii to discuss general-character religious issues. 13 . The 

following issues were discussed in these meetings: 

a. “The archpriests’ convocation, whereon we informed before and we received positive 

notification for the development. 

b. The abbots’ convocation, to the purpose of raising both the economic and the moral 

state of the churches, the monastic discipline and obedience. The attorney catalogued 

these intentions as undesired and dangerous for amplifying the influence of the 

monasteries on the believers. 

c. Editing the Typicon in Moldavian. The initiative was rejected on the grounds that the 

churches from R.S.S.M are over-saturated with church literature. 

10 Ibidem, ff. 84-85. 

11 Pasat,V.I., Orthodoxy in Moldova. Volume 1, Doc. № 58, pp. 278-286. 

12 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 64, (see Appendix 27). 

13 Archive of the Social-Political Organizations from R. Moldova, as follows AOSP, F. 51, i. 9, d. 

44, f. 13.

196 


d. Status of the churches: the closed churches from big parishes should be reactivated, 

and instead of them the churches from small parishes should be shut, the initiative 

being rejected” 14 . 

Analyzing the above-quoted document, we note the following: 

1. P. Romenschii received, from Moscow, directives, which aimed at the issues of the 

diocese from Chişinău. His main mission, in fact, consisted in monitoring and 

assessing the religious life from R.S.S.M. for transmitting the collected information to 

the Council for the Issues of the Orthodox Church within the Council of the Ministers 

from U.S.S.R, which was invested with decision-making power in the ecclesiastical 

sphere. 

2. No pastoral or administrative activity was allowed without the authorized Council’s 

permission, which was a flagrant mixture from the civilian power in the religious 

field. 

3. The Soviet State, through all legal and illegal means, aimed at discrediting the 

Bessarabian monasteries, which turned into resistance centres against the State’s 

antireligious politics. 

4. In order to diminish the religiosity among the population, the biggest and most 

prosperous parishes were shut, as the small and weak ones disappeared by themselves 

in time, with no effort from the State. 

5. There was forbidden to print service books in “Moldavian”, to the purpose of 

diminishing the liturgical activity and of slavishing the divine service, so unpopular 

among the Bessarabian clergy. 

All these wishes, submitted in 1949 to the attorney P. Romenschii, were the result not 

so much of the pastoral zeal from the Bishop Nectarie, but of the great number of 

complaints and petitions addressed to the diocese administration from Chişinău by the 

parishioners throughout the republic. 

In fact, the situation in the church sphere, under Nectarie’s leadership, as compared to 

the one from Ieronim’s period, did not improve at all. Even if during the years 1950- 

1956, the priests’ number registered a significant rise and the one of the open churches 

registered a relative stability; we may characterize the respective period as continuous 

spiritual decline, which was provoked by the corruption of the church’s leadership, by the 

prevalence among the clergy of the material interests over the spiritual ones, by the 

neglect and even oppression of the Romanian traditional values in favour of the Slavish 

ones and by the artificial creation of the “Moldavian” nation and language. 

The Russian Orthodox Church from R.S.S.M., unfortunately, was among the first 

supporters of elaborating the Moldavian ideology, promoting from the pulpit the 

“Moldavian” language and history 15 . This new ideology was convenient both to the 

Soviet State and to the Russian Patriarchy’s leadership. If during the tsarist period, in 

order to distinguish the population throughout the abusively appended territory in 1812 

from the rest of historical Moldavia, the Russian authorities called it “Bessarabian”, then 

in 1940 and after 1944, the Romanians from Bessarabia were called this time 

“Moldavians”; and the territory, Moldavia. All these manipulations aimed at disrupting 

the population on the left bank of the Prut from its Romanian stem and at creating an 

14 AOSP, F. 51, i. 9, d. 44, f. 14. 

15 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 24, f. 177.


alternative nation to the Romanian one, which should be culturally and ideologically 

identified with the Slavs. Also on an ecclesiastical plan, creating the “Moldavian” nation 

was opportune. During the period the Russian Church was subject to the repressions by 

the Bolsheviks, the Romanian Orthodox Church was promoted as Patriarchy. In 1928, 

within this Patriarchy, Bessarabia’s Mitropoly was set up, recognized by all 

Autocephalous Churches. Consequently, creating the Russian diocese on Bessarabia’s 

territory, mostly populated by Romanians, was a serious infringement of the church 

canons, which regulate the jurisdictional disputes between two Autocephalous Churches. 

However, in case Bessarabia’s population is of another nation than the Romanian one, 

therefore “Moldavian”, then the Russian Church had all the right allowed by its status of 

Missionary Church to set up new dioceses on newly appended territories, where other 

nations are located and which do not have Autocephalous Church. This way, the Russian 

Church conditioned the territorial church jurisdiction on the atheist State’s political 

expansion. Another argument in supporting the Russian Church’s canonical presence in 

Bessarabia was the existence of the Russian diocese at Chişinău during the tsarist period; 

consequently, in 1940 and in 1944, this diocese was reactivated. However, appealing to 

this argument denotes not recognizing the will of the population from the three Romanian 

Principalities to constitute a nation and a Unitarian State, a fact internationally contested 

in 1921 only by the Soviet authorities. Therefore, the denial by the Russian Patriarchy of 

the Romanian appurtenance of Bessarabia’s autochthonous population is a continuation 

of the anti-Romanian politics promoted by the Soviet State during the inter-War period. 

This way, the Russian Orthodox Church from R.S.S.M. turned into a cleverly used tool 

by the Communist authorities in order to annihilate the Romanian culture and identity of 

the autochthonous population. 

The fight with nationalism among the clerics, and also the transformation of the church 

service into profitable business increased the number of those dissatisfied with Nectarie’s 

pastoral activity. Some of them, not wishing to pay unofficial taxes to the diocese, such as 

the priest Samuil Salamon, illegally activated, officiating in the shut churches from 

various localities. 16 . Surprisingly, these priests were tolerated and even helped by the 

local authorities who knew quite well the internal situation from the diocese of Chişinău. 

On the phenomenon of the travelling priests, labelled as “rebellious impostors”, the 

bishop Nectarie reported to P. Romenschii that the “Local authorities in several 

departments do not undertake real measures for stopping the activity of the pseudopriests, 

who are not registered, but officiate in shut churches and in the people’s houses. 

These impostors prejudice the State and, being unpunished, they disseminate in more 

departments their activity” 17 . 

Other priests, to make right, left for the Patriarchy of Moscow, asking for permission to 

officiate in the parishes of the diocese of Chişinău. Such a priest, named Filaret Şundeac, 

was arrested in 1955 and penally judged, according to art. 110 and 180/1 of the Penal 

Code of U.R.S.S. During the interrogation, he declared to have the permission to officiate 

in the church from the village of Crocmaz, county of Olăneşti, from the very patriarch 

Alexei I of Moscow; however, the bishop Nectarie took away this permission for having 

16 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 56, f. 59. 

17 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 15.

198 


refused to pay the bishop 10 thousand rubles ∗ so as to acquire a car and for not bringing 

presents to the officials of the diocese 18 . Nectarie’s involvement in the economic sphere 

became so intense that some county financial departments, in order to cash in their 

income taxes from the clergymen, which were illegal, directly addressed the bishop so 

that he should compel them. 19 . The bishop’s endeavour for the good of the nation was 

appraised this way by the Soviet authorities: “During his stay in R.S.S.M., the archbishop 

Nectarie positively recommended himself and testified loyalty and patriotic aspirations 20 . 

For this special worth, the Russian Patriarchy, in February 1956, awarded him the rank of 

archbishop of Chişinău and Moldavia 21 . 

As reaction to the abuses from the bishop Nectarie and in the wish to stop them, a group 

of priests, led by the archimandrite Macarie (Misail ChiriŃă), being encouraged by the 

political changes from U.R.S.S., addressed, in the spring of 1956, a letter to the marshal 

Jucov wherein he a asked the support for the Church in Moldova to the purpose of 

reacquiring the status of Metropolitan Church and of obtaining the autonomy within the 

Patriarchy of Moscow. Likewise, in this letter, the desire was expressed for the Prime of 

the Church from Moldavia to be of Moldavian nationality and to speak Moldavian 

because the Moldavian people “has some national and religious traditions completely 

foreign to Russian spirituality...”. The archbishop Nectarie did not speak Romanian, 

although he was shepherding this diocese for 7 years and “therefore he was not able to 

fulfil the Moldavians’ religious requirements, which, in Moldavia, are 95%”. In the letter, 

there is also specified the desire of the Orthodox Church from Moldavia to remain within 

the Russian Patriarchy, however with status of “younger sister” 22 . 

The separatist-character letter had bomb effect and raised rough reactions from the 

Council for the issues of the Russian Orthodox Church within the Council of Ministers of 

U.R.S.S. headquartered in Moscow. In an emergency informative note 23 G. Carpov, the 

president of the Council, sends to P. Romenschii the letter of the archimandrite Macarie 

(Misail ChiriŃă) addressed to marshal Jucov as regards the autonomy of the Orthodox 

Church from Moldavia and asks him to draw the attention on Macarie’s actions, taking 

measures for him not to succeed in popularizing his intentions and in informing the 

Council on what P. Romenschii knows in this respect 24 . From this informative note, and 

also from the characterization given to the Archbishop Nectarie by the attorney P. 

Romenschii 25 , we deduce that the Soviet authorities were aware of the bishop’s flaws; but 

for his serving the Soviet regime and to the purpose of discrediting the Church, they 

tolerated and promoted him. To get the situation under control and to prevent the 

dissemination of the separatist feelings among the Moldavian clergy, during the 12 th -17 th 

of June 1956, in Chişinău, there inspected Ivan Ivanovici Ivanov and Medvedev, the 

∗ For comparison, the rent of a single in Chişinău cost 100 rubles monthly, a worker, on average, 

received 200 rubles monthly, and P. Romenschii, in 1956, had a monthly salary from 1200 to 

1400 rubles (ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 88). 

18 ANRM, F. 3046, i 1, d. 56, f. 32. 

19 

ANRM, F. 3046, i 1, d. 56, f. 176. 

20 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 62. 

21 

Ibidem. 

22 

Ibidem, ff. 106 şi 106a. 

23 

Notă informativă de urgenŃă, nr.1113, 19 aprilie 1956. 

24 


25 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, ff. 60-62.


members of the Council for the issues of the Russian B.O. within the Council of 

Ministers U.R.S.S. 26 In his turn, the patriarch Alexei I submitted to the archbishop 

Nectarie that in July 1956, the Moldavian monasteries should be inspected by the 

metropolitan bishop Serafim Luchianov, who had been in France and by the bishop 

Teodor, who had been in Argentina 27 . The target of the inspection was not accidental, 

both the archimandrite Macarie, and some signatories of the letter addressed to Jucov 

proceeding from the ecclesiastical environment, which was the most reticent towards the 

church activity promoted by the Russian Church in R.S.S.M. 

The campaign of verifications and inspections caused by the letter of the archimandrite 

Macarie culminated with the non-official visit of Moscow’s patriarch, Alexei I 28 , to 

Chişinău, during the 1 st -2 nd of September 1956. Having non-official character, this visit 

of the patriarch to Chişinău was most probably focused on the internal situation of the 

Orthodox Church in the republic. The patriarch also met the attorney P. Romenschii. The 

results and decisions made during this visit remain unknown, however they were decisive 

in the evolution of the relation between Church and State in R.S.S.M. 

As regards the corruption and neglect of the spiritual needs of the believers from the 

Archdiocese of Chişinău, the situation did not change even in the following years. Being 

reprimanded by many anonymous complaints and letters, the patriarch Alexie I was 

compelled in 1959 to send to Nectarie a discouraging message: “To the Patriarchy of 

Moscow and to me, personally, in Odessa, complaints continue to come from the believers in 

the parishes and monasteries from the dioceses of Chişinău and Moldavia. They refer to the 

fact that the parishes remain without priests and the believers’ spiritual needs remain 

unsatisfied, which is contrary to the law. I propose to Your Sanctity to submit a written 

report for taking attitude. Patriarch Alexei I” 29 . However, this situation was not only 

characteristic to the diocese of Chişinău, the amplitude of the moral-spiritual decline among 

the Russian bishops became dramatic. As reaction to the deplorable situation in the church 

sphere, the Soviet authorities, under the pretext of the fight against corruption and moral 

decay in the Church’s bosom, initiated, in the spring of 1959, an anti-religious campaign 

throughout U.S.S.R. For the Diocese of Chişinău, the repressions against the Church were 

the most drastic and ample. In the beginning of this anti-religious campaign, the archbishop 

Nectarie, being assaulted by dozens of complaints and appeals from the clergy and the 

believers, protests and submits to the attorney P. Romenschii 15 cases of flagrant 

interference in the Church’s affairs from the local authorities. Among these actions, there 

are: shutting churches, forbidding the money gathering for repairing churches, forbidding the 

service officiating in the people’s houses, forbidding the bells, forbidding to officiate in 

service days, intimidating the priests through false hooliganism accusations, confiscating the 

priests’ official documents etc. 30 . However, because of the relation pre-set for several years 

between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet State, the archbishop Nectarie was apt to 

collaborate with the laic authorities as regards raising the atheist culture and conscience 

among the autochthonous population. 

26 Ibidem, f. 44. 

27 Ibidem, f. 30. 

28 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1 d. 65, ff. 79-81. 

29 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1 d. 93, f. 20. 

30 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, ff. 55-57.

200 


In parallel with the State’s repercussions against the religiosity of the population from 

R.S.S.M., the leadership of the Russian Church, being pressed by the State, tightened the 

priests’ conditions of liturgico-sacramental activity. This way, in a circular of Nectarie, 

addressed in 1959 to all archpriests and abbots from his diocese, there is recommended 

not to install crucifixes at crossroads, public places and fountains. The existing ones had 

to be evacuated in graveyards. These actions had to be executed with the local authorities. 

Likewise, there was forbidden officiating the services in front of the fountains and of the 

crucifixes 31 . In another document issued during the same year by the Chancellery of the 

Moscow Patriarchate, addressed to all dioceses, there is forbidden for the people under 18 

years old to officiate in the altar. It is reminded that, through the law of 1929, the 

religious services in public places are forbidden. The priests’ visits during Easter and 

Christmas holidays were forbidden. Likewise, there was forbidden praying in the ruralenvironment 

people’s households, unless they had the local authorities’ notification. In 

the same order of ideas, the priests were forbidden to rent houses and apartments to the 

purpose of officiating religious services. Charity events were forbidden, regardless of 

their form. 32 . Those who infringed these provisions were liable of criminal liability and 

deposition from priesthood. 

Likewise, in 1959, the Soviet repressions aimed at the bastions of the national orthodox 

spirituality from R.S.S.M. – Bessarabian monasteries. The archbishop Nectarie, with no 

objection, approved the decree issued by the Council of Ministers of R.S.S.M on the 5 th of 

June 1959, whereby shutting down several churches were ordered. For liquidating these 

places of worship, the bishop created a commission, consisting in the members of the 

diocese administration. This commission dealt both with the psychological training of the 

inhabitants within the monasteries aimed for abolition, and with the management of the 

wealth left after liquidating the monastic complexes. The apparition of the members of 

this commission in a monastery was a sure sign it would be shut, and its buildings – 

delivered to the local authorities. Usually, this decision was met with resignation by the 

abbots and father superiors who did not dare to infringe the vote of obedience. Any revolt 

from them was catalogued both as anti-Soviet, therefore anti-State manifestation, and as 

infringement of the church canons that refer to hierarchic subordination. Only in a single 

case, at the monastery Răciula, both the abbess and the people of the village of Răciula 

and of the neighbouring villages, on the 23 rd and 24 th of June showed insubordination and 

disobedience firstly towards the church authority from R.S.S.M. and secondly towards the 

local authorities 33 . The most revolting fact, which raised the indignation of the population 

from Răciula was that the hierarch, instead of protecting the spiritual sheep, was among 

the first to betray it, “uniting with the unholy”. In an anonymous letter, addressed to the 

patriarch Alexei I of Russia, with respect to the tragedy from Răciula, the leaders of the 

Church were called Ana and Caiaphas. In the letter, the reproach is made that the 

“population from Răciula is disappearing and no one defends it”, and the Church’s 

bishops left Christ and united with the unholy” 34 . However, the Soviet authorities very 

much appreciated Nectarie’s contribution to liquidating the Bessarabian monasteries: 

“There is worth mentioning that, in liquidating the monasteries Pripiceni and Dobruşa, 

31 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105, f. 22. 

32 Ibidem, f. 24. 

33 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, ff. 13-14 şi 17-18. 

34 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, f. 6.


the work provided by the diocese administration contributed to a great extent; therefore ... 

the bishop Nectarie disposed to be evacuated from the monasteries those monks who 

unfolded an undermining activity against the monastery shutting down. All practical work 

for liquidating these monasteries was directly made by the representatives of the 

diocese” 35 . Consequently, we may state that the revolt from the monastery of Răciula had 

not only anti-State, as most researchers in the field assert, but also religious character, 

manifested through disobedience against the local bishop. 

The collaboration of the archbishop Nectarie with the Soviet structures to the detriment of 

the spiritual authority continued during the following years. With the bishop’s approval, in 

the years 1959-1960, still other 171 churches were shut throughout the republic, there being 

abolished - 10 monasteries, fired - 88 priests, and in 1961, shut down - 44 churches, two 

monasteries and fired - 31 priests. Consequently, the years 1959-1961 were the most tragic 

for the entire Soviet period of the Orthodox Church from Bessarabia. 

The person of the archbishop Nectarie was the most marking for the church life in 

Bessarabia during the Soviet period, being a faithful representative of the 

collaborationism between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet State. Undermining the 

church sphere to the benefit of the laic one, in Nectarie’s case, is most clearly presented 

in the open letter published in 1960 by the archbishop in the “Journal of Moscow 

Patriarchate”, wherein he accuses U.S.A. of immixture in the life of other States, 

supporting N. Hruşciov’s position 36 . This loyalty was proved in the period when, in 

R.S.S.M., according to the “new cultural policy”, promoted in Bessarabia by the same 

Hruşciov, hundreds of churches were shut, the monks were cast off monasteries, tens of 

priest were fired and hundreds of thousands parishioners were intimidated. The 

explanation of Nectarie’s loyalty towards the Soviet leadership is also discovered in a 

strictly secret document, proceeding from the KGB archives, wherein there is described 

the activity of the operative and prophylactic activity in the fight against the clergymen’s 

menacing actions from 1959 37 . Among the conspiracy names in this document, there 

appears first the one of “KazanŃev”. As regards this KGB agent, the assertion is made that 

he holds leading function in the diocese. From the description of the agent “KazanŃev”’s 

activity, we may state that under this name, the archbishop Nectarie himself hid, who had 

been probably recruited by KGB ever since his being in the prison from Moscow, in the 

years 1944-1946, wherefrom he left without undergoing judicial process. The given 

assertion may be supported by the choice of the Russian bishop’s name. There is known 

that Nectarie originated in the region Cazani from Russia, in the town of Cazani, 

graduating theological studies. Consequently, the workers of the Soviet security gave him 

the conspiracy name KazanŃev, in honour of the town wherefrom the recruited agent’s 

hierarchical career started. This manner of infiltrating the security agents within the 

Russian Orthodox Church was traditional for the Soviet period. We suppose that the 

Russian bishops having followed the archbishop Nectarie were likewise KGB agents and 

contributed to the diminution of the religiosity from R.S.S.M. The declassification of the 

personal files from the S.I.S. archives of R. Moldova will help us to elucidating this black 

page in the history of the Orthodox Church from R. Moldova. 

35 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 91, f. 48. 

36 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105, ff. 120-121. 

37 V.I. Pasat, Hard pages of Moldova’s history, Moscow, editing house Terra, 1994, pp. 651-653, 

translated by V. Beşleagă in Cross overthrown by regime, the Raciula Monastery, 1959, Prut 

InternaŃional Publishing House, 2006, pp. 186-188.

202 


It is regrettable finding that the attitude and the contribution of the Primes of the 

Orthodox Church from R.S.S.M towards the persecution of the religious feeling and of 

the national traditions by the Soviet authorities during 1945-1962 was anti-Romanian 

and, many times, contrary to their status of Church leaders. Intimidated or tempted by the 

worldly, the church bishops submitted herein also proved spiritual weakness, often 

forgetting that the “Church’s reason to be is to preach the Gospel, as Saviour Christ asked 

from his Apostles after the Resurrection and, through them, from the followers of the 

overall Church; and to share with the people, through the Sacraments, the saving grace” 38 . 

However, despite the expectations of the atheist State, the mission of the Orthodox 

Church continued, being present and glorious in the souls of the hundreds of thousands 

Bessarabians who remained faithful to the Church of the Apostles and of the Holy 

Fathers. 

References 

1. Pasat,V.I., Orthodoxy in Moldova. Volume 1, Doc. № 58, pp. 278-286. 

2. Pasat,V.I., Hard pages of Moldova’s history, Moscow, editing house Terra, 1994, pp. 

651-653, (translated by V. Besleaga in Cross overthrown by regime, the Raciula 

Monastery, 1959, Prut International Publishing House, 2006, pp. 186-188). 

3. Păcurariu M., Bessarabia, aspects from Church’s and Romanians histories, Iaşi, 

1993, p. 125. 

4. Petraru Gh., Orthodoxy and Proselytism”, Trinitas Publishing House, Iasi, 2000, p. 

31. 

5. National Archive of the Republic of Moldavia, as follows ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5. 

6. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10. 

7. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12. 

8. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 24. 

9. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 56. 

10. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64. 

11. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1,d. 65. 

12. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 91. 

13. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1,d. 93. 

14. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105. 

15. Archive of the Social-Political Organizations from R. Moldavia, F. 51, i. 9, d. 44. 

38 Pr. Prof. Gheorghe Petraru, Orthodoxy and Proselytism”, Trinitas Publishing House, Iasi, 2000, 

p. 31.

TABĂRA NUNNERY UNDER THE 

SOVIET-IDEOLOGY DOMINANCE 

Liliana CONDRATICOVA 1 

Nunneries present, in our opinion, a special phenomenon in national history. The 

activity in various periods comprises clarifying aspects of a particular significance, 

inclusively the juridical and economic status, the social stratification and the dynamics of 

the monastic congregation, the typology of the nunnery (with one’s own or separate 

living), spiritual life, workshops etc. The diversification of the research sources and the 

corroboration between the historical data and those of the adjacent domains (psychology, 

art, ethnography) allowed approaching a series of issues referred to with the motivation of 

leaving to the monastery, opting for an ascetic monastic life, the process of 

“feminization” of the nunneries in terms of increasing their number, the relations between 

various monastic ranks within the community, the role of the abbess in affirming and 

strengthening the congregation. Researching these aspects becomes even more 

pronounced, considering the chronological limits, namely the operation of the nunnery 

under the dominance of the Soviet atheism. 

After the Second World War, the growth of the monastic congregations was firstly 

conditioned by the spiritual need of the widows, unmarried women, remained without 

their children’s support. The importance and the great number of the monasteries are also 

confirmed by the fact that, in 1940, in Soviet Russia, no monastery was functioning. 

However, once with appending Ukraine, Bessarabia, Belarus and the Baltic Countries, 

their number rose to 46, whereof 24 Bessarabian monasteries, five with their own living. 

According to the decisions of the USSR’s People Commissariat no. 1130-436 c “On 

Orthodox Monasteries”, along a decade, the monasteries were subjected to excessive 

benefits and taxes; and the Bessarabian and Ukrainian monasteries were compelled to 

contribute inclusively with alimentary products and financially to raising the country 

after the war and “constructing” socialism [1]. At the same time, in the framework of the 

nunneries, the most valuable and known creation workshops were concentrated, such as 

vestment and carpet manufacturing workshops, embroidery and crocheting workshops. 

The craft and artistic activities were favoured by the idio-rhythmical status (self living) of 

the monasteries. The separate living allowed the indwellers the work in the housesmonastic 

cells of their possession. 

As follows, we set out to restore the history of Tabăra nunnery ever since 1944 until its 

liquidation and monastic-congregation abolishment, settling common moments, 

particularized in the tragic fate, as compared to Hirova nunnery, placed at insignificant 

1 Institute of the Cultural Patrimony, Institute of Encyclopaedic Studies of Moldavia’s Academy of 

Sciences, Chişinău, Republic of Moldavia.

204 


distance from each other. The functioning of Tabăra convent is analyzed in terms of 

economic development during the Soviet period, situation of the monastic congregation, 

of the liturgical inventory and of the ornaments, which had greatly suffered during that 

period, being sold by the Soviet authorities, but also of the monastic-complex 

architecture, the cultural edifices being used for the necessities of the local kolkhozes 

(village clubs, hospitals for insane, orphanages). 

Tabăra nunnery dedicated to the Assumption is placed in the middle of the locality with 

the same name (Tabăra village, Orhei district, Republic of Moldavia), on the bank of 

Vatici river. It was founded in 1779 by the bailiff Darie Carp from Furceni [2]. 

The installation of the Soviet regime in Bessarabia (1940) had a negative impact on the 

autochthonous church, as churches and monasteries were shut, having been devastated 

and deprived of the accumulated goods. Tabăra nunnery, during the first Soviet 

occupation (1940–1941) was therefore deprived of all its goods [3]. After the disaster 

caused for a year by the Soviet authorities, in 1941–1944, the monastery registered some 

progress as regards the monastic community and economic development. In these years, 

the abbacy of the monastery was given to Tamara nun (Maria Alenic), who, on March 25, 

1938 was appointed abbess of Tabăra nunnery [4]. In 1941–1942, at the nunnery, 64 nuns 

and 36 obedient sisters [5] searched for soul comfort. Over a year, their number rose to 75 

nuns and 29 obedient sisters [6], fact which conclusively expresses the role of the 

monasteries. The cashier of the monastery was the nun Neonila (Natalia Manoli), who 

also was administer. Tailor and ecclesiarch was the nun Micdonia (Maria Ciorbă). The 

function of tailor was also fulfilled by the nun Manefa (Maria Vulpe). 

After 1944, a few nuns of Tabăra monastery together with the abbess retreated with the 

army in Romania [7]. In the monastery, 73 mothers superior and 78 obedient sisters [8], 

remained; and the abbacy was given to nun Mavra (Limari) [9]. Also during the following 

year, in 1945, at Tabăra monastery, 151 dwellers [10] are documented, inclusively 

15 minors, whereof 7 persons having entered the nunnery were under 12 years old, 

seven monks and priests-confessors. In 1947, once with the launch of the first wave 

of reprisals on the Orthodox church, the number of nuns practically diminished by 

two thirds, reaching 52 [11]. 

So as to assess the enormous damage caused by the Soviet rule, we remind that, shortly 

before the war, Tabăra nunnery possessed 55 ha of land, vineyard, orchard, vegetable 

garden, numerous cattle [12]. In wartime, the economic situation of Tabăra monastery 

was stable [13]. The wool-carding, carpet-choosing, household-object workshop 

successfully functioned. Once with the Soviets’ coming to power, the monastery had for 

its use 30,5 ha arable land, most nuns working the land and vineyard close to their homes 

[14]. The policy of the Soviet authorities was based on the labour force and on the 

mastery of the nunnery inmates. This way, on January 31, 1945, a contract was signed 

between the president of the consumer cooperative from MSSR, A. Kovaliov and the 

nunneries Tabora, Răciula, Vărzăreşti, Frumoasa, Hârjauca (as the most numerous and 

appreciated carpet and liturgical, priestly vestment-manufacturing workshops). According 

to the contract, the nuns received wool instead of monetary remuneration, they processed 

it and manufactured varied articles, the carpets being the most solicited [15]. The State 

could not allow the possession by the monasteries of significant agricultural terrains,

Liliana CONDRATICOVA: Tabăra Nunnery under the Soviet-Ideology Dominance 205 

which were also methodically seized for the benefit of the newly formed kolkhozes. This 

way, in 1945, Tabăra nunnery only possessed 20 ha arable land, 1 ha garden, 1 ha 

vineyard, overall 28 ha land; the number of animals being reduced (two horses, a caw, 4 

sheep) [16]. The nuns living in their houses possessed arable land between 0,5 and 2 ha, 

gardens, orchards, some sheep and goats, some poultry. 

Taxing and continuously diminishing the agricultural fields created discontent among 

the clergy, discontent attested not only in the church from Moldavia, but also Ukraine and 

Baltic Countries. Therefore, in order to calm the spirits and to attenuate the consequences 

of its reforms, the Soviet State adopted, in 1948, a law liberating for a while the 

monasteries from paying the construction tax and land rent [17]. 

The Soviets’ arms, along with the economic constraint, were completed through the 

clergy calumniating, through disagreement, through instigating to envy, disobedience 

towards the monastery administration etc. In this context, the letters and commentaries of 

the abbess Mavra (Limari) in the management bodies are significant in order to clarify the 

situation, which suited the authorities. This way, in 1948, she wrote a complaint wherein 

she mentioned that a carpet-manufacturing workshop functioned in the monastery; 

however, in the village, another such workshop was purposefully organized, named 

„Pobeda”, where the village lasses worked; however 7 young obedient listeners were coopted. 

She asked for a disposition for the nunnery inmates to work solely in the monastic 

workshop; as a matter of fact, there were created numerous disciplinary issues etc. [18], 

the abbess well noticing the intentions to open the workshop in the village. 

It is easy to understand that the abbess’ complaints did not stop, in 1949, the first 

attempt to close Tabăra nunnery. This way, as “the monasteries stand for the nucleus of 

the religious fanaticism etc.”, CC of PC (b) from MSSR, in its address towards CC of PC 

(b) of USSR, asked for the approval as regards the church-activity restriction and the 

monastery-number reduction, inclusively Tabăra [19]. In the created situation, the Soviet 

local organs forcedly occupied a few houses-monastic cells of Tabăra nunnery, provoking 

disobedience, violence; supplementary taxes were levied; the villagers, the people in the 

local kolkhoz were sent to feed from the monastic refectory [20]. 

In the beginning of the 1950s, during the abbacy of the nun Sepfora (Chiriacova), the 

monastic congregation was still on the rise, reaching 207 persons, inclusively 81 nuns and 

126 obedient sisters [21]. This positive dynamics is due to the cumbersome status of post- 

War Moldavian economy, to the search for consolation in monasteries especially by 

widows, but also to liquidating other monastic communities throughout the country, their 

indwellers searching for refuge in the still functional sacred abodes. According to their 

age, in the monastery was a minor, 25 dwellers between 18 and 30 years old, 32 inmates 

beneath 40 years old, 35 nuns under 50 years old, 12 persons aged between 50-55 years 

old, 13 persons under 60 years old, 34 dwellers under 70 years old and 36 persons above 

70 years old, inclusively 11 inmates above 80 years old [22]. 

Since 1953 until the monastery abolishment (1960), the monastic community was 

administered in turn by nun Raisa (Cebotari) and the nun Serafima [23]. It is the period of 

the second wave on the church and monastery liquidation, the policy of the Soviet 

authorities to reduce monastic fields, the taxing constraint and pressure taking an

206 


unprecedented scale. This way, in 1951, there were seized 0,5 ha land possessed by each 

nun in part, the community only possessing 11,55 ha of land, whereof 8 ha arable land, 

0,8 ha vineyard and 1,35 ha orchard [24]. The fields close to the nuns’ houses were 

drastically reduced, rendering impossible the maintenance of every dweller in part, but 

also of the churches and household facilities. 

By 1952, the news was disseminated that after liquidating Tabăra nunnery, only the 

carpet-manufacturing workshop will keep on operating, managed by president Isai 

Vasserman, a Jew, one of the first initiators to close the nunnery. Among the nuns, 

there also were some willing to continue the activity in the carpet workshop, such as 

Vera (Garştea), Xenia (Donescu) etc. The president of the workshop stated without 

reluctance that he would banish from Tabăra monastery any nun that would not 

apply for entering the carpet-manufacturing workshop and respectively giving up 

monastic life [25]. 

We notice that the opened workshop, through promoting libertinism, disobedience 

towards the management of the monastery etc., had an anticipated goal, namely to lead 

the monastic community to the idea of the necessity for the self-liquidation of Tabăra 

nunnery. The pride of this workshop, the famous Moldavian carpets, were well known 

and appreciated in the country and abroad, standing for a genuine historical-artistic value, 

therefore they opted for keeping the monastic workshop. 

Under these circumstances, we bring information on the workshop from Tabăra 

monastery, which was placed in a monastic facility, at 10-m-distance from the monastery 

and 20-m-distance from the abbey.[26]. Until 1952, between the abbey administration 

and the workshop management, an agreement was signed whereby only the monastery 

inmates could work here and the raw-material deposit was placed outside the monastic 

complex. However, in 1952, the president of the workshop modified the convention, 

enabled co-opting within the neighbouring village dwellers, he installed the radio, which 

much upset the abbess. In line with the aforementioned, the bishop Nectarie was to decide 

whether to liquidate the village workshop or to close the monastery. In the case of 

liquidating the former, the carpet-weaving workshop within the monastery would have 

remained without raw material, whilst its production was deemed the best in MSSR, 

being highly searched. 

In 1954, in the hope of paying all taxes and delivering some products even beyond 

the workload, the nuns from Tabăra thought they would not share the same fate with 

the monasteries already abolished at the time [27]. However, on January 1, 1955 the 

monastery fields were diminished again, reaching only 9,46 ha land, whereof 7,44 ha 

arable land; 0,82 ha garden and 0,89 ha vineyard [28]. The monastic land had been 

secularized; therefore some nuns were summoned to work at the local carpet factory. 

We notice, in this context, that the economic choking was a major measure in the 

monastery-liquidation process. In 1957, the commissioner on church issues P. 

Romenski had come with proposals as regards the diminution in the use of the land 

by the monasteries, pursuant to whom the land significantly diminished, the lands 

being unconditionally ceded for the benefit of the local kolkhoz. Thereby, Tabăra 

nunnery was entitled to use only the land within the perimeter of its yard [29].


We notice that the State’s policy in terms of economy and ideology bore fruit, the 

liquidation of the monastic community from Tabăra being unquestionable and very 

painful. The nuns opposed to their best, but in vain. In 1952, the abbess, together with the 

congregation of priests, wrote a letter wherein they tearfully explained that they had 

grown up in the monastery ever since childhood; that they had grown old there, too. And 

that “They undertake to be obedient, dutiful, submissive, lest their monastery should be 

closed, provided they should be allowed to further live at Tabăra” [30]. Soon, the abbess 

Sepfora wrote a new letter stating that after the discussion with the archpriest Iacov 

Baderău, in the monastery, rumours were spread that the monastic community would be 

abolished in two weeks’ time. The nun Tavifa (Ursu) much suffered because of the 

president of the workshop, attempting by various means to maintain a severe discipline in 

the monastery; therefore she was fired from the workshop and consequently remained 

without means of subsistence 

Tabăra nunnery was presented in front of the authorities as “an extreme evil and 

enormous danger for the population of Tabăra village, in the midst of which it is placed” 

[31]. We emphasize that the tendency to abolish the monasteries may be traced along the 

period. The six monasteries put out of evidence in 1958, were in fact soon closed. 

On January 1, 1959, at Tabăra lived 188 inmates, inclusively 95 nuns [32]. Of the total 

number, 171 nuns lived in their own houses-monastic cells, and 17 dwellers – in the 

abbey. During the same year, the monastic lands lessened to only 1,48 ha land, 

inclusively 1,3 ha arable land [33]. This way, the monastery, once very large and 

economically stable, in such conditions, was liquidated without supplementary efforts in 

early 1960 [34]. We mention on this occasion that an ideological activity for preparing 

the liquidation of the monastery was carried out, that anti-religious lessons were read by 

atheist lecturers, that the Roma people were forbidden to settle nearby, as they came out 

to defend the monastic congregations. A special commission, consisting of 13 persons, 

party activists, was created, directly concerned with liquidating Tabăra convent and with 

transferring the nuns to work in the carpet workshop. In order to use the nuns’ labour 

force and mastery, at Străşeni, in 1960, they planned to build a new carpet factory.[35]. 

Of the 180 indwellers, more than half were elderly. The youngest ones, the Council stated 

in its decision, should they want to pray, they might attend the churches in the villages 

nearby, placed at 3-6 km from Tabăra nunnery. 

In 1960, after numerous efforts to intimidate the monastic congregation, Tabăra convent 

was abolished. Most nuns remained at their homes, surrounding the two churches. 

Nowadays, the elderly nuns from Tabăra confess that they suffered a lot and that they 

hardly bore that the nunnery had been transformed into a place of debauchery. On this 

occasion, we emphasize that the carpets woven by the nuns from Tabăra are worth special 

attention and that they present an invaluable source for the study of the national 

decorative art, possessing a special historical-artistic value [36]. A while, the diligence of 

the nuns from Tabăra was exploited by the communists. A carpet-weaving factory made 

them famous in the former MSSR. The choice carpets by the artisans from Tabăra 

nunnery have always aroused the admiration of the art collectors and amateurs. Only in 

1959, of 180 dwellers, 80 worked at these carpets. After the closing of the monastery, in 

1960, the nuns skilled in the art of the traditional carpet were compelled to work in the

208 


workshop, and after 1971 – in the framework of the Craftsmen Association from MSSR. 

Nionila Manoli, Olga Leah, Vera Garştea, Mavra Limar etc. are worth mentioning among 

the famous nuns specialized in manufacturing carpets at that time. The adornment of the 

nuns’ present-day cottages stands for the most eloquent exemplification as regards the 

role of the carpets in the fate of Tabăra convent. 

During the liquidation of the church, the facilities of the monastic complex much 

suffered, the two churches, the abbey, the refectory. The church dedicated to the 

Assumption was transformed in club, and later in on – in granary, thereafter it remained 

empty until 1989, which occasioned its unhindered devastation and destruction of original 

architecture. In the other church, dedicated to the Holy Trinity, until 1989, the local 

school had been installed. The State institutions being placed here, until the re-opening of 

the nunnery, the churches benefited from some care. 

The liquidation of the monastic congregation and the closing of the monastery also 

caused an irreplaceable loss as regards the liturgical inventory and vestment. It is well 

known that the fate of the religious ornaments was tragic. Their small dimensions at 

enormous price, inversely proportional to size, led to numerous robberies of the churches 

and monasteries in search of precious pieces. It was the case of the icons with silver 

binding, of the various chalices, votive lights, censers, crowns, procession crosses, small 

baptismal crosses, embroidered flags. As such, these ornaments took to some antiques 

stores, were passed without reluctance across the borders with a view to being marketed. 

Deprived of numerous religious ornaments, the monasteries were obliged, after their reopening, 

to gradually gather and acquire another inventory; however the spiritual heritage 

of yesteryear was no longer recovered. 

In this context, the history of the Romanian heroes’ cemetery is worth pointing out. 

It is accurately known that during the Soviet dominance, the nuns from Tabăra 

convent secretly kept a list of the militaries from the Romanian Army buried in 

Tabăra village. The teacher Raisa Bârnaz of the local school recounted: “The list with 

the Romanian heroes buried in Tabăra graveyard is true. The front line being here, on 

Dealul Culii, when they died, they were brought to the monastery for the funeral 

service. They were all buried in a Christian way. Even if only parts of their bodies 

were found, their identity was reconstituted from documents and they were buried 

properly to a Christian. The known ones were registered in a list kept here, in the 

convent, by the nuns. The list was kept in the monastery and comprises names of 

Romanian soldiers who died in the 1944 withdrawal. “The nuns hid the list after the 

monastery had been closed, in 1960, as those heroes were said to be fascists…”. Most 

Romanian militaries were buried on the hill. The higher militaries, separately; the 

others, in mass graves. Formerly, the cemetery had remnants of wooden crosses. By 

1968, places for homes were given there. The local authorities offered the place of the 

graveyard to those who wished to build homes, but no one dared to begin the 

construction. Now, the crosses installed again in the graveyard only possess a 

symbolic character, as the tomb site does no longer correspond. In the list drawn up 

by the nuns, more than 70 dead persons from the nearby localities are registered. 

Those from Romania, in general, are not known and lie in mass graves [37]. 

We notice that, during the dominance of the communist ideology, the nunnery with 

independent living Tabăra had a tragic destiny, passing through a genuine Calvary. The 

policy of the Soviet authorities, underlain by economic constraint and intimidation of the


monastic community, by the destruction of the liturgical inventory and by the 

transformation of the monastic-complex facilities in clubs with free singing and dancing 

finally led to the liquidation, in 1959–1960, of a very large and economically stable 

nunnery. Along more than three decades, the monastic buildings much suffered, being 

used by the local authorities; the nuns were compelled to work in kolkhozes, their houses 

with all appended land being given to the kolkhoz or to village activists. The negative 

impact of having abolished the monastic congregation and having liquidated the 

monastery is still felt, after 20 years of independence. Deprived of land, with devastated 

churches, the monastery attempts to comply with the difficulties, to support the 

community of nuns, most of them being elderly, to restore the churches, the abbeys and 

the household facilities, hoping they would reach the former greatness of Tabăra nunnery. 

It was a period of agony for the people, faith and also for the institution of monachism; 

the monastic assemblies, the nuns and the priests, the possessions, the sacred ornaments 

suffering a lot. 

Table 1. Domain of Tabăra nunnery (1944–1960), possessed land [ha] 

1944 30.5 

1945 

Total – 28 ha, inclusively 20 ha arable terrain, 1 

ha garden ,1 ha vineyard 

1951 

1953 

Total –11.55 ha, whereof 8 ha arable terrain, 0.8 

ha vineyard and 1.35 ha orchard 

1955 

Total – 9.46 ha, whereof 7.44 ha arable terrain; 

0.82 ha garden and 0,89 ha vineyard 

1959 

Total – 1.48 ha land, inclusively 1.3 ha arable 

terrain 

Table 2. Dynamics of the monastic community from Hirova and 

Tabăra (1944–1960) 

Period 

Total number of nuns 

Hirova Tabăra 

1944 100 151 

1945 - 151 

1944–1945 163 - 

1947–1948 13 52 

January 1, 1951 - 207 

1952 173 - 

1957 170 - 

1.I.1957– 

12.VI.1959 

162 188 

1960 - 180

210 

References 

Table 3. Dimensions of the buildings of Tabăra monastic complex 

Building No 

Dimensions 

monastic interior /exterior 

cells [m 2 ] [m 2 ] 

Abbey 7 100.5 129.0 

Confessor priest’s house 4 48.0 60.0 

Two-levelled hostel 4 84.0 91.0 

Total 232.5 280.0 

Household facilities 3 44.0 60.0 

Stable for horses 15.0 24.0 

Three barns 111.0 151.0 

Total 170 235 

Carpet-manufacturing 

5 124.0 155.0 

workshop 

Summer church 160.0 216.0 

Winter church 107.0 140.0 

Total 267.0 356.0 

Table 4. Dimensions of the buildings of Hirova monastic complex 

Building No cells Dimensions 

interior/exterior 

[m 2 ] [m 2 ] 

Abbess’ house 6 92.0 135.0 

Priest’s house 4 46.2 64.0 

Two-levelled hostel 7 114.1 - 

Total 252.5 280.6 

Kitchen 5 49.3 - 

Barn 3 84.4 75.1 

Stable 3 75.6 107.8 

Winery 2 59.9 80.3 

Wattle or plate barn for - 33.6 37.3 

cereals 

Total 302.8 343.6 

Winter church - 76.5 94.0 

Summer church - 180.0 254.6 

Total 256.5 348.6 


1. Monaşestvo i monastiri v Rossii. XI–XX veca. Istoriceschie ocerchi. Moscva, Nauca, 

2005, c. 337-341 (Монашество и монастыри в России. XI–XX века. 

Исторические очерки. Москва, Наука, 2005, с. 337-341). Monahismul şi 

mănăstirile din Rusia. Secolele XI–XX. SchiŃe istorice. Moscova, 2005.


2. DesfiinŃarea schitului Fântâna Doamnei În: Arhivele Basarabiei, Chişinău, 1936, an. 

8, nr. 2, p. 59-61. 

3. Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova (în continuare: ANRM), fond 1135, inv. 2, 

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sub prima ocupaŃie sovietică (1940–1941) În: Buletin ştiinŃific. Revistă de Etnografie, 

ŞtiinŃele Naturii şi Muzeologie. S.N. volumul 13 (26). Etnografie şi Muzeologie. 

Chişinău, 2010, p. 229-240. 

4. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 1687, f. 14, 192. 

5. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 212. 

6. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 1687, f. 96. 


8. Beşleagă V. Cruci răsturnate de regim. Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959, Chişinău, Prut 

International, 2006, p. 54-55. 

9. ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 24, f. 3. 

10. Pravoslavie v Moldove. Vlasti, Ńercovi, veruiuşcie. 1940–1991. (Ortodoxia în 

Moldova. Puterea, biserica, enoriaşii. 1940–1991, în 4 volume. Red. resp., alcătuitor 

şi autorul prefaŃei V. Pasat), Moscova, 2009, vol. I, doc. 28). Православие в 

Молдавии. Власть, церковь, верующие. 1940–1991. В 4-х томах. 1940–1953, Отв. 

редактор, составитель и автор предисловия В. Пасат, Москва, РОССПЭН, 2009, 

том 1, c. 166-168, док. 28. 


12. Micşunescu Dimitrie P., Vizitând mănăstiri basarabene şi bucovinene. Bucureşti, 

1937, p. 61. 


14. Beşleagă V., Cruci răsturnate.., p. 54-55. 

15. Agachi Al., Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu (1677–2010), Chişinău, Pontos, 2010, p. 163. 

16. Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, c. 166-168, док. 28. 



19. Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova ( AOSPRM), fond 51, 

inv. 9, dosar 44, f. 45-50. 

20. Agachi Al., Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu, p. 165. 

21. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 188, f. 36. 


23. Православие в Молдавии. Том 2, c. 351, док. c. 351. 


25. ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 46, f. 19-24. 

26. Православие в Молдавии, Том. 1, c. 645-654, док. 159-162. 





31. Beşleagă Vladmir, Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 53. 

32. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 82, f. 259.

212 



34. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 189, f. 81-84. 


36. Condraticova L., Covoarele tradiŃionale din colecŃia mănăstirilor moldoveneşti – 

parte a patrimoniului naŃional in: Patrimoniul bisericesc – recuperarea trecutului. 

Rezumatele conferinŃei naŃionale din 5 mai 2012. Chişinău, 2012, p. 18-20. 

37. http://mitropoliabasarabiei.md/news/217/, accesat 5 noiembrie 2011

THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE FOR THE 

DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIA, REFLECTED 

IN THE CONSTITUTION DRAFTS BY THE 

OPPOSITION (1946–1947) 

Lora DONCHEVA 1 

Abstract: After the proclamation of Bulgaria for Republic on September 15, 1946 on agenda is 

the question of the elaboration of a new Constitution. The conflicting alternative ideas of the 

Fatherland Front and the opposition according to the constitutional structure reflected not only 

the polarizing of the political life in Bulgaria between 1946 – 1947 but also was the last open act 

of free will in Bulgarian society. The model of state and political system, proposed by the 

opposition was a validation of a modern state separation of powers in a system of state structures 

and government with a very specific competence and relationships built on solidarity and 

cooperation between them, accurately and clearly stating and protecting of civil rights and 

liberties. The constitutional views of the opposition described the pursuit of creating a public 

organization that will ensure the political, economic and spiritual freedom of citizens and 

generally progressive development of society. 

The power of the Fatherland Front (Otechestven Front – OF) established on 9 

September 1944 in Bulgaria did not ensure the constitutional, legal and democratic order 

in the country. On one hand, it formally recognized the Tarnovo Constitution, but on the 

other, with its legislation and political practice, it systematically violated it. In July 1946, 

the ХХVІ Ordinary National Assembly adopted a law providing for a referendum on the 

form of state governance and elections for a Grand National Assembly (GNA) to draft a 

new Constitution. The constitution issue put on the agenda had to address not only the 

question whether the Tarnovo Constitution was obsolete, but also whether the 

mechanisms of constitutional governance in Bulgaria were up-to-date in the second half 

of the 1940s and the idea of the democratic state was viable. 

The Fatherland Front concept for the organization of the state considers the principle of 

the separation of powers and the idea of the supremacy of popular sovereignty as 

incompatible. According to it, the unitary and indivisible power of the state cannot be 

separated, due to which as a fundamental constitutional principle is formulated the 

principle of the unity of power. In the draft Constitution of 4 October 1946, this principle 

is promoted by emphasizing the representative character of the governance by ensuring 

the supremacy of the National Assembly. A new system of relations between the 

constitutional factors has been created establishing the absolute power of the Parliament. 

Only the National Assembly can pronounce on the constitutionality of the laws created by 

it; decide on the amendment of the Constitution; elect the Chairperson of the Republic 


214 


(together with the representatives of the regional and district councils), the Prime 

Minister, the chairpersons of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Court of 

Cassation and the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic. 

In the area of the judiciary are combined the principle of election of the first magistrates 

with the principle of appointment of all other judges. Setting up of courts for specific types of 

disputes is envisaged. The Chief Prosecutor is subordinate only to the National Assembly. 

The Fatherland Front’s draft of 1946 reflects the existence of state, cooperative and 

private property and underlines the role of the state in the economic life of society. It 

lacks preciseness of terminology: it provides for “special protection by the state” of the 

acquired “through work and saving” private property; the explicit stipulation of its 

inviolability is avoided and the formulation “recognition” of private property is 

introduced; the questions of its inheritance are left in the hands of the ordinary lawmaker. 

The texts create uncertainty and conditionality regarding private initiative and enterprise, 

as through the common economic plan they are placed under the control of the state. 

In the draft by the governing coalition the citizens’ rights and freedoms are only listed 

as admissible but not bound by constitutional guarantees of their inviolability i . 

Fundamentally different are the convictions of the opposition, set forth in the 

constitution drafts by the Democratic Party (DP), by Prof. V. Ganev on behalf of the 

Bulgarian League for Protection of Human and Citizen’s Rights, by the Bulgarian 

Agrarian People's Union – Nikola Petkov (Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sajuz – Nikola 

Petkov, BZNS–NP) ii . The opposition’s views for the democratic system and functioning 

of society follow the tradition already enshrined in the Tarnovo Constitution. The 

emphasis falls on the organization of the state power and governance based on the 

principle of separation of powers, understood as a distribution of the functions of the 

unitary state power among different constitutional bodies. The separation of powers 

according to the opposition suggests exact designation of the competences of the different 

state bodies and building up their interrelations in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity, 

not confrontation or mutual exclusion. In contrast to the Bulgarian Workers’ Party 

/communists/ (Balgarska Rabotnicheska Partiya /komunisti/ – BRP/k/) and the OF, the 

representatives of the opposition relate the principle of separation of powers with the idea of 

the supremacy of popular sovereignty. The natural link between these two guiding principles 

for the organization of the modern state derives from the fact that the power is one, unitary 

and indivisible and as such it belongs to the sovereign – the people. The sovereign, however, 

cannot assign this supreme right to anyone, even to the directly elected by it people’s 

representation. The guarantee for the execution of the will of the sovereign is the distribution 

of the functions of the unitary state among the different state bodies. 

The Constitution and legal order are guaranteed by non-constitutional legal acts of the 

National Assembly through the activities of the Constitutional Court, which rules on the 

observance of the constitutional provisions in the process of law making. The 

constitutional guarantees regarding the executive are contained in the principle of 

parliamentary responsibility, through which the Government is bound by the Parliament 

and the right of the Head of State to appoint and dismiss ministers. The amendment to the 

Constitution is entrusted to the Grand National Assembly. Appointed and irremovable 

judges implement the laws and ensure the independency of the judiciary. 

The opposition’s constitution drafts explicitly guarantee the inviolability of private 

property and its unconditional inheritance. This principle is related to the conviction that 

private property and initiative are fundamental for the economic and social progress.

Lora DONCHEVA: The Democratic Alternative for the Development of Bulgaria… 215 

Constitutionalism is revealed in the consistent and comprehensive proclamation of human 

rights and freedoms, in the precise determination of the limits of interference by the state with 

respect to the citizens’ autonomy. In all drafts by the opposition comprehensively and 

thoroughly are set forth the personal, political and social rights of citizens. 

The freedom and inviolability of the person are bound by the constitutional prohibition 

for passing retroactive penal laws, setting up of exclusive courts, concentration camps 

and forced labour education homes, guaranteeing the secrecy of correspondence and 

inviolability of the home. Penal liability is personal and no person can be punished 

without a sentence passed by the respective court, which has become effective. Tortures 

of any form and any accusation are explicitly prohibited, as well as the confiscation of 

property as punishment for any committed offence. In the draft by BZNS-NP there is a 

text, which excludes the death penalty iii and in the draft by Prof. V. Ganev, the death 

penalty is permitted only in case of martial law, but even then it is impermissible for 

political crimes iv . 

The right of freedom of speech and press is clearly and unambiguously stipulated, 

bound by the prohibition of censorship of any form. The right to association and 

organization is guaranteed without asking the respective authorities for preliminary 

permission, as long as their aims and means are not contradictory to the Constitution and 

the state and public order. As a fundamental right is defined the freedom to assemble 

peacefully without any arms, without being obliged to ask any authority for preliminary 

permission. In the draft by the DP there is a text, prohibiting coercive persuasion on the 

citizens for membership in organizations and associations in order to enjoy their right to 

work, or to be awarded with “certain benefits and advantages of professional, economic 

or official character” v . 

The drafts by the opposition also lay down the fundamental social rights of the citizens. 

They provide for compulsory and free basic education, ensuring equal and free access to 

universities without any restrictions on the grounds of nationality, religious or political 

affiliations (art. 79 of the draft by Prof. V. Ganev) vi . Art. 101 of the draft by BZNS-NP 

defines education as “free and democratic” vii , and art. 121 of the draft by the DP 

recognizes the scientific and administrative autonomy of universities viii . The right to work 

and employment is related to the freedom of the citizens to choose for themselves their 

occupation and work (art. 122 of the draft by the DP) ix , as compulsory attachment to 

farms, factories or institutions (art. 96 of the draft by BZNS-NP) x . In all drafts by the 

opposition, the protection of the right to work is guaranteed by the right to trade union 

actions, including the right to strikes within the limits of the law. 

The democratic spirit is seen in determining the responsibility of the state when civil 

rights and freedoms are infringed. Art. 89 of the draft by Prof. V. Ganev underlines that 

the rights and freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be “restricted, limited or 

impaired” by any legal or administrative acts by state authorities or actions of individuals. 

Any encroachment on the rights and freedoms of the citizens is indictable. It is explicitly 

stipulated that any criminal offences committed against the personal inviolability, which 

are related to torture and violence against the detained person, “shall not prescribe with 

time, shall not be amnestied and those convicted of such offences may not be pardoned” 

xi . Though more briefly, art. 116 of the constitution draft by BZNS-NP clearly states that 

offences against personal inviolability, accompanied by violence against the detained, as 

well as those in case of elections or referendum “shall not lapse by prescription, the 

actions shall not be amnesties and the convicted persons may not be pardoned” xii .

216 


The state and political system model suggested by the opposition establishes the 

founding for the modern state principle of separation of powers, which requires a system 

of state authorities and governance with strictly defined competences and relations, built 

on solidarity and cooperation between them, precisely and explicitly proclaiming and 

guaranteeing civil rights and freedoms. 

The discussion on the fundamental principles of the new Constitution must be 

considered in the context of the common problem of establishing a state organization to 

ensure opportunities for material and spiritual fulfilment of the individual, guaranteeing 

the development and self-improvement of society. In that sense the contradictory in their 

nature constitutional views of the OF and the opposition constitute different systems of 

ideological values, in which the problems for the relation state – society, democracy and 

progress have different characteristics and solution. 

The opposition follows the ideological values of democracy, which is viewed not only 

as a development goal, but as a way of living as well. Its constitutional views reflect its 

endeavours to create such a mechanism of state power and governance, which will 

guarantee the political, economic and spiritual freedom of the citizens and the progressive 

development of society as a whole. According to the opposition, the optimal conditions 

ensuring democratic order are determined by the existence of constitutional, legal and 

social state. 

The collision of these alternative ideas about the constitutional system of Bulgaria 

reflects not only the polarization of political life in 1946–1947, but also the last open 

expression of free-thinking in Bulgarian society. After the Polish Meeting of the nine 

workers’ and communist parties in Europe in September 1947, in the countries with 

people’s democracy was imposed intensification of the changes towards a socialist line of 

development under the Soviet model. In such situation, on 4 December 1947, the new 

Constitution was unanimously adopted, in which the elements of parliamentarism were 

eliminated and was imposed the Soviet state and legal doctrine. This Constitution cleared 

the path for building a state and political model excluding the principles of democracy 

and affirming the dictatorship of the Communist Party. 

i Български конституции и конституционни проекти [Bulgarian Constitutions and Constitution 

Drafts]:. С. 1990, 154–166. 

ii 

Ibid., 167–212. 

iii 

Ibid., p. 195. 

iv 

Ibid., p. 210. 

v 

Ibid., p. 180. 

vi 

Ibid., p. 208. 

vii 

Ibid., p. 193 

viii 

Ibid., p. 179. 

ix 

Ibid. 

x 

Ibid., p. 193. 

xi 

Ibid., p. 211. 

xii 

Ibid., p. 195.

STATE INTERVENTION IN THE PERSONAL 

AND CULTURAL LIFE OF THE BULGARIAN 

TURKS DURING THE YEARS OF 

COMMUNIST REGIME 

Iliyana GANCHEVA 1 

Abstract: After World War II, defeated Bulgaria was left in the Soviet sphere of influence and controlled 

by the left coalition dominated by the Communist Party. From 1944 to 1947, the new government paid 

particular attention to the Bulgarian Turks to distinguish the line of the previous cabinets and to gain the 

support of this population, which in their social characteristics is a part of the social base of a left 

government. After this period a drastic change began in the policy towards the Turkish population. It 

was reported that tolerating and enhancing its cultural and religious characteristics led to its closure, 

isolation and alienation that was dangerous for the unity of the nation and of the country. The article 

presents this form of repression associated with the encroachment on cultural characteristics and 

identity of Bulgarian Turks in an attempt to modernize their lifestyle by removing the external signs of 

religious differences in clothing and family rituals and the emotional significance of these changes for 

them. All these measures have acquired sense for the Muslims as a cultural and historical boundary 

between their traditional lifestyle and the modern times. 

Nowadays the Bulgarian Turks have two memories of the recent communist past - on 

the one hand peace and progress, and on the other - repression, an attempt at violation of 

their personal and cultural life. The article treats precisely this form of repression 

associated with the encroachment on their cultural characteristics and identity in an 

attempt to modernize their lifestyle by removing the external signs of religious 

differences in clothing and family rituals and the emotional significance of these changes 

for them. All these measures have acquired sense for the Muslims as a cultural and 

historical boundary between their traditional lifestyle and the modern times. This was 

well understood by the ideologists of the campaign, who saw in it the first step towards 

the "taming" of these people for making them straight "builders of socialism." Significant 

in this respect is a statement of Pencho Kubadinki i since 1959, who claimed that all signs 

that distinguish the Muslims from the Bulgarians must be removed - religion, 

circumcision, fezzes and veils, with the argument that these would be revolutionary acts 

with great symbolic significance [4]. 

After World War II, defeated Bulgaria was left in the Soviet sphere of influence and 

controlled by the left coalition dominated by the Communist Party. From 1944 to 1947, 

the new government paid particular attention to the Bulgarian Turks to distinguish the 

line of the previous cabinets and to gain the support of this population, which in their 

social characteristics is a part of the social base of a left government [1]. The Turks are 

not only the largest minority, but in some regions of the country they represent a majority 

of the population. The results of the four census that were taken during 1946, 1956, 1965 

and 1992, the Turks were between 8 and 10% of the population [1]. 


218 


After the signing of the Paris peace treaty in 1947, the Government of Georgi Dimitrov 

received a full opportunity to decide on religious matters. The first step was the adoption 

in December 1947 of the new Constitution (the so-called Dimitrov’s Constitution). The 

paragraph 78 says: "The legal status of the religious communities, their maintenance 

issues, as well as the right to establish their internal organization and government, is 

regularized by a special law." That law was promulgated on the 09.01.1949 [2]. 

Since 1956 a drastic change began in the policy towards the Turkish population. It was 

reported that tolerating and enhancing its cultural and religious characteristics led to its 

closure, isolation and alienation that was dangerous for the unity of the nation and of the 

country. Along with the period of Stalinism the understanding of the Bulgarian governing 

for “multinational character" of the country adopted by the USSR was also gone. In 

parallel with the promotion in power of Todor Zhivkov a new line to the Bulgarian Turks 

was adopted, which focused on the fact that their home country was Bulgaria and they 

were "an integral part of the Bulgarian nation" [1]. This was connected with the other 

direction in the policy towards them – the restraint and the gradual overcoming of those 

religious, linguistic and national - household characteristics that distinguish them from 

the Bulgarians and whose culmination is the so-called Renaissance in the late 80s. The 

changes were interpreted by a part of the Turkish population as the beginning of a cultural 

assimilation. Many rituals and activities directly related to the Muslim faith were 

prohibited: in 1959 the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare decreed that for 

"humanitarian reasons", circumcision could be performed only by qualified physicians. 

This decree was the nature of prohibition, because at that time there was almost no 

Muslim doctors. Also traditional Islamic funeral on a wooden stretcher was banned due to 

hygienic reasons [2]. Even in the spring of 1951 by decision of the Politburo a special 

attention to medical care was paid. The Ministry of Public Health was required within 

three months to fill "all vacancies and other locally health services in the districts of 

Turkish population." The construction of new health centers and maternity homes was 

also provided for [11]. 

In his book Revival process in Bulgaria (1992), the author Stoyan Mihaylov argues that 

among the Ottoman Turks mortality was much higher than among the Bulgarians. Here the 

author even reaches the "enlightenment" that poor hygiene and unhealthy lifestyle of the 

Ottoman urban population - polygyny, buggery, consumption of tobacco, opium and coffee - 

were related to religion and made the Turks more susceptible to plague epidemics. 

What actually is the hygiene, the circumcision and the traditional burial practice for the 

Muslims, and what is the emotional significance for them of those prohibitions imposed 

by State authority? One of the main principles and doctrinal foundations of Islam 

enshrined in the Koran is: the purpose of the hygiene, the physical and the spiritual one, is 

the removal of negative external effects and the prevention of corruption because 

"cleanliness is half of faith" [10]. 

According to the Islamic religion, circumcision is one of the ten personal-hygiene 

Commandments that were imposed on the prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) by Allah and 

subsequently according to the Sharia’s law of Mohammed. They were turned into 

prophetic orders i.e. syunnet ii . The first circumcised man was Ibrahim, who circumcised 

himself at the age of 120. Then he circumcised his son Ismail (Isaac) at the age of 13. The 

Islamic theology accepts Ismail as one of the 28 major prophets, from who originates the 

whole family tree of Mohammed. In order to prove the divine predestination of the 

religious faith and uniformity of the Muslim blood, theologians argue that in ethnic origin

Iliyana GANCHEVA: State Intervention in the Personal and Cultural Life… 219 

all Muslim nations have the same beginning, i.e. they are descendants of Ibrahim and 

Ismail. By bringing the Arab-Turkish ancestry of the first righteous men who were 

circumcised, Ibrahim and Ismail, they aim to provide circumcision for specific, individual 

rite of their religion: "Circumcision belongs to Islam. It is a sign of the Islamic religion. A 

Muslim and one who isn’t Muslim are different because of this trait. So if you find a 

circumcised dead body among uncircumcised bodies, the circumcised person is 

considered Muslim, a prayer is organized for his funeral and the body is buried in a 

Muslim cemetery". So circumcision as "behest of the Prophet," inspired by Allah to 

maintain personal hygiene of the faithful along with the rinsing of the mouth and teeth 

brushing, shaving, shearing, nails cutting, depilation of the underarms and genital areas, is 

"enough" in further the Islamic theology to insists that there isn’t more elevated and purer 

religion than the Islam [13]. 

An important reason for establishing the circumcision as a household ritual is a 

ceremony marking the passage of the child in the group of adults (i.e. Initiation). The 

ritual is a dedication of the young Muslim in faith and community, starting magical and 

symbolic link to it. The meaning of this act precisely as scarring is encoded and in 

preserved ritual practice of placing item on the forehead of the child by blood, which may 

have a protective effect [4]. The circumcision of the children in Bulgarian Muslim 

families is one of the biggest holidays in infancy. It is honored like a child's wedding. In 

some areas, the festival continues for one week. In the villages a Dyulsaybiya is 

determined who organizes the party. Wealthy people who also have children for 

circumcision help him. He invites the chefs and the drummers. Children who have to be 

circumcised should be taken on horses and form a procession, like a wedding - go ahead 

standard-bearer with a flag of red print and stuck to it a bunch and a cloth. The procession 

goes to yard of the Dyulsaybiyata. There the man who circumcises begins first with the 

child of the householder, then everyone else. The wound of circumcision is covered with 

dust from the skin burned by the previous syunnet. During this time in the yard and the 

street play zourias, drums and whistles [12]. 

Led by "humanitarian" reasons - to protect the health and lives of children, the people's 

government took certain measures to circumcision. Originally it banned the practicing of 

circumcision by persons who did not have special permission from the health authorities 

in the country. Permits were issued only to those people who have more practice and 

some health education, enabling them to prevent serious damage to health and lives of the 

Muslim children [5]. Subsequently, the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare decided to 

eliminate the harmful practice, namely the circumcision to be performed by incompetent 

people - instances of people who performed circumcision. The issuance of a special 

district (from the 30 th of December 1959) banned all activities of those people in the 

country, for which severe penalties were provided, concluding that circumcision of boys 

is done in a very primitive and unhygienic manner that is unnecessary and harmful and 

often led to complications. To them were taken away their issued permits and was ruled: 

"The health authorities to prosecute offenders and hand them to the judicial authorities for 

seeking criminal liability." [4]. It is envisaged that circumcision should be performed only 

by qualified physicians with appropriate training, and necessarily in a hospital 

environment. After that, the children had to be hospitalized for 2-3 days. Thus the 

Ministry of Public Health sought the circumcision to be performed in all required health 

conditions that ensure the health and lives of children circumcised [5]. 

On the one hand, the normative act sought to "modernize" this practice and turned it 

into an operation in the medical sense by limiting the possibilities for complications and 

infections. On the other hand, the considerations of the district were not only medical and

220 


related to "health and enlightenment." It was the first step to the criminalization of 

circumcision. Began the removal and subsequent prosecution of people who performed 

circumcision for which this was something like a traditional craft. It became a part of the 

practice of physicians who in this period were almost entirely Christian. For a Muslim who 

believes, that means full or partial undermining of the act of initiation due to his shift in the 

“clean” hands, of hygiene and medical perspective, but "dirty" in a religious sense hands. This 

was the reason why parents massively sought to avoid circumcision in hospitals and continued 

to seek the services of well-known (and "safe") circumcisers who already illegally continued to 

practice their old craft [4]. Since the mid 60s the courts began to issue effective sentences of 

the circumcisers and later of the parents of the Children accepted the circumcision on the 

ground: "For inflicting heavy (or medium) injury." 

In connection with the traditional Islamic burial, the same Decree of 1959, also 

provided the introduction of coffins for all citizens, and thus replacing the open wooden 

stretcher, same for hundreds of dead, due to hygiene reasons. Following the traditional 

burial practice, Bulgarian Turks laid dead on a special funeral stretcher called tabut, 

which is stored in the mosque and is common to all deceased [3]. The tabut is carpeted, 

which wraps the dead. After the ritual of cleaning of the body, a characteristic of the 

Muslims, the dead man was wrapped in burial cloth (kefin), covered with a carpet strewn on 

the stretcher and so for the graveyard [7]. According to some authors, the introduction of the 

coffin into the burial practices and Bulgarian Turks was the implementation of Christian 

elements in the lives of this population. The same is done in respect of women's participation in 

funerals, the presence of music, the creation of common cemeteries, etc [9]. 

The party also takes measures to combat external signs of Turkish identity. The 

orientation of the ruling elite was to complete deletion of the Muslim religious identity. 

One of the first steps was the so called campaign of "removal of veils" that began in 1959 

and stretched through the first half of the 60s. These measures, accompanied by 

demonstrations of power inevitably turned into a manifestation of the regime's policy 

towards Muslims and left a lasting impression in their collective memory. On the other 

hand, they achieved the opposite effect. Instead of full inclusion, the closing and selfisolation 

were deepened [4]. 

For a traditional man, the clothing was an information sign for him and for the group to 

which he belongs. Through it, he determined in terms of gender, age, marital status, and 

material status, ethnic and religious backgrounds. Many thinkers from Muslim countries 

called religious covers "rolling prison" which bondages the woman in physical and 

spiritual meaning. The veil is not something original within Islam. It has existed in some 

ancient Eastern nations iii , copied completely and exalted as an absolute requirement of the 

god of Islam iv , as a sign of "moral clarity" of the Muslim women [8]. According to the 

Muslim tradition, wearing veils have been introduced by Mohammed, because he was 

very jealous of his youngest wife Ayshe from his own distant relatives and subordinates. 

As a favorite of the Prophet, Ayshe accompanied him in various treks and tours around 

Medina. The young and beautiful Ayshe attracted the men’s eyes, so jealous Mohammed 

following these cases, devoted a particular part of his home only for women, but when 

they left out, wanted to be covered with thick covers [6]. 

The regime was reflecting "the removal of veils" as a struggle between "new" versus 

"old" and Muslims - as a threat to their identity. All services to women with "old 

costume" (Nedelino village, regions of Zlatograd) have suspended. There were placed the 

appropriate signs informing that "women-of-date clothing are not served". The retail

Iliyana GANCHEVA: State Intervention in the Personal and Cultural Life… 221 

outlets themselves were even deliberately closed on Friday, so that the faithful coming 

from neighboring villages and hamlets of the mosque to be unable to buy food, and thus 

seeking to limit visits to religious services. So at the beginning of the 60s the pressure for 

change in the traditional clothing is intensified and became a major manifestation of state 

policy towards the Bulgarian Muslims [4]. 

In the 70s the assimilation policy towards the Bulgarian Turks began raising. In 1974, 

then the chief-ideologue of the Communist Party – Alexander Lilov insisted to replace 

traditional clothing and mainly Muslim holidays and rituals with a corresponding system 

of socialist holidays and customs. The introduction and promotion of new holidays and 

customs are likely to be assigned to the Fatherland Front. However, this step isn’t 

manifestly been met with much success. At a meeting of the Fatherland Front in 1980 on 

"The role of the Fatherland Front for the further strengthening of the socialist way of 

life," the secretary of the district committee of the Fatherland Front in Razgrad reported 

that the Islam practiced in 1973 still by 42.1% of the whole population of the county, 

showed a remarkable ability to resist. For example, the newly established civil burial 

ritual, was used only by 42% of people. Continue to occur and some conservative 

customs and traditions, dedicated to the founding family, the birth of children, the 

funerals, the mourning rites and the circumcision for children of Bulgarian Turks. To 

overcome that, they had to win the support of the Turkish women, who enjoyed a great 

honor as carriers of the household traditions. Measures for further education, but also 

courses such as "How to furnish my home," "How to celebrate my birthday" and "How to 

call my child" should awaken the interest of the women. Feasts and fashion shows were used 

for additional bait. Also in Kardzhali District was held this or similar events. But at the same 

time, the Delegate of municipal Fatherland Front-Committee noted: "Our successes are 

undeniable. But we worry about the stubborn adherence to some conservative traditions and 

petty tendencies. Still a terrible custom is honored that is prescribed by the Islam, the 

"circumcision" of young boys. It takes place in the family of Bulgarian Turks, and many of the 

descendants of forcibly converted to the Islam in the past." [2]. 

By the early 90s of the twentieth century, the state policy towards the Turkish population in 

the country, made by the Bulgarian Communist Party, has been characterized by its 

inconsistency and even contradiction. There are various options - from complete tolerance of 

its ethnic specificity in attempts to total obliteration. In the second option, depending on the 

extent and the scope of its application, there’s always an element of violence - physical, but 

significantly more psychological. The target of government policy chiefly was the conservative 

lifestyle, the low education level and the characteristics of the demographic and social structure 

of the minority, and the attempt to implement a socialist mode of conduct and content in the 

customary ritual system of the Bulgarian Turks. 

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7. Съботинова, Д. Семейник или колелото на живота., Силистра, 2002. Sabotinova, 

D. Family or the wheel of Life., Silistra, 2002. See: [7] 

8. Татарова, Е., Билялов, С. Религията и жената. – В: Беседи за исляма., С., 1960, 

201-212. Tatarova, E., Bilyalov, S. The religion and women. – In: Talk about Islam., 

Sofiya, 1960, p. 201-212. See: [8] 

9. Тахиров, Ш. Социалистическа обредност и духовно единство. С., 1984. 

Tahirov, Sh. Socialist rituals and spiritual unity., Sofiya, 1984. See: [9] 

10. Тeoфанов, Ц. Свещен Коран., С., 2008. Teofanov, Ts. A sacred Koran., Sofiya, 

2008. See: [10] 

11. Трифонов, Ст. Строго поверително! БКП и националният въпрос 1944-1989.-В: 

в. Поглед, бр.16, 22 април 1991. Trifonov, St. Strictly Confidential! Communist 

Party and the National Question 1944-1989.- In: “A Look” newspaper of 22.04.1991. 

See: [11] 

12. Цанева, Е. Обичаи при бременност, раждане и отглеждане на дете. – В: 

Етнографски проучвания на България. Родопи., С., 1994., 118-145. Tsaneva, E. 

Customs during pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing. - In: Ethnographic studies of 

Bulgaria. Rodopi. Sofiya, 1994, p. 118-145. See: [12] 

13. Ферхадов, И. Обрязването. – В: сп. Атеистична трибуна, 1980, кн 3, 53-61. 

Ferhadov, I. The circumcision. - In: Atheist Tribune, 1980, No 3, p. 53-61. See: [13] 

Notes 

i From 1958 to 1962 was secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 

ii The word "syunnet" primarily means the principles, rules and instructions of Mohammed, hence 

the tradition to circumcise boys is also called syunnet. 

iii Under the laws of the Assyrian slave state which existed 3000 years ago, a special law absolutely 

forbade women to walk in public with uncovered faces. A similar case existed in ancient Persia. 

But there it was connected with Zoroastrianism - an ancient religion, in which played a large 

role the worship of fire. The woman was determined to keep away not to blow out the fire in the 

divine fireplace. To avoid contamination with her "unclean," "unworthy" breath the Fire God, 

she had to close her mouth and part of her nose with a special headscarf [8]. 

iv O, Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to descend to 

themselves the veil [when they go out]. It is the most appropriate to be recognized and not make 

grieve. Allah is Forgiving, Most Merciful (Sura 33, verse 59) [10].

THE OPERATIONS OF THE ROMANIAN 

RIVER FORCES DURING THE EVACUATION 

OF BESSARABIA (28-30 JUNE 1940) AND ITS 

LIBERATION (22 JUNE - JULY 1941) 

Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO 1 , Florin STAN 2 , 

Dan Ionel CIOCOIU 3 

Abstract: With the Soviet ultimatum of June 26, 1940, under which Romania was forced to cede 

Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, the Romanian Royal Navy conducted evacuation operations of 

military units and refugees. In the following period the Romanian river naval forces discouraged 

Bolshevik troop’s incursions, breach of national territorial waters and their provocative actions. 

With the onset of Plan "Barbarosa", the Romanian Navy intervened with all forces to release the 

occupied territories a year ago, acting on the Danube, in southern Bessarabia, to annihilate the 

enemy and moving the front outside its operation area. 

1. Brief history of the Romanian river forces 

To address the action of the Romanian river forces is necessary to make a brief 

overview of the history of this category of force, to highlight the importance that our 

country has given to the river border, trough adequate facilities. 

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the military shipbuilding have made several 

improvements, among them there are a new type of warship, a small battleship to operate 

on river, but sometimes used even for maritime coast guard. The first vessel of this type, 

being called MONITOR, built by American engineer Erickson, was designed for the 

fulfillment of combat missions on the river during the War of Secession (1861-1865). 

Owned by the North American States fleet, the ship was sent to act against Confederate 

frigate MERRIMAC (first armored ship) who ruled the mouth of a river. Through the 

operations performed, MONITOR properly fulfilled its mission, forcing the enemy to 

withdraw MERRIMAC. Excited by this success, the Yankees continued to build many 

and named that class of ships after the prototype name i . 

At the same time, the new type of American ship found followers among river navies of 

other countries, among them enrolling also Romania ii . Since the late nineteenth century, the 

idea of construction of armored warships for the Danube Flotilla emerged, whereas in 1898 

the Parliament passed a law that opened, at the expense of the War Department, a credit of 

20 million lei, of which 4 million were awarded to the Navy for construction of two river 

monitors, three torpedo ships and to purchase necessary weapons for those ships iii . 

1 Romanian Naval Museum, ConstanŃa, Romania. 

2 Romanian Naval Museum, ConstanŃa, Romania. 

3 Major Staff of the Romanian Navy, ConstanŃa, Romania.

224 


Although to the credit allocated by that law was given another use, the idea of building 

monitors was not abandoned. In 1905, War Minister, General Grigore Manu, obtained 

from the government, for Navy, a loan of 12 million lei for construction of ships and 

naval weapons. Lieutenant Commander Petre Demetriade, as Director for the Navy in the 

War Ministry, a very energetic and enthusiastic officer, gave the best use for that money 

as was recorded later in one of the works of the Rear Admiral Nicolae Negrescu iv , 

ordering the shipyard in Trieste the construction of four monitors, and at a shipyard in 

England the construction of eight river patrol ships that were the first Romanian squadron 

of battle on the Danube. 

Monitors, whose construction at Stabilimento Technico Triestino of Trieste was 

supervised by Commander Constantin Bălescu v , had the following features: displacement 

680 tons, length 63 m, width 10.16 m, maximum draft of 1.60 m, and a speed of 23.1 km 

/ hour vi . These ships were powered by two triple expansion engines of 800 hp and had a 

crew of 113 people. In terms of armament of these vessels, given specific tasks were to 

meet, it was necessary to be armed with 120 mm caliber guns and small cannons of 47 

mm vii . Taking into account the need for execution of firing artillery upon pill boxes on the 

shores, hidden in valleys and protected by various obstacles, it was decided that the 

monitors had to be armed with howitzers. The whole artillery material was ordered to 

Skoda-Werke Company in Pilsen. As Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Commander 

Bălescu was sent to Pilsen to monitor the construction of guns and armor turrets, which 

would endow monitors. In the Journal of the Navy checking commission is noted that the 

March 1, 1906, was received a first batch of weapons necessary for monitors, consisting 

of three 120 mm guns, two 120 mm howitzers and four 47 mm cannons. At the same 

company in Pilsen was ordered and the required gun powder for ammunition, on which 

clarifications are in the correspondence between representatives of the Skoda Company 

and the Romanian Ministry of War in the fall of 1906 viii . In early 1907, the construction 

of different parts of monitors was completed and their Skoda weapons consisted of three 

120 mm guns, one installed in the bow and the other one in the aft, each protected by 

armored turrets, two 120 mm howitzers each, four 47 mm guns each and two 6.5 mm 

machine guns each installed on spardeck ix . 

Regarding of the monitors’ armor it had different thickness, depending on exposure to 

the artillery strikes. Thus, on the hull the armor had a thickness of 76 mm, on deck had 25 

mm and the armored turrets had 50 to 75 mm thickness. 

Since the passage of warships of any kind through the straits was banned under treaties 

in force, the monitors could not be assembled in builder shipyard, instead were 

transported, section by sections, by rail, to GalaŃi. On an improvised dockyard of the 

Navy Arsenal in GalaŃi the vessels were assembled and permanently riveted, the 

operation being carried out under teh supervision of a Trieste shipyard engineer and 

Commander Bălescu x . 

On September 19, 1907, in an official occasion, the launching ceremony of the four 

monitors xi took place at the Navy Arsenal in GalaŃi which was named after four 

Romanian political personalities of the late nineteenth century: MIHAIL 

KOGALNICEANU, LASCĂR CATARGIU, ALEXANDRU LAHOVARI and ION C. 

BRĂTIANU. 

In June 1913 the Second Balkan War broke out, caused by Bulgaria, which attacked 

former allies of the First Balkan War. Seeking to counter any attempt to form hegemony 

in the Balkans, the Romanian government decided to enter the war against Bulgaria.

Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO et al.: The Operations of the Romanian River Forces… 225 

Naval campaign lasted until August 1913, while the General Navy Headquarters was in 

Turnu Măgurele. The Danube Flotilla ensured passage of troops across the Danube, 

guarding of bridges and other operational targets, support landings, material transport, 

including locomotives and wagons, supplies and transports of injured xii . 

During World War I, the Romanian Navy has performed various missions, of which the 

most important were: the attack on August 14, 1916, of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet in 

Rusciuk harbor, the action of Danube Flotilla to defend the beachhead Turtucaia and 

protect Romanian troops in the area, supporting the right flank of the army in Dobrogea 

under direct fire of German artillery xiii . 

Referring to how the fleet supported our land troops and managed to advance under 

heavy fire of the seven German batteries, in his memoirs, Rear Admiral N. Negrescu 

noted: The days of tracking the left flank of the German army in Dobrogea and days of 

Rasova engagements will be forever consider a glorious page of the small but brave and 

tireless Romanian Flotilla. 

In the fall of 1916 the flotilla has achieved a number of successes, like advancing under 

the German batteries fire and even to liberate a number of small villages in Dobrogea, 

previously occupied by the enemy. With the withdrawal of the Romanian Army for 

recovery in Moldova, in December 1916, the Flotilla ceased the offensive actions 

focusing on defense, particularly to protect the evacuation of all of the Navy ships on 

Chilia Canal. In 1917, the Romanian Danube Flotilla supported the army to defend the 

Danube front by shelling the enemy batteries of Tulcea, and securing the river 

communication between GalaŃi and Sulina xiv . 

During the last year of war (1918) the Navy received one of the most difficult tasks and 

that was the sweeping of the Danube and the coastal area of Black Sea in order to resume 

shipping in peacetime. 

After World War I in 1919, under the influence of the Bolshevik movement, some 

revolutionary sailors started to organize themselves and prepare a general revolt of the 

Romanian Navy. The center of this rebellion became Chilia Nouă where the main vessels 

of the Danube Flotilla were concentrated. The movement ignited initially on LASCĂR 

CATARGIU and MIHAIL KOGĂLNICEANU and then widened to include large masses 

of sailors. Moreover, it was an attempt to coordinate the sailor mutiny with other red 

disorders and actions organized in Galati, Tulcea, Vâlcov, Reni, Ismail and mutinous 

military units in Chilia, Tulcea, and Ismail. A committee was established to manage and 

prepare the uprising actions, which began to operate on April 1919, consisting of five 

sailors, a corporal and a soldier from monitor MIHAIL KOGĂLNICEANU, two 

sergeants from LASCĂR CATARGIU and one sergeant from the fast patrol boats. To 

illustrate the moment, it is a significant testimony of Rear Admiral Dorin Iacomi. He was 

the executive officer and artillery commander onboard of BRATIANU when seamen 

revolt broke out in 1919. Referring to the living conditions that led to the sailor mutiny, 

he said the following: Crew thrown into the Danube the lentil soup and began to talk 

about what happened in the barracks. Some resigned, others were outraged and proposed 

to react, even violently, by applying certain sanctions on officers, petty officers and 

enlisted, then raise the revolutionary red flag as the Russian sailors did once. Then with 

the two monitors in Chilia to navigate downstream to the Black Sea and joined the Soviet 

Red Fleet, wherever it was. They proposed Sergeant Helmsman George Cimpoieru as a 

commander of the revolutionary group; he enjoyed the confidence of the crew and 

sympathy of all sailors xv .

226 


Following a denunciation, the rebellious sailors were arrested and prosecuted, in total 

about 24 people. The trial took place at the court martial of the Third Army Corps. Eight 

defendants were sentenced to death, including Cimpoieru George and all the others to 

hard labor. During the appeal trial in ConstanŃa, one of the defenders of the sentenced 

sailors was the same Iacomi Dorin. Court Martial of ConstanŃa commuted the death 

sentences and hard labor for life with imprisonment for fewer years xvi . 

In the period following the end of the war, the Danube Flotilla received three monitors 

coming from the former Austro-Hungarian Fleet as spoils of war, which were named after 

the three Romanian provinces returned to the natural boundaries at the end of the war; 

ARDEAL, BUCOVINA and BASARABIA xvii . 

2. Romanian Navy actions during the evacuation of Basarabia 

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union has sent to Romania an ultimatum through which 

our country was forced to cede Basarabia and northern Bucovina. In these conditions, all 

Romanian naval forces have adopted measures to strengthen the surveillance system to 

prevent an enemy attack. On May 27, Rear Admiral Alexander Gheorghiu, commander of 

the Danube Flotilla has raised the state of alert of all the subordinate forces in the 

Bessarabian ports and order the evacuation of the military units, administration and 

refugees. To perform this complex task, the Navy and Air Ministry gave him in support 

all the available vessels and port authorities. The monitors have provided coverage at 

Vâlcov, Chilia Nouă, Ismail and Reni xviii . 

The evacuation started on 28 June, being mobilized all civilian ships, tugs, barges and 

boats, state or private companies owned, which together with warships had made river 

crossings with land troops, weapons and ammunition xix . 

During the evacuation there were numerous incidents that the Romanian sailors have to 

solve promptly. Were about 25 000 people, mostly Hebrew, which made troubles at 

Tulcea and GalaŃi, and requiring passage on the left bank of the river Prut. Their transport 

was carried out on August 29 and 30, from GalaŃi to Reni and Tulcea to Ismail xx . 

A special situation was created in different towns such as Chilia, Ismail or Vâlcov. 

There, authorities and security forces left their posts, so the police role was supplanted by 

Romanian sailors, who often used the small armament fire to enforce the order. On June, 

29, at Ismail a local soviet committee was established and armed groups of civilians fired 

on the retreating Romanian army with the sailors responding properly and the evacuation 

ends around 12.00. Also, Reni was occupied by Soviet troops on the morning of June 30; 

the Romanian ships were evacuated to GalaŃi. The Soviet army disregards the deadline 

specified in the ultimatum so that a large quantity of arms, ammunition and archives left 

by Romanian troops was captured xxi . 

As the Soviet army act unpredictable and inconsistent with the ultimatum, to ensure the 

Danube three marines battalions had been deployed to Periprava-Chilia, Sulina-Sfântu 

Gheorghe and Tulcea, with the task to respond to possible enemy crossings in Danube 

Delta. Also, to emphasize freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Danube Flotilla 

ordered to tug GIURGIU to navigate from GalaŃi to Tulcea, although the Soviet 

authorities asserted that there is no recognizing for the international status of the river. 

After July 4, the shipping was resumed, disregarding enemy threats xxii .


To determine the land and river border, the Romanian government appointed a 

commission, one of the members being Rear Admiral Alexandru Gheorghiu, who 

onboard the passenger ship TRANSLVANIA, went to Odessa, on June 29. The talks 

lasted until July 7, the border line being agreed on Chilia Canal down to Musura 

Canal xxiii . 

Although the Soviet demands were met in the aftermath have been reported numerous 

incidents at the border. Among these include xxiv : 

• A group of enemy monitors landed troops on the night of October 25, 1940, on the 

islands of Daleru Mare and Salangic where few Romanian conscripts were captured; 

• On the morning of November 5, 1940, the Soviets occupied the island between Musura 

Canal and Stari- Stambul Canal, which led to the boundary changes; 

• Early next year the enemy actions conducted hostile actions with the intention to occupy 

the Danube mouths, but the Romanian forces response was strong. 

All these acts have created a tense challenging to the Romanian Navy, who had to 

organize a continuous observation of the enemy and establish an effective mining of the 

access routes towards its own positions 

3. Romanian River Forces operations during the outbreak of Plan "Barbarosa" 

On June 22, 1941, the Romanian naval forces consisted xxv of two groups of ships, 

according to specific area of operations and war plans: River forces and Sea forces. 

The River forces intended to be the pivot of the southern sector of the eastern front; lean 

against the Danube, with a length of 155 km, from river Prut to Periprava had an active 

defensive stance while the left wing of the front had to execute a pincer movement on the 

general direction southeast. 

The Navy had the mission to contribute to the coastal defense of the naval bases sectors 

and to protect sea lines of communications. 

These two great groups of forces acted according to the Plan for use of the Navy at the 

beginning of hostilities, plan which was further amended during the war, the amendments 

being dictated by the phases of the operations on the Eastern Front. 

The Soviet forces xxvi had an absolute superiority that enabled them to develop offensive 

operations. Soviet Navy ship had a total displacement of over 200,000 tons and 700 guns 

from caliber 302 mm to 20 mm. Soviet ships had on board a large number of mines and 

torpedoes. The Romanian Navy, had a total displacement of only 28,000 tons, and only 

120 guns, encompassing all sizes, from 150 mm to 20 mm. 

The Romanian naval forces operating both, on the Danube and sea, out of their 

numerical inferiority to the Soviet forces, presented a number of difficulties in terms of 

quality, because almost all of the ships were old and worn, no longer met the war 

requirements. The sweeping equipments were insufficient and incomplete, which greatly 

limit the use of naval forces in the areas susceptible to be mined. In addition, it was 

lacking in maritime aviation. 

The disproportion between the two navies highlights the difficult task of Romanian 

forces, who found it alone facing the Soviet fleet, from the first day of war. With modest 

means at its disposal, had to defend the coastline, to provide the allies transport in the 

Black Sea, to perform other tasks important and difficult as well. By the fall of 

Sevastopol, all the combat missions, all the actions in the Black Sea were carried out 

exclusively by means of the Romanian Navy xxvii .

228 


The Soviets had the river very well organized and well equipped in all aspects xxviii . Very 

strong points fortified, provided with plenty of large caliber artillery, on which the entire 

Soviet defense rely on, were held in Reni and Vâlcov. 

The Giurgiuleşti - Reni area was the pivot of the entire defense of the Lower Danube. 

Given the importance of this area, the Soviets organized early, important works of concrete, 

and installed large-caliber artillery. Three monitors type "MARTINOF" and a considerable 

number of fast ships, fast boats, and armed patrol boats also remained in the area. 

From Reni to Ceatal Ismail, the Soviets had, all along the Danube, observation and 

surveillance points protected by very powerful artillery. 

At Ismail, the enemy forces were numerous with their disposition being reinforced with 

barges and light boats – fast boats, amphibious tanks - which led to the conclusion that 

the region Ismail - Chilia Nouă was offensive organized. In the area, for the same reason, 

were three monitors, two of them type "UDARNIC", armored, with 130 mm guns. All 

along Cartal, Ismail to Chilia Nine were placed numerous primary and secondary 

airfields, close to the combat zone, having the command and supply center at Ismail. 

At Vâlcov, the Soviets had fewer ground forces, but framed with large number of 

artillery pieces. 

Enemy forces in their totality, had combined left flank of the front, securely attached to 

the Danube, covering the withdrawal of their troops in southern Bessarabia. The coastal 

artillery and ships actions continued, combined with an intense aerial bombardment and 

land actions - crossings and beachheads designed to hold our potential offensive and to 

provide evacuation and withdrawal. Landing of troops were made to occupy important 

points on the right bank of the Danube and neutralize the Romanian forces action to 

ensure freedom of navigation on Chilia Canal. 

The Romanian dispozition, from GalaŃi to the sea, had, in general, the following 

shape xxix : 

In Brăila – GalaŃi area was deployed a group of four monitors, two river gunboats, a 

group of underwater weapons, armed boats, patrol and auxiliary ships, supported by land 

forces artillery from GalaŃi, having the main task to ban with any costs, any attempt of 

Soviet forces to move upstream and endangering the safety of Galati, and as secondary 

mission to destroy the Soviet monitors in Reni, mitigating the risks for its own monitors, 

if possible, and keep the ships intact for the subsequent operations. Also near Cotul 

Pisicii, a mine barrage was installed and a powerfull system of surveillance and 

observation was set up. 

From Cotul Pisicii – Isaccea area up to Ceatal, the defense of the Romanian bank was 

provided exclusively by the land troops (10th Infantry Division) which, using a Navy unit 

(an observation company), had the main task to stop any Soviet infiltration to the 

Romanian river bank and destroy enemy ships traying to withdraw downstream, and the 

secondary task being to destroy the Soviet batteries and to support by fire, on request, the 

actions of Romanian river groups. 

From Ceatal - Tulcea area to the sea was set the dispozition of 1st Maritime 

Detachment, consisting of three marines battalions equiped with artillery and small boats. 

The operations in this area were led by the 10th Infantry Division. 1st Marine 

Detachment mission was mainly to keep the position at any cost, to oppose any attempt to 

land at Sulina - St. George and, as a secondary mission, to try to occupy Vâlcov with the 

forces at its disposal.


To coordinate the actions between units of the Danube Delta and the 10th Infantry 

Division, and as to strengthening of these forces, was established in Tulcea, a battle group 

consisting of two monitors, four fast patrol boats and a group of underwater weapons. Its 

task was to install mine barrages to ban Soviet vessels crossing from one area to another 

and help with its mobile forces the land forces action, acting also as Tulcea area defense 

reinforcements. 

Campaign on the Danube was divided into two distinct periods, namely: 

• Period I, until the Soviet withdrawal from Bessarabia - July 22; 

• Period II, after the Soviet withdrawal from Bessarabia. 

On June 22, 1941, war broke out at 3.15. Navy operations orders were sent by special 

courier on 18, 19 and 20 June. 

Even before the war began, the Danube Flotilla ships had made real warfare xxx . On the 

night of June 20, a dam consisting of 16 mines was installing, placed on two lines, at mile 

76, on the Danube. The mines were from the WW I stock, having the ignition from ashore. 

The following night, on June 21, more precisely on the morning of June 22, at 2.30, 5 

and 6 armor fast boat made an operation contamination with magnetic mines in the old 

hermitages (km 4.4 to 4.5) being launched me on two lines 10, the distance between me 

100 meters. 

At 03.15, the whole artillery, from GalaŃi way down to the sea, opened a lively fire on 

Soviet positions, while executing some inroads on the left bank, which were rejected by the 

enemy. The hammer of fire lasted 45 minutes, and the Soviet reaction was insignificant 

across the Danube front. The fire duel was intermittent. The heaviest bombardments were 

carried out in three areas: GalaŃi – Cotul Pisicii to Reni - Giurgiulesti, Tulcea - Ismail and 

Chilia - Vâlcov. Of these sectors, only in Chilia, after all indications, our disposition was 

attacked by the Soviets with the intention to take over the whole Chilia Delta, to cut the 

communication between Tulcea and Sulina, to rush into Dobrogea in order to overthrow, if 

possible, the Romanian front from Măcin – Brăila to Prahova Valley. In this sector, for three 

days without interruption, the entire area was heavily bombed by enemy’s aviation and 

artillery xxxi . On June 26, after an artillery preparation made by concentrated fire of five 

batteries, two of them heavy caliber, against Chilia Veche, at 03.00, the Soviet troops landed 

on the Romanian bank, being aided by eight fast patrol boats. Overwhelming superiority of 

Soviet troops made our forces to retreat with heavy losses. Strategic reasons made the 

Soviets not to exploit the success of this action xxxii . 

In the GalaŃi - Reni area was executed artillery firing by the Romanian monitors upon 

the Soviet positions, mainly in order to estimate the enemy forces strength and their 

disposition. The firing frequency was high, many times with one or two duels daily. Each 

time, the Soviets responded with the artillery placed at Giurgiulesti and on monitors upon 

GalaŃi and our ships. The results of these bombardments were insignificant. The artillery 

firing was more consistent in Tulcea - Ismail area although the artillery pieces there were 

few in numbers. The Soviets systematically bombed Ceatalchioi and Lascăr Catargiu, 

villages which were held by them for short periods of time xxxiii . 

On June 27, at 10.03, three Soviet fast patrol boats of the Ismail steamed to Ceatal to 

enter the Danube, but Romanian fast patrol boats, hull number 1 and 3, engaged them and 

made them to withdraw, one being burned, the other two retreating to Ismail xxxiv . 

Because of their combat actions on the land front, the Soviets withdrew the river forces 

from Reni – Isaccea area to Ismail during the night of July 8. On that night, at 22.00, 

taking advantage of a thick fog, the Soviet monitors succeeded to leave the Cuhurlui Lake

230 


into the Danube. Very well camouflaged, with engines stopped, preceded by three fast 

patrol boats, they use the river stream to reach Ceatal. Romanian observation posts 

alarmed the artillery batteries and Tactical Group of Tulcea. It began a shellfire, but 

imprecise. Soviet ships started the engines at mile 45 and in full speed passed through the 

artillery barrage made by monitor MIHAIL KOGALNICEANU, which was at mile 42, 

and the small caliber guns fire of Pătlăgeanca, reaching Ismail xxxv . 

During this period continued the mining of the Danube. The mine layer AURORA had 

installed a mine barrage at the mouth of Sulina Canal and released stream mines against 

Soviet monitors. On July 15, after nearly a month of war, after carrying out the received 

tasks, AURORA was sank in Tulcea area by the Soviet aviation, together with barges 

DANIEL and AGAPIA xxxvi . 

In the first month of war, ships and Romanian crews were kept in constant alarm and air 

strikes, with no time for rest and recovery. Were subjected to air attacks all villages and 

towns in Danube Delta and towns of Sulina, Tulcea, GalaŃi and Brăila. 

The advancement of the land front in Basarabia to south, led to a sudden withdrawal of 

forces from the Soviet river disposition, on July 19. In the Reni – Izmail area, the enemy 

burned their ammunition and stores because it was little time to escape. At 04.30, the 

Soviet ships, 3 monitors and 11 fast patrol boats had passed the village Periprava firing 

with all weapons. After two hours, there was another passage and the bulk of the Soviet 

forces were evacuated through Otchakov Canal to the sea. It was also hastily evacuated 

Vâlcov to Jibrieni xxxvii . 

The next day, July 20, a Romanian Marines Company landed and took Reni. 

Simultaneously, the action of sweeping the mine barrages installed by the Romanian 

forces on the Danube started including the mines launched by the enemy. The sweeping 

began at Cotul Pisicii trough Reni, Isaccea and ended at Ceatal. The monitors in GalaŃi 

went downstream anchoring, by 20.00, near Pătlăgeanca on Chilia Canal. The same day, 

a detachment of the 10th Infantry Division crossed the Danube without opposition, 

evidence that the area was deserted. The River Group 2 from Tulcea swept between miles 

48 and Ceatal - Ismail and sweeping resumed the next day by Ismail with 3 fast patrol 

boats and 3 barges modified for this purpose. It was subsequently executed Pătlăgeanca 

mine barrage sweeping, paving the way to a passing convoy made up of 3 passenger ships 

and 6 barges loaded with troops of 10th Infantry Division. Few hours’ later 16 barges 

with four tugs to transport the troops of the second echelon arrived in Tulcea xxxviii . 

In the early hours of July 21, 15th Marines Battalion occupied Chilia Veche, passing, 

then, in Chilia Nouă and 17th Infantry Battalion took Vâlcov and continued for Jibrieni. 

Thus, on the morning of June 22, around the entire Danube Delta and all three canals 

were under Romanian control xxxix . 

At this stage another difficult and continuous operation began for the Danube Flotilla. 

Its task was to ensure navigation by cleaning the reeds and all canals of unexploded 

mines, shells and aviation bombs. The Danube Flotilla moved its headquarters at Tulcea 

to be closer to the future theater of operations. The monitors had provided safety for the 

sweeping forces and transports from GalaŃi to Vâlcov. Tugs, boats and fast patrol boats 

provided the transport of munitions and supplies of all kinds, day and night xl . 

After the arriving in the area of the 2nd Army Corps, Marines infantry battalions were 

ordered to advance on the littoral to Cetatea Albă in order to clean the shore, employment 

of the observation points and establishing communications with Sulina xli .


During sweeping actions mines were discovered outside the mined areas themselves. 

On July 24, tug CERNA jumped on a mine at mile 69, and sank immediately. On 25, tug 

BICAZ was hit by a mine at mile 61.5 and grounded and tug HELIDOU sank at mile 

42.5. On the same day, on Chilia Canal at km 112, two tugs, AMURG and MUREŞ, had 

broken into each other xlii . 

As a consequence of liberation of Basarabia, the Romanian seaside widened up to 

Limanul Nistrului, the Tactical Group Liman was established, under the command of 

Captain Nicolae Bardescu. The group was subordinated to the Danube Flotilla. 17th 

Marines Battalion was deployed along the coast of Basarabia with a fixed maritime 

observation positions at Zolocani, Burnas and Budochi. To this group were made 

gradually available, boats, barges, troops transport ships and river gunboats xliii . 

The next stage was to continue, with high intensity, the troops, ammunition and 

supplies transportation along the Maritime Danube. All those tasks were performed 

superbly under the Danube Flotilla protection. 

i Joannès Tramond, André Reussner, Éléments d’ histoire maritime et coloniale contemporaine, 

(1815-1914), Société d’Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, Paris, 1932, pp. 101-110. 

ii Lt.Cdor Ion Bălănescu, Răsboiul naval pe înŃelesul tuturor, Bucureşti, 1915, pp. 48-49. 

iii X X X, Monitorul Oficial, nr. 42 din 27 mai-8 iunie 1898, p. 1466. 

iv C.A. Nicolae Negrescu, Rolul marinei în războiul pentru întregirea neamului şi recompensa 

finală, Bucureşti, 1920, p. 162. 

v 

X X X, Revista marinei, nr.4/1929, pp. 3-5. 

vi 

X X X, Calendarul maritim /1914, pp. 256-257. 

vii 

Arh. M.Ap.N. fond DirecŃia V marină, dosar 78/1906-1907, fila 521. 

viii 


ix 

Lt.Cdor Ion Bălănescu, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 

x 

X X X, Registrul matricol al monitorului ALEXANDRU LAHOVARI. 

xi 

X X X, Marea Noastră nr. 7-8/1938, p. 264. 

xii 

George Petre, Ion Bitoleanu, TradiŃii navale româneşti, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991, p.117. 

xiii 

ibidem, pp. 190-206. 

xiv 

ibidem, pp. 209-211. 

xv 

Arh. M.Ap.N., fond C.M.M., dosar 287/1919, fila 469. 

xvi 

Georgeta Borandă, Istoricul monitoarelor româneşti, în Momente din istoria Marinei Române – 

Lucrări de cercetare, 1984, fila 34. 

xvii George Petre, Ion Bitoleanu, op. cit., p. 236. 

xviii Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, Glorie şi dramă. Marina Regală Română 1940-1945, Editura 

“Ion Cristoiu”, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 26. 

xix ibidem, p. 27. 

xx ibidem. 

xxi ibidem. 

xxii ibidem, pp. 27-28. 

xxiii ibidem. 

xxiv ibidem, pp. 29-31. 

xxv Dorin Mara, Marina Regală a României în cel de Al Doilea Război Mondial, Editura 

Economică, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 30. 

xxvi 

ibidem, p. 29. 

xxvii 

ibidem. 

xxviii 

Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 

xxix 

Dorin Mara, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

232 


xxx 

Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 

xxxi 

X X X, Dosar Răsboiul neamului contra bolşevismului. OperaŃiunile Marinei Regale Române, 

Biblioteca Muzeului Marinei Române, fila 22. 

xxxii 

Cpt. R.1 Ion Raicu, Marina militară română în campania din anii 1941-1944, în dosarul 

Momente din istoria marinei române. Lucrări de cercetare, Biblioteca Muzeului Marinei Române, 

1986, pp. 111-112. 

xxxiii 


xxxiv 

ibidem. 

xxxv 


xxxvi 


xxxvii 

Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., p. 57. 

xxxviii 


xxxix 

Cpt. R.1 Ion Raicu, op. cit., p. 112. 

xl 

ibidem. 

xli 


xlii 

ibidem. 

xliii 

ibidem.

THE LENINIST ALIMENTARY 

DICTATORSHIP - THE MODEL FOR 

STALINIST HUNGERS OF 1931-1933 

AND 1946-1947 

Vadim GUZUN 1 

Abstract: One of the means having favoured the power conservation by the Bolsheviks was the 

alimentary one. Taking control over the alimentary resources meant not only supplying the 

proletariat, the army, the emerging huge repressive apparatus, but also subordinating the great 

mass of the population. Amid the civil war, the economic disorganization and the international 

isolation, the regime’s solution consisted in draining the survival-necessary resources from the 

rural environment. The study deals with the “fight for bread” – a process having ended in the 

hostile peasants’ physical liquidation and in converting the survivors to the ideology underlain by 

communist-socialist principles. Based on sources from the former Soviet archives, published after 

the USSR disintegration, but also on autochthonous thematic sources, we set out to reconstitute 

the internal political context from Soviet Russia and Ukraine. The use of violent means applied on 

a large scale by the Bolshevik regime explains the Sovietization by starvation of tens of millions of 

people in an extremely short time, the population’s massive resistance. This approach facilitates 

comprehending the subjective and objective factors having determined the essence of the Soviet 

hungers, the reaction of the authorities and of the affected population. The model of Stalinist 

hungers from 1931-1933 and from 1946-1947 may be found in Leninist great hunger, which 

peaked in the years 1921-1922. 

The Bolshevik revolution and the civil war deeply and irrevocably undermined the 

internal situation in the former Russian Empire. The sanitary and alimentary situation in 

towns had become unbearable. In the year 1918, the living conditions, well below 

endurance, were marked by the lack of food: a worker’s daily ration was below half the 

minim level necessary for survival. Intellectuals made no exception, internationally 

renowned scientists suffered from the urban food crisis, reckoned by some researchers 

rather a distribution and exchange issue than a production one, given that the paralyzed 

rail was not able to ensure the normal food flow. Another main cause of the urban crisis 

was the peasants’ refusal to sell their products in exchange of the money that had no 

longer value. The executive’s attempt to acquire agricultural products at fixed prices had 

the opposite effect, obliging the peasants to reduce the cultivated surfaces 2 . 

In this context, the assertion that Russia returned to the Middle Ages-specific 

production and living means seems pertinent. Furthermore, amid the not very good 

harvest of 1917, the food supplies from 1918 were correspondingly affected. In some 

1 Romanian Academy, Bucureşti, Romania. 

2 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy: a history of the Russian Revolution, New York, Penguin Books, 

2007, pp. 607-608.

234 


regions, the cereals that the peasants disposed of not only were not enough for the 

agricultural campaign, but were not sufficient for supporting the families. Whereas the 

inhabitants from such areas went in more favoured areas, in order to buy grain, millions 

of townsfolk moved to the countryside, so that, for instance, during 1918-1920, according 

to some sources, the population of Petersburg diminished by approximately 75%. The 

still functioning economic units joined in cooperatives, carried their products in the 

countryside and exchanged them for food. The spring of the year 1918 was marked by the 

generalization of this phenomenon, deepened the workers’ absenteeism from plants and 

factories, reaching in some places to 80% 3 . The economic decline was also accelerated by 

the fact that, by the year 1919, the property of the big industrial units had passed to the 

State in a percentage of 90%, and by late 1920, all companies counting more than 5 

employees had been nationalized 4 . 

War communism, as an expression of the “socialist centralism” and of the military 

subordination of the economy 5 , stood for the Bolshevik solution to the crisis. On the 9 th of 

May 1918 it was regulated that any grain surplus belonged to the State, the 

representatives of the Power being convinced that, unless they succeeded in extending 

their control over the rural environment, the revolution would be annihilated under the 

weight of the starved cities. The “fight for bread” was not a mere slogan; it had become 

the expression of the new regime’s fight for survival. One of the most efficient 

instruments of this fight consisted in organizing the armed brigades of requisition, whose 

modus operandi consisted in occupying the localities and violently seizing the cereals 6 . 

The appeal from the 31 st of May 1918 of the Soviet Presidium Petrograd of enrollment in 

the supply detachments announced that, on the 29 th of May, the gathering of all 

organizations of workers, sailors, soldiers and railway men decided to send the best men 

under the slogan: “To the countryside for bread for hungry Petrograd!”. “Comrades, time 

does not wait. Join the regional Soviets. Address in Smolnyi, room 41. We need hundreds 

and thousands of honest workers!”, the above-mentioned Soviet’s cry closed in 7 . 

Among the measures that were to ensure the installation of the alimentary dictatorship, 

there were the introduction, in the months of June and July 1918, of the food rationing 

cards on four categories, first in the capital, then in other towns, the urban hunger peaking 

in late 1918 – early 1919 8 . The conflict between the urban and rural environments and the 

crimes incited by the leaders from Petrograd are also confirmed by the Romanian 

militaries from the I st Corpus Volunteers: “Villages, however, need the wheat from the 

3 Ibidem, pp.611-612. 

4 I.T. Berend, Decades of crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, Berkeley, 

University of California Press, 2001, p. 205. 

5 I.V. Bystrova, “State and Economy in the 1920’s. The Battle of Ideas and the Reality”, in 

Otechestvennaya Istoria no. 3, 1993, pp. 19-20. 

6 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 614-619. See the examples submitted by the author. 

7 I.M. Volkov, L.M. Papin, D.K. Shelestov, Documents and materials about the USSR history. The 

Soviet Period 1917-1958 (in Russian), Moscow, Moscow University Press, 1966, p. 83. 

8 S. Adamets, Guerre civile et famine en Russie. Le pouvoir bolchevicue et la population face a la 

catastrophe demographique (1917-1923), Paris, Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 2003, pp. 64, 75, 91.

Vadim GUZUN: The Leninist Alimentary Dictatorship - The Model For Stalinist Hungers … 235 

country-side. Without it, villages cannot live. And the villagers refuse to give it for free or 

for the prices fixed by the Soviets” 9 . 

The tone of the collection campaign was given by Kremlin, this being one of the 

regime’s priorities. V.I. Lenin’s letter towards A.D. Tsiuriupa, the Supply commissioner, 

from the 5 th of August 1918, as regards the collection from the county of Eletsk, province 

of Orlov, is relevant to this purpose. The administrative unit being one “wherefrom much 

bread could be taken”, Lenin ordered: “To be immediately sent, with maximum rapidity, 

in the county of Eletsk, all detachments of food, harvest and requisition, with the 

maximum number of thrashers and equipment (if possible) for the rapid drying of the 

bread etc. The task should be immediately given for the county to be cleaned of all bread 

surplus. This will probably yield a few million poods of bread” 10 . On the 8 th of August, 

Lenin accused the “counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie” of blocking the executive in the 

fight against hunger and asked the Council of the People’s Commissars to intensify the 

“merciless mass terror” against the “traitors who, through intensifying the hunger, tried to 

help the foreign robbers”. . According to the founder of the Soviet State, the “heroic fight 

with famine” should have contributed to the installation of the proletariat’s dictatorship, 

the peasants who held some grain surplus had to be declared “people’s enemies”, arrested 

and condemned, the hidden and undeclared bread – seized with no payment, the opposing 

grain traders – executed on the spot if they were armed 11 . 

In order to understand the peasantry’s counter-reaction, we quote the first Bolshevik 

leader’s instruction towards the president of the Commissars’ Council of the Province of 

Penza, the president of the Provincial Committee of RKP(b) and the president of the 

Provincial Executive Committee, from the 11 th of August 1918: “Comrades, the riot of 

five koulak volosts must lead to merciless suppression. This is in the interest of the entire 

revolution, as the final decisive battle with the koulaks is fought. The example must be 

given: 1) to be hung (necessarily hung – so that the people should see) no less than 100 

known koulaks, wealthy and blood-suckers, 2) their names should be published, 3) all 

their bread should be taken, 4) the hostages should be designated, according to 

yesterday’s telegram. To act so that on a radius of one hundred versts, the people should 

see, tremble, know, shout: the blood-sucking koulaks are strangled and will be strangled”. 

The revolt that Lenin referred to was liquidated on the 12 th of August 1918. The peasants 

having participated in the murder of 5 food agents and of 3 members of the local Soviet 

from the village of Kucika as well as the organizers of the revolt were shot 12 . 

Only in the interval July-August 1918, more than 200 uprisings were registered against 

the food commandos, which searched for and qualified the hidden grain as surplus and 

not as vital reserves. The confrontation between the civil population and the requisition 

expeditions had reached dramatic quotas, producing victims on both sides, especially 

when the alternative for the numerous families wherefrom all products were confiscated 

9 V. NiŃulescu, Twenty Months in Russia and Siberia, vol. II “The Years 1918-1919. In the 

Soviets’ Capital. Beliefs in Siberia” (in Romanian), Bucharest, United Romanian Publishing, pp. 

64-65. 

10 See the letter in I. Mintz, E. Gorodetsky, Documents on the History of the Civil War in the USSR 

(in Russian), vol. I, Moscow, Politizdat Publishinhg, 1941, p. 165. 

11 Ibidem, pp.165-166. See Lenin’s appeal towards the Council of the Peoples’ Commissars. 

12 I.N. Amiantov, I.A. Ahapkin, V.N. Stepanov, V.I. Lenin. Unknown Documents. 1891-1922 (in 

Russian), Moscow, Rosspen Publishing, 2000, pp. 246-247.

236 


was very clear. The reply of a village from the region of Samara to the food robbery and 

to the brief execution of a few peasants consisted in beheading the 12 members of the 

food brigade, as well as in exposing the murdered activists’ heads at the entrance in the 

village, in guise of warning for other brigades. Three weeks later, the village was 

bombarded by the army and subsequently burnt down. Another means used by the 

Bolshevik authorities consisted in organizing “blocking detachments” – they controlled 

and seized the products of those attempting to reach the cities. Beside cereals, pecuniary 

means, clothes and alcoholic drinks were seized 13 . 

Another method for “collecting” the grains, which vitiated the rural society, consisted in 

artificially dividing the peasants into “wealthy” and “poor”, in using the latter as poorpeasant 

committees. The respective committees were organized on a local level under the 

leadership of the Agricultural Commissioner and of the Soviets’ Executive Central 

Committee. According to the decree VTsK from the 11 th of June 1918, signed by Lenin as 

president of the Council of the People’s Commissars, combedy were authorized to 

distribute the bread, to support the local supply organs in the activity of seizing the 

“surplus from the hands of the koulaks” and benefited from privileges in distributing the 

seized products and from discounts in buying the bread seized from the so-called koulaks. 

In the localities wherefrom the “surplus” was thoroughly seized, the committees benefited 

from a discount of 50% in buying the essentials of living and the agricultural machinery; 

and in those that “energetically helped the alimentary organs” they were remunerated 

with free of charge use of the more sophisticated agricultural machinery 14 . 

Another normative act, with destructive effect on the agricultural producers, signed by 

Lenin, on the 11 th of January 1919, was the Decree as regards razverstka 15 between the 

provinces producing grain and fodder to be placed at the State’s disposal. To the purpose 

of ensuring the urgent bread supply of the Red Army and of the “breadless districts”, 

strict rules were set for alienating the “grain and fodder surplus to the State’s benefit”. 

Razverstka was applied to the cereals meant for trading, but also to those meant for the 

agricultural campaign; and meant the taking over of the grain and the fodder from the 

population at State-fixed prices (derisory) in very short timelines – 1 st of March, 

respectively, 15 th of June. The peasants who did not observe the share-delivery timelines 

were confiscated the reserves discovered by the food agents and those who hid the 

reserves or opposed the delivery were to be sanctioned, including by wealth confiscation 

or prison. This way, the entire agriculture was subordinated to the State interests or, better 

said, to the huge administrative apparatus, police and army 16 . 

As a matter of fact, by the year 1919, the peasant could only retain from his own 

production what was strictly necessary to his family – the rest had to be delivered to the 

State, so as to receive in exchange industrial goods. This is where there intervened, on 

one hand, the peasants’ resistance, hiding the agricultural surplus and, on the other hand, 

the requisition measures. The villagers answered in many regions with “bloody and 

permanent” uprisings 17 . In Siberia, in the meadow of the river Uda, the revolution had 

13 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 618-620, 622-623. 

14 I.M. Volkov et. all., Documents and Materials…, op. cit., pp. 83-85. 

15 The obligation to deliver towards the State the surplus of alimentary products. 


17 E. Bufnea, Cruciaders, Tirants and Thieves, vol. II “In Kolceak’s Siberia” (in Romanian), Baia 

Mare, Marist Publishing, 2008, p. 25.


destroyed any return on livestock farming that had amplified before the war, and the 

authors of the requisitions belonged to both camps: “Sometimes the red ones, other times 

the white ones rob the population of everything they find in the barns and around the 

house. They also commandeered hunting weapons; the game and wild animals rose in 

number, often constituting a danger to the life of the humans and domestic animals.” In a 

village from Taiga, in the month of August 1919, the Romanian volunteers discovered 

one of the most ancient means to hide the grains and the winter garment: digging 

graveyards. Moreover, the volunteers confirmed the peasants’ refusal to work and the 

intensification of the requisitions, following the “drastic measures” for supplying the 

army 18 . 

A pressure means whereby the State “stimulated” draining the cereals, with mostly 

terrorist nature, was taking hostages. Relevant examples in this respect may be found in a 

volume of documents on the theme of the anticommunist resistance from Western 

Siberia. Considering the “difficult” alimentary situation, the deputy head of the Political 

Office from the county of Ishimsk and the deputy provincial commissar for the supply of 

Tyumen, in the beginning of the month of December 1920, ordered the “immediate arrest 

of all koulaks, no exception”, from a number of 8 volosts. It was stipulated that the 

population should be informed that the villagers were taken hostages until the overall 

execution of the food tax. From the telegram of the supply commissar of the county of 

Tobolsk, there ensues that in the Abalax county, a 35-member detachment was delegated 

for confiscating the wealth, following the lack of payment of the State obligations, 

mentioning that, previously, 10 peasants were taken hostages. On the 10 th of December 

1920, the provincial commissar of the supply, discontent with the results of the seizures 

from the volost of Ghilev, showed that, for ensuring the fulfilment on time of the 

razverstka, a “brutal and merciless retaliation with the koulaks” was called for. 

Furthermore, Yndenbaum asked that, in every locality, 10 hostages should be captured 19 . 

The main reason for the resistance from Western Siberia was the fear of famine. 

According to the minutes of the Soviet organizations in the province of Tambov, of 

21 st of July 1919, already affected by hunger at the time, the party activists 

recognized that if they disposed of the grain from Siberia, Don and Ukraine, they 

would not have been compelled to “take the last bread slice from the peasant”. A 

report from late 1919 shows that the State almost exclusively obtained all grain 

through confiscations, through detachments constituted according to concrete plans. 

Isolation ensured the success of the punitive expeditions: “The detachments usually 

acted from the periphery to the centre of each county, in order not to allow the 

passage of the bread from one county to another; pickets were installed on all roads, 

in order to eliminate the possibility for the bread to pass within the county”. These 

detachments confiscated the entire annual surplus. Perfecting the forced-seizure 

mechanism is rendered this way: “If, according to last year’s system, the peasant 

could refuse, as he risked nothing; this year his situation changed, as he risks all 

18 Ibidem, pp. 42, 53-54, 117. 

19 V.I. Shishkin, For Soviets wihout Communists. The Peasants’ Revolt in the Tyumen Gubernia. 

1921. Documents (in Russia), Novosibirsk, Sibirsky Hronograf Publishing, 2000, pp. 52-53, 56.

238 


bread and all cattle he possesses”. Such mass requisitions were accompanied by 

conflicts and riots, the peasants used the women and children as human shield against 

the detachments. Military units likewise organized requisitions 20 . 

On the 11 th of January 1920, A.M. Bolshakov showed in a report what happened to the 

cereals confiscated from the county of Shatsk, province of Tambov: “To the extent of 

necessity, detachments were called for to lift the surpluses; cases are sometimes met of 

taking the last bread, not letting even the peasant’s ration. This system gives us no right to 

hope that peasants will succeed next year in sowing the fields. Furthermore, in the 

collection points, there are 250 thousand grain poods, waiting to be loaded and 

transported to the Centre, however they do not give us wagons. Because of the improper 

depositing spaces, the wheat begins to rot”. In these conditions, according to a report of 

the Provincial Party Committee, until the 1 st of February 1920, in Tambov, 10 million 

poods of grain were collected from the plan of 27 million poods. The abuses perpetrated 

by the alimentary agents were known. The agitations intensify as, during the collection, 

the requisition detachments resort to inadmissible repressions: the peasants are beaten, 

locked in cold barns”. The answer of the abused village consisted in the mass 

assassination of the communists involved in collection campaigns 21 . 

We intentionally presented the requisition actions, the army or the paramilitary units 

playing an important part in the alimentary and riot-repression campaigns. In the regions 

wherein the “collection” was more ferocious, during the years 1921-1922, the famine has 

made the largest ravages 22 . The peasants’ generalized resistance manifested not only 

under passive forms, but also under the one of the armed revolts, on a local and regional 

level. If, in the year 1918, there were assassinated 200 members of the “food brigades”, in 

the year 1919, the figure rose to almost 5 000, and in 1920 – above 8.000. By the year 

1920, Soviet Ukraine was crossed by anti-Bolshevik revolts 23 , and Central Russia by the 

peasants upraised under Antonov’s leadership. In Belarus, the revolts forced the 

evacuation of Minsk and Smolensk. The regions Voronej, Saratov, Samara, Simbirsk and 

Penza were seething. In the mountains Caucasus, the insurgents’ number exceeded 30 

000. In Siberia, the regions Tyumen, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Tobolsk, Ekaterinburg and 

Tomsk stood out. The industrial activity of the cities was blocked by the workers’ strikes. 

The bread ration was reduced to 1/3 24 . 

The consumption per capita diminished for some products by up to 95% as compared to 

the pre-war years 25 . The topic of the food was discussed in all corners of Russia. At the 

Metallurgic Workers’ Conference, from February 1921, Lenin qualified the internal 

situation in the following terms: “This winter, the peasants are in a desperate situation. 

The peasants must sow the entire area; otherwise we will perish – indisputably!” Lenin 

admitted that rail transportation was no longer functional, which meant the impossibility 

20 V.P. Danilov, L.G. Protasov etc., Antonovschina. The Peasants’ Revolt in the Tambov Gubernia. 

1920-1921 (in Russian), State Archives Tambov, Tambov, 2007, pp. 103, 110-113. 

21 Ibidem, pp. 114, 124, 134. 

22 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 752-753. 

23 See the insurgence movement of the peasants in V.A. Smoli (coord.), The History of the 

Ukrainian Peasantry (in Ukrainian), vol. II, Kyiv, Naukova Dumka Publishing, 2006, pp. 7-19. 

24 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 753, 758-759. 

25 See comparative table in F.A. Golder, On the trial of the Russian Famine, California, Stanford 

University Press, 1927, pp. 10-11.


of transporting the bread towards Moscow. The solution adopted for the moment 

consisted in replacing the abusive requisitions with fees and in liberalizing the market. As 

a matter of fact, it was about a new economic policy 26 . In the month of March 1921, 

despite recognizing the sharpening of the food situation, because of the agricultural 

collections, Lenin claimed that “the peasant must starve a while; so that the overall 

hunger of the companies and cities should be thereby avoided” – those that ensured the 

support of the Party and Bolshevik executive 27 . 

The Communist leaders were ready to do anything to save the regime, including giving 

up the generalized requisition and allowing the marketing of the agricultural products. 

After heated debates on the theme of the possible action options for taking the agriculture 

out of the crisis, on the 15 th of March 1921, the X Congress of RKP(b) decided to replace 

razverstka with the tax in nature and thus fixed the coordinates of the passage to Novaia 

Ekonomiceskaia Politika (NEP). The VTsIK decree of 21 st of March 1921 as regards the 

tax in nature stipulated that the new taxation should be lower than the previous one, 

should cover the necessities of the army, of the urbane population and of the one not 

yielding agricultural products; however, it should be so determined that, after paying the 

tax, all alimentary reserves, raw material and fodder be left to the producer 28 . The 

possibility of realizing agricultural products on the market was very important and with 

deep connections in the peasant’s mentality – even if the change did not generate 

immediate results, from political standpoint, many popular riots were stopped. 

By the spring of 1921, a quarter of Soviet Russia’s rural population was starving. 

Typhus and cholera epidemics were rampant. Millions of peasants tried to save 

themselves, heading towards the industrial centres, without knowing that access to the 

great cities was blocked, under the pretext of combating epidemics. The cannibalism 

cases increased – only in Bashkiria, in Pugacev and Buzuluk, hundreds of cases were 

reported, one of the investigated persons confessing that, in his village, everybody ate 

human-origin meat, inclusively in catering places. The cases of scavengers were equally 

common 29 . The figure of the hunger-affected population in March 1921 reached 26 

million in Russia and 7.5 million in Soviet Ukraine 30 . Following the Bolshevik 

agricultural and fiscal policy, the cereal agricultural surfaces reduced from 60.4 million 

desiatinas in 1916 to 46.2 desiatinas in the year 1920. Moreover, in the State’s account, 

only in 1920, the immense quantity of 347 million poods of cereals was confiscated from 

the population 31 . In the “hunger area”, approximately 70 million people were caught – 

more than 50% of the population, and in the epicentre – up to 35 millions 32 . 

The TsIK decree of the 21 st of June 1921 qualified 9 territories as “starving”: Astrahan, 

Tsaritsin, Saratov, Samara, Simbirsk, Viatka, the Germans’ Republic on Volga, of the 

Tartars, Maroblast, and the decree from the 8 th of August recognized 5 other provinces 

26 L. Fischer, Russia`s Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations.1917-1941, New York, 

Harper&Row, Publishers, 1969, pp. 53-54. 

27 M. Wehner, “The Famine in Samara Gubernia in 1921-1922 and the Reaction of the Soviet 

Government”, in Cahiers du monde russe, 1997, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 227. 


29 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 776-777. 

30 R. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik regime…, op. cit., p. 411. 

31 V.V. Kondrashin, The Famine of 1932-1933. The Tragedy of the Russian Village (in Russian), 

Moscow, Rosspen Publishing, 2008, p. 319. 

32 Ibidem, p. 323.

240 


from the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic (Kazakhstan): Uralsk, Orenburg, Bukeev, 

Aktiubinsk, Kustanai. Through the decree of the 13 th of August 1921, there were added 

on the list of hunger: the province Ufa, the regions Ciuvashia and Kalmykia, through the 

one of the 29 th of August – Votiaks, in the autumn, there were added the Republic 

Bashkiria and Chelyabinsk, and in April 1922 – Crimea, Perm and 3 provinces of Ukraine 

(Zaporozhye, Ekaterinoslav, Donetsk) 33 . According to the final statistics of the Central 

Committee of Pomgol of the year 1922, the population of the starving provinces counted 

31 714 thousands persons (23 434 thousands in Russia and 8 280 thousands in Ukraine). 

These data are however incomplete, not including numerous hunger-affected territories 

(Azerbaijan, Daghestan, the regions Kalmyk, Don, Tersk, the provinces Voronej, 

Tyumen, Tambov, Stavropol etc.) 34 . 

In full famine, in the year 1922, from hunger-devastated Ukrainian regions, inclusively 

from those with Romanian population 35 , cereals were removed for regions of Russia in 

the same situation. From the province of Odessa, for instance, 58 thousand poods of 

wheat were removed for Samara, Ural, Tsaritsin and Pugaciov. Only in the year 1922 

Pomgol approved that part of its funds should be also directed towards Ukrainian RSS – 

in the conditions in which, according to the data of the Commission, on the 1 st of May 

1922, in 5 plains throughout the republic, approximately 3 709 556 were affected by 

hunger. Throughout Ukraine, the number of those in need of help amounted to 6.6 

millions. Almost 40% of the starving persons were children, and the public supplies were 

only enough for 7.5% of them. Only after repeated insistence of the Republican Party 

leadership, the figure of the aids was significantly increased, reaching to approximately 

1.8 poods. Beside the internal assistance, 1.8 million persons benefited from the 

international organizations’ assistance, which could only unfold since the autumn of 

1922 36 . 

Another aggravating circumstance for the State policy is exportation. The cereals from 

Ukraine, for instance, were subject to negotiation with Great Britain, Italy, Turkey, 

Finland, Japan. On the 13 th of September 1923, the Central Committee of RKP(b) settled 

that “in the shortest time” “to be thrown” in Germany 10 million poods of bread (wheat 

and rye) 37 . The official explanations, from the month of December 1922, based on the 

argument that neither the State, nor the population disposed of the necessary means for 

acquiring the wheat surplus from the hunger-non-affected regions, when, at the same 

time, the country benefited from international support, cannot be accepted. Situations 

such as the one in which two neighbouring regions (the case of Podolia and Odessa) had 

different status – grain supplier for export, respectively, grain importer or help consumer 

– seemed absurd for the foreign observers, unexplainable for the hungry peasants, but 

acceptable for the Soviet regime. Obtaining the industrialization-necessary currency 

resources was reckoned more important than supplying the starving regions 38 . 

33 

S. Adamets, Guerre civile et famine..., op. cit., pp. 123-124. 

34 

I.A. Poliakov, 1921: The Victory over the Famine (in Russian), Moscow, Politisdat Publishing, 

1975, pp. 18-19. 

35 

See V. Serhiiciuk, How they killed us through starvation (in Ukrainian), Kyiv, Kyiv National 

University “Taras Shevcenko”, 2006, p. 19. 

36 

V.A. Smoli, The History of the Ukrainian Peasantry…, op. cit., 2006, pp. 21, 25. 

37 

V. Serhiiciuk, How they killed us…, op. cit., p. 19. 

38 

H.H. Fisher, The famine in Soviet Russia…, op. cit., pp. 323-324.


The pressure exerted by the authorities on the population or the inhuman behaviour 

towards those having come out the acute phase of the disaster were noticed and 

communicated by OGPU to the decision-making factors. The synthesis of the politicaleconomic 

situation during the period May-June 1922, for instance, confirmed that in 

Caucasus (Don, Tersk, Kuban, Stavropol, Gorsk, Dagestan, Cabardin, Karaciaevo- 

Cerkesk, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), despite the hunger, the fiscal pressure did 

not stop 39 . The synthesis OGPU for the month of October 1922 underlined that the 

deterioration of the peasants’ attitude towards the regime was exclusively determined by 

economic reasons. Zaporozhye, Nikolaev, Podolia and Kyiv were included in the 

category of the “unsafe regions”. The forced collection of the tax in nature constituted the 

exclusive cause for the deterioration of the mood and for the aggravation of the hunger. 

The analysts OGPU admitted the excessive character of taxation; the expression 

“condemnation to hunger” belongs to them and emphasized the artificial component of 

the tragedy. Another factor deepening the popular discontent against the tax in nature was 

represented by the abuses perpetrated by the local organs, which “inspire to the peasants 

the pessimistic attitude against all actions of the Soviet power and undermine its authority 

where it was at sufficient height” 40 . 

Discontents against the exaggerated character of the unique tax will also be registered in 

the year 1924, after paying their obligations to the State, the peasants remained breadless. 

In the month of January 1924, the population from Karelia (75%), Buryatia (35%), 

Kustanay, Arhanghelsk, Fergan or Kamchatka 41 was starving. Because of the peasants’ 

disinterest in the agricultural activities, in the State’s exclusive favour, of the exhaustion 

of the food reserves, but especially of the demoralization, the famine will register latent 

quotas until it regains acute forms reaching their climax in the years 1931-1933. 

Intermediate overheating segments existed – such a dramatic interval was 1924-1925, 

during which time the territory to the left of the Dniester, inclusively the Moldavian 

ASSR was confronted with a new famine 42 . This is also the case of Nagorno-Karabah or 

of the Germans’ Autonomy on Volga. The pauperization was a constant, and the 

insufficiency of the aids that the starved persons benefited from – a certitude confirmed 

not only by the survivors’ testimonies, but also by the strictly secret reports of OGPU, 

who ensured the decidents’ impeccable information. 

Final considerations 

The requisitions and the meteorological factors constituted main causes of the 

humanitarian disaster; however, the decisive role was played by the commandeering 

campaigns – they anticipated the meteorological phenomena and dispossessed the peasant 

39 G.N. Sevostianov, A.N. Saharov, I.F. Pogony et. all., “Strictly Secret”. Lubyanka to Stalin on 

the situation in the country. 1922-1934, Moscow, Editorial Center of the Russian History 

Institute of the Russian Science Academy, 2001, vol. I “1922-1923”, Part I, doc. no. 11, pp. 178- 

179, 182, 185. 

40 Ibidem, doc. no. 16, pp. 279-282. 

41 Ibidem, Part II, pp. 26-29, 43-44, doc. no. 1 and 2. 

42 C. Stratievschi, “Difficult Years, Famine Years in the ASSRM. 1924-1926 гг.”, in Moldova 

History Review No. 1(69), 2007, pp.3-19. In our opinion, the author highlights disproportionately 

the objective causes.

242 


of his vital reserves 43 . The massive and forced requisitions of the “surplus” of grain and 

other agricultural products stood, in fact, for the confiscation of all those food reserves 

that peasants resorted to in difficult agricultural years, marked by drought, frost or pests. 

For instance, in the Germans’ Autonomy on Volga, during the interval 1921-1922, there 

were commandeered 41.9% of the harvested grains 44 . Although we agree that the 

deleterious consequences of any war against the civilian population and on the economy 

of whatsoever country remain beyond any discussion, we do not share the exacerbation 

disfavouring the criminal means used by the Bolsheviks 45 . Depriving peasants of food 

reserves was deliberately organized, undertaking the fatal consequences for the dozens of 

millions of peasants; and, on the other hand, the war communism was applied to the 

purpose of the regime’s political survival, the urban areas and the repressive apparatus 

being pre-eminently supplied. The subjective factor played a main part and not a 

conjectural one in launching the famine mechanism, this being a direct consequence of 

the Communist policy, which much exceeded the agrarian sphere. 

Amid the concrete measures used by regime in achieving the goal of food-resource 

seizure, we retain: 1) nationalizing the banking system and the great industrial and 

agricultural properties, doubled by abolishing the private trade; 2) directing an aggressive 

propaganda against the village, aiming at demoralizing the peasants (the majority) who 

did not support the regime or who opposed the abusive actions of property and food 

reserve confiscation; 3) the food rationalization in the urban areas, corresponding to the 

level of “accepting” the regime, including through introducing the system of the cards; 4) 

antagonizing the population, including through the division town-village, rich peasantspoor 

peasants; 5) organizing the so-called “supply detachments”, arming and sending 

them to the rural areas, in order to support the local Bolshevik leaders in the campaigns of 

totally commandeering the grain; 6) isolating the areas confronted with alimentary 

difficulties and blocking the access of the peasants and of the agricultural products in the 

urban areas; 7) tolerating and encouraging the abuses committed by the local and regional 

representatives of the regime; 8) allowing food privileges, especially as regards the aid. 

In closing, we emphasize the particularities of the alimentary dictatorship which may be 

found in the sources underlying communication: 1) major decisions as regards the control 

on the food resources were adopted at the Center and transmitted by the main leaders to 

the representatives throughout the territory; 2) violently suppressing the opposition 

against the policies with impact on the supply, inclusively through involving the army 

and the secret police; 3) using the famine as pretext for launching the offensive against 

religion, confiscating the religious objects and repressing the church representatives; 4) 

becoming aware that the loss by the State of the “fight for bread” meant the loss of the 

one for village subordination; 5) generalized joint responsibility in the case of refusing to 

deliver their grain – taking hostages and organizing punitive expeditions being among the 

most serious; 6) giving up too late the generalized requisition and allowing the 

commercialization of the agricultural products, so that preventing famine became 

impossible; 7) exporting cereals whilst famine has not been thoroughly eradicated and 

obliging hungry regions to contribute to helping other regions. 

43 

O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., pp. 752, 775-777. See the cases submitted by the author. 

44 

Ibidem, p. 412. 

45 

See, for instance, V.V. Kondrashin, The famine of 1932-1933…, op. cit., pp. 318-319.

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AS A TOOL IN THE 

HANDS OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITY 

Anka IGNATOVA 1 

Abstract: This report marks the beginning of two previously unexplored aspects of the 

history of the archive activity in Bulgaria. One is the organization of work with the 

documents of the created by the Communist government in 1951 dedicated archive 

section "Card indexes and Archive" in the State Security of the Ministry of Interior. Other 

issue is related to the servicing of the repressive state apparatus with documents from the 

state archives, established in 1952 in the structure of the same power department. Due to 

the wide range of the topic, the current research is limited to the period of the late 40's - 

mid 50's of the twentieth century, which is characterized by active in connection with the 

search, storage and use of archival documents necessary to expose and judicial 

crackdown on opponents of the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party. 

Documents have various public functions for ages. One of them is legislative. Еach 

document can acquire that function, when used as evidence in court. In a totalitarian state, 

documents, including the archival ones that are out of operational use, can become an 

instrument of persecution and repression. The Topics of the present study are the actions 

of the Communist authorities for searching, storing and using of archival records by State 

Security (SS) and the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in order to investigate and 

eliminate their opponents during the late 40's - mid 50 years of the twentieth century. 

After the Communists came to power as a result of the Revolution of September 9, 

1944, a great attention is called to the аrchival documents regarding the activities of the 

Communist Party. In 1946 an archive of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist 

Party was established. In 1949 it was granted the status of Central and later became a 

network of regional party archives. Officially according to the Law for collecting of 

materials from the resistance movement in 1949 1 and the Ordinance on its application 2 

from the end of 1950, tracing and collecting documents for the revolutionary struggle of 

the Bulgarian people for the period after the Liberation (March 3 1878) to September 9 

1944 was assigned to the Museum of the revolutionary movement in Bulgaria. The 

museum had to transmit the original documents to the Central Party Archive and prepare 

transcripts for its own needs. Using the Soviet model, a lot of completely autonomous 

party archives and secret services archives were created in Bulgaria and other countries of 

the so-called Eastern Bloc. Concentration and organizing of certain categories of 

documents under the direct control of State Security and the BCP for the use of power 

was directly related to the peculiarities of the political life in the late 40's - early 50’s of 

the last century. In the terms of the internationally imposed policy of the "cold war" 


244 


establishing the political system in Bulgaria was strongly influenced by Stalin's thesis of 

aggravation of the class struggle in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. 

That required the improvement of revolutionary vigilance, not only again the class 

enemy, but the enemy with a "party membership card". 

In a strictly confidential decree of the Politburo of the Communist Party, Case "B", №15 

from August 1, 1950, apart from the success of State Security in detecting and exposing 

the "enemies of the Party and the people, especially in 1949 and the first half of 1950", a 

number of serious mistakes in investigation work were reported. Among them were those 

associated with providing documents. "The investigations have been conducted without 

any documentation, not any search of documents confirming any criminal activity of the 

arrested. The examinations and the search for witnesses haven’t been made, so the 

testimonies were very doubtful and not supporting by evidence. As a part of the 

investigative system the existing special service documentation bureau was dealing with 

minor issues and has left its work apart from the investigators" 3 . Among the measures to 

ensure "the successful implementation of the tasks set by the Party and government to 

prosecuting authorities of State Security, prosecution and judicial authorities against the 

imperialist agents and counterrevolutionary organizations in the country" was the 

expansion of the "Card indexes and Archive" department of the SS 4 . 

Information about the activities of the Communist Party on collecting, storing, using 

and studying of police, court and prison records of members of the Communist Party and 

the Workers' Youth League (YCL) before September 9 1944 was contained in the report 

of the Minister of Interior February 21, 1951 5 . A draft decision of the Politburo of the 

Central Committee for order in their organization aiming its adequate use was attached to 

the report 6 . The report reveals that in 1951 all the documents were spread to different 

parts of the country. 90 000 of the police dossiers from all the country, about 1000 prison 

dossiers from Pleven municipality and 107 folders with reports of police agents were in 

CC of BCP. 4000 file (individual and group) taken from the regional courts about trials 

against members of the Communist Party and its Youth League, that were prosecuted 

under the Law for Protection of the State were held in the Courthouse of Sofia. 16,835 

prison dossiers of political prisoners – members of the Communist Party and YCL 

collected in November 1950, and police reports archive of the former regional and district 

police chiefs and other important documents were piled up in the warehouse of State 

Security 7 . The Minister of the Interior submitted to the Central Committee legal 

documents about maintenance of the records. His motives were the lack of the necessary 

facilities for the proper storage of these documents "that made it difficult for the efforts of 

the Party and the State Security to detect the former provocateurs in the Communist Party 

and secret police and makes it possible for enemies that worked for the secret police" and 

that "Some documents might be destroyed by interested persons" 8 . 

On March 6, 1951 the Politburo of the Central Committee adopted Decision "A", № 

75 9 . It pointed out that according to the Politburo the lack of accountability and order in 

the use and storage of materials of the police, prison and lawsuits before September 9, 

1944 "preclude the revealing of persons associated with the fascist police in the past and 

who are now into the party or work for the state". To ensure protection, accountability, 

research and development of these documents it was decided "all police records, court 

and prison documents and all materials of the fascist intelligence agencies and authorities, 

no matter where they are located (including police records that are in the BCP) were to be 

collected in the Ministry of Interior – State Security, Sofia". A special unit of the

Anka IGNATOVA: Archival Documents as a Tool in the Hands of the Communist … 245 

Department "Card indexes and Archive" of the State Security, for organizing, arranging, and 

storing of documents was created for this purpose. The requirement for employees in this unit 

was "supreme loyalty to the Party". The examination of the employees was assigned to the 

Administrative Department of the Central Committee and the State Security and the 

appointment had to be made by the Minister of Interior, but only after they were approved by 

the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 10 . 

According to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee for managing 

documents and the staff of the Department, as well as furnishing a specially designated 

area for this purpose should be done within one month 11 . After receiving information 

“about past relationships of members of the party with the police as agent provocateurs” 

by the newly created unit or department "Provocateurs", the Minister of Interior should 

immediately inform the BCP. The Minister also had to take the necessary measures 

against “the enemies of the Party and Nation”, according to the results of studies and 

analysis of the police materials. He had to submit for approval instruction for reporting, 

storing, using and learning materials from police records to the Secretariat of the Central 

Committee of the Party 12 . 

On March 26, 1951 by Decision № 218 "A" of the Politburo of the Communist Party, 

Instructions for reporting, storing, using and analyzing of the special archive by the "Card 

indexes and Archive" department in SS were adopted 13 . According to the instructions 

"special archives" included: „1. Police records for the intelligence and counterintelligence 

department of the Foreign Office; 2. Archives of intelligence and counterintelligence 

bodies of the Royal army; 3. Archival personal dossiers of senior staff of the Ministry of 

Interior; 4. The archives of the former centers, dissolved bourgeois parties, as well as 

fascist and pro-fascist organizations that are operational interest for the authorities of the 

State Security; 5. Foreign archives (former colleges, etc.); 6. Political Archives of BCP 

members; 7. Court and prison dossiers of members of the Communist Party before Sept. 

9, 1944” 14 . The instructions regulated the ways of ordering, storing, filing, registration, 

use, study and development of special papers archive. Right to work in the area that meets 

all safety requirements where these documents were kept, had only the special assistants 

of 5 th Department of "Card indexes and Archive" whose appointment had to be approved 

by the Central Committee 15 . The study and analysis of documents from this archive was 

done by section "P" of State Security, according to a special instruction 16 . 

Several months after the adoption of that instruction for the organization of work with 

documents that SS needs, in November 10, 1951, the Presidium of the National Assembly 

adopted the Confidential Edict 515 on the establishment of the State Archives. The decree 

declared all "documentary materials that have political, scientific and practical 

importance, regardless of their date, content, layout, equipment and method of 

reproduction" for State-owned 17 . According to point 3 of the edict the State Archives was 

under the direct management of the archival management at the Ministry of Interior. A 

subsequent Decree of 18 April 1952 set the beginning of a centralized archive system, 

which included the following departments for managing of the national documentary 

heritage: Archival Management, Central State Archive of the Republic of Bulgaria 

(CSA), Central State Historical Archive (CSHA), district state archives in all regional 

cities and in Sofia – Sofia City and Regional State Archive (SCRSA) 18 . 

The subordination of the State archives to the Ministry of Interior was not a surprise. By 

that time Soviet archives were a structural part of the Ministry of Interior and, the 

Bulgarian government strived in every way to follow the Soviet experience. Moreover, 

the Edict 515 had to be prepared under the direct guidance of Nikolai Romanovich

246 


Prokopenko - an advisor of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party 

(Bolsheviks) who was in the country at the request of the Central Committee of BCP 19 . 

The nine-member committee that prepared the legal framework of the State Archives 

included two representatives of the Ministry of Interior. They were the heads of 

"Secretariat" and 14 th departments of the Ministry 20 . The archive collection "General 

Department of Archives" of the Central State Archive 21 still holds copies of the draft 

edict 22 , of the decision of the Politburo of the BCP to create the State Archives 23 , of the 

table of permanency of archive management 24 and other important documents for the 

archival system all signed by the head of 14 th department of MI Ivan Chukov and stamped 

with the SS stamp. Some of the discovered and published documents by Evdokia 

Simeonova in 1971 regarding the creation of the State Archives were part of the official 

archives of the State Security (№ 1, 12, 15) 25 . The facts clearly show that the beginning of 

the archival work in Bulgaria was set with the active participation of 14 th department 

("Card indexes and Archive") of DS. Because a "Lack of control and management of 

archives, hostile class elements were able to destroy valuable archives or use them against 

the Nation". That was one of the reasons for establishing of State Archival Funds stated 

on the decision of Politburo of CC of BCP from October 27, 1951 26 . Therefore realizing 

the semi centennial idea of creating a state archives in the country was not dictated only 

by the desire of the government for saving our national documentary heritage, but also 

because the idea to put these documents under control in the service of communist rule. 

Archives are institutions that carry out state policy in the field of stored documents and 

purposes that they will be used for largely depend of the form of government of the 

country. 

The report for the main issues and problems of the state archives, presented at a meeting 

with the heads of regional state archives on June 23, 1952, stated the need for applying 

the experience of Soviet archival, according to the following conclusion: "archival 

development in our country will be committed in a fierce class struggle. A responsibility 

of all the archive workers is not to allow any form of subversive work or any attempt by 

the enemy to use documentary materials for their counterrevolutionary purposes" 27 was 

said in the report. Sufficiently reliable people dedicated to the government were in charge 

of managing the country's most important documents. It was not a surprise that previous 

occupation of most of the first employees in the archives was also in the Interior Ministry, 

although it could be explained with the departmental subordination of the state archives 28 . 

In July 1952 as a part of Archive Management it was established a Secret section that 

coordinated with "State secrets" department of SS 29 . Its main tasks was organizing and 

supervising the work of the state archives in relation to confidential documents of 

agencies, organizations and businesses. The section prepared a list of the types of all 

documents considered as confidential, after September 9, 1944. The list also contained 

documents that were interest for SS as: "10. Police, municipal and county orders, letters 

for search and arrest of illegal Communist supporters, partisan and other individuals * ; 

11. Letters and reports of civilians to the fascist government for the actions of 

communists and partisans; .... 14. Documents with information about anti-communist 

activities and slander, denouncing individuals * " 30 . Later, the Archive management 

* Handwritten


decided that the section will not draw up such lists and targeted types of confidential 

documents will be collected in a regulation 31 . 

In a higher confidential letter 197 of 27 September 1952 the Deputy Chief of Archival 

Division Major E. Elias gave instructions to the directors of all public archives on how to 

proceed with the incoming confidential documents, that might be used against national 

security if available to hostile elements and foreign intelligence services, but also those 

documents, which could be in favor of the Party and State security. Confidential should 

be considered also "documents that are discrediting for individuals as reports and letters 

brought by private individuals and others to fascist for the activities of communists, 

guerrillas, illegal supporters, etc.; materials for some deviance in work after September 9, 

1944; incriminated publications, literature and so on" 32 . For the secret documents found 

during work process a "strictly professional secrecy" was required along with a report to 

the Head of the Regional State Archive, who had to take the necessary measures 33 . Secret 

documents found during working process that could be interesting for SS and BCP 

required these institutions to be informed immediately. After documents were analyzed 

and a list was done, those related to issues of local importance were reported to the head 

of the Interior Ministry, and those that were of nation-wide importance were reported to 

the head of the Archives management 34 . They were sent out by a courier of the district 

state archives and if there was no such – via MI confidential mail 35 . The letter had to 

contain instructions on measures that had to be taken by the chief of the archives for the 

protection of classified documents released by a special regulation. 

The regulation for handling confidential documentary materials in the state archives, 

terms of use and storage had to be approved by the Minister of Interior in 17 July 1953 36 . 

In letter 197 of 27 September 1952 the specific category of documents was determined as 

the second of the three groups that are classified as confidential documents 37 . Working 

with them and with other confidential documents was assigned to the secret archives of 

government departments or "appropriate" employees. The regulation determined how 

documents of interest for SS and the Party had to be handled. In principle the way of 

handling was not different than that specified in the letter. These documents had to be 

reported to the Director (Head) of the archive, which in turn had to report them to the 

head of the District Police Department. If the materials were of particular importance 

those had to be reported by the head of the archives management to the Ministry of 

Interior. When confidential documents were requested, two copies had to be made - one 

was sent to the addressee, and the second was kept in secret department. For bulky 

materials only summaries were issued 38 . If any damage to the posted packages with 

documents was found SS had to be informed immediately. Accepted and sent confidential 

documents were listed in a separate list in State archives in special import and export 

books 39 . 

Regulations for the use of archival documents were extremely tight, as in "special 

cases" the Director (Head) of the archive could allow the use of confidential material only 

after the permission of DS" 40 . Among the limited number of outsiders who were allowed 

to enter the Archive, were the authorized representatives of the State Security 41 . 

At the end of July 1953, pursuant to a Ministerial Order, archive management ordered 

to state archives to deliver police records to the local State Security branch or to send 

them to SS – Sofia after consultation with the head of the Interior Ministry. After finding 

of any documents related to police work, or data containing killings of anti-fascists, etc. 

after the required copying the originals had to be sent to SS 42 .

248 


Confidential letter 306 of 21 April 1954 the Head of "State Archives" of MI 43 

contained additional guidance for the work of SCRSA, CSA and CSHA. It was send 

with reference to some questions raised by CSA and a meeting held in this regard. 

Statements of DS had to be prepared by the secret sections. For particular information 

on some raw materials the sections had to make notes on where the document is 

placed during processing in order that documents could be found easily if needed. 

The information was transmitted to the office. Then boxes of documents were 

transmitted to the reference sections for storage. The original documents that were 

provided for use by the Ministry of Interior, courts and prosecutors were subjects of 

the reporting and reference section. In order to monitor the return of materials the 

reference sections filled a combined log, which was a guide for both sections, and the 

accountability and control is performed with introduced instruments 44 . 

Some idea of the volume and type of documents of the state archives provided to 

SS, was given by records stored in Archival fund records, memos and letters of the 

head of the government in this regard, inventories and references attached to some of 

these records and reports and the annual report the work of the secret section from 

July 9, 1952 to December 31, 1952. The annual report stated that for nearly half a 

year since its establishment the section provides for the use of the SS and the Party 8 

folders with confidential documents and five separate confidential documents 45 . On 

August 5, 1952 two folders containing 5875 sheets of paper were found in the state 

economic enterprise "Waste" – Sofia were sent to the archive along with a report of 

the Deputy Minister of Interior Maj. Gen. George Kumbiliev 46 . Employees of archival 

management found in the same place documents submitted to the Minister of the 

Interior by a report of Sept. 11, 1952, prepared on behalf of Deputy Minister Maj. 

Gen. A. Tsanev and the Chief of the archive management 47 . These documents 

consisted of a folder of 286 pages, mainly letters from 1920-1923 and 1931-1934 The 

letters are a result of the activity of Police department, Ministry of Justice, Lovech 

District Court, Lovech District Administration, Lovech District Prison, Bulgarian 

Communist Youth Union, Labor Party, Bulgarian National Bank, Sofia Bishopric, 

etc.. 48 . Among those sent in early 1953 by CSHA documents found in the collections 

of the Supreme Chamber of Commerce and Monarchical Institute were some personal 

dossiers of employees, congratulatory telegram to the tzar in 1933 by an interned 

communist and some transcripts of interrogation conducted in the Department of 

police in 1929 49 . Some saved reports indicated that the documents should be returned 

after completion of work on them, because they were part of the National Archives. 

In some cases, not originals but their copies were sent to SS. Such is the case when 

SS required copies of a reference stored in the “Direction railways and harbors” 

Archive about 36 affidavits of employees on their membership in organizations 

banned by the Law for Protection of the State and a report of a civilian about 

revealing another as a communist 50 . 

On two meetings of the management staff of the archive from May and June 1953 it 

was reported that a delay in the activity of the archives in relation with the search of 

secret documents for MI 51 . According to a confidential letter UA 272 from June 16, 

1953 by the head of the Archive Management and Head of the "Usage" department, 

the work of organizing the state archives and the use of confidential documents in 

support of the Party and MI till that moment was unsatisfactory. In May it was 

pointed out that nine of the twelve county public archives existing at that time had 

"no archive units used for this purpose". The chief of the secret archives of the central


departments and the heads of regional state archives were ordered to take "serious 

"measures. The letter described 26 groups of documents that persons performing 

scientific and technical processing of archives had to search in order to find 

compromising documents needed for the regime. It was stated that confidential 

documents in support of the Party and MI can be found in all archival units. The letter 

ordered the heads of all archives to "monitor and provide assistance in the regard to 

avoid any document to remain undiscovered, no matter its location in the archive". 

There was a requirement for all the information for this task to be registered in the 

quarterly reports of the state archives. It was stated that according to these results 

Archival Management "will determine the vigilance and the overall condition of the 

local archives" 52 . In the report for the condition of the archival system of 1953 it was 

highlighted that an important share of using archival documents was the "active 

support of the Ministry of Interior with documentary materials for establishing and 

proving hostile activities of individuals". According to the report, the archives were 

"full of such documents" and the central and some regional state archives had 

provided 185 archival units 53 . A report of the head of "Use" department concerning 

State Archives in July the same year indicated that, all archives except SCRSA had 

promoted an insufficient amount of documents that could be of use to the MI. The 

check-up showed that the work of finding any documents in CSHA and CSA is 

unsatisfactory despite these archives swimming in such files. 10,000 photographic 

images labeled with a village or town, or with some special occasions noted on them 

were represented as an example of strong compromising materials. The Regional 

State Archives in Pleven, is also stated as an example of an archive with many 

archive funds containing documents interesting for MI. Those funds were 

Municipality, District Administration, Regional requisitioning commissions, etc. That 

regional state archive provided only 50 archive units which are also stated as very 

poor. The conclusions made after all check-ups were that more assistance and more 

serious work were required to be done 54 . "Some success" of the state archives 

regarding Ministry of Interior was reported in August that year. Compared with 58 

archival units used in July by the MI, in August they doubled them giving 270 units 

and copies to the Ministry of Interior 55 . A report by the Head of Archive Management 

from August 13, 1953 showed that archive employees were poorly rated as 

“neglecting, and omitting important documents" that were particularly valuable in the 

operational work of the Interior 56 . 

Several months later, with the official letter AU-673 of October 17, 1953, Archival 

Management urged heads of the state archives in Kolarovgrad (now Shumen), Tarnovo, 

Haskovo and Ruse, which didn’t provide any archive documents to the MI. They had to 

"draw the attention of archives staff, particularly those engaged in scientific and technical 

processing of archival materials and sharpen their vigilance for completing the task". In 

addition, it is recommended "a direct connection with the MI to be maintained". These 

state archives had to report the reasons for the low use of archival material held by the 

Ministry of Interior and activities for improvement of that process 57 . In drawing up the 

plans for the first quarter and annual plans in 1954 all state archives were required "to 

plan events on disclosure of classified material" that were available in their archives 

indicated by letter AU-272 on July 16, 1953 58 . 

Archival institutions had to be supported by SS to cope with that hard and important 

government task. For example in letter 390 of Archival management from May 15, 1954

250 


г. to all regional state archives regarding further improving of the organization and 

working methods of the expert commissions were given instructions to those which still 

hadn’t started to work with SS for "immediate measures in order to resolve that issue" 59 . 

In a highly confidential report DA-959 from December 7, 1954 of the chief of "State 

archive" department of MI addressed to the Deputy Minister of Interior Maj. Gen. St. 

Giurov regarding clarifying of some issues about working with confidential documents it 

was expressly stated that State archives alongside scientific and technical processing of 

documentary materials had the task to find secret materials and provide them for the use 

of MI. Usually employees were experiencing some troubles in orientating during the 

search for confidential documents and also were omitting to report some of the 

documents that may be useful to SS. In order to clarify the methods of work and avoid 

pointless activities it was suggested an agent of 8 th department of SS to hold a discussion 

with the employees of the confidential sections of State archives in order to give 

instructions of what kind of documents had to be searched 60 . A conference of the Archive 

management was hold in November 1, 1955. It is reported that the assistance of members 

of 8 th and "State security" departments of SS to the expert commission sled to "taking of 

better decisions" 61 . 

The results of the use of archival documents from the Ministry of Interior can be 

judged from a strictly confidential report of the Minister of the Interior regarding the 

work of 2 nd Division of State Security for developing police records sent to the 

Politburo of the Communist Party at the end of 1954. The reports stated that between 

January 1, 1951 and December 31, 1954, 4991 lawsuit files, 94,296 police dossiers 

created for members of the Party, Communist Youth Union, Workers Youth Union, 

82,377 police dossiers for persons in the service of foreign intelligence and former 

members of bourgeois-fascist organizations and 20,049 general police files were 

investigated and analyzed 62 . Based on that huge amount of documents are revealed 

290 secret collaborators, 987 police informers, 93 betrayers, 140 killers, and 246 

collaborators responsible for information about bourgeois-fascist organizations and 

foreign intelligence. 291 of these people were arrested and investigated. Among them 

were 42 agents, 26 secret police collaborators, 16 betrayers, 140 killers and 68 

policemen and military men. 37 of them are sentenced of death, 36 of 15 to 20 years 

in prison, 45 of 10 to 15 years, 35 of 5 to 10 years, 21 of 1 to 5 years and 48 of them 

were sentenced of community service. 64 people are released – 19 because of 

operational reasons, 21 because of political reasons and 24 because of lack of 

evidences. For the period of its existence, the department sent 653 special reports to 

the BCP Central Committee regarding members of the party, which have signed 

capitulating declarations or had capitulating behavior while they were in the police. 63 . 

The report also stated that information about 20,000 people of interest to the Ministry 

of Interior was found, and that police had information about 40 secret police 

collaborators that because of lack of data remained not disclosed, but working on 

their files continued. The Interior Minister offered to the Politburo of the Communist 

Party in January 1, 1955 the 2 nd department to be disbanded. He was motivated by the 

fact that all the police archives were investigated and analyzed by that department of 

SS and all the derived issues were solved. The minister also proposed the undisclosed 

cases about secret collaborators of the police and future cases about police 

information to be a task of 3 rd department of SS which in 1955 consisted of 3 agents 64 .


The activity of the state archives in serving the Ministry of Interior continued in the 

next decades, regardless of changes in the departmental subordination in November 1, 

1961. It turned out that a number of documents that have been seized from 

enterprises, organizations and individuals by the authorities of the MO were 

destroyed by operational services after completion of work on them. At the insistence 

of the archive management measures were taken to prevent similar cases. The 

"Inspectorate" of the Ministry of Interior issued letter I-197 of 6 February 1961 to all 

individual units in the country. The letter ordered to the operational services and 

county administrations to keep the documents that were in need of SS or the People’s 

militia or to send these documents to the local archives after work on them was 

finished. Moreover, operational services were obliged to inform the Archive 

department of the MI or a public archive if specific documents with no present use 

were encountered during performance of their duties 65 . Early in 1954 the 

management of archives proposed to Deputy Interior Minister Maj. Gen. St. Gurov 

the archive collections of V. Radoslavov, V. Dimov, I. Bagryanov, Prof. Katzarov, 

part of the Archive fund of the Monarchy Institute and some other documents to be 

committed to State archives. They were stored in the Archive of 8 th department of 

State Security and by that time they didn’t have any operational significance 66 . The 

proposal was accepted and inventorying was started 67 , followed by commiting of the 

documents to CSHA. Although the documents provided by the archives of the 

Ministry for temporary use, were an integral part of the National Archives many 

remained in the archives of the DS for a very long time. After the fall of the 

communist regime in late 1989, the management of records raised the question of 

their return 68 , but this was a very long following process. Some of these documents, 

State archives get back in 2012. 

According to the presented facts based primarily on documents from CSA following 

conclusions can be drawn. It is well known that establishment of the Communist 

regime was accompanied by persecution and repression not only of those who openly 

oppose its policies, but also of those who were guilty before the party before 

September 9, 1944. The discovery of documentary evidence for this appeared to be 

one of the important tasks of the SS, which in 1951 created for this purpose a special 

unit to archive "Card indexes and Аrchive" 69 which started to collect such documents. 

The centralized network of state archives, directly subordinated to the Ministry of 

Interior also assisted in finding such documents. One of the tasks that the newly 

established archive system had was to inform immediately the SS for archive 

documents compromising any individuals to the Party. This activity during the period 

was rated as not effective enough. That’s why the assistance of the SS was required. 

Indications for using data stored in the special archive documents by SS was for the 

sentencing of Bulgarian citizens. 

Undoubtedly, the subject of this release deserves attention and should be followed in a 

chronological plan fully to highlight this previously unexplored part of the history of 

archives in Bulgaria. This will help to clarify the fate of the documentary heritage used 

for the needs of the repressive communist government. 

References 

1 Държавен вестник, бр. 177 от 30.08.1949 г. [State Gazette, issue 177 of 30 August 1949.]

252 


2 Известия на Президиума на Народното събрание (на Народна република България), бр. 8 

от 26.12.1950 г. [Notifications on Presidium of the National Assembly (of Peoples’ Republic 

of Bulgaria), issue 8 of 26 December 1950) 

3 Строго секретно! Документи за дейността на Държавна сигурност (1944-1989). С., 2007, с. 

147. [Top Secret! Documents regarding the activities of the State Security (1944-1989), Sofia, 

2007, p. 147.] – http://desebg.com/2011-01-06-11-23-01/524-2012-01-04-09-14-02. 

4 Ibid., p. 149 

5 ЦДА, ф. 1Б, оп. 6, а.е.1269, л. 3-4. [Central State Archive, f. 1B, op. 6, a.u. 1269, pp. 3-4.] 

6 Ibid., л. 1-2 [pp. 1-2]. 

7 Ibid., л. 3 [p. 3]. 

8 Ibid., л. 4 [p. 4]. 

9 Ibid., л. 1-2 [pp. 1-2]. 

10 Ibid., л. 1 [p. 1]. 

11 Ibid., л. 1-2 [pp. 1-2]. 

12 Ibid., л. 2. [p. 2]. 

13 Ibid., а.е. 1410, л. 1-4 [a.u. 1410, pp. 1-4]. 

14 Ibid., л. 1 [p. 1]. 

15 Ibid., л. 2 [p. 2]. 

16 Ibid., л. 4 [p. 4]. 

17 Указ за Държавен архивен фонд на Народна република България. – В: Сборник 

нормативни актове по архивното дело в Народна република България. С., 1978, 7-10. 

[Edict of the State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria. – In: Collection of legislation on 

archives management in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia, 1978, pp. 7-10.] 

18 Постановление № 344 от 18 април 1952 г. за организиране на Държавния архивен фонд и 

одобряване правилник за архивното управление при Министерството на вътрешните 

работи. – В: Сборник нормативни актове по архивното дело..., с. 18. [Decree 344 of 18 

April 1952 on the organization of the National Archives and approval of rules for archive 

management in the Ministry of Interior. – Collection of legislation on archives management…, 

p. 18.] 

19 N. R. Prokopenko was a former deputy chairman of the General Directorate of Archives of the 

USSR, and at that time he was the director of the Central State Archive of the October 

Revolution and Socialist Construction of the USSR. 

20 Симеонова, Е. Документи за създаването на държавните архиви в България. – Известия на 

държавните архиви, 1971, № 22, с. 89. [Simeonova, E. Documents for the establishment of 

state archives in Bulgaria – Journal of the state archives, 1971, № 22, p. 89.] 

21 Central State Archive, established by Decree 268 of the Ministry Council of 30 December 1992, 

merged the previously existing Central State Historical Archives, State Archives of the 

Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria and the Central State Technical Archive. Later in the new 

formations archive, received and documents of the Central Communist Party's Archive 

(excluding internal parties). 

22 ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 3, л. 17-22. [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 3, pp. 17-22.] 

23 Ibid., л. 15-16 [pp. 15-16]. 

24 Ibid., л. 4-14 [pp. 4-14]. 

25 Симеонова, Е. Документи за създаването на държавните архиви..., 61–102. [Simeonova, E. 

Documents for the establishment of state archives..., pp. 61–102.] 

26 ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 3, л. 15. [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 3, p. 15.] 

27 Ibid., а.е. 128, л. 10 [a.u. 128, p. 10]. 

28 For example three of the five agents that were proposed to go to the USSR to examine the 

archival system there worked as a scout until that moment. One of them worked in “Staff” 

department of MI, and the other two worked for 6 th and 12 th departments of the SS. 

(Report of the Deputy Minister Maj. Gen. Angel Tsanev to the Minister of Interior Leut.


Gen. G. Tsanev from April 18, 1952 – ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 7, л. 1. [Central State 

Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 7, p. 1.] Moreover to the chief and deputy chief of Archive 

Management were assigned military ranks, and they kept them even after archives 

separated from the MI. (ЦДА, ф. 405, оп. 8, а.е. 286, л. 19-20.) [Central State Archive, f. 

450, op. 8, a.u. 286, pp. 19-20] 

29 Some tasks were assigned to the administration: Based on the studies they’ve made to assist 

the department with methodical preparation of rules and instructions for organizing the 

work of the confidential records of government departments and how to save and use 

confidential documents; to compile a list of the types of documents to be kept confidential 

in the state archives, to organize the central funds of the central catalog for the recording 

of these documents, etc. (ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 131, л. 36.) [Central State Archive, f. 

540, op. 1, a.u. 131, p. 36.] 

30 ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 131, л. 19, 20. [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.e. 131, pp. 19, 

20.] 

31 Ibid., а.е. 132, л. 1 [a.u. 132, p. 1]. 

32 Ibid., а.е. 8, л. 1 [a.u. 8, p. 1]. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid., л. 2 [p. 2]. 

35 Ibid., л. 3 [p. 3]. 

36 Ibid., а.е. 21, л. 12-16 [a.u. 21, pp. 12-16]. 

37 Ibid., л. 12 [p. 12]. 

38 Ibid., л. 13 [p. 13]. 

39 Ibid., л. 15 [p. 15]. 

40 Ibid., л. 14 [p. 14]. 

41 Ibid., л. 15 [p. 15]. 

42 Ibid., а.е. 23, л. 110 [a.u. 23, p. 110]; ДА – В. Търново, ф. 1150, оп. 1, а.е. 4, л. 50. [State 

Archive – Veliko Tarnovo, f. 1150, op. 1, a.u. 4, p. 50.] 

43 In 1954, Archive Management Department was transformed into "State Archives". 

44 ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 39, л. 31. [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 39, p. 31.] 

45 Ibid., а.е. 132, л. 3 [a.u. 132, p. 3]. 

46 Ibid., а.е. 16, л. 8 [a.u. 16, p. 8]. 

47 Ibid., а.е. 17, л. 9 [a.u. 17, p. 9]. 

48 Ibid., а.е. 16, л. 3-7 [a.u. 16, p. 3-7]. 

49 Ibid., а.е. 24, л. 17-21 [a.u. 24, pp. 17-21]. 

50 Ibid., л. 36, 38 [pp. 36, 38]. 

51 Ibid., а.е. 27, л. 34-35, 53-55 [a.u. 27, pp. 34-35, 53-55]. 

52 Ibid., а.е. 23, л. 93 [a.u. 23, p. 93]. 

53 Ibid., а.е. 27, л. 98 [a.u. 27, p. 98]. 

54 Ibid., л. 130 [p.130]. 

55 Ibid., л. 160 [p.160]. 

56 Ibid., а.е. 38, л. 41 [a.u. 38, p. 41]. 

57 Ibid., а.е. 23, л. 147 [a.u. 23, p. 147]; ДА – В. Търново, ф. 1150, оп. 1, а.е. 4, л. 76. [State 

Archive – Veliko Tarnovo, f. 1150, op. 1, a.u. 4, p. 76.] 

58 Ibid., л. 161 [p.161]. 

59 Ibid., а.е. 39, л. 12 [a.u. 39, p. 12]. 

60 Ibid., а.е. 34, л. 3 [a.u. 34, p. 3]. 

61 Ibid., а.е. 44, л. 27 [a.u. 44, p. 27]. 

62 Ibid., ф. 1Б, оп. 64, а.е. 205, л. 2 [f. 1B, op. 64, a.u. 205, p. 2]. Text is published with incorrect 

data in: Строго секретно! Документи за ..., с. 252-254. [Top Secret! Documents …, pp. 252- 

254.]) 

63 Ibid., л. 2-3 [pp. 2-3].

254 


64 

Ibid., л. 4 [p. 4]. 

65 

Ibid., ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 98, л. 8 [f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 98, p. 8]. All territorial state archives were 

informed by letter №VІ-144 from February 17 1961. (ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 1, а.е. 97, л. 35; ДА – 

В. Търново, ф. 1150, оп. 1, а.е. 15а, л. 6.) [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 1, a.u. 97, p. 35.; 

State Archive – Veliko Tarnovo, f. 1150, op. 1, a.u. 15a, p. 6.] 

66 

Ibid., а.е. 34, л. 4 [a.u. 34, p. 4]. 

67 

Ibid., л. 1, 4 [pp. 1, 4]. 

68 

By letter №10072 of 27 November 1990 regarding the increased interest in papers seized by the 

Interior Ministry, the President of the General Department of Archives to the "Information and 

records" of the Interior Ministry insited they to be returned to the state archives. It was 

available, upon request, by the Ministry of Interior, Archive Management to provide free 

copies of microfilm. (ЦДА, ф. 540, оп. 6, а.е. 6, л. 119.) [Central State Archive, f. 540, op. 6, 

a.u. 6, p. 119.] 

69 

The special archive section "files and records" maintained its autonomy even after the creation 

of the Archive of the Ministry.

DIFFERENT GENERATIONS, DIFFERENT 

SHARED MEMORIES. A STUDY OF TURKISH 

MINORITY IN BULGARIA MEMORIES 

Margarita KARAMIHOVA 1 

Abstract: The article presents research results of fieldwork on memories of Turks living in 

Bulgaria regarding the traumatic events during so called “renaissance process” through an 

ethnological perspective. What is the impact of tensions, conflicts and mass exile of Turks (1984- 

1989) on the Turkish minority group memories for the next 22 years? How the communist 

modernization project has been reflected by minority group members? Those are the main 

questions on which focus this article. 

Methodology 

The article is an attempt to identify major factors to be estimated when analyzing the 

process of shaping memories. Stressing the constructed character of remembrance, I refer 

to Halbwachs who states that memories are in most cases a reconstruction of the past with 

the help of events from the present. Those events are caused by the political system and 

ideology (Halbwachs 1985). Trauma and victimization have come to play within a 

politics of memory. Basic premise is that memories are never simply records of the past, 

but they are interpretative reconstruction that bears the imprint of local narrative 

conventions, cultural assumptions, discursive formation and practices and social context 

of recall and commemoration. When memories recall act of violence against entire group 

they might become emblems of victimized identity. Thus, acts of remembering often take 

on performative meaning. 

I examine the discursive and narrative practices that have a stake in particular constructs 

of memory. It is widely accepted that memories are produced out of experience and in 

turn, re-shape it. This implies that memory is intrinsically linked to identity. As far as 

aggressive assimilatory politics of communist regime was directed to reverse group 

identity of Turks in Bulgaria (1984-1989) I do examine the cultural means and social 

institutions through which the practices or memory are mediated (Antze, Lambeck 1996: 

xii) aiming to play a search-light of role of Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) 

after collapse of communism. 

As Connerton (1989) stresses, special institutions or at least mechanisms are needed to 

generate collective remembrance. To understand the impact of Turkish minority on the 

events of 1984-1989 and the traumatic experience taking place in group memories it was 

necessary to examine carefully the messages propagated by MRF and its leader Ahmed 

Dogan for 22 years as well as immediate reactions in the groups of Turks in Bulgaria – in 

terms of remembering the socialist past and shaping voting strategy directed to the future 

in the first decade of 21 st century. 


256 


The main message of Ahmed Dogan and MRF activists which provoked my research 

states that the resistance of Turkish population, guided by its leader was the main factor 

to overthrow communist regime. In a seminal 1995 essay, Alison Landsberg discusses the 

implications of what she calls 'prosthetic memory' - memories which do not come from a 

person's live experience in any strict sense. Although memory might always have been 

prosthetic”, she writes, "the mass media - technologies which structure and circumscribe 

experience - bring the texture and contours of prosthetic memory into dramatic relief." In 

particular, Landsberg contends, cinema has for roughly a century had the capacity to 

generate experiences and memories of its own - "memories which become experiences 

that film consumers both possess and feel possessed by." (Landsberg 2000: 191). The 

essential assumption of prosthetic memory as a theoretical construct is that reality always 

has been mediated, as a consensus upheld through narrative and information cultures - or 

indeed through the very structure of language itself. 

Taking these considerations into account, I would like to present following arguments in 

this paper: Politics of (re)shaping groups memories had resulted in different hidden 

histories in terms of Halbwachs (1984:55) which articulate between Turks, born before 

and after early 80s. Deep rupture in communication between generations emerged. 

Different memories shape different identities in young and older generations. Those 

generations often use communist times as a point of reference. 

Despite Bulgarian 1989 was branded by the exodus of Turks during the summer there are 

not so many researches concerning the problems related to so call “renaissance process” 

(1984-1989), Turkish resistance and the events which follow (Stoyanov 1998; 

Karamihova 2000; Karamihova 200a; Grouev, M. A. Kalyonski. 2008; Todorova; 

Marushiakova&Popov) . The first to write on so called “renaissance process” were close 

related to socialist state security (Gotcheva 1991). Though the first academic results are 

taken into account in writing this article. 

Methods 

The determined objects of research demand elaboration of several research methods 

aimed to collect and analyze relevant data. The research started from classical 

Ethnological methods – structured and semi-structured interviews, participant 

observations, free conversations and observations between 1988 and 2012 during 

fieldworks held in different towns and villages populated by Turks. There were conducted 

more than 100 interviews with informants at age from 19 to 79. Male and female 

informants are balanced in number. The educational status of informants predominantly is 

8 school degree (minor educational status), but about 2% of informants hold University 

degree. The economical status of informants is almost equal – low monthly income (100- 

150 Euros) despite their job positions (or retirement). Almost all of them own houses and 

land and produce food to support their households. Participant observation was held 

during different local fests. The aim of those observations was to monitor interactions 

between citizens from different ethnic and religious groups, to register group identity 

manifestations in terms of symbols, music and location, eating together or separately; to 

measure how the group borders function after the years of tensions and small scale 

conflicts. 

To collect data on MRF messages were used media and internet based sources.

Margarita KARAMIHOVA: Different Generations, Different Shared Memories … 257 

10.11.1989 and after 

On 10 November a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian 

Communist Party accepted the resignation of the long-term party and state leader Todor 

Zhivkov. Historical facts and following development of the country leave no place for 

doubt that it was internal coup within the Communist Party leadership that lead to Todor 

Zhivkov’s demise 2 . 

The reason for this statement considers the fact that there was no strong anti-communist 

movement in Bulgaria and following governments were entirely dominated by 

communists (i.e. socialist). The Bulgarian dissident movement was much weaker than 

those in countries like Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Most of newly emerging 

pro-Perestroyka associations called for reforms within the socialist system. Some of them 

attempted to change the system from within; others wanted to overthrow it and fight for 

democracy but still in the frames of Perestroika. One center of dissent was an 

environmental movement, which focussed on air pollution from badly run factories in 

neighboring Romania. Another was made up of Bulgarian intellectuals who were opposed 

to assimilatory politics directed toward Turks in Bulgaria. Neither movement implied 

fundamental criticism of the Bulgarian socialist regime. However, the more important 

forces for change came from within the party. Zhivkov resigned in November 1989 and in 

December the Party gave up its monopoly on power. The result of the 1989 "revolution" 

was to return reform-minded ex-Communists to power. 

Seizing power, new communist rulers brought in practice: 

1. New way of managing long-term communist elite strategy with indisputable 

contribution of state security structures; 

2. Political engineering aimed to face challenges of contemporary world (political, social 

and economical mimicry) in each and every structure of the society, with special attention 

on minority issues. 

Turkish minority in Bulgaria 

In the course of 20 th century all Bulgarian governments have pursued long-term 

assimilation policies aiming to either assimilate Turks or to force them to leave the 

country. In general, assimilatory policies were conducted since independent from 

Ottoman Empire Third Bulgarian Kingdom was established (1878). 

After the communist takeover on 9 September 1944, the Turks in Bulgaria became 

targets of a carefully elaborated policy carried out by the new regime. In the beginning, in 

unison with the Soviet model, the policy was adopted to accept Turks as an ethnic 

community within the Bulgarian nation with equal rights and their own identity, to 

involve them actively in the ‘building of the new socialist republic’, and to improve their 

economic and educational level. Simultaneous with the aspiration to increase the level of 

education of the Bulgarian Turks, the Bulgarian government initiated decisive steps to 

counteract the influence of religion among the Muslim population (Marushiakova, 

Popov :10-11). 

On 16 April 1951 the Political Bureau of Communist Party took decision for ”Special 

care when working with Turkish population“. Based on it, the major departments of Sofia 

University “Climent Ohridski” opened special Turkish sub-departments (where the 

2 Recent archival sources revealed that Zhivkov was ready to leave his powerful positions a year 

earlier.

258 


subjects were taught in Turkish). A special Department of Turkish Philology was opened 

at the University of Sofia, and three colleges for Turkish primary school teachers were 

established in Kurdjali, Shumen and Blagoevgrad. (Marushiakova, Popov :13). The 

membership of the emerging Turkish intelligentsia in the Communist Party was greatly 

encouraged. All efforts were directed towards creating a Turkish nomenclature as a 

mediator between communist administration and Turkish community. 

The new policy on minorities in Bulgaria began with the April plenary session of the 

Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1956. This plenum 

recommended important corrections to the previous government policies towards the 

Turkish population. The new concept was adopted: ”The Bulgarian Turks are an 

indivisible part of the Bulgarian people.“ Between 1959 and 1972, Turkish schools were 

merged with Bulgarian schools and Turkish language instruction was gradually 

eliminated. 

More than 80% of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks were concentrated in the north-eastern and 

the south-western parts of the country. A majority of them are employed in tobacco 

farming, but a large number of Turks also used to work in the more profitable 

manufacturing sector. A privileged elite of urban-based, university-educated Turks was 

formed during the communist era and, as Maria Todorova notes, “Among them are to be 

found the most ardent exponents of a distinct ethnic consciousness” (Todorova 1992: 

154). 

Starting from 1960ies its assimilatory policies were directed toward small ethno-cultural 

groups (Roma, Pomaks). A harsh assimilation campaign was conducted by totalitarian 

regime in the period 1984-89 directed toward Turks (so-called “national revival 

process”). The main action can be resumed as follow 3 : 

• “Turkish-Arabic” names were changed. People could choose from an official list 

with “Bulgarian” (Christian or Slavic) names; 

• Turkish language was forbidden. Speaking Turkish was pronounced to be felony; 

• Religious and local communities life was controlled by state security services; 

circumcision was pronounced to be felony etc; 

• Constant interventions in traditional culture especially in the customs, costumes, 

folklore were conducted; 

• Constantly persons and families were interned from “compact Turkish” regions 

to “clear Bulgarian” places. 

Ethnography 

“Before they changed our names we were decorating our brides beautifully. Heavily 

made up with flowers drown on the face of the bride… Our wedding parties were so 

convivial, just like Bulgrian weddings. Now it is so expensive”, said Milka, 43, village 

Bistrentsi, distr. Rousse (record 1994). 

“When they changed our names it was forbidden to come to Dambula at the night of 

Huderlez [6 th of May]. Militia was urged to blockade roads and no body was allowed to 

fill a bottle of holly water. Once a border guard officer was filling water and a militia 

officer passed a remark to him. Nearly sitting Turks started to fill water too and there 

started a scandal”, Ali (48), (record may 1995), around the healing water source 

Dambula, near Momchilgrad, Eastern Rodopes. 

3 For details see literature cited.


“It was betted in the times of Bay Tosho [Todor Zhivkov]. His only mistake was when 

he had changed the names. Then Bulgaria went back, rotten. It started at 1984 and was 

obvious at 1989. At 1984 the militia started a war. Four people were killed. After that 

they came and changed our names”, Ahmed (67), Momchilgrad (record May 1995). 

“It was great at the time of Todor Zhivkov. There were low and order, job positions and 

money”, Mehmed (65), Dazdovnitsa, Eastern Rodopes (record May 1995). 

“The worst thing that communists did is that they separated families”, Ali (70), Gradina, 

Razgrad (record March 1994) During the interview my informant started to cry because 

his daughter will not come for the fest of Bayram from Turkey. 

“Because our faith was forbidden we know only the stories told by our grand parents. I 

do not know how to pray in the mosque. My wife was pregnant when the circumcision 

was forbidden. She was praying all the time if the baby will be boy to be born 

circumcised. They were people sentenced because of illegal circumcisions. It was 

humiliating every month to bring the baby boys to doctor for check-up… ” Sabri (39), 

Podrumche, region of Krumovgrad (Record May 1992) 

“Before the religion was forbidden there were great fests. A lot of kurbans… Now 

everything is so expensive…” Ali (78), Dajdovnik, Krumovgrad (record May 1992). 

“My wife does not know Bulgarian. For five years she and the other women from the 

village did not travel to the town. Just me… You pay a fine if you are speaking Turkish. 

How to go there with your wife? She is not an animal and you cannot spend a day in the 

town in silence…” Raif (78) Yabalkovets, Eastern Rodopes, (Record July 1992) 

“My brother could not bare this humiliation. He committed suicide in the age of 45. It 

was horrible to bury him with too many militia officers around. They were there to check 

if we are using coffin… and to see if someone will comment the politics…” Myumyun 

(47) Byal Kladenets (1992). 

“I was bitten because I rejected to change my name. It was because of my second – 

fathers name… We are orphans. My brother had raised me. He was not in the town. He, 

as a man and as an older brother had to choose our fathers name… it was so 

humiliating…” Gyulfem (50) Ardino(Record August 1992). 

“Bay Todor was caring us in his arms”, anonymous woman (about 60) at a train station 

in Istanbul (record of Eran Livni 2008). 

The modernization project of “Peoples Republic” even during the 80s was estimated by 

Turkish minority members as having still high resource potential. It is remembered as 

stimulating personal development; constantly raising living standard and assuring new 

quality of life; providing choices at micro level (person, family);providing (social) 

security for a life time and in day to day terms. 

In the quoted narratives, the relation between local culture model including religion and 

the political regime under socialism is presented as one of competing institutions, in 

which the state was seen as suppressing Islam and fragmenting the union of the Bulgarian 

nation. 

This point of view is shaped by and used as a mode of interpretation for the present-day 

problems which Turks in Bulgaria have to face. 

The “greatest exodus” 

Between June and August 1989 over 360,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey in what 

international humanitarian relief organizations at the time described as the largest 

collective civilian migration since the Second World War. (Pickles 2001: 1)

260 


The exodus of ethnic Turks lasted until 21 August 1989, when Turkey closed its border 

to persons arriving from Bulgaria. For about two months 369,839 people had left 

Bulgaria, 214,902 people remained in Turkey (according to the Bulgarian Ministry of the 

Interior at the end of 1990). 

“All neibourhood leaved then. There were rumours spread around: ‘If you are not 

leaving to Turkey you will be raped’. They said that Bulgarians will rape everybody 

because they need revenge. Turks were raping when they enslaved Bulgarians. But we 

decided not to leave” remembers Leysan (35), village of Tetovo, District of Rousse (ACE 

– MER 1994:16). 

From August to November Bulgarian media were occupied with scary stories of 

refugees who returned. Western radio stations were broadcasting interviews mostly with 

expelled leaders of Turks, sharing their experience and information about cases of 

violation of human rights in Bulgaria and still talking in pro-system manner. 

Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) 

One of the ‘mythical motifs’ of any national mythology (Smith, A. D., 1986, p. 192) is a 

‘myth of liberation’ which displays how one’s own nation (the ancestors) was liberated 

from the oppression of the other nations. The myth sais that Everybody, regardless of 

their social and economic status, participated at the uprising. This is a very common 

image of the nation: “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail, 

the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”. (Anderson, B., 1992, 

p. 7) I would add that a national minority can “borow” (develop) the ‘myth of liberation’ 

too. “The fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated.” (Barthes, 

R., 1993, p. 119) 

In 1990 a political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), dominated by 

ethnic Turks was established with declared goal to protect the civil and religious rights of 

all Bulgarian citizens. Its first actions were to open debates on forcible assimilation of 

Bulgarian Turks (1984-1989) and to indict the former socialist authorities responsible. 

Following years an idea was pronounced that the resistances of Turks and especially of 

their party leader Ahmed Dogan were the only ones to struggle for and to achieve 

democratization of Bulgarian society at 1989. The MRF gradually created a public image 

of ethnic Turks as the main force causing democratization of Bulgarian society. 

However, the process of lustration (2007 - 2008) has shown that almost all MRF activists, 

the party leader including, were closely related to the totalitarian State Security secret 

services. It opens new debates on their role in the processes from 1984 until nowadays. 

For almost 20 years Movement for Rights and Freedom declares that: (a) It is the only 

force which contributed to collapse of communism, mobilizing Turkish minority 

resistance; (b) It is the only guarantee for peaceful development of the country after 1989. 

Due to the lack of relevant documents we can only speculate that establishment of MRF 

and its further political activities set in rhetoric of minority rights protection is an 

example of political engineering developed by the communist party leaders aiming to 

keep the status quo. What the fieldwork and media sources had shown is that it’s policy 

goes through: (a) Rhetoric and actions resulting in stabilization of victim complex of 

Turkish minority in Bulgaria; (b) Challenging macro society via provocative 

pronouncements, raising tensions between minority group and nationalistic circles.


Both result in strong belief that only MRF can guarantee rights and freedom of Muslim as 

whole and Turks in Bulgaria in particular. Capsulation of the group and strong electoral 

motivation are most probably desired outcome. 

Subsequent economic consequences of post-socialist regional economic collapse 

(what I shall refer to as ‘economic violence’) have shaped the path of transformation 

and produced a particular regional model of post-communist transformation. (Pickles 

2001: 1). Early 90s were years of mass voluntary emigration of Bulgarian Turks and 

we witnessed an emigrational wave higher than that in 1989. The push factor seemed 

to be economical. Depopulation of whole regions continues until nowadays. 

Generations born after 80ies grew up with stigmatised image of communist times. Young 

Turks receive via politicians, internet, media and even movies the image of ‘dark times 

’marked by oppression, murders and Exodus. They face difficult economic and political reality 

and develop strategy for successful emigration. Their generational ‘memory of communism’ is 

painted black and they refuse to share memories of their grandparent’s generation. 

Conclusion 

Halbwachs states that the reading of the present is not only influenced by the 

historiography of the official ideology, but by the individual and remembered experiences 

of the people. The individual experienced past might even be more important for 

analysing the present than the official historiography (Halbwachs 1984:55). Those 

individual memories might gain the status of a collective memory, a “hidden history” 

which might be contrasted with the authoritative discourse of the political regime. In 

Bulgarian case the socialist reading of the past was superseded by the ethnic/ religious 

reading of the past, which was just as authoritarian as the former and served the interests 

of looking for status quo parties. 

Due to different personal experiences and different social environment with different 

influences on Turks in Bulgaria, since about mid 90ies there are two collective memories 

on socialist past, developed in different age groups. The myth about abundant, pieceful 

and prosperous past is muted or passing away with old, powerless generation. The myth 

of constant repressions, rejection and economicl genocide is widening its territory. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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2. Abuses during the Forced Assimilation of the Ethnic Turkish Minority. London. 

3. Anderson, Benedict. 1991[1983]. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 

4. Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 

5. Antze, P., M. Lambeck 1996. Preface. Tense Past Cultural Essays on Trauma and 

Memory. Antze, P., M. Lambeck (eds.) Routledge, NY, London. 

6. Barthes, R., 1993: Mythologies. London, Vintage. 

7. Bougarel, X. Islam and Politics in the Post-Communist Balkans. 

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/13%20Bougarel.pdf. Last visited: 

November 2008. 

8. Buechsenschuetz, U.: 2000, Malcinstvenata politika v Bulgaria. Politika na BKP kam 

evrei, romi, pomaci i turci (1944–1989). [The minority policy in Bulgaria. The politics 

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262 


10. Crampton, R.: 1989, The Turks of Bulgaria, 1878–1944, in: International Journal of 

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11. Galabov, A. 1995. Ethnicheskiyat problem v Bulgaria [Ethnic problems in Bulgaria]. 

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regime] Ed. IIRP, CIELA 

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“vãzroditelen protses”. [A Family after the So-Called “Revival Process”.] – In: 

Aspetki na etnokulturnata situatsija. Osem godini po-kãsno. [Aspects of the Ethno- 

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17. Landsberg, A.Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in 

the Age of Mass Culture . 

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la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien n°18, juillet-décembre 1994 

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Ethnographic Materials 

1. Archive Centre of Ethnology (ACE) – Mission to the sity of Ruse and the region, July 

1994.

DEMOCRATIC MACEDONIA – OUTSIDE` 

THE GRASP OF TITO 

Milen MIHOV 1 

Abstract: The establishment of the communist dictatorship in Vardar Macedonia is a rapid 

process even in the beginning of 1945. The resistance to the new Yugoslav power is organized by 

the followers of the idea of independent, democratic Macedonia under the protection of the 

western countries. The major role for the separation from Yugoslavia is played by the members of 

the Bulgarian organization IMRO who are subject of mass repressions. After the dissolution of 

Yugoslavia in the end of the 20 th c. the issue of the political and historical rehabilitation of the 

victims of communism in FYROM still remains open. 

The establishment of the communist regime in Vardar Macedonia at the end of World 

War II is fulfilled within the project for the revival of Yugoslavia as a federal state. The 

plans of the allies from the anti-Hitler coalition for post-war organization on the Balkans 

exclude the possibilities for territorial changes which actually means establishment of 

autonomous Republic of Macedonia within the borders of the future Federal Yugoslavia 

and “providing” the “Macedonian minorities” in Greece and Bulgaria with rights. The 

establishment of the new state is accomplished under the guidance of the Yugoslav 

communist leader Josip Broz - Tito and in fact follows the Soviet model of multi-national 

state. Communist Yugoslavia exists only for forty-eight years and disintegrates only 

twelve years after its creator’s death. The state which is often connected with Tito’s name 

ended its existence with a series of blood conflicts which caused suffering to millions of 

people. 

The most consistent in the application of the communist policy on the Macedonian 

issues is the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP). Macedonism becomes a major weapon 

for realizing Tito’s striving for the revival of Yugoslavia. The projected federal state must 

overcome the national contradictions left by the old regime and ensure peaceful coexistence 

of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians [5] [i]. 

The Yugoslav communist leader makes plans which define his leader’s position on the 

Balkans and in Eastern Europe. In the end of 1944 Tito starts a campaign aiming at 

inclusion of Bulgaria into Yugoslavia, joining of Aegean Macedonia from Greece as well 

as annexation of Albania and parts of Hungary[4] [ii]. When realizing these ambitions, 

Macedonia plays and important role. In the foreign policy it is used as a means of 

exerting pressure on Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. 

The strategic importance of Macedonia, the extremely weak influence of the Yugoslav 

communists in the region, and the preserved strong connections with Bulgaria, define the 

extremely quick communization of power. It can be reasonably said that Vardar 

Macedonia is the first “state” not only in Federal Yugoslavia, “but also in this part of 

Europe, subject to transformation following the Soviet model, in which the communist 


264 


dictatorship is established”. The Popular Front, established as a mass national 

organization, does not unite political parties with pre-war biography and different 

ideology but is dominated only by communists [2] [iii]. 

The establishment of communist dictatorship is under the direct supervision of Lazar 

Koliševski in the first months of 1945 and includes in the first place construction of the 

repressive system of the state[1][iv]. The personal devotion of L. Koliševski to the Yugoslav 

leader provides ground to the German research worker Stefan Troebst successfully to define 

him as Tito’s “Macedonian commissioner” [6][v]. The establishment of the communist 

dictatorship is accompanied by a quick process of national construction which involves 

creation of new national language, national history and new national symbols. Totally 

excluded from the political life, condemned as “pro-Bulgarian”, the anti-communist 

opposition in Vardar Macedonia stands out with its conspiratorial nature and marked anti- 

Yugoslav orientation. A fundamental element in the programmes of the separate 

organizations is the call for independence of the Republic outside of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 

One of the first underground organizations that emerged in 1945 is the Democratic 

Front of Macedonia “Ilinden – 1903”. The organization is managed by Dr. Iliya Chulev – 

former deputy to the National Assembly from Maček’s Agricultural Party in pre-war 

Yugoslavia, Kosta Hrisimov – Smilec – former chief of staff of VІ partisan brigade and 

participant in the military actions against the German army and Dimitar Zlatarev – doctor 

of Law. The session of the Foreign Ministers Council of the states from the anti-Hitler 

coalition which was held in London from September 11 until October 2, 1945 and on 

which was discussed the preparation of the peace treaties, is the ground for elaborating a 

memorandum concerning the Macedonian issue. The document is presented on behalf of 

the Macedonian population and above all on behalf of the Bulgarians who are the 

majority in Macedonia, and reflects the basic ideas of the organization. The authors 

clearly state their Bulgarian identity and appeal to the Great Powers for intervention 

because in Vardar Macedonia “if the Macedonian feels like a Bulgarian he is a criminal”. 

The reason for this is the stated desire for separation from Yugoslavia. The Memorandum 

expresses the wish for creation of Independent Macedonia, within its geographic 

boundaries, under the auspices of the Great Powers, which to become a Switzerland on 

the Balkans. To achieve this goal it is necessary to make an international inquiry because 

“Tito’s resolution of the Macedonian issues is not a resolution of the same one”. 

The Memorandum sent in a diplomatic way is responsible for discovering the 

underground organization and arresting its leaders. In February 1946 a specialized 

structure of the Supreme Court in Skopje sentenced to long-term imprisonment the 

members of the organization for restoring the Bulgarian “terrorist organization” (IMRO) 

in Vardar Macedonia, lead by Ivan Mihailov [7][vi]. 

In October 1945 another anti-communist organization emerges. It publicly declares its 

continuity with the Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia. Initiators are 

the doctors Dr. Vasil Ivanov, Dr. Kosta Trenchev and the jurist Dr. Konstantin Terziev. 

Several basic elements of marked anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist orientation can be seen 

in the approved programme. The active members in the organization state that they restore 

IMRO in Vardar Macedonia and proclaim: for separation from Yugoslavia, achieved mainly 

through legal means and on the basis of the Constitution; for recognition of the Bulgarian 

identity with all rights in the Republic as an unchanging condition for democracy; for just

Milen MIHOV: Democratic Macedonia– Outside` the Grasp of Tito 265 

resolution of the Macedonia issue from the Paris Peace Conference via uniting the three parts 

of Macedonia to create an “independent Macedonia” under the auspices of the Great Powers. 

In connection with the preparation of the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 the leaders of 

IMRO prepared a summary memorandum to the Great Powers. The main claim in the 

document is the victorious countries to defend the right for self-determination of the 

population. Under international control a plebiscite to be conducted for the separation of 

Tito’s Yugoslavia and the creation of free and independent Macedonia [3][vii]. 

The Yugoslav delegation in Paris receives the Memorandum and this leads to revealing 

and annihilation of the organization. In June 1946 mass arrests were carried out and over 

3 000 people were sent to prison. There is a trial against the 13 members of the Central 

Committee and accusations are bought which foresee a death sentence. 

The extent of the repressions is so big that it leads to the intervention of the Great 

Powers. In January 1947 the Soviet Union, England, the USA and France sent joint 

delegation which had to make an inquiry concerning the case and to meet with the 

arrested people. The meeting is held in Belgrade and only Ivanov, Trenchev and Terziev 

are allowed by the authorities to be present. The prisoners are preliminary “prepared” for 

the conversation with the foreign diplomats and they have an ultimatum that the only 

position they might have is repentance, otherwise they will extremely aggravate their 

situation. Personally the Interior Minister of Yugoslavia Alexander Ranković warns them 

to give up their claims because “all IMRO members and all Bulgarians in Yugoslavia will 

turn into skeletons”. In the presence of the representatives of the victorious states the 

three leaders of IMRO repeat the claims contained in the memorandum of the 

organization and insist on separating from Yugoslavia in a legal way via referendum 

approved by the Great Powers and proclaiming an independent state under international 

guarantees [3][viii]. 

At the end of March 1946 in Skopje is held the trial against the thirteen members of the 

Central Committee. The seven leaders who signed the memorandum for the Paris Peace 

Conference were sentenced to death. Under diplomatic pressure the Supreme Court in 

Belgrade confirms the death sentence only of Dr. Konstantin Terziev. While serving the 

term of imprisonment in Idrizovo near Skopje other three of the convicts die [3][ix]. 

The problem with the rising anti-communist and anti-Yugoslav opposition raises 

justified concerns among the new rulers of Vardar. The issue was discussed in series of 

special meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia. (CPM) 

in May and June 1946. Presentations and analyses indicate that the top communist 

governing body notes with alarm the public support of the idea about “Autonomous 

Macedonia under the protectorate of the Great Powers”. For achieving their aim the 

population depends mainly on the United Kingdom and the USA. In the Party’s 

documents the supporters of these ideas were labeled with such names as “IMRO 

members”, “mihailovists”, ‘Great Bulgaria shovinists”, ‘bugarashi’ and ‘pro-Bulgarians” 

which were meant to replace the ethnonym Bulgarians [2][x]. 

According to research in Macedonian historiography the number of oppositional 

organizations exposed in 1945 is 8, in 1947 – 19, in 1948 -16, 1949 – 7. The official data 

produced by the Ministry of Interior of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(FYROM), made at the request of a group of MP’s from IMRO-DPMNU reveals that 

during the period between 1945 and 1991 105 underground organizations were exposed. 

For the same period 1045 people were sent to prison, and 245 were sentenced to death 

or sent to prison for more than 15 years[8][xi]. Prof. Dimitar Gotsev, an erudite scholar of

266 


the subject and son of one of these Yugoslav convicts and a leader of IMRO in 1947, 

points out that only in 1945 and 1946 more than 4700 Bulgarians were murdered or 

missing, and more than 15 000 others were sent to prison[3][xii]. 

After more than two decades from proclaiming the independence of FYROM 

rehabilitation of victims is still a question for the future. The existing legislation 

effectively deprives the victims and their heirs of political and social justice. Art. 36 of 

the constitution of FYROM from 1991 declares that the state guarantees the social rights 

of anti-fascist resistance fighters and also of the persecuted and repressed people for 

“their ideas about the identity of the Macedonian people and the state system” and the 

members of their families who are not capable of physical and social existence [xiii]. 

Only on July 18, 2002 the Law for the rights of the prosecuted and repressed for their 

ideas about the identity of the Macedonian people and the state system and the members 

of their families was approved, by whose aid the declared constitutional rights must be 

implemented. According to Art. 2 of the Law the people who were interned, forced to 

emigrate, removed from work, detained or confined by Court’s judgment or declared for 

illegal gaining of wealth, for ideas and actions with the purpose of “creation of 

independent, united and democratic state of Macedonia” [xiv], are entitled to material 

compensation and social protection. Lawmakers retrospectively equate the struggle for 

“independent Macedonia” which is a program of the anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist 

opposition to the affirmation of “the identity of the Macedonian people” – Tito’s 

communist doctrine. The victims, most of whom dead, and their heirs are subjected to a 

new violence, which aims at replacing the memory of the past. Despite the limitations of 

the Law which excludes from its scope a number of groups persecuted by the communist 

regime, its application is blocked by the decision of the Constitutional Court from 

December 18, 2002. The Court ruled on an appeal of the Union of the fighters for 

national liberation and anti-fascist war, an organization with a strong communist 

character, and repeals Art. 2 and some other provisions unconstitutional, which 

effectively makes the law inapplicable [xv]. 

In 2005 the Assembly of the Republic passed a law which amends and supplements the 

law form 2002, where the repealed texts are repeated with minor additions. It should be 

noted that those corrections are in fact a formal recognition of the repressions: detentions 

without trial, sentences to death and prison, sentences to forced and ‘corrective” labor and 

internees after 1945 [xvi]. The Union of the fighters opposed against these provisions and 

challenged the law before the Constitutional Court. The arguments of the depositors of 

the new law are that during the period between 1945 and 1991 there are no registered 

cases of persecution for ideas and actions aimed at promoting “the identity of 

Macedonian people and their country”, because they were “realized” in 1944. Moreover, 

according to the opponents of the law its major weakness is the possibility to benefit 

individuals who with their actions in the past “have challenged the identity of 

Macedonian people and their country”. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal of 

the Union of Fighters [xvii], with its decision from December 2005, but the effective 

application of the law was placed entirely in the hands of the executive power, 

represented by the minister of Finance, Labor, Social Affairs and Interior.

Milen MIHOV: Democratic Macedonia– Outside` the Grasp of Tito 267 

In April 2012 Ali Ahmeti, leader of the Albanian party which is part of the country’s 

coalition government, presented a draft law for the rights of the former political prisoners 

and the repressed in Macedonia between 1945 and 1991. It provides rehabilitation of the 

convicted for “ideological and political reasons” by the Military and the People’s Court 

of Tito’s Yugoslavia in order to guarantee their social rights and compensate for the 

suffering incurred. The ruling party of the Prime-minister Nikola Gruevski met the 

initiative with reservations. Speaking to the media he states that the project was far too 

‘utopian” and difficult to apply. According to the Government the reason lies in the fact 

that most of those who fought for independent Macedonia were convicted with charges 

for ‘terrorism, destruction of public order or been described as “vanchomihailovists” i.e. 

Bulgarians [xviii]. 

Bibliography 

1. Angelov, V. The Macedonian Bloody Christmas. Creation and Recognition of Vardar 

Macedonia as a Republic in the Yugoslav Federation (1943-1946), S., 2003. See: [1] 

2. Dimitrov, A. Birth of a New State. The Republic of Macedonia between Yugoslavism 

and Nationalism. S., 2011. See: [2] 

3. Gotsev, D. The restoration and the Activity of IMRO in Vardar Macedonia after 1944 

– In: 100 years Internal Macedonian Odrin Revolutionary Organization , S., 1994. 

See: [3] 

4. Markov, G. The Balkanization. Geo-political Phenomenon in Conflicts Studies. S., 

2011. See: [4] 

5. National liberation movement of the Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians 1878-1944, 

volume 4, S., 2003. See: [5] 

6. Trebst, S. Bugarsko-Jygoslovinska kontraverza za Makedonija 1967-1982, Sk., 1997. 

See: [6] 

7. Tsarnushanov, K. Macedonism and the Resistance Movement of Macedonia against 

It. S., 1992. See: [7] 

8. Velinovski, H. Macedonia, Statehood and independence 1945 – 1991. Sk., 2002. See: [8] 

Notes 

i Националноосвободителното движение на македонските и тракийски българи 

1878-1944 г. Т. 4, С., 2003, 413-430. 

ii Марков, Г. “Балканизацията”. Геополитическо явление в конфликтознанието. 

С., 2011, 376-377. 

iii Димитров, А. Раждането на една нова държава. Република Македония между 

югославизма и национолизма. С., 2011, с. 522. 

iv Ангелов, В. Македонската кървава коледа. Създаване и утвърждаване на 

Вардарска Македония като република в Югославската Федерация (1943-1946). 

, С., 2003, 201-235. 

v Требст, С. Бугарско – Jугословинската контраверза за Македониjа 1967-1982 г. 

Ск., 1997, с. 59.

268 


vi Църношанов, К. Македонизмът и съпротивата на Македония срещу него. С., 

1992, 284-287. The absence of death sentences against the leaders of the 

organization can be explained with the intervention of external factors. Despite the 

condescension of the court Dr. I. Chulev and Dr. D. Zlatarev die due to the hard 

conditions in prison and K. Hrisimov loses his one hand there. 

vii Гоцев, Д. Възстановяването и дейността на ВМРО във Вардарска Македония 

след 1944 г. – В: 100 години Вътрешна Македоно-Одринска Революционна 

Организация. С., 1994, 181-183. 

viii Гоцев, Д. Възстановяването и … 186-188. 

ix Гоцев, Д. Възстановяването и … 195-198 

x Димитров, А. Раждането на …528-531 

xi Велjановски, Н. Мекедониjа. Државност и независност 1945 – 1991 г. Ск., 2002, 

65-67. The author cites studies of Zoran Todorovski, a professional historian 

featuring rare in Macedonian historiography competence, objectivity and scientific 

integrity. 

xii Гоцев, Д. Възстановяването и … 181 

xiii http://www.jorm.org.mk/ustav.shtml 

xiv “Service journal”, Ed. 61, 26.07.2002 

xv http://www.ustavensud.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf 

xv i“Service journal”, Ed. 58, 19.07.2005 

xvii http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf 

xviii http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=507CB672D8CF334099D786FE038E4D95 

&arc=1

BULGARIA AND THE BULGARIANS IN THE 

IDEOLOGY OF YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS 

Milen MIHOV 1 

Abstract: The formation of communist Yugoslavia goes through formation of a federal state after 

the Soviet pattern. The project implementation requires the formation of People’s Republic of 

Macedonia as a national state of the “Macedonian nation”. The communist project of Macedonia 

is characterized not by its ideological construction but by the underlying nationalism. Maintaining 

the stable image of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians as enemies and cause of the partition of 

Macedonia is of great importance for the internal consolidation of Yugoslavia. 

The creation of communist Yugoslavia after World War II is an implementation of a 

geopolitical project aiming at preserving the territorial status quo of the Balkans which 

was imposed by the peace treaties of Versailles. The invasion of the Red Army and its 

key role in the military operations on the peninsula determine the primary role of the 

Soviet Union in settling the postwar organization of the peninsula. During the 

negotiations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain on October 9 – 11, 1941, the 

Great Powers distributed the spheres of influence in the region. The conversations in 

Moscow between Stalin and Churchill ended with an agreement with percentage 

expression and provide dominant influence of the Soviet Union in Romania, Hungary and 

Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia was divided equally. In return for the big concessions in 

Eastern Europe Churchill gets Stalin’s consent for dominating British influence in Greece 

equal to that of the Soviet Union in Romania. The application of these agreements in 

practice depends on the military presence of each of the countries in the region[5] [i]. 

The arrangements concerning Yugoslavia are based on imaginary balance between the 

powers but in fact the military actions lead to imposing the total power of the communist 

movement which is connected with the Soviet Union. This is especially true for Vardar 

Macedonia which, after the withdrawal of the Bulgarian armies in September 1944, was 

occupied by the powers of the Wehrmacht. On the basis of the agreement from October 5, 

1944 between Bulgaria and Tito’s Yugoslavia, signed under the auspices of Stalin in 

Craiova, the Bulgarian army emancipates from the German occupation the Valley of 

Vardar and actively participates in the Belgrade invasion operation of the Red Army in 

the composition of the Third Ukraine Front. In the agreement the Patriotic Front 

government makes serious concessions to the Yugoslav communists since it is obliged to 

let the Yugoslav partisans enter first the places emancipated by the Bulgarian army. 

Completion of military operations in Vardar Macedonia is followed by an immediate 

withdrawal of the Bulgarians troops which leads to full imposing of the communist 

government in the region [8][ii]. 

1 St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo.

270 


The establishment of the communist regime in New Yugoslavia reproduces the Soviet 

Federation model as the solving of the national question has an important place in the 

ideology of the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP). The ideological construction of the 

communist Macedonism is formulated with respect to Macedonia. The marginal, in the 

past decades, idea of the existence of “Macedonian nation” is defined in the decisions of 

the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1934 and becomes the main 

weapon of the Yugoslav communists lead by Tito for the Revival of Yugoslavia. The 

projected federal state must overcome the inherited from the old regime national 

contradictions and to ensure peaceful co-existence of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and 

Montenegrins as well as of “Bosnians” and “Macedonians” [9] [iii]. 

The construction of the Macedonian nations faces serious difficulties in the end of the 

war due to the mass collaboration of the population during the Bulgarian government in 

the area in 1941 – 1944. Besides the preserved Bulgarian national consciousness and the 

satisfaction from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, caused by the Serbian denationalization 

policy during the decades[3] [iv], an important factor for the support of the Bulgarian 

government is the consistent policy of Sofia for full integration and accelerated 

development of the “new lands” reaching the level of privileged attitude. 

One of the first steps of the Bulgarian government in Vardar Macedonia in 1941 is the 

liberation of all Bulgarian prisoners from the defeated Yugoslav army. Bulgaria came to 

an agreement with Germany and Italy for the liberation of the Bulgarian prisoners, for the 

organization of their repatriation in the country and sending them to their native places. 

By the end of May 1941 12 600 people were released from captivity [7][v]. The process 

of searching, liberation and returning of captives continues in the following months and 

the Bulgarian administrative and military authorities in Macedonia, the organizations of 

the Macedonian Bulgarians in Sofia, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Bulgarian 

state actively participate in this process. 

The policy of the Bulgarian state to the Serbian colonials in the area is of great 

importance. In the past years they have been settled in lands which have been taken from 

the native people and were the ethnic basis of Serb domination. By the end of 1941 the 

Bulgarian authorities deported 26 451 Serbs from Vardar Macedonia and were prepared 

to deport 11 773 more. The process is ceased on the insistence of Germany since the 

colonials who have been returned to Serbia filled in the ranks of the anti-Hitler 

opposition. The positive reaction of the population is proved also by the fact that even in 

the beginning of 1940 the communist leader in Skopje Metodi Shatarov demanded from 

the Central Committee of YCP to deport the Serbian Colonials from Macedonia as a 

means for strengthening the influence of the communist party [vi]. 

The deportation of a part of the Serbian colonials is followed by agrarian reform whose 

purpose is to provide “all Bulgarians by origin and citizenship” with land. They have to 

be hard-working, capable of agriculture and most of all they have to be residents of the 

lands which are provided. During the Bulgarian government under the Law of the labour 

farms 50 000 hectares of land were parceled and approximately 70 % of them were 

received by landless and poor peasants. 

The whole Bulgarian policy is oriented towards fast development of the area which is 

considered extremely undeveloped in comparison with the old lands. In the 

historiography one can see that during the whole period of government in Vardar 

Macedonia, the Bulgarian state spent in various activities over 10 billion and 609 million 

leva and put almost 43 billion in state property which at the end of the war remains for 

the new communist power in Skopje [vii].

Milen MIHOV: Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the Ideology of Yugoslav Communists 271 

The establishment of communist Yugoslavia follows the state model of the Soviet 

federation and reproduces the Bolshevist examples of artificially created nations. The 

modeling of national consciousness is implemented under the conditions of communist 

dictatorship which in the first years after the war follows closely Stalin’s government 

model. The comprehensive system of political control and repressions imposed in Vardar 

Macedonia is combined with broader policy of national building [2] [viii]. The 

proclamation of Vardar Macedonia as a national state of the Macedonians demands the 

construction of the historical past of the “Macedonian nation” through expedient 

falsification of history [6] [ix] and with it the invention of “Macedonian” literary 

language as a basis of the new cultural identity[4] [x]. 

The main edge of the ideologically formulated Macedonism is directed against Bulgaria 

as a state and the Bulgarians as an ethnic notion. Throughout the period of the communist 

government in Vardar Macedonia within the boundaries of Yugoslavia everything that is 

Bulgarian is being marked as incompatible with the communist ideal. The term 

“bugarash” which is used for the Bulgarians is a synonym of fascist and is the most 

severe social stigma. In this sense the statement of the famous writer from Skopje Mladen 

Sarbinovski is very eloquent: “the bad demon for us was Bulgaria and if it did not existed, 

they would have invented it for us” [11] [xi]. 

The beginning of the constitution of Vardar Macedonia as a union republic in New 

Yugoslavia was the Ant-fascist Meeting for National Liberation of Macedonia 

(AMNLM) on August 2, 1944 in “St. Prohor Pcinjski” Monastery. The meeting is an 

important step in the “Macedonian policy” of YCP aiming at predetermining the fate of 

the contested zone and imposing the Yugoslav demands of Bulgaria and the allies from 

the ant-Hitler coalition [9][xii]. 

The first session of AMNLM adopted seven decisions, Declaration for the rights of the 

citizens of democratic Macedonia and Manifesto to the Macedonian nation, the 

nationalities in Macedonia and the Macedonian emigration. One can observe that in all 

documents the term “Bulgarians” is not used but the definitions “Bulgarian” are always 

used with other pejorative forms. This is a clear confrontation between the Bulgarian, 

which is a symbol of ultra conservatism and the Macedonian which is the reborn new. 

Each manifestation of Bulgarian identity is defined as a betrayal to the “Macedonian 

nation” and proof of collaboration with “fascist enslavers”. Despite the different 

biographies and political fates the eminent Bulgarians Iv. Mihaylov, D. Chkatrov, Sp. 

Kitinchec, D. Gyuzelev and K. Tsipushev are condemned as “traitors and enslavers” 

[xiii]. 

Assuming the right of supreme legislative and executive authority AMNLM proclaims 

the entry of Macedonia within the boundaries of Federal Yugoslavia. The goal pursued by 

YCP requires historical arguments which being deprived of reality searches for its 

grounds in intentional imagination. The ideas of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians declared in 

the documents during the next decades become an ideological framework of state 

propaganda including historiography. Semi-official publications in the new Yugoslav 

republic must build the “scientific” arguments of political spells invented by the 

communist functionaries during the World War II. 

The need to forget turns into compulsory condition for political loyalty and public 

realization in the coming decades. Full “passages” from the Macedonian history are 

doomed to silent oblivion and dozens of persons and events have been turned into a 

taboo. The new identity is based mainly on a part of the Bulgarian history. In the

272 


AMNLM’s documents, the medieval Bulgarian state of King Samuil and the anti- 

Ottoman struggles in the 19 th c. under the leadership of IMARO are supporting elements 

of the new national history. They should symbolize continuity and tradition but under 

new national identity. 

In the first years of the establishment of the communist regime a new version of the 

Macedonian history is manifested. In some respect it is a mild version of the negative 

attitude towards Bulgaria and the Bulgarian history. D. Vlahov and P. Shatev are 

representatives of this trend. In their publications and social appearances the tight 

connections of the “Macedonian history” with Bulgaria are acknowledged. This causes 

severe reaction of the central party authorities led by “Tito and his Macedonian 

commissar Lazar Kolishevski” [11][xiv]. 

Macedonization is imposed by the party authorities in extremely brutal way and this 

leads to the arrest of Pavel Shatev in 1949, his internment in Bitola and tragic death. At 

the same time Dimitar Vlahov is put under permanent surveillance by the secret services. 

All his social appearances are under control and his publications are censored under the 

direct supervision of the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central 

Committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia since 1945 [xv]. 

History and language are powerful tools of the cultural debulgarization and the 

imposing of the Yugoslav cultural and political monopoly. The creation of the 

Macedonian language and the history of the “Macedonian nation” is implemented in one 

and the same way. They ensue from the party-state and are politically and legally 

approved thus turning into a steady norm. 

This is eloquently formulated in May 1945 in a statement of Blaže Koneski who is later 

proclaimed in Yugoslavia as the “creator” of the Macedonian language – “The future is 

ours. And this means that the past is ours also.” [1][xvi] 

In the first years after World War II the problem for the nation becomes the starting 

point for the political constitution of the past. The nation exists and therefore its origin 

must be explained. This inevitably requires historical evidence for differentiation with 

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians. The orthodox historical separatism of Yugoslav communists 

finds expression in passing dividing lines in the history between the Bulgarian and the 

“Macedonian nation”. These lines are on different levels but have one and the same 

purpose – to make impossible any community or any mutual penetration. The external, in 

its nature, geographic division examines the past as history of earth and passes the 

Macedonian natural borders as borders of history. This division is necessary in order to 

prove the historical rights of the People’s Republic of Macedonia as an heir of the 

national liberation struggles of the Macedonian nation and to justify its role as Piemont to 

all “Macedonians”. 

Another form of the separation are the internal dividing lines. Historical processes, 

facts, events and individuals from the Macedonian history are defined according to their 

attitude towards the “fact” of the Macedonian nation existence. The division determines 

two opposite processes which are in constant conflict. The one expresses the consistent 

efforts of the “Macedonian nation” for freedom and national state, and the other is 

manifested in the activity of those circles of the Macedonian society which are connected 

with the “great Bulgarian propaganda” and the “conquest interests” of Bulgaria. Marxism 

of Yugoslav communists gives this division dogmatic class character. Thus the 

“Macedonian bourgeoisie” serves as an excuse for the Bulgarian dimensions of the 

Macedonian history in the 19 th c. and is loaded with historical responsibilities for the 

“successes” of the “Bulgarian propaganda”.

Milen MIHOV: Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the Ideology of Yugoslav Communists 273 

Packed in its exclusivity the history of the “Macedonian nation” is based on one-way 

isolation towards everything that might connect it with the Bulgarian history. Applying a 

kind of retrospective determinism the past becomes an evidence for the present in which 

Skopje has central position. 

Political relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia after 1948 played good role for the 

radical Macedonization of parts of the Bulgarian history. Reality provides enough reasons 

for the formation of historical image of the enemy in the face of Bulgaria[11] [xvii]. 

Yugoslav communist regime creates conditions under which for the professional 

researchers the negative attitude towards everything that is Bulgarian becomes an 

obligatory criterion simultaneously for scientific authenticity and patriotic responsibility. 

The proclaimed identity is imposed in history with the power of politics. The border 

between the “Bulgarian” and the “Macedonian” in the sense of “non-Bulgarian” occurs 

through geography, politics and history but is proved by “consciousness”. 

The nature of communist paradigm for Macedonia is not in its ideologization but in the 

ethnonationalism which is an ideology of power in the Yugoslav state. The image of 

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians as enemies, guilty of its separation is a consolidating factor 

within the boundaries of Yugoslavia [11][xviii]. 

Bibliography 

1. Andonov – Poljanski, Hr. Lectures and Views. Sk., 1982. See: [1] 

2. Angelov, V. The Macedonian Bloody Christmas. Establishment and Recognition of 

Vardar Macedonia as a Republic in the Yugoslav Federation (1943-1946). ,S., 2003. 

See: [2] 

3. Dimitrov, A. The Birth of a New State. The Republic of Macedonia between 

Yugoslavism and Nationalism. S., 2011. See: [3] 

4. Kiselinovski, St. Codification of the Macedonian Literary Language – In: The Balkans 

– Language, History, Culture. Veliko Tarnovo, 2008. See: [4] 

5. Markov, G. “The Balkanization”Geopolitical Phenomenon in Conflicts Studies. S., 

2011. See: [5] 

6. Mihov, M. Politics in History. The New Bulgarian History and the Macedonian 

Historiography 1944 – 2005. St. Cyril and St. Methodius University publishing house, 

Veliko Turnovo, 2006. See: [6] 

7. Michev D. Bulgarian Action Committees in Macedonia – 1941. S., 1995. See: [7] 

8. Michev, D. The Macedonian Question in the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Relations 

(September 9, 1944 – 1949). S., 1994. See: [8] 

9. Paleshutski, K. Macedonian Liberation Movement 1924-1934. S., 1998. See: [9] 

10. Trebst, S. Bugarsko-Jygoslovinska kontraverza za Makedonija 1967-1982, Sk., 1997. 

See: [11] 

11. Sarbinovski, M. Trick. St. Cyril and St. Methodius University publishing house, 

Veliko Tarnovo, 2011. See: [12] 

Notes 

i Марков, Г. “Балканизацията” Геополитическо явление в кофликтознанието. С., 

2011, 373-375. 

ii Мичев, Д. Македонският въпрос в българо-югославските отношения (9 

септември 1944 – 1949 г.). С., 1994, 100-124.

274 


iii Палешутски, К. Македонското освободително движение 1924-1934. С., 1998. 

340-350. 

iv Димитров, А. Раждането на една нова държава. Република Македония между 

югославизма и национолизма. С., 2011, 292-299 

v Мичев, Д. Българските акционни комитети в Македония – 1941. С., 1995, 69-71 

vi Димитров, А. Раждането на … 302-303. 

vii Димитров, А. Раждането на … 304-306. 

viii Ангелов, В. Македонската кървава коледа. Създаване и утвърждаване на 

Вардарска Македония като република в Югославската Федерация (1943-1946). 

,С., 2003; Димитров, А. Раждането на едно нова държава: Република 

Македония – между югославизма и национализма. С., 2011. 

ix Михов, М. Политика в историята. Новата българска история и македонската 

историография 1944 – 2005 г. Университетско издателство “Св. св. Кирил и 

Методий”, В. Търново, 2006. 

x Киселиновски, Ст. Кодификация на македонския книжовен език. – В: 

Балканите – език, история, култура. В. Търново, 2008, 200-203. 

xi Сърбиновски, М. Шашма. Университетско издателство “Св. Св. Кирил и 

Методий”. Велико Търново, 2011. с. 5. 

xii Палешутски, К. Югославската комунистическа партия и македонския въпрос 

1919-1945. С., 1985, 318-319; Гибианский, Л. СССР отношения между 

коммунистами Болгарии и Югославии по поводу Македонии и федерации на 

Балканах (1943-1945). В: България и Русия през ХХ век. Българо-руски научни 

дискусии. С., 2000, с. 367. 

xiii АСНОМ. Документи.Т. І, Кн. І - ІV, Ск., 1984, с. 136, 175-176. 

xiv Требст, С. Бугарско – Jугословинската контраверза за Македониjа 1967-1982 г. 

Ск., 1997,59-63. 

xv DARM (Държавен архив на Република Македония) , F. 766, к. 2, а. е. 189, p. 

571. A Letter of D. Vlahov to L. Kolishevski. 

xvi Андонов – Полjански, Хр. Беседи и огледи. Ск., 1982, с. 123. Political power 

exercised by the communist state ensures the power over the future which guarantees 

also the monopoly over history. B. Koneski’s thought is a version, which is three 

years ahead of what George Orwell wrote in his famous novel 1984. In 1948 the 

eminent English writer formulates the principle that “the one who controls the past 

also controls the future. The one who controls the present, also controls the past”. 

See: Orwell, G. 1984. S., 1989. p. 12 -13. 

xvii Требст, Ст. Бугаро-Jогословенската … 57-59. 

xvii Требст, Ст. Бугаро-Jогословенската … с. 64.

ASPECTS AS REGARDS THE 

TRANSYLVANIAN SAXONS’ DEPORTATION 

FROM łARA FĂGĂRAŞULUI TO USSR 

Florentin OLTEANU 1 

A “Memory of the Deported Persons’ Families Addressed to Petru Groza” Government, 

from the summer of the year 1945, outlined the general frame of the recent history’s 

dramatic chapter: 

“In the 11 th of January 1945, as well as after this date, Romanian citizens, allegedly of 

German ethnic origin, as well as of other origins, were arrested in rash, for war labour in 

USSR. There were seized, without identity paper check, without medical control, 17 yearold 

minors, lasses, women, who had never left their parental home, men up to 45 years 

old and even elder, officers and soldiers under the flag. Many were pupils, students, 

intellectuals, not accustomed with gross physical work. Sick persons and convalescents 

were picked up. Cruelly beating us, taking our brothers, sisters or children with no fault 

of their own, and taking our only consolation to be together, those having survived the 

bombing or having not fallen in the fights as sacrifice for the country. Most of them were 

absolutely peaceful men, who made no politics, who were not inscribed in the ethnic 

group, therefore, who were not legionnaires, Nazis of fascists. On the contrary, they much 

as ourselves, we completely distanced from these foreign ideologies and this because we 

were completely assimilated and framed within the Romanian life. 

The arrests were done by surprise, without notice, from bed, from work – as for 

ordinary criminals – to be started with no preparation, luggage or food, in a long journey 

to a foreign country, in frost and storm, in freight wagons. We cannot venture to describe 

the horrors having occurred after these abuses and heartbreaking suffering. 

The Government’s communication from 12 I 1945 and the subsequent ones asserted 

that that those citizens had been only provisionally taken and only as long as the war 

lasted. The promise was made that, having reached their destination, they would be 

allowed to write to their families. Nowadays, after half a year, most of them received no 

notice, no mail, and no one is acquainted with their fate, if the arrested ones are or not 

healthy, whether they live, where they work and if some of them died meanwhile. 

We have clear conscience, we know no fault in ourselves, much as those sent to work in 

USSR and we can only explain this as undeserved persecution against us. Isolated cases 

were exaggerated and generalized. We cannot however be made responsible for mistakes 

made by others and it is cruel and unfair for all to equally suffer because a small number of 

persons fell into guilt. It is right only for the guilty ones to be judged and sanctioned, and not 

all allegedly German-origin citizens to be blamed. We understand for someone to suffer from 

and because of his deeds, to be judged and sanctioned if he is guilty, but not to be 

persecuted because we are born in a locality of the globe, because of our name and origin. 


276 


Through the abusive procedures described above, we see ourselves out of the country 

laws and we address our prayer wherever justice can be done to us, to intercede by the 

Soviet authorities for all these faultless deported persons, who have been carrying gross 

and forced labour for 6 months in USSR to be repatriated. Now, when the war ended, 

when its harsh laws should be no longer applied, we ask for them to be given back to their 

home. They paid enough, some with their labour, others with their life, for this measure of 

the repatriation to be applied to them, too 2 . 

Beyond the injustice in itself of the deed of arresting part of the German ethnics from 

Romania, a confirmation of the arbitrary character of the procedures, also invoked by the 

above quoted written statement, came from the very soviet authorities, who had already 

sent back in the country in the first year of the deportation calvary circa 8.000 persons, 

sick and mothers with children born in the USSR. Starting with the 2 nd of October 1945, 

until the beginning of December 1945, circa 4.000 persons had already arrived in Sighet 3 . 

As regards the preliminaries of the deportation operation developed in January 1945, we 

will retain as follows a few chronologic benchmarks for “inventorying” the persons 

targeted by the “Decision of the State Committee for Defence no. 7161 from the 16 th of 

December 1944” where it was stipulated: 

“1. Mobilizing and confining all labour-apt Germans, men aged between 17 and 45 

years old, women aged between 18 and 30 years old, on the territories freed by the 

Red Army – Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, to be 

sent to work in USSR. 

2. The leadership of the mobilization will fall to N. K. V. D. ... (Comrade Beria). N. K. 

V. D is in charge with organizing the reunion points, with achieving the 

mobilization, with making up, solving, as well as guarding the transportations. [...] 

... 

10. Mobilizing and confining the Germans will be effectuated from December 1944 to 

January 1945 and the transportation to their labour places will be ended up to the 

15 th of February 1945. 

President of the State Committee for Defence, Stalin.” 4 

2 State’s Archives in Romania, România. ViaŃa politică în documente 1945 (Romania. Political 

Life in Documents 1945), coordinator: Ioan Scurtu, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 159-162. 

3 Hannelore Baier, Sighet – punctul de frontieră prin care s-au întors primii deportaŃi etnici 

germani din U. R. S. S. (Sighet – Frontier Point through which the First Deported German 

Ethnics Returned from U. S. S. R Returned), in the Annals Sighet II, “Instaurarea comunismului 

– între rezistenŃă şi represiune” (Installation of Communism – between Resistance and 

Repression), Foundation Civic Academy, 1995, pp. 433-436. In the years 1946/47, the 

transportations of sick persons were sent by the soviets towards Germany’s area of soviet 

occupation, whence only part of those having recovered their health could return in the country, 

the issue of reuniting the families becoming acute, which was to constitute one of the factors 

having launched the increasingly massive emigrations. [...] Most German ethnics “mobilized for 

labour” returned in the years 1948/49 also through Sighet. Ibidem, pp. 434, 436. 

4 Departe, în Rusia, la Stalino. Amintiri şi documente cu privire la deportarea în Uniunea 

Sovietică a etnicilor germani din România (1945-1950) (Far Away, in Russia, at Stalino. 

Memories and Documents as regards the Deportation in the Soviet Union of the German Ethnics 

from Romania (1945-1950),), collage made up by Hannelore Baier, graphics Friedrich von 

Bömches, trans. Werner Kremm, InterGraf, 2003, p. 26.

Florentin OLTEANU: Aspects as Regards the Transylvanian Saxons’ Deportation … 277 

This “Decision” was taken after L. P. Beria had ordered, “in accordance with his 

indications [Stalin]”, to send towards the “freed areas”, “three groups of operative 

collaborators of N. K. V. D. of U. S. S. R. for achieving – within 10 days – a provisional 

inventory of the persons living in those areas who are of German nationality.” This action 

of Beria was reported to Stalin in the 24 th of November 1944 5 . 

Maybe not without connection to the respective deed was the “Note no. 75 from the 31 st 

of October 1944, of the Allied Commission of Control for Romania towards the president 

of the Council of ministers, general Sănătescu” who claimed: 

“Not later than the 10 th of November this year, they should submit to the Allied 

Commission of Control, in Russian, the following complete data: 

a) Tables with the German and Hungarian subjects who lived in the Capital, towns and 

counties throughout Romania up to the 23 rd of August 1944, with the specification 

who and in what camp is detained, as well as who is not confined, at the same time 

informative data in figures in this respect, separately according to nationalities and 

sex (men, women, children). 

b) According to the same norms, tables and informative data in figures upon the 

German or Hungarian ethnic origin subjects, (...).” 6 . 

From the lower level of achieving the “situations” upon the German and Hungarian 

ethnics from the villages of the “plăşii Făgăraş”, a recently discovered document brings 

further information in knowing the problem. Bearing the date of the 8 th of December 

1944, the document refers to a local precedent of the “situation” achieved “following the 

Soviet delegate”. 

“County prefecture Făgăraş 

Praetorium Plăşii Făgăraş 

Nr. 2595/1944 

Telephone note no. 10230, from the 8 th of Dec. 1944. 

Gentlemen Notaries 1-10. 

Following the application of the Soviet delegate [from the Allied Commission] of 

Control [for the Application] of the Armistice, please have the kindness to make up again 

and communicate by telephone until tomorrow the 9 th of Dec. 1944, between the hours 8- 

9 in the morning, separately for the Germans and separately for the Hungarians, the 

situation below: There will not be passed into the situation those absent from the village 

as: arrested, sent to work, concentrated, left with the German army, as missing from the 

county. Example: the one concentrated at Făgăraş will be registered and specified in the 

section observations, there will not be registered the one concentrated at Braşov or in 

other locality from the country or abroad. 

Search rigorously and give the exact data. 

The situation will comprise the following sections: 

1. Village 

2. Total number of Germans or Hungarians in the village who are at home (the one 

concentrated or working in the county is deemed at home). 

3. Among these, the number of men and women. 

5 Ibidem, pp. 33-34. 

6 Ibidem, p. 33.

278 


4. Both men and women from every nationality will be passed on the following ages, 

namely: up to 16 years old, aged of 16 years old, aged of 17 years old, 18-30 

years old, 30-40 years old, 40-45 years old, 45-50 years old and from 50 years 

old upwards. 

First praetor Secretary 

Oct. Giurca/ss Signature/illegible” 7 . 

The document also submits another particularity: a so far unknown diversification of the 

age categories that the registration of the targeted ones was to be done. They seem to be 

similar to those complementary “age steps (men of 16 years old, respectively 46-48 years 

old, women of 17 years old, respectively of 31-32 years old) who were rather seen as a 

reserve or only in the second instance as apt for confinement”, as they appear in 

“situations” from central Transylvanian counties 8 . 

Reporting the data in the 9 th of December 1944 was followed by their transmittal and 

centralization on hierarchically superior levels. 

Finalizing this “provisional inventory”, that the very head of N. K. V. D. had ordered, 

allowed this one, in the 15 th of December 1944, to submit to Stalin and Molotov the result 

of “counting the Germans” from the “freed area”, which means 551.049 persons [in 

Romania-421.846], whereof 240.436 men and 310.613 women. From what the document 

says as follows, there ensues that only in the meeting from the 16 th of December 1944, the 

decision was taken to “mobilize” the women – “Initially, the proposal was made for the 

mobilization to be limited to the men aged between 17-45 years old, whereof only 97.484 

had been censed [in Romania-70.476], and, after the diminution of those inapt for labour, 

70.000 were still left. The proposal of Beria for mobilizing the Germans who were to be 

detained and sent to labour in U. S. S. R was improved, in the sense that the decision was 

taken to use the feminine labour force” 9 . 

The decision taken in the meeting from the 16 th of December, presided by I. V. Stalin, 

was to be executed in the known conditions. 

According to a report of the Inspectorate of Gendarmes Sibiu, the situation on the level 

of the county of Făgăraş would have likely been this way: Registered on the tables: 1957; 

Arrested: Men 817; Women 764; Total 1581; Excepted 448; Disappeared 54; Having 

committed suicide - ; In other localities 90 10 . 

An advised local testimony outlined the picture of this collective drama: “From 

Moscow’s order, enacted by NKVD together with the obedient organs of the General 

Safety and Gendarmerie, during the month of December 1944, the lists with valid adults 

were drawn up, with absolute discretion, from every locality with German ethnics. 

According to the high instructions, the German ethnics between 18 and 50 years old, men 

and women, had to be deported in the Soviet Union for the reconstruction and recovery 

labour of the destructions perpetrated by the German army on the Soviet territory. This 

was the motivation of the deportation. The lists with targeted persons in every locality 

were elaborated by the cells of PCR and by the County Office of PCR, afterwards 

7 

National Archives, County Direction Braşov, Collection Mairy Recea, 1944, f. 685]. 

8 

Departe, în Rusia, la Stalino…, (Far Away, in Russia, at Stalino ) p. 54. 

9 


10 

ACNSAS, Fond D, file no. 14955, ff. 10-11.


finished and applied by the public order organs with the direct and substantial 

contribution of the NKVD Russian militaries. The night of 12/13 January 1945 was set as 

data for perpetrating this terrible NKVD operation. The news was disseminated, as 

lightning, in the afternoon of the morning of the 11 th of January, when in every 

Transylvanian Saxon locality, the Security agents, the gendarmes and the NKVD soldiers 

entered, provided with machine guns that were firing collective-intimidation shots. They 

crossed out the locality exits, keeping under observation the village borders and the 

notary public, accompanied by agents and gendarmes, went to the domicile of the 

outcasts, putting in consideration that, within a few hours, to prepare for departing in a 

long journey, for many of them turning into a road of no return. The hubbub, psychosis 

and terror that suddenly took hold of the residents are unimaginable, relating to the not 

menaced ones. A fierce manhunt began, with heartbreaking scenes and soldierly 

brutalities. The victims were seized by the death drama and did not know what objects to 

take in their hand luggage, how many they were afforded to take. 

Here are the localities of the county of Făgăraş, with mostly Transylvanian Saxon 

population (2/3), fallen prey to deportation: 1. Şercaia. 2. Crihalma. 3. Ticuşu Vechi. 4. 

Jibert. 5. Felmer. 6. Şoarş. 7. Bărcut. 8. Seliştat. 9. Merghindeal. 10. Cincu. 11. Cincşor. 

12. Toarcla. 13. Gherdeal. 14. Bruiu. 15. Şomărtin. 16. CârŃa Olt 11 . 

Everywhere, the soviet organs abusively and menacingly, sometimes even ferociously 

behaved. People beyond 50 years old or beneath 18 years old were also confined. Where 

they deemed to face adversity, they beat and destroyed. They also lifted sick persons from 

bed. In my village, they snatched from bed the son of the rich innkeeper Johann Geltsh, 

seriously ill with pneumonia. This one, out of his home and in contact with the frost 

outside, deceased in the cart, before reaching Arpaş. 

I deem appropriate to illustratively expose in this tragic context the following episode I 

lived. I was judge at the Court from Făgăraş. In the day of the 11 th of January 1945, by 14 

o’clock, I had left work with other elderly colleagues. The weather was nice, but very 

frosty and with a lot of snow. On the point of leaving the gate, we heard from Beclean, 

great commotion and gun shooting. In the distance, a horse-cart convoy appears, loaded 

with wrapped people, flanked by soldiers that travelled on foot. At their sight, the 

magistrate colleagues left home. I stayed in a group in front of the Tribunal gate to see 

what was happening. The convoy difficulty advanced through the abundant and frozen 

snow. Horses trotted in tired step and, at every cart loaded with people, the horses were 

held by bridle by a walking carrier. We all looked in astonishment at this sinister show, 

wondering in puzzlement: what is happening? 

All of a sudden, the carrier of the first cart passing in front of the Court, discovers me 

among the on-lookers, stops the horses at about 5-6 meters and runs towards me shouting 

«Mister Remus, mister Remus, look what the Russians are doing to us, they are taking us 

11 In 1930, the ratio Romanians/Transylvanian Saxons in the above-mentioned villages was: 

Şercaia – 756/730, Crihalma – 802/0, Ticuşu Vechi – 425/1070, Jibert (jud. Târnava Mare) – 

684/832, Felmer – 693/524, Şoarş – 369/750, Bărcut – 483/620, Rodbav – 180/343, Seliştat – 

324/413, Merghindeal – 449/808, Cincu – 1206/1112, Cincşor – 224/581, Toarcla – 498/271, 

Gherdeal – 104/226, Bruiu – 399/493, Şomartin – 325/745, CârŃa – 502/446. Censorship from 

1930. Transylvania, Studia Censualia Transsilvanica, coord. Traian Rotariu, Presa Universitară 

Clujeană, pp. 190-193, 201, 206-213, 550-553].

280 


to Siberia !!!» From the first and second cart, I again heard a few known women’s voices, 

who desperately cried, knowing I was Court judge : «Mister Remus, save us, save us, 

mister Remus !» What was happening, who and what was this death convoy, I realized on 

the spot and in terror. There were the very Transylvanian Saxons from my village Şomărtin. 

They had been arrested from their houses and households in the very afternoon of the 

previous day (10 th of January 1945), all harnesses with horses and carriers from the locality 

were requisitioned for transportation to the station Făgăraş, and by 1 o’clock in the evening, 

in the 1 st of January 1945, the convoy set in motion, making cca 50 heavy kilometres in 

snow and frost under – 10 ° C, to Făgăraş. […] In the same form, there were organized, in 

the night of 10/11 th of January, convoys of deported persons from the 16 localities of the 

county. They were all directed to the station CFR Făgăraş to the purpose of their boarding 

for transportation to the Soviet Union. Another drama will continue in the station Făgăraş. 

The frost beneath – 10 ° C is maintained, the sky is dark and snowflakes lightly fall. The 

convoys with deported persons flow towards the plateau near the station, where the new 

construction of the CFR station Făgăraş is placed. The transport carts returned home, and the 

carriers, also Transylvanian Saxons, bid farewell to those who left. 

In the afternoon of the 11 th of January 1945, there, on the plateau of the station, a 

political camp outdoors was improvised, approximately summing up 5000 persons [?], 

considering that from the 16 villages, approximately 200-300 persons had been arrested 

[?] from every locality, men, women and even youth beneath 18 years old. This unhappy 

gathering was guarded by an ad-hoc guardianship constituted of Romanian gendarmes 

guided by Russian militaries, of course NKVD-ists, and by agents of the State Safety. The 

deported persons had been brought, but the freight wagons destined to transportation had 

not yet arrived. They served to the war transportations of the Romanian and Soviet 

armies. […] On this plateau, in terrible conditions of cold and frost, outdoors (the army 

had sent insufficient tents), in a total lack of hygiene and without water, without toilets, 

without food, not even hot teas, those Transylvanian Saxons had been kept a few days 

until the arrival of the wagons. As the freight wagons arrived, their sets loaded with 

prisoners were formed and headed towards USSR. I later found out, from the 

Transylvanian Saxons in the village that, during the long route of 2-3 weeks, in frost, 

misery and physical [exhaustion], many deported persons got sick and, in default of 

medical care, died. In the CFR stations from Sibiu, Făgăraş, Braşov, raids and police 

filters were effectuated in the night of 11/12 th of January, as well as in the following days, 

to catch the escapists and runaways. Many of them were caught through these raids, too. 

After that night of 11/12 th of January 1945, similar to the «Night of Saint 

Bartholomew», going to my parents, I immediately perceived the disastrous 

consequences on my village Şomărtin, following the German ethnics’ deportation. From 

some houses, parents and major children had been taken, the households being forsaken. 

In other houses, only old men had remained, helpless in most cases, or only minor 

children, taken willy-nilly into the supervision of the relatives or of the neighbours. The 

stables in most Transylvanian Saxon households had remained full of cattle, pigs, fowl. 

They had to be fed, watered, daily cleaned twice. There was no longer somebody and 

something to do that, as the thefts of fodder and cereals from the unguarded barns, from 

penthouses or from the field had begun. Those suspected of practicing these new living 

sources were the native gypsies, the poor Romanians and various foreigners who had 

started to wander with no justification through the Transylvanian Saxon villages. When,


sometimes, the old men in the houses heard at night noises in the yard and if they went 

out to protect their wealth and labour, they risked being beaten or crippled by the night 

thieves and robbers, even if they were identified, the victims had no courage to denounce 

them to the gendarmerie or to divulge them to the public opinion, lest of incurring upon 

themselves unwanted revenge. The situation got rather clearer after the 6 th of March 1945. 

It got clearer that the new pro-communist government started applying the paragraphs 

from the Armistice Convention, beginning the requisition of goods and the seizure of 

values, on account of executing the Armistice, from the population. On the background of 

this State action, the Transylvanian Saxon stables were voided of cattle in the course of 

the months of March and April 1945. Part of the deported persons’ minor children having 

remaining deprived of support and care, were brought by the authorities to the Orphanage 

from Sibiu, whence they did not return in the village. 

The deportation of the German ethnics from Romania in USSR constitutes the first step 

on the ladder of the economic, social and moral decline of the regions with mostly 

German population. The Transylvanian Saxon villages from our county fall into decay, 

the Transylvanian Saxon households come to ruin, the gypsies and the Romanians begin 

to migrate towards the cities, and the thefts, violence, administrative disorder, lack of 

human respect and immorality changed into general rules and principles of behaviour 

during communism 12 . 

Note 

We mention the following story told by Cristian Raul Vintila 13 , heard in his childhood 

“My story is simple. And now it is told by a young person who can only imagine. I was 

young and inexperienced, unfortunately. 

My story tells of sadness and memories that have shaped my fate and the fate of many 

other fellows of my time. We could not influence fate and it was not our fault, why we 

had to suffer. 

I was actually still a minor. Yes, I was a little innocent girl who had never touched a 

man, but should look at the naked body of a dead deportee. 

It started in Brasov, Romania where I enjoyed my childhood with my dear family. The 

day I was dragged into a truck along with other germane speaking citizen, was my most 

disastrous. 

I barely could shout to a playmate of my sister: "Tell my family they have taken me." 

And I was being dragged. 

First a train that was set up for cattle transports, and then with trucks I came into the 

mining area of Donets’k. For many years I had to survive in cool barracks with small 

food rations, everyday life and work in lignite mines was hard. For everyone it was 

dangerous and for me worse. A large heavy sharp rock almost amputated my arm. I've 

survived but I've almost lost the fight with tuberculosis. 

Many have perished. 

12 Remus Cocoş, Note şi amintiri din Făgăraş. În perioada 23.08.1944-15.05.1948 (Notes and 

Memories from Făgăraş. During the period 23.08.1944-15.05.1948), in the Archives of the 

Foundation «Negru Vodă» Făgăraş, pp. 10-12. 

13 German Forum, Braşov, Romania.

282 


Some have eventually given up the fight. Men smoked. They rather preferred, to barter 

their food rations for cigarettes. They have perished. 

We women have fought. We held together. We pluck every leaf and picked their roots 

of the ground. We have prepared food and medicines, paying attention to every sufferer. 

We stood TOGETHER. 

However, I was so sick that I was sent to quarantine where I was poorly nursed. I was 

the youngest, the weakest, my life hung by a thread. 

A loving Russian speaking doctor has taken me into her heart. She was my guardian 

angel. She knew what I needed. What I needed couldn't be found in deportation. 

She helped me "flee" setting me on a list of patients to be transported out of deportation, 

to Dresden and maintained by the German Red Cross to become healthy. Yes, the actions 

of this woman saved my life. 

Two years later, I was healthy again, an independent young woman. I have decided 

what to achieve in the future. It was obvious that 'home' is there where I see the 'Zinne' 

hill, there where my family lives and where I would hopefully meet my friends again. 

I made my way back to Brasov, Romania into a new country that I no longer 

recognized. Communism changed everything. But it was a great satisfaction to be home 

with my family. A virtual live at home, because we had to rent our own house that had 

been nationalized. But we were at ‘home’ we could celebrate Christmas and worship in 

our church. I mention this just so ... without suffering, hatred or revenge thoughts. 

It was just like that, life is beautiful as long as we can enjoy it. From my experience, I 

have learned, however, to recover the time stolen from me. I enjoy every day with 

optimism and I appreciate all the little things in life. Communism is over, new times have 

come. I've told facts in the hope that younger generations will always appreciate 

freedom.”

Florentin OLTEANU: Aspects as Regards the Transylvanian Saxons’ Deportation … 283

284 

Remembrance in Time

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 

RELATED TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE 

AGRICULTURAL ESTATES IN FAGARAS 

COUNTY IN 1950 


Among the documents we found in the course of the investigation on the theme of 

“Communization of Fagaras County”, some of them show a peculiar force of expression, 

taking into account the fact that they reveal directly the complete image of a particular 

reality we intend to show below, illustrating the structure of the agricultural estates in two 

administrative sub-divisions of former Fagaras County, namely, the Fagaras district and 

Arpasu district, two of the five districts of the county, the other three being the districts of 

Voila, Cincu and Sercaia [1]. 

1. Analysis of situation in Fagaras District 

The first of these documents named “Nominal Table of Types of Social Categories of 

Householdings in Fagaras District’, from 1950 [2], [3] records in figures the situation 

characterizing the categories of property in 19 settlements. We calculated them and put 

the purcentage values for each situation in square brackets. 

Total households and surfaces of Fagaras County is shown in Table 1. 

Table 1. 

Surfaces [ha] 

Number 

Households 

[%] 

0 162 4.93 

0-1 176 5.35 

1-3 818 24.89 

3-5 942 28.66 

5-10 1032 31.40 

10-20 157 4.77 

Total 3287 100 


286 


The 19 villages belonging to Fagaras County are characterized by the following 

situations: 

0 ha: 

3 villages (Hârseni, Ileni, Şona) possessed any household of 0 ha; 16 villages 

possessed between 2 and 28 households of 0 ha; Among them, 4 villages (Dejani-17, 

GalaŃi-18, Sebeş-24, Copăcel-28) possessed between 17-28 households of 0 ha; the 

purcentage per district is 4.93 %. 

0-1 ha: 

18 villages possessed between 1and 17 households of 0-1 ha; 

Purcentage per village is between 0.82 %-10.83 %; 

1 village (GalaŃi) possessed 34 households of 0-1 ha; 

Purcentage per village is of 11.29 %; 

Purcentage per district – 5.35 %. 

1-3 ha: 

2 villages (Beclean, GalaŃi) had 100 and 120 households of 1-3 ha; 

2 villages (Telechi Recea, Vaida Recea) had 81 and 86 households of 1-3 ha; 

15 villages had between 5 and 54 households of 1-3 ha; 


3-5 ha: 

2 villages (Beclean, GalaŃi) possessed 98 and 110 households of 3-5 ha; 



5-10 ha: 

3 villages (Berivoii Mici, Copăcel, Ileni) had 119, 122 and 122 households of 5-10 

ha; 

Purcentage per village : 70.83 %, 49.19 %, 45.35 %; 

4 villages (Iaşi, Hârseni, Şona, Mărgineni) had 68. 87, 92, 101 households 

respectively of 5-10 ha; 

Purcentage per village : 55.73 %, 59.59 %, 41.82 %, 53.16 %; 


3 villages (Dejani, Vaida Recea, Telechi Recea) had 3.7 ha, and 10 households of 

5-10 ha; 

Purcentage per village: between 2.31 %-6.37 %; 


10-20 ha: 

3 villages (Ileni, Iaşi, Mărgineni) had 22. 30, 44 households of 10-20 ha; 

Purcentage per village : 8.18 %, 24.60 %, 23.16 %; 

2 villages (Berivoii Mici, Şona) had 11, 12 households of 10-20 ha; 

Purcentage per village: 6.55 %, 5.45 %; 

9 villages had between 1-7 households of 10-20 ha; 

Purcentage per village between 0.72 %-5.05 %;

Florentin OLTEANU: Preliminary Considerations Related to the Structure of the Agricultural… 287 

5 villages (Dejani, GalaŃi, LuŃa, Telechi Recea, Vaida Recea) had no households of 

10-20 ha; 

Purcentage per district –4.77 %. 

Some observations 

From the 162 holdings possessing 0 ha – representing 4.93% - the major part belonged 

to the communities of gipsies. In Copacel, the 28 households – representing 11.29 % were 

gathered in the hamlet of “Măliniş” and the main occupation of the inhabitants was 

broom and besom manufacturating, and basketry work. These products were sold in 

neighbouring villages. The same situation was detected in the village of Dejani, where the 

householdings were gathered in a community called “Muşunoaie”. (3). 

This district located in the central part of the county presents significant percentages for 

the categories of households possessing 3-5 ha, 942, representing 28.66 %, 5-10 ha – 

1032, representing 31.40 % and 10-20 ha – 157, representing 4.7 %. We can notice that 

the percentage of the households of 3-20 ha was of 64.76 %. 

The second document we intend to present conveys information on the situation of 

agricultural households in Arpasu de Jos District, their structure according the surface of 

the arable land they use [4]. 

2. Analysis of situation in Arpaşu District 

The 18 villages in Arpasu district show the following situation: 

0-1 ha: 

4 vilalges (Arpaşu de Sus, Viştea de Sus, Oprea CârŃişoara, Streza CârŃişoara) 

had between 43 and 59 households of 0-1 ha; 

The other 14 villages possessed between 4 and 26 households of 0-1 ha; 

Purcentage per district – 8,60 %. 

1-3 ha: 

5 villages (Grânari, Corbi, Colun, Ucea de Jos, Ucea de Sus), had between 15 

and 82 households of 1-3 ha; 

6 villages (Feldioara, Viştea de Jos, Viştea de Sus, Scorei, Sărata, Streza 

CârŃişoara); 

had between 102 and 140 households of 1-3 ha. 

5 villages (Arpaşu de Jos, CârŃa, Porumbacu de Jos, Oprea CârŃişoara, 

Porumbacu de Sus), had between 159 and 203 households of 1-3 ha; 

1 villages (Arpaşu de Sus), had 278 households of 1-3 ha; 

Purcentage per village : 74.73 %; 


3-5 ha: 

3 villages (Scorei, Porumbacu de Sus, Porumbacu de Jos) possessed between 

142 and 154 households of 3-5 ha; 

Purcentage per village: 49.48 %, 40.49 %, 42.19 %;

288 


6 villages (Viştea de Jos, Noul Român, Sărata, Arpaşu de Jos, Ucea de Sus, 

Ucea de Sus, Viştea de Sus) had between 91 and 111 households of 3-5 ha. 

Purcentage per village: between 38.72 % and 36.51 %; 

2 villages (Colun, Ucea de Jos) had 68, 77 households of 3-5 ha; 



5-10 ha: 

6 villages (Grânari, Porumbacu de Jos, Noul Român, Ucea de Sus, Viştea de 

Jos, Viştea de Sus) had between 26 and 34, households of 5-10 ha; 



10-15 ha: 

1 village (Noul Român) had 1 household of 10-15 ha; 

Purcentage per village: 0.45 %. 

15-20 ha: 

1 village (Noul Român) had 1 household of 15-20 ha. 

Purcentage per village : 0.45 %. 

30-40 ha: 

1 village (Arpaşu de Jos) had 1 household of 30-40 ha. 

Purcentage per village – 0.36 %. 

Having a different estate structure – there is no distinct registration of the estates of 0 

ha, being only included in the category of 0-1 ha, and those having a surface of 1-3 ha, 

being divided in the categories of 1-2 ha and respectively 2-3 ha, we intended to adapt our 

study to the categories existing in Fagaras district. 

Arpaşu de Jos district has in a large proportion households of 1-3 ha –2213, 

representing 56.26%. Householdings of 3-5 ha – 1366, representing 32.44%, and those of 

5-10 ha represented 6.32%. 

The comparison between the two districts show the great number of small 

householdings in Arpasu district and the great number of medium householdings in 

Fagaras district (Table 2). 

We do not possess any information related to the several large estates in the former 

Fagaras County, estates supressed by the Agrarian Reform from 1945 and the Decree 

83/1949 [5]. 

Table 2. 

Total of householdings in Total of householdings in 

Surface [ha] Arpaşu District Făgăraş District 

Number % Number % 

0 162 4.93 

0-1 362 8.60 338 10.28 

1-3 2213 52.56 818 24.89 

3-5 1366 32.44 942 28.66

Florentin OLTEANU: Preliminary Considerations Related to the Structure of the Agricultural… 289 

Total of householdings in Total of householdings in 

Surface [ha] Arpaşu District Făgăraş District 

Number % Number % 

5-10 266 6.32 1032 31.40 

10-15 1 0.02 157 4.77 

15-20 1 0.02 

30-40 1 0.02 

Total 4210 100 3287 100 

3. Some conclusions 

(1) During the period between the two world wars, Făgăraş county was organised in three 

districts: Arpasu de Jos, Făgăraş and Şercaia. See „ Statistic Indicator of villages and 

administrative units in Romania. Containing the results of the general census of 

population from 29 th of December, 1930, Bucarest, 1932, pp. 157-159”. After the 

Second World War, until the administrative re-organisation in 1950, the county was 

divided into 5 districts, Arpaşu de Jos, Făgăraş, Şercaia, Cincu and Voila (the last one 

being supressed on the 1st of April 1946, in “Brazde Făgărăşene”, nr. 13/apr. 1946). 

(2) Yet, we possess, information on the destiny of a former owner from Tulcea countea, 

arrived in Fagaras. His name is Boantă A. Gheorghe, born on the 25th of February in 

Rahmanu, Tulcea, son of Andrei şi Maria Boantă, and was sent in Fagaras along with his 

family in 1949. His father, Andrei, born in November 16, 1880, in Berivoii Mari, Fagaras, 

son of Gheorghe and Eva, colonized in Dobrudja, at Rahmanu, succeded in making a 

good fortune (73 ha, 300 sheep), but, was expropriated by the D. 83/1949 and send with 

his family in DO at Fagaras (March 1949). Gheorghe Boantă was several times 

emprisoned in the Fortress, for periods of 2 or 3 months, between 1951-1956. Due to the 

severe conditions in the cells of the fortress, his physical health condition worsened . 

[Information obtained from Mrs. Alexandra Palfi, from Fagaras, daughter of G. Boanta). 

(3) In order to make comparisons with the situation in the country, by categories, we 

took over Table 3. 

Table 3. 

Class of size 

Number of households Surface [ha] 

1930 1948 1930 1948 

under 1 ha 18.6 17.5 1.6 2.1 

1-3 ha 33.5 36,1 11.1 17.5 

3-5 ha 22.8 22,6 15.3 21.7 

5-10 ha 17.1 17,9 20.0 29.7 

10-20 ha 5.5 4.7 12.0 15.3 

20-50 ha 1.7 1.0 7.8 7.3 

over 50 ha 0.8 0.2 32.2 6.4 

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

290 

References 


1. Dezvoltarea economiei RPR 1948-1957. Ed. Academiei, Bucureşti 1958. 

2. www.scrigroup.com/afaceri/agricultura/agricultura-roman 

3. The National Archives, Brasov County Direction, Fond 499, Pretura Făgăraş, dosar 

Tabele Com. Prov. Plasa Făgăraş, SecŃia Cadre, inv. 57/1949, ff. 61, 93. 

4. Information obtained from several villagers from Copăcel and Dejani, and from the 

neighbouring villages as well. 

5. The National Archives, Brasov County Direction, Fond 497, Pretura Arpaşu de Jos, f.

MISSION OF THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, 

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN 

RSS MOLDAVIA (1946–1953) 

Lidia PRISAC 1 

The Soviet policy referring to territorial acquisition – Bessarabia, in the plan of 

imposing the “scientific legitimacy” for occupying and appending to USSR was apart 

from everything Stalin had ideologically built up to that time. After the classical model of 

justifying the expansion policy, the actions of the central authorities were directed to the 

purpose of emphasizing the cultural, linguistic, literary and historical uniqueness of the 

newly created republic – MSSR. The detachment from Romania of the re-annexed 

territory determined inventing the history of Soviet Moldavia’s population i and imposing 

a prefabricated identity ii . 

The main subjects of the official propaganda, reflected in all cultural acts, were the 

suffering inflicted by the Romanians to the Moldavians, the historical and literary 

connections with Russia and Ukraine – argument which was easily cultivated at the level 

of the communist mystics implanted through the indoctrination and education system iii . 

The main thesis, essentially propagandistic, in the style of the circulated Soviet doctrine, 

was the myth of the “Slavonians’ primary rights” on Bessarabia and the assertion of its 

incorporation to Russia iv . 

The Moldavian ideology, also called “Moldavian fundamentalism”, was “scientifically” 

justified by the Moldavian Soviet historiography v , created of the order of PCUS’ 

Propaganda Section vi . This way, what we would like to subscribe through this study is the 

analysis of the Moldavian Soviet academic centre in the field of forming the historical 

discourse for legitimizing the “Soviet Moldavian State” and the “Moldavian people” in 

the framework of USSR. The chronological segment of the study comprises the period 

since the constitution of the Institute of History, Language and Literature (IILL) until 

Stalin’s death. For presenting the subject, the specialized literature and the archive 

sources were resorted to. 

Historical context of MSSR’s IILL apparition. The process of “exporting” the Marxist- 

Leninist ideas and the theoretical substantiation for expanding the Bolshevik revolution in 

the adjacent territories to USSR involved the creation of institutional scientific structures 

proximate to the spaces entering the expansionist viewfinder of the Soviet nomenclature. 

This way, to the left of the Dniester, after the formation of RASSM on October 12, 1924, 

close by the People’s Commissariat for Education (NARCOMPROS), on December 30,

292 


1926, the Moldavian Scientific Committee was constituted with status of supreme 

scientific institution of the republic vii . The title of the committee’s collaborators was 

similar to the one of the collaborators of USSR’s Academy of Sciences. This committee 

aimed, besides “elaborating the issues of the Marxism-Leninism” viii , at “studying the 

Moldavian people’s region and culture for disseminating the scientific and practical 

knowledge” ix . 

The Moldavian Scientific Committee was also composed of a History Section (founded 

in 1928), whose members published a series of studies that praised the fight of the 

Bolsheviks from Bessarabia and from the left bank of the Dniester for the installation of 

the Soviet power x , that blamed the “Romanian-landlord occupation” of Bessarabia xi and 

positively presented the successes of RASSM in the “socialist construction” xii . Displaying 

a pronounced propagandistic character, these writings had a declarative content, the 

documentary basis wholly missing. The party and Soviet State leadership was particularly 

interested in proving the “illegal” character of the union between Bessarabia and 

Romania, therefore in March 1935 the Moldavian Scientific Committee from RASSM 

was also called Moldavian Institute of Scientific Researches in the field of Culture and in 

1939, on its basis, the Moldavian Institute of Scientific Researches (IMCŞ) was founded, 

in the field of History, Economics, Language and Literature (IELL) xiii . 

The interwar Soviet publications, referring to the space between Prut and Dniester so 

coveted by the Soviets, insistently promoted a series of historical-political myths, 

insistently propagated towards the Transnistrian population xiv . 

Once with appending the Pruto-Dnistrean space to USSR xv and forming MSSR, on 

August 2, 1940, the necessary political conditions were created for extending the 

propaganda of the “Moldavianism” upon society, with a view to the ethno-national 

eradication. To this end, the use of history as indoctrination instrument was resumed 

through IMCŞ in the domain IELL, transferred from Tiraspol to Chişinău. The task to 

scientifically substantiate the annexation of Bessarabia and other Romanian territories to 

USSR was incumbent on A. I. Manusevici, who very soon published in a history 

magazine from Moscow, an article wherein he presented the union between Bessarabia 

and Romania, in 1918, as its “kidnapping” by the Romanian “bourgeois-landowners” xvi . 

Retrieving Bessarabia in the summer of 1941 and its return within Romania’s borders 

imposed the evacuation of IMCŞ in the domain IELL at Buguruslan, region Orenburg 

(RFSS Russian), whence it returned to Chişinău, in October 1944, after re-annexing 

Bessarabia to USSR. 

The institute that had to directly or indirectly promote the untruth on the Moldavians’ 

historical past was catalogued, in 1946, by the secretary CC of PC(b)M, M. Salogor, 

through an approach addressed to the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Direction of 

CC of PC(b) from Moscow, G. F. Aleksandrov, wherein he referred to the tasks in the 

agenda on researching “history, material culture, the Moldavian people’s language and 

literature ...”, as inapt to deal with the proposed tasks, as “…in the past, both Moldavia’s 

1 Institute of the Cultural Patrimony of Moldavia’s Academy of Sciences, Chisinau, Republic of 

Moldavia.

Lidia PRISAC: Institute of history, language and literature. Scientifically… 293 

territory, and the Moldavian people’s history were hardly studied” xvii . M. Salogor asked 

for the support through the Decision of the Board CC of PC(b)M for improving the work 

of the Institute through increasing the number of researchers, until then only 15. This 

way, on March 11, 1946 through the support by the Presidium AŞ of USSR, on the 

grounds of the Moldavian Institute, they decided to create USSR’s Moldavian Scientific 

Basis of AŞ. 

They hoped that after founding this basis, a turn will occur in the Soviet-Bolshevik 

elaboration process of the Moldavian history. The organisational issues, the 

institutional structure and the main directions of the scientific researches were 

developed in the meeting of the Board CC of PC(b) M from June 18, 1947. Among 

the main activity directions of the Basis, remitted for approval to the Presidium of 

USSR’s AŞ, there was also stipulated “studying the Moldavian people’s history, 

archaeology and ethnography”. The necessity was argued for setting up the Institute 

of History, Language and Literature (IILL), as autonomous institution, consisting of 3 

sections, the first being the one of history and archaeology. This way, after having 

examined, on June 29, 1946, by the Presidium AŞ of USSR, the approach of the 

MSSR leadership, the submitted projects were approved, with some modifications. 

Director of the Moldavian Scientific Basis was appointed Acad. V. Volghin, deputy 

president USSR ‘s AŞ. Among the priority scientific directions, there were registered 

studying the Moldavian people’s history, archaeology and ethnography, as well as 

elaborating the issues as regards the genesis and the development of the Moldavian 

language, literature, folklore and popular art xviii . 

The shortage of human and financial resources determined the modest institutional 

dimensions and structure of the Moldavian Scientific Basis. Of the 8 created scientific 

organizations, only one had the status of institute – the one of History, Language and 

Literature, the rest were autonomous-status sectors xix . Interim director of IILL was 

appointed V.M. Senchevici, and since 1947 Dr. I. Ceban. 

The scientific staff within IILL. One of the most acute problems faced by the 

Moldavian Scientific Subsidiary of USSR’s AŞ, in the beginning, was the shortage of 

qualified scientific staff. This way, in the years 1942–1943, in the history section, 

only two persons were employed: N.V. Berezneacov and V. M. Senchievici xx . 

Subsequently, on December 14, 1945, when the meeting of the Scientific Council of 

IMCŞ took place, the history sector, beside the aforementioned, consisted of R.E. 

Soboli, A.R. Fin, beside this from evacuation they were joined by Dr. in history N.A. 

NarŃov, since March 27, in that sector, the superior scientific researcher C.M. Russev 

was transferred and since October 6, I.I. Meșeriuc, I.E. Levit și V.M. Aliasevici xxi 

were enrolled there. The shortage of staff might be explained through the repression 

and escape, out of ideological and political reasons, of a considerable part of the 

scientific and cultural intellectuality during the years 1940–1941 and in the early 

postwar years; besides, many persons who might have been framed within the field of 

science deployed their professional activity in higher-education institutions. This way 

or otherwise, the shortage of staff directly reflected on the failure to fulfil the 

scientific activity plan. xxii . In one of the meetings of the Institute, V.M. Senchevici

294 


asked for measures to attract in the history sector, the professional staff, claiming 

“how to form a Moldavian historical-philological community if the history sector not 

only failed to attract young professionals, but rejected them” xxiii , whereat N.V. 

Berezneacov claimed that “he attempted to attract as non-titular collaborators, 

comrade Grosu, Lojeckin, Şlain, Popovici and Roitman from the Pedagogic Institute; 

however they were more preoccupied with teaching the students’ themes” xxiv . Despite 

the small number of staff within the history sector V.M. Senchevici declared 

“considering we have most units in the staff charts we are entitled to ask from the 

history sector more scientific results than from the other sectors” xxv . This statement 

suggests that the history sector had most units in the staff charts. 

As regards the teaching staff, the situation was no better; however during postwar 

period it was solved on two paths: through the help of the Soviet of USSR’s People 

Commissars, which set to work in the Institute, graduates and doctoral students of the 

universities from Moscow and Leningrad and through the experts in history, 

economics, language and literature of Moldavia ’s ICŞ, which acted as Institute 

collaborators xxvi . The list of the teaching staff had the following aspect: N.V. 

Berezneakov – candidate in historical sciences, head of the Chair of History, graduate 

of the University from Leningrad, head of the history section of Moldavia ’s ICŞ, 

taught the history and historiography of USSR; Z.V. UdalŃova – superior lector, 

graduate and doctoral student at US from Moscow, taught ancient and middle history; 

N.O. PavliŃkaia – candidate in sciences, docent, taught the history of USSR and the 

modern one, graduate of US from Leningrad; V. Senchevici – lector, taught the 

history of Moldavia, graduate of the Pedagogic Institute from Tiraspol, head of 

Moldavia ’s ICŞ; I. S. Grosul – dean of the Faculty of History, candidate in historical 

sciences, lector, defended his candidate thesis in historical sciences on the theme 

Peasant Reform from 1868 in Moldavia (in fact, in Bessarabia – nn). This way, we 

can say that great part of those activating in the history sector of IMCŞ also deployed 

didactic activity. 

In the first postwar decade, the interaction between historians and power was 

determined by the contradictory nature of the functions performed by historical science in 

the Soviet State. On one hand, the historians were permanently verified and watched. For 

instance, during the meeting of the Scientific Council of the Moldavian Institute for 

Scientific Researches from November 10, 1946, the president of the Commission CC of 

PC (b) of Moldavia noticed that “part of the workers are not sufficiently trained for the 

scientific-research activity...”, “... the commission also settled that some workers of the 

institute do not have adequate interpretations on the Marxist-Leninist teaching...”, besides 

“... the commission believes that one of the causes for the unsatisfactory activity of the 

institute consists in the lack of constructive criticism xxvii . 

In MSSR, it was very important for the specialist, when employed, not to have been 

before the war on the “occupied” territory and not to have had contacts with the 

“Romanian and German fascists” xxviii . Therefore, as regards some scientific collaborators 

from the Institute of History who, during interwar period, had studied in Romania, even if 

not on the spot, however they were reminded this.


The unique-party status of the Soviet power called for ideologically substantiating its 

activity and preparing the staff for the average school, which made them ask from the 

workers in the research environment “...the political rise of the Institute collaborators xxix . 

This way, in default of sufficiently well trained staff in terms of Marxist-Leninist 

teaching, it comes to attracting important specialists from Moscow and Leningrad xxx . 

Ethnically, in IILL constituency, allogeneic elements prevailed. According to the 

archive documents, from December 14, 1945, of the 19 employees of IMCŞ, 7 were Jew, 

4 were Russian, 3 were Ukrainian and 5 were Moldavian xxxi . This way, the number of 

Moldavians was insignificant compared to the allogeneous, and the human scientific 

potential was pre-eminently completed with representatives of the other republics. Things 

did not change much even later on. In 1949, of the number of 112 collaborators of the 

Moldavian Scientific Subsidiary, only 50 were scientific researchers xxxii . At union scale, 

in 1950 according to the statistics, only 126 Moldavians activated as scientific 

researchers, subsequently their figure was constantly growing. This way, in 1955, a 

number of 305 Moldavian scientific researchers activated in the academic 

environment xxxiii . 

As regards the historians’ writings, through the law-enforcement and security organs PC 

“helps” them acquire the Leninist conception on the historical process, the Marxist 

research methods, so that the policy of the Soviet State in terms of science dictated the 

content, form and research methods. The research themes at IILL of the Moldavian 

Scientific Basis of USSR’s AŞ referred to Moldavia’s history as part of USSR, the 

development of the capitalism in Moldavia, the revolutionary movement, the installation 

of the Soviet power etc. 

In the attempt to explain why part of the autochthonous historians were concerned, in 

their researches, with older epochs, especially those having written on the Middle Ages, 

we might say they were less oppressed by the official propaganda, whilst those who were 

compelled to write about the proximate past, completely dissolved in this machinery of 

lie xxxiv . Thus, in broad terms, the set of themes suited the political requirements of the 

communist party. 

Activity of the Institute of History, Language and Literature. In early postwar years, 

the priority of the Soviet historians from Chişinău consisted of harshly condemning the 

Romanian administration during wartime, combined with continuously defaming the 

“Romanian-boyard occupation” upon Bessarabia during 1918–1940. In parallel, the 

secular friendship relations between the “great Russian people and the Moldavian 

people” xxxv were praised. 

The turning point, we dare say, in propagandistically substantiating the historical 

science in Soviet Moldavia was the Plenary Decision CC of PCM from August 27-29, 

1947 as regards elaborating a synthesis of Moldavian history. 

Although Prof. N. NarŃov from the Pedagogic Institute of Chişinău had previously 

declared that he had elaborated a history textbook of Moldavia, ready for publication, this 

work was rejected, imputing to the author that had not invented an ethnogenesis of the

296 


Moldavians, different from the Romanians’, in the historical justification of MSSR’s 

existence, but inversely, “followed the thread of the Romanian historiography...”. 

The negative role in the fate of this work went to the XIII-th Plenary, the principal 

report, whose main commissioner, I. S. Zâkov, secretary of CC for ideology, insisted that 

“the Romanian-German occupants attempted to intoxicate the labourers’ conscience with 

the poison of nationalism, to graft the reactionary ideology, to provoke the instincts of 

private-wealth cultivation, to ignite the hatred against the Soviet Union’s peoples and 

especially against the Russian people”. Besides, the secretary CC of PC(b)M looked very 

disturbed that “...this alien ideology..., is supported by the remains of the hostile class 

elements, by the Moldavian people’s fiercest enemies, the Moldo-Romanian 

nationalists... ” and notices that in the framework of IILL “the themes on the common 

historical fates of the Moldavian and Russian people, on the history of their common fight 

against the foreign invaders, against the capitalist yoke” inclusively the fact that within it 

“a team of specialist historians, capable to write a textbook in the Marxist-Leninist line of 

history of the Moldavian people has not yet been constituted” are poorly treated. 

Consequently, the idea was suggested that “as regards Moldavia’s history, not a certain 

textbook, but a Marxist-Bolshevik textbook must be edited”. The conclusion of the 

plenary was that Moldavia’s history textbook cannot be elaborated by a single person, but 

by the best historians headed by CC of PC(b)M” xxxvi . 

The ideological importance of this work was proved by the transfer of its elaboration 

under the direct control of CC of PC(b), through creating a commission consisting of 

party and State higher persons in charge, headed by C. U. Cernenko (subsequently – A. 

Lazarev). The authorship, chosen in 1947, included three categories of persons – staff 

reckoned local: I. Grosu, V. Senchevici, F. Grecul, I. Ceban, N. Berezneacov, N. Mohov, 

persons with Moscow-specific training: Acad. L. V. Cerepnin, Prof. A. D. UdalŃov, Prof. 

C. P. Trapeznikov (clerk at CC of PC(b)U), on whom was also incumbent the role of 

editors-in-chief) or from other Soviet centres: T. Passec, M. Tihanova, F. Omelciuk, G. 

Smirnov, D. Şemeacov and persons educated in the interwar Romania’s institutions: V. 

Cioban, E. Russev, G. Bogaci, A. Kidel xxxvii , who were to realize together the plan of the 

work xxxviii . 

The fact that Moldavia’s History was elaborated at order, being an emergency for the 

ideological propaganda, is proved by the imposed and strictly monitored rhythm in its 

achievement. In March 1948, the Office CC of PC(b)M was already discussing the issue 

Cu privire la planul editării manualului de istorie a Moldovei (As regards the Plan of 

Editing Moldavia’s History Textbook), approving the developed plan of the synthesis, 

submitted in front of the commission. 

The synthesis model was nothing more than a typical product of the late Stalinist 

era xxxix , as it followed an extremely simplified scheme and betrayed the complete absence 

of scientific studies on Moldavia’s history. The only sources referred to were the classics 

of Marxism-Leninism and Stalin’s works. The structure of the work was underlain by the 

economic development and class struggle. 

The version of the submitted Moldavian ethnogenesis supposed that the Wallachians 

(Romanized Geto-Dacians) having lived in the Pruto-Dnistrean region, after having


merged with the Eastern indigenous Slavic population would have called about the 

Moldavian ethnogenesis xl . 

The Russian and Slavish influence on historical Moldavia was overwhelming; all 

political and cultural leaders of this land were supposed to have been influenced by the 

“great Russian people and its advanced culture”. The pro-Russian attachment culminated 

in interpreting Bessarabia’s annexation, in 1812, as positive factor, (by the influence of 

the Russian intellectuality) despite all vices xli . At the same time, the content of the work 

was also prevailed by the fact that they attempted to prove the local roots of Bessarabia’s 

revolutionary movement, although many revolutionaries were known to be Ukrainian and 

Russian – Grigori Kotovski was presented as famous son of the Moldavian people, even 

if he was Russian. 

As regards the period of Soviet-power establishment, the Moldavian historians 

“discovered” that the Soviet authorities officially took over the power at Chişinău on 

January 14, 1918. This new myth legitimated that by 1940, Bessarabia was “liberated” 

and the Soviet power was restored xlii . 

After the elaboration of the work, on September 3, 1949, the Board CC of PC(b) 

adopted the Decision Despre editarea machetei primei părŃi a manualului „Curs de 

istorie a Moldovei” (On Editing the Model of the First Part of the Textbook “History 

Course of Moldavia”) settling the issuance term on September 15. The Board compelled 

the “propaganda and agitation section of CC of PC(b) from Moldavia (comrade 

Cernenko) to organize an “ample discussion” of the model in the republic’s scientific and 

didactic environment xliii so that, subsequently, the concept should be recognized and 

approved by the entire society. At the same time, the model of the work was dispatched to 

the universities and scientific institutions from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odesa, Kazan, 

CernăuŃi, Minsk, Tbilisi, Taşkent and other towns whence dozens of notices, observations 

and desiderata came, taken into account when writing the manuscript. 

Editing the model inscribed in the series of actions consecrated to the 25-year jubilee 

since MSSR’s establishment, whose roots dated back in 1924, when RASSM was 

constituted. On this occasion, CC of PC(b) published a material for the party 

propagandists, entitled Douăzeci şi cinci de ani ai RSS Moldoveneşti (Moldavian RSS’s 

Twenty-Five Years) xliv . 

By the end of 1949, from the Institute of History of the USSR’s Academy of Sciences, 

which was the main research centre in the field of history, at CC PC(b) from MSSR , a 

letter came with the announcement that discussing the model of Moldavia’s History will 

take place after having delegated and confirmed some persons’ names for participating in 

the discussion. This way, at Moscow, was delegated the authorship A. Lazarev, president 

of the Synthesis-Elaboration Commission, N. Mohov, I. Grosul, D. Şemiakov and N. 

Berezneakov xlv . In January 1950, the enunciated persons assisted at discussing the model 

of the first volume of Moldavia’s History at the Institutes of History from Kiev, Moscow 

and Leningrad xlvi . From them, the Moldavian collaborators received “precious 

recommendation and advice”, that they were to consider whilst elaborating the synthesis. 

According to those invited to comment on the “model”, the use of the term „Moldavia”

298 


was too liberal, considering extremely clear that Bessarabia’s territory was not identical 

to the one of MSSR xlvii . 

This way, Moldavia’s history was practically written by incompetent persons, those 

written by “autochthonous” authors being reviewed and most often re-written by the 

historians from Moscow, Kiev etc. Although the model of the manuscript was discussed 

in the framework of many scientific and education institutions from USSR, it was still not 

scientifically justified and had no essential source-ologic basis, no firm and precise 

motivations. 

Finally, after long “discussions” and “approvals” in 1951, in the bookshops of Chişinău, 

the first of the two volumes of Moldavian RSS’s History was issued xlviii under the 

patronage of the editors UdalŃov and Cerepnin xlix . The work was elaborated in Russian 

and published in “Moldavian” only in 1954. The fact is explained not only through lack 

of recognition by much of the authors of the “Moldavian language” and especially 

through the instituted practice for every historical publication, and not only, to pass 

through the political and ideological censorship to the centre l . 

Although the concepts of the first volume were shaky, reviews appeared that praised the 

work, proving once again its ideological character. Nevertheless, on the grounds that the 

work was deprived of written sources and archaeological materials referring to early 

history, the role of the Slavonians in the Moldavians’ ethnogenesis and in edifying the 

medieval State, measures were taken for intensifying the archaeological researches 

through deploying scientific expeditions. 

Approaching the evolution of the definitions as regards the national identity and the 

historical science since setting up IILL until Stalin’s death makes us draw some 

conclusions. The Marxist-Leninist historians from MSSR constantly promoted the idea of 

Moldavianism with a view to justify the Soviet policy in the region, artificially creating a 

Moldavian-called people, with a Moldavian-denominated language; and with a view to 

legitimate its existence and to ensure its historical continuity in the framework of USSR, 

a Moldavian-State past was created. 

REFERENCES: 

i 

King, Charles: Moldovenii, România, Rusia şi politica culturală, Chişinău. Editura Arc, 2002, 

p. 63-88. 

ii 

Cojocaru, Gheorghe: ConştiinŃa istorică, identiate de stat şi identitate etnoculturală în Republica 

Moldova (Reînodarea firului istoriei şi păşirea în moderniate). In: Akademos, 2009, nr. 2 (13), 

p. 63. 

iii 

Молдавия в великой семье республик Советского Союза. Cб. статей, Кишинев, 1941. 

iv 

King, Charles: Politica culturală sovietică în Basarabia de la anexare până la Perestroikă. In: 

Sub povara graniŃei imperiale (A. Pop (ed.)), Bucureşti. Editura Recif, 1993, p. 89. 

v 

Republica Moldova. EdiŃie enciclopedică, Chişinău. Enciclopedia Moldovei, 2009, p. 384-390. 

vi 

Chifu, Iulian: Basarabia sub ocupaŃie sovietică şi tentative contemporane de revenire sub tutela 

Moscovei, Bucureşti. Politeia-SNSPA, 2004, p. 121. 

vii 

Academia de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei: Istorie şi contemporanietate, 1946–2006, Chişinău. ŞtiinŃa, 

2006, p. 28.


viii Dolghi, Adrian: Politica statului sovietic în domeniul învăŃământului istoric superior în 

perioada anilor 1944–1965. (În baza materialelor din MSSR), Teză de doctor în istorie, 

Chişinău, 2010, p. 51. 

ix Dragnev, Demir: Istorie şi civilizaŃie medievală şi modernă timpurie în łările Române. Studii şi 

materiale, Chişinău. Cartdidact2012, p. 515. 

x Нарцов, Н. А. Боротьба за Жовтень на Молдавию (Bor’ba za jovteni’ na Moldavju (In 

Ucrainian)), Тирасполь, 1932. 

xi Дембо, В. О. Советcкая Молдавия и бессарабский вопрос (Sovietskaja Moldavija i 

Bessarabskij vopros (In Russian)), Москва, 1925; Idem, Бессарабское крестьянство под 

властью кулаков и помещиков (Bessarabskoe krest’janstvo pod vlast’ju kulakov i pomescikov 

(In Russian)), Москва, 1931, Бантке, С. С. 10 лет борьбы против румынских бояр (10 let 

bor’by protiv ruminskih bojar (In Russian)), Москва-Ленинград, 1928; Галайда, К. 

Украденная страна (Ukradenaja strana (In Russian)), Москва, 1928. 

xii Борисюк, И. С., Мамаев, П.В. Молдова Совиетикэ (Moldova Soovietică), Тираспол, 1938. 

xiii Academia de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei: Istorie..., p. 29. 

xiv Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 516. 

xv Following the non-aggression treaty between Germany and USSR also called Ribbentrop- 

Molotov Pact, in the Baltic States, Academies of Sciences in Soviet style were officially 

established. In Lithuania, the Academy of Sciences was set up on January 16, 1941. See: 

http://lma.lt/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=161&Itemid=186&lang= 

en (Accessed on June 26, 2012). In Estonia, the academic centre founded on January 28, 1938, 

after the annexation to USSR was liquidated on July 17, 1940 and reorganized after the Soviet 

model on June 28, 1945. See: http://www.akadeemia.ee/en/academy/history/ (Accessed on June 

26, 2012).In Latvia, the Academy of Sciences was established on February 14, 1946. See: 

http://www.lza.lv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=279&Itemid=123 accesed on 

June 26, 2012). 

xvi Манусевич, А. Я. История захвата Бессарабии Румынией (Istoria zahvata Bessarabii 

Ruminiei (In Russian)). In: Исторический журнал, 1940, № 8. Vezi: Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., 

p. 517. 

xvii Ibidem, p. 520. 

xviii Academia de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei: Istorie..., p. 33. 

xix JarcuŃchi, Ion: File din istoricul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe (65 de ani de la formarea primelor 

instituŃii academice din Republica Moldova). In: Akademos. Revistă de ŞtiinŃă, Inovare, Cultură 

şi Artă, 2011, nr. 2, p. 15. 

xx Arhiva Academiei de StiinŃe a Moldovei (În continuare AASM), Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 1, f. 121. 

xxi AASM, Fond 3, unv. 1, d. 10, f. 1-3. 

xxii 

Ibidem, f. 3. 

xxiii 


xxiv 

Ibidem, f. 8-9. 

xxv 

Ibidem 21-22. 

xxvi 

Eremia, Mihai: Facultatea de Istorie din cadrul Institutului Pedagogic Moldovenesc (1941– 

1944). In: ConferinŃa corpului didactico-ştiinŃific „BilanŃul ActivităŃii ştiinŃifice a USM pe anii 

1998/99”, 27 septembrie-2 octombrie 2000, Rezumatele comunicărilor, Chişinău, 2000, p. 294. 

xxvii 

AASM, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 10, f. 54-56. 

xxviii 

Dolghi, Adrian: op. cit., p. 93. 

xxix 

AASM, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 10, f. 61. 

xxx 

Ibidem, f. 63-64. 

xxxi 

AASM, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 14, f. 9-10. 

xxxii 

JarcuŃchi, Ion: op. cit., p. 34. 

xxxiii 


xxxiv

300 


łurcanu, Ion: Istoriografia din Moldova Sovietică între ştiinŃă şi propagandă. In: Revista de 

Istorie a Moldovei, 1994, nr. 3-4, p. 11; Xenofontov, Ion: Mişcarea naŃională din RSS 

Moldovenească în istoriografie: premise, evoluŃie, consecinŃe. In: Sfârşitul regimurilor 

comuniste. Cauze. Desfăşurare. ConsecinŃe, Cluj-Napoca. Argonaut, 2011, p. 396. 

xxxv Ibidem, p. 517. 

xxxvi Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 523-524. 

xxxvii Matveev, Sergiu: Procesele etno-culturale din spaŃiul carpato-nistrean în secolele II-XIV. 

Istoriografia sovietică, Chişinău. Pontos, 2009, p. 22. 

xxxviii Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 524-525. 

xxxix Dolghi, Adrian, Despre cum s-a scris istoria Moldovei în USSR – un exemplu tipic al 

imixtiunii politicului în viaŃa didacico-ştiinŃifică. In: Transilvania, Sibiu, 2008, nr. 11, p. 72. 

xl Dolghi, Adrian: Politica statului sovietic în domeniul învăŃământului istoric..., p. 27. 

xli Van Meurs, Wilhelm Petrus: op. cit., p. 223-235. 

xlii Lazarev, Artem: Cum a fost scrisă istoria Moldovei. In: Nistru, 1989, nr. 2, p. 136. 

xliii Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 526. 

xliv Двадцатъ пятъ лет Молдавской Советской Социалистической Республики (материалы 

для докладчиков) (Dvadcat’ pjat’ let Moldavskoj Sovetskoj Socialističeskoj Respubliki 

(materialy dlja dokladčikov) (In Russian)), Кищинев, 1949. Responsabil de publicaŃie V. I. 

Ovcinnikov. 

xlv Dolghi, Adrian: Politica statului sovietic în domeniul învăŃământului istoric..., p. 147. 

xlvi Lazarev, Artem: op. cit., p. 135. 

xlvii Van Meurs, Wilhelm Petrus: op. cit., p. 212. 

xlviii История Молдавской ССР (Istorija Moldavskoj SSR (In Russian)), Кишинев, 1951. 

xlix Межвузовское научное совещание по истории на Дону и Северном Кавказе в конце XIXначале 

ХХ вв. (Mejvuzovskoe naučnoe soveščanije po istorii na Donu i Severnom Kavkaze v 

konce XIX–načale XX vv. (In Russian)) In: Тезисы докладов, Ростов-на-Дону, 1958. 

l Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 527.

PRIVATE PROPETY AS BASIC VALUE OF 

THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. 

BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE DURING THE 

TIME OF THE TARNOVO CONSTITUTION 

Nikolai PRODANOV 1 

Abstract: The article identifies some of the most visible manifestations of violations of the 

principle of the inviolability of private property in the duration of the Tarnovo Constitution in 

Bulgaria. Specifically mentioned are: the violation of democratic principles in the expropriation of 

private property, issues in the implementation of entitled to Bulgarian citizens who are not ethnic 

Bulgarians and Orthodox Christians, the use of state power for harm to private property as a 

means to combat political opponent and others. Built argues that to September 9, 1944 in 

Bulgaria's constitutional principle of the inviolability of private property still has not become the 

legal norm in public attitude and mentality of the Bulgarians. 

Modern democratic society is based on several groups of inter-related values. The 

following are most significant ones: political freedom and, above all, supremacy of law 

and election of leaders; the economic freedom on the basis of the inviolability of 

property, religious freedom, incl. also the freedom not to be religious. To these some 

important cultural attitudes must be added - respect for human life, tolerance and 

openness. 

Even ancient Greeks were aware of the importance of private property as a guarantee 

against arbitrariness of the state. It is no coincidence that the formula "sacred and 

inviolable private property", which gained popularity afterwards, appeared exactly at that 

time. During the following centuries the struggle for more human freedom has been also 

connected with efforts to raise the public status of private property. 

* * * 

The Modern Bulgarian statehood is genetically related to the first constitution of the 

state, which after an old tradition, we call Tarnovo. It has been in force for 68 years and is 

currently the longest running fundamental law of the country. The Tarnovo Constitution 

set out the basic features of democratic governance model in independent Bulgaria. Any 

attempts as to its overt violations and even suspension invariably generate serious public 

opposition. Despite certain attempts to interpret the norms of the Tarnovo Constitution 

divorced from social realities, the thesis that over several decades, it has remained the 

most important pillar of the Bulgarian democracy is indisputable. 

The situation changed after 1934, when Bulgaria was included in the overall 

authoritarian stream which later on became totalitarian, covering the greater part of 

Europe. The changing social conditions lead to the revocation of the Tarnovo 

Constitution in late 1947 and to the adoption of a new fundamental law, which created 


302 


favorable conditions for the imposition of undemocratic governance and economic 

regime. An important element of this regime was the attitude of the authorities to private 

property. It was consistently negative, although there is a clearly discernible 

differentiation in attitude to the different types of private property. Although the 

possession and use of agricultural land was essentially nationalized during the entire 

period of existence of Communist Bulgaria, the ruling class did not dare to fully 

nationalize it, so that at least nominally private ownership over land was retained. 

The almost complete elimination of private property in Bulgaria did not produce a 

uniform response in the community. While the nationalisation of the possession and use 

of agricultural land (also known as "collectivization of land") brought to defiance and to 

the appearance of the so called Goryani movement, carried out a few days after the 

adoption of new constitution, the nationalization of industry passed without resistance 

under the rather indifferent eyes of the majority of the population. This fact is one of 

many that show that the then Bulgarian society was not consolidated in their attitude to 

private property. 

I tend to think that the lack of such a consolidation was due also to the very 

controversial practice in respect of the implementation of the private property provisions, 

set out in the Tarnovo Constitution. 

* * * 

The legal status of private property in the Principality of Bulgaria is regulated in Part III 

of Chapter XII of the Tarnovo Constitution. According to Art. 67 rights of ownership are 

inviolable and according to Art. 68 involuntary transfer of property can only be done for 

state and public benefit, and against fair payment in advance. The method for similar 

expropriation of property was intended to be settled in a special law. 

For the aforementioned 68 years existence of the Tarnovo Constitution several such 

laws have been adopted. Their legal qualities are different, as is to a large extent the 

attitude to private ownership vested in them. Undoubtedly the most unscrupulously 

unconstitutional law among them is the law on the expropriation of buildings for the 

needs of the state and the municipalities of 1920. Its purpose was to alleviate the 

budgetary burden on the state and municipalities, by discontinuing the rent payments for 

private buildings and the latter were nationalized. The compensation for owners was not 

fair because it was limited to the tax valuation of the property at 1919-1920. The 

compensation was not paid in advance because it was effected through government 

bonds, i.e. by securities that would bring real income in the future. The law was then 

assessed by the then legal circles as confiscatory. After the removal of the Agrarian 

Government from power in 1924 the law was officially declared by the National 

Assembly unconstitutional and was repealed. 

Altogether the Bulgarian Argarian People’s Union was one of the then political parties 

in Bulgaria, which looked down on the basic law, and their attitude to private property 

was very specific. They declared that they were in favor of small private property, while 

they intended to liquidate the big private property. Moreover – again in violation of the 

Constitution. Payment of land expropriated under the Law on the labour land ownership, 

by virtue of which they wanted to redistribute land ownership in accordance with the 

Party's program was far from fair, because it was far below the land’s actual value. 

* * *

Nikolai PRODANOV: Private Propety as Basic Value of the Democratic Society… 303 

The attitude of almost all political parties in the country to the private property of 

foreigners, non-Bulgarian residents and to the private property of Bulgarian nationals 

who are not ethnic Bulgarians and Orthodox Christians is disrespectful. 

As early as the late nineteenth century, the authorities attempted to thwart the settlement 

of Jews in Dobrudja, making obstacles to the formalization of the documents evidencing 

ownership over the lands they had purchased. The main motive for this policy is that non- 

Bulgarian population should not be allowed to settle in the border areas, because in 

extreme conditions their loyalty cannot not be relied upon. The escalation of this attitude 

lead to an amendment in 1906 of the Law on Rural Municipalities, thus prohibiting 

foreign nationals to own land in Bulgaria at all. This prohibition was retained until the 

end of the Tarnovo Constitution. In March 1917, at the height of World War, the 

parliamentary group of the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union made an unsuccessful 

attempt to extend the prohibition through legislation to the covered real estate. 

In the deportation of the Greek population of Bulgaria in 1906 and 1914 the official 

government authorities (in particular the respective ministers of justice) gave instructions 

to produce obstacles to the Greeks willing to sell their properties. 

The state had an extreme attitude to the land owned by the Bulgarian Muslims in the 

areas appended to the Bulgarian territory after the Balkan War. A considerable part of 

them fled from the area of military actions, abandoning their property. Those, who later 

returned to their native places, found their lands confiscated by the state under a special 

law. Years later they cultivate their lands and pay a rent to the state at that. 

Also extreme is the state policy regarding the private ownership of Bulgarian Jews 

during World War II. The anti-Jewish legislation incorporates a strong confiscatory 

element, whereas some of nationalized properties have not been returned to their owners 

after September 9, 1944. 

* * * 

Certain Bulgarian governments took the liberty to prosecute their political opponents by 

encroachment on their property. After 1923 a significant part of the property of the 

former Prime Minister Alexander Stamboliyski was confiscated on the grounds that it 

was acquired with stolen public funds. Although the latter statement was probably 

accurate, the confiscation was a result of a fair trial. Later, during World War II, in some 

cases the prosecution of participants in antigovernment resistance was accompanied by 

physical annihilation of their property. 

* * * 

Over 8 out of the 68 years of existence of the Tarnovo Constitution, Bulgaria was at 

war. One of the most important aspects of communication between the state and the 

population during these years is the various requisitioning of all sorts of chattel, food, 

cattle, etc., principally intended for the needs of the army. These actions were in 

implementation of the relevant provisions of the requisitioning laws, which do not 

provide for compensation in advance. Perhaps such behavior is acceptable in view of the 

war realities, but finds no legal basis whatsoever in the text of the fundamental law. 

* * * 

The Bulgarian state during that time failed to form a legal consciousness among his 

citizen that certain purchase transactions must be carried out through complex formalities, 

whose objective is protect their interests and the public interest. I mean the circumstance 

that in those decades real estate transactions were persistently performed (mainly in 

agricultural land) through the so-called private purchase deeds, bypassing the notarised

304 


form for the performance of the transaction in order to avoid payment of fees. The 

Bulgarian citizens and in particular the Bulgarian peasants stubbornly refused to pay this 

extra money, considering it unfair payment. Post factum more than 20 times (!) the state 

was forced to adopt special laws by which vest similar implemented legal transactions 

into formal legal power. 

* * * 

By chance, the Communist government came in office in Bulgaria very soon after the 

country started developing along the path of a classical democratic development. Some 

basic values of the democratic political and economic model have not as yet overcome 

traditional perceptions of the Bulgarians. This is probably one of the reasons for the 

relatively easy establishment of state socialism in the country and for its existence devoid 

of substantial domestic public opposition, for several decades. 

References 

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2. Bochev, Stoian. Kapitalizmyt v Bylgariia. Systavitel Rumen Avramov. Sofia, 1998. 

3. Vacov, Lyubomir. Zaprotivo-konstitucionnite ni zakoni ot imushtestven harakter. – 

Yuridicheski pregled, 25, 1924, №3, 130-134. 

4. Velev, Alexander. Glavni reformi na zemedelskoto pravitelstvo. Sofia, 1977. 

5. Vladikin, Lyubomir. Istoria na Tyrnovskata konstituciia. Plovdiv, 1936. 

6. Girginov, Alexander. Dyrzhavnoto ustroystvo na Bylgariia. Sofia, 1921. 

7. Daskalov, Rumen. Bylgarskoto obshtestvo. T. І. Dyrzhava, politika, ikonomika. 

Sofia, 2005. 

8. Dermendzhiev, Ivan. Namesa na dyrzhavata v stopanstvoto po vreme na Pyrvata 

svetovna vojna (1914-1917). – Godishnik na Sofijskiia universitet, Iuridicheski 

fakultet, T. 47, Ch. І, Sofia, 1955, 337-403. 

9. Kacarkova, Verka. Opiti za dyrzhavno regulirane na ikonomikata na Bylgariia prez 

Pyrvata svetovna vojna (1915-1918). - Voennoistoricheski sbornik, 37, 1968, №6, 

56-73. 

10. Kirov, Stefan. Statisticheski danni po presledvane obshtinski kmetove i pomoshtnicite 

im ot 1898 do kraia na 1901 godina za razni prestypleniya. – Grazhdanin, І, 1904, № 

4, 279-280. 

11. Ludvig von Mizes. Choveshkoto dejstvie. Traktat po ikonomika. Sofia, 2011. 

12. Braudel, Fernand. The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15–18 

Century. Harper and Row, 1979. 

13. Brander, James A. Government policy toward business. 4th ed. Mississauga, Ontario, 

John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2006. 

14. Capitalism. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006. 

15. Ricardo, David. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray 

Publisher, 1821. 

16. Shaffer, Butler. Boundaries of order. Private Property as a Social System. Published 

by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Auburn, 2009.

PREPARATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY 

ELECTIONS HELD IN 1946 

1. Political climate before the elections 

Cristina ROMAN 1 

The communist press and the repressive bodies (Police, Gendarmerie, Intelligent 

Service) controlled by Groza’s government have played a significant role in creating a 

strained mood amid political opposition and public opinion before the elections in 1946. 

The electoral strategy of the communist government expressed through the Election 

Law and the electoral program of the Block of the Democratic Parties has mainly aimed 

to annihilate democracy in Romania. The propaganda initiated by the Central Section of 

Political Education of the Communist Party had to bring, as Iosif Chişinevschi said, „90- 

94% of the votes”. 2 . 

The communist campaign to violently eliminate the democratic parties from the 

political scene started in 1945 and intensified in early 1946. Terrorist actions began in the 

first months of the year to intimidate the `historic` parties’ members and sympathisers for 

the upcoming elections. In February, there was an unsuccessful conspiracy to murder 

Dinu Brătianu during his travel to Câmpulung Muscel where he intended to participate in 

a meeting. On April 22, the prominent member of the National Peasants’ Party Emil 

HaŃieganu was stopped and aggressed by a group of violent communists on the way from 

Cluj. The next one was Ion Mihalache, the leader of the Nation Peasants’ Party, whose 

right to participate in such elections was cancelled because he had taken part in the anti- 

Soviet war as a volunteer. 

Despite the agreement reached during the Moscow Conference in December 1945, 

whereby free elections were imposed to be organized in Romania in the shortest possible 

time, Western diplomats kept on being reserved in their correspondence as regards the 

good intentions declared by the communist government from Bucharest. In a report on his 

mission to Bucharest, the British Ambassador to Moscow Clark Kerr has sorrowfully 

declared that he left Petru Groza with the feeling that `the latter is an unshakably 

experienced impostor`: Ì think that Dr. Groza is full of hidden thoughts and will make 

everything possible to put as many obstacles against our policy as the Russians will tell 

him to put. It is melancholic but I cannot see what more can be done 3 `. 

1 

Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, 

Bucureşti, Romania. 

2 

Arhivele NaŃionale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), fond CC al PCR-Cancelarie, Dosar 52/1946, f. 22. 

3 

Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Sovietizarea României. PercepŃii anglo-americane (1944-1947), 

Bucureşti, 1993, p. 163.

306 


Although the Anglo-Americans have repeatedly encouraged the leaders of the 

National Peasants’ Party and of the Liberal Party, Western chancelleries knew even since 

1945 the results of the upcoming elections in Bucharest. During a conversation with the 

American Ambassador Harriman in December 1945, Soviet Vice-commissary Vîşinski 

foresaw a victory of the government `by 70%`. Following the same prognostic, the Soviet 

Ambassador to Bucharest said prior to the elections that the communist party could hope 

to obtain` through certain techniques` even 90% of votes 4 . 

Shortly after the representatives of the National Peasants’ Party and of the National 

Liberal Party, Emil HaŃieganu and Mihail Romniceanu, were admitted in the government 

as ministers without portfolio, the communists started a denigration and marginalization 

campaign against them. During the meeting held by the Extended Political Bureau on 

January 8, 1946, Vasile Luca said: „These two persons have to be unmasked and isolated 

from the reactionary parties before the public opinion, but the campaign does not have to 

take a form against which the foreign forces could react. We need an extraordinary ability 

and elasticity to fulfil these tasks, this strategy of the Party` 5 . 

At the end of the meeting Gheorghiu-Dej concluded: „We have to set up a battle plan 

for our journalists on how to attack Ministers Romniceanu and HaŃieganu. To prepare 

traps. We shall cavil at them with great ability and versatility. I can friendly argue with 

him in the Council of Ministers, then come out with him arm in arm and make him speak 

so that the journalists can hear` 6 . 

In their capacity as ministers without portfolios, their role was considerably 

diminished. Ana Pauker remarked it during one of her interventions: `The Moscow 

Decision aimed to help us as follows: the 18-minister government will remain as it is, 

with only one change, which in fact almost does not exist` 7 . In reality the Moscow 

agreement brought only one surface change for Groza’s government in Bucharest in order 

to reduce the Anglo-American reactions against the undemocratic policy of the regime 

which was ruling in Romania. 

As if anticipating the future, Iuliu Maniu conditioned his participation in the 

government on receiving firm warranties from the government for free elections and 

freedom of the press. By speculating any opposition from their political adversary, the 

communists criticized Maniu’s attitude and considered that he breached the Moscow 

agreement as he did not provide his collaboration and loyalty within the government, 

when calling his representative during the government meeting. 8 . 

The guidelines of the Romanian Communist Party in the upcoming elections 

weredecidedat the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of January 27-29, 1946 9 . 

The main objective of the Plenary Session was to set up a political platform based on 

which all democratic forces are gathered in a block, with a program `neither of the 

4 

Adrian Cioroianu, Pe umerii lui Marx, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 65. 

5 

ANIC, fond CC la PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 5/1946, f. 8. 

6 

Ibidem, ff. 15-16. 

7 


8 


9 

Coord. Virgiliu łârău şi Ioan Marius Bucur, Strategii şi politici electorale în alegerile 

parlamentare din 19 noiembrie 1946, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, pp. 1-90.

Cristina ROMAN: Preparation of the Parliamentary Elections Held in 1946 307 

Communist Party nor of the Social Democratic Party – it was not supposed to belong to 

any of these forces, but it had to be for the economic recovery and the reconstruction of 

the country` 10 . Gheorghiu-Dej’s wording sounded well, but starting from 1947 the reality 

proved to be different. The program will be that one established by the Romanian 

Communist Party. 

The `battle for elections` became the signal word of the communist leaders. The 

show of a real battle was absolutely necessary for them to proclaim their victory in the 

end. `We involve in the great battle of elections` as Teohari Georgescu said at the 

same Plenary Session 11 . The scenario of the `battle` was also necessary for them to rewrite 

the history in the version of P.C.R. (the Romanian Communist Party). The score 

of 90% to be officially announced in favour of the procommunist block will be 

resumed as a real fact decades after decades. In order to form the expected `block`, the 

adhesion of the Social Democratic Party of Romania was essential. Participating in the 

elections alone would have been a real threat for the Communist Party. The 

Extraordinary Congress of P.S.D.R. was held on March 10, 1946 in Bucharest and 

through open vote, oppressiveness, personal blackmails and flagrant fake documents, 

they obtained the desired result: 232 for the joint lists proposed by the Communist 

Party, with 29 cons and 60 abstentions 12 . 

Following the Extraordinary Congress, the Social Democratic Party split in two 

wings: one wing led by Constantin Titel Petrescu who, at the Congress of May 9, 

1946, established the Independent Social Democratic Party and voted its by-law and 

nominal structure of the leading authorities, and the pro-communist wing led by 

Lothar Rădăceanu and Ştefan Voitec, which definitively remained attached to the 

Communist Party. 

2. The electoral campaign 

This campaign was different from the previous ones. It was not about alternation in 

governance. The objective of the Communist Party was the juridical and physical 

annihilation of it adversaries while the ultimate purpose was to dissolve the opposition 

party and to eliminate their leaders and main adepts. 

The official inauguration of the government electing campaign started with Petru 

Groza’s speech in Iasi on June 2, 1946. It was an opportunity to launch threats against the 

opposition. Gendarmerie was turned into an instrument of the regime, with confidential 

weekly reports on the activity of the Block of the Democratic Parties (the Romanian 

Communist Party, the Pro-Communist Social Democratic Party, the National Liberal 

Party - Gheorghe Tătărescu, the Ploughmen's Front, the National Popular Party, the 

National Peasants’ Party - Anton Alexandrescu), the activity of the opposition and the 

population mood. 

10 Ibidem, p. 10, p. 15. 

11 Ibidem, p. 81. 

12 Coord. Ioan Scurtu, România viaŃa politică în documente. 1946, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 127-128.

308 


In order to prepare the elections, Ana Pauker mentioned during the meeting of the 

Central Committee of July 12, 1946: `The Ministry of Interior has a big responsibility in 

these elections. We can stop reactionary people talking, but the police force has to be the 

one to put them in their place whenever they do not do what they have to so that the legal 

form shall be fulfilled 13 . On July 13, the Ministry of Interior set up the action plan to be 

followed by the General Division of the Police for the preparation of the elections. Item 1 

of the document stipulated: `Verification of the entire police unit regarding their 

professional capacity and political sympathy. Those who do not meet the criteria will be 

proposed for dismissal by July 31, 1946 14 . 

At the meeting of the Central Committee of P.C.R. held on July 26, 1946, Vasile 

Luca proposed new strategies of working with `the enemy`: „You do not know what the 

enemy does. Some are happy that the enemy does not act openly when he in fact works 

out of sight, from person to person. We have to know what he whispers in people’s ear, 

we have to infiltrate our people among his people. This is why we have to know our 

enemy, his methods of work and catchwords; we have to know all he does 15 . 

On July 13, 1946, under the constant pressure of the P.C.R. and the Soviet officials, 

the King ended in signing the Election Law and the Law on the organization of the 

Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was abolished in order to facilitate the control of the 

Legislative by the government. The protests of the opposition parties against the breach 

of the 1923 Constitution were not a success, being rejected. The 1946 Electoral Law was 

a new breach of the democratic rights. 

One of its provisions forbade the right to vote and to run for elections to the following 

people: ordinary criminals, people guilty of the country’s disaster, fascist leaders in 

Northern Transylvania, fired people and ministers under Antonescu’s regime 16 . 

The Central Electoral Commission appointed by the Ministry of Justice on July 23, 

1946 played a decorative role, because the official results were established in advance by 

the government and the P.C.R. leaders. 

The electoral lists were produced in a hurry without distributing any evidence of 

registration. Citizens were `bombed` every day with propaganda staff. An additional radio 

station named Romania Libera (Free Romania) started broadcasting on September 3, in 

favour of the BPD. Opposition was never given access to the radio. The press 

subordinated to the communist party played a key role in the election campaign and 

significantly contributed to the denigration of the political opposition. At the plenary 

session of the Central Committee of the P.C.R. held on October 9-10, Iosif Chişinevschi 

pointed out the following: „Scânteia became a powerful central body. It deeply 

popularized our platform. We regularly find in Scânteia the B.P.D logo - the sun. Now 

the entire press has to do the same.” 17 . The meetings of the governmental coalitions 

succeeded in a free way while censorship was strict and more increasingly directed 

towards opposition only. 

13 

ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Cancelarie, dosar nr. 40/1946, ff. 19-20. 

14 

Cartea Albă a SecurităŃii, doc. Nr. 107, vol. 1, Bucureşti, SRI, 1994. 

15 

ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Cancelarie, dosar nr. 41/1946, f. 42. 

16 

Scânteia, 15 iulie 1946, p. 1. 

17 

ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Cancelarie, dosar nr. 51/1946, f. 26.


Even if the three opposition parties did not get formally associated, they pursued 

related objectives focused on correctness and freedom of elections. As regards the 

pressure, the intimidations and the violence of the BPD activists, the members of the 

Peasants’ Party, the liberals and the independent social democrats acted so as not to offer 

any reason to the state order forces and the aggressive bands to react against them. 

On October 21, they sent the Press Release whereby they announced that P.N.ł., 

P.N.L. and P.S.D.I. formed the national opposition. The three parties synchronized their 

efforts to defend the rights of the country. The opposition’s leaders have repeatedly sent 

the King, the Prime Minister, the Allied (Soviet) Commission of Control, the Political 

Missions to Bucharest of the USA and of the Great Britain and the Ministers of Foreign 

Affairs of the three great powers to Bucharest memoranda and letters of protest against 

the breach of commitments by Groza’s government. But all these had no effect. The 

Allied (Soviet) Commission of Control returned the letters without opening them. 

Just before the elections, P.N.ł. presented the Mission of the USA to Bucharest the 

cases of violence and aggressions registered prior to early November 1946: 6 members of 

the national peasants’ party killed, 42 seriously injured, 100 leaders underwent house 

searches and an impressively large number of cases when the P.N.ł. electoral ads were 

not permitted to be distributed. 

The analysis of the reports at the opposition’s county headquarters extracted from a 

notice of the Mission of the USA dated November 18, 1946 shows `with a constant 

regularity a sinister picture of detentions and terror against the famous members of the 

peasants’ party and liberal party, who in fact were directly exposed to the attack of the 

government’s supporters` 18 . 

On August 24, 1946, after a meeting with Petru Groza, the American diplomat Burton 

Y. Berry wrote in his report to the Secretary of State that after carefully examining each 

piece of information on the intentions of Groza’s government regarding the elections, he 

reached the inevitable conclusion that the government would not intend to organize free 

and accurate elections as requested by the Moscow resolutions. Moreover, the Romanian 

government’s attitude was supported by the Soviet government. In the end he mentioned 

that such situation needed a decision on behalf of the United States. The decision was to 

come through an acknowledgement by the USA and the Great Britain of a deed, namely 

of the big electoral fraud. 

3. The electoral fraud planned during 1946 

Even from the end of January 1946, the P.C.R. leaders planned according to the 

Moscow directives the percentage that the governmental coalition would have to „win” in 

November elections. In January, after the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 

of USSR, USA and England which was hold in Moscow, a tripartite commission went to 

Bucharest to implement those decisions regarding Romania. 

18 Raportul nr. 1244 din 18 noiembrie 1946, Burton Y. Berry din Bucureşti către Secretarul de 

Stat, N.A.W., 871.00/11-1846.

310 


Following the meetings in Bucharest, Vîşinski told Harriman that Groza’s National 

Democratic Front would win 70% of the votes, the Peasants’ Party 20% and the National 

Liberal Party 10% 19 . The subsequent `directives` set up a threshold of over 80%. During 

the Plenary Session of the P.C.R. organized on January 29, Teohari Georgescu said: `We 

are not allowed to say at any time that we shall have 70% - 80%. Yes, comrades, we shall 

have more than 80%, but with one condition: not with the support of the police; we have 

to waive this thing” 20 . 

On May 27, the American representative to Bucharest Burton Y. Berry reported to the 

Secretary of State in Washington that Bodnăraş intended to use violent and extremist 

strategies in order to ensure 90% for the government team while Gheorghiu-Dej and 

Groza would be satisfied with 60% of the votes obtained through frauds, a result which 

would permit the opposition to exist 21 . 

Following the discussion with Petru Groza on August 24, the American diplomat 

Burton Y. Berry concluded: „At present, in Romania we cannot do more for the 

acceptance of our point of view except to maintain a firm line … so that to prevent an 

increasing difference between our official declarations and our daily action” 22 . 

Governments from Washington and London admitted implicitly and explicitly the 

results of the èlections` of November 19. Prior to October, they sent notes of protests to 

the government and underlined each time on the basis of examples that they do not 

observe the commitments assumed. Such notes were rejected by the Bucharest authorities 

that knew they had the entire support of Moscow. The P.N.ł., P.N.L. and P.S.D.I. leaders 

were not given any notice that the Western Allies would intend to confirm the results of 

the elections by signing the Peace Treatment with Romania in February 1947 followed by 

an exchange of diplomatic representatives. 

On September 12, 1946, the American diplomat Roy M. Melbourne reported from 

Bucharest to the Secretary of State in Washington that: `The Romanian elections are 

about to be stolen` 23 . His conclusion turned true. On November 6, 1046, during a 

conversation between Emil Bodnăraş, General Secretary at the Presidency of the Council 

of Ministers and D. Iakovlev, counselor at the Embassy of USSR to Bucharest, Bodnăraş 

stated that the Block of Democratic Parties would get 344 mandates 24 . 

According to the official data, B.P.D. obtained on November 19, 1946 a number of 

347 mandates. Thirteen days prior to the elections, Emil Bodnăraş anticipated the final 

results with an error of less than 1%! 

19 

Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946, Random 

House, New York, p. 528. 

20 

Coord. Virgiliu łârău şi Ioan Marius Bucur, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 

21 

Telegrama nr. 531 din 27 mai 1946, Burton Y. Berry către Secretarul de Stat, N.A.W., 871.00/5- 

2746. 

22 

Telegrama nr. 821 din 24 august 1946, N.A.W., 871.00/8-2446. 

23 

Telegrama nr. 896 din 23 septembrie 1946, N.A.W., 971.00/9-2346. 

24 

Document publicat de Tatiana Pokivailova, sub titlul Metode în desfăşurarea alegerilor din 

România, în „Magazin Istoric”, nr. 11 (344), noiembrie 1955, pp. 11-12.


These documentary sources described above for the period January – November 1946 

are evidence which show that even long before the citizens’ votes, the P.C.R. leaders had 

set up the level of 80-85-90% to their benefit and to the benefit of their masters from 

Moscow. The official figures published in several days after the èlections` have 

confirmed the above-mentioned percentages. 

4. The Results of the 1946 Elections 

Plenipotentiary Minister of the Great Britain to Bucharest Adrian Holman wrote in a 

report: The government realized that all the falsification methods had failed. 

Consequently, they were forced to fake the official figures and to present what it had been 

a crushing defeat of the government as an overwhelming victory` 25 . 

The agenda of the meeting organized by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 

of the P.C.R. on November 23, 1946 included the following topic: usage of the successful 

results obtained in elections and prevention against the historic parties’ challenges.` The 

stenograph of the meeting mentioned: `The acts of violence committed by the members of 

the historic parties during the election campaign will be used as grounds for special files. 

The press will pay a special attention to the acts of violence committed by those persons. 

Administratively, measures will be taken against those who spread rumors; also any 

production of lists or vote-counting process monitored by the historic parties will be 

blocked 26 . 

The central media body of the P.C.R. – Scânteia - published on November 23 the fake 

results of the elections which showed 4,766,630 votes for B.P.D. and only 878,927 for the 

National Peasants’ Party 27 . România Liberă of November 22, 1946 announced on its front 

page that: „the elections were performed with no perturbations and in order. Maniu’s and 

Brătianu’s supporters tried to disturb the process of elections by causing disorder and 

bloody events` 28 . 

In Romania, between 1919 and 1937 there were ten parliamentary elections. Five out of 

them expressed the electors’ will without any touch-up: in 1919, 1920, 1928, 1933 and 

probably in 1937. In the five other cases, authorities intervened to obtain that minimum 

40% of the total votes, a percentage which allowed the organizing party to be given 60% 

of the mandates as provided by the Election Law. Of course, the unprevailing parties 

accused the officials of fraud. 

However in the five cases from between the two world wars when the results were 

àdjusted`, the coming into power of the liberals, of the supporters of the peasants’ party, 

Averescu’s supporters or of a National Union government has meant continuity in the key 

sectors of the country : economic, social and politic. Between the two world wars there 

were differences of approach from one government to another, but not of overturning the 

democratic basis of the country. 

25 Florin Constantiniu, Ioan Chiper, op. cit., p. 201. 

26 ANIC, fond CC al PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 56/1946, f. 5. 

27 Scânteia, 23 noiembrie 1946, p. 1.

312 


In 1946, the objective was different. Winning the election meant the legitimization of 

the Communist Party’s program, which aimed to sovietise the country. Falsification of 

results reached in 1946 its maximum level which represents a unique situation after 1859. 

With minor exceptions, none of the promises included in the Program-Platform of the 

B.P.D. was observed. Moreover, the political class that had been formed by 1939 was 

completely destroyed juridically and physically and in several years, the entire political 

class disappeared – it was arrested, deported and outlawed together with its parties. 

The 1946 elections have opened the way for the annihilation of the Romanian 

traditional society of European type and for its forced positioning into the Soviet patterns 

and separation from the normal progress of the other European countries. 

28 România Liberă, 22 noiembrie 1946, p. 1.

STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT IN HUNGARY 

AND IN HÓDMEZİVÁSÁRHELY 

Szilvia SASS 1 

The origins of the Stakhanovite-movement 

The unsuccessful first 5-year-plan of Stalin (Gosplan 1928-32) queried the efficiency of 

the Stalinist economic policy, so for the second plan they planned more realistic targets 

and harmonized development. However, in February, 1932 (the 17 th Congress of the 

Soviet Communist Party) Stalin declared that the second 5-year-plan (1933-37) is only a 

minimum program, it had to be exceeded. 

The already existing work competition movements aimed the effacement of the plan, 

but the Stakhanovism was introduced only in 1935. 

On the 23 rd of August, 1935 according to the idea of Petrov, the party secretary of the 

mine “Centralnaja Irmino”, the international youth day was to be celebrated with an 

unexpected record. They decided to execute the record in the Nikanor-Vostok part of the 

mine. Then they chose Aleksei Stakhanov, a young collier to fulfil the task. 

He started his “big shift” at midnight on the 30 th of August. Four other miners helped 

his activity. He had to finish his work at 5:45 a.m., as they ran out of wood. He produced 

102 tons of coal, which meant the 1457% of the norm. 

Aleksei Stakhanov, breaking his norm by 1457 % 2 

For his result he got a premium of 220 rubbles, a flat with a telephone and eternal 

membership in the miners’ club. 


2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakhanovite_movement (dd. 11th of November, 2012).

314 


After publishing his benefits many miners applied for the possibility to break 

Stakhanov’s record. By the 11 th of September there were four other records executed, by 

October 40 Stakhanovists got flat, and in a short period the miners bought 100 record 

players, 6 pianinos, 70 radios and 200 bicycles. Centralnaja Irmino became a centre of 

financial improvements: a plenty of money was spent on the infrastructure and the 

culture. 

According to Stalin “the movement spread as a hurricane”. On the 1 st of December, 

1935 the 15% of the miners of Donbass were Stakhanovists, while the 11% of the 

workers of Leningrad became “top-workers”. 

The main topic of the plenum of the All-Union Communist Party between the 21 st and 

25 th of December, 1935 was the work competition. According to the decree of the Central 

Commission “The Stakhanovite movement means organizing labor in a new fashion, 

rationalizing technologic processes, correct division of labor, liberating qualified workers 

from secondary spadework, improving work place, providing rapid growth for labor 

productivity and securing significant increase of workers' salarie” 3 . Everybody being 

against the movement is the “enemy of the people” (vrag naroda). 

However, due to the increase of the amount of the distributed wages many company 

leaders had conflicts with the Stakhanovists, who thought that the leaders were the 

traitors of the people. As a result many of the leaders were deported to the GULAG, and 

many Stakhanovists got higher and higher. Another result of the process – and the fear of 

the company leaders – was that the rate of the Stakhanovists significantly increased. 

There were even factories where the 60% of the workers were Stakhanovists. 

It is worth to look at Stakhanov’s later life: he had a marvellous career, he studied at the 

Industrial Academy of Moscow, and from 1942 he became the Director of mine no. 31 in 

Karaganda. Later he worked in the Ministry of coal Industry of the USSR, and from 1957 

– for 2 years he was the deputy director of Chistyakovantratsit. Then he was a chief 

engineer for 17 years, up to his death. Despite his bright career he was alcoholic and 

neurotic, and his private life also went wrong. 

Stakhanovite movement in Hungary 

For the 70 th birthday of Stalin the Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party 

announced a “work-dedication” starting from the 28 th of October to the 21 st of December, 

1949. That was the beginning of the Hungarian Stakhanovist movement. The whole 

program was advertised as being the result of individual initiations. 

From 1950 not “top-worker”, but “Stakhanovist”- medals were given to the workers 

who broke the norms. Between 1948 and 1950, they gave 16200 “top-worker” medals 

(Kiváló dolgozó), and between 1950 and 1953 they distributed 115 thousand 

Stakhanovist-diplomas. 

More than 100 thousand Hungarian workers received medals for being a “top-worker”. 

During the years the value of the award became lower. In the beginning only politicians 

of the highest level were entitled to give it to the workers, but later, when the quantity of 

the distributed medals/diplomas increased, even factory leaders had the right to decide, 

who could be a Stakhanovist. 

3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakhanovite_movement - dd. the 11th of November, 2012.

Szilvia SASS: Stakhanovite Movement in Hungary and in Hódmezıvásárhely 315 

The Stakhanovist diploma 4 

The Stakhanovist medal 5 

Furthermore, the hierarchy of the different levels of the award was too complicated, 

so in 1954 the distribution of the Stakhanovist medals has been stopped, however, the 

formerly received medals could be worn by the workers. At the end the award ceased 

in 1956. The majority of the Hungarian Stakhanovists lived in Budapest and worked in 

the heavy industry. However, the Stakhanovite movement is associated with the 

production of poor quality; there were many new ideas from these “top workers”, later 

introduced in the production process. The elite of the Hungarian working class was 

4 http://retronom.hu/index.php?q=node/2984 (dd. 10th of November, 2012). 

5 http://gmic.co.uk/index.php/topic/14828-hungarian-kivalo-dolgozol-badges/page__st__20 (dd. 

11th of November, 2012).

316 


represented by the “top workers” and the Stakhanovists in the 1950’s. On average they 

were of their thirties, they earned more than an average worker and they lived among 

better conditions, too. They meant a transition between the working class and the 

intellectuals. 

Hungarian Stakhanovists 

The most famous Hungarian Stakhanovist was Ignác Pióker, a trimmer. He was born in 

1907 in Temesrékás (Banat), and in 1929 he escaped to Hungary. He started working for 

the General Electric as a trimmer. From 1945 he joined the Hungarian Communist Party. 

In December, 1949 he achieved a new record of 1470% of his norm. In 1950 he became 

the “top-worker” of Hungary – his had many personal initials on his workpieces, and he 

worked almost without scrap. 

By March, 1951 he executed his whole plan of 1952. By his activity he became one of 

the most famous celebrities of Hungary, he could have a holiday in Galyatetı and got 

really high wages. He was proud of his activity up to his death of 1988. 

Ignác Pióker with his awards 6 

Another very famous Hungarian Stakhanovist was Ede Horváth – a metal turner. 

Thanks to his activity later he became the director of Rába (Hungarian Railway Carriage 

and Machine Works Public Limited Company). 

If we make a list of the most well-known Stakhanovists, it is worth to take a look at 

their profession: drill-master, tool-maker, bricklayer, railway-workers. These professions 

were advertised by the propaganda of the 50’s. The Hungarian political leaders – lead by 

Mátyás Rákosi (who was directed by the Soviets) – wanted to “turn Hungary to the 

country of iron and steel”, so the several branches of the heavy industry were developed 

in an aggressive way. 

6 http://www.168ora.hu/cikk.php?id=7976 (dd. 10th of November, 2012).


Ede Horváth 7 

Although the main goal of the majority of the Hungarian workers was to become a 

Stakhanovist, the price of being a “top-worker” celebrity was high: the Stakhanovists had 

to identify themselves with the unpopular decrees of the power (for example they had to 

advertise the peace loans). Furthermore, they had to set an example to the simple workers 

and had to support the higher and higher norms. As a result they had many enemies 

among the people (for example András Bordás – a turner – was killed in the revolution of 

1956). 

Stakhanovite movement in Hódmezıvásárhely 

However, the majority of the Hungarian Stakhanovists were from Budapest, there were 

many top-workers in the countryside, too. 

In Hódmezıvásárhely – similar to the other territories of Hungary – the labour 

competitions were connected to special occasions, for example, the 3 rd Congress of the 

Hungarian Communist Party in 1954, Stalin’s of Rákosi’s birthday, the International 

Women’s Day…etc. To get a view about the movement in Hódmezıvásárhely, it is worth 

to read the related articles in the local newspaper – the Viharsarok. I looked through the 

articles of the newspapers of 1953 and 1954; in the future I plan to do a complete research 

about the movement. 

The factories of Vásárhely mostly published in the newspaper in connection with the 

Stakhanovite movement: the Scale factory, the Knitwear Factory and the Machine 

Station. 

Results of the Scale Factory 

The Scale Factory moved from Budapest to Hódmezıvásárhely in 1951. 

In January, 1954, Mihály Zsigrai and Károly Miadovics – scale mounters – decided to 

achieve the Stakhanovist medal by the 4 th of April (Liberation – by the Soviet troops – 

day in Hungary). Zsigrai achieved 250%, while Miadovics 170% 8 . 

7 http://www.kisalfold.hu/szieszta/tiz_eve_halt_meg_horvath_ede/2071954/ (dd. 10th of 

November, 2012).

318 

The Zsigrai-brigade 


Later on, both of them became Stakhanovists for the second time, which was very 

special in Hódmezıvásárhely 9 . 

According to the Viharsarok, there were five requirements necessary to achieve the 

Stakhanovist-level: 

1. high level of quality, 

2. economy of raw materials, 

3. new working methods, 

4. high level of discipline, 

5. increase of the execution of norms. 

In 1954 György Égetı and Sándor Molnár – forgers of the Scale Factory fulfilled all the 

above requirements, so they became Stakhanovists (they achieved 208% of the norm on 

the week of the Congress – with perfect quality). 

On the 12 th of May, 1954 Viharsarok reported that the Scale Factory workers had 

founded the Club of Stakhanovists and Innovators – engineer Sándor Bánfi suggested to 

establish the award for the “Best innovator of the Scale Factory” – according to him the 

winner of the award should have found out at least six innovations every three month 10 . 

8 Viharsarok, 1954. 1.9.1. 

9 Viharsarok, 1954. 5.13.5. 

10 Viharsarok, 1954. 5.12.3.


The Knitwear Factory 

The Knitwear Factory – formerly owned by the Kokron family – was established in the 

19 th century, but in 1948 it was nationalized. 

In 1954 – the week of the Party Congress – they started a labour competition, and 

founded the award of the best brigade and the best factory-workshop. 

According to the Viharsarok: “The first day – at 6 a.m.- each worker got tulips and 

everybody worked with a smile on her face – with enthusiasm.” 11 

Mrs. Paksi – the “top-worker” 

• The best workers of the Knitwear Factory in 1953-54 were: 

• Mrs. Zsoldos – a cap fluffer – who achieved 139% during the Congress week, 

and she became a Stakhanovist in May, 1954. 12 

• Mrs. Paksi – fulfilled 121% - and having great plans for the future – she wanted 

to achieve the Stakhanovist level for a longer period 13 

The Machine Station 

The Machine (Tractor) Station was founded in 1948 according to the first three-yearplan. 

That was the largest plant repairing agricultural equipment in Hungary. 

The Viharsarok continuously reported about the Stakhanovist tractorists of the Station, 

however, they didn’t determine the exact requirements of being a top-worker. This way 

they wanted to motivate their workers to work as much as they can. 

The best tractorists of the time were: 

• Pál Trenyik 

• Ferenc Puskás 

• István Mihály. 

11 Viharsarok 1954.5.18.1. 

12 Viharsarok 1954. 5.18.1. 

13 Viharsarok 1954.6.13.1.

320 


However, the tractorists girls’ propaganda widely spread in Hungary, there was no 

Stakhanovist tractorists girl in Hódmezıvásárhely. 

Conclusion 

Summarizing the Stakhanovite movement in Hungary we can say that from one side the 

movement was successful: the Party partially could turn the people’s attention from the 

really important problems – many people were enthusiastic, really believing in a better 

future and their ability to form it themselves. 

From the other side – considering the productivity and the economic development of 

Hungary – the program did not fulfil the party leaders’ hope.

FALSIFICATION IS DEFENDED BY 

ANOTHER FALSIFICATION 

Mladen SRBINOVSKI 1 

A self-centered master of arts and especially of literature will not contribute 

significantly. It will be done by an author who predominantly is looking at the others. The 

more we see what’s happening around us, the more we learn about ourselves. But there 

are experiences that happened to the others, we heard about them from the others, and we 

can have only a pale proves in terms of our own experience for that same event. 

Our personal experience with communism is just like that. As time passes, it is normal 

to state that the new generations will create historical distance, with more objective 

thinking about that historical phenomenon which for long decades was reality and 

significantly marked and shaped the twentieth century. But we, the people who lived that 

time, a bit emotionally in the first decade of 21 st century, gathered here to discuss about 

our time in socialism. I don’t believe that we will be completely understood by the young 

people in the auditoria. Here in Bulgaria and in every country under the communism, we 

are already incomprehensible with our emotions, positive or negative, and that means we 

as persons are incomprehensible. 

Maybe I am wrong, dear attendants, for thinking that even before you opened your 

mouths, I already know what you will say. As much as I want to learn about your 

experience in the time of the communism and how will you shape it in thoughts, even 

more I want to see how you will shape your emotion in picture or thought. 

My books are my receptacles of emotions. And probably because of that, the host of this 

round table, invited me, to share my emotions and to hear something for our Macedonian 

specificity that started by the time of the socialism, and its crescendo continues until 

nowadays So, I came from one Balkan exotics, the central area and mythical core of the 

Balkans, one small, young and unstable country, which does not have its own 

internationally recognized name, and our problem that we have with our neighbors 

Greece, for decades is under surveillance for solving by the United Nations and European 

Union. Small countries, in opposite of their area, are capable of creating such big 

problems, that even United Nations and the European Union are not in condition of 

solving them. I don’t know how well informed you are but Skopje is visited everyday by 

ministers, prime ministers and delegations from the biggest European countries and they 

return home with close lips and slump shoulders, after what they hear from the 

Macedonian government and what they see in the center of Skopje. 

Fascism and communism are the twin brothers of the European totalitarianism of the 

twentieth century and it depends in which country or region, how much one of them was 

working. The consequences that they left behind are dire and Europe will need years to 

recover fully. And while you already talk about the false enthusiasm, different 

1 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.

322 


experiences and critics over communism, which still is a good sign for successive, long 

term and painful, but still a recovery, we on the other hand, in our small Macedonia, are 

living very intensively the postulates of the red twin of the European authoritarianism. 

From the ongoing negative utopia, if not the humanity, intellectuals at least will learn 

something, and that is, that social ideological engineering, the deeper it goes in 

manipulation with human its dehumanization is becoming even bigger and pathologic. 

Here we can even brag who have more scars by the communism, just as Saint Francis of 

Assisi when he was showing his scars inflicted by his opponents, but that unfaithful title 

of The Victim, I hope is belonging to me. It is not simple to calculate this complex social 

processes without a simplification – black and white, but it’s a fact that in every region 

and in every country in Europe, the pluralism slowly is changing the closed ideological 

systems, except in Macedonia where Stalin’s Comintern went deeper with its ideological 

engineering and created new nation which now in the newly invented pluralism creates 

problems for United Europe and United Nations. 

I don’t feel like a victim, I never act as a victim. I worked reading and writing. I never 

bend my back under the forces of the day, and that kept me in a normal life, if ever this 

kind of life can be called normal. With decades under threats, insults, and the days spent 

in cares how existentially to survive, without cell phone, no internet, no driver’s license, 

here in front of you stays maybe the last dissident in Europe, as they call me, the biggest 

internal enemy of the state and of the official Bolshevik Macedonism as national 

ideology. Now if here was a representative of the official institutions of the state, you 

would see how we would argue and how he or she will disapprove my invitation on this 

discussion. I don’t know if the organizers have invited anyone else from Macedonia, but 

if any when they heard that I came, I know that they would decide not to come. But me, I 

am still alive and in a good health, and I don’t want anyone to think of me as of official 

representative of my country in which by some strange chance I managed to survive. 

In your countries it already starts a boring European way of living, but in Macedonia the 

life is still exciting. It’s a hard for living, but wonderful for creating literature. As I see, 

the whole world needs one new Gogol or Jonathan Swift, but nothing strange if he is 

already born in Macedonia. What would I do without the daily “colossal” discoveries and 

ideas of the Macedonian government, Macedonian academics, Macedonian scientists, 

writers and journalists that the first man created by God was Macedon, that Macedonians 

are the oldest nation on the Earth and that Greeks are stealing out of history. And by that 

time, in our City square in Skopje, in the time Macedonia have the largest unemployment 

in Europe, with astonishingly forty percent unemployed citizens, and big part of the 

nation is literally starving, ancient-style buildings and thirty meters sculptures of Philip 

and Alexander popping up daily, and the names of the streets, stadiums and bridges are 

changing by getting names of ancient dynasties from Amyntas to Perdiccas. 

But my general European and civil satisfaction will be small, tomorrow when this 

constructed by them buildings and sculptures, will be their biggest witnesses against 

themselves from now convicted on failure by time, when they will neglect that it was like 

that. 

On theirs transparent anti-European game although have a visible end, in the big picture, it 

is not that simple in the end. The position and the opposition are Siamese twins of 

Macedonian bolshevism and the result is in front of all of us: materialized symbolical chaos 

in the center of Skopje is semantic victory of national diversion which is forced at these 

decisive steps for prolonging their existence of identity from the communist ideology.

Mladen SRBINOVSKI: Falsification is Defended by Another Falsification 323 

Now, through this symbolical chaos created in the center of Skopje, the Bolshevik- 

Macedonian reign is already turning into latent dynamite of dissension which will 

function as a cluster bomb of hate and will be triggered by need every time when we 

make more serious steps toward Europeanism. And as much as our anti-European forces 

will be chased by the European political forces, our macednonist anti-NATO and anti- 

Europeans, will find their demoniac power and rescue right in the center of Skopje. 

The center of Skopje is already turned in source of sectarian negative energy. The center 

of our capital city is enchanted Bolshevik-Macedonistic mythological stronghold against 

whom will be powerless every rational method that can thorn it apart, and now, with their 

total Macedonistic failure, all together, consciously they pull us toward them into maybe 

our definitive complete historical debacle. Consciously, methodologically running away 

from the self, they are running with their sick self-hate because of the historical selfidentification, 

in front of all, the Slavic-Bulgarians. 

In the middle of this world economic crisis have been spend five-hundred million 

Euros! Three times more than that will be spend if needed, but would not be allowed 

people to get its own cathartic self-identification. It must be admitted, they are on big 

worries. Created as a preemie in bloc divided Europe, the new European reality of 

integration is driving them crazy. The big state choir of dishonor of academics, 

professors, writers, priests and journalists are breathlessly fighting against revealing of 

their intellectual criminal activities, helping the government for the worst, creating of 

Skopje, arena for eternal clash of world’s largest nations and the local smaller nations, in 

a place of national, civil and ethnic intolerance, in a place of eternal destabilization from 

where negative, evil energy will spill all over the country and the region. 

We said so many things, but let us not stay only outside of this semantic layer of the 

problem, but, shortly, let us get into the invisible, hermeneutics layer of this construction 

problem in Skopje, in the hearth of the problem. 

To reach the ground, the hearth, the essence of this problem is a question of honor for 

free minded Macedonian intelligentsia, if there is any, and its attempt to answer this 

question will mean more or less to wash its hands from this planned chaos that started 

long time ago and disturbs Macedonia on the levels of interethnic and interconfessional. 

It seems there is no simple explanation of this very difficult question: who creates and 

keeps this constant and planned chaos in Macedonia and for whom. I will recall on one 

short analysis of the sublime Dostoevsky for the greatest novel from Cervantes and with 

unimaginable easiness the answer by itself will show up on the table. 

There is an episode in Don Quixote, when the lunatic knight from reading lots of knight 

novels whom he trust unwaveringly, will stop and asks himself how is it possible one 

knight, even the bravest of all, in one fight, for one hour, can kill hundred thousand 

enemies when for that action, at least physically he will need more time. The knight who 

daily swallows “truthful” novels and who have difficulties separating real from fiction, in 

that moment needs of realism and as he cannot doubt the knights bravery and the enemies 

numbers, he came to an explanation that will joyfully tell to his servant Sancho. The 

armies of hundred thousand, actually, are not from people like us, from blood and flesh, 

so he would need energy and time separately to destroy each, but they were ghosts, 

something like a fog, like worms or flies, so in one swing of a sword, a man can destroy 

dozens even hundreds of these monsters. 

The lie is recorded in the most “truthful” books. But once the lie is said, other lies start 

to call on it and from that lie, they are creating another lie. Such a lie, such a historical

324 


falsification is written by the Bolshevik Comintern and Stalin in their party documents, 

for later, from that intern party’s conclusion, in the borders of Socialist Yugoslavia to be 

created a new Macedonian nation with new identity, with its own culture, history and 

language, religion… And so, happily and victoriously, in our Macedonia, in the frames of 

Yugoslavia, passed our first, joyful period of our national lie accepted as “holly truth” 

until eighty-ninth, when the Berlin wall and blocs separated Europe collapsed. 

Today’s United Europe to which even we from independent Macedonia are striving, 

prefers new rules of tolerance instead of bloc separation and confrontation. Most affected 

by that was the old system, which institutionalize that lie as our new identity and that 

identity is now an obstavle for entering into NATO and European Union. The 

untouchable politicians and intellectuals who “scientifically” invented and by force kept 

this our new identity for some decades more, it is normal not to reject it peacefully. The 

problem really is not simple. That was said by all European diplomats that daily come to 

Skopje that is what I said here, that is said by anyone who understands the Macedonian 

situation, but who will attempt to try to say this to the people openly? 

Despite by the time of bloc separation and the Cold war, the lifetime of Bolshevik 

Macedonism was terminated, still in Macedonia we want this anachronistic paradox and 

to protect it at all cost as it is our identity. 

And what are we doing? 

To save a lie, a falsification, we need to create another, even bigger lie, even bigger, 

colossal falsification, at least twice as big as the last one, and if that succeed, we with our 

false Bolshevik Macedonism will get out from the mud of lies. Let me ask you: if you 

remember until we studied, how many times we were telling lies aiming to skip classes, 

think about it, how many times daily have we lied about it and to cover that up we even 

more intelligently lied to cover up the first lie? 

The lie is saved by a lie. Yes, our Macedonian intellectual and national functioning can 

be cached and explained only by Dostoevsky. After analyzing these anthropological 

findings of it, now you can easily understand whole new logics of Macedonian 

government saying that we are direct successor of Alexander the Great and the need of 

spending uncountable amount of money for antient sculptures and buildings in the center 

of Skopje. Once we take part in a lie, and if we want to get out of it, we must as a national 

project, to invent even more grandiose and more fantastic lie so we can get out of the 

mess that we are into. Our official government unconsciously works after Dostoevsky or 

Dostoevsky already two hundred years ago red our Macedonistic lampoons? 

Communists believed that they can create even new nations, they lied, falsified, but in 

the newly created democratic conditions, new governments, overtaking the old lie, for our 

pure identity, now they, in the second half of our newest history, came up with even 

bigger and more fantastic lies that we are the oldest nation on the earth, only to get out of 

the dead end. 

It is said to the nation, that we must survive this, the whole world hates us. Of course, 

except Serbia and Russia. If this very expensive lie that is our national interest succeed, 

our secret police, UDBA with its newly created team will be saved from the enormous 

embarrassment which it is facing, and we Macedonians will became in front of you, in 

front of the world, as the oldest nation. 

Does United Europe have understanding for this Macedonistic logic of ours, and yet, 

Comintern intellectual smuggling and can it pass through the European institutions? 

So far it can not.

ROMANIA ECONOMIC OPENING 

TO THE WEST AND EXTERNAL DEBT 

CRISIS OF THE 80’S 

Liviu łĂRANU 1 

On December 7, 1972, Ceauşescu signed Decrees no. 493 and 494 for Romania's 

accession to the Agreement on IMF and IBRD. The preamble of both decrees show that 

accession to the two UN specialized agencies of the international financial plan was in 

line with "broad international cooperation policy at all levels" and that "Romania wants to 

contribute to the development and promote trade and economic and financial cooperation 

between states and the international monetary system improvement". 

10 years later, in 1982, Romania concluded, emergency, an agreement "stand by" with 

the IMF to save their credibility toward Western creditor banks, which cut all Romanian 

funding lines since 1981. From this moment Romania's economic opening to the West 

began to be problematic. 

At 40 years after Romania joined the IMF and 30 of the crisis in 1981 and 1982, 

research these moments of history not only economic but also political, remains at an 

early stage. How conducted negotiations with the IMF and what agreed the leaders from 

Bucharest is little known today, as long-term implications on the Romanian economy and 

society of that agreement of 1982. 

For the entire communist period in Romania, from the economic point of view, 1976- 

1989 interval separates decline and deep crisis into which fall not only the economy but 

the whole social and political system of the country. Historians, political scientists, 

sociologists etc. have identified the premises of this impasse in the centralized command 

economy system and extensive industrial growth, neglecting efficiency, profitability and 

quality. Certainly, the causes are far more numerous, among which are, even in those 

times, difficult financial situation of the country. 

Is well known that the country's foreign trade is an important indicator of economic 

health that state and external balance is an important component of general economic 

equilibrium. Communist bloc countries, far from defying this rule, depending on context 

have generally tried to get just such a balance. 

Romania under the communist regime had trade relations with over 100 countries, they 

carried on in conditions in which the state had a monopoly on foreign trade, achieved by 

its companies. The State also has the exclusive right to own, buy and sell foreign currency 

and gold, and to determine the exchange rate. 

1 The National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (C.N.S.A.S.), Bucuresti, Romania.

326 


In the balance of payments communist Romania, achieving external balance was quite 

difficult and then when it was with great sacrifices. For any country but especially for 

developing countries as Communist Romania, industrialization and modernization of the 

economy could not do than by large imports of machinery, equipment and modern 

technology and raw material imports. Because of this external balance remained a goal. 

In general, we can cut three times in balance of payments: 

a. 1950-1970 when the call to scale external resources was reduced due to international 

political context; 

b. 1971-1981 period characterized by intensive use of foreign loans and the crisis of 

external debt; 

c. 1982-1989 period marked the return to external balance through debt settlement. 

The first two decades of communist rule were marked by mainly economic relations 

with socialist countries. Annual trade agreements had in mind mainly a balanced trade 

balance, and where negative balances appeared to agree, for the following year, 

increased deliveries of products for the shortfall. Recourse to external credit was very 

limited 2 . 

The situation has changed since 1963 when the Bucharest authorities were aware that 

the Polish model to borrow long term loans from the West for upgrading their industry 

represent the best solution to maintain the pace of industrial growth and investment in this 

fundamental branch of the socialist economy. 

First Secretary RMP Gheorghiu-Dej expressed quite realistic, in December 1963, the 

new situation of Romania and the need for change in development strategy: "To keep the 

rhythm in which we go and call not only to national income will having to call to credit". 

Vital for Romania that time was to use the favourable context existing in relationship 

with Western countries: “the developed capitalist countries are willing to give us credit 

and of course, they do not put us political conditions” said Gheorghiu-Dej. 

"If we want to maintain a high growth rate of productive forces, we will appeal to 

long-term loans. Necessarily have to do it" indicates Gheorghiu-Dej in the Politburo. 

He was convinced that "capitalist large banks tended to contact us. Either we need 

bank capital" 3 . 

Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, has only to continue and deepen this 

economic strategy. In the 70s the call to Western banks financial resources has grown 

to major. Impact on the country's external balance over the medium to long was but 

one miserable. The international economic context of the time marked by two oil 

crises, Romania's current account has deteriorated dramatically, especially since 1978 

(-759 million) reached in 1980 to a deficit of 2,420 million dollars. Although both 

import and export recorded consistent growth between 1976-1980, the differences 

between import and export have become higher over the latter. 

2 N.N. Constantinescu (coordinator), Istoria economică a României (Economic History of 

Romania). 1939-1989, vol. II, Economic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 375 [Chapter 12 

prepared by Gheorghe Stroe, Băncile, circulaŃia monetară şi creditul în perioada 1948-1989 

(Banks, Currency an Credit between 1948 and 1989)]. 

3 Romanian Historical Archives, Central Comittee fund of the Romanian Communist Party, 

Chancellery, file no. 59/1963, leaves 14-16.

łĂRANU: Romania Economic Opening To The West And External Debt … 327 

The leadership from Bucharest did the large imports of machinery and equipment 

modern Western manufacturing, supported by foreign loans from IBRD or other 

Western banks. As a result, external debt soared. 

Most of the loans were contracted for developing medium and long term, but some of 

these loans contracted in the years 1976-1978 have become due in the years 1980-1981. 

Due to large amounts payable to Western creditors, without having to cope with current 

revenues of Romanian exports, the Romanian government reached in spring 1981, the 

arrears (late payments) totalling U.S. $ 1.143 million. 

In addition to the late payment of credit, "oil bill" to be paid by Romania for imported 

oil at a price increased by oil crisis of 1979 and short-term borrowing (which rose as a 

share from 4% to 22% in 1980), all contributed to what economists have called "the debt 

crisis". The trigger held by the external context: Poland, an important state of the socialist 

bloc, came in 1980, to the default payment. The result was not much expected: Western 

banks have become very cautious in relation to the CMEA countries, cutting them 

effectively, access to finance. 

Although management of "high" Romania was advised to begin discussions with all 

Western creditors to reschedule debt, in order to prevent an anticipated cessation of 

payment, Ceauşescu refused or delayed any dialogue on the subject. The inevitable 

happened in the autumn of 1981, and the Romanian state had to start negotiations with 

the IMF and Western creditor banks. 

It must be said that those in charge of the finances of the country had experience of such 

negotiations, the first time when Romania called for a rescheduling of debt. There is 

however a great advantage, unique in the communist bloc, that Romania was a full 

member of the IMF, World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development. Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe that have this quality and 

a capital of 500 million dollars made to the IMF. 

Romania's position in the IMF was not negligible. In late 1981 the IMF had 145 

member countries and the amounts deposited in the Fund at that time reached 60,000 

million SDRs (special drawing rights) that was equivalent to approx. $ 600 billion. The 

votes of each country were directly proportional to the percentage derived from the total 

share capital deposited to IMF. For example, in 1982, the U.S. had 19.64%, England 

6.80%, France 4.51%, 5.08% Federal Republic of Germany, Japan 3.92%, Canada 3.20%, 

Italy 2.94%, Popular Republic of China 2.84%, Sweden 1.09%, Yugoslavia 0.68%, 

Romania 0.61%. Thus, our country after the capital paid, ranked 31, behind us, with 

smaller capital, the number of 114 countries including South Korea, UAE, Greece, Israel, 

Portugal, Turkey etc. 

A Board of representatives of member countries provided the IMF operation, a Board of 

Directors consisting of 22 members and a CEO. Based in Washington, the IMF was 

actually led by the Board that five countries had one permanent representative: USA, 

England, Germany, France and Japan. The other 16 representatives were elected every 

two years, each representing a number of countries. 

In 1982, IMF Managing Director, was Jacques de Larosière, of French origin. He was 

who extended a friendly hand Romania's representative in that difficult time, Petre Gigea.

328 


This man held the position of Romanian Minister of Finance from February 1981 to 

August 1986. 

Policy and the IMF loans allow member countries, upon request, when they were in a 

difficult financial situation. The basis of such a program loan was agreed, confirmed by 

letter of the government and resulted in an arrangement "standby". The advantage of 

these loans was primarily less interest than is paid on financial markets and a unique 

commission of 0.5%. The amount of credit was always established in SDRs, converted, 

usually to dollars. In 1982, one SDR was equal to U.S. $ 1.16. Usually, the loan is 

granted in instalments, the deadlines set out above, but depending on the fulfillment of 

certain measures agreed in the agreement "standby" checked thoroughly by the IMF on 

the spot. 

Measures required for countries seeking IMF financial assistance have been and are 

often very hard, from the rules of market economy: price liberalization, elimination of all 

subsidies by the state, restrict government spending with government, education, health 

etc. Statistically, this action by the States that have signed agreements with the IMF 

resulted in 98% cases of the population to violent protests and street signs. In the opinion 

of many Romanian and foreign economists, the IMF, with these requirements, promoting 

the expansion of free-style economy in the world. 

Romania, in the early 80s, was among the few countries where the demonstrations 

did not appear due to very strict regime of monitoring the population and preventive 

actions carried out by Securitate. Located on the second loan agreement with IMF (of 

three each have existed between 1975-1989), Romania has met almost all measures 

agreed, receiving a total credit of $ 1.5 billion, paid in three installments quarterly. 

Steps to obtain the loan, as Petre Gigea writes in his memoirs, were those applicable 

to the present: the Romanian government signed a letter of intent, then developing an 

economic memorandum, an action plan, and finally Loan Agreement "standby". All 

these documents have been negotiated and prepared jointly by representatives of the 

Romanian Government and IMF team present in Bucharest. Following negotiations 

"heavy and hard" to describe Petre Gigea, chief negotiator on behalf of Romania, it 

was concluded that it hadn’t applied a shock therapy, but a gradual increase in prices 

and tariffs for the population and reducing costs budget administration, education, 

health and culture. Specifically, the measures agreed in the "adjustment program" 

aimed at increasing domestic prices for fuels (gas, coal, gasoline, diesel), electric 

power, reducing subsidies to industry and agriculture (for example, the textile 

industry were reduced subsidies for school uniforms and children's clothing), 

reducing imports, especially the oil, increasing bank interest rates, currency 

devaluation by changing the ratio leu-dollar trade deficit and, finally, settlement 

payments in arrears to Western banks. Loan of $ 1.5 billion has obtained Romania, a 

3.5% annual interest (interest on financial markets was over 7%), with the agreement 

signed with the IMF was a guarantee for the entire international community, whether 

it was about Western bankers and governments, that the Romanian state will meet its 

financial obligations 4 . 

4 Dumitru Constantin, Cum şi ce a negociat România cu FMI în anii ’80, (How and what 

negotiated Romania with IMF in 80s) in „Cotidianul”, 26 mai 1980.

łĂRANU: Romania Economic Opening To The West And External Debt … 329 

Through the Paris Club of creditor countries (institution created in 1956 and comprising 

19 developed countries) and with France, Romania managed to defuse the debt crisis. 

Were held long discussions with the IMF, Paris Club, the London Club, representing 

major commercial banks and several governments have guaranteed loan for Romania. 

The discussions resulted in some rescheduling. But the government in Bucharest has been 

ordered to urgently pay payable (up to one year). IMF provided, however, some facilities 

funding and support in restructuring foreign loans. At the negotiating table due loans 

were rescheduled in 1982 ($ 2.7 billion) and 1983 ($ 770,000,000). 

The "structural adjustment" program agreed with the IMF was implemented 

successfully by the Bucharest authorities, the balance of payments surplus since 

becoming in the year's 1982. Although consider a rescheduling of payments and 1984, it 

was not necessary, the current account allowing timely payment of all foreign maturities. 

Unfortunately, the summons to pay urgent all accounts payable (perceived at the top 

nomenklatura as interference in internal affairs) upset the Ceauşescu who decided that 

Romania has to pay the entire foreign debt. Result was positive in terms of lower external 

debt of Romania's credibility on financial markets, but the for the Romanian economy 

this decision was a blow. Imports of raw materials and above all, the modern technology 

were drastically reduced leading to lower quality industrial products and a malfunction of 

most Romanian companies. Add to this the steep, the decline in living standards of 

people, many consumer goods that would have to find domestic were exports. 

To shorten the period of payment of foreign debt, Ceauşescu decided to be sold on the 

Western market a quantity of 80 tonnes of gold from central bank vaults. This amount 

would be redeemed after the external debt was liquidated. In early 1987 the gold was 

sold, were already collected over one billion dollars, which sum was immediately used to 

pay foreign loans, the interest is paid between 7-11%. 

Although foreign exchange reserves in the coming years could provide redemption of 

gold sold by December 1989, only 21 tonnes of gold sold was bought. 

George Stroe, former director of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank and currently vice 

president of CSP, described the gesture to sell gold from the treasury of the country as an 

"error", this kind of measures are applied only in case of disasters or wars. This mistake 

was doubled, according to the same economist, by the second decision, gold sold was 

only partially redeemed. 

In the years 1987-1988 were paid exorbitant external debt: 356 million dollars in 1987, 

4.252 million in 1988 and 1.790 million in 1989. 

At the end of 1989, Romania's bank accounts were availability of $ 1.8 billion and some 

developing countries, claims receivable were $ 2.9 billion U.S. In December 1989, 

Romania, practically had no external debt. 

Unfortunately, no. 

Prepayment of the entire foreign debt was one of the most unwise economic 

decisions before December '89. It was, after an informed opinion of Adrian Vasilescu, 

a violation of bank rules severely punished by the representatives of international 

financial market.

330 


For a period of 15 years, Romania has been removed from the world circuit of 

capital. The resulting financial quarantines were felt for a long time and the Romanian 

economy became darker than before. After “debtor euphoria” of the '70s, there was 

despair prepayment of external debt by all means, also, desperate, even including the 

massive sales of food and gold. The result was a weakness economy and population. 

And what followed was not encouraging. The reserve gathered in 1989, 1.8 billion 

dollars, was exhausted in a few months of 1990, when we sees another reversal in 

Romania's trade balance: exports fell and imports increased massively. And again, 

currency pantry was almost empty. In the summer of 1992, Romania was again on the 

brink of insolvency 5 . 

5 Adrian Vasilescu, Valuta din cămara Băncii NaŃionale (The Currency from the “storehouse” of 

the National Bank) (V), in „Ziarul Financiar” (Financial Newspaper), year XI, no. 

2668/23.06.2009

MONASTERY CLOSING CAMPAIGN 

THROUGHOUT SOVIET MOLDAVIA 

(1944–1962) 

Dimensions of the problem 

Ion XENOFONTOV 1 

According to the English historian Timothy Ware “traditionalism is specific to 

Orthodoxy, that archaic scent, that determination to remain faithful to the past, in the 

sense of a continuity with the ancient church” [1]. This collective piety towards spiritual 

traditions was regarded by the Bolshevik propaganda as opium of society – religion and 

church being included in the category of the Soviet Union’s internal and external enemy. 

On 20 January 1918, in USSR, the separation of the Church and State was declared and 

therefore the soviet authorities’ political-ideological, economic actions intensified, which 

tended to settle in full the Soviet citizens’ spiritual dimension. The article 124 of the 

Soviet Constitution (1936) guaranteed the religious-political dualism “freedom of 

conscience and exercise of the religious cults and, at the same time, freedom of the antireligious 

propaganda [2]. Following the “active campaigns in favour of the atheism” in 

the 1960s, in the Soviet Union, the number of the places of worship was reduced from 20 

thousand to 7 thousand, and of the monasteries from 87 to 17 and of the seminars from 8 

to 3 [3]. In the communist regime’s perception, the monastic congregations stood for 

spirituality centres, also for resistance centres of the Romanian national language and 

conscience, against the denationalization and Russification policy [4]. In this context, the 

monasteries from Bessarabia appended by USSR were subjected to a thorough 

intimidation, denationalization, monastic-congregation destruction campaign etc. 

From the communist leaders’ perspective, any complete remake of society called for 

eradicating religion and destructing churches. The church availed itself of rich economic 

resources, strong social prestige and was obviously an important competitor of the Soviet 

State, wishing to change the religious faith into a party one. 

The communist slogan of the respective period was well known: “So as to be a good 

communist, you must be a good atheist”. Soviet Union’s leader Nikita Khrushchev, 

declared that the Soviet people will enter Communism “without priests and drunken”. In 

order to achieve this goal, directed meetings of the “toiling people” were organized, 

wherein the liquidation of the sacred places was declared. The religious institutions, the 

clergy, the Christian symbols were desecrated and marginalized. 

This practice was subsequently applied by Soviet authorities in Moldavian SSR. 

1 Institute of Encyclopaedic Studies of Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Republic of Moldova.

332 

Historical landmarks 


Since 1420, with the attestation of the first monastic institution in the region (Vărzăreşti, 

Nisporeni) until 1940, throughout Bessarabia, 48 monasteries had been set up. The large 

number of monasteries on a vast territory may be explained through the inhabitants’ 

religious piety and feeling and through the support and privileges granted by the secular 

power to the holy places. During interwar period, throughout the Republic of Moldavia’s 

current space, a dualism was constituted as regards the religious policy and life. After 

1918, in Bessarabia, returned in the Romanian space, a revival of the spiritual life 

occurred. This way, during the year 1925, in the Romanian province, 1104 priests 

officiated in 1090 churches and chapels; 20 monasteries were active and 9 hermitages 

with 2414 inhabitants operated [5]; the level of the theological education was raised (in 

1926 at Chişinău, the Faculty of Theology within the University of Iaşi was inaugurated). 

In 1940, the monastic complexes had 1 624 hectares of land, averaging 61,6 hectares each 

[6]. Another trajectory was followed by the population of the Moldavian Socialist Soviet 

Autonomous Republic (RASSM), territorial unit created in 1924. In 1917, throughout the 

area, 1017 churches and prayer houses, 13 monasteries and hermitages were active, 

wherein 890 priests and 384 monks officiated the divine service [7]. Until 1941, in this 

space, almost all churches were demolished and closed, only one being allowed to 

operate, the one of the cemetery no. 2 from Odessa. 

On 28 June 1940, when USSR annexed Bessarabia, throughout the region, 1090 

Orthodox churches and 28 monasteries were active. As a consequence of the Soviet 

intervention, the anti-Christian propaganda intensified, the churches were transformed 

into the bedrooms, warehouses, showrooms of the Soviet troops or they were closed. In 

order to demonstrate the negative role of religion on the “constructing Socialism”, the socalled 

Anti-Religious Museum from Chişinău was set up, in the former chapel of the 

High-School for Girls Queen Mary. The crosses on the holy abodes were destroyed and 

replaced with red flags. Such a flag was also hoisted at the statue of Stephen the Great, in 

the hand with whom the ruler of the Country of Moldavia used to hold the cross [8]. The 

priests were humiliated by being dressed as laymen, given short haircuts and shaved. 52 

priests and 45 church singers were deported to Siberia and assassinated [9]. Detachments 

of anti-religious agitators (безбожники) were set up, which organized various antireligious 

propaganda actions in the communities [10]. On the Orthodox Church, 

economic pressures were effectuated, with a single purpose beyond the appearances: 

liquidation of the holy places. For instance, if an electric current kilowatt cost 13 kopecks 

for private persons, the church was charged with five roubles. In 1940, the monastery 

Saharna, for instance, was transformed into the … kolkhoz administration headquarters, 

being abusively dispossessed of most owned agricultural lands [11]. In October 1940, the 

monastery forests were nationalized. Frumoasa monastery was transformed into rest 

house, Suruceni and Hârjauca – in hospitals, HârbovăŃ, Căpriana – in orphanage. At the 

Soviets’ withdrawal, in 1941, the monasteries were looted and desecrated. The famous 

miracle-working icon from the monastery HârbovăŃ, Icon of God’s Mother was burnt in 

the Cathedral of Chişinău [12]. 

In 1944, after the Romanian authorities’ withdrawal from Bessarabia, part of the 

members of the monastic congregation, priests, deacons, singers, especially people with 

higher education and high hierarchical positions fled yonder. In the county of BălŃi, the 

most populous, in the year 1946, the Soviets drew up a list for repatriating 218 priests, 8 

deacons and 66 teachers over the Prut [13].

Ion XENOFONTOV: Monastery Closing Campaign Throughout Soviet Moldavia … 333 

Religious soviet policy promoted in MSSR, inclusively in the monastic system 

During the military operations in 1944, the Soviets devastated and plundered the 

Bessarabian monasteries. For example, from the monastery Noul NeamŃ, the Soviets stole 

“for the needs of the front”, the carpets of the two churches, a big gold cross, 120 

thousand lei, chairs, tables, beds, couches, two trucks, two tractors, four tones of barley 

and wheat [14]. After the Romanian gendarmes’ offensive on the Soviet partisans and 

paratroopers from the monasteries Căpriana and CondriŃa, some paratroopers “spent 

the night at Hâncu Monastery” [15], and the monastic wealth was nothing left. In the 

summer of 1944, the convent Coşălăuca was dispossessed of 376 seed trees, cut by the 

Soviet militaries [16]. In August 1944, in the Moldavian SSR, 25 monasteries were 

active [17]. 

After the Soviets’ reinstallation in the region, the Romanian church administration 

was abolished. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was replaced by the Diocese of 

Chişinău and Moldavia, administratively subjected to the Synod from Moscow. As in 

the Tsarist period, this structure was only headed by Russian and Ukrainian bishops: 

bishop Ieronim Zaharov (1944–1947); bishop Benedict Poleakov (1947–1948); 

archbishop Nektarie Grigoriev (1948–1968). They were monitored by the 

commissioner of the Council for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church close to 

USSR’s Council of Ministers, a repressive organ of the spiritual life, instituted on 7 

October 1943, through the decision CCP of USSR. The head of the Council for the 

affairs of the Union Russian Orthodox Church was G.G. Karpov, head of department 

of NKGB of USSR. For the Moldavian SSR, P.G. Romenski was appointed 

commissioner, who worked in the leadership of the People’s Commissariat, 

subsequently changed into Moldavian SSR’s Council of Ministers. After his having 

been installed in this office, P.G. Romenski initiated a series of actions for closing the 

sacred places. The same policy was promoted by the subsequent commissioner, A.I. 

Oleinik, who focused on collaborating with the leadership of the parishes in order to 

liquidate more easily the holy abodes. In his activity, the commissioner was supported 

by a network of agents infiltrated in the Orthodox Church’s administrative structures. 

The Moldavian Church’s head, the archbishop Nektarie, had the conspiratorial name 

“KazanŃev”, and his assistant was “Iuriev”, in his turn KGB agent [18]. In the context 

of taking the decision to close a monastery, the archbishop Nektarie removed from the 

monastic complex the most active monks, to avoid thereby the possibility of a 

resistance from within, creating therefore the impression of a spontaneous action, 

initiated by the very monastic congregation [19]. According to an informative note of 

the Moldavian SSR’s State Security Committee from the 8th of January 1960, the 

Orthodox Church’s agency network consisted of 16 persons, inclusively with 

administrative functions in the monasteries, with conspiracy names “ÎnălŃatul”, 

“Albu”, “Nikitin”, “Florea”, “Grigoriev”, “Scurtu” etc. [20]. The priests’ preaches 

were supervised, much as their private mail. Conducting divine services by priests, 

unregistered monks, officiating cross processions upon their initiative were strictly 

forbidden. 

The ministers, treated as “people’s enemies”, suffered from the deportations in 1949. If 

on 20 June 1949, in the Orthodox Church, 430 clergymen and 356 psalm readers 

activated, on 1 January 1950, only 353 clergymen and 321 psalm readers were left. In the 

absence of a theological school in MSSR, the cases for studies were filed at the

334 


Theological Seminar from Odessa. For instance, in the years 1955–1956, respectively 8 

and 43 persons filed their cases. The non registered ones were strictly supervised and 

ideologically processed by the party and komsomol organisations [21]. 

On 16 October 1958, the decision was taken to fully clear the monastic system from 

Moldavian SSR [22]. In the 1960s, in Moldavian SSR, pulling bells was forbidden, more 

than 30 000 crucifixions and crosses were removed from cities, pilgrimages to 

monasteries and holy places were banned. On 1 January 1962, 98 churches were 

transformed into clubs, gyms, libraries; 67 were demolished. Over one year, in the 

Diocese of Chişinău and Moldavia, only 256 churches and a single monastery operated. 

The political factor, supported by the one of the security’s structures, managed in a 

short while to marginalize and to subject the institutional structures of the Orthodox 

Church from SSRM. Moreover, the Soviet Moldavian Orthodox Church’s bishops were 

partly changed into useful tools for compromising and closing the monastic abodes. 

General situation of the monasteries and of the monastic congregation from 

Moldavian SSR after the Second World War 

After the Second World War, the number of the monastic establishments was 

substantially reduced. In 1945, in the new Soviet Republic, 25 monasteries and 

hermitages were registered (16 – of monks and 9 – of nuns) [23]. In 1948, only 22 

monasteries operated: in the year 1949 –20, and in 1956 – 15, whereof 7 of monks and 8 

of nuns [24]. All monasteries needed repairs, as they had not been maintained for several 

years and had suffered from the global conflagration. Even monastic establishments with 

good economic situation had no possibilities to make ample repairs, as during war the 

construction materials and equipment were scarce [25]. 

As a consequence of the violent pressures from the central and local authorities, the 

number of the monastic-establishment dwellers was substantially reduced. If, in 1947, the 

number of the monks and nuns constituted 1642; in 1950 – 1746; in 1952 – 1569; then in 

1956 only 311 monks and 1059 nuns remained. The number of the mothers superior was 

three times greater than the one of the nuns. One more aspect: most dwellers were aged. 

This way, in the year 1952, 51 persons were under 18 years old, 526 – from 19 up to 40 

years old, 399 – from 41 to 55 years old, 593 were over 55 years old. As a result of the 

Soviet intimidation policy as regards the religious lifestyle, the number of the monastic 

newcomers gradually diminished. This way, in the first half of 1957, in the monasteries 

only 14 persons entered, inclusively 9 youths (4 lads and 5 lasses) aged between 18 and 

26 years old [26]. In ethnic terms, most were Moldavian, fewer Russian, Ukrainian, 

Bulgarian, Gagauz. Most dwellers from monastic congregations proceeded from peasants. 

In the year 1948, a single monk had secular higher education, one – theological high 

education; 7 – secular high education; 1400 – primary education and 233 were illiterate. 

According to the Soviet commissioner P.G. Romenski: “The persons who have entered a 

monastery for the recent years are mostly local peasants, most Moldavians proceeding 

from needy families, culturally and religiously backward to fanaticism; whereof there are 

not only elderly and middle-aged people, but also youth and children who enter the 

monastery prompted by their parents or, many times, by close relatives (brothers, sisters 

etc.), who had become monks or had taken the veil before” [27]. On 23 January 1959, CC 

Office of PCM decided: “The Council of Ministers of Moldavian SSR will submit to the 

Council of Ministers of USSR the reduction of the number of monasteries throughout


Moldavian SSR and the subsequent closure of all monasteries (s.n.)”. Consequently, on 5 

June 1959, the Council of Ministers of SSRM took the decision to “gradually close nine 

monasteries throughout the republic, during the years 1959–1960” [28]. In the light of the 

indications set by the central Soviet authorities, only in the years 1959–1960, nine 

monasteries and 173 churches were closed. During 1960, in SSRM, only five monasteries 

were active: 3 of monks (HârbovăŃ, Căpriana and ChiŃcani) and 2 of nuns (Călărăşeuca 

and Japca). In 1961, the monasteries HârbovăŃ and Călărăşeuca were abolished, with a 

total number of 179 persons; and in 1962 Căpriana and ChiŃcani, with a total number of 

171 persons. Liquidating the monastic complex HârbovăŃ, on 10 May 1961, was 

motivated as executed “in compliance with the need to reduce the number of monasteries 

in the republic” [29], being transformed into orphanage. Some monastic establishments 

became social homes (Hâncu), hospitals for disabled children (Saharna), hospitals 

(Cuşălăuca, Noul NeamŃ, Căpriana), schools for disabled children (Călărăşeuca), clubs 

(Tabăra), insane asylums (Curchi) etc. 

The only monastery not closed was the one from Japca, subsequently taken under the 

direct administration of Moscow’s Patriarchate. 

Forms and mechanisms for liquidating the monasteries and for intimidating the 

monastic communities 

As a result of creating the oppressive mechanisms of religious-life liquidation in 

Moldavian SSR, categorical indications were given as regards compromising and 

subsequently liquidating the monastic establishments. To this purpose, the Soviet 

authorities applied several radical methods and tricks: from physical removal and 

psychological intimidation to economic and social marginalization of the monastic 

congregations. 

In the profile of the war communism, the formula was applied Who is not with us is 

against us. Using the respective principle, an ample campaign for “liquidating” the 

elements declared by the Soviet-occupation authorities to be anti-Soviet, inclusively 

within the monastic congregations, was initiated. This way, in a document from June 

1946, among the anti-Soviet elements during the Second World War, the monks were 

mentioned and qualified as “collaborators of the occupation regime”, being blamed of 

having allegedly denounced the groups of Soviet partisans, as well as of other “anti- 

Soviet” actions. Consequently, 28 monastery dwellers were arrested [30]. 

In the complex mechanism of monastic-establishment liquidation, the State Security’s 

organs and collaborators were massively and permanently driven (NKVD). This way, in 

the HârbovăŃ monastery-closing operation “a great part was incumbent on the agents and 

trustees, who held management positions in the diocesan administrations, in the 

monasteries or lived in the neighbouring villages”. So as to discreetly close the 

monastery, avoiding the public-protest manifestations, the Soviet Security studied the 

current situation of the monastery, monks, neighbouring localities. In order to pave the 

field for liquidating the complex, the rumour first spread on closing the monastery: “On 

our indications, the agents and trustees among the monks and believers first spread the 

rumour on possibly closing the monastery. The rumour was also supported by our agent 

… who was the abbot of the monastery. Therefore, a group appeared among the monks 

who asked for the monastic wealth distribution. Using these circumstances, our agents… 

convinced approximately 52 persons, whereof 94 monks, to leave the monastery…

336 


The agent…, on our indication, did not resist the monks’ leaving; on the contrary, he 

provided them with all necessary stuff – food, clothes and money. After the monks have 

left the monastery, the agent, in the person of ChiŃcani monastery abbot, without 

notifying the bishop, left, prompted by us, to HârbovăŃ monastery and organized the 

transportation of the monks who had expressed their desire to leave for ChiŃcani 

monastery. When only a few monks remained in the monastery, the agent … officially 

addressed the commissioner for the Russian Orthodox Church, with the request to take 

under guard the monastery wealth and, at the same time, asked the abbot of the 

neighbouring monastery to come after the remaining monks. Our agent…, who occupied 

a leading position in the diocese, actively contributed to closing the monastery. On his 

indication, during the monastery closing preparations, the persons capable to exercise a 

negative influence on the monastery closing were transferred to other establishments” 

[31]. 

In the vast monastic complex-liquidation campaign, with excessive zeal, the regular 

communists involved themselves. The case of Suruceni monastery, on 10 July 1955, is 

indicative in this respect. That day “in the monastery, the manager of the wine factory 

from Ialoveni, A. Gh. Karataev, party member, president of Voroşilov Kolkhoz from 

Chiperceni, Vidiş, party member, together with three other men and two women, 

drunken, appeared. They began to behave like thugs, chasing monks, shouting at them to 

explain their reason for still living in the monastery and not spreading out. Especially 

Vidiş stood out through his behaviour, running, the knife in hand. He wanted to cut an old 

monk’s beard and to hit with the knife the abbot of Gargalâc monastery, in the very 

church, where he ran during the service. Monks came to the abbot’s rescue, taking Vidiş’s 

knife and chasing him out of the church. The service was discontinued, the believers were 

scattered. Thereafter, Vidiş and the other drunken troublemakers did not stop their 

hooligan actions, they kept running through the monastery yard, shouting: «let me kill at 

least one monk»” [32]. 

Monasteries, reckoned temples of divine purification, were subjected to diverse actions 

of psychological intimidation and of monastic-lifestyle compromise. Thus, in order to 

justify the closing of Căpriana monastery, the Ministry of Health of SSRM was “obliged 

to organize until 5 October 1949 a screening of the monastic staff and to note that the 

monastery was an outbreak of venereal disease” or there were instituted “penal charges as 

regards rape actions and other violent actions perpetrated on the women by the monks” 

[33]. 15 cases of venereal diseases were officially registered; the former abbot figuring 

among the contaminated. On 5 October 1949, the prosecution of Călăraşi sued a case 

consisting in a woman’s rape by the monks in the monastery [34]. The same “arguments” 

were invoked in the case of the nuns from Tabăra monastery. As regards the monastic 

congregation yonder, they said it to make up a “a home of the most shameful debauchery 

and a breeding ground for contagious diseases. The dissolute life led by the nuns in this 

monastery, the drunkenness, and the disorderly sex life have resulted in persons among 

the nunnery sick of syphilis and other socially dangerous diseases. Moreover, invoking as 

reason their fake «chastity», their godly lifestyle; and, in reality, lest their vices should be 

damasked in front of the people, the infected nuns seek to thoroughly hide their disease 

and avoid treatment, which contributes to a wider distribution of the venereal diseases 

both in their environment and among the population they are in contact with” [35]. As


regards the monks from Curchi monastery, they are said to “be fond of drunkenness and 

lead a dissolute life; the abbot itself, Veniamin Batâr, lives with the nun Dionisa Cempoc 

from Hirova monastery. The monastic cells and the monks are dirty” [36]. The 

commissioner Romenski concluded in 1956, that all monasteries are centres of amoral 

behaviour and sexual debauchery [37]. 

Another constraining form of the monastic establishments was economic. According to 

a classification of the Soviet authorities, three categories of monasteries existed in the 

republic: monasteries with high, medium and poor economic potential. The third-category 

monasteries were reckoned to have no existence perspectives, therefore they were to be 

liquidated or merged [38]. The first monastery abolished on these grounds was Frumoasa 

convent (6 June 1946). As argument for closing Vărzăreşti monastery, in the year 1949, 

the fact was invoked that “the monastery is insufficiently provided materially and does 

not dispose of t he necessary conditions to further exist”. The same “arguments” were 

invoked in case of łipova (Horodişte) monastery [39]. 

Unlike farms, monastic complexes were not granted exemptions. Monasteries were 

subjected to taxes and other compulsory deliveries of animal products. Because of the 

poor harvest, in 1947, 12 monasteries from 22 did not meet the cereal-delivery plan. 

In 1952, the taxes and obligations of the monasteries towards the State doubled 

compared to 1950. Through economic ruining, there was counted on “decently” 

liquidating the monastic establishments. The economic restrictions on monasteries were 

intensified by late 1950s. New taxes constituted three quarters or more from the total 

volume of the harvest [40]. Grigore CăpăŃină, abbot of Suruceni monastery, reported that 

because of the high tax – 5000 litres of milk – sold two cattle [41]. 

In the collectivization process, there was staked on nationalizing the monastic estates. 

On 3 April 1946, the monasteries owned 1317 land hectares, inclusively 791 ha of arable 

land, 117 ha of orchards and 109 ha of vineyards. In two years, on 16 March 1948, the 

monasteries only owned 1030 ha, inclusively 506 ha of arable land, 81 ha of orchards and 

67 ha of vineyards. On average, a monastery owned 46,5 ha of land. The new collective 

households forcedly seized in their turn the monastic lands and buildings. Monasteries 

were charged with exorbitant taxes. In the context of the collectivization, various attempts 

were made to dispossess the establishment of land and the monastic congregation 

members were obliged to work in the collective households with modest remuneration 

[42]. This way, by late 1944, the abbot of Noul NeamŃ monastery from ChiŃcani, Axentie 

Munteanu, submitted a complaint as regards the occupation of the land and the seizure of 

the monastic wealth by the newly established local sovkhoz [43]. In 1946, Hâncu 

monastery was dispossessed of its crop by the local authorities: “And God gave full fruit 

in the orchards, 150 000 (one hundred fifty thousand) roub. could be taken , but the 

Soviet of Ciuciuleni village – cheated on abbot Pavel Friptu and seized all these fruit ... 

took from the monastery all the grape and fruit harvest” [44]. 

In the second half of the 1940s, according to the assessments of the Soviet authorities, 

Saharna monastery was included in the category of the socio-economically developed 

establishments [45]. The Soviet State continued however to dispossess the establishment 

of its estates, one of the first actions being the seizure of the mill. Then the monastic 

establishment was charged with exorbitant taxes. In 1946, the monastic community 

requested the diminution of the taxes, the request being categorically rejected by the 

Soviet commissioner, who reckoned the taxation to be “correct” [46].

338 


Part of the convents (Tabăra, Hirova, Vărzăreşti, Răciula, Frumoasa) were obliged to 

supply industrial products for modest remuneration [47]. 

Pressures from the State were also effectuated at Japca monastery. In 1948, the abbess 

of Japca monastery, Pahomeea, filed a complaint against the director of the Industrial 

Complex from Vertujeni district, who wanted to dispose from the monastery estate, of 3 

land hectares, to the purpose of extracting calcium hydroxide (slaked lime). The petition 

was submitted to the Executive Committee’s president of Vertujeni district to take the 

reasonable steps [48]. On 19 April 1955, the administration of the kolkhoz from Japca 

village addressed the higher courts with the request to transfer to the balance of the 

collective farm a monastic construction so as to house the animals [49]. On 21 May 1959, 

the abbess Serafima informed the archbishop of Chişinău and Moldavia, Nektarii, that 

Japca monastery was not rewarded for the work in “Moldova” kolkhoz [50]. In 

September 1959, as a result of the intimidation actions, Japca monastery was 

dispossessed of almost the entire estate, only 6 ha of land remaining [51]. The nuns were 

forced to work in the kolkhoz. Left without household, they only maintained the garden 

and vineyard around the monastery 

On 26 November 1958, a decision of the Moldavian SSR’s Council of Ministers was 

adopted. “On taxing the monastery incomes”, according to which the tax for an arable 

land are in the districts Otaci, Rezina, Floreşti constituted 16 roubles, for Răciula – 20 

roubles; the tax increased towards the Southern districts, attaining 50 roubles for an are 

in Bender district. On 23 January 1959, the Office CC of PCM proposed to minimize the 

land plots of the active monasteries, through the settlement of a standard of 0,1 ha per 

monk. The fields with the highest incomes were to be seized (orchards, vineyards etc.). 

The monasteries were to pay the rent to the state for all buildings, ancillary household 

constructions and others in their use [52]. 

Moderate actions, “more human” were applied for liquidating the monasteries. On 31 

May 1947, in line with the Decision of the Moldavian SSR’s Council of Ministers “On 

the activities of protection and restoration of the architectural monuments from the 

Moldavian SSR”, part of the monastery complexes were taken under the State’s 

protection [53], which action was but a form of interference in the internal affairs of the 

holy establishments by the Soviet authorities. This way, in 1952, according to the 

commissioner’s declaration, the cause of closing the monk monastery from Hârjauca was 

the decrease in the number of monks and the necessity to protect the building as 

architectural monument. 

Final considerations 

As a consequence of the Soviet policy of marginalization and ideological, economic etc. 

pressure on the religious life, in general, and on the monastic life, in particular, 

throughout Bessarabia, the monastic abodes and congregations were liquidated, excepting 

Japca monastery. The fierce mechanism of monastic-establishment abolishment inscribed 

itself in the Soviet authorities’ strategy to liquidate any form of spiritual manifestation 

and resistance. However, these radical actions of the Soviet State failed. It is not by 

chance that USSR’s decomposition was directly related to the broad religious movement 

followed by the reopening of all Kremlin-dissolved monasteries.


Notes 

1. Ware Timothy, Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe (The history of the Orthodox Church [In 

Romanian]), Bucureşti. Ed. Aldo Press, 1993, p. 196. 

2. KonstituŃia SSSR, Moskva, 1943. 

3. Soulet, Jean-François: Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele 

noastre (The comparate history of the communist states from 1945 till our days [In 

Romanian]), Iaşi. Polirom, 1998, p. 44, 243. 

4. Tihonov Ludmila, Politica statului sovietic faŃă de cultele din SSR Moldovenească 

(1944–1965) (The politic of the soviet state regarding the cults from Moldavian SSR 

[In Romanian]), Chişinău. Prut InternaŃional, 2004, p. 214. 

5. Ciobanu Ștefan, Basarabia. PopulaŃia. Istoria. Cultura (Bessarabia. Population, 

History. Culture [In Romanian]), Chişinău, 1992, p. 84. 

6. Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul. Documentarul deportărilor de pe teritoriul SSR 

Moldoveneşti (Calvary. The documentar of the deportations from Moldavian SSR 

territory [In Romanian]), 1940–1959, ROSSPEN 2006, p. 371. 

7. Nistor Ion, Istoria românilor din Transnistria (The history of the Romanians from 

Transnistria [In Romanian]), Bucureşti. Editura Eminescu, 1995, p. 79. 

8. GuŃuleac Alexandru, Profanarea sau distrugerea patrimoniului bisericesc sub prima 

ocupaŃie sovietică (1940–1941) (The profanation or distroction of the hurch 

patrimony in the period of first soviet occupation [In Romanian]). In: Buletin 

ştiinŃific. Revistă de Etnografie, ŞtiinŃele Naturii şi Muzeologie. Serie nouă, Volul 13 

(26), Chişinău, 2010, p. 230. 

9. Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., p. 33. 

10. Pravolsavie v Moldavii: vlasti, terkovi, veruiuşie. 1940–1991. Sbornik dokumentov : 

v 4 t. / V. Pasat (The Orthodoxy in Moldova: the power, church, believers. 1940– 

1991: Collection of documents / V. Pasat [In Russian])/ Т. 1. Моskva, RОSSPAN, 

2009, p. 101-103, doc. 6; p. 106–107, doc. 9. 

11. Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova (ANRM). F. 1135, inv. 20, d. 212, f. 2-9; 

Pravolsavie v Moldavii... Т. 1. p. 98-99, doc. 2; p. 99, doc. 3; p. 100-101, doc. 5; , p. 

103-104, doc. 7. 

12. Ieraclie, Mănăstirea HârbovăŃ (Harbovat Monastery [In Romanian]). In: 

Luminătorul, nr. 9-10, Chişinău, 1942, p. 583. 

13. Cemârtan Romeo, SituaŃia şi evoluŃia vieŃii bisericeşti în perioada 1945–1962 (The 

situation and evolution of the church’s life in the period 1945–1962 [In Romanian]). In 

Destin românesc. Revistă de istorie şi cultură. Serie nou, 2010, anul V, nr. 3-4, p. 119. 

14. Ciorbă Veaceslav, op. cit., p. 214. 

15. Agachi Alexei, Istoria mănăstirii Hâncu (1677–2010) (The history of the Hancu 

Monastery [In Romanian]), Chişinău. Pontos, 2010, p. 159. 

16. Beşleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim. Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959 (Crosses 

overthrown the regime. The Raciula Monastery [In Romanian]), Chişinău. Prut 

InternaŃional, 2006, p. 45, 58. 

17. Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova (ANRM). Fond 3046, inv. 1, dosar 6, f. 22. 

18. Bessarabiana. Teritoriul dintre Prut şi Nistru în câteva ipostaze istorice şi reflecŃii 

istoriografice (Bessarabiana. The territory from Prut and Dniester rivers in some 

history ipostases and historiographical reflections [In Romanian]), Chişinău. Editura 

Cartididact, 2012, p. 211.

340 


19. Pasat V.I.,Trudnîe straniŃî istorii Moldovî: 1940–1950-e gg (The hard pages of the 

Moldova history: 1940–1950 years [In Russian]), Moskva, 1994, pp. 652-665. 

20. Beşleagă Vladimir, op. cit., doc. nr. 8, p. 313. 

21. Cemârtan Romeo, op. cit., p. 123-124. 

22. Țurcanu Ion, Bessarabiana…, p. 211. 

23. Pravolsavie v Moldavii..., T. 1, p. 165, doc. 28. 

24. Cemârtan, Romeo: op. cit., p. 125. 

25. Pravolsavie v Moldavii..., Том 1. p. 361, doc. 79. 

26. Pasat V.I.,Trudnîe straniŃî istorii Moldovî: 1940–1950-e gg (The hard pages of the 

Moldova history: 1940–1950 years [In Russian]), Moskva, 1994, p. 646–648. 

27. Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul. Documentarul deportărilor de pe teritoriul SSR 

Moldoveneşti (Calvary. The documentar of the deportations from Moldavian SSR 

territory [In Romanian]), 1940–1959, ROSSPEN 2006, p. 372-373. 

28. Beşleagă Vladimir, op. cit., p. 63, doc. nr. 2, p. 306, doc. nr. 4, p. 308. 

29. Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul…, p. 375. 

30. Ciorbă Veaceslav, Biserica Ortodoxă din Basarabia şi Transnistria (1940–2010) 

(The Orthodox Church from Bessarabia and Transnistria [In Romanian]), Chişinău. 

Pontos, 2011, p. 214. 

31. Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul…, p. 376-377. 

32. Ciorbă Veaceslav, op. cit., p. 144. 

33. Arhiva istorică. In Cugetul, Chişinău, nr. 1, 2000, p. 52. 

34. Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., p. 58. 

35. Beşleagă Vladimir, op. cit., p. 64. 

36. Ibidem, p. 69. 

37. Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., 2004, p. 60. 

38. ANRM. F. 3061, inv. 1, dos. 12, f. 17. 

39. Beşleagă Vladimir, op. cit., p. 63 

40. Pasat, Valeriu: Calvarul…, p. 377-378. 


42. Pravolsavie v Moldavii..., T. 1, p. 240, doc. 51; p. 409, doc. 94; p. 356, doc. 80. 


44. Ibidem, p. 59. 

45. Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova (AOSPRM). F. 51, inv. 

9, d. 44, f. 135. 

46. Agachi Alexei, op, cit., p. 165, 179. 

47. ANRM. F. 3041, inv. 1, dos. 6, f. 4-7. 

48. Pravolsavie v Moldavii..., T. 1, p. 397, doc. 90. 

49. Ibidem, T. 2, p. 292, doc. 57; p. 480, Planşa 14. 

50. Ibidem, p. 649, doc. 225. 

51. AOSPRM. F. 51, inv. 19, d. 82, f. 258. 

52. Beşleagă Vladimir, op. cit., p. 82; doc. nr. 2, p. 306 

53. ANRM. F. 2848, inv. 22, d. 40, f. 142.

CELEBRATIONS AND RITUALS OF THE 

STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF VELIKO 

TARNOVO (1963-1989) 

Mariya ZHELYAZKOVA 1 

Abstract: The report is about the holidays and rituals in the University of Veliko Turnovo between 

the years 1963-1989. It focuses the attention on the student holiday the holiday of the university, 

the spring homecoming and the torch marching. The text follows the main points in organizing and 

holding these events by the students in the old city. Its purpose is to distinguish those rituals- 

created by the young people- which go beyond the obligatory frame of the official holiday– ritual 

system and they are a tribute to the specifics of the student identity, its constants and varieties, 

when celebrating the dates of the student’s holiday calendar during the years of Communist 

regime in Bulgaria. Documents and materials from the archives of the University Museum, and 

oral evidence collected by the author during the held half-standardized interviews whit the 

University of Veliko Turnovo alumni. 

Introduction 

This release marks the beginning of an interesting study, especially for young people, a 

topic related to holidays and ritual system in Veliko Tarnovo University (VTU) "St. Cyril 

and Methodius " 1 in the years of socialism. It covers a wide range of problems, so the 

emphasis in the layout is on some of the most important student holidays - December 8 

and May 24. 

Celebrations and rituals of the students 

Holidays are an integral part of life for everyone. They are useful and necessary in order 

to distract us at least for a moment from everyday concerns, to make us integrate into 

certain traditions to unite us as people. In the years of the communist regime, the festive 

system was entirely influenced by the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ruling party 

attempts to regulate not only nationwide celebrations, but also those of different social 

groups. In pursuance of decisions of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the 

Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP Central Committee) of 1968, the Central Committee of 

the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (CC Dimitrov Young Communist League), its VIth 

Plenary Session of May 29, 1969, established a system for the symbols, rituals and traditions 

in the Dimitrov Young Communist League and the Pioneer Organization, called 

Septemvriyche. It included both the common for the entire Youth Union holidays and those 

of the Bulgarian Students: Meeting the students in the universities, December 8- the 

National Student Day, and a solemn graduation of the students. 2 


342 


An attempt to regulate the holiday calendar of the students from University of Veliko 

Tarnovo was made in 1973 when the Rector's Council discussed a draft document entitled 

Academic socialist ritual and symbolism of the local university. The same was returned to 

the compilers for some adjustments and later a programme of rituals and traditions in the 

University Cyril and Methodius was elaborated and approved. 3 It says that "the rituals 

and traditions are very important for the communist education of students in higher 

education" and that "the new academic traditions and rituals in accordance with the 

traditions of our people and the modern requirements of a socialist society cooperate to 

shape the mind, behavior , self-confidence and national pride of the young student. "It 

was also emphasized that they "should be considered an integral connection with the 

learning process, the total range of activities aimed at achieving greater efficiency in the 

ideological and political education of students." This programme established as rituals 

and traditions the celebration of the following major events: 

"1. Adoption of freshmen; 

2. Opening of the school year; 

3. Brigade report to the Communist Party; 

4. Organizing celebrations of students - December 8; 

5. Welcoming the spring; 

6. Distribution of students – graduates; 

7. Taking the oath of students; 

8. Patronal feast celebration of the university - May 24; 

9. Summer Opening of the brigade. " 4 

The most loved and anticipated, by the academic youth, festival is on December 8. The 

beginning of the celebrations of the students’ holiday in Bulgaria began in 1903. The 

Academic Council of Sofia University decided in 1902 to the day on which the Bulgarian 

Orthodox Church honors St. Kliment Ohridski enlightening - 25 November, new style 8 

December. 5 After 1944 this tradition interrupted for 18 years, and the International Day 

of Student Solidarity was observed (November 17). The reopening of the celebration of 

the Bulgarian Students’ Holiday in 1962 gave the opportunity to the established a year 

later the Higher Educational Institute "Cyril and Methodius", grew in 1971 as University 

"Cyril and Methodius", to include in its annual holiday calendar. 

The scenario of this holiday, according to the decisions of the leadership of Dimitrov 

Young Communist League in 1969, was as follows: "The celebration of the December 8 

is the continuation of the progressive traditions of Bulgarian Common Students' Union 

(BONSS). It was organised under the slogan "Always faithful to the party" ... Dimitrov 

Young Communist League (DKMS) Committees organized the holiday in cooperation 

with the academic councils of universities under the leadership of the university 

committees under the supervision of the Bulgarian Communist Party. In conducting the 

festival it was of importance the following to preserve and become a tradition: the 

meetings of students with members of the Political Department (the so called Political 

bureau) and the secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and other 

state and party leaders, major celebrations in the institutions themselves, organising 

exhibitions of students' scientific creativity, presenting wreath to the Georgi Dimitrov 

Mausoleum, Common Grave, monuments, plaques, etc.; Komsomol checks and beams; 

student balls.". 6

Mariya ZHELYAZKOVA: Celebrations And Rituals of the Students … 343 

From the outset, at the University of Veliko Tarnovo it was a practice, representatives 

of the local party and the state leadership, and in many cases prominent governmental and 

party leaders and members of the CC of the Dimitrov Young Communist League to be 

guests during the celebrations. Among them were the Communist leader and Head of 

State Todor Zhivkov (1976), Encho Staykov- a member of the Political bureau of the 

Communist Party and chairman of the National Council of the Fatherland Front (1964), 

Venelin Kotsev- secretary of the BCP Central Committee (1969 years), Tsola 

Dragoycheva- member of the Political bureau of the Communist Party and Chairman of 

the Committee for Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship (1971), Vladimir Bonev- member of the 

Secretariat of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the National Assembly 

(1975), Milko Balev- secretary of the BCP Central Committee (1980), Peko Takov- 

member of the Political bureau of the Communist Party and deputy heads of the State 

Council (1981), etc. 7 Since the mid-70s of the twentieth century the university leadership 

began to honor distinguished guests with the honored symbol of the local university. At 

the solemn meeting, besides the guests, the rector, the secretaries of district committees of 

the Communist Party and the Dimitrov Young Communist League leaders and other 

official guests welcomed the students. In 1965 the festival was attended by 30 students 

from the Conservatory in Novosibirsk USSR. Within the celebrations on December 8 a 

series of cultural events were organised - theater, film screenings, concerts, exhibitions of 

students from the Faculty of Fine Arts and others. In the early part of the celebration there 

were student scientific sessions. The first one was held on 6 and 7 December 1964 and 

was dedicated to the 600th anniversary of Gregory Tsamblak. 8 On this day the freshmen 

students solemnly were given red hats "involving them in the student youth of Bulgaria. 

But they were also an expression of an obligation, a responsibility to the heroic past.". 9 

Each year the students looked forward to their first student holiday. What a student said 

in 1983, who was one of them: "This holiday is nothing new for us, different from all 

dates in the calendar. Among other things, it makes a person give what brings balance in 

yourself and what you can do. Student holiday makes us feel that we have crossed the 

threshold of childhood." 10 . One of the exciting events on the eve of December 8 was the 

torchlight procession along the main street, which became a tradition for decades. The 

two beams that left from the square in front of Tsarevets Hill and Gabrovski Park, met in 

front of the Mother Bulgaria monument, where historians and philologists exchanged 

humorous remarks. The student ball was the culmination of the festival that left 

unforgettable memories. For example, Mrs. Kalinka Gencheva remembered how in 1980 

the walls of the student canteen were decorated with cartoons drawn on the wrapping 

paper from the colleagues at the Faculty of Fine Arts. One of them made on her a 

particular impression- the students were depicted as green tomatoes in the first hall of 

the University, and teacher - as a watering can. Following the efforts of the teacher 

only the first, next to the teacher started to become, all the rest were still green. 11 In the 

70s the student festival included some film shows at Poltava cinema; the costs were 

covered by the university. The events during the school year 1981-1982 were also 

“interesting” when publicly the presentation of the movie "Big Night Bathe" was 

announced. Unfortunately, students were unpleasantly surprised by the fact that 

instead of the announced film screening another one began. They expressed their 

dissatisfaction within a conversation with the leadership and finally managed to gain 

back the screening of the desired movie.

344 


Another big celebration of the academic community in the local university was 24 May 

– The Day of the Cyrillic alphabet and Bulgarian culture, which is the patronal feast of 

the University since its inception. It was officially recorded especially in 1988- the 25th 

anniversary of the Alma Mater was celebrated. 

Each year the celebration of May 24 included a series of student events – literature 

readings of the circle Emiliyan Stanev, exhibitions of works by the students from the 

Faculty of Fine Arts, sports festivals that took place within a few days and many others. 

Traditionally, the festivities began with a solemn assembly in the hall of the university, 

where the rector, the secretaries of the local party and Komsomol leaders and other 

official guests served their greetings to the teachers and students. A ceremony for 

awarding students was held "for an excellent and very good and active Komsomol 

activity." 12 In the 80s of the twentieth century an interesting practice was introduced: 

during the days which were dedicated to the patron famous foreign scientists to have been 

awarded Honorary Doctor; prominent scientists to have been awarded Evtimii’s award for 

Bulgarian studies. 

On May 24, all university students must participate in the citywide parade. In the early 

years after it the freshmen made their solemn oath of loyalty to the Party and the 

Motherland. According to the program rituals and traditions in the University "Cyril and 

Methodius" this important event related to ideological and political education of students 

took place on Sunday the second week of May in the village Sushitza, Veliko Tarnovo, 

the birthplace of the patron of the University's Komsomol organization - senior sailor 

Dimitar Atanasov Dimitrov. It was assumed during the year to do this in Nikola 

Gabrovski Park in Veliko Tarnovo. There were some exceptions from the regulations. For 

example, in 1976 the student oath was held in the village of Balvan, where the students 

and professors paid tribute to fallen partisans in the Balkan Battle 13 , in 1983 - on 

Tzarevetz Hill 14 , and later on, in front of the University. 

Traditionally, after a citywide parade on May 24 ceremony the exchange of the flag of 

the History Faculty was held; the flag represented a ponytail. Graduates from the 4th year 

gave it to the third course students. This ritual was accompanied with many jokes, it 

usually took place near the fountain in Marno pole park. After it had been closed for 

reconstructions in the mid-80s of the twentieth century, the ritual was held in Druzhba 

Park. In 1981, exceptionally, the exchange of the "horse tail" of the historians happened 

on 10 May in the town of Pliska, where was the final stage of the student expedition 

"1300" 15 . That was the biggest academic event of the 1300th anniversary of the Bulgarian 

state, organized by the Faculty of History from 8 May to 10 May. 

The initiatives devoted to May 24, included traditional sports festival involving students 

and professors from the university. In 1969, the races included cadets from the Vasil 

Levski National Higher Military School 16 . In 1981 in the sports festival the first relay lap 

Cup Journal "Science and Labour was held ." 17 On May 24, 1984 of the stadium running 

mass gymnastic composition "40 Years of Progress", implemented under the guidance of 

professors of VTU 18 . Since the mid-60s of the twentieth century there was a tradition 

football matches between teachers and students stems to be organized; the initiative 

belonged to the Faculty of History. One of the most attractive players in the team then 

was Prof. Yordan Andreev who was remembered by the audience as a "goalkeeper" who 

was walking in front of the goal, reading a newspaper, thus demonstrating the poor play 

of the opponent. 19

Mariya ZHELYAZKOVA: Celebrations And Rituals of the Students … 345 

In 1986, students from the Faculty of History launched a torchlight procession to 

celebrate the date March 3 - Bulgaria's Liberation. 20 The next year it included all students 

from the local university. Three rays: "Bulgarian revolutionaries", “Fighters for Spiritual 

Freedom “and "Brothers liberators" marched downtown. The three rays gathered in front 

of the Regional History Museum and the procession ended with a solemn meeting. 21 

At the initiative of local university students began to organise the spring holidays. For 

the first time, together with teachers’ help in 1968, students performed a spring ball, 

which presented plays of the student theater group 22 . In 1973 the first spring carnival took 

place inspired by the idea of the students in Arts. It was dedicated to the law of Khan 

Krum. The competitions "Miss and Mister Carnival, the contest for the best dancing 

couple, as well as the contest for the most original Carnival costumes also contributed to 

the good mood during the carnival." 23 In subsequent years, students from Sofia University 

took part in the carnival. 24 

Among the student holidays that left unforgettable memories, was the graduation ball. 

The beginning of tradition which has lasted up to nowadays started in 1967, when the 

first class, taught in three specialties, graduated then the University. 

Conclusions 

Festive- ritual system of VTU was not limited to those holidays here, but they gave rise 

to make some basic conclusions. The facts showed that students' holidays in the 

University were organised over a set of government rules. This was manifested itself in 

solemn assemblies, which were official guests party and state leaders from local and 

national level, presentation of greetings in the spirit of recent decisions of the Communist 

Party and Dimitrov Young Communist League, the student oath of allegiance to the Party 

and the Motherland and others. Student youth managed to break the bureaucratic nature 

of the imposed festive- ritual system, adding new elements such as balls and spring 

carnivals, torchlight processions, football matches between teachers and students. Thus, 

young people brought many positive emotions and pleasant experiences in the public 

holidays designated by the communist regime. Creating traditions inherited by today's 

students, in which the joint celebration of students and teachers, was dominated by 

youthful urge for more spontaneity, variety and fun. 

Notes 

1. Its contemporary name the University of Veliko Tarnovo received in 1990. 

2. DKMS v resolyutzii i resheniya (1968- 1977). Volume 4, izdatelstvo “Narodna 

mladezh”, C, 1978, 127-128. 

3. DA-V. Tarnovo, f. 1178, op. 2, pp. 132-133. 

4. Programa za ritualite i traditziite v University of Veliko Tarnovo St. Cyril and 

Methodius- Sluzheben arhiv na University of Veliko Tarnovo St. Cyril and 

Methodius. 

5. http://news.bpost.bg/story-read- 15506.php 

6. DKMS v rsolyutzii i resheniya…, 127-128. 

7. Popova, D. Letopis na University of Veliko Tarnovo St. Cyril and Methodius (1963- 

1983 г.) – Sluzheben arhiv na University of Veliko Tarnovo St. Cyril and Methodius.

346 


8. Doncheva, N. Plamtyasht fakel na naukata.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 6-7, 5 

December 1964. 

9. Ivanov, P. Eho ot studentskiya praznik.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 1-2, 1 January 

1983. 

10. Kirilov, P. Praznikat prez pogleda na parvokursnitzite.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 

12, 8 December 1983. 

11. Intervyu s Mrs Kalinka Yovcheva Gencheva from Stara Zagora, student from 1978- 

1982, speciality History 

12. Dni na Velikotarnovski universitet.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 4, 24 May 1982. 

13. Hristov, N. Kletva pred partiyata i naroda- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 5- 6, 1 May 

1976 

14. Sharlopov, St. Studentska kletva- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 7- 8, 27 June 1983. 

15. Studentska ekspeditziya “1300”- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 5-6, 21 May 1981. 

16. Yordanov, Y. Sporten praznik.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 9- 10- 11, 24 May 

1969. 

17. Todorov, N. nashiyat sporten praznik.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 5, 18 June 1982. 

18. Kirilovi-Metodievi tarzhestva.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 5, 18 June 1984. 

19. Intervyu s Mrs Kalinka Yovcheva Gencheva 

20. Rumen, R. Pamet I priznatelnost.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 2, 20 March 1987. 

21. Rumen, R. Pamet I priznatelnost.- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 2, 20 March 1987. 

22. Penkov, P. Prolet i mladost- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 7- 8, 24 April 1968. 

23. Simeonova, M. Nashiyat karnaval- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 10- 11, 18 April 

1973. 

24. Tenev, T. Nashiyat proleten karnaval- vestnik “Nauka i trud”, issue 3- 4, 9 April 

1975.

3. CONDEMNING COMMUNISM 

PART I

VALUABLE PIECES OF THE SAXON 

CIVILIZATION IN THE PATRIMONY OF 

THE FĂGĂRAŞ COUNTY MUSEUM 

Elena BĂJENARU 1 

In the second half of the 12 th century, Hungarian King Geza II (1141-1161) brought 

German settlers in order to defense and develop the economy of southern and 

northeastern Transylvania. These settlers came from the territories of the Rhine and the 

Mosela rivers basins. Thanks to the privileges granted by the Hungarian regality over 

time, they became an important economic, political and cultural factor in Transylvania. 

During their history of over eight hundred years, the Transylvanian Saxons developed a 

powerfully specific civilization that continued until the last decades of the 20 th century, 

leaving behind remarkable values and memories to those, very few, who remained and to 

those who went to Germany. Many works of this civilization proclaimed as being 

“European” or “Occidental”, were treasured in private collections or in museums 

collections, among these being also the collections of our museum. 

The Museum of Făgăraş County, housed in the Făgăraş fortress, one of the most 

outstanding monuments of medieval architecture in Romania, has collected in over 90 

years of existence different categories of cultural objects that defined the cultural identity 

of the Saxons from southern Transylvania. 

The pieces collected by the museum bases the knowledge of everyday life of the Saxon 

population in southern Transylvania. The collected heritage tried to maintain a permanent 

interest in the Saxon cultural universe and the pieces were selected among those who 

represent to the highest degree the Saxon culture and civilization. 

One of the most remarkable pieces entered into our museum heritage by donation, in 

1951, is the triptych altar that belonged to the Lutheran Church of Cincşor. Viktor Roth, 

the Saxon art historian dated it in his work Siebengurgische Altare, published in 1916 at 

Strassburg, back to 1655. The triptych altar is important from a documentary and artistic 

point of view because of the rarity of this kind of altar in the panel painting in 

Transylvania. The construction is simple: a triptych made up of a central panel and two 

wings painted on both sides. The iconography is dedicated to the Passion of Jesus. Closed 

during the week, the folding panels present on their outer face four scenes, distributed in 

two registers, from The Passion of Jesus - Judas' Betrayal, Peter's Threefold Denial, 

Christ Judged by Anna and Caiaphas, The Taunting. 

Opened on Sunday, the wings revealed on their inner side other four scenes from The 

Passion: Jesus judged by Herod, Pilate Washing His Hands, The Flagellation, The 

Crucifixion of Jesus. These scenes, presented in an isomorphic repetition, are framed by a 

semicircular frame that is gold plated. 

1 Tara Făgăraşului Museum, Făgăraş, Romania.

348 


The lateral wings are attached to a lime wood frame and decorated with sculpted 

elements. They are attached to the frame by metal hinges that give them mobility for 

viewing the paintings on both sides. Recently restored to the regional laboratory of The 

ASTRA National Museum Complex, restoration that lasted more than two years, the 

shrine has regained lost beauty. 

In general simply organized with small figures, the secondary scenes manage to create, 

according to the historical moment depicted, a profound and dramatic feeling, the color 

contributing also to this impression. This is dark, but with a particular brightness of the red 

tones. The color intensity is highlighted, at the scenes on the intrados of the wings, by the 

semicircular golden frame. The anonymous painter renders carefully enough the clothing and 

weapons of the soldiers, being inspired by his period examples. The altar painting is not of high 

quality, but the center stage is more exquisite, especially the image of the Virgin Mary and Jesus 

crucified. The items that we relate to the Renaissance not appear in the actual painting of the 

altar, but in the decorative elements accompanying the panel painting. 

Because lack of documentation and the impossibility to make detailed analyzes and 

comparisons, it is difficult to know who was the painter of the altar, which was probably 

made by a local carpenter and painted by a priest with artistic ambitions in painting. 

An important component of Saxon heritage museum is represented by the decorative 

ceramics made by potters’ guilds in southern Transylvania, guilds arising since the 

second half of the 14 th century (1376). Taking European models, the Saxon potters made a 

wide range of vessels (plates, cups, jugs etc.) using a variety of different techniques: the 

Saschiz ceramic with the graffito technique, the Drăguşeni ceramic painted with a horn 

and a brush in a Baroque style, putting the cobalt blue floral motifs all over the surface. 

Well represented in the collection is the ceramic made at Braşov by the Saxon potters 

who were documentarily attested around 1500. This has a decorative work formed by 

blue vertical lines with cobalt blue. In 1743, the Potters Guild of Sibiu made one of the 

most valuable pieces of preserved Saxon pottery: a jug that belongs to the museum since 

1966. The decorative motive is “the apple of garnet” and a German text is printed on it: 

“Drink and eat and do not forget God. Long live the good souls!” The ceramic collection 

also comprises pieces made at Rupea in the first half of the 19 th century or by the Potters 

Guild of CârŃa, whose last member died in 1907. Besides the Saxon decorative ceramics, 

which has sparked interest among collectors and art professionals because of its beauty 

and originality, the Saxon potters have produced a variety of stove tiles, decorated in the 

same manner as the ceramic pieces. 

The Saxon painted furniture, part of an interior that is a form of identity affirmation, finds a 

well-defined place in the patrimony of the museum: dowry chest (considered the oldest and 

most important piece), the chest of drawers made under the influence of the Biedermaier style, 

the massive wooden table, pegs on which decorative ceramics was put, the bed. Those pieces 

were made during the second half of the 18th century and the 19th century. The furniture 

painting with Renaissance floral motives and garlands with fluttering ribbons taken from 

baroque decoration, with a generous color range, free drawn or using a template, was made at 

the beginning of the 18th century under the influence of the two main cities of the region: 

Braşov and Sibiu, more responsive to the Central European fashion due to the constant 

economical exchanges and the circulations of people and ideas. 

Brought from Western Europe since the 13 th century and settled in some parts of 

Transylvania, the Saxons preserved the rural habitat specific to different areas. The 

conservative tendencies were very strong especially in the aspect of the costume; this

Elena BAJENARU: Valuable Pieces of the Saxon Civilization in the Patrimony … 349 

bears representative elements of the Saxon civilization and is well individualized in the 

patrimony of our museum. The Saxon clothes of the collection are different, e.g. the 

girdle of the embroidered peasant blouse, the cloak for going to church (kirchenmantel), the 

velvet cylinder of the confirmed girls, the mourning black silk bonnet with embroidery, the 

mantle of the finest cloth with velvet and lace, the men's sheepskin coat embroidered with silk 

and red leather applications. An identity element, the Saxon folk costume is sumptuous in 

ornaments, chromatically rich and beautifully cut. These characteristics of the Saxon costume 

were determined by certain factors, in which the contact with the urban civilization and the 

economical possibilities were the most important. 

Some pieces of our patrimony present influences of the medieval period and the 

Renaissance: shirt with wrinkles around the neck, chest buckle (Heftel), black wrinkled 

coat (Krauser Mantel), velvet cylinder worn by girls, embossing metal belt. The round 

buckle is the oldest Saxon ornament, that can be traced back in time to the Germanic 

round fibula of the 11 th century, made up of concentric zones and which can be 

considered the predecessor of the buckle from Transylvania. 

Due to the conservative sense of the Saxon community, the costumes changed very little over 

time, its development being influenced by the specific economic and historical conditions. 

A special place in the museum collection, but also as part of the Sunday’s best, is occupied by 

jewelries that began part of the folk costume especially after its disappearance from the 

patricians clothing. The most interesting pieces acquired by the museum are the hair needles, the 

buckle worn on the chest (Heftel), the belt (Gürtel). These ornaments, made by Braşov 

silversmiths' guild, guild attested in 1511 and which was famous throughout Transylvania, were 

made using the repoussé technique and engraved with floral decoration in the Renaissance style 

and then following the morphological and stylistic line of the Baroque. The materials used for 

these objects from the patrimony of our museum are gold-plated silver or brass, combining glass 

crystals with turquoises. 

The patrimony of the museum preserves some mowers made by the guilds of Braşov in 

the second half of the 18 th century. The art of tin casting was brought in Transylvania by 

Saxon settlers from the Rhine region in the 14 th and 15 th centuries. This technique 

practiced in Transylvanian cities was amplified by the use of European craftsmen in our 

area or the interests of the wealthy people who brought foreign professionals to exercise 

their skills. Our heritage does not contain spectacular pieces, it falls within the limits of 

modesty, simplicity and balance between technical feasibility, design and aesthetic 

mentality of the market in the second half of the 18 th century. 

Appreciated as a sign of wealth and of the social class, the tin objects from the 

collection of the museum (a diverse morphological range: plates, platters etc.) certifies 

the identity of an artistic craft and the integration of the Transylvanian production in the 

circuit of European values. 

Throughout its existence, the museum has acquired, or received as a donation, Saxon 

fabrics - tablecloths, pillowcases, towels etc. - worked on the loom at home and decorated 

either with exquisite handmade motifs in a monochromatic tonality (red or black) or 

embroidered on the wire. These pieces were made from the mid-nineteenth century to the 

middle of the last century. We have to make mention of the wall tissues embroidered with 

iconic texts of the Bible, texts that introduce us to a world of the Divine Word authority, 

which always led the Saxon community life. There is a semantic relationship between the 

living space, viewed in its existential dimension, and the religious representations specific 

to the mentality of the Saxon rural communities.

350 


Emil Sigerus wrote in 1906 in the preface of a folder with Transylvanian Saxon flax 

embroidery patterns: “a collection of old patterns and embroidery on canvas is as a 

collection of stories and wise sayings that have been told long time ago, but now 

disappeared. What remains are indecipherable letters and their ornamental forms. The 

embroidery on canvas reflects the peasant’s behavior, his Sunday clothes, his gestures, his 

gait, and many others aspects." 

The museum acquired pieces related to the existence of the Saxon guilds - guild chests, seals, 

convocation boards, regulations or statutes, guilds that worked in Făgăraş or surroundings. 

The development of the crafts as a result of diversification and the specialization of 

jobs, of the ample effort to construct the fortifications systems around the towns were the 

factors which assured the numerical development of guilds, which from the moment of 

their legal recognition were considered entities of public right capable of rights and 

responsibilities, exteriorized through symbols, having an independent patrimony from the 

one of its members. For example, in our city, since 1598 until 1873 existed 19 guilds. 

The guilds’ chests, where were kept guild’s privilege, different documents, money or 

seals, from museum’s patrimony, belonged to shoemakers’ guild – 17th century ( with the 

privilege from 1598 ), Saxon curriers’ guild 1845, furriers’ guild from Cincu – 1832 

which has on the interior an inscription with guild’s counsel, wheelwrights’ guild, 

upholsterers’ guild – middle of the 19th century. 

The guild’s statutes, which represents a series of articles composed by the members of 

the guild, each undertaking to respect the rights of the other one and of all together, for 

the good progress of the profession and defending the common interest in a moral 

purpose and mutual aid, are found in our museum’s patrimony, even if those are of the 

curriers, or spinners, statutes written at the beginning of the 19th century. 

Therefore, in the course of their living in Transylvania, the Saxons have created a 

society which for the other ethnic groups – Romanians or Hungarians – represented an 

example, a model. 

This year, our museum organizes, as part of the project called „Together” in which will be 

presented the communities near Făgăraş, a temporary exhibition dedicated to Saxon society 

and to the values that they have created in the course of their living in Transylvania. 

Bibliography 

1. Iulius Bieltz, Portul popular al saşilor din Transilvania, Ed. de Stat pentru Literatură 

şi artă, 1956. 

2. Vasile DrăguŃ, Arta gotică în România, Ed. Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1979. 

3. Ligia Fulga coord., Saşi despre ei înşişi, vol.I, Ed. Transilvania Expres, Braşov, 2008. 

4. Lorand Madly, De la privilegiu la uniformizare. Saşii transilvăneni şi autorităŃile 

austriece în deceniul neoabsolutist 1849-1860, Presa Universitară Clujană, 2008. 

5. Gheorghe Mitran, Cositorul transilvănean, Ed. C2 DESIGN, Braşov, 2002. 

6. Idem, Arta aurarilor în Transilvania, Braşov, 2003. 

7. Gheorghe Mitran, Raluca Moscaliuc, Protejarea patrimoniului cultural mobil, 

Braşov, 2011. 

8. Thomas Nagler, Românii şi saşii până la 1848, Ed. Thausib, Sibiu, 1997. 

9. George Oprescu, Bisericile cetăŃi ale saşilor din Ardeal, Ed.Academiei, Bucureşti, 1957. 

10. Karla Roşca, Horst Klusch, Ceramica din Transilvania, Ed. Honterus, Sibiu, 2010. 

11. CIBINIUM, 2011, Ed.ASTRA Museum, Sibiu, 2011. 

12. Nicolae Sabău, Metamorfoze ale barocului transilvănean.Pictura, Ed. Mega, 

Cluj-Napoca, 2005.


8 th AMENDMENT TO THE STASI 

RECORDS ACT OF 2011 

Jens BIENERT 1 

The Stasi Records Act of 1991 provides the legal framework for granting the various 

forms of access to the records of the Stasi. In accordance with strict legal regulations it 

allows private individuals, institutions, researchers and media representatives the 

access to the records for various purposes. The Stasi Records Act defines the legal 

requirements for granting access to the records for potential victims of the Stasi or for 

near relatives of affected persons. The Department of the Federal Commissioner for 

the Stasi Archives preserves and protects the archives of the Stasi, the secret police 

and intelligence organisation of the German Democratic Republic. This department is 

a federal agency of the reunified Germany. In 2011, conflict occurred on the matter 

that there were almost 50 ex-Stasi-employees among the staff at the office of the 

Federal Commissioner. This conflict was addressed by the 8th Amendment to the Stasi 

Records Act of 2011. Essential contents of this amendment law are: easier access to 

Stasi records for near relatives of affected persons, expansion of the group of civil 

servants subject to examination of past Stasi-activities and removal of former Stasiemployees 

from the office of the Federal Commissioner. The conflict between the 

interests of potential victims of the Stasi and personal rights of ex-Stasi-employees 

among the staff at the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives is 

highlighted in this article. 

2. Historical Background 

The first freely elected parliament of the German Democratic Republic paved the 

way for the protection and the controlled access to the archives of the Stasi. Since 

1991, the Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives preserves 

and protects the archives of the Ministry for State Security of the former GDR, clears 

the past crimes of the former Stasi, and provides for public access to the Stasi files. In 

addition, the Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives preserves 

documents concerning the history of the GDR-opposition and the victims of Stasi 

activities. 

The Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives is a federal 

agency of the reunified Germany. The Stasi was the Ministry for State Security of the 

former German Democratic Republic, the intelligence service and secret police of the 

GDR. 

1 Law Institute, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg.

352 


Approximately 90 000 employees and 150 000 unofficial informants 2 inside the East- 

German society worked for the Stasi. 3 

With the German Reunification in 1990 a Special Emissary for the Stasi Archives, Dr. 

Joachim Gauck, was appointed. In 1991, the Department of the Federal Commissioner 

was officially founded and the position of the Special Emissary was renamed Federal 

Commissioner for the Stasi Archives. 

The department was established by Dr. Joachim Gauck. 4 Since 2000, the department 

was directed by Marianne Birthler. Since March 2011, the department is directed by 

Roland Jahn. 5 

The Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives is independent in the execution of his 

office and subject only to law. The department sees itself as a modern service institution 

which works transparently for the people. 6 In 1992, the Stasi records were made available 

for the general public. 7 Since then, every person has the right to inspect those files of the 

archives which were compiled individually by the Stasi on this person. 

In 2011, there were about 1825 men and women who work for the Federal 

Commissioner. 8 In 2011, conflict occurred on the matter that there were approximately 50 

ex-Stasi-employees among the staff at the office of the Federal Commissioner for the 

Stasi Archives. 9 This conflict was addressed by the 8th Amendment to the Stasi Records 

Act. 

The Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives has five functions 

to fulfil: It has to preserve the records of the Stasi in its archives. It allows access to them 

for various purposes to private individuals, institutions and the public in accordance with 

strict legal regulations. It has the task of instructing the public on the dictatorship of the 

state party of the GDR, the SED. 10 For that purpose it does historical, political, judicial, 

and social research. It provides information on the history of the dictatorship of the SED 

in events, exhibitions, and on the internet. 11 The heart of the department is the archive. 12 It 

documents the methods of the regime and the knowledge of the power of the SED and of 

its secret police. The archive contains files, index cards, films, and audio documents. 

2 

More detailed information on the definition of unofficial informants: Lindheim, DtZ 1993, p.358. 

3 

Thereto: Eberle, DtZ 1992, p. 263. 

4 

Detailed information: http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/ 

AufgabenUndStruktur/_node.html;jsessionid=0B6FD9F99E40D9782290DED7FF3F46D0.2_c 

id134. 

5 

Thereto: http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/Bundesbeauftragter 

/_node.html. 

6 

More detailed information: http://www.bstu.bund.de. 

7 

BT-Drs. 16/9875, p. 6, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/BKM/2008-06-18fortschreibung-gedenkstaettenkonzepion-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 

8 th 

10 Activity Report 2011 of the Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives, 

p. 24: http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/Taetigkeitsberichte/ 

10_taetigkeitsbericht_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 

9 

Exact information: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/stasiunterlagengesetz106.html; 

http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/stasiunterlagengesetz100.html; 

http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article942919/Fuehrung-der-Birthler-Behoerde-in- 

Bedraengnis.html. 

10 

BStU, VIZ 2003, p. 571. 

11 In addition: http://www.bstu.bund.de. 

12 BStU, VIZ 2003, S. 570.

Jens BIENERT: 8 th Amendment to the Stasi Records Act of 2011 353 

The Stasi had records on some 6 million people. It is one of the largest archives in 

Germany with a total of approximately 180,000 linear metres of records. 13 Additionally, 

there are more than 15,000 bags with shredded documents. 14 

3. Stasi Records Act 

At the end of 1991, the Stasi Records Act provided the legal framework for the various 

forms of the inspection of files. The German legislator had decided to open and to use the 

records. Individuals can inspect their files to see how the Stasi determined their fate. 

Scholars and journalists can also request access to the files for historic research. Public 

agencies and a few private institutions are allowed to use the Stasi-files for examination 

whether a person was formerly an official employee or an unofficial informant of the Stasi or 

not. So information from the Stasi-archives can prohibit that ex-Stasi-employees manage to 

infiltrate secretly state authorities. The law of 1991 allowed the examination of persons only 

in higher functions and leading positions. Since 1991 up to the middle of the year of 2012, 

about 6.751.348 applications for information, for inspection of files, and for decoding of the 

real names of unofficial informants of the Stasi were submitted, including applications for 

examination whether a person was an official employee or an unofficial informant of the 

Stasi or not. In 2011, about 80.611 applications of citizens were still worked on. 15 

3.1. The application for private inspection of files 

Every individual has the right to ask the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archive 

whether there is information on his person in the documents or not. If there are 

documents found on somebody, access is granted. Every person has the right to inspect 

those documents which were compiled individually on his person. 16 

3.2. Access to files for scholars and journalists 

The Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives supports historical research, press, radio, 

media and facilities for political education in the historical and political reconstruction of the 

activities of the Stasi, and of the regime of the former GDR. Under certain legal 

requirements access is allowed to scholars and journalists. Applications from established 

research institutions, such as universities, are approved without further examination. 17 

13 

More detailed information about the return of Stasi files to Germany: 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/703303.stm. 

14 

Detailed information: http://www.bstu.bund.de; Bundestag, VIZ 2004, p. 107; 

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/17/technology/back-togetheragain.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm;http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/puzzlingtogether-the-past-new-computer-program-to-reassemble-shredded-stasi-files-a-482136.html. 

15 

See: http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/BStUZahlen/_node.html; see 

also the number of applications up to 31.12.2007: BT-Drs. 16/9875, p. 6: 

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/BKM/2008-06-18-fortschreibunggedenkstaettenkonzepion-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 

16 

Further information about the access to Stasi files: Bienert, in: Calvary – Deportations and 

Destinies, p. 171 (176). 

17 

About the access to Stasi files on holders of political offices: BVerwG, 8.3.2002 - 3 C 46/01, 

NJW, p. 1815; VG Berlin, 4.7.2001 – 1 A 389/00, NJW 2001, p. 2987; Arndt, NJW 2001, p. 

2948; Arndt, NJW 2004, p. 3157; Geerlings/Küas, DVBL 2001, p. 1642.

354 


3.3. Applications of public agencies and a few private institutions 

The access to the archives of the Stasi for public agencies and for a few private 

institutions is also regulated. The examination whether a person was an official employee 

or an unofficial informant of the Stasi or not is possible. According to the Stasi Records 

Act of 1991, only members of the Federal Government or of a Federal State 

Government, elected representatives and local elected officials, only persons who 

accepted leading positions in public service (e.g. director of offices) could be 

examined, as well as judges. The employees of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi 

Archives might also be subject to examination to clarify whether they worked for the 

Stasi or not. 18 

3.4. Access to files for near relatives of missing or dead persons 

According to the Stasi Records Act of 1991, the documents on missing or dead persons 

were only accessible for a specific group of persons and the access was limited for certain 

purposes. Generally, the files of missing or dead persons were not accessible. However, 

there were exceptions for near relatives of affected persons (near relatives are i.e. 

spouses, children, grandchildren, parents). Access was granted only in questions on 

vindication or on the determination of the fate of a missing or dead person. Personal 

interests did not establish a right of access (i.e. family research). 19 

4. 8 th Amendment to the Stasi Records Act of 2011 

At the end of December 2011, the Stasi Records Act was reformed by the 8th 

Amendment to this act. Essential contents of this 8th Amendment of the statute are: 

Easier access to Stasi-files for near relatives of affected persons, expansion of the 

group of civil servants subject to examination of past Stasi activities and removal of 

former Stasi-employees from the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi 

Archives. 20 

4.1. Easier Access to files for near relatives of missing or dead persons 

Near relatives can gain now easy access to the files of missing or dead persons if 

interests of other people whichever deserve protection are not prevailing. 21 Sufficient for 

access is legitimate interest in the practice and proceedings of the SED dictatorship. More 

and more, young Germans want to see Stasi-files of relatives. They are interested if their 

parents or grandparents have spied for the Stasi or if they were, on the other hand, 

themselves victims of the GDR Secret Service. 22 

18 

More detailed information about the access to Stasi files: Bienert, in: Calvary – Deportations 

and Destinies, p. 171 (179). 

19 

Thereto: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-junge-deutsche-wollenstasi-akten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html. 

20 

See the overview of the amendment law: http://www.bstu.bund.de/ DE/Bundesbeauftragte 

UndBehoerde/Rechtsgrundlagen/StUG/StUG_novelle_2011/stug_novelle_node.html. 

21 

BT-Drs. 17/5894, p. 6, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a22/berichte/Stasi- 

Unterlagen-Gesetz/gesetzentwurf.pdf. 

22 

In addition: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-junge-deutsche-wollenstasi-akten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html.


Since the beginning of 2012, the Department of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi 

Archives observes an application rush of near relatives. 23 Young people want to work off 

their family history with the help of the files. For relatives of former GDR citizens it is 

now easier to clear up the family history also with the help of the Department of the 

Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives. The increasing number of applications for 

inspection of records on dead persons shows that the next generation wants to know how 

their parents have lived. 

The increase of the applications is very clear. During the first two months in 2011, 

about 640 of such applications were put at the authority. They had to be often turned 

down because the legal basis for an inspection of records was missing. In January and 

February 2012, the number of these applications has nearly doubled (there were about 

1135 applications). 24 Now the prospects of success are better. Near relatives could ask for 

the old law merely in special cases or with juridical discussions for information. Since 

2011, examination can be also granted to them if it is a matter quite in general concerning 

the influencing control of the Stasi on a family destiny. 25 

4.2. Expansion of the group of employees which might be examined for Stasi 

activities 

The 8th Amendment to the Stasi Records Act expands the group of employees in the 

civil service which may be examined in order to reveal former Stasi activities. 

Employees, which exercise a leading function, can be checked in future already from 

lower salary groups than before. 26 Besides, an examination is allowed for each employee 

in civil service if facts justify the suspicion of an activity for the Stasi. The examination 

terms which would have run out, otherwise, to the end of the year in 2011 are extended 

up to 2019. 27 

4.3. Employment ban on former employees of the Stasi 

Finally, the amendment law of 2011 intends an employment ban on former fulltime 

employees and on former unofficial informants of the Stasi within the office of 

the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives. A small group of ex-Stasiemployees 

and of unofficial informants were intentionally hired in the office of the 

Federal Commissioner. The new statute allows to move these ex-Stasi-employees to 

equivalent jobs in other federal authorities taking into account the reasonability in 

particular cases. 

23 More detailed information: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-jungedeutsche-wollen-stasi-akten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html. 

24 Thereto: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-junge-deutsche-wollenstasi-akten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html. 

25 See: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-junge-deutsche-wollen-stasiakten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html. 

26 BT-Drs. 17/5894, p. 6, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a22/berichte/Stasi- 

Unterlagen-Gesetz/gesetzentwurf.pdf. 

27 In addition: http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/bundespraesident-wulffunterzeichnet-stasi-unterlagen-gesetz_aid_697126.html.

356 

5. Justification of the 8 th Amendment to the Stasi Records Act of 2011 


The new law was justified as follows: The access to the Stasi archives belongs to the 

most important instruments of understanding the GDR dictatorship. The need for 

inspection of the Stasi archives of citizens, scholars and journalists is still unbroken. 

The application figures are furthermore at a high level. To strengthen the confidence 

in public institutions and to ensure transparency, the circle of employees that might 

be examined for Stasi activities is expanded in the civil services. 28 An essential 

intention of the Stasi Record Act is to provide trust in democratic institutions and in 

the constitutional state. The purpose of the new employment ban on former 

employees of the Stasi is to create trust and to give respect to the victims. Besides, the 

new regulation pursues the aim to release the employees of the Federal Commissioner 

for the Stasi Archives from the general suspicion of former Stasi cooperation. 29 The 

risk should be excluded that victims of the Stasi system do not turn to the office of 

the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives up to now, because of the activity of 

former Stasi-employees at this office. 30 It is not much expected from the ex-Stasiemployees 

of the office of the Federal Commissioner. They should change merely to 

another federal authority on the same payment for their job. 31 The new § 37a of the 

Stasi Records Act is valid for former full-time employees as well as for former 

informants of the Stasi. It should be made sure that the former unofficial informants 

who have hidden their activity for the Stasi are not allowed to work for the office of 

the Federal Commissioner any longer. The intention of the new § 37a of the Stasi 

Records Act is to make the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives 

to a Stasi-free zone. 32 

If Stasi victims had to suffer still today from the results of the spying, it is reasonable to 

members of the Stasi to change their place of work under retention of all claims. It was 

argued that the new regulation gives transparency and confidence in the employees of the 

civil service. It was called intolerable for the victims of the Stasi if they meet former 

members of the Stasi in the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives .33 

No victim should have to sit opposite to a former employee of the Stasi. 34 The 

consequence is that almost 50 former employees of the Stasi have to leave the office of 

the Federal Commissioner. 


Unterlagen-Gesetz/bericht.pdf. 





31 See also: http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/bundespraesident-wulff-unterzeichnetstasi-unterlagen-gesetz_aid_697126.html. 



33 More detailed information: http://www.fr-online.de/politik/bundestag-stasi-unterlagen- 

gesetz,1472596,10921544.html. 

34 Thereto: http://www.fr-online.de/politik/bundestag-stasi-unterlagen-gesetz, 1472596, 

10921544.html.


6. Conclusion 

However, there was protest against this amendment law. The criticism is about the 

planned sacking of the ex-members of the Stasi from the agency. It was criticized that the 

8th Amendment to the Stasi Records Act forms a piece of single case legislation, which is 

back-leading de facto. The retrospective effect of the amendment law is in terms of 

constitutional law highly problematic. 35 The former employees of the Stasi work 

meanwhile for 20 years in the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives 

and they would have done nothing wrong. 36 

The former Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives Dr. Joachim Gauck clearly 

criticised the decision the present Federal Commissioner Roland Jahn. The decision not to 

employ former members of the Stasi any more in the office would be wrong. The former 

regulation which enabled to employ also some former members of the Stasi would be 

right. The people who have served the constitutional state about 20 years would be 

concerned. 37 During 20 years, a consensus of all groups in the German Parliament about 

the Stasi Records Act would have existed. The ex-Stasi-employees were hired in the 

office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives and they were selected with 

care. 38 Only employees who had helped in the final stage of the GDR civil rights activists 

were selected. 39 All together they were less than 20 people in the whole former GDR. 40 

These people had betrayed neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the office of the 

Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives. According to Dr. Joachim Gauck, we knew 

the past and we needed the competence of former employees of the Stasi to fulfil our 

duties better. 

Strongly worded: In the interests of the victims it was inevitable to cooperate with 

specialists of the Stasi. 41 


I thank Dr. jur. Edgar Rose for his valuable support. 

References 

1. Arndt, C.: Die Herausgabe von Stasi-Unterlagen Prominenter. In: NJW 2004, 

pp. 3157-3159. 

2. Arndt, C.: Stasi-Unterlagen Prominenter. In: NJW 2001, pp. 2948-2950. 

3. Bienert, J.: Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives – The conflict between 

research interests and personal rights. In: Calvary – Deportations and Destinies, 

International Symposium`s Proceedings, Helerea/Mailat/Olteanu (Ed.), Fagaras, 

Tansilvania University Press of Brasov, Brasov, Romania, 2010, pp. 171-186. 

35 Detailed information on the protest by Socialdemocrats, Greens and the left-winged Party: 

http://www.fr-online.de/politik/bundestag-stasi-unterlagen-gesetz,1472596,10921544.html. 

36 See: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/stasiunterlagengesetz106.html; http://www.fr-online.de/ 

politik/ bundestag-stasi-unterlagen-gesetz,1472596,10921544.html. 

37 Thereto: http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Gauck-warnt-vor-Nostalgie-Nebel-article5081826.html. 

38 See: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/stasiunterlagengesetz106.html. 

39 Thereto: http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Gauck-warnt-vor-Nostalgie-Nebel-article5081826.html. 

40 More information: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/stasiunterlagengesetz106.html. 

41 See: http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Gauck-warnt-vor-Nostalgie-Nebel-article5081826.html.

358 


4. BStU: Aufarbeitung einer Diktatur ist eine Generationsaufgabe. In: VIZ 2003, 

p. 570. 

5. BStU: Schüler und Schülerinnen sollen zur Auseinandersetzung mit der DDR- und 

MfS-Geschichte motiviert werden. In: VIZ 2003, pp. 571-572. 

6. Bundestag, Große Mehrheit für neue Regionalstruktur der Stasi-Unterlagenbehörde. 

In: VIZ 2004, p. 107. 

7. Eberle, C.-E.: Journalistischer Umgang mit Stasi-Unterlagen – Rechtliche Aspekte. 

In: DtZ, 1992, pp. 263-265. 

8. Geerlings, J./Küas, C.: Der Streit um die Herausgabe von Stasiunterlagen. In: 

DVBl 2001, pp. 1642-1648. 

9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/703303.stm. Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

10. http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/Taetigkeitsberichte/10 

_taetigkeitsbericht_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Accessed: 15-07-2012. 

11. http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Home/home_node.html. Accessed: 12-07-2012. 

12. http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a22/berichte/Stasi-Unterlagen- 

Gesetz/gesetzentwurf.pdf. Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

13. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/BKM/2008-06-18fortschreibung-gedenkstaettenkonzepion-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 

Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

14. http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/bundespraesident-wulffunterzeichnet-stasi-unterlagen-gesetz_aid_697126.html. 

Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

15. http://www.fr-online.de/politik/bundestag-stasi-unterlagengesetz,1472596,10921544.html. 

Accessed: 17-07-2012. 

16. http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Gauck-warnt-vor-Nostalgie-Nebel-article5081826.html. 

Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

17. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/17/technology/back-togetheragain.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 

Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

18. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/puzzling-together-the-past-newcomputer-program-to-reassemble-shredded-stasi-files-a-482136.html. 

Accessed: 14- 

07-2012. 

19. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ddr-immer-mehr-junge-deutsche-wollenstasi-akten-von-verwandten-einsehen-a-820691.html. 

Accessed: 12-07-2012. 

20. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/stasiunterlagengesetz106.html. Accessed: 12-07- 

2012. 

21. http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/stasiunterlagengesetz100.html. Accessed: 14-07- 

2012. 

22. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article942919/Fuehrung-der-Birthler- 

Behoerde-in-Bedraengnis.html. Accessed: 14-07-2012. 

23. v. Lindheim, T..: Zum Begriff der Zusammenarbeit des inoffiziellen und 

hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiters mit dem MfS. In: DtZ, 1993, pp. 358-361.

POSSIBILITIES TO RESEARCH 

COMMUNISM IN SEVERAL 

EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 

Péter BLAZOVICH 1 

Now, 23 years after the transition, it is still an actual question, how the governments of 

the ex-communist countries should handle the secret documents of the communism. 

There are several approaches to the above issue: according to several opinions the past 

should be revealed without any limitations, so the violators/agents could be impeached; 

others think that the complete reveal would be not fair, as many documents – mainly the 

ones related to the top-servants of the communist system – have disappeared or have been 

exterminated, so the “fat cats” cannot be found or impeached now. And it is worth to 

mention, that many of the former agents and the concerned people are still alive – so a 

law regulating the reveal of documents has to respect the personal rights. 

There are still heavy disputes about the above issue. In the majority of the countries of 

the former Eastern bloc it is still a daily political and/or social issue, what to do with the 

remaining files. The remaining part of the documents is not complete in any of the 

countries: many documents have been exterminated or disappeared in the communist 

period, or later, during the transition. Furthermore, there are still many files kept in secret 

by the existing State Security organs. The personal data (containing the files related to the 

sexual life or the health condition of the concerned people) limit the possibilities of the 

researches and even more their publication. 

It is worth to examine, how the several ex-communist countries approach to the 

researching possibilities of their communist past. 

Germany 

The Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives (Bundesbeauftragte für die 

Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen 

Republik – BstU) was founded parallel with the German Reunification, on the 3 rd of 

October 1990 by the parliament. Nowadays there work about 1700 employees and there 

are about 111000 linear meters of files stored. 

Furthermore, there are about 16 thousand sacks of torn paper-documents that were to be 

exterminated at the time of the transition, but thanks to the occupation of the Stasi centre 

that couldn’t be executed. 

The experts of the BStU work on the reconstruction of the above mentioned, halfdestroyed 

original documents, which has drawn the interest of other countries, too. 


360 


In January 1990 the participants of the demonstration, who occupied the Stasi centre 2 , 

found about 17000 sacks of files there – torn sheets of paper, cardboards, photos, audiotapes 

and films – prepared to be exterminated. After supervising the content of the sacks 

from the Stasi centre and from other further Stasi affiliates, there are about 16000 sacks 

of files, which they started to reconstruct manually in 1995 3 . It has to be highlighted, that 

the documents were not shredded, but only torn to pieces. According to the preliminary 

estimations and the first trials of reconstruction this “puzzle” could long for even 600 

years (!), so the German parliament and government started to support the creation of an 

informatics solution in 2000, to accelerate the process in a cost-efficient way. The 

consortium, established in 2003 for the execution of the task, made a study of realization, 

according to which the approximately 600 million pieces of papers could be reconstructed 

within 5 years, by the scanning of the originals and arranging them with software, 

specially developed for this. To realize the reconstruction, 100 computers should run at 

the same time. The monumental, but extremely expensive program is in experimental 

phase, the first results will influence the decision about the reconstruction of the 

remaining 15 thousand sacks. 

The rights of the concerned people 

According to the above mentioned regulation everybody has the right to introspect the 

files that had been made by the Ministry of State Security of Eastern Germany 4 . But this 

entitlement doesn’t mean unlimited introspection to every file about the concerned. The right 

is limited by the protection of personal rights of the other people, included in the files. 

During the preparation of the documents these data are covered and made nameless. At the 

same time the official employees and co-operators of the state security organs are not 

protected the above way, according to a separate request the office resolves their code-name, 

and can inform the concerned people about the identifying data of the person with the codename. 

This kind of information is not provided, if the employee of the state security was less 

than 18 years old. According to the relating regulation the right for information extends to 

the identification of the people, who had caused harm with their reports. 

However, the law, regulating the handling of Stasi-documents, considers it serious to 

protect the rights of the concerned and third faces (1. §). The personal data obtained by a 

secret way can not used for a purpose that would be disadvantageous to the concerned or 

the third faces. The measure sanctions with imprisonment every activity, by which any 

personal data protected by the law (44. §) is published. 

In the case of missing or dead people the close relatives are not automatically entitled 

to access to the files, only if the application for the introspection is justified. Such a case 

is, when the data are necessary for the protection of the personal law or the rehabilitation 

of the missing or dead person, or if the data are needed for the revealing of the reason for 

his disappearance. The researches on the family-history or to support a claim for a 

property are not included in the above justified cases. 

2 The films, that show, how the demonstrators, occupying the Stasi-building tear the documents in 

pieces, and disperse the pieces in the starcase, can be watched on the site of the Institute: 

www.bstu.bund.de (the latest download on the 11 th of June,: 2012) 

3 For more details about the work of the Institute see the site of the BStU 

4 About the operation of the Institute you can read Trócsányi, 2007: 83–91; and The European…, 

2009; www.bstu.bund.de (the latest download on the 11 th of June,: 2012).

Péter BLAZOVICH: Possibilities to Research Communism in Several Ex-Communist… 361 

Scientific or other researches 

The researching possibilities in the files of the BStU are reasonably different. 

As a principle everybody has the possibility to research in the files, but the researches, 

not supported by research workshops, universities or academic institutions, have to 

support their application for a research with a synopsis or a researching concept. 

The documents, not containing personal data, or made nameless, or giving well-known 

information, can be accessed and copied without any limitations. 

The data of the third faces and concerned people can be researched after having their 

written permission 5 . The personal data of formerly died persons can be researched after 

30 years. In the case of researches supported by an academy or a university it is possible 

to access to the personal data without covering the names, if the researcher can prove, that 

the requested data are essential for his research. However, generally the researchers 

cannot have the information about the personal data of the public faces. 

The data of the contemporary historical figures, politicians and public faces are 

regulated separately. One can research the information accessible for the public (public 

speeches), and the information, related to the public activity of the above mentioned 

people. It has to be highlighted, that the information, obtained by breaking the obligation 

of confidentiality 6 , prohibited interrogation or interception are also under strict limitation 

of researches. The BStU always informs the concerned person about the fact that 

somebody wanted to research his data, and also gives him the purpose of the research. 

The colleagues of the BStU can access to the files containing personal data in an easier 

way, but their activity is also regulated related to the publications. 

Publication 

For the office handling the Stasi documents there are no special measures requiring to 

the publication of the originals, registers or lists, so the institution doesn’t publish such 

documents on its website – except for some photos for illustration. There are no archiveguides 

on the site, either. It is possible to use the files only at the centre of the BStU or at 

a branch office of it, after the colleagues of the institutions had prepared them. According 

to the information from the colleagues of the BStU the publication of personal data or 

original documents on the internet is not compatible with the Privacy Regulations 7 . As a 

consequence even the researchers, having permission can not be given extra rights to 

research from afar. 

The Czech Republic 

There work 130 colleagues in the Czech Office of State Security, and there are 20000 

linear meters of documents stored there. The Czech regulations are quite similar to the 

Slovakian ones. And from the point view of the possibilities to research and publications 

it is the most permissive. 

5 The European…, 2009: 32. 

6 The BStU could get back more than 280000 copies of files, also containing the list of names of 

agents of HV A, from the USA in 2003. 

http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/Rosenholz/rosenholz_node.html (the latest 

download on the 10th of May, 2012) 

7 See: http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/BundesbeauftragteUndBehoerde/Aktuelles/Englisch-Text- 

Introduction.html?nn=1703834; Cseh, 2010: 3

362 



In the Czech Archive of the State Security the information-compensation of the former 

victims is regulated by the law no. 107/2002. According to that the concerned people can 

have introspect to the files relating to them, and they can get a copy of the documents. As 

there are no special criteria to become a researcher, at the Archive of Prague anybody can 

be considered as a researcher and handled in the same way. The cartons about the health 

of the members of the former State Security Authority can not be researched by the 

researchers or the citizens investigating about their own documents. 

Scientific and other researches 

Researches can placed without any support or “qualifying” process, everybody is 

entitled to research after signing the application for researching, accepting the rules 

regulating the process. The documents are not made nameless in the Czech Republic, 

however, the documents relating to the health of the members of the State Security 

Authority can not be examined. The situation is the same with the other health-related 

documents, issued by an official healthcare institution. At the same time the researchers 

undertake to handle all the documents keeping all the Privacy regulations. 

Publication 

The Czech Institute for state security and the archive widely publishes the operative 

registers, and the cartons of the officers and the people involved in the agents’ net. 

According to the information from the colleagues of the institute they have this 

possibility, because the majority of these registers have been published after the Slovakiarelated 

documents had been handed over to Bratislava. 

Up to February 2010 the cartons of the former civil intelligence’s officers were 

published (total 1350 pcs), just as the registers of the several files and also the registers of 

the civil and military security files. 

To avoid the accuses of manipulation the Institute Researching the Totalitarian Regimes 

publishes not lists, but the digitalized copies of the original cartons and registers, without 

any comments. 

According to their own point of view they don’t state of anybody to be a member of the 

StB, they only publish, that there are such documents in the archive. 

Hungary 

The Hungarian regulation is similar to the Polish. 

The Historical Archives of State Security employs about 100 colleague, and they store 

about 4000 linear meters of documents. 

According to the 2 nd paragraph of the Statute on III. Of 2003. the successor bodies of 

the organisation creating the documents is entitled to maintain the classification of the 

files, and don’t need to hand over them to the Historical Archive. According to the 

current estimations, based on the information of the State Security Service, 8% of all 

documents are covered by the above statute. 

The data of the 18 magnetic computer tapes, discovered by the Kenedy-committee can 

be also included in the above category. However, it is a fact, that these magnetic tapes 

don’t contain any original files, only administration records, arranged in a database. If the 

content of the above tapes were possible to discover, they wouldn’t become evidence.

Péter BLAZOVICH: Possibilities to Research Communism in Several Ex-Communist… 363 

The publication of them would draw legal action from the part of the concerned people, 

and their usage in scientific publication would be questionable due to the lack of original 

sources. According to the experience of the institutions, owning similar database can be 

used only as a guide supporting the researches; however that is important, too. 


Any Hungarian and foreign individuals can apply for introspection into the files that had 

been made of them by the state security organs. The introspection doesn’t entitle the 

concerned person to discover the personal data of others – within a certain period of 

protection - , except for the identifying data of the employees serving the former system, 

and the data, recorded on public events or the personal data that had been formerly 

published. 

After the death of the concerned person the bereaved (spouse, relatives, step-children, 

step parents, brothers) inherit the right for introspection. 

Scientific or other researches 

Doing scientific and private researches is possible at the Historical Archive. The 

research worker, who has the permission of the Archive Advisory Board can have an 

introspection to the personal data contained in the files and related to his research project, 

except for the data, related to the health-condition, the addictions and the sexual life of 

the concerned people. The researcher is entitled to get acquainted with the personal 

identifying data of the agents and official employees of the state security organisation. 

The private researchers can get acquainted with the personal data, except for the files 

recorded at public events, the data that had already been published in a legal way, or the 

data, necessary to the identification of the public faces being agents only after the 

protection period. 

Publication 

The relating regulation doesn’t oblige the Historical Archive to publish the original 

documents or registers, and the publishing possibilities are strictly limited. According to 

the 5 th § of the statute the personal data can be discovered by anybody only after the 

period of protection, except for the data related to the public events, the data, that had 

already been published earlier, or the identifying data of the public faces and the public 

agents. The Constitutional Court concreted the publication possibilities. In 2005 they 

made a decision upon the publication of the identifying personal data of the agents: as the 

researchers and also the concerned citizens can get to know the above data, there is no 

social need for the limitation of the basic right of publication. According to the 

regulations the archive cannot publish lists of agents, operative registers or originals with 

the personal data of the concerned. However, the data related to the career of the leading 

employees of the state security authority is being processed in its archontology database, 

also available on the internet.

364 

Summary 


Despite the legal regulation is different in the above countries, the principles of the 

relating measures – harmonizing with the European privacy principles – are quite similar 

from several aspects. Beyond the informational compensation and creation of the 

possibilities to introspect to the files, the legislatures intended to protect the personal data 

of the concerned: the data related to their private life, health-condition or sexual life. 

Consequently, there is no “file statute” in any of the above countries. The files are not 

fully published. The abuse with the personal data is punished with exclusion of the 

researches, or even imprisonment. 

Due to the above regulation none of the institutions make the documents fully 

accessible. Even the Czech and the Slovakian Institute, considered to be the most liberal, 

limits their publications to the operative and agent registers. It doesn’t publish files or 

documents, containing mass of personal data. In the aspect of the scientific research 

possibilities it seems to be right, that the “ones, starting later, going on faster”. In the 

archives, which were established later, they take less attention on the protection of the 

personal data of the concerned people, however, the legal sanctions are also included in 

the regulations. 

In general it can be stated, that the researchers face more administrative obstacles at 

the BStU, than at the Archive of Prague, for example, or even at the Hungarian Historical 

Archive. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CSEH 2010 

Cseh Gergı Bendegúz: State Security Panorama from Central-Eastern Europe. Publicity 

of the State Security documents in the former Socialist Countries. Betekintı, 1. sz. 

http://www.betekinto.hu/2010_1_cseh (the latest download: 8th May, 2012.). 

THE EUROPEAN…, 2009 

The „European Network of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret-Police Files”. A 

Reader on their Legal Foundations, Structures and Activities. Berlin, BStU, 

www.bstu.bund.de (the latest download: the 8th of May, 2012.). 

TRÓCSÁNYI 2007 

Trócsányi Sára: Revolution in the Archives. The legal aspect of the informational 

compensation. Budapest, Holnap Kiadó.

PERMANENT EXHIBITIONS 

IN BULGARIAN MEMORIAL MUSEUMS: 

POST-COMMUNIST NARRATIVES 

Vera BONEVA 1 

Abstract: The paper analyses the current status of the permanent exhibitions created and 

maintained at memorial museums in Bulgaria. Nowadays there are almost 80 memorial museums 

in the settlements and places related to the cultural and political history of the country. Most of 

these museums are dedicated to memory of some eminent persons that have left distinctive traces 

in national development during the last two centuries. In most cases these museums are sheltered 

in the authentic houses where the corresponding figure have been lived or worked over a 

significant period of time. Therefore the said type museums are called houses-museums. A part of 

the memorial exhibitions are devoted to the key historical events – mainly military battles which 

are crucial for the establishment of the Bulgarian statehood. 

Introduction 

Nowadays 201 museum institutions function in Bulgaria – national museums, regional 

museums, municipality museums, private museums. They are located in different 

villages, towns and cities which are related to certain historical events. Most of 

municipality and ethnographical museums feature the specifics of local history, folklore 

and cultural development. As a rule, museum exhibitions are thematically profiled. The 

general expositions, related to the entire chronology of national history exist only in the 

halls of the largest national and regional museums around the country. The biggest 

museums maintain more than one museum exhibitions. Usually museum narrative is 

centered on an important event, topic or person. Thus the total numbers of permanent 

exhibitions in the country reaches one relatively high figure – 294. Many exposures are 

linked to the settlements and regions in which there is millenary urban tradition – Sofia, 

Plovdiv, Varna, Stara Zagora, Kyustendil. A significant part of the museums are 

associated to archaeological and historical reserves or to complexes of immovable 

cultural sites. This is also true for the seven historical sites included in the UNESCO 

World Heritage List. 

Usually memorial museums are devoted to an eminent public figure or a great historical 

event which is represented in the exhibition and in the museum collection. These types of 

cultural institutions have appeared in Bulgaria before World War II. Their network 

widely expanded during the communist regime. In 1989 in the country there are about 

100 memorial museums. Some of them are related to the cult of communist activists and 

leftist intellectuals. Nowadays the number of this group of museums is reduced to 83. 

1 State University of Library Studies and Information Technologies, Sofia, Bulgaria.

366 


Few of them have not permanent exhibitions and therefore are not objects of this survey. 

In this study are examined 71 museums. All of them are dedicated to certain influential 

historical figure – mainly an artist or another public man /woman. Several museums are 

devoted to important families of intellectuals and politicians. The museums, devoted to 

some great historical events, are excluded from this data base. In Bulgaria they are not so 

many and as a rule they are parts of larger memorial complexes (museums, monuments, 

churches or monasteries, historical buildings local cultural centers – chitalishta, and 

architectural reserves). For this reason they would have to be object of more complex 

analyzes; therefore they have been excluded from this observation. 

In this text are explained some of my ideas about appearance of permanent exhibitions 

of a large numbers of Bulgarian memorial museums. Under the focus of my reflections 

are content highlights and aesthetic accents of museum narratives. I also take into account 

different types of links between the exposure and the corresponding cultural environment. 

The survey does not consider about small museum collections, open air museums, 

temporary exhibitions, autonomous monuments and memorial signs, connected to the 

public figures whose museums are subject of this interpretation. 

All museums in the presented data base are subsidiaries to largest state or municipal 

cultural institutions – national or regional museums, art galleries, municipal associations. 

There are not museums in this group which were created or ruled from private companies 

or citizen associations. According to the legislation on force, the Ministry of culture has 

significant controlling functions to the creation and maintenance of permanent 

exhibitions. However many exposures are obsolete and offer the audience unattractive 

museum content. The main reason for this situation is the result of the slow change of 

cultural paradigms in Bulgaria. Also it must be taken into account limited funding for 

museum activities both at national and local level. 

Museum subjects 

Main characters of the memorial exposures are prominent historical figures with an 

undoubted contribution to the national development in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. There is 

no museum dedicated to any public figures that had lived and worked until the late 18th 

century. Leading personalities of Bulgarian political and cultural revival are presented 

particularly strong in permanent museum exhibitions. Some figures are symbolically 

immortalized with three or two museums – Vasil Levski, Petko Slaveikov, Ivan Vazov, 

Zahari Stoyanov, Penyo Penev. Exhibitions dedicated to the statesmen of the 20 th century 

are a few. There are no museums of Bulgarian kings which governed the country during 

the period of Third Bulgarian Kingdom (1879-1946). The only one museum is dedicated 

to the ruler’s person. This is the museum of the Russian emperor Alexander II, known 

among Bulgarians with nickname Liberator. 

A considerable part of museums of communist leaders, which had functioned during the 

socialist period, were gradually closed until the end of 20 th century. Nowadays exist three 

of them as departments of Research institute of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Museums of 

the two leftist poets – Hristo Smirnenski and Nikola Vapzarov, remain components of 

existing Bulgarian museum network. As an unusual exception during the last decade the 

municipality in the town of Pravets continues to maintain and promote the memorial 

museum of ex-communist leader Todor Zhivkov.

Vera BONEVA: Permanent Exhibitions in Bulgarian Memorial Museums 367 

Most representative is the group of museums associated with the memory to influential 

artists – writers and poets, painters and sculptors, musicians and composers. Usually these 

types of cultural institutions have been created after a big donation of the artist’s heirs 

that includes building (or apartments), personal belongings, books, documents, copyright 

on book issues and music recordings, and other artifacts. Some memorial museums of this 

group are functioning as specific cultural centers. Except of care about permanent 

exhibition, the staff of these art museums organizes other events – symposiums, festivals, 

temporary exhibitions, concerts, educational programs. 

Only four are non-Bulgarian persons that have their own museums around the country – 

French poet Lamartine, Hungarian poet Laslo Nagi and Hungarian political leader Layosh 

Koshut, Russian emperor Alexander II. These prominent men resided for short spaces of 

time in Bulgarian towns (Plovdiv, Shumen, Smolyan, Pleven) and the local communities 

record this fact by special memorial museums. Mentioned institutions set up in the houses 

where strangers were staying during their Bulgarian trips. 

Outside those trends stand out few specific cases. Only one museum is devoted to an 

athlete – Dan Kolov (famous Bulgarian wrestler). Only two museums are devoted to 

clericals – archimandrite Neofit Rilski (educator, writer and linguist) and metropolitan 

Ilarion Makariopolski and Tarnovski (church movement leader). No personal museums 

dedicated to great soldiers or army officers. 

Only four are Bulgarian museums related to public activity of women. And four of them 

are too indicative – Raina Knyagina (Rayna the Prinsses – young teacher who participate 

in the April Uprising), Baba Vanga (famous blind prophet), Baba Iliytsa (ordinary women 

prototype of a novel’s character written by the writer Ivan Vazov), and Petya Dubarova 

(child poetess died when she was 17 years old after suicide). Some of women artists are 

presented on the general exhibitions or on the museums of their spouses – Peyo Yavorov 

Museum in the city of Sofia, Chudomir Museum in the town of Kazanlak, Stanka and 

Nikola Ikonomovi Museum in the town of Razgrad. 

Museums locations 

Almost all museums are situated in the in settlements and areas where the famous 

person was born, stayed for a short or for a long period of time. Native houses are 

strongly preferred. It is considered that the birth space, the work space or the living space 

of the great person is permeated by his spirit. As a rule the house of the public figure was 

restored or rebuilt strictly following the original. Before WWII the house of the national 

poet Ivan Vazov in the town of Sopot was reconstructed in this manner – on the base of 

memories of relatives and neighbors. 

Preference for native homes is the main cause that creates the popular name of these 

type museums – house museum (kashta-musey). Even in the cases in which the museum 

is situated in an apartment or in a modern building, the official name of the institution is 

the same – house-museum. The last statement refers to the Nikola Vaptsarov Museum in 

Sofia and to the Peyo Yavorov Museum in Sofia. These museums are situated in 

apartments where poets lived during their last years. 

Where is possible in the area of museum complex was being built and a separate 

modern building. In this building the museum staff arranges a modern exhibition – 

usually with documents, manuscripts, photographs, personal belongings. There are 

modern buildings constructed especially for museum purposes – Georgi Rakovski

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Museum in the town of Kotel, Vasil Levski Museum in the town of Lovech, Yordan 

Yovkov Museum in the town of Dobrich. In the halls of these museums experts maintain 

more factual exhibitions which contain significant amount of artifacts and documents. 

Representative and pleasant stone or bronze monuments often take place in the area of 

museum complex. 

Museum exhibitions 

Typically exhibitions are arranged in a traditional way. Most of them consist of two 

parts – a reconstruction of the antithetic interior and a classical museum exposure. 

Personal belongings of the famous person are key components of the museum narrative. 

The biographical facts are also described in relevant texts. In some cases copies of the 

original artifacts are exposed. This is valid for personalities which public cult is presented 

in several museums. Pieces of art, manuscripts, first editions of significant books, 

personal letters are strongly preferred as major components of museum exhibitions. There 

are some controversial exponents in the Bulgarian memorial museums. For example in 

the hall of the Aleko Konstantinov Museum in Svishtov the preserved heart of the great 

Bulgarian writer is shown in a glass vessel. 

The permanent exhibitions of memorial museums are highly contextual. Almost 

everywhere the local story and the concrete event are laid in the national frame. This 

repeatability gives some uniformity of the museum landscape. On the other hand the 

approach creates conditions for drawing larger historical images trough specific museum 

items. Furthermore the museum exhibitions reconstruct family contacts, strengths 

friendships, and professional clans around prominent personalities. 

The majority of Bulgarian museums trace the life and carrier of public personalities 

chronologically. The museum narrative focuses the attention of the audience on 

significant activities of the prominent historical figure. The emphasis is mostly 

achieved with traditional means – combination of text, photographs, and artifacts. 

The Bulgarian model of museum expression has a specific feature – a strong 

preference for facsimiles, documents, books. Thus museum exhibitions acquire the 

appearance of archival collections. In many cases museum exhibition highlights 

history events rather via texts than vision effects. This makes a significant part of the 

exposures boring for young people whose consciousness is obsessed with the vision 

and digital technology. 

Museum perspectives 

Memorial museums are highly appreciated in Bulgarian society. Their impact is 

connected to the cult of national heroes. Part of the museums is included in the system of 

celebration of public holidays. Museums of prominent artists – writers, musicians, 

painters – are centers of educational activities. Often the memorial museum is a major 

cultural institution in the area. This situation is typical for small towns and villages. For 

these reasons the museum network associated with memory to the great personalities 

should be strengthened and improved.

Vera BONEVA: Permanent Exhibitions in Bulgarian Memorial Museums 369 

Development of the permanent exhibitions aims to enrich the content, to incorporate 

new digital technologies in the museum narrative, to emphasize on European identity of 

national cultural tradition. Aesthetic parameters of museum expression would have to 

provoke sensitivity of contemporary people to the good old traditions – intangible and 

tangible. These issues add new requirements on members of museum staff; because the 

museum is not only a reproduction of the past but it also is a creative interpretation of 

history. 

REFERENCES 

Books and articles 

1. Belcher, Michael. Exhibitions in Museums. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1991. 

2. Boneva Vera. Musei i turizam v Bulgaria (Museums and Tourism in Bulgaria). 

Veliko Turnovo/Sofia: Faber, 2011. 

3. Boneva Leonora. Muzeynite izlozhbi: Prostranstvo, kolektsii, publika. (Museum 

Exhibitions: Space, Collections, Publics.) Sofia: Sdruzhenie "Buditel", 2007. 

4. Burcaw, Ellis G. Introduction to museum work. Third edition. AltaMira Press, 1997. 

5. Dean, David. Museum Exhibitions: Theory and Practice. Third edition. London and 

New York: Routledge, 2002. 

6. Falk, John H. and Beverly K. Sheppard. Thriving in the Knowledge Age. New 

Business Models for Museums and Other Cultural Institutions. Lanham: AltaMira 

Press, 2006. 

7. Henning, Michelle. Museums, Media and Cultural Theory (Issues in Cultural and 

Media Studies). Glasgow: Bell&Bain Ltd, 2006. 

8. Nedkov, Simeon. Istoriya na muzeinoto delo v Bulgaria (History of museum work in 

Bulgaria). Sofia. "Agency Evropres" publishing house, 2006. 

9. New Museum Theory and Practice; An Introduction. Edited by Janet Marstine. 

Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2006. 

10. The Manuel of Museum Exhibitions. Editrd by Barry Lord and Gail Dexter Lord. 

Walnut Greek: AltaMira Press. 2001. 

11. The New Museology. Edited by Peter Vergo. London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1993. 

12. Parman, Alice and Jeffrey Jane Flowers. Exhibit Makeovers: A Do-It-Yourself 

Workbook for Small Museums. AltaMira Press, 2008. 

13. Pearce, Susan. Museums, Objects and Collections. University of Leicester, 1992. 

14. Serrell, Beverly. Exhibit Labels: an Interpretative Approach. Oxford: AltaMira 

Press, 1996. 

15. The Responsive Museum. Working with Audiences in the Twenty-First Century. 

Edited by C. Lang, J. Reeve, V. Woollard. Wiltshire: Ashgate Publishing Company, 

2006. 

16. Unikalni musei v Bulgaria. Patevoditel. (Unique Museums in Bulgaria. Guide.) 

Sofia: Book Boutique, 2010.

370 


Internet resources * 

1. Base of Museums in Bulgaria – http://bomb.museumsbg.com 

2. Bulgaria Inside: Online Travel Guide – http://www.bulgariainside.com 

3. Bulgaria Travel: the Official Tourism Portal of Bulgaria – 

http://www.bulgariatravel.org 

4. Google Digital Library – http://books.google.bg/ 

5. Official Portal 

6. Hundred national tourist sites in Bulgaria – http://100nto.org/ 

7. Ministry of Culture of Bulgaria – http://mc.government.bg 

8. Museums in Bulgaria Portal http://bulgarianmuseum.blogspot.com 

9. National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria - http://www.nsi.bg 

10. Network of European Museum Organisations – http://www.ne-mo.org 

Yordan Yovkov Museum in the town of Dobritch, a part of the permanent exhibition 

* The text is also based on official data, published on Internet sites and portals of Bulgarian 

museums, municipalities and other official institutions. Last date on which I used data from these 

sites and portals is 31August 2012.

COJOCARU COMMISSION 

Viorica OLARU-CEMÎRTAN 1 

Condemning communism, as social-political phenomenon that affected Eastern Europe 

and especially the captive countries in the soviet colossus, was a priority on Europe’s 

academic and political agenda. In most these countries, at the given moment, academic, 

research institutions and funds activate to reveal to the world what the scourge of 

international communism and its crimes against humanity meant. On 14 January 2011, 

through the Decree of the interim President of the Republic of Moldavia, Mihai Ghimpu, 

the Commission for studying and assessing the totalitarian communist regime in the 

Republic of Moldavia was formed. This event had been studied for longer time by the 

country’s academic, civil community and it was an opportunity for debates. 

The constituency of the commission : president - Gheorghe Cojocaru, doctor in history, 

vice-president - Igor Caşu, doctor in history, vice-president - Sergiu MusteaŃă, doctor in 

history, secretary - Mihail Taşca, doctor in law 

Members of the commission : Vasile Bahnaru, habilitated doctor in philology, Vladimir 

Beşleagă, writer, Ion Casian, lawyer, Sergiu Chrică, doctor habilitated in economics, Lilia 

Crudu, political scientist, Andrei Cuşco, doctor in history, Demir Dragnev, doctor 

habilitated in history, Nicolae Enciu, doctor habilitated in history, Andrei Eşanu, doctor 

habilitated in history, Victor Juc, doctor in philosophy, Alexandru Moşanu, doctor 

habilitated in history, Gheorghe Negru, doctor in history, Petru Negură, doctor in 

sociology, Viorica Olaru-Cemîrtan, doctor in history, Gheorghe Palade, doctor in history, 

Pavel Parasca, doctor habilitated in history, Anatol Petrencu, doctor habilitated in 

history, Elena Postica, doctor in history, Ion Sârbu, doctor habilitated in philosophy, 

Andrei Smochină, doctor habilitated in law, Veaceslav Stăvilă, doctor in history, Igor 

Şarov, doctor in history, Ion Şişcanu, doctor habilitated in history, Ludmila Tihonov, 

doctor in history, Octavian łâcu, doctor in history, Ion Varta, doctor in history. 

As follows, we submit the report of the commission, with the exposed arguments and 

recommendations. 

Following the recovery of the historiography during the communist and post-communist 

period, of the historical literature issued abroad, as well as of a vast volume of archival 

documents, whereof many were accessed for the first time, the Commission submitted a 

comprehensive synthesis on the communist totalitarian epoch during 1917 / 1924 and 

1991. This epoch has as benchmarks, the instauration of the communist dictatorship in 

the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Autonomous Republic (MASSR) within Soviet Ukraine, 

1 Faculty of History and International Relations, International Free University of Moldavia, 

Chişinău, Republic of Moldavia.

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to the left of the Dniester, the transplant of communist system on the right bank of the 

Dniester, in Bessarabia, in 1940, once with the military occupation of this territory by the 

Soviet Union’s war machine, the reoccupation of this territory in 1944, the restoration 

and strengthening of the Soviet totalitarian regime, its stiffness and collapse when out of 

the communist captivity of the freedom-thirsty peoples and URSS’s collapse in 1991. 

According to the Commission’s findings, the totalitarian Bolshevik experiment was 

initiated on the left bank of Dniester, as part of URSS, whereas on the right bank, in 

Romanian Bessarabia, the foundations were laid for democracy, so that the Dniester 

separated not only two banks or two States, but also two systems: a democratic one and a 

totalitarian one. The XX-th century proved that totalitarianism is not only incompatible 

with democratic values, but it is the mortal enemy of democracy. A totalitarian regime is 

the antipode of democracy. This regime is oppressive and repressive, with an official 

State ideology, underlain by a single political party, headed by the “great leader”, by an 

omnipresent secret police and which holds monopoly on economy, culture and 

information. In starting the Bolshevik dictatorship to establish a new world, based on 

class criteria and class hatred, the former Moldavian Socialist Soviet Autonomous 

Republic was reserved a special part. Forming this entity on the Dniester border with 

Romania had to serve the Soviet plans for appending Bessarabia and, at the same time, to 

contribute towards extending the space of the proletarian world revolution in the Balkans. 

A series of the most variegated documented testimonies prove with all clarity the hostile 

and aggressive attitude of the Bolshevik regime of the III-rd Communist International 

towards Romanian Bessarabia, the intention of the revolution exportation on all possible 

paths. Although presented as autonomous State entity, Moldavian ASSR was in fact a 

„bridgehead” in the Soviet expansionist plans, evolving since 1924 up to 1940 to the 

drastic narrowing of the characteristics proper to a pretended State entity, to the status of 

a regular region of Soviet Ukraine. 

In MASSR, as everywhere throughout URSS, the power of the Bolshevik unique party, 

of the party and administrative apparatus is underlain by a sum of principles brutally 

infringing the human being’s fundamental rights. Whereof: the cancellation of the private 

property and the „socialization” of the main production means and of the labour product, 

a vast repressive apparatus for constraining the citizens and maintaining the power, 

inhibiting the personality, conscience and civic initiative, a system of total control and 

general denunciation, isolation from the external world. Whereto: attributing a 

hypertrophied role to the communist ideology and promoting a multitude of fakes and 

myths, to the purpose of educating the masses towards the blind belief in the unique 

„leader”, in the „justness” of the party line and its infallibility, the propaganda on the 

temporary character of the hardships, due to the „wiles” of the Soviet State’s internal and 

external enemies, to the false promise as regards the “communist heaven” which was to 

be soon constructed. 

The Bolshevik totalitarian regime transformed the autonomous republic beyond the 

Dniester into a genuine polygon for the most horrible political, social, economic, cultural 

and identity experiments. The commission made a radiography of these totalitarian 

policies and practices, deployed during 1924-1940 in Moldavian ASSR and assessed their 

nature and costs.

Viorica OLARU-CEMÎRTAN: Cojocaru Commission 

The forced collectivization in the beginnings of the `30s, through applying constraint 

and violence in the relations between the Bolshevik regime and the peasantry, through 

instrumenting administrative and ex-communication measures against the wealthy 

peasants, through instigating the poor and middle ones against the so-called “kulaks”, 

resulted in the cancellation of the private property in the village, in a new civil war 

against the peasants, in the terrible famine during 1932-1933. On 7 August 1932, when 

famine ravaged in Ukraine, the famous Law on the „five stalks of wheat” entered into 

force, in I. Stalin’s redaction which, even for the smallest thefts stipulated shooting and 

only in very rare cases a “milder” punishment was stipulated – 10 prison years. The Law 

savagely hit the hungry peasants who, in the desperate situation because of the criminal 

requisition policies, were condemned to steal from the wealth of the kolkhozes, to save 

themselves from death. On 27 December 1932, the system of Soviet passports was 

instituted, but only for the urban population, not for the peasants, who were condemned 

to die in their villages, with no reserve of cereals. 

The terrible famine, the repressions and deportations operated by the communist 

authorities generated a massive population exodus – the flee accross the Dniester, in 

Romania. For stopping this exodus, which constituted a conclusive evidence of the 

catastrophic failure of the policies promoted by the communist authorities, there was 

resorted to fortifying the guard of the Soviet border, accompanied by the use of the 

weapons against the hungry stowaways. In 1932, the Committee for Helping the 

Stowaways across the Dniester dispatched to the League of the Nations, a memorandum 

wherein mention was made: „… Having no choice, they leave their lands and ancestral 

homes and, in the blind despair to save their only wealth left in the world, God’s gift, life, 

they venture to flee across the Dniester, in Romania. … The Soviet regime, however, 

knows no pity and, this way, the fugitive Moldavians are shot in mass with gunshots, with 

tens, hundreds, with no mercy, along the Dniester…”. 

The victim number of the famine during 1932-1933 from MASSR has not yet been 

precisely established, being about tens of thousand people. 

The Great Depuration from `30 in USSR heavily impacted on the Moldavian ASSR. 

The mechanism of the mass terror made no distinctions among the victims, admitted no 

indulgences. Under the guillotine of the so-called “Special Troika”, fell one after the 

other, peasants, intellectuals, workers, priests, innocent people who benefited from no 

trial, no Christian funeral. Victims became the very commissioners in the party and 

administrative hierarchies. The “bourgeois” social origin, the „kulak” status, the 

maintenance of the contacts with the relatives in the „capitalist countries” served as 

counts of indictment as „people’s enemy” at anyone’s address. Answering the political 

commandments of the Communist Party, the repression organs of the regime competed to 

condemn not for real infractions, but for invented infractions, ignoring the laws and the 

human right, sowing behind them death, pain, humility. 

The Commission proved that the communist totalitarian regime is guilty of cultural 

crimes against the spirit and identity of the Moldavians across the Dniester and, 

subsequently, after 1940, of the Bessarabians, through imposing a counterfeit Moldavian 

literary “language”, according to aberrant “class” principles and through inventing, in 

default of any historical and ethno-cultural benchmarks, a “Moldavian” nation, apart from 

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the Romanian one. The communist regime is guilty of repressing and mutilating our 

national conscience, of suppressing our free spirit, of orchestrating a cultural, identity, 

propagandistic and informational war against the brothers on the two banks of the 

Dniester, against the brothers on the borders of the Prut, with dramatic consequences for 

our linguistic and ethno-cultural integrity. Or, nothing can be more tragic than a war 

between brothers, nothing can be more criminal. 

In 1989, when 50 years fulfilled since the launch of the Second World War, the 

Congress of the People’s Deputies from USSR condemned the signing of the secret 

Soviet-Nazi additional Protocol from 23 August 1939, which delimitated the influence 

spheres from Eastern Europe on the account of third countries, declaring it caducous 

since the moment of its signing. On 23 June 1990, the Supreme Soviet of SSR Moldavia 

denunciated the Soviet-Nazi pact and the secret additional protocol, and its consequences 

for Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Reiterating this position, on the bases of 

rigorously documented analyses and data, the Commission underlines that, on 28 June 

1940 USSR perpetrated a violation on Romania’s territorial integrity, an act of military 

and political occupation of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and the Country of HerŃa, 

against the will of the population in these territories, through dictate and menace with 

resorting to force, an unjust act of territorial annexing. In the forcedly appended territories 

to USSR, piece by piece, a transplant of Soviet system was achieved, the regime of the 

terror, of the class-hatred propagation and of the inhuman ideology of the Unique 

Communist Party. The formation of the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, through a 

formal arbitrary decision of USSR’s Supreme Soviet, beside the national territory and the 

reduction to silence of the people’s voice, through not considering the letter of the soviet 

Constitution, which did not stipulate USSR’ right to form new republics, only to admit 

within the Soviet federation, was a direct consequence of this occupation act. Breaking 

into pieces Bessarabia, the territory and the human body connate for centuries with the 

space between Prut and Dniester, in contradiction with the historical truth and ethnic 

realities existing at the time, is part of a series of abusive acts perpetrated by the 

communist totalitarian regime against large communities of people. 

The commission noted that, in 1940-1941, in Bessarabia, the years 1937 and 1938 were 

repeated, namely the years of the Great Terror within the Soviet Union, resumed 

thereafter in the post-War years. The soviet repression organs fiercely hit the few 

intellectuals and leaders of the public life, having remained between Prut and Dniester, 

condemning them to heavy years in the Stalinist goulags, the fate of the writer Nicolae 

Costenco serving as dramatic example for the way in which the Soviets aimed at 

annihilating the free mind, effectuated summary executions, hiding the traces of having 

killed hundreds and thousands of innocent people in the basements of NKVD or in the 

lime pits. Killings in mass, imposing choking taxes to the peasants, persecuting the priests 

and Church, abolishing Romanian and forbidding the Romanian alphabet, reversing the 

value-scale and instilling a fear and generalized terror atmosphere were other effects of 

the Soviet-occupation act from 28 June 1940. 

More than 70 years ago, in the night between 12 towards 13 June 1941, weeping and 

mourning were littered across Bessarabia. The forefront of local communities, the pillars 

of strength from father to son of our Moldavian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, Russian


or mixed villages, of the Hebrew towns, whole families, men, women, children and old 

men, from Bessarabia to Northern Bucovina, were mounted with bayonets into cattle cars 

and brought to the lands of Siberia, whence many did not return. The archival documents 

consulted by the members of the Commission highlight disturbing data: even the newborn 

babies in the Soviet “ox-wagon” were written, together with their parents, on the list 

of the “people’s enemies”(!…). The deportation operation was initiated, authorized and 

watched by the Political Office of CC of PC(b) throughout the Union, and the party, 

Security and Internal-Affair structures of USSR and of MSSR were the logistical basis of 

the repressive mechanism. Unfortunately, part of the executants of the of the deportation 

operation from 12-13 June 1941 were recruited among the natives, to their greatest part, 

delators and opportunists, declassed elements, who aimed a strictly personal benefice. 

At the express indications of the Political Office of CC of PCUS, of USSR’ s Council of 

Ministers and of USSR’s State Security, the Soviet totalitarian people-mincing machine 

will hit twice in full force in the population of Moldavian SSR: on 6 July 1949, following 

the adoption of the strictly secret Decision of MSSR’s Council of Ministers No. 509, 

from 28 June 1949, as regards the deportation from the Moldavian SSR of the families of 

the kulaks, former landlords and big merchants, and on 1 April 1951, based on MSSR’s 

Council of Ministers, from 24 March 1951, as regards the confiscation and use of the 

wealth of the deported ones from the territory of the Moldavian SSR, being targeted the 

so-called “anti-Soviet” contingent of the confession “Jehovah’s Witnesses”. The 

deportation operations were planned by the repression organs as full-fledged military 

operations against the civil population. The peak of the Soviet-type justice was that the 

people were first lifted from their homes, deported beyond the Ural mountains, thereafter 

penal files of “people’s enemies” were addressed to them(!). The peak of these “crimes 

against humanity”, as Moldavian SSR’ Supreme Soviet qualified them, on 23 June 1990, 

was the party leadership, the official factor commissioned with taking a decision – 

MSSR’s Council of Ministers, and the executants – the organs of security, internal affairs 

and justice of USSR and MSSR. 

The Commission for studying and assessing the totalitarian communist regime assessed 

the number of the deported persons having undergone repressions during the 1929-1951 

to more than 90 thousand persons. 

An expected effect of the deportation from 1949 was the accelerated and massive 

enrolling of the peasants in kolkhozes, the so-called collectivization or “decisive 

offensive of the socialism” on the village between Prut and Dniester. Linking the peasant 

to the kolkhoz land, through the dictate of the Bolshevik regime, resulted in the 

liquidation of the private property and in the loss of the economic initiative in the 

villages, in the des-peasantry and disinheritance of the peasants’ class. Once with the end 

of collectivization, a special mechanism of the production and repartition relations was 

instituted, mechanism that allowed the Soviet State to overall control the agricultural 

production, the peasants receiving from the State only the necessary minimum for 

surviving and working hard on the lands of the kolkhozes. 

The conclusions of the Commission attest that the awful famine of the years 1946-1947 

was not only a direct consequence of drought, but also of the economic and social policy 

of the communist totalitarian regime towards the Moldavian SST’s population, towards 

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the soviet system of access to the food products. According to the statistic data 

accumulated by the Commission, as a result of the famine, circa 200 thousand people 

deceased. The guilt for the deceases in mass because of the famine is incumbent both on 

I.Stalin and on the soviet leadership from Kremlin, and on the Office CC of PC(b) 

throughout the Union for the Moldavian SSR, president – V. Ivanov, Central Committee 

of PC(b) from Moldavia, led by the first-secretary N. Salogor, MSSR’s Council of 

Ministers, led by its president, N. Coval, by the commissioner of USSR’s Council of 

Ministers, for the collections of cereals in MSSR, on A. Sîci, on other representatives 

within the party and administration, which decided the simple persons’ destiny. Namely, 

the peaks of the Communist Party make themselves guilty of inhumanly requisitioning 

the last agricultural products, remained through the attics of the houses, leaving the 

hungry families with no piece of bread on the table, which constituted the main cause of 

falling ill and dying in mass. Through the policy promoted in the years 1946-1947, as 

well as in the following years, the Soviet authorities wholly ignored the human being’s 

life and right to life, the fundamental moral norms, compulsory for the institutions of a 

State. The hunger from MSSR was a phenomenon provoked through the policy of the 

communist regime, was a monstrous crime that it itself is directly guilty. For this crime, 

wilfully perpetrated against the peaceful population, the children and old men, the elder 

persons, of all ethnicities and confessions, the communist totalitarian regime must be 

morally, politically and judicially condemned. 

The activity developed by the Commission for studying and assessing the totalitarian 

communist regime is (also) an opportunity for rendering homage to the personalities which 

represented our honour and dignity in those times of terror. The first anti-Soviet resistance 

manifestations were registered soon after Bessarabia’s occupation, on 28 June 1940. A 

testimony in this respect are the resistance actions of the members of the clandestine 

organization of some youth from Orhei, who militated against the soviet occupant, for 

defending the freedom, Romanian language and our national values. During the years 1945- 

1953, on the territory of the districts Bravicea, Călăraşi, Corneşti, Chişcăreni, Chiperceni, 

Orhei, Răspopeni, Rezina, Susleni, Sângerei, Teleneşti a considerable number of armed 

actions against the State institutions and local activists, undertaken by the group members 

led by the famous Filimon Bodiu, by the clandestine organizations „Armata Neagră” and 

„Partidul Democrat Agrar”. One of the greatest and better organized anti-soviet resistance 

formations in the rural areas, „Partidul Democrat Agrar (Agrarian Democratic Party)”, 

activated (in the years 1950-1953) under the leadership of Simion Zlatan, originating in 

the village Popenchi, RîbniŃa, and Vasile Odobescu, originating in the village Cuizăuca, 

Chiperceni. At Soroca, the organization „Arcaşii lui Ştefan (Ştefan’s Archers)” was set 

up, in the districts Chişinău, Hânceşti and Cărpineni activated another anti-communist 

conspiracy organization – „Partidul LibertăŃii (Party of the Liberty)”, and at BălŃi – 

„Uniunea Democratică a LibertăŃii (Democratic Union of the Liberty)”. The warriors, 

fallen prey to the repression organs were condemned to death or to long privation of 

liberty, and the communist propaganda aimed at compromising and at erasing their names 

from our collective memory. The moment came today to bow our front in memory of 

these simple people, whose effort and sacrifice, manifested in the unequal, deathly grip 

with the communist regime for human liberty and dignity is impressive.


We do not have to forget those who, in the battle with the soviet obscurantism and 

censorship, brought in the school textbooks Mihai Eminescu, Vasile Alecsandri, Ion 

Creangă, asserted the Latinity of the language, culture and our national being in an epoch 

wherein any such gesture was liable to excommunication from within society or to 

punishment with difficult years of liberty-privation. A Pantheon of our history and culture 

should include: Vasile Coroban, George Meniuc, Grigore Vieru, Vlad IoviŃă, Vasile 

Vasilache, Ion Vasilenco, Gheorghe Vodă, Mihai Grecu, Emil Loteanu, Lidia Istrati, Ion 

Vatamanu and many others. An example of intellectual verticality, of resistance through 

culture and of protection of our Romanian language is represented by the works of the 

writers: Ion DruŃă, Dumitru Matcovschi, Mihai Cimpoi, Serafim Saca, Petru Cărare, 

Nicolae Dabija, Ion Hadârcă, Valentin Mândâcanu, Vladimir Beşleagă and others. The 

worker Gheorghe Muruziuc’s fact of temerity, who in the night of 28 June 1966, hoisted 

the Tricolor on the Sugar Factory of Alexăndreni, district Sângerei (remained there for 5 

hours), the protest of Liliei Neagu and Asei Andruh from 1970 against the Russification 

and de-nationalization, the activity of the Patriotic National Front of freedom from the 

soviet occupation, whereof Alexandru Usatiuc –Bulgăr and his close collaborators 

Gheorghe Ghimpu and Valeriu Graur, other manifestations with civic and national 

character, as well as the national-emancipation movement from the `80 point a resistance 

line, as it was, which passes as a red thread through all soviet period. These personalities’ 

worth is immense: they kept our self conscience awake, they taught us that beyond the 

human being’s need to adapt to his environment and to the surrounding conditions, as 

many of us proceeded, perennial values and ideals exist. 

In the hard times of the communist inquisition, we appeased our thirst of truth, tightly 

keeping our years against the radio apparatuses, in order to receive the waves of Europa 

Libera, BBC, Radio Vatican and Radio Libertatea. Nobody and nothing could force us to 

give up the need to break from the spiritual prison universe, neither the regime with all its 

oppression army, nor such a „de-nationalization champion”, as Ivan Bodul, first-secretary 

of CC of PCM during the years 1961-1980. 

In the centre of the investigations of the commission, there also were social and 

economic aspects of the evolutions from the Moldavian SSR. The Commission did not 

overlook the processes of industrialization and urbanization, or the frame of social 

assistance offered by the soviet state to the simple citizen. What the conclusions of the 

Commission reveal is that MSSR’s industry becomes wholly dependant on USSR’s 

industrial centres, whence, in exchange of agricultural products and alimentary-industry 

production, petrol and coal, iron and steel, plastics and metals, tractors, trucks and cars, 

excavators and agricultural machinery, machine-tools and industrial equipment, popularconsumption 

objects. In the situation in which the production of the republic does not 

develop on its own basis, but on the imported raw material, the right of the Moldavian 

SSR to an independent existence was a fiction. More than that, most industrial plants and, 

at the same time, the most profitable, were placed on the territory of the former MSSR, 

which constituted, likewise, the result of a far-reaching policy. Holding the managerial 

levers, the pan-union and union-republican ministries promoted the policy of the massive 

affluence on MSSR’s territory, of the population outside the republic, brought for 

constructing new enterprises in the conditions of local surplus of labour force. This policy 

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led to the substantial diminution of the quota of the autochthonous population in the 

industrial sphere, to the devaluing of the status of the language, culture and our traditions 

in various branches of economics, at instructing, in the higher and medium education 

institutes, pre-eminently or even exclusively, in Russian. Following the “rapid 

industrialization”, it was reached, on one hand, to rigidly embedding MSSR in the panunion 

military-industrial complex, to subjugating to the local industry, USSR’s raw 

material resources and its centralized financing, and on the other hand, to serious ethnodemographical 

disequilibria. 

The ecological consequences of the social-economic policy promoted by the communist 

regime along the post-War decades were likewise a disaster. 

Our opponents’ reply might follow: people had a workplace, an ensured retirement 

benefit, State medical services, free education. So it is. The socialist state assumed the 

role of paternal philanthropist, but this paternalism was of a State irresponsibility 

producing and the individuals’ dependence, both in the field of the public life, and in the 

one of the private life. Or, in a totalitarian State, equality may be maximized only on 

account of the liberty, so that authentic equality and fraternity are destroyed. This is why 

the totalitarian past cannot offer any solutions for our present and future, and for the ones 

of our children. 

The main pillar of the communist totalitarian regime was the Unique Communist Party, 

which confiscated the public authority. The party leadership commanded and perpetrated 

crimes in mass, repressions and deportations qualified as crimes against humanity, 

instrumented a repressive ideology, exercised a quasi-total control on the society and 

individuals apart. The Communist Party and its repression organs are primarily 

responsible with all horrors produced during the soviet epoch. Obedient to the orders of 

the leadership of PCUS, CC of PCM opposed to the last moment the process of 

sovereignty and State-independency acquisition of the Republic of Moldavia, being 

declared, after the putsch from August 1991 from Moscow, outside the law. 

The Commission settled that the Republic of Moldavia of our days is the outcome and 

result of the democratic and national-emancipation movement from late `80s of the past 

century, is the expression of the secession political will act by the former USSR and of 

plenary integration in the free and democratic world. 

The Commission realized an inventory of the crimes, horrors, atrocities, abuses and 

injustice perpetrated by the communist totalitarian regime during the`20 – `90s of the 

XX-th century, which includes: 

1) extension of the dictatorship of the Unique Communist Party in the areas included 

within the Moldavian SSAR and the mission of undermining and subverting this entity 

in relation to Romania and the population from Bessarabia, of bridgehead of the 

Bolshevik world revolution; 

2) instituting a diabolic repression mechanism (CeKa, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, 

MGB, KGB, Justice and Prosecution) ands applying terror in mass; 

3) decreeing and applying an anti-human discriminatory legislation; 

4) imposing an ideology of the class hatred, of the hatred against the human being and 

dignity, exacerbating the anti-Christian propaganda and xenophobia;


5) spiritually mutilating the Moldavians through imposing an artificial language, foreign 

as compared to the Romanian one and an ideologically counterfeited identity; 

6) forbidding the free conscience, the right to associate, the free initiative, exterminating 

and marginalizing the intellectuality; 

7) liquidating the peasantry as class through forced collectivization and the deportations 

from the beginnings of the `30s of the XX-th century; 

8) the terrible famine during the years 1932-1933; 

9) launching the repressions against the so-called “anti-Soviet” and “nationalist” 

elements from the mid `30s of the last century, deporting and exterminating in mass 

the people, through the decisions of extra-judiciary institutions, of the so-called 

„troika”; 

10) occupation, through dictate, on 28 June 1940, of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and 

HerŃa Land, following the Soviet-German transaction from 23 August 1939 and the 

subsequent secret understandings between USSR and Nazi Germany; 

11) realizing a Soviet-system transplant in the occupied Romanian territories and 

forcedly imposing the communist totalitarian regime; 

12) applying terror against the forefront of the of the public life, of the intellectuals, of 

the clergymen, and of the simple people remained in the occupied territories, 

executing assassinates out of class-hatred reasons; 

13) forced exodus of tens of thousand people, especially intellectuals, from the territories 

occupied by USSR; 

14) abusively forming the Moldavian SSR and tearing Bessarabia’s territory; 

15) forbidding the Romanian alphabet and language, and imposing the Russian alphabet, 

through the Decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR from 11 

November 1940; 

16) abusively cancelling the right to Romanian citizenship through the Decree of the 

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as regards the re-establishment of the Soviet 

citizenship by Bessarabia’s inhabitants and its acquisition by Northern Bucovina’s 

inhabitants from 8 March 1941; 

17) deporting in USSR’s far-away regions tens of thousands innocent people on 13 June 

1941; 

18) ante-War and post-War forced mobilization of tens of thousand youth on the work 

sites (FZO) from USSR and their enrolling in the Soviet Army; 

19) arresting and depurations operated by the Soviet-repression organs in the first post- 

War years; 

20) organizing the famine in 1946-1947; 

21) deporting in USSR’s far-away regions tens of thousand innocent people on 6 July 

1949; 

22) liquidating the private property, confiscating the peasants’ material assets and 

collectivizing the village; 

23) persecuting the Church, the clergymen, closing, desecrating and demolishing the 

religious establishments; 

24) deporting for faith in the far-away regions of USSR, on 1 April 1951, the believers of 

the confession “Jehovah’ Witnesses”; 

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25) ideological and propagandistic offensive against the writers and our national values; 

26) soviet-ization, Russification and de-nationalization of the population through the 

education and culture system, through the administrative apparatus, mass-media and 

propaganda; 

27) manipulating and deforming our identity conscience through falsifying history, 

imposing rituals, monuments and symbols foreign to our nature; 

28) negating the Romanian identity of the majority population and inoculating the 

Romanian phobia; 

29) instrumenting a regime of the “memory terror”, of the control, of the constraints and 

of the persecutions on human individuality for the least the attempt to free thinking in 

relation to the communist totalitarian regime; 

30) promoting a colonial-type industrialization and urbanization, with serious ethnodemographical 

consequences; 

31) registering great ecological disequilibria and adverse consequences for the 

population’s health following the experiments beyond agriculture, based on 

excessively chemically treating and excessively concentrating the agricultural 

production; 

32) forming a privileged caste of the party apparatus, of the nomenclature, which 

confiscated and concentrated the absolute power, and was a parasite on the simple 

citizens’ back, serving foreign interests. 

Starting from the exposed, the Commission strongly supports that the communist 

totalitarian regime had been since the beginning to the last moment of its existence, a 

criminal and repressive, abusive and inhuman regime, devoid of any trace of legitimacy. 

Transplanted from MASSR in Bessarabia, only after a dictate act, it had been at the same 

time a Soviet foreign occupation regime, since that moment up to its removal and 

collapse during 1990-1991. 

The Commission submits officially condemning the communist totalitarian regime from 

Moldavian SSAR and SSR, as one having perpetrated genocide acts and crimes against 

humanity, through terror in mass, political repression, organized hunger, deportations, 

violating the human dignity and the fundamental human rights. 

The commission proposes honouring and commemorating all the victims of the 

communist totalitarian regime, all the victims of the Holocaust, all those who, in the 

terrible years of terror, repression and oppression, had suffered, as well as all those who, 

in these years, through their fact, verticality and word, had resisted the communist 

totalitarian regime, putting their life and liberty at risk. 

Considering the necessity of debarring from the difficult legacy of the communist 

totalitarian regime, of irreversibly distancing from this regime, in the spirit of the 

recommendations of the Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union, the Commission 

formulated the following proposals: 

1) condemning the communist totalitarian regime from MSSAR and MSSR as one having 

perpetrated crimes against humanity, as well as morally condemning the actions of all 

those persons who participated in perpetrating the crimes of the communist 

totalitarian regime;


2) forbidding the utilization of the “communist” notion and of its derivatives, in the titles 

of the political formations, in the names of some institutions and public and private 

companies, as well as forbidding the use and propagation to political purposes, in the 

public space, of the totalitarian symbols, both communist and Nazi, according to 

OSCE resolution from 2009 as regards the reunion of the divided Europe, through 

promoting the Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the XXI-th century; 

3) elaborating and adopting without delay the Law of the Illustration; 

4) restoring the victims of the communist totalitarian regime and their offspring in their 

full judicial, moral and material rights through amending the judicial frame in force 

or through adopting a new Law; 

5) eternizing the memory of the victims of the communist totalitarian regime and of the 

participants in the resistance movement through raising in Chişinău town a memorial 

complex, through opening local museums, through installing commemorative plates in 

the places of perpetrating the communist crimes and horrors; 

6) declaring the day of 23 August as European Day for Commemorating the Victims of 

the Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, which should be marked with dignity and 

impartiality, in consensus with the Resolution from 2009 of the European Parliament 

as regards the European conscience and the totalitarianism; 

7) declaring the days of 13 June (1941), 6 July (1949) and 1 April (1951), wherein 

massive deportations took place, as national days for commemorating the victims of 

the communist totalitarian regime; 

8) forming an expert commission that should evaluate the material damages caused by 

the communist totalitarian regime; 

9) approving a long-term State program as regards the in-depth investigation of the 

communist totalitarian regime; 

10) reorganizing the Archive of the Social-Political Organizations from the Republic of 

Moldavia in the Archive of the Communist Totalitarian Regime from the Republic of 

Moldavia, with the transmission of all archival funds from the special deposits of the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs, of the Service of Information and Security, of the Ministry 

of External Affairs and European Integration, of the funds of the General Prosecution, 

as well as of other funds that reflect the essence of the communist totalitarian regime 

in the funds of the respective archive and ensuring the unlimited access to all these 

funds; 

11) creating an Institute for Studying Totalitarianism; 

12) elaborating a manual of history of the communist totalitarian regime and introducing 

in the pre-university instruction and education system, a history course on 

totalitarianism; 

13) encouraging the deployment in mass-media of the public debates on the inhuman 

essence of the totalitarian, communist and Nazi regimes. 

14) abrogating the Law no. 546-XV from 19 December 2003 on the adoption of the 

Conception of the national policy of the Republic of Moldavia, the conception being 

tributary to the past and to the totalitarian ideology, incompatible with the European 

course of our society. 

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Advancing this set of proposals, the Commission underlines that some be realized 

without delay, others in a medium or long time, being of importance the continuation, 

under different forms, within various institutions – pre-university, university, research 

mass-media etc. – of the activities initiated through its institution. Only this way, real 

results may be obtained in the sanitation of the social, politic and moral climate within 

society. 

The Commission is convinced that only through assuming the historical truth, we can 

really feel free people, we will be stronger, more open towards ourselves and towards the 

external world, more united, we will have more trust in our forces and in tomorrow, in 

our European future. 

The Commission makes an appeal to our good sense and to our collective memory. 

We have no right to forget, we have no right to be indifferent. Through assuming the 

historical truth, we will never allow anyone to doubt our right to a dignified and free life 

in a free, prosperous and democratic society. A civic reconciliation is necessary, but a 

civic reconciliation is only possible through assuming the historical truth, hard and bitter 

as it may be.

THE MUSEUM OF SOCIALIST ART IN 

BULGARIA AND ITS PUBLIC RESPONSE 


Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present the Museum of Socialist Art in Bulgaria, 

opened in Sofia on September 19, 2011, and the way it is accepted by the Bulgarian society. The 

reasons for the wave of discontent provoked by the new museum institution are explained by some 

of the most characteristic statements of political parties and public organizations, journalists, art 

critics, artists, historians. The respective conclusions are drawn on the basis of the information 

available in the electronic media and internet forums. 

The Museum of Socialist Art is a museum institution which is the first of its kind in 

Bulgaria. Its purpose is to collect, preserve and exhibit art samples from the period 1944– 

1989 which thematically belong to the epoch of socialism 1 . It has the status of a branch of 

the National Museum of Bulgarian Fine Arts (known as the National Art Gallery) in Sofia 

and is located in Izgrev quarter of the capital city. The museum was built on the initiative 

and with the funding provided by the Ministry of culture and was opened on 19 th of 

September 2011. It consists of a sculpture park, an exhibition hall and a video hall. 

Seventy seven pieces of monumental sculpture are exhibited in the park with an area of 

7 500 m 2 . At the entrance of the museum complex, on a two meters high pedestal the 

five-pointed red star is placed which has been taken off the building of the Central 

Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (known by the public as the Party House) 

on 4 th of October 1990, after the main political forces at the National Assembly have 

adopted the Declaration for the removing of the non traditional political symbols from 

public buildings, flags and anthems. The star was made in the USSR on the analogy of 

the ruby star on the tower of the Kremlin in Moscow and in 1984 was lifted at the place 

of the old one made in 1954 2 . The five-pointed star which is not a piece of art is placed at 

the beginning of the outdoor museum exhibition in the capacity of a symbol of socialism. 

Among the monuments in the park the five meters high sculpture of Georgi Dimitrov 

shows up with its imposing size (transported from the Vasov’s Machine-Building Plant in 

the town of Sopot) and also the 45 tones heavy figure of Lenin created in the 70’s of the 

20 th century by the soviet sculptor Lev Kerbel and situated at the central square of the 

same name in the capital city (today St Nedelya Square) where it stood until 1990. In “the 

park with figures of fallen idols” 3 the sculptures and the busts not only of these but also of 

many other communist leaders could be seen – Dimitar Blagoev, Vasil Kolarov, Todor 

Zhivkov and members of his family, etc. The exhibited miniature model of the sculpture 

“Republic” by Vasil Radoslavov, Alexander Zankov and Stoyu Todorov gives impression 

of the unpreserved six meters high plaster original erected in 1946 on the square in front 

1 St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo.

384 


of the Royal palace. The outdoors exhibition also includes sculptures dedicated to the 

common socialist worker as for example “Harvesters’ song” by Vaska Emanuilova, 

“Women members of a co-operative farm” by Stefana Boyadzhieva, “Fitter” by Iliya 

Ivanov, “Shift” by Iva Hadzhieva and others, as well as sculptures dedicated to the antifascist 

struggle. Pieces of art are also exhibited that were created before 9 th of September 

1944 as for example the bas-reliefs “Engine-driver” from 1933 and “Third class” from 

1935 (placed at the inscription with the name of the museum) whose author Ivan Funev is 

considered to be one of the originators of socialist realism in Bulgarian sculpture. 

The exhibition hall covering an area of 550 m 2 is part of an entirely reconstructed 

building, a property of the Ministry of culture, which houses other cultural institutions as 

well. The first exhibition in the hall includes 60 pictures and 25 easel art pieces of high 

artistic quality created in the first years after 9 th of September 1944 4 . Among the 

remarkable pictures from the socialist period are: “The woman supporter of partisans” by 

Nenko Balkanski, “After the execution” by Alexander Poplilov, “Welcoming of the 

Soviet army” by Stoyan Venev, “Examination” by Nikola Mirchev, “Execution” by Iliya 

Petrov and others. In the hall, as well as in the park, some pieces of art are exhibited that 

precede the period to which the museum is dedicated. For example pictures like 

“September” (1932) by Tsanko Lavrenov dedicated to the September uprising, “A local 

cinema” (1942) by Alexander Zhendov, a member of the Communist Party before and 

after 9 th of September 1944 and a victim of the purge in the party ranks that took place in 

the beginning of the 50’s of the 20 th century. Works by other authors are exhibited which 

were branded by the communist authority: by Nikola Tanev who after 9 th of September 

1944 was arrested and sent to prison but later rehabilitated; Kiril Petrov who in 1946 was 

declared a formalist by the critics of the people’s power regime and was not allowed to 

participate in exhibitions until 1961. Among the sculptures in the hall and in the park 

there are such that lack the characteristic elements of the dominating artistic method – the 

socialist realism (for example the sculpture of a naked female body by Vasil Radoslavov, 

“Expectation” by Velichko Minekov and others). 

Documentaries from the socialist epoch in Bulgaria are shown in the video hall. They 

are from the funds of the Bulgarian National Film Store and present party leaders, 

moments from manifestations, work on construction sites etc. Here the visitor could see 

frames showing not only the building of the Mausoleum of G. Dimitrov but its 

demolishing in 1999 as well, the construction of the Party House and its setting on fire in 

1990, and the taking off of the five-pointed star from it. According to the director of the 

National Art Gallery the further development of the video programme involves showing 

of “feature films from the times of socialism which will be something like a 

representative extract of the cinematographic art of that period” 5 . 

In the museum café copies of posters from the 50’s of the 20 th century are exhibited, 

with various slogans, whose originals are kept in the National Art Gallery. Some of them 

are working copies which bear notes written in pencil by authors like Alexander 

Stamenov, Ivan Kirkov, Lyuba Pelikarova. Huge posters with the images of Lenin, Stalin, 

Georgi Dimitrov, Marx, and Engels are also exhibited which have been used in 

demonstrations. 

The souvenir shop offers to the visitors various products (cups, t-shirts, ball-point pens) 

with the museum’s logo, on which the silhouettes of Stalin, Lenin and Georgi Dimitrov

Anka IGNATOVA: The Museum of Socialist Art in Bulgaria and its Public Response 385 

are depicted, and also post cards, books, films etc. Plaques and badges from the socialist 

epoch with antiquarian value could also be bought in the shop, as well as copies of 

curious posters from the same period. 

The greater part of the art works included in the museum exhibition belong to the 

collection of the National Museum of Bulgarian Fine Art while others have been placed 

at the museum’s disposal by municipalities and other galleries. Some of the exhibits are 

shown to the public for the first time. 

With a view to the future development of the museum its governing body makes plans 

for the sculpture park to be complemented and enriched, and the exposition in the interior 

part to be periodically changed and thus other curators and authors to be given the 

opportunity to present their idea of the period 6 . 

Do the today’s rulers manage to “bring socialism in the museum” as the Minister of 

culture has declared even before the opening of the Museum of Socialist Art 7 and does 

the transition to democracy of Bulgaria end with the starting of this museum symbolizing 

the long and painful parting of the country with communism as the Associated Press 

correspondent Veselin Toshkov notes 8 ? 

This is a controversial issue. Anyway, it is certain that though the museum has found its 

fans, it has also managed to provoke a wave of discontent among various layers of the 

Bulgarian society. One of the reasons for this is the substitution of its name. 

According to the initial idea this new museum institution should be devoted to the 

totalitarian and not to the socialist art which in the opinion of many specialists does not 

exist. The so called “Concept of the leading museums in the capital city” of the Ministry 

of culture, adopted by the Council of ministers on 10 th of February 2010 and aiming at 

improving of the existing structure of the museum network in Sofia and changing the 

town into an attractive centre of international cultural tourism, provides for the 

establishing of four museum complexes among which a museum of totalitarian art. It is 

pointed out in the document that Bulgaria is one of the last countries from the former 

Eastern bloc in Europe to have such a museum connected with the totalitarian period and 

that such a museum would fill in “a gap in our museum network by creating a museum 

environment in which representative specimens of the art created in our recent past to be 

exhibited”. A concept was promoted that this museum should be “part of the network of 

traces of that time, which can be found in all areas of Sofia: from the suburbs (monument 

“Flag of Peace”, Boyana Residence) to the city centre (the Largo complex, the 

undergrounds of the former mausoleum, the Monument to the Soviet Army, the Common 

Grave, etc.) 9 . 

An area was fixed for the building of the museum in immediate proximity of its today’s 

site. According to the authors of the mentioned Concept the situating of the museum out 

of the historical centre of the capital city is a priority since the specified place is not 

burdened with other historical signification and allows impartial apprehension of the 

exposition, and besides it is easily accessible by convenient transport connections. It was 

planned that the museum to consist of two parts – indoor and outdoor one where art 

works from the socialist epoch to be exhibited 10 . In a communique for the press of the 

Ministry of culture from 17.09.2010 on the occasion of journalist questions about the idea 

of its establishing, the museum is not mentioned by a concrete name but is defined as “a 

museum for works of art by outstanding Bulgarian authors that have lived and worked in 

the period after the World War II until 10 th of November 1989”. The document makes 

public the proposals that have been received to be discussed at an expert level. One of

386 


them is about the inclusion in the museum exposition of the concrete pill-box standing in 

the yard in which an atmosphere partially resembling the one in the former mausoleum of 

the communist leader Georgi Dimitrov to be created. Another one suggests that 

monuments from the period from the end of World War II until 10.11.1989 to be 

exhibited and preserved in the museum surroundings. It is also said in the communique 

that similar museums have been opened in many East European countries and that the 

Museum of Communism in Budapest is especially successful one 11 . The first of the 

suggestions was not realized probably because it did not correspond to the concept of the 

museum which remained unknown to the experts and the public as a whole. In connection 

with the establishing of “the new national museum presenting the art and culture of the 

Bulgarian society in the socialist epoch” it was demanded by an electronic letter of the 

Vice-Minister of culture Todor Chobanov from 17.05.2011 that the national, regional and 

municipal museums in the country should send up to 28 th the same month to the Ministry 

of culture inventories of the cultural valuables from the epoch of socialism possessed by 

them like monuments, sculptures, interior (easel) sculptures, pictures, memorial signs, 

etc. A copy of the letter was sent to all mayors of municipalities. 

The initial idea of a museum of totalitarian art was transformed in the process of 

realization into a museum of socialist art. On 25.08.2011 in the morning show on TV7 

Channel the Minister of culture Vezhdi Rashidov, who is a famous Bulgarian sculptor, 

announced that the word “totalitarian” would not be included in the name of the 

museum 12 . Later for other media he quite unconvincingly tried to explain this unexpected 

change stating that the term “totalitarian” refers not only to the socialist period but is 

wider and is applicable even today when characterizing particular party leaders, alluding 

to the President of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party Ahmed Dogan 13 . 

According to information in some foreign electronic media the curator of the Museum 

Bisera Yosifova grounds the change of the museum’s name by the reluctance to display 

“emotional extremism” in the evaluation of the past and notes that valuable art works by 

well known artists and sculptors from this epoch are presented in the museum while an 

exhibition devoted to totalitarism could possibly be organized in the near future. And one 

entirely different explanation is also given: the opponents of the changing of the 

museum’s name think that the Bulgarian political elite that comes from the communist 

ruling top wants to cover up the mistakes of the past, to make smooth the sharp angles 14 . 

Some days before the opening of the museum the director of the National Art Gallery 

Svetla Ivanova states before the media that during the preparation period a lot of opinions 

about the purpose of the museum and the reason for its starting sprang up. According to 

her its purpose is not to ideologize and by no means to politicize but to show Bulgarian 

art from the socialist period which is actually absent from the permanent expositions in 

most of the galleries and museums in Sofia and in the country 15 . Anyway, the problem of 

the establishment of this museum focused the attention and the commentaries of various 

political formations. 

A day after the official opening of the Museum of Socialist Art, on 20.09.2011, the 

Union of the Democratic Forces came out with a declaration on that occasion. It is said in 

it: “…we become witnesses to the subsequent attempt at a centralized writing of history. 

It is an attempt that goes beyond the rehabilitation of the communist regime to which we 

have already got used. This is an attempt of GERB 16 and the government to tell us all 

what is socialism, communism and what is art”. After pointing out that “the museum is 

not simply a new building whose band the ruling party leaders to cut before the


elections”, but “it is an exposition, spirit, problematic fields”, the ruling party is asked the 

following questions: how have the exhibited works been chosen; who has defined these 

exhibits as art and on the basis of what criteria; why no one speaks about a competition 

for a concept and governing of the museum. Finding it intolerable “to turn museums into 

the next instrument of the authorities for imposing ‘a matrix’”, the Union of the 

Democratic Forces suggests that “a real museum of totalitarism should be established 

which to remind of all the aspects of this regime and to honour the memory of all the 

spoiled human lives” 17 . 

Though with a certain delay, on 11.10.2011, organizations of the repressed in Bulgaria 

expressed their resentment at the opening of the Museum of Socialist Art. In a protest 

declaration against the returning of the communist symbolism in the country, signed by 

the chairmen of the Union of the Repressed by the Communist Terror in Bulgaria, the 

Union of the Repressed in Bulgaria, “Istina” (Truth) Union, and “Goryani” (Guerillas) 

Union it is pointed out that instead of ridiculing the criminal communist regime by the 

Museum exposition, the effect of exaltation of the communist leaders and their acts is 

achieved while great part of the exhibited works were created to the orders and under the 

pressure of that same regime. The repressed suggested that the name of the museum 

should be changed and a hall should be equipped as part of the exhibition displaying the 

violence committed by the communists. They express their disagreement with the 

assertions of the ruling circles on the occasion of the opening of the Museum that the 

transition period has come to its end and thus this historical page is closed. According to 

them this could happen only after the other part of this page is read when a Museum of 

Communist Violence is opened, and when this aspect of our history is also studied by the 

students 18 . 

In a non conventional way the political party “Order, Legality, Justice” also reacted 

against the Museum of Socialist Art and the government’s policy. On 19.10.2011, its 

candidates for municipal councillors in Sofia donated to the Museum as a “valuable 

exhibit” a sculptural portrait of the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov which they put at the 

base of the pedestal with the bust of Todor Zhivkov. In this way they expressed their 

protest against “the crazy idea to substitute history”. According to them the sculptural 

portrait of the miserable “rescuer of socialism” Boyko Borisov was quite appropriate to 

mark the one-month existence of this museum. They suggested that a new section should 

be established in it – “Non socialist art”, in which this piece of art would be the greatest 

attraction of the museum exhibition 19 . 

Some months later, on 23.03.2012 – a day for parliamentary control at the National 

Assembly, the representative of the Union of the Democratic Forces Mihail Mihaylov 

made an interpellation about the building and functioning of the Museum of Socialist Art. 

Many of the concrete questions in it (as for example about the reasons for the changing of 

the museum’s name as well as about the concept confirmed by a resolution of the 

government, the criteria for the selection of the works, the expenditure for its 

maintenance, etc.) remained without exact answers. What became clear from the words of 

the minister of culture was that for its six-month existence the museum realized an 

income from tickets and souvenirs to the total value of 14 000 leva which were enough to 

meet its current expenses while the Ministry of culture paid for the electricity and water 

consumption, and the security guard. In contrast to the noisily announced 1,5 million 

Euro from the budged of the Ministry of culture put into the building of the museum, the 

government kept silent for the means for its maintenance. Making once again public his

388 


concern not to allow works of fine arts from the period 1944–1989 to be wasted and 

destroyed, the Minister states that the museum “has been established to preserve, to 

prevent the disappearance of works of art” by great Bulgarian authors who had worked in 

this period 20 . To tell the truth we should note that pictures and sculptures by authors from 

the socialist period are kept in a number of other museums and galleries. Therefore this 

should not be the only reason for the starting of a new museum institution. 

A number of artists, sculptors, art critics, museum specialists, journalists and others also 

expressed their disagreement with the name of the museum and the way it was organized. 

One of the most negative appreciations belonged to Professor Velislav Minekov, a 

lecturer at the National Academy of Arts and a chairman of the Control Committee of the 

Union of Bulgarian Artists. In an interview published in “Sega” Paper on 17.09.2011, he 

defines the new museum as “a scandal, an outrageous violation of copy rights”, “an 

entirely useless collection” which has nothing in common with the idea of starting a 

museum of communism that has at one time been launched by a civil society among 

whose founders the professor himself has been. Something more, according to him the 

museum is even “dangerous” since he suspects that “one of the underground purposes is 

only works by certain authors to get into the museum collection in order their names to be 

swept away, their works to be shut up there and forgotten forever and thus some 

“geniuses” to get rid of some names that have always disturbed them with their talent and 

honesty” 21 . Since sculptures by his father Velichko Minekov are exhibited in the 

Museum, some accused him of bias. 

The artist Tsvyatko Ostoich also subscribed to Prof. Minekov’s opinion. In an interview 

for the Bulgarian National Radio on the day of the official opening of the Museum, he 

declares: “I think that this museum is some kind of non sense. First, it will be difficult to 

find any unanimous definition of what socialist art is. It is scandalous to bind art to some 

kind of political doctrines”. He also speaks about breach of copy rights because “not only 

anyone of the heirs of these people has been asked but there are letters from heirs and 

authors who are still alive who have made explicit objections to the exhibiting of their 

works”. Moreover, Ostoich finds the exhibition incomplete because the greater part of the 

works of the Minister of culture himself is not present in it though his creative career 

covers this period as well. In conclusion he points out: “This museum is not the result of 

some kind of public or professional discussion. Such a discussion has never taken 

place” 22 . 

The opinions of some journalists are extremely negative too. For Tatyana Vaksberg “the 

Museum of Socialist Art in Sofia is a museum of humiliation – in it the crime against the 

Bulgarians is presented also by authors who have nothing to do with it. What is wrong to 

bring together has been gathered together in the museum – works of the propaganda art of 

communism; works alien to the propaganda but painted in the communist period within 

or outside the framework of socialist realism as well as works that have nothing in 

common neither with communism nor even with the period during which it reigns the 

country” 23 . This later gave her grounds, basing her argument on the definition of Albena 

Stambolova, to call the museum “the most expensive storehouse” 24 . According to her “the 

museum promoted by Vezhdi Rashidov could be saved in one way only: if he himself 

becomes an exhibit in a museum of post-communism – a place to show by particular 

examples the whole irresponsibility of the self-proclaimed politicians of the transition 

period” 25 . Margarita Boycheva, another journalist and an author of a number of cultural 

television programmes, in her publication “The silence of the lambs” defines the new


museum as “absurd” and as “an apotheosis of ministerial megalomania which easily 

sticks dishonest labels on worthy artists and irresponsibly substitutes the truth about 

socialism” 26 . The documentary maker Atanas Kiryakov, an author of the film “Guerrilas”, 

also shares the opinion that “this museum is part of the great substitution” of the 

transition, “an attempt to show us how happy the so called socialist past was”. According 

to him the governing political circles “want to make us think that we have lived in a free 

socialist country while the truth is that our socialism was a dictatorship of the proletariat” 

and “the cruel deformation of the mentality of the Bulgarians by the 45-year long 

dictatorship did not allow them freely to take part in the changes” 27 . 

The opinion of the art critic Svetlana Kuyumdzhieva, who works as a critic and curator 

at an art gallery in Sofia, also deserves attention. In her article “A Museum of socialist art 

opened on 19.10.2011. A museum of what?”, commenting on the exhibition, she points 

out: “In the way it looks now the museum does not register style nuances, evolutionary 

stages, political and social context, that is to say it not only does not look like but it does 

not function as a museum”. She expresses a fear “that the selection in this case has been 

made in a way to respond to the expectations of the average ignoramus-consumer with a 

pompous feeling of national pride but not to get engaged with any historic analysis 

whatsoever”. The author of the publication gives an answer to another question raised by 

her: “And yet I wonder, maybe this is the most authentic museum of governmental selfsatisfaction 

and insurmountable historical want?” 28 . 

Prof. Chavdar Popov, Doctor Habil. in Arts, paraphrasing “the contra-formulation” of 

the famous Soviet dissident A. Sinyavski regarding socialist realism, defines it as “not 

quite a museum of the not so socialist art”. In spite of the most benevolent attitude 

towards such an intention, as he himself emphasizes, a number of questions arise as to 

how and by whom it has been designed; what forces the necessity of establishing a 

museum of socialist art exactly; why should it be separated into an independent 

exposition and not be part of the new large museum under construction dedicated to 

Bulgarian fine arts which will include all the main stages of its centuries long 

development; how the presence in the exhibition of works by artists like Iliya Beshkov, 

Ivan Nenov, Bencho Obreshkov, Kiril Petrov has been motivated; are they exactly the 

most prominent representatives of socialist art; why significant, emblematic figures are 

absent in the “museum? The lack of a clear answer at the present moment lies at the root 

of his conclusion that “the museum has not come to be yet” but only an interesting 

exhibition has been organized with more lasting duration (but what duration?)” 29 . 

Still many more negative evaluations and opinions similar to the already presented ones 

could be found in the media and Internet 30 . With the time they have become lesser and 

lesser. Even the new exposition, second in turn, under the title “Totalitarian art from the 

collections of the National Art Gallery and the National Historical Museum from the 

middle of the 40’s until the middle of the 50’s of the 20 th century” which was organized 

in the exhibition hall of the Museum of Socialist Art remained aside of the media fuss and 

did not provoke any particular reaction among the experts. At its opening on 22.03.2012, 

some interest was manifested by foreign ambassadors but not by those who govern the 

country who at the official opening of the Museum had demonstrated a large-scale 

presence, showing in public their concern about the cultural heritage and stating that the 

communist past had already gone in the museum. By the words of Bisera Yosifova the 

new indoor exposition “is neither nostalgia, nor irony” 31 and does not have the ambition 

to tell the whole truth, and so a discussion is necessary on what exactly totalitarian means.

390 


She emphasizes that “in Bulgarian art we do not have all that totalitarian art in the form 

typical for the Soviet Union” 32 . In a reportage for the Bulgarian National Television she 

has stated that this is her perusal and that she does not deny the need of discussion 33 . 

In the way it is organized now the museum falls short of the expectations of those who 

are not its extreme deniers. Among them is Prof. Ivaylo Znepolski, a director of the 

Institute of Research on the Near Past, an ex-minister of culture in the period 1993–1995, 

and one of the initiators of the starting of a museum of communism. To the question (put 

to him in July 2012) as to what extent the Museum of Socialist Art meets his idea of such 

a museum, he answers: “it does not meet my idea but the more important thing is that it 

does not cover the epoch in an adequate way”. According to him “the exposition is rather 

a disorderly arranged show case of achievements than an instrument for rationalizing the 

phenomenon”. In spite of that he thinks that “an important step has been made, there is a 

building, there is a space, there is an institution”, and “the exposition could be improved 

or changed if the will is there” 34 . 

It should be noted in conclusion that two decades after the fall of the communist regime 

in Bulgaria there was established not the long-awaited museum of communism, not even 

a museum of totalitarian art as it had been envisaged in the Concept of the leading 

museums in the capital city but a museum of socialist art. Reasonably it provoked a wave 

of discontent not only because of its changed name but also because of the way by which 

it was organized. It still raises among the public the question as whether the museum 

creates a romantic idea of the communist regime. In its present state, in spite of the 

periodically changing indoor expositions, the museum is not in the position to send exact 

and clear messages to the ordinary visitors and not only to them. One of the main reasons 

for the museum’s failure to fulfil one of its most important functions – the educational 

one, is the lack of historical context in its expositions. Of essential significance is the 

defining of the terms “totalitarian art” and “socialist art” whose existence is denied by 

many. For this as well as for the arranging of the museum exposition a professional 

discussion is needed as the experts appeal. As Prof. Chavdar Popov points out, “without 

an objective and socio-cultural evaluation of this heritage made by art critics no kind of a 

museum is possible” 35 . No wider public discussion has taken place on the occasion of the 

opening of the museum in its present state. The public response reflected in the media and 

Internet forums is the next proof that the Bulgarian society as a whole has not overcome 

the consequences of the communist regime yet. At present we still lack an objective and 

critical perusal of our near past which to create for the Bulgarian society a clear and 

comprehensible basis for the rationalizing of the essence and character of the communist 

regime from the second half of the 20 th century. 

It may safely be said that in the Museum of Socialist Art a great number of sculptures 

and pictures have found their rescue from being destroyed or discarded in storehouses, 

basements and other places though another resolution to the problem could be found as 

well. In spite of all the criticism and contradictory evaluations the museum rouses the 

interest of the visitors, mainly young people from this and from foreign countries for 

whom it is something exotic 36 . In order not to be perceived only in this way the museum 

governing body should reorganize its activities and give a new meaning to them. Thus it 

will present the most objective notion of the socialist period through the means of the fine 

arts. To what extent it will come to these expectations and the hopes of the ruling party to 

turn the museum into a profitable tourist destination only time will show. 

With the opening of the Museum of Socialist Art the great theme of knowing, 

understanding and evaluating of all the aspects of the Bulgarian reality from the second


half of the 20 th century has not been exhausted. Bulgaria in contrast to other postcommunist 

countries still does not have her museum which to show the real face of 

communism that has built through violence, demagogy and ideological phraseology a 

totalitarian system that has crushed human individuality and spirit. Let’s wish that the 

promised future museum of State security will manage to do this at least to some extent. 

References 

1 

На 19 септември в 11.00 ч. ще бъде официалното откриване на новия Музей на 

социалистическото изкуство в София [The official opening of the Museum of Socialist Art will 

take place on 19 th of September at 11 o’clock in Sofia] 17.09.2011. – 

http://mc.government.bg/newsn.php?n=2707&q=%EC%F3%E7%E5%E9+%ED%E0+%F1%EE% 

F6%E8%E0%EB%E8%F1%F2%E8%F7%E5%F1%EA%EE%F2%EE+%E8%E7%EA%F3%F1 

%F2%E2%EE. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

2 

Коя е петолъчката в музея? [Which is the five-pointed star in the museum?] 24.09.2011. – 

http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/60922/koja_e_petolychkata_v_muzeja; More information about the 

five-pointed star No2 see in: Мила Вачева. Нашата петолъчка по-модерна от кремълската 

звезда. [Mila Vacheva: Our five-pointed star more modern than the Kremlin Star.] – 

http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=631245. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

3 

Thus Irina Vagalinska names the park in the museum complex in her publication „Лечебница за 

паднали идоли”. [Public health station for fallen idols.] – 

http://www.temanews.com/index.php?p=tema&iid=673&aid=15447. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

4 

http://www.nationalartgallerybg.org/index.php?l=71&id=85. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

5 

Голямата снимка: Музей на социалистическото изкуство. [The large photography: Museum 

of Socialist Art.] 17.09.2011. 

http://www.dnevnik.bg/bigpicture/2011/09/17/1157071_goliamata_snimka_muzei_na_socialistich 

eskoto_izkustvo/. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

6 

http://www.nationalartgallerybg.org/index.php?l=71&id=85; Голямата снимка: Музей на 

социалистическото изкуство. [The large photography: Museum of Socialist Art.] 17.09.2011. – 


eskoto_izkustvo/ 

7 

Рашидов: Вкарваме социализма в музея [Rashidov: We bring socialism in the museum.] 

25.08.2011. – http://culture.actualno.com/news_358188.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

8 

Toshkov, V. As Europe marks the 20th anniversary of the Soviet collapse, Bulgaria opens 

museum of socialist art – http://www.artdaily.com/index.asp?int_sec=2&int_new=50047. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

АП: Музей бележи края на прехода към демокрация в България. [AP: A museum marks the 

end of the transition to democracy in Bulgaria]. 24.08.2011 – 

http://culture.actualno.com/news_358114.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

9 

Проект на Концепция за водещи столични музеи, част 1, с. 21. [Draft of Concept of the 

leading museums in the capital city, part 1, р. 21.] 15.01.2010. – 

http://mc.government.bg/files/745_Koncepcia_part1.pdf. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

The idea of starting such a museum is not new. Already on 23.02.2005 the Chairman of the 

Committee on Tourism at the Municipality of Sofia, Rumen Draganov suggested that around the 

Monument “Bulgaria 1300 years old” in front of the National Palace of Culture a museum of the 

totalitarian art to be built which also to include the impressive buildings in Stalinist architectural 

style in the central part like the former Party House, the Presidential Residence and the Council of 

Ministers Building. – Баева, И., Е. Калинова. Социализмът в огледалото на прехода. С., 2011, 

с. 84. [Baeva, I., E. Kalinova. Socialism in the mirror of transition. Sofia, 2011, р. 84.]

392 


10 Проект на Концепция за водещи столични музеи, част 1, с. 21. [Draft of Concept of the 

leading museums in the capital city, part 1, р. 21] 15.01.2010. – 

http://mc.government.bg/files/745_Koncepcia_part1.pdf. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

11 Прессъобщение на Министерството на културата. [A communique for the press by the 

Ministry of culture.] 17.11.2010. 

http://mc.government.bg/newsn.php?n=2313&p=61&q=%EB%E8%F2&l=1. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

12 Министър В. Рашидов: Това правителство ще вкара социализма в музея! – 2 част [Minister 

V. Rashidov: This government will bring socialism in the museum! – second part.] 25.08.2011. – 

http://tv7.bg/dobro-utro/news/887332.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

13 Вежди Рашидов: Музеят на социалистическото изкуство е закъснял. [Vezhdi Rashidov: 

The Museum of Socialist Art is behind time.] (An interview of the Minister of culture Vezhdi 

Rashidov by Silvia Yordanova for the programme „Под лупа” (“Through a magnifying glass”) of 

Europe Channel). 20.09.2011. – http://www.tvevropa.com/bg/news/interviews/view/59800. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012.; Вежди Рашидов: Музеите са онова място, където се съхранява 

паметта и историята. [Rashidov: Museums are the place where memory and history are 

preserved.] (An interview of the Minister of culture Vezhdi Rashidov by Andrey Zahariev in the 

programme „Денят започва” (“The day begins”) of the Bulgarian National Television.) 

19.09.2011. – 

http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/60570/vejdi_rashidov_muzeite_sa_onova_mjasto_kydeto_se_syhranja 

va_pametta_i_istorijata and others. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

14 Эстрова, М. В Болгарии создается Музей социалистического искусства. [Estrova, M. A Museum 

of Socialist Art is opening in Bulgaria.] 26.08.2011. 

http://artinvestment.ru/news/artnews/20110826_bulgaria.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012; Toshkov, V. As 

Europe marks the 20th anniversary of the Soviet collapse, Bulgaria opens museum of socialist art. – 

http://www.artdaily.com/index.asp?int_sec=2&int_new=50047. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

15 Голямата снимка: Музей на социалистическото изкуство. [The large photography: Museum 

of Socialist Art.] 17.09.2011. 


eskoto_izkustvo/ 

16 An abbreviation of the name of the political party Citizens for European Development of 

Bulgaria which is the ruling party at the moment. 

17 Недопустимо е чрез експонати, дарени от фондовете на ЦК на БКП да бъде правен опит 

за подмяна на историята. Декларация на СДС по повод Музея на социалистическото 

изкуство. [It is intolerable to make an attempt to change history through donated exhibits from the 

funds of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Declaration of the Union of 

the Democratic Forces with regard to the Museum of Socialist Art.] Accessed: 20.09.2011. 

http://www.sds.bg/articles/4274-nedopustimo-e-chrez-eksponati-dareni-ot-fondovete-na-tsk-nabkp-da-bade-praven-opit-za-podmyana-na-istoriyata. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

18 Георгиева, Л. Репресирани въстанаха срещу Музея на социалистическото изкуство. 

[Repressed rose against the Museum of Socialist Art.] – 

http://culture.actualno.com/news_363633.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012; Станева, Д. Комунизмът 

се върна в МВР. [Communism has returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.] – 

http://www.novini.bg/news/26177- 

%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D1%8A%D1 

%82-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D1%8A%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B2- 

%D0%BC%D0%B2%D1%80-page_id1.html. Accessed: 22-08-2012; Организации на 

репресираните против създаването на Музей на социалистическото изкуство. [Organizations 

of the repressed against the establishing of a Museum of Socialist Art.] – 

http://www.mediapool.bg/%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7 

%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0- 

%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B 

D%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2-


%D1%81%D1%8A%D0%B7%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1% 

82%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%B9- 

%D0%BD%D0%B0- 

%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B 

8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE- 

%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BEnews184978.html. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

19 РЗС – София занесе бюст на Борисов в Музея на социализма. Пресцентър на РЗС. 

[“Order, Legality, Justice” Party – Sofia brought a bust of Borisov to the Museum of Socialism. 

Press center of the party “Order, Legality, Justice”.] 19.10.2011. – 

http://www.rzs.bg/index.php?t=4046. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

20 Стенограми от пленарни заседания на Народното събрание. Триста тридесет и трето заседание. 

[Shorthand records of plenary sessions of the National Assembly. Three hundred and third session.] 

23.03.2012. – http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2721. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

21 Музеят на социзкуството е опасен. [The Museum of Socialist Art is dangerous.) [An 

interview of Prof. Velislav Minekov by Milena Dimitrova]. 17.09.2011. – 

http://www.segabg.com/article.php?issueid=10114&sectionid=5&id=0000901. Accessed: 22-08- 

2012. Also interesting is another interview by him in “Sunday 150” Programme of the Bulgarian 

National Radio: Професор Велислав Минеков за Музея на социалистическото изкуство (Prof. 

Velislav Minekov about the Museum of Socialist Art). 25.09.2011. – http://www.focusnews.net/?id=f18809. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

22 Цвятко Остоич: Безобразно е изкуството да се свързва с политически доктрини [Tsvyatko 

Ostoich: It is scandalous to bind art to some kind of political doctrines.] (An interview of the artist 

Tsvyatko Ostoich by Diana Yankulova for „Нещо повече” (“Something more”) Programme of 

„Хоризонт” (“Horizon”) Channel of the Bulgarian National Radio.) 19.09.2011. – 

http://bnr.bg/Audio.aspx?lang=1026#http://bnr.bg/sites/horizont/Shows/Current/NeshtoPoveche/c 

ulture/Pages/museumsocialism.aspx. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

23 Ваксберг, Т. Българският музей на унижението. [Vaksberg, T. The Bulgarian museum of 

humiliation.] 17.10.2011. – http://fakti.bg/mnenia/19951-balgarskiiat-muzei-na-unijenieto. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

24 Ваксберг, Т. В най-скъпия склад. [Vaksberg, T. In the most expensive storehouse.] 

15.10.2011. – http://www.glasove.com/v-nayskupiya-sklad-16812. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

25 Ваксберг, Т. Българският музей на унижението. [Vaksberg, T. The Bulgarian museum of 

humiliation.] 17.10.2011. – http://fakti.bg/mnenia/19951-balgarskiiat-muzei-na-unijenieto 

26 . Бойчева, М. Мълчанието на агнетата. [Boycheva, M. The silence of the lambs.] 17.11.2011. 

– http://www.blistermagazine.com/eggs/malchanieto-na-agnetata. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

27 Атанас Киряков, кинодокументалист, автор на филма „Горяни”: Подмяната на прехода е 

най-голямото зло за България. Интервю за в. „Дневник”. [Atanas Kiryakov, a documentary 

maker, an author of the film “Guerrilas”: The substitution of the transition is the greatest evil for 

Bulgaria. An interview for “Dnevnik” Paper.] 10.10.2011. – 

http://www.dnevnik.bg/intervju/2011/10/10/1173675_atanas_kiriakov_kinodokumentalist_avtor_n 

a_filma/. Accessed: 22-08-2012. (A. Kiryakov is the author of more than a hundred films. Among 

them are the films about the working camps in Belene and Lovech, about the artist Ivan Kiryakov, 

several films about ecological issues after 1977 which have been awarded but have been kept 

under lock and key for years on.) 

28 Куюмджиева, С. Музей на социалистическото изкуство, открит на 19.09.2011г. Музей на 

какво? [Kuyumdzhieva, S. Museum of Socialist Art opened on 19.09.2011. A museum of what?] 

30.09.2011 – http://www.kultura.bg/bg/article/view/18789; with the motive that “the topic is 

important and should not be bypassed in silence” the article was published on the site 

blistermagazine.com. – http://www.blistermagazine.com/eggs/muzey-na-sotsialisticheskotoizkustvo-otkrit-na-19x2011g. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012.

394 


29 Проф.Чавдар Попов за новооткрития Музей на социзкуството в София. Не съвсем музей 

на недотам социалистическото изкуство. [Prof. Chavdar Popov about the newly opened 

Museum of Socialist Art. Not quite a museum of the not so socialist art.] – 

http://bta.bg/bg/mags/lik/2011/12/Story. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

30 Грънчаров, А. Гневни мисли по повод откриването на “музея” на 

социалистическото “изкуство”. [Grancharov, A. Angry thoughts on the occasion of the opening 

of the “museum” of socialist “art”.] 18.09.2011. – http://aigg.wordpress.com/2011/09/18/1-283/. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012.; Ние сме от едно поколение, което задава въпроса „защо?”…Разговор 

на Владия Михайлова с Никола Михов за СОЦМУЗ. [We belong to a generation that asks the 

question “why?” A conversation of Vladia Mihaylova with Nikola Mihov about the socialist 

museum.] – 

http://litvestnik.wordpress.com/%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0% 

B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5-%D0%BD%D0%B0- 

%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0/%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0 

%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B8-%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%BA%D0%B0- 

%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BA%D0%B0- 

%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%BB%D0%B8/. Accessed: 22-08-2012.; 

Чернин, А. Изкуството на онова време. Един протест. „Музей на социалистическото изкуство” в 

София. [Chernin, A. Art of that time. A protest. “The Museum of Socialist Art” in Sofia. 17.02.2012. – 

http://www.kultura.bg/bg/article/view/19369 and others. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

31 Б. Йосифова: Изложбата не е нито носталгия, нито ирония. [B. Yosifova: “The exhibition is 

neither nostalgia, nor irony.] 22.03.2012. – http://news.bgnes.com/view/994134. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

32 Министерство на културата на Република България. Посланикът на САЩ Джеймс 

Уорлик бе сред първите посетители на новата експозиция „Тоталитарно изкуство” в Музея 

на социалистическото изкуство. [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Bulgaria. The USA 

ambassador James Warlick was among the first visitors of the new exposition “Totalitarian art” at 

the Museum of Socialist Art.] – 

http://www.mc.government.bg/newsn.php?n=2931&p=2&q=%EF%E0%F0%E0%E4. Accessed: 

22-08-2012.; Б. Йосифова: Изложбата не е нито носталгия, нито ирония. (B. Yosifova: “The 

exhibition is neither nostalgia, nor irony). 22.03.2011. – http://news.bgnes.com/view/994134. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

33 „Тоталитарно изкуство” в Музея на социалистическото изкуство, репортаж на Весела 

Кръстева. [“Totalitarian art” in the Museum of Socialist Art, a reportage by Vesela Krasteva.] (for 

the „Денят започва с култура” (“The day starts with culture”) Programme of the Bulgarian 

National Television) – 

http://bnt.bg/bg/productions/121/edition/21523/denjat_zapochva_s_kultura_22_mart_2012. 

Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

34 Йолова, И. Интервю за болестите, оцелели от комунизма в прехода, за компромисите и 

отговорностите на елитите, за протестите извън политиката. [Yolova, I. An interview about 

the communist illnesses that have survived during the transition, about the compromises and the 

responsibilities of the elites, about the protests outside politics.] 23.07.2012. – 

http://pressadaily.bg/publication/1530-%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%84.- 

%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB%D0%BE- 

%D0%97%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8:%D0 

%9A%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B0-%D1%89%D0%B5- 

%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BC-%D0%BE%D1%82- 

%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0- 

%D0%9D%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B0. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

35 Проф. Чавдар Попов за новооткрития Музей на социзкуството в София. Не съвсем музей 

на недотам социалистическото изкуство. [Prof. Chavdar Popov about the newly opened 

Museum of Socialist Art. Not quite a museum of the not so socialist art.] – 

http://bta.bg/bg/mags/lik/2011/12/Story. Accessed: 22-08-2012. 

36 Соцтворби радват младежи. [Works of socialist art delight young people.]. Accessed: 

22.03.2012. – http://republika.bg/index.php?id=42283. Accessed: 22-08-2012.


PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CASES OF 

ACCESS TO STASI FILES 

Brita A. MESTER 1 , Sabrina ERKELING 2 

Years after the reunification of Germany, the legacies of the Stasi regime are still the 

subject of numerous debates in German literature and jurisprudence. The reason for this 

discussion are the still existing and restored Stasi documents, that contain a variety of 

information about individuals, which were collected at the time of the Stasi - in part by a 

"spy" or using hidden recording devices. The opportunity to educate oneself on own fate 

is seen as an essential right of the persons concerned. Nevertheless is this right subject to 

limitations, as the records of a particular person, can contain a number of names and 

personal information on other people (i.e. Stasi-members, contact persons, but also family 

and friends), who in turn may desire that this information will not be shared. The reasons 

may be completely different in nature. 

The possibility to access and the possibly of a release of contents of the Stasi Records 

are therefore frequently the subject of civil law disputes. 3 Although the possibility of 

access to the Stasi files for persons concerned is regulated by law, it is limited by a 

variety of conditions which have to be previously met, before access is granted. The right 

of access is laid down in a law which was especially created for the Stasi Archive, the so 

called Stasi Records Act (Stasiunterlagengesetz - StUG). 

This law is known as one of the first laws of Germany, which combines the principle of 

"freedom of information" and the protection of privacy with each other. 4 To understand 

the context of the issues of the Stasi Records Act and the enforcement of the rights that 

are therein contained, the German legal system must be considered in more detail. It 

allows the restriction of the constitutionally protected protection of personality only under 

certain conditions. 

The subject of this paper is therefore intended to be a brief introduction into the in 

Germany constitutionally guaranteed personal rights and its limits permitted by the 

German Constitution. 

1 School of Computing Science, Business Administration, Economics and Law, Department 

ofLaw, Chair of Civil Law, Commercial Law and Legal Informatic, Carl von Ossietzky 

University of Oldenburg, Germany. 

2 School of Computing Science, Business Administration, Economics and Law, Department of 

Law, Chair of Civil Law, Commercial Law and Legal Informatic. University of Oldenburg, 

Germany. 

3 On third party protection in the Stasi Records ActcfSpindler, in: Bamberger/Roth, Beck´scher 

Online-Kommentar BGB, § 823, Rn. 200. 

4 Tinnefeld, NJW 2007, p. 625 (627).

396 

2. The Stasi Records Act 


The Law for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German 

Democratic Republic (Gesetzüber die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 

ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, in short Stasi Records Act 

(Stasiunterlagengesetz - StUG)) was passed on 14 th November 1991 (and entered into 

force on 29th December 1991). It includes, among other things, regulations on the use of 

the files of the MinistryforState Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit - Stasi) and 

forms the basis for the archiving of the files, their management and the access to the 

information therein. Originally the Federal Archives Act (Bundesarchivgesetz) (Act on the 

Preservation and Use of ederal archive (Gesetzüber die Sicherung und Nutzung von 

Archivgut des Bundes)) –dated 6 th January 1988) 5 was applicable on the existing 

documents of the Stasi. The problem with this regulation was that the Stasi records 

contain numerous personal information. According to the Federal Archives Act an access 

to the information in those files would not have been permissible or only permissible after 

at thirty-year period. For this reason the Stasi Records Ac was created. It includes in 

particular rules on access to the files by persons concerned and is thus a “special law” 

(Spezial gesetz) created for the access to those files. 

According to § 3 section 1 sentence 1 StUG anyone has the right to know of the 

Federal Commissioner, whether the Stasi files contain information about themselves: 

"....The right to request that the Federal Commissioner reports 

whether there is information on his person in the already exploited 

documents...." 

“…. Das Recht, vom Bundesbeauftragten Auskunft darüber zu 

verlangen, ob in den erschlossenen Unterlagen Informationen zu 

seiner Person enthalten sind…..” 

If such information about an individual is available, there is the right to report, access to 

the documents and the return of documents to the person concerned 

(§ 3 section 1 sentence 2 StUG). There is also the possibility of using this information 

and documents (§ 3 section 2 StUG). Concrete rules can be found in §§ 12 ff StUG for 

the procedures to implement the rights of the persons concerned. In contrast 

§ 13 section 4 StUG contains the requirement that personal information about other 

concerned persons or third parties exofficio has to be made an ominous before issuing 

duplicates. 6 

However, the law makes a difference between certain types of documents depending on 

the question whether they are without personal information, contain anonymous personal 

information or contain personal information on specific groups of persons, and other 

personal information (see for example: § 12 section 4, § 13 section 4 and 

§ 32 section 1 StUG). Depending on the type of documents, various rights are given. 

Essential for the implementation of the right of access and/or publication of information 

5 BGBl. I p. 62. 

6 For further information Stoltenberg/Bossack, Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, § 13.

B. A. MESTER et al.:Privacy Protection in Cases of Access to Stasi Files 397 

contained in the Stasi Archives is the kind of documents that are the subject of the request 

for information. After that it is decided to which extent it is possible to have access to the 

original filesor whether it is necessary to give duplicates with anonymous information to 

the person concerned (see § 13 StUG). 

The concept of personal information is not defined by the Stasi Records Act. Instead, 

the courts use the existing formulations of the Federal Data Protection Act 

(§ 3 section 1 BDSG). 7 Furtherm, the Stasi Records Actgives requirements for the insight 

and return of documents. Either there has to be made a balance of interests before the 

insight and return of documents (see § 3 section 3, § 13 section 4 No. 2 StUG) or the 

consent of other persons whose information is contained in the documents has to be given 

(§ 13 section 4 No. 1 StUG). To understand this regulationin the Stasi Records Act the 

general personality right and the right to informational self-determination is presented. 

3.The general personality right 

The fundamental right to free development of one’s personality is generally protected in 

Germany by Article 2 section 1 in conjunction with Article 1 section 1of the German 

Constitution (Grundgesetz – GG). Entailed is the protection against any burden, from the 

mere existence to the physical integrity up to the free movement of every individual. 8 The 

general personality right is defined as the "right to respect and the non-infringement of 

the person (individual sphere), especially in his/her immediate manifestation (appearance, 

writing, and speech), his/her social prestige (honor) and his/her directly associated realm 

of existence (private and intimate sphere). 9 Protected are also the character image, the 

right to a secret sphere and the economic reputation; covered are in particular 

professional, religious and moral activities. Included is also the evaluation of this 

information. 10 Above all this is about protecting the autonomy of every individual with 

self-determination. It is a defensive right which protects the individual depending on the 

degree, the quality and the extent of the interference and the public relation. 11 According 

to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) the constitutionally 

guaranteed general personal rights in Article 2 section 1 in conjunction with 

Article 1 section 1 GG 12 protects not only the closer personal sphere of life, but also the 

preservation of the basic conditions which ensure its existence which is not completely 

protected by the traditional guarantor of freedom (Freiheitsgarantin). The need for this 

assurance is particularly due to the modern development and the associated risks for the 

general personal right. 13 A violation of the general personal right is every burden which is 

placed on this right. 14 A part of the general personal right is the right to informational 

7 Cf. BVerwG, Urteil v. 8.3.2002, Aktz. 3 C 46/01, NJW 2002, p. 1815 ff. 

8 Geigel, Haftpflichtprozess, 26. Auflage 2011, 23. KapitelRn. 17. 

9 Cf. Schaub, Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch, § 148 Rn. 2. 

10 SeeGeigel, Haftpflichtprozess, 23. KapitelRn. 17 

11 Cf. Geigel, Haftpflichtprozess, 23. Kapitel Rn. 17. 

12 From 23.5.1949 (BGBl. I), as last amended by Act of 26.7.2002 (BGBl. I p. 2863). 

13 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 3.6.1980 – 1 BvR 185/77, NJW 1980, 2070; seePieroth/Schlink, 

Grundrechte Staatsrecht II, Rn. 429; Jarass, NJW 1989, p. 857. 

14 Cf. Schaub, Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch, § 148 Rn. 22; on the problem of interference see 

Pieroth/Schlink, GrundrechteStaatsrecht II, Rn. 436 ff.

398 


self-determination. 15 The informational self-determination is the right of the individual to 

determine in principle whether his personal information is divulged and used. This 

fundamental right is seen, since the so-called "census decision" (Volkszählungsurteil) in 

1983 as an integral part of the general personal right (Article 2 section 1 in conjunction 

with Article 1 section 1 GG). 16 Through the right of informational self-determination all 

holders of fundamental rights are protected againstthe usage of one’s personal 

information through others and have influence and knowledge about the usage of 

personal information through others. The right to informational self-determination in 

Article 2 section 1 in conjunction with Article 1 section 1 GG provides the basic 

protection of all personal data. 17 A concerned person has, in principle, the power to 

decide on a disclosure and use of his/her personal information. 18 He/She should be able to 

overlook that information relating to him is known, because only then he/she can plan and 

decide on his/her own uninhibited self-determination. 19 The peculiarity lies in the fact that 

it is not the freedom of production and use of information which is a form of freedom of 

behavior, but rather the fundamental right to protect a person against the handling of 

information and data on and related to his/her person. 20 In the German literature the right 

to informational self-determination is often referred to as the constitutional basis of data 

protection law. 21 However, it is to consider that the right to informational selfdetermination 

is merely a specification of the general personal right, developed with 

regard to the risks associated with modern information technology. Therefore data 

protection law has only a limited constitutional status. 22 A separate fundamental right was 

not created. The right to informational self-determination is rather a kind of processing 

barrier whose special design finds itself in the data protection rules. 23 In this sense, some 

regional state law (Landesrecht) have laid down the right to informational selfdetermination 

in normal law and used in their privacy policies (see for example § 1 of the 

Data Protection Law of North-RhineWestphalia (Datenschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen 

15 

BVerfG, Urteil vom 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209/83, NJW 1984, 419. 

16 

BVerfG, Urteil vom 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209/83, NJW 1984, 419 = BVerfGE 65, 1. 

17 

On informational self-determination see Mester, Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz, p. 8 ff. 

18 

BVerfG, Urteil vom 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209/83, NJW 1984, 419 (422); confirmedby BVerfG, 

Urteil vom 17.7.1984 – 2 BvE 11/15/83, BVerfGE 67, 100 (143); BVerfG, Beschluss vom 

9.3.1988 – 1 BvL 49/86, NJW 1988, 2031; BVerfG, Beschluss vom 14.9.1989 – 

2 BvR 1062/87, NJW 1990, 563; BVerfG, Beschluss vom 25.3.1992 – 1 BvR 1430/88, 

NJW 1992, 1875; BVerfG, Beschluss vom 28.1.1992 – 1 BvR 1319/91, NJW 1992, 1379; the 

protection is not lost through the knowledge of the possiblity of sb. Over hearing sth., see 

BVerfG, Beschluss vom 19.12.1991 – 1 BvR 382/85, NZA 1992, 307; BVerfG, Beschluss vom 

11.6.1991 – 1 BvR 239/90, CR 1992, 368; there are affirmative but also critical voices in the 

literature Busch, DVBl 1984, p. 385; Hufen, JZ 1984, p. 1072 (1074); Meydam, DuD 1985, 

p. 12 (16 f.). 

19 

BVerfG, Urteil vom 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209/83, NJW 1984, 419 (422). 

20 

Albers, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, p. 87. 

21 

See Simitis, NJW 1984, p. 394 (399). 

22 

Gola/Wronka, Handbuchzum Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz, Rn. 80, on the content of the 

fundamental rights developed by the judgements of the Federal Constitutional Court see 

Heußner, RDV 1988, p. 7 (8); Simitis, NJW 1984, p. 394; or rather a new constitutional 

approach, so at least Geigel, Haftpflichtprozess, 26. Auflage 2011, 23. Kapitel Rn. 17. 

23 

See Gola/Wronka, Handbuch zum Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz, Rn. 8; Däubler, Gläserne 

Belegschaften?, Rn. 80; Heußner, ArbuR 1985, p. 309 (313); Gola, NJW 1988, p. 1637 (1638).


- DSG NRW)). Important in this context is, that the Federal Data-Protection Act contains 

the basic rules for the protection of personal information. It contains definitions which are 

used by the courts for the explanation of terms in the Stasi Records Act. 24 In addition, the 

Federal Constitutional Court has made several requirements that the legislator has to 

fulfill when he intervenes into the right of informational self-determination of the citizen. 

So it is not surprising that especially for dealing with the Stasi Archives, a law had to be 

created, which, in addition to the requirements demanded by the Federal Constitutional 

Court, requires a balancing of interests of all relevant persons (see, for example, 

§ 3 section 3 StUG). 

4. Legal reservation 

But neither the general personal right nor the right to informational self-determination 

are given unconditional. Everybody has to accept interference in their right of 

informational self-determination on the basis of a legal regulation. 25 This is also laid 

down in the Federal Data Protection Act (see§ 4 section 1 BDSG). Data processing is 

allowed, when the Federal Data Protection Act or any other statute permits this. 

Therefore the possibility of collecting and preserving of the Stasi files according to the 

rules in the Stasi Records Act must be controlled in light of the principles of data 

protection. Would the requirements not be met any intervention made by state agencies 

(without the necessary authorization basis), would lead to defense claims of those 

affected. 26 The requirements for the authorization basis are relatively high. For instance, a 

holder of fundamental rights has to accept a limitation of informational self-determination 

only when a predominant public interest exists. The restriction must not go further than 

what is imperative to fundamental public interests. 27 The stronger the intervention into the 

private sphere and the more intense the existing data is tobe used, the higher the 

requirements. Furthermore the question whether already anonymous information or 

personalized or individualized information is to be used plays adecisive role. 28 This 

makes it clear why the provisions of the Stasi Records Act provide such strict 

requirements for the inspection and return of documents. It is clear why there is not only a 

distinction between the personal information, but also why a balancing of interests is 

necessary. 

5. The balancing test for personal information 

The Stasi Records Act distinguishes therefore in part on whether it is personalized, 

individualized or anonymous information (§ 12 section 4 StUG). The Stasi Records Act 

does not give an own definition of these terms. Due to the previously outlined 

dependence on the data protection law, the courts resort to the explanations given in the 

Federal Data Protection Act. 29 A definition of personal data is found in 

24 

BVerwG, Urteil v. 8.3.2002, Aktz. 3 C 46/01, NJW 2002, p. 1815 ff. 

25 

BVerfGE 65, 1 (43 f.), siehe auch BVerfG, Beschluss vom 25.7.1988, 3009 f.). 

26 

In detail see OVG Koblenz, Beschlussvom 7.1.1986, NVwZ 1986, 575 f.; on the public claim 

to forbearance see Di Fabio, GG Art. 2 Rn. 180. 

27 

BVerfGE 65, 1 (44); see Trute, JZ 1992, 1043 ff. 

28 

Cf.Di Fabio, GG Art. 2 Rn. 180. 

29 

BVerwG, Urteil v. 8.3.2002, Aktz. 3 C 46/01, NJW 2002, p. 1815 ff.

400 


§ 3 section 1 BDSG, which includes in the term “personal data” all details of personal or 

material circumstances of an identified or identifiable natural person. Although the term 

“data” is used, the courts apply this definition (because of the linguistic proximity and its 

comparability) on the term “personal information” used in the Stasi Records Act. In 

addition, the Federal Data Protection Act gives also an explanation for the term “make 

the data anonymous” which is required by the Stasi Records Act. According to 

§ 3 section 6 BDSG the anonymous making of data is reached, when the details of 

personal circumstances can no longer be assigned or only with a disproportionate amount 

of time, cost and labor, to an identified or identifiable natural person. 

If it is such personal information, the Stasi Records Act requires (depending on the 

individual case) before publication or access to the documents again a balancing of 

interests (see§ 3 section 3 StUG): 

"... through the provision of information, the permitting of access to 

documents or the issuing of documents may not infringe overriding 

legitimate interests of other people...." 

“… durch die Auskunftserteilung, Gewährung von Einsicht in 

Unterlagen oder die Herausgabe von Unterlagen dürfen überwiegende 

schutzwürdige Interessen anderer Personen nicht beeinträchtigt 

werden….” 

In order to make such an assessment of interests all the various interests are set against 

each other. Such an intervention can only be legitimized when the interests of the other 

person are predominated. For this purpose, the various circumstances of life can be 

divided into spheres (areas of protection - Schutzbereiche). The private, inner region is 

the most protected and this protection wears off the more the affected areas of life are 

related to business, economic or public context. 30 

On the side of the person concerned the load of the infringement must be taken into 

account. In general the disclosure of true facts must be accepted (under the consideration 

of proportionality), while disclosure of untrue facts must not be accepted. In addition, the 

severity of the impairment, the reason for the previous behavior of the person concerned 

(i.e. as a member of the Stasi), whether the person concerned was forced to work for the 

Stasi or did it under his own free will and the public appearance of the person concerned 

must be considered. 31 

On the side of the intervening person (the person requesting the access)it has to be 

taken into account which means of intervening (and location of intervening is selected), 

the status of the activity(for example, freedom of information), type and duration of the 

interference with the rights of the person concerned and the purpose (private or public) of 

the intervention. Moreover, the circumstances, the severity of the intervention and the 

specific justification for the acquisition of the information are to be considered. 32 Again it 

may also be relevant in which sphere the intervention takes place. 33 

30 Cf.Geigel, Haftungsprozess, Kapitel 23 Rn. 18. 

31 SeeGeigel, Haftungsprozess, Kapitel 23 Rn. 18 (withfurtherliterature). 

32 Geigel, Haftungsprozess, Kapitel 23 Rn. 18. 

33 Siehe Di Fabio, GG Art. 2 Rn. 181.


This has the consequence that if the person concerned is i.e. approved Stasi employees 

or a public figure, has less interest in the disclosure of this information than an 

uninvolved third party. It may also be relevant in which way the Stasi obtained the 

information. In the case of a high-profile individuals whose information was obtained 

using surveillance cameras, call recording or because of the use of secrecy may not be 

published (see the case of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl). 34 

6. Consent 

If insight or publication of information containing personal information which is not 

anonymous is requested the law also provides the option of the consent of the concerned 

person. The requirement of consent is not defined by the Stasi Records Act.The German 

Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) sometimes (depending on the subject of the 

declaration) allows the consent without the fulfillment of certain requirements. But the 

relevant information is “personal data”. Therefore the requirements of the Federal Data 

Protection Act are to be fulfilled. According to § 4a BDSG, consent is only possible 

under the circumstances specified therein, which means, that the requirement of 

voluntariness and the requirement of the written form have to be fulfilled. Furthermore 

there has to be a specific reference to the data for which the consent is given. 35 

7. Conclusion 

In the implementation of rights granted by the Stasi Records Acta variety of 

requirements has to be tested ant their presence must have been positively established 

before access is granted. Not all the terms used in the Stasi Records Act are defined 

directly therein. It is important thatthefundamental rightsenshrined in the German 

Constitution, in particular the general personal right and the right of selfdetermination 

and the way they are formulated in other laws are to be taken into 

account. There are also requirements that were formulated by the courts. The need to 

respect these rights makes it necessary that each individual case must be checked for 

the possibility of an inspection and/or publication of documents. Only with an 

understanding of these factors it is understandable that the Stasi files are not generally 

made available to the public. 

Bibliography 

1. Albers, Marion: Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, Hamburg 2005. 

2. Pardey, Frank: 23. Kapitel, in: Haag, Kurt (Hrsg.): Geigel, Haftpflichtprozess, 26. 

Auflage, München 2011. 

3. Arndt, Claus: Stasi-Unterlagen Prominenter, NJW 2001, p. 2948-2950. 

4. Busch, Jost-Dietrich: Auswirkung des Volkszählungsurteils des 

Bundesverfassungsgerichts, DVBl 1984, p. 385-389. 

5. Däubler, Wolfgang: Gläserne Belegschaften?, 4. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 2002. 

6. Di Fabio, Udo: Art. 2, in: Maunz, Theodor/Dürig, Günter, Grundgesetz Kommentar, 

64. Auflage, München 2012. 

34 Dazu bei Arndt, NJW 2001, p. 2948. 

35 On consent in general see Taeger, § 4a, in: Taeger/Gabel, BDSG, Rn. 1 ff.

402 


7. Gola, Peter: Zur Entwicklung des Datenschutzrechts im Jahre 1987, NJW 1988, p. 

1637-1644. 

8. Gola, Peter/Wronka, Georg: Handbuch zum Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz, 4. Auflage, 

Frechen 2008. 

9. Heußner, Hermann: Datenverarbeitung und die Rechtsprechung des 

Bundesverfassungsgerichts im Spannungsfeld zwischen Recht und Politik, ArbuR 

1985, p. 309-315. 

10. Heußner, Hermann: Datenverarbeitung und Grundrechtsschutz nach der 

Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, RDV 1988, p. 7-9. 

11. Hufen, Friedhelm: Das Volkszählungsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgericht und des 

Grundrecht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung, JZ 1984, p. 1072-1078. 

12. Jarass, Hans D.: Das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht im Grundgesetz, NJW 1989, p. 

857-862. 

13. Mester, Britta A.: Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz – Notwendigkeit und Inhalt einer 

gesetzlichen Regelung, Edewecht 2008. 

14. Meydam, Jan: Volkszählungsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und mögliche 

Konsequenzen für den Sozialdatenschutz, DuD 1985, p. 12-20. 

15. Pieroth, Bodo/Schlink, Bernhard: Grundrechte Staatsrecht II, 7. Auflage, 

Bonn/Marburg 1991. 

16. Schaub, Günter/Koch, Ulrich/Linck, Rüdiger/Vogelsang, Hinrich: Arbeitsrechts- 

Handbuch, 12. Auflage, München 2007. 

17. Simitis, Spiros: Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung – Grundbedingung einer 

verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung, NJW 1984, p. 394-405. 

18. Spindler, Gerald: § 823, in: Bamberger, Heinz Georg/Roth, Herbert, Beck´scher 

Online-Kommentar BGB, München 2012. 

19. Stoltenberg, Klaus/Bossack, Carolin: Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, Kommentar, Baden- 

Baden 2012. 

20. Taeger, Jürgen: § 4a, in: Taeger, Jürgen/Gabel, Detlev (Hrsg.), 

Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Frankfurt am Main 2010. 

21. Tinnefeld, Marie-Theres: Sapereaude! Über Informationsfreiheit, Privatheit und 

Raster, NJW 2007, p. 625-630. 

22. Trute, Hans-Heinrich: Die Regelung des Umgangs mit den Stasi-Unterlagen im 

Spannungsfeld von allgemeinem Persönlichkeitsrecht und legitimen 

Verwendungszweck, JZ 1992, p. 1043.

THE MEMORY OF JOSIP BROZ TITO IN THE 

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 

MACEDONIA 

Milen MIHOV 1 

Abstract: The cult of Josip Broz Tito has its specific dimensions in post-communist Macedonia and 

is characterized by extreme resistance. More than three decades after his death and twenty years 

after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, a number of schools, enterprises and streets in 

Skopje and the big cities are still called after his name. The work of the legendary Croatian is still 

a subject of scientific discussions and publications. The explanation of this fact with the postcommunist 

nostalgia typical of all countries of the Eastern bloc is unsatisfactory in this case. 

Tito’s canonization and the stability of his cult can be understood only through the prism of the 

Yugoslav-communist Macedonism. A fundamental element in the construction of the Macedonian 

identity and national history is the recognition of its originality. Tito’s life and work are a 

“historical” argument for the originality of the Macedonian nation. 

The cult of the party leader’s personality is a fundamental element in the totalitarian 

system of the communist countries and is the most visible sign of a society deprived of 

freedom. In this respect communist Yugoslavia makes no exception, despite the 

propagandized “democratic socialism” and the periodic demonstrations of independence 

towards the Soviet Union. The exceptional position of the party leader Josip Broz Tito 

was secured by his constitutionally defined role as a life president of the Federation 

which was popular under the name “Tito’s Yugoslavia”. 

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the cult of Tito has its specific 

dimensions which make it extremely stable compared to the other countries from Eastern 

Europe. More than three decades after his death and over ten years after the dissolution of 

the Yugoslav Federation, a number of schools, enterprises and streets in Skopje and the 

big cities are still called after his name. The work of the legendary Croatian is still a 

subject of scientific discussions and publications. The explanation of this fact with the 

post-communist nostalgia typical of all countries of the Eastern bloc is unsatisfactory in 

this case. Tito’s canonization and the stability of his cult can be understood only through 

the prism of the Yugoslav-communist Macedonism. A fundamental element in the 

construction of the Macedonian identity and national history is the recognition of its 

originality. Tito’s life and work are a “historical” argument for the originality of the 

Macedonian nation. Thus the contiguous and deliberate policy of the Yugoslav communists 

under Tito’s leadership for the formation of Macedonian national identity is represented as a 

historical recognition of the Macedonian nation and its sovereign right of a state. 

The creation and development of the cult of Tito is a part of the process of building the 


404 


totalitarian power in Yugoslav Macedonia. It started in the years of the armed resistance 

movement and became consolidated with the establishment of the communist federation. 

The formation and the evolution of the Macedonian historiography as a part of the 

political processes in the Republic are under the strong influence of the cult of the creator 

of new Yugoslavia. The process of “Titovization” of the historiography and the social life 

is determined by the political process in the union and republican government. Among 

the fragments of the past which fill post-communist Macedonia after the dissolution of 

Yugoslavia, the cult of Tito occupies a decisive position. The manifestations of the cult 

can be found in the preserved names of public objects which are still a place for praising 

the Yugoslav leader. Such an example is “Josip Broz Tito” High School in Skopje which 

is named after tito since 1945 up to nowadays and is one of the best high schools in the 

Republic [1]. In the courtyard of the high school an imposing bust of the patron is 

preserved and every year it is a place of worship. On May 4, 2012 in front of the 

monument was organized a celebration accompanied by presenting flowers and hoisting 

the Yugoslav flag on the occasion of the 32 nd anniversary of Tito’s death. The event is 

organized by Tito’s left party which emphasizes on the Yugoslav leader’s merits for the 

recognition of Macedonia as an independent state within the boundaries of Yugoslavia 

[2]. 

Preserving the myth of the patron of the Macedonian nation is the main activity of the 

organization “Association of the citizens respecting the image and the work of Josip Broz 

Tito”. In 2005 the association publishes a voluminous book under the eloquent title Tito 

for Macedonia – Macedonia for Tito [3]. The publication is a sequel of the literature 

approving the cult of Tito from the time of the Yugoslav unity. The book includes old 

publications from the periodicals and monographs with religious contents. The pictures 

are borrowed from the book Tito in Macedonia [4]. The authors’ purpose is to make a 

documentary contribution to “explaining a significant period in the formation of the 

Macedonian state system”, which is at the root of modern Republic of Macedonia. 

The text is an outspoken praise of Tito in the spirit of the communist propaganda. The 

conclusion summarizes: “By making a documentary and chronological review… we 

intended to point out the deep and real connection between the Macedonian nation, its 

national liberation struggle, the formation and growth of its state system and the 

significant social, national, economic and cultural transformations in the common state of 

the peoples of Yugoslavia... in the era that we popularly call Tito’s era, in the time when 

the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state reached their highest achievements 

under Tito’s leadership”. 

The relation between Tito and Macedonia is metaphysically explained as a “natural 

concrescence” between the “undeniable revolutionary, military commander and giant 

statesman” and the “historical destiny of the Macedonian nation” [5]. 

Professional historians also have significant contribution to the development of the cult. 

A reviewer of the publication is one of the former heads of the Institute of National 

History – the most prestigious historical institution in Skopje, Orde Ivanovski. He defines 

the publication as “precious contribution to the preservation and respect of Tito’s epochal, 

Macedonian, unrivalled work”, which is “catechesis” for the spiritual growth of young 

generation.[6] On another occasion O. Ivanovski says: “Tito has a great merit in forming 

of what is now called Republic of Macedonia… that is why the Macedonian will never 

forget what they have received from him” [7].

Milen MIHOV: The Memory of Josip Broz Tito… 405 

Tito’s exceptional role in the Macedonian history is also a subject of discussion in the 

official publications of the Institute of National History printed after a decision made by 

the governing body and presenting part of the publishing activity of the Institute. In 2003 

Trayche Gruyovski’s book was published. It is a kind of historical journalism coloured 

with a huge dose of Yugoslav nostalgia [8]. The author, who was a part of the highest 

communist elite, aims at revealing the reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Actually 

the book is an idealized picture of the communist government under the exclusive 

leadership of Tito who is defined as a charismatic person capable of pursuing a policy 

solving all problems and perfecting public relations. His death is defined as a fateful 

moment for the Yugoslav peoples. According to the author: “Tito’s death became an 

objective factor… for the functioning of the whole social system. It was easy to develop 

the system while Tito was still alive. Then everything developed into a negative 

direction” [9]. 

The praise of Tito is complemented with a huge dose of communist nostalgia in 

Yugoslav version. By pointing out the achievements of Macedonia during the time of the 

Federation, the author denies the historical perspective of independence. The supporter 

of the Yugoslav unity ends his book with the optimistic prognosis that the idea of “own 

sovereign state” will become old and will give way to the European integration which in 

practice makes a parallel between Tito’s federation and the European future of the 

Western Balkans [10]. 

The memory of Tito is also reflected in the interethnic relations in the Republic loaded 

with potentially growing tension between the Orthodox Christian majority and the 

aggressive Albanian minority. The preservation of the interethnic peace not only has 

internal significance but it directly affects neighbour Kosovo and may have consequences 

for the whole region. The essence of the problem is the coincident claims of both ethnic 

groups for the role of the native population of Macedonia. A friendly match in Pristina on 

February 17, 2012 between the handball teams of Kosovo and Macedonia on the occasion 

of the 4 th anniversary of the independence of the Republic, became the reason for public 

and political conflicts. In the beginning of the match the Albanian fans rose the poster 

“Macedonia does not exist” and shouted “God created you Bulgarians, Tito made you 

Macedonians”. Started on the sports ground, the scandal quickly spread in social 

networks and became the major topic of the Macedonian and Albanian media [11]. The 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Skopje also intervened in the development of the problem 

and made a special statement that the incident raises problems for the development of the 

bilateral relations. The incident ended with excuse from Pristina which was extended on 

behalf of the Handball Federation [12]. 

In a specific way, the myth of the communist leader of Yugoslavia continues his life in 

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia combining in a unique way the shadows of 

the past with the fears of modernity. In the tensed small Balkan country the deceased 

from Belgrade is still accepted as a factor able to solve all the problems of the past, the 

present and the future. An illustrative example of this is the T-shirts bearing the image of 

the dictator and the words “Come back, Tito”.

406 

Bibliography 


1. http://josipbroztito.edu.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=176&It 

emid=118 

2. http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=73E3BDD43E66474DA220E94D04374681 

3. Караjнов, П. Тито за Македониjа, Македониjа за Тито. Documentary miracle. 

Sk., 2005. The author is a former journalist from “Skopje” Radio and an active 

member of the communist party. On the official forms of the association is printed 

the image of Tito and the flag of the Republic of Macedonia. The association 

publishes other publications in the same vein. See: Бурзевски, В. Еден од 

генерацијата. Ск., 2004; Мирковиќ, Ст. Браварот беше подобар. Ск.,2004; 

Ценчиќ, В. Тито, Јосип Броз - посветено на лице или институција. Преведувачи 

С. Анастасова и Г. Ристеска. Ск., 2003. 

4. Павловски, J. Тито во Македониjа. Sk., 1978. The new edition incorrectly uses part 

of the pictures published in 1978. On the back cover there is a crude collage and on 

the background of a meeting in Belgrade during the 40s is placed another picture of 

Tito and it is described as a meeting in Skopje. 

5. Караjнов, П. Тито за Македониjа, Македониjа за Тито. Documentary miracle. Sk., 

2005. p. 431. 

6. Караjнов, П. Тито за Македониjа … p. 465. 

7. Ченто и Македонската државност. Зборник трудове од научниот собир по повод 

100 години од раґането на М. Андонов – Ченто. Одржан во Скопиjе 16-17 

декември 2002. Ск., 2004, с. 307. The statement is made during a discussion dealing 

with the historical evaluation of the first prime-minister of Federal Macedonia who 

became a victim of the communist regime of Tito. 

8. Груjоски, Т. Распадот на СФРJ. Студиjа и светоштво. Sk., 2003. A picture of the 

author together with Tito is printed on the cover and the title page. 

9. Груjоски, Т. Распадот на СФРJ… p. 286. 

10. Груjоски, Т. Распадот на СФРJ…, 236-239,287. 

11. http://www.dnes.bg/balkani/2012/02/17/kosovski-fenove-bylgari-ot-gospod-make 

donci-ot-tito.15171 

12. http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=AA97F913C58F7841BC84F12D6AB7C4E2& 

arc=1

ZSUZSANNA LORÁNTFFY, 

COMENIUS AND FAGARAS SCHOOL 

Florentin OLTEANU 1 , Elena HELEREA 2 , 

Viviana MOLDOVAN 3 

Abstract: During the 16 th and the 17 th centuries, in the Hungarian-Walachian region, the 

educational system developed following the model of the Western schools. One of the most 

important person in those times, Zsuzsana Lorantffy, had a great contribution to raising the 

social-cultural Region of Fagaras. The paper presents a brief biography of the princess who ruled 

the land of Fagaras, the importance of the encounter with the great Comenius, which had an 

impact in the school organisation from Sárospatok. In Fagaras the princess organizes the 

Romanian school, following the principles of the pedagogue Comenius. The certificate dated 3rd 

of April 1657 which stated the foundation of the Romanian school in Făgăraş emphasizes the 

modern vision of the princess that exceeded the limits of mentality and time, and anticipated the 

future requirements. 

Zsuzsanna Lorántffy – the wise princess 

Zsuzsanna Lorántffy (1600-1660) was the wife of Prince George Rakoczy I 

(1630-1648). Her unique personality, the feminine ideal model worth following even 

today, astonishes with the grandeur radiating from the complexity of its many forms. 

She was admired for her virtues, having rich knowledge in religion, trained for superior 

theological controversies, her skills in managing the household. A strong woman, a 

loving wife and mother, she has endured with courage and dignity the losses in her family 

- three children and her husband. 

But what is absolutely impressive is her taking action in the community, her relentless in 

supporting culture, a generous person, a founder of the school, and her status as the first 

author of Hungarian language. She remained with the image of a princess wise, 

intelligent, with a perfect household spirit, economic and diplomatic 

She was born in 1600, in a reformed family of noble landowners in the Zemplen 

County. Her father was Lorantffy Mihaly and her mother Kamáras Zelenczei 

Borbála. Her childhood was marked by the loss of her mother and then her father. 

1 Negru Vodă Cultural Foundation, Făgăraş, Romania. 


3 Theoretical High School, Codlea, Romania.

408 


Alone at the age of 16, she stood with dignity the greedy relatives who wanted to 

take her fortune. The hard times and events contributed to her status as serious 

mistress, responsible, generous but intransigent, with a strong character 4 . 

She married at the age of 16 with George Rakoczy, a young captain from Onoda city, 

gouverner of the Borsod I county, she helped with her dowry to her husband's prestige 

and authority, making him a man of action, taking important decisions on which 

application they will sacrifice their wealth and even their youth 5 . 

The year 1630 brought a decisive turn in the family life, in that after the death of 

Stephen Bethlen the throne of Transylvania was offered to Rakoczy I, on December 24, 

1630, and he will be sworn in Alba Iulia as prince. Princess of Transylvania, Zsuzsanna 

Lorantffy will stay by his side, sharing hardships with her husband during his reign, 

helping and guiding him with advice. Within their work is now Transylvania, with its 

center in Alba Iulia Court. The Princess took her new role with dignity, imposing strict 

rules during his reign, keeping him away from politics. 

But the most important role which Zsuzsanna Lorantffy assumed was to support the 

cultural rise of Transylvania, performing all the duties of an enlightened mistress, a true 

patron. First, she took note of the situation of schools and the Academy in Alba-Iulia, 

especially since the two sons were studying at the Academy. In this Academy there 

weremany excellent professors as JH Alstedt, professor at the University of Hernborn, a 

disciple of Comenius, and L.Ph. Piscator, a professor at the University of Heidelberg. The 

most important personality remains Bisterfeld JH, a German theologian and naturalist in 

Nassau, the confident and advisor of Rakoczy I. In this company, the Princess had direct 

contact with new religious and spiritual currents of the time. 

She also encourages students in Transylvania to continue their studies, giving them 

generous scholarships, ensuring their own financial resources, and the most gifted she 

offered scholarships at universities from abroad. Those who left to study in university 

centers in Europe urged to bring as many new books in Transylvania, giving them 

consistent material aid. It is well-known the case of Csánáki Mate, who traveled to 

Germany, England and the Netherlands, and he was supported by the prince at the 

insistence of his wife, obtaining his license as a physician at the University of Bologna. 

Since 1629, he becomes the doctor of the Rakoczy family first to Sárospatak, then in Alba 

Iulia. Csánáki is the author of the first dissertation on medical topics in Transylvania, 

entitled "On the plague" (Cluj, 1634). 

The young man returned his travels in the West, with boxes full of books ordered by the 

princess, thus succeeding to compile a library in the Rakoczy family where one could find 

books reflecting all philosophical and scientific currents of the time 

The generous support provided by Zsuzsanna Lorantffy for the School in Oradea drew 

here valuable professors from renowned universities in the Western Europe, which in 

1640 amounted to the rank of the scientific center of the country. The rector of the school, 

Kecskeméti Miklos, has acquired his knowledge at Dutch and English universities. 

4 Csetriné Lingvay Klára, Principesele noastre, Ed.Bisericii Reformate, 2004, p. 31. 

5 Nicolae Albu, Istoria învăŃământului românesc din Transilvania până la 1800, Tipografia 

,,Lumina” Miron Roşu, Blaj, 1944, p. 64.

Florentin OLTEANU et al.: Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, Comenius and Fagaras School 409 

Professor in Oradea, he introduced for the first time in Transylvania, Comenius's 

manuals, Ramus and Amesius. Enyedi Samuel, also taught here, who obtained his license 

as "medicinae doctor" in the Netherlands, also Koleseri Samuel, a follower of the English 

revolution, then Magyari Benedek, the author of the first anthology of Puritan works. The 

printing house from Oradea had also an important role and it was founded in 1640. 

Faith and desire to fulfill her mission helped Zsuzsana Lorantffy to resist the loss of two 

children whom she had with her husband, from their four children. On 11 October 1648, 

Prince George Rakoczy I dies and he is buried next to his great predecessor Gabriel 

Bethlen, in the Cathedral of Alba Iulia. But faith strengthens her. ,, Our life filled with so 

much bitterness we dedicate to our daily ministry of faith, "confessed one that will 

continue to serve the common good, beyond the limits of time thinking and anticipating 

future requirements. Further, she helped poor children to learn, encouraged the education 

of girls, supported education in the mother tongue, built schools and churches, religious 

institutions and equipped hospitals. 

Comenius, Apaczi and Szuszana Lorentffy 

Comenius (Jan Amos Komensky born in March 28, 1592 at Nivnice, Moravia and died 

on 15th of November 1670 in Amsterdam) is considered the "teacher of nations" as one 

of the first modern pedagogues. Comenius did his graduate studies in theology at the 

Academy of Herborn and Heidelberg University. Comenius developed in his many 

works, his ideas on improving the school system. He described the school system in four 

stages, all levels of education, education throughout six years and the last unit, the 

adolescence school, was named the Academy. 

Comenius was a contemporary and colleague of Janos Apáczai Because Both were 

professors. 

Apaczai (born in 1625, at Apacza in a free peasant family Apaczai) studied at 

universities in the Netherlands. He had the opportunity to listen to lectures from all over 

the world-renowned professors at universities in Leiden and Utrecht University 

Harderwijk, he was a PhD in theology. Susanne Lorantffy intervened on behalf of 

Apaczai to appoint him the head of the Protestant College in Cluj 

One of the greatest cultural achievements of Szuzana Lorentffy was transforming the 

school from Sárospatak into Academy. The Princesse, Suzanne Appel Lorantffy invited 

Comenius to participe to the reconstruction of the school of priests from Sárospatak and 

to help her provide modern knowledge: "Be our holy help and make our school from 

Patak raise and make the right proof of your natural and excellent method already known 

worldwide. " 

And, indeed, the great teacher worked four years at Sárospatak, contributing greatly to 

the prestige of the school, conceiving in this quiet place his most important works. He 

wrote here the masterpiece "Janu" and its illustrated version, "Orbis pictus Sensualium".

410 

Zsuzsanna Lorántffy and the Fagaras Citadel 


The name of the Princess is tidely connected to the name of Fagaras, an important land 

of the Transylvania County. 

On June 1st 1634, the Diet of Alba Iulia decided the registration of Fagaras on the 

princess's name in the amount of 80,000 florins. Proving her household spirit, seriousness 

and responsibility, the Princess aimed raising Fagaras in all its aspects - economic, social, 

cultural and religious. 

Inventories from the Fagaras Fortress give us information about Zsuzsanna Lorántffy 

during the years 1637, 1657 and 1676. 

• Thus, the inventory of the situation in 1637 under George Rakoczy I, his wife is the 

owner of the city. It is noted that the north wing of the castle was still occupied by 

the Princess’ apartments, a statement confirmed by the indications in the inventory 

such as the rich ceiling spaces at the third level of the northern wing, 'the 13 

paintings framed and a foot board game " 6 . 

• The following inventory in 1656, presents the situation in the time of George 

Rakoczy II, his mother, Zsuzsana Lorantffy, being the owner, and there are 

significant changes due to the transition of the Princess from the position of wife to 

the mother of the new prince, and also the widow. We note that the princess was 

moved to the second level of the Northern wing with direct access to the courtyard. 

They also arranged the chapel, and then to the East,,, the grand dining room, of our 

lady ", the home of middle mottled Tower", the house of his Majesty Our Lady ',' the 

inner house of Mary its our lady ", the house of the girls suite". 

• The last inventory in 1676, presents the situation during Michael Apáffy I when the 

owner of the domain (in 1663) was his wife, Ana Bornnemisza. It is mentioned the 

fact that the second level of the northern wing of the castle, in one of the rooms, ït 

used to live during her widowhood Zsuzsana Lorantffy” 7 . 

To know the real state of the field, she made visits and meetings with the area leaders. 

The instructions to the captain of the castle show knowledge and desire to raise for the 

three courts of the field: Comana, Fagaras and Porumbacu 

Meanwhile, she signed 21-degree certificates, she was called "Nos Suzana Lorandffi 

Serenissima quondam Principis Georgiis Rakoczi Domini, Principis Transilvaniae, 

Partium kingdom Hungariae Domini et Siculorum Comitis" 

Among them, we mention: 

- in 1651, as Lady of Fagaras with a diploma issued in Fagaras on 20th of February 1651, 

confirmed again Radu Radocsa and his sons and brothers, all from Bucium in their old 

rights for which they lost the documents;; 

- she also confirmed the landlord status on Herszeny Jude (1651), Barbat from Ucea de 

Sus (1652), Coman and Ilie Popenici from Venetia de Jos (1652), Lia alias Liany de 

Herszeny( 1652), then TrâmbiŃaş from Drăguş( 1654), Codrea from Drăguş( 1654), 

Ludul Sztoje de Şinca and his children Many, Aldea and Mathei Sztojes. 

6 Gheorghe Sebestyn, Cetatea Făgăraşului, p. 20 

7 Ibidem, p. 22


Zsuzsanna Lorántffy and the Romanian school from Fagaras 

Consistent, the educated Princess continued the school policy in Fagaras, applying ideas 

of the prestigious Jan Amos Comenius. The school was founded by the certificate degree 

in April 3rd, 1657, after having made known the plan to the Romanian Leaders in and 

Fagaras, and they promised with enthusiasm that " they will also offer their aid to this 

holy and divine thing." 

The school opened in the summer of 1657, and it brought a new spirit: a systematic 

organization, a detailed study plan, meeting all requirements and operating conditions, the 

premises of maintenance, the teachers, the students and their duties, rights and inspection, all 

were established by a regulation whose content deserves to be known, not only because it 

presents documentary importance, but also an indication of high cultural and educational level. 

Our purpose is not to do a comprehensive study on the Romanian school founded in 

1657 in Fagaras by Zsuzsana Lorantffy, but we want to mention some ideas that went 

beyond the limits of time thinking and anticipated future requirements, two of which are 

highly suggestive: 

- "Romanians should have a special house both for teachers and for learners, and 

auditorium and a separate courtyard, which through a common door people can meet, 

those who are obliged to live in harmony with one another otherwise they will be 

punished by masters”. 

It should be the same for the Hungarian School "(see chap. I, art. 2 of Degree); 

-„The Hungarian master take good correspondence, as friends of the same dominion 

and both live together in harmony with their students as well, for that neither Romanians 

from the Hungarian part, nor Hungarians from the Romanian part should have no 

offense. Otherwise, they will be punished by their masters or magistrates according to 

their fail "(see chap. II," On the master (teacher) Romanian Article 5 ". 

We present as it followsthe script from the Certificate of April the 3rd, 1657, after the 

Romanian translation made by Professor John Lupas: 

,, I, Susana Lorantffy, widow of His Highness Lord, George Rakoczi, by the Grace of 

God once prince of Transylvania, ruler of the Hungarian regions and the Szekley county 

We let every one know by this letter and especially our honored and glorified Lord John 

Kemeny of Gyergjomonostor, senior captain of Fagaras, our prefect now and in the 

future, our judges of the court, chief magistrates, and all rulers from Fagaras , to rich 

people, deans and priests in the present and the future, that we who know and reckon that 

our chief duty is to defend and spread the religion and to preserve the public good, 

considering the great ignorance is kept among the Romanian nation all over Fagaras 

county, both common people and the nobles, and even those who would be indebted to 

teach. Besides, being asked by the most enlightened persons, by Christian mercy I 

ordered to stand here in Fagaras town, for their good future, a Romanian school with 

teachers and learners of need, with all supplies needed for maintenance. For its 

organization and leadership, I stated some laws by our subjects skilled in these things, 

offering them and to the Romanian Leaders in Fagaras, they received those laws with 

great joy after promising that they as well will assist to this holy and divine work. "

412 


I. About the site, buildings and exemptions of the Romanian school. 

1. The Romanian school is located next to the Hungarian school for its great service 

and that it can be easily inspected, for Romanian learners to learn Hungarian, for they 

can easily learn the Hungarian and Latin, and vice-versa, the Hungarian learners to 

learn how to speak and write in Romanian. 

2. Romanians should have a special house both for teachers and for learners, and an 

auditorium and a separate courtyard, where through a common door can meet people 

who are obliged to live in harmony with one another or they will be punished by the 

masters. The exemption should be the same for the Hungarian school. 

II. About the Romanian master (teacher). 

1. He should be a taught person coming from the Hungarian Reformed schools, a man 

of real science who can write and speak Romanian very well. 

2. His position and his service is stated by the Lord of Fagaras, as a high governor, or 

by the Ministry or the consistory of Fagaras. He should always be under their 

obedience. 

3. Firstly, he should teach both the old and young the Romanian ABC, using the same 

letters to teach them how to write Romanian, especially to make them read the New 

Testament, the Psalter and the Catechism, printed in Alba Iulia, and aftewards or in the 

meanwhile to teach them in Romanian the Catechetica Capita (the ends of Catechism), 

Our Father, Apostles Creed, the 10 commandments, the mystery of baptism and church 

discipline canons.... 

4. He should teach at least as many hours as the Hungarian master. 

5. He must have a good correspondence with the Hungarian master, as friends of the 

same dominion and both live in harmony together with students for that neither the 

Hungarians nor the Romanians do not have any offense. Otherwise, masters or 

magistrates should punish them, or they will fall under heavy censorship .... 

… 

8. A master (teacher) in Romanian will not be send to villages until he knows very well 

to write and read in Romanian, to sing and learn the Catechism which he will 

demonstrate and prove during regular examinations to the satisfaction of visitors and 

inspectors otherwise he will be punished and his salary according will be diminished 

according to the magistrate’s order 

III. About learners and other disciples. 

1. Leranres all over the land of Fagaras are bound to come from everywhere and learn 

Romanian in this school in Fagaras, otherwise they will be removed and declared serfs 

again ..... 

6. Those who will miss the lessons without the knowledge of their masters will not 

receive bread. 

…. 

11. Those leraners, who are well accustomed to learning, can preach, even while they 

are still in school, in the Romanian church in Fagaras and villages, especially on 

Sundays and public holidays, even on other occasions, when they have time-this is to get 

used to preaching. This will happen only with the the Archpriest’s consent... 

IV. About school inspectors. 

1. School inspectors are primarily governors (priests) from Fagaras, then 2-3 

Consistory inspectors, who know well Romanian and together with 2 of the most learned 

nobles and Romanian ministers.


V. About the master’s salary and the learners’support in school 

1. The master’s salary 

Our school master: 

The payment in money – forty florins..........................................................................fl. 40 

Wheat 16 buckets......................................................................................................cub.16 

Wine – twenty five liters............................................................................................cub.25 

Bier – eighty liters.....................................................................................................cub.80 

Cows - two....................................................................................................................nr. 2 

Or instead – four florins..............................................................................................fl.4 

Cheese – two packs....................................................................................................nr. 2 

Wood – twenty five chariots......................................................................................nr. 25 

From the nobles the payment is in money – fifty florins...............................................fl.50 

And a hen every year.... 

The poor children and the learners who live in school will be taught without pay. 

2. Alumni support (internists). 

1. For eight learners of the poorest and most-hearted, who live in school, I ordered to 

be given every year in our city without interruption, four pieces of bread per day. They 

should be named on the first rank masters and preachers 

... 

The school prestige exceeded the Fagaras area. Its fame reached the Romanian 

Countries, where young people came to learn. We mention the name of Ionaşcu from 

Romanian Country (Valachia), who, in 1677, went to,, the country of Olt to take what 

learners have learnt" and then he stayed in the monastery NeamŃu. We do not know for 

sure how long the school functioned, but the documents of the time infer its existence for 

four decades. Thus, in a decree dated May 6, 1662, the Prince Michael Apaffy I we know 

the teacher's name Daniel Silvas (Silvassy) 8 . In another decree of June 23, 1662, the same 

prince refuses the request of city leaders to increase the Romanian teacher’s pay 9 . Other 

testimonies of its existence are revealed at the end of the seventeenth century, namely in 

1694, when the school was mentioned again in a decree/certificate where Apaffy allowed 

Constantin Brancoveanu to build a stone church for Romanians in Fagaras 10 . The school 

probably functioned until Romanians have depended on the reformed superintendent 

reformed of Fagaras. 

Post Scriptum 

Zsuzsana Lorantffy was an erudite personality, aware of the political writings of the 

time. Her rich and complex culture was revealed in all areas of social, political and family 

and gave her the strength to meet the challenges of his time. She offered role models or 

challenged almost for all possible situations. 

We all know that “History is constantly renewing, new sources appear on which new 

assumptions are made. Gaining the past for the future benefit is an act of moral 

uprightness, inextricably linked to the need to rebuild the hierarchy of values by 

8 N. Albu, op. cit., p. 75 

9 Ibidem, p. 76 

10 Ioan cav. de Puşcariu, op. cit, p. 413.

414 


promoting the value. The dialogue between generations and the promotion of the mutual 

respect, the reconstruction of human sense and the promotion of institutional vocation 

represent the necessary background to rebuild the past in its real size, so to better 

understand the present and to turn it toward the good of the future” 11 . 

An important example of necessary historical return is the honest reconsideration of the 

complex personality and her remarkable role in the history of Zsuzsanna Lorantffy- in the 

Transylvanian culture. Zsuzsanna Lorantffy (1616-1660) was the Princess of 

Transylvania during 1630 and mistress of Fagaras 1634-1660. A generous spirit, admirer 

of the great teacher I. Amos Comenius, she made a real development program for the 

schools throughout the Transylvania County. She helped poor children to learn, 

encouraged the education of girls, supported education in the mother tongue, built schools 

and churches, equipped religious institutions and hospitals. Among her greatest 

achievements are worth mentioned the Romanian school founded in Fagaras 1657. 

The contradictory assessments of leading historians on Lorantffy Zsuzsanna’s 

contribution to the establishment of the first institutionalized Romanian schools in 

Fagaras are incomprehensible. 

Thus, Nicolae Albu, a famous historian of Romanian education shows that school 

founded in Fagaras in 1657, "brought a new spirit: a systematic organization, a detailed 

plan, meeting all requirements and operating condiŃions: maintenance of the building, the 

teaching staff, pupils and their duties, rights and inspections, all established by a 

regulation whose content deserves to be known, not only because it presents documentary 

importance, but also as it is a hint of cultural-pedagogical level "for those times 12 . 

And on page 76 quoting Dr. I. Ratiu 13 he concludes, 'Appreciating the light and the 

instruction which could spread within the walls of the school in Fagaras we can easily 

recognize that two almost three centuries ago, it was the leading fireplace of culture in 

Transylvania”. 

The same author, in the same work, considers the founding of a Romanian schools in 

Fagaras ”an ingenious trap to convert Romaniansfrom Olt County to Calvinism 

outstretched by Lorantffi Susana, the widow of George Rakoczi I" 14 . 

And on page 76 quoting Nicolae Iorga he shows that „ not a generous altruism or a 

selfless love made Szuszana Lorantffi prompted Ioan Kemeny, senior captain of Fagaras, 

to found here a Romanian school 15 , but an old passion, the desire to spread the Calvinism 

among Romanians " 16 . 

The work of the Wise Princess implies a new approach. An attempt of this kind, we 

have made in the present paper. 

11 

www.centrul-cultural pitesti.ro / index.php? Mihaela Stănciulescu. 

12 

Nicolae Albu, History of Romanian Education in Transilvania until 1800 (Istoria ÎnvăŃământului 

românesc din Transilvania până la 1800, Tipografia ,,Lumina” Miron Roşu –Blaj,1944 ,p.68. 

13 

Dr. I.RaŃiu in ,,Foaia Şcolastică”, (Blaj) An .XIII, Nr.11. 

14 

Nicolae Albu, o.c. p.63. 

15 

N. Iorga in ,,Revista Istorică ”, 1923, octombrie. 

16 

Ion Matei, Form a heft of a theacher (Din carnetul unui dascăl), Sibiu, 1910, p. 95.

THE MEMORIAL MUSEUMS SITUATION 

AFTER THE 1990’S IN ROMANIA - MUSEUMS 

DEVOTED TO THE COMUNIST PERIOD 


Abstract: In Romania, there are approximately 100 memorial houses opened as museums and 

spread all over the country’s territories. They are dedicated to the collective memory of some 

important and outstanding personalities, a part of them hosting also exhibitions with ethnographic 

topics, especially if they are open in the countryside. The paper proposal is to draw the 

importance of the memorial museums units after the 1990’s and the necessity of a real support for 

others institution of this kind, dedicated to over 40 years of sufferings for the Romanian nation. 

The memorial museums are cultural institutions, of instructions and education, which 

are preserving great relics of outstanding people’s life. They are temples of gratitude, for 

what the followers have duties in front of the forerunners. Excepting the objects exposed, 

illustrative are the buildings, the rearranged gardens and the interiors which are making 

you thinking of that times 3 . The exhibitions are remaking the vintage atmosphere of the 

period in which the illustrious personalities have lived. 

The museum houses, respectively the memorial houses, are attractive through the 

privacy and the coding of a creator’s personality. The memorial object is actually the one 

which is making the passing from a reality to another, helping the visitor to transpose 

himself in the rendered personality’s time 4 . 

In Moldavia, there are over 20 of this kind of institutions, starting with the Romanian 

Literature Museum from Iaşi, which has 12 museums and memorial houses. The 

Romanian Literature Museum was born as institution with juridical personality in the 

year 1990, through the separation of the literature section of the National Moldavia’s 

Museum Complex. 

Ion Creangă’s Hut from Iaşi (Fig. 1), the first literary memorial museum from Romania 

(opened at 15-th of April 1918), is one of the 12-th literary branches making part of 

Romanian Literature Museum of Iaşi. He was one of the Romanian’s Literature classics. 

Very known for his fairytales, stories and relates, Ion Creangă became in the Romanian’s 

literature history, especially for his autobiographic opera „Childhoods memories”. His 

hut today became museum, hosted Ion Creangă, starting from the summer of 1872, after 

he was inhibited and forced to leave his house from Cozia’s Monastery. The man from 

Humuleşti moved here, in the right-side room, having Ecaterina Vartic as neighbour, the 

1 

History County Museum, Brasov, Romania. 

2 

Casa Muresenilor Museum of Brasov, Romania. 

3 

Mihai GeleleŃu, Ion Mihăescu, Writters in museums and memorial houses, Ed. Didactică şi 

pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1979, p. 7. 

4 

Opriş Ioan, Museosophy, Ed. Oscar Print, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 54.

416 


one who has cared him until his life’s ending. All his stories and childhood memories 

have been written in the house named ”hut” by the writer. In the summer and autumn of 

1876, Mihai Eminescu lived here as a renter of Creangă. The building which is hosting 

the documentary exhibition referring Creangă’s life and opera, the library, as long as the 

outdoor amphitheatre were built in the 1984-1989 period, and open in the date of 11-th 

June 1989,during the centenary of the great storyteller’s death. 5 . 

Vasile Alecsandri Museum was open for the public in 1928, with the support of the 

Romanian Academy. The House from Mirceşti, belonging to Vasile Alecsandri became 

memorial museum in the year of 1957 and was re-organised in 1987, and restored in the 

years of 1991-1992, 1998. The permanent exhibition includes photos, paintings, 

manuscripts, journals, rare books, various objects which constitute themselves in a 

suggestive road of Alecsandri’s life and opera 6 . There are impressing especially the 

vintage atmosphere, the rooms in which there are exposed furniture objects, objects 

which he has used, souvenirs collected from his trips. In the park, situated in the front of 

the house, the writer’s mausoleum, ordered by the Romanian Academy in 1928 7 , can be 

found. 

Sf. Ierarh Dosoftei Museum hosts the Romanian old literature section, the building was 

the office of the second priting press from Iasi, in 1677-1686 period. Thanks to the 

canonization of bishop Dosoftei (2005), the museum’s name became Saint Hierarch 

Dosoftei Bishop 8 . 

Mihai Codreanu Museum’s house is preserved almost like how it looked in the time 

when the poet’s life, with all the artistic values, with the library, the work office, the 

living room, the bedroom and all the others annexes. 9 . 

Vasile Pogor House, the place where the Junimea’s meetings were held: the building 

was built between years 1855-1858 by Vasile Pogor. At the end of February 1870, here 

were read the first lyrics set to the Literary Conversations, of Eminescu. Here in the main 

room from the first floor, „Junimea’s room” outstanding writers for the Romanian 

literature read: Eminescu, Caragiale, Creangă, Maiorescu, Conta, Xenopol 10 , etc. 

Other branches of the Romanian Literature Museum are also Otilia Cazimir Museum, 

which became memorial museum in 1972, Mihail Sadoveanu Museum, open in 1980, 

George Topârceanu Museum, Mihai Eminescu Museum, the building from Culture Park 

Copou being open in 1989, as a tribute for the poet, at the Centenary of his death. 

Constantin Negruzzi Museum was inaugurated in 7-th of October 1995, today having a 

documentary exhibition and museographic reconstitution of four memorial rooms 11 . 

In Botoşani there is also a memorial house which cannot be avoided, Mihai Eminescu 

Memorial House (Fig. 2) from Ipoteşti. It is arranged in the place where the great poet has 

lived and it was inaugurated in 1940. In the courtyard of Eminescu’s memorial house 

there is Papadopol House, vintage farmhouse in Moldavian style, which was owned by 

5 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-ion-creanga-bojdeuca-9/ 

6 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-vasile-alecsandri-5/ 

7 Lucian Vasiliu, Ioana Coşereanu, Dan Jumară, The book of literary museums of Iasi, Ed, Terra 

Design, Gura Humorului, 2006, p. 15. 

8 Ibidem, p. 18. 

9 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-mihai-codreanu-vila-sonet-j/ 

10 Mihai GeleleŃu, Ion Mihăescu, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 

11 ***, Muzeul „Constantin Negruzzi”, Ed. Vasiliana, 1998, Iaşi, 2009, p. 2.

Rozalinda POSEA: The Memorial Museums Situation after the 1990’s In Romania … 417 

the last Ipoteşti estate owner. He donated his house to the Romanian state. Now, there is 

the Etnographic Museum of National Centre of Studies from Ipoteşti, being exposed 

objects from the old peasant households. The museum presents, chronologically, during 

of ten symbol-spaces, the moments of Eminescu’s life and opera. In entrance in the 

museum recreates metaphorical, the universe on Eminescu’s nature: the sky full of stars, 

the sea sand with the nacre shells, exposed in hone and the stylized trees, three elements 

which can be found permanently. 

The memorial houses situated in the South of Romania are in a number of 

approximately 40, 15 of them being found in Bucharest. 

George Enescu National Museum from Bucharest (Fig. 3) is situated in Cantacuzino’s 

Palace, in three rooms of the palace being developed chronologically the permanent 

exhibition which include, except other, photos, manuscripts, various documents , 

diplomas, decorations, art objects, musical instruments, his clothes from Romanian 

Academy, artist's death mask and his hands moulded 12 . 

Theodor Aman Museum of Bucharest is the only vintage documentary house rested in 

Bucharest, hosting a collection of 186 paintings,400 drawings and engravings, but also 50 

engraving plates. 

George Călinescu Memorial Museum from Bucharest presents a part of his personal 

objects, furniture, manuscripts, documents regarding great man of letter’s life and 

activity 13 . 

In Prahova County there are approximately 10 memorial houses, in which the most 

representative are: Constantin Stere Museum, Ion Luca Caragiale Museum, Cezar 

Petrescu Museum, and Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu Museum. 

Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu Museum (Fig. 4) was open for the public in the time when he 

was living. The exhibition exposes documents about culture’s history, family photos, 

manuscripts, furniture and personal objects which were owned by the scholar and his 

daughter (approx. 300 exhibits); old book, paintings with Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu and 

his daughter Iulia Haşdeu; Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu archives; his sketches for Iulia 

Haşdeu Castle; the first editions of Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu (1838 - 1907) and of Iulia 

Haşdeu (1869 - 1888) works 14 . 

In Transylvania there are almost 30 memorial houses in which the most representative 

are Mureşenilor House and Stefan Baciu House from Braşov. 

Mureşenilor House from Braşov (Fig. 5) was constituted in 1968, after the donation 

made by the followers of Mureşeanu family. They were putting in this way in work Iacob 

Mureşianu’s cultural testament, offering for the Romanian state, for organising a 

museum, the necessary space, a very important furniture collection, paintings, sculptures 

and especially an archive of invaluable cultural value counting over 25.000 documents. 

The museum is dedicated to the memory of many members of this family with big worth 

in the cultural and political life of their time. Subordinate for a period to the County 

Museum of Braşov, starting with 1998, became itself a museum. The museum illustrates 

especially the life and the activity of the poet Andrei Mureşanu, the author of Romanian 

12 http://www.georgeenescu.ro/document_65_istoric_pg_0.htm 

13 http://www.muzeeromania.ro/arta/casa-memoriala-george-calinescu-bucuresti/ 

14 http://ghidulmuzeelor.cimec.ro/id.asp?k=489

418 


state hymn, of the publicist Iacob Mureşianu (1812 - 1887), of his son Aurel Mureşianu 

(1847 - 1909), journalist and publicist, his father successor at the leadership of 

„Transylvania Gazette”, and the composer Iacob Mureşianu junior 15 . 

Stefan Baciu Memorial House from Braşov was inaugurated in the year of 2006, thanks 

to the donation made by the Baciu family for opening a memorial museum dedicated to 

the personality of the great man of culture from Brasov. The memorial house exposes 

Biedermeier furniture pieces, art works, objects, books (over 3.600) and an archive 

counting 5.800 documents, belonging to Baciu family: prof. Ioan Baciu – the father, 

Elisabeta Baciu – the mother, Ioana Baciu Mărgineanu – the sister, Ovidiu Mărgineanu – 

brother-in-law, Ştefan Baciu - poet and Mira Simian Baciu - professor. 

In Alba County another representative museum for this kind of institutions can be 

found: Lucian Blaga Memorial House is situated in the town Lancrăm. The house has 

been built in the 1870’s by the priest Simion Blaga, the grandfather of the poet Lucian 

Blaga. The collection presents pieces of furniture which belonged to Blaga’s family; 

personal objects of the poet, manuscripts, princeps editions, photos and a local 

ethnographic collection, consisting in icons, textiles and ceramics. 16 . 

In Cluj County, town Ciucea, there is organised Octavian Goga Memorial Museum 

(Fig. 6). The museal complex includes the castle which became a memorial museum. The 

House of Ady Endre, the building in peasant style, known under the name of the whit 

living-room, a small church brought by Goga from Galpaia village (Sălaj County) and the 

mausoleum. First of the two rooms of the museum is the library, which contains over 

9.000 volumes, together with a Moorish cedar wood chest (from the 16-th Century), a 

work table, a couch and some chairs. From the library you can get into the office, where 

are exposed some family photos, some sketches made by Nicolae Grigorescu, candles in 

Brâncoveanu’s style (17-th – 18-th Centuries), belts (girdles) with inlays of precious 

stones from India, Syria, Turkey, a small table with the deck from ceramic tile original 

from Persia (16-th Century), a Byzantine icon from the 11-th Century. All over the 

museum, there can be found various art works, objects made of bronze, from Pompei an 

French arras from the 16-th Century, paintings signed by Theodor Pallady and Nicolae 

Dărăscu, a chest which was owned by Avram Iancu. Along these, there can be met 

correspondence and manuscripts belonging to the poet, publicist and man of politics 

Octavian Goga (1881 - 1938). For the remembering of the Hungarian poet Ady Endre, 

friend of Goga, there was arranged, at Ciucea, the building in which he lived time for four 

moths. It includes an interior specific from Romania and another one in the Hungarian 

style 17 . 

In Lupeni, Harghita County, can be found Tamási Áron Memorial House (Fig. 7), 

which was inaugurated in 24-th of September 1972. It’s his parents’ house, built 150 

years ago, and from wood carved with a roof from shingle. In this house was born Tamási 

Áron in 19 september 1897. The exhibition consists in his personal objects, manuscripts, 

works, letters, and photos of the artist. 

15 http://ghidulmuzeelor.cimec.ro/id.asp?k=159 


17 Mihai GeleleŃu, Ion Mihăescu, op. cit., pp. 89-94.


In Odorheiul Secuiesc, there’s another memorial house dedicated to the poet, translator 

and redactor Tompa László, the exhibition presenting dates about his life and activities. 

We exposed some of remarkable memorial museums existing on the Romania’s 

territory. Many of the memorial houses existing weren’t include in this study, but this 

thing doesn’t mean that they are less important for illustrating the past and the activity of 

the remarked personalities along the history, through their own worth. We tried only to 

underline the existence of these culture places after the 1990-s, many of them because of 

their cultural and educative activities. 

The museum dedicated to „Memorial Pain” from Sighet is organised by the Civic 

Society. For the opening and sustaining such institutions dedicated to the collective 

memory, there were made a lot of trying (to Pitesti, Fagaras, in the old communist 

prisons) not materialized until the present 

The Civic Academy Foundation was born in 21st of April 1994. Through its main 

purposes, there’s also the civic education, teenagers education, a better knowledge of the 

country’s past and, in this sense, the restitution of the contemporary history of Romania, 

falsified in the years of the communism dictatorship. The main project is called The 

Memorial of th Victims of Communism and of the Sighet Resistance. 

The Memorial of the Victims of Communism and the Resistance was thought and 

initiated starting with the year 1992 by the president of the Civic Aliance, Ana Blandiana, 

realised together with Romulus Rusan and an important group of historians, architects 

and designers. At 21 April 1994, the author of the project, Ana Blandiana, and a number 

of 175 of personalities gave life to the Civic Academy Foundation, having as general 

purpose the civic education at his „Memorial”. 

Through a competition, the composition of the rehabilitation project was given to a 

company called UMROL from Cluj, and the self execution from Baia Mare. The work 

lasted until the year of 2000. Because the building, old as a Century, was ruined and full 

of dampness, it was necessarily the restoring of the foundations, of the isolations and of 

the roof, and the inside walls, which were anyway repainted and they didn’t remind of the 

50’s period, were painted in white. Each cell became a museum room, in which, firstly in 

a temporary form and then final, following now an chronological order, were attached 

objects, photos, documents, creating in this way the ambiance and the documentation of a 

hall of a museum. In one of the courtyards of the past prison, after a contest of projects in 

which participated 50 architects and artists, was built in 1997 a Space of Silence and 

Prayer, after the project made by the architect Radu Mihăilescu, which combines the 

ancient style (the suggestion of the Greek tholos and the Christian catacomb) with a 

modern vision. On the descending ramp walls in the underground space were engraved 

the name of almost eight thousands of death people in the prisons, camps and the 

deportation places of Romania. Extremely meticulous, raising the names of all the deaths 

was really difficult and it needed ten years of work in the International Centre of Studies 

about Communism, and the number is pretty far to discover the real amplitude of the 

repression. The majority of the names were established by Cicerone IoniŃoiu and the 

regretted Eugen Şahan, both historians and ex-political prisoners. Regarding the costs for 

this project, they were paid by the regretted sponsor Mişu Cârciog from London, which 

rests until now the principal donator of the Memorial.

420 


In 2000, there was attached to the old building, a module including a modern hall for 

conferences, in which there can be developed the symposiums, the talks and the seminars, 

summer schools. The hall contains simultaneous translation facility, and it could be rent 

for international meetings. 

Some art works of very important value completes the profile of the Memorial, offering 

him a special personality through the History Museums. The works donated by authors, 

are impressing by the symbol of accepted sacrifice which describes them. A tapestry like 

Freedom, we love you by Şerbana Drăgoescu, the painting Resurrection by Cristian 

Paraschiv, the bronze sculpture Black Sea dedicated by de Ovidiu Maitec to the historian 

Gheorghe I. Brătianu and, overwhelmingly the two big sculptures owned by Camilian 

Demetrescu and names Tribute to the political prisoner (one subtitled Resurrection), 

create a high and dramatic atmosphere. 

But the artistic paper is the Sacrificial procession (Fig. 8), which is almost becoming 

one of the symbols of the museum. It's eighteen human figures walking towards a wall 

that closes the horizon, like the communism closed the life of millions of people. 

Presented in 1997, from wood, the work was transformed into bronze and today it is 

exposed in another courtyard of the ex-prison. It’s the point where hundred of tourists are 

taking photos at the passing through the Memorial. 

In the end, one of the components is the Poor’s Cemetery situated at 2.5 km, 

architectural ensemble dedicated to the political prisoners which died ore were executed 

in prisons, cams or deportation place, like also for the memory of the partisans killed in 

the fight with the Security. The arrangement of this cemetery began after 1997, when The 

Memorial of Victims of Communism and of Resistance was declared - law nr 95 – 

„ensemble of national interest”. By the same law, the cemetery was considered part of 

the Memorial, as long as in the 50’s here were threw up in some wholes the bodies of tens 

of death political prisoners in Sighet Prison. 

There isn’t known how many dead people were buried here, and how many in other 

places, because the communists practiced the erasing of the names of people buries, and 

there weren’t registered their grave. The grave was made also to be lost in tie through the 

previous graves, and in this way any indication was also disappearing. 

There was drawn a map of the country (from trees), and in the place where Sighet 

were located(counted as an epicentre of this repression), there was built a cenothar altar. 

In the niche under the altar were deposed tens of urns with soil brought from different 

prisons, camps deportation centre, or execution places. 

In the back of the altar, there is a cross in Byzantine style, graved in chalk by the 

master in mason Constantin Marinete, and in the background were built some roadside 

crosses dedicated to the victims by their family or by associations. 

The ensemble includes also some tens of andesite plates in which are graved the name 

of the Romanian citizens who died in the deportations from Soviet Union. They complete 

the name of the death persons from prisons and caps, partially registered on the plates 

from the courtyard of Memorial 18 . 

The Romanian Peasant Museum in Bucharest, together with the collection with an 

ethnography specific: clothes, ceramic, furniture, wood and glass icons, xilograves, 

religious objects, textiles, carpets, tools, like also an important foreign popular art 

collection, has an section dedicated to the communist period (Fig. 9). 

18 Material elaborated with the sustainement of Mrs. Andreea Fürtos.


The Association Revolution Memorial 16th-22nd December 1989 was born in 26th of 

April 1990 with the statutory purpose to horn the memory of the victims of the repression 

from the Romanian Revolution in December 1989. From 1990 until 1999, the Association 

realised a memorial complex in the Heroes Cemetery of Timişoara, and 12 monuments, 

built in city in the repression area from December 1989. Starting with 1996, inside the 

Memorial is operating the Researching and Public Information Centre on the Revolution 

from December 1989. 

The City Hall of Timişoara offered for the association an immobile in the civic centre of 

the city. It’s about a building from the 18th Century in baroque style, a monument 

building. The construction was in an advanced state of decay, reason for what it has been 

necessarily to make some important act of consolidation arrangements, which they hadn’t 

been finished yet. 

POST SCRIPTUM 

Today, even if more than 22 years had passed from the Revolution of December an 

1989, in Romania there isn’t any other museal institution to illustrate from an historical 

point of view, the period of more than over 40 years of communism regime in the 

conditions in which the communism regime made a large number of victims in the 

Romanian Gulag. 

Acknowledgement 

We want to thank very much on this way to miss Andra Tudor from Nicolae Titulescu 

College of Brasov for all her support for the translation of this study, and especially for 

presenting this paper in Hungary. 

Fig. 1 

Ion Creanga’s Hut

422 


Fig. 2 

Mihai Eminescu House 

from Ipoteşti 

Fig. 3 

George Enescu Museum


Fig. 4 

Bogdan Petriceicu 

Haşdeu Museum 

Fig. 5 

Casa Mureşenilor 

Museum in Braşov 

Fig. 6 

Octavian Goga 

Memorial Museum

424 


Fig. 7 

Tamási Áron Memorial 

House 

Fig. 8 

Sacrificial Procession

RESEARCH OF THE COMMUNIST PERIOD IN 

HÓDMEZİVÁSÁRHELY – SOME LOCAL 

VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME 

Zoltán PRESZTÓCZKI 1 

Abstract: The research of the period between 1944/45 and 1989/90 is in question from several 

points of view. There are many data that cannot be obtained due to the privacy limitations related 

to the personal rights, however, more and more information can be reached about the communist 

period. There are more and more publications about that system, and not only memoirs, as shortly 

after the transition, but professional issues, too, giving a good source for further researches. 

Another resource to reveal the past can be the documentary films, giving back the mood of the 

period, and also expanding the knowledge of the average people about their past. 

Related to the constant openings of archives there are more and more possibilities to 

research. The researches are regulated by legal background (the data protection act, the 

archives act, and the recommendations of the data-protection commissioner) which 

separate the personal and public data and determines the circle of public faces. 

After the transition several historian-workshops were formed. Among them the two 

most important ones are the Institute of the 21st Century and the 1956 Institute (The 

Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). The experts of the latter have 

been issuing their highly professional publications, representing the events, the 

background, the antecedents and results of the revolution, for two decades. The Institute 

of the twenty-first Century, operating since 2000 and cooperating with the scientific 

workshops from the ex-socialist countries of the similar profile, focuses on the 

suppressing character of the communist system. The colleagues of the Institute also do a 

very valuable and useful job. 

For all the researches the net of archives can provide an essential assistance, mainly by 

their guides. In these guides the archive material of an institute or a college, the activity 

data of the leader officers, or the several decrees of a given college can be found. Related 

to Hódmezıvásárhely the archontology of the officers of Csongrád County, the catalogue 

of the criminal suits of Szeged (with some concerned people from Vásárhely) has been 

published. Furthermore, the themes-catalogue of the sessions of the local committee 

(www.csml.hu) is available on the internet – including all the decrees, made up at a 

certain session. 

It is the merit of Biernacki Karol – director of the Archives of Csongrád County, Csaba 

Farkas and Attila Varsányi the chief archivist that the local events, formerly handled as 

taboos, could be revealed. 


426 


In Hódmezıvásárhely the colleagues of the Emlékpont Museum have been working on 

the reveal of the communist past of the city since 2006. This process also involves the 

examination of the communist elite, and the political, economic and cultural changes, too. 

This work is essential for the preparation of a monograph of the history of 

Hódmezıvásárhely. The 5 th volume of the historical monograph of Szeged, summarizing 

the historical events of the city between 1945 and 1990, was published in 2010. 

The exhibition, representing the events, victims and consequences of Katyn was 

established with the cooperation of the Archives of Csongrád County and Emlékpont in 

2010. The exhibition was made up by Karol Biernacki and Zoltán Bagi chief archivist 

with the assistance of Polish experts. On the opening of the 22 nd of January the leaders of 

Vásárhely and Andrzej Przewoznik – a Polish Historian held a speech, the latter speech 

was translated by Karol Biernacki. 

The massacre that happened seven decades earlier – more than 22000 Polish people, 

mainly officers were killed – was blamed on the Germans by the Soviet propaganda, but 

finally, in 1989 it became clear, that the Soviets were the ones, committing the slaughter. 

It is a sad fact, that Przewoznik was also staying in the plane, falling down due to the bad 

visibility, on the 10 th of April, 2010. All the 97 passengers died. Przewoznik’s book titled 

“Katyn – Crime, Truth, Remembrance” – was issued in October, 2010. 

The researches about the events in the communism are done not only in the frame of 

the several institutions, but private people also deal with that; as being former victims 

(Ferenc Földesi, Lajos Csoma), or as experts being interested in a certain topic (Mihály 

Herczeg, Gabriella Baracs, Gyula Belényi, Péter Bencsik, Gábor Vincze, András Bán or 

László Bálint), and later publishing their results. The yearbooks of the Szeremlei Society 

and the volumes of the Museological Workshop sometimes include the studies about the 

local events of the communist period or its victims. Mihály Herczeg, the former director 

of the Archives was one of the first experts, dealing with the process, how the 

communism got the power in Hódmezıvásárhely. His study was published in 1985, in the 

Archives-series titled “Studies from Csongrád County”. 

Gabriella Baracs revealed the economic history of Hódmezıvásárhely between 1945 

and 1962, while László Bálint summarized the local events of the 1956 revolution in a 

book. All the above works were based upon the researches in the archives, as it would not 

be possible to write a book or a study without studying the documents, stored in the 

archives. 

Below the types of sources are listed, with the place where they can be studied. 

The arranged part of the reports and filed documents of the organisations of the local 

government (the City Committee and the Executive Committee) and the organisations of 

the professional management (Secretariat, Technical-, Agricultural- ..etc. Department) 

can be researched without any limits at the Hódmezıvásárhely Archives. The majority of 

the documents of the local factories, cooperatives, schools, and civil organisations are 

also stored in Hódmezıvásárhely. These documents are constantly under arrangement, 

and the researches are eased by the creation of different registers and fond-histories. 

The documents of the political parties, operating between 1944 and 1950 and in 1956 

can be found mainly in the “Party-Archives” – stored at the Archives of Csongrád 

County, or in the capital – in the Archives of the Institute of Political Science. The 

documents of the MDP (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and the MSZMP (Hungarian 

Socialist Labour Party), related to Vásárhely are also stored in the “Party-Archives”.

Zoltán PRESZTÓCZKI: Research of the Communist Period in Hódmezıvásárhely… 427 

There are only a few documents related to the Vásárhely Smallholders’ Party. The 

remaining files are stored by individuals (the descendants of the former party leaders), or 

in the “Party-Archives”, or in Érd – at the Smallholders’ Archives. Along the documents 

an important type of source is the local media (newspapers, like the Vásárhely Népe, 

Alföldi Újság, Vásárhelyi Független Újság, Délvidéki Hírlap, Viharsarok, Csongrád 

Megyei Hírlap, newspapers of the revolution 1956), which are available not only at the 

Archives of Hódmezıvásárhely, but also in the local library. 

The memorials of the people’s court acting between 1945 and 1949 can be researched 

in Szeged. There are many Vásárhely-related cases among the documents. The trials’ 

reports are excellent documents of the period; however, they could be formed with 

manipulative purpose: some witnesses supported the unreal conception made by the 

accusation with their statements. Some documents of proceedings related to 

Hódmezıvásárhely can be found in the Archives of Budapest, too. 

The documents of the organisations, established with state security purpose (PRO, 

ÁVO, ÁVH) are stored in the Historical Archives of State Security. 

Hódmezıvásárhely was the centre of Csongrád County between 1950 and 1962. The 

files of the county council and its executive committee, and the whole material of its 

organisations are stored at the Archives of Csongrád County. 

Regarding to the period – a new kind of source can be the audio and television 

recordings of the sessions of the different organisations (party or others). These 

recordings – approaching to the transition – are more and more valuable. According to 

them many information can be obtained about the attitude of the leaders to the changing 

circumstances and the strengthening oppositionist movements. 

To do any researches is possible by keeping the rules of law in force (Law no. LXVI of 

1995 about the archives; and law no. CXII of 2011 about the rights of self-determination, 

and the freedom of information). 

And finally, here are some examples of the leaders of the local Smallholders’ party. 

The general staff of the Vásárhely Smallholders’ Party (István Fejes – the president, 

Sándor Karácsonyi – director of the party, Sándor Oláh – party secretary, Tamás 

Keresztes – Member of Parliament, Flórián Kruzslicz – vice president and others) were 

successful to pick up the gauntlet against the local communists lead by Mihály Oláh. It is 

a well-known fact that in June 1947 Ferenc Nagy – the prime minister was forced by 

Rákosi to resign and to emigrate, and new leaders serving the communists got the power 

with the leadership of István Dobi. Before and after the elections of 1947 the former 

supporters of Ferenc Nagy were excluded from the party, which lead to the meltdown of 

the party throughout the country. However, in Hódmezıvásárhely, even the election held 

on the 31 st of August 1947 was won by the Smallholders, though the one third of their 

former supporters voted for the Hungarian Party of Independence, locally lead by the 

formerly excluded from the Smallholders’ Party – Tamás Keresztes. 

The communists demanded it in vain, that all the leaders of the Smallholders’ Party 

resigned from the autumn of 1946, that occurred only in 1948, following István Fejes, 

Sándor Karácsonyi and the others were seized according to false accusation. In 1949 the 

former leaders of the Smallholders’ Party were put on kulak-lists, and some of them were 

judged to 1-2 year-long imprisonment due to the omission of the obligatory delivery 

quotas or the ‘violation of the state law of the Republic’ – all according to the 

communists’ influence.

428 


The wife of the old Flórián Kruzslicz, whose son had died in the WWII as a hero, has been 

humiliated, also according to a false accusation. Perhaps, that was the reason, for he – at the 

age of 76 – joined the Vásárhely revolution of 1956, participated in the reorganisation of the 

Smallholders’ Party. After the revolution he was accused for his activity. 

A contrary example is István Fejes, who, after his persecution in 1949 kept himself 

away from politics. Despite he didn’t participate in the events of the 1956 revolution, 

either, he was detected for several years. 

Tamás Keresztes, who couldn’t be put on kulak list as being a smallholder, became the 

victim of his political activity. In August 1947 he with some other members of the 

Smallholders’ Party joined the newly formed Party of Independence. That party reminded 

the voters to the former Smallholders’ Party, lead by Ferenc Nagy and Béla Kovács more, 

than the new party lead by Dobi. During the campaign he was beaten up by some hired 

people in Csongrád. He was informed in the hospital that he got a mandate with his new 

party. However, on the pressure of the communists the election court took away 49 

mandates of the Party of Independence, and Keresztes – with some other delegates – 

being afraid of their imprisonment, left the country. He settled down in the USA in 1949, 

and he died in 1953, probably due to his injuries in Csongrád. The exact date of his death 

was published by the Hungarian Népszava of America – its copies can be found in the 

National Széchenyi Library. 

The researches on Tamás Keresztes can be supported by the newspaper articles about his 

activity, the documents of the City Council stored in the archives and his speeches in the 

parliament. There is only one photo about him. His documentary heritage is in the USA. 

The net of agents in Hódmezıvásárhely before 1989 

Some years ago the leaders of Hódmezıvásárhely decided to release the documents 

related to the local agents net, acting before 1989. A reason for this decision was to face 

with the past, and to examine, how the state security methods, highly reflecting the ways 

of the operation of the power, influenced the political, social, cultural and everyday life of 

the city. The researcher committed by the museum prepared his detailed reports in 2009. 

He gave several information about the methods of the research; his professional 

experience, the relating rules and the international methods of the agents’ past. 

In the first 58-page-part of the work he included the structure of the III/III organ of the 

State Security Authority, the statistics of their sources of information, and the main types 

of documents that were researched. Later, he listed and identified the members of the net 

– so the officers, responsible for the agents’ activity, and also the persons, recruited with 

code name. The latter ones had to make reports to the former ones time to time. 

As a closure of his study, the author reveals the daily operative informational reports of 

1989, related to Hódmezıvásárhely, he summarizes the message of his research and the 

methods he used. The 500-page-enclosure, attached to the study can be found in the Historical 

Archives of the State Security. It includes the summarizing reports, made by the documents 

related to Vásárhely and the documents related to the concerned people of the city. 

The study made in the form of a report gives the first in Hungary authentic view – 

supporting on the documents of the archives – about a topic, that formerly had been 

handled as a taboo – the communist informers’ net. That can have a significant influence, 

due to many concerned people still alive, and can feel it detrimental to have his name and 

personal data in such a form.

THE POST WAR ROMANIAN MILITARIES 

FROM EXILE AND CONDEMNATION 

OF COMMUNISM 

Mihaela TOADER 1 

At the end of World War a small number of Romanian troops are stationed in Western 

European countries, which meet various diplomatic missions are sent to study in 

Germany or those taken prisoners on the occasion of military operations on the Western 

Front plus more later the army improperly removed on political grounds, chose exile. 

Many of them took a stand on condemning communism. 

As shown in the documents covered the majority of Romanian troops left the country in 

the period 1941-1950 2 . Evolution military representatives in exile organization has 

developed in relation to or in relation to international events and because of Soviet 

actions in the country. 

On the other hand, creates a Cold War because of the image of a European continent 

divided between Western Europe affected by the Americanization and Eastern Europe 

Sovietized. Geographically and symbolically, „Western debate related to the American 

presence in Europe almost always identified with the Old Continent to the west. Usually, 

the other part of Europe is mentioned marginally, or is simply ignored. When it is taken 

into question, the American presence in Eastern Europe is rarely presented as an 

autonomus subject, typically used in contexts in which American cultural debate 

diplomacy efficiency during the Cold War. In other words, what kind of American 

presence can talk in a region occupied by the Red Army and fallen under the influence of 

the Soviet Union? Political divisions, ideological, economic and cultural ties between 

East and West were large and had a significant impact on developments on the 

Continent” 3 . 

1 

Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, 

Bucureşti, Romania. 

2 

Is there two periods in which Romanian troops left the country: 1. between 1941-1945, the 

coming of Legionnaires fall persecuted during the regime of Ion Antonescu regime established 

officers and Division "General Platon Chirnoaga" the military studying in Germany, 2. 1946- 

1950, especially after the abdication of King Michael, to include soldiers in the army unhappy 

situation following the massive purges of political criteria and carrying out the action of 

"democratization" of the military. Some of them reached the West via Hungary and Austria, 

some with Yugoslavia, particularly pilots and others by Turkey's; ACNSAS, fund SIE, file no. 

184, Ion Calafeteanu, Romanian exile. Hope erosion. Documents (1951-1975), Encyclopedic 

Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, Ion Calafeteanu, Politics and Exile 1946-1950 The history of 

the Romanian exile, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000. 

3 

Bogdan Barbu, Americans are coming! U.S. Presence in Romania symbolic Cold War, 

Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 17-19.

430 


Militaries who chose to remain in the West path tried by varios means to be the 

spokesmen of Romanians who remained in the country under the influence of regime 

headed by a commnunist totalitarianism. „The representation materialized in relation to 

the West as a whole host states authorities and public opinion of the free world” 4 . But the 

representation function was directly related to the function of information held in two 

directions. On the one hand, "the Romanian exile sought to inform and raise awareness 

especially about the situation in the country. But, in addition to information about the 

nature of Western powers, practices and consequences of the communist regime in 

Romania, exile was also intended to inform public opinion in the country” 5 . 

On the other hand, „a feature of particular importance to exile was that of keeping the 

democratic tradition, while delegitimization communist regime. Romanian exile 

Romanians entertained the idea of „alternative democratic nation was living conscience” 6 

In this context represented by military sought exile by General Nicolae Radescu 

Romanian National Committee desired to represent the Romanian government in exile. 

The first category was the postwar exile besides Romanian military career diplomats who 

held foreign diplomatic and military who refused to return home. Among them included: 

General George Băgulescu and General Ion Gheorghe. 

Also one of the very active diplomatic personalities exile was, undoubtedly, Scarlat 

Radu Arion 7 diplomat, Chargé d'Affaires of the country in Athens until 1947. He ordered 

a 72-page report on the organization of the armies of communist countries, with special 

reference to Romania. The report provides information gathered by military author 

refugees, especially from a Romanian officer - unnamed - who later settled in Australia. 

They are backed by extensive political commentary on the effects of communism, 

primarily in Romania and then in neighboring countries or in distant China. 

"The plan of reorganization of the Romanian army 8 , spread over three years, is largely 

over, given the haste with which the Communists prepare war. It seems that the 

intelligence services of the western powers are systematically betrayed by the 

Communists when trying to find the stage of preparation of the communist armies. It 

seems, too, that Westerners do not know that the intelligence of a special communist 

armies of disinformation responsible for Counterintelligence department and specializes 

in making available to reach the offices of opponents false information on Communist 

armies, false documents or fake, as fake maps”. 

Report on the current armed forces RPR. Western powers are wrong if leaders 

underestimate the military power of the Soviet Union satellite countries, including former 

enemy countries, like Romania. Following reoganizării Romanian armed forces after the 

Soviet model, the communist government in Bucharest could mobilize quickly in the 

event of war, an army with equal effective, if not superior, to those taken by the 

Romanian royal army during the war against the Soviet Union. 

4 

Dumitru Dobre, Iulia Huiu, Mihaela Toader, Security Sources inform, Humanitas, Bucharest, 

2008, p 23. 

5 

Ibidem. 

6 

Ibidem. 

7 

View on Constantin Arion Arion Scarlat Radu, diplomat and dissident in "Historical Review", 

III, 1992, no. 7-8, p 834-836. 

8 

View Ulrich Burger, Ethridge mission in Romania, Civic Academy Foundation, Bucharest, 2000, 

pp. 231-236.

Mihaela TOADER: The Post War Romanian Militaries from Exile and Condemnation ... 431 

Western leaders must not imagine that communist governments that do not respect any 

commitments set out in treaties and conventions in the political, economic, cultural, and 

so on will follow precisely the commitments they have made in the military. 

After the signing of 23 august 1944, the Romanian army suffered a drastic treatment, 

most officers and active and reserve being removed from frames. 

They were replaced with the offer from the soldiers belonging to the Communist 

divisions Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia, Cloşca and Crisan, arrived in the USSR. 

Communists have kept some career officers to prevent complete disorganization of the 

army, given the total failure of officers and soldiers coming from. Former officers and 

NCOs who were retained were used for training new military personnel, among 

adherents recutita regime. Social background is the main criterion recutare the future 

communist army officers. Romanian officers promotions projecting the years 1946, 

1947, 1948 and 1949 are entirely made up of sons of workers or members of the 

Communist Party”. 

About recutarea personnel in the military can be found in an extensive article by 

Colonel Dan Ivanovici 9 : „Officers are currently recutează both MFA troops and the 

troops M.A.I. U.R.S.S. officers in schools Only youth who were found by communist 

activity in youth organizations, those with healthy social origin, those who did not have 

any wealth, they and their parents, etc., can be admitted to schools officers. Checking 

and supervision to continue throughout the two years of school, many of whom were 

expelled a few months or even a few days before becoming officers. In addition, can 

be received directly by the officers in schools, youth Youth Workers Union (UTM) 

sent directly by party organizations, youth highlight the work and their dedication to 

the cause of communism. Simultaneously receive a thorough political training, 

handing them the: Marxist study and knowledge of the history of the USSR 

Communist Party Bolshevik USSR. Currently, because most officers were 

îndepărataŃi career, having been used to reorganize the communist army officers 

Communists were strengthened double orders of commanders and political units. 

There, where there are career officers means that their presence is still required, but 

will not delay replacement. All these officers, who are considered enemies of the 

people are double or second, in such a way that any movement or gesture is watched. 

Everywhere, in all military departments, policy officers, through their agents covered 

or not counteract any intention of resistance”. 

Finally one of the main conditions that would constiut a first step and that has led 

Romanian troops to follow exile was just reorganizing the army 10 . This was one of the 

first military attitudes concerning the condemnation of communism and the whole system 

set up in Romania. 

9 Buletinul Militar nr. 5, 1953, pp. 14-15. 

10 To reorganize the army see Florin Sperlea, From the royal army to army folk. Sovietization of 

the Romanian army (1948-1955), Editura Ziua, 2003.

432 


The first political organization in exile Romanians was the Romanian National 

Committee from New York 11 . „The need to represent the whole country (Romania) to the 

imperialists and the need to act together, led to some political groups are a Romanian 

National Committee of emigrants from abroad” 12 . 

An important role in this Committee, which was intended, in fact, a provisional 

government of the Romanians in exile, was represented by General Nicolae Radescu. 

"The main character around which we all gathered to form the Romanian National 

Committee was General Nicola Radescu, which elected him at first as president. Two 

circumstances led to this choice: a) Radescu Nicolae was the last president of the Council 

of Ministers recognized as legal, b) anti Nicolae Radescu had net attitude, and openly 

manifested strongly in February 1945” 13 . 

General Nicolae Radescu 14 proved a strong personality within this organization that was 

born as a committee that wanted his actions to contribute to condemn communism. 

Among the early actions of General Nicolae Radescu have mentioned his attempts to 

unify or group of soldiers in exile such as attracting its share of General Chirnoaga Platon 

and Puiu Petrescu, Colonel Ion Tomoroveanu, comandorii Mihail Opran and Mircea four 

and Maior Bazil Ratiu and Bobi Chintescu. 

In this sense, created under the direct control of General Puiu Petrescu an information 

center at Paris. Condemnation of communism by military in exile is reflected in attempts 

to create organizations to pool around them soldiers from exile and beyond. These 

include: Association of French combatants and combatants Romanian Union. "The main 

activities of the Association of former combatants consisted in organizing international 

symposia on military issues, participation in commemorative celebrations and initiation 

of approaches to the NATO Military Command” 15 . 

Also in 1954 attempted a revival of the Association of Former combatants "in order to 

increase its combativeness. The action was involved and King Michael, who criticized the 

Romanian National Committee leadership that contributed to the disintegration of the 

officer corps, leading thus passing its anti-monarchic positions. The revival Association 

and Americans were concerned that pursuing the establishment of foreign legions of 

volunteers under the U.S. flag. As a result, a small number of Romanian officers signed 

enrollment in U.S. military commitments, but soon gave up for fear of sending them to 

the front in Korea” 16 . 

11 

This organization was established in the following circumstances: 1945-1948 between some 

leaders fled abroad reactionary as Buzesti Gregory Constantin Visoianu, Nicolae Radescu, 

Augustin Popa, Virgil Benjamin, Farcasanu Misu, Vintilă Bratianu, Zissu, Ieftimie Herman and 

others. View Caietele INMER, June 2005, Documents, p 32. 

12 

Caietele INMER, 2005, Documents, p. 32. 

13 


14 

For general Radescu see Exile Romanian military. From 1939 to 1972. No army commanders, 

edition edited by Dumitru Dobre, Veronica Nanu, Mihaela Toader, ProHistoria Publishing, 

Bucharest 2005, or Dumitru Dobre, Personalities of Romanian military exile, Bucharest, 2008. 

15 

Romanian military exile. From 1939 to 1972. No army commanders, edition edited by Dumitru 

Dobre, Veronica Nanu, Mihaela Toader, ProHistoria Publishing, Bucharest, 2005, p 15. 

16 

Ibidem, p. 15.


Exiled Romanian troops pursued in the context of West-East political perspective, the 

events that took place in Romania, fighting through all means available to them to return 

the country to democracy. In this regard, relevant studies and articles can be found in the 

publication Bulletin of the military, led by Dan D.Ivanovici. 

This military magazine aimed to keep alive the flame of exile, especially the military. In 

this magazine found studies that reflect exhortations to mobilize "the Romanian exile in 

the revolutions in Eastern Europe" 17 by proposing conditions: "1. up as soon as a 

National Council that can act on behalf of the exile counsel whose members are elected 

by the entire exile, 2. forming a Military Committee to deal with the issue of the 

liberation struggle of the Romanians, 3. creating a fund for transport, education and other 

operations. 

An article by Major Grove reflects distrust exile in Soviet policy practice look to 

withdraw Soviet troops from Romania: "... withdrawal of Soviet troops, aims to reduce 

nurtures hatred, today, the Romanian people against the Soviets, against communism and 

even against Russia. Reality is different than expected. If Soviet troops left Romania 

another Soviet army invisible Romanian general public continue to provide established 

communist government in Moscow” 18 . 

Talking about "... the confrontation between the two worlds," 19 Colonel Dan. 

D.Ivanovici presents a comprehensive study targeted goals Communist Russia at a 

meeting in Geneva May 11, 1959. Some of these goals would be: "1.a. a weakening of the 

current tension between East and West and B. Recognition of the status quo in Eastern 

Europe; 2.a.scoaterea Allies in Berlin and East Germany b recognition ". Dan Ivanovich 

attempted a synthesis of these Soviet aims "... to see to what extent they are acute and 

urgent Communist Russia. I said Soviets plan weakens the blood produced by the Cold 

War would lead to a serious reduction in arms spending, funds which they could use to 

finance the 7-year plan, after what was propaganda constitutes a living condition and a 

maintenance regime to power of Khrushchev. 

Western economists argue that only by loosening the tension Kremlin would get 

recognition from the West to the status quo in Eastern Europe, ie recognition by the free 

world domination by the Soviets subjugated peoples, recognizing slavery established. The 

problem I think is the most sensitive to safety communist empire, because these people 

constitute the most dangerous enemy of the communist world. Uprisings and movements 

in different countries enslaved, as the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Soviets 

maintained in continuous duty, general fear of a revolution is not removed with all their 

police unit” 20 . A present box every time the page was Military Intelligence Bulletin. 

World enslaved or free world. Articles on current news in the world of international 

situation and about Romania. 

17 Buletinul Militar, an IV, nr. 10, 1956, pp. 14-15. 

18 Buletinul Militar, an VI, nr. 7-8,1958, pp.11-13. 

19 Buletinul Militar, an VI, nr. 3,1959, pp. 1-4. 

20 Ibidem.

434 


To this end started espionage and sabotage agents prepared to be infiltrated with 

various missions in the country, or had relations with Western intelligence, either 

expressed in print or spoken in Western countries. In 1951 was founded the Association 

of Free Romanians in Germany having as honorary president Gen. John George. 

Association undertook generally attract actions Romanian refugees and especially their 

Volksdeutshe-raise the question of repatriation. Emphasized overthrow the government in 

Bucharest and then return home. "For example, on the occasion of 23 august 1955, 

General Ion Gheorghe together with the Romanian Association of Southern Germany 

held a religious ceremony and speeches at protests against the action that led to the 

liberation of the country. Spiteful and slanderous character actions against our country 

Association of Free Romanians are encouraged and Free Europe, in particular through 

wide publicity that the press and radio make such actions” 21 . 

On July 8, 1954 in Munich created a coordination center in the Romanian exile. 

These meetings Romanian Association of Austria, led by I.V. Emilian, Romanian 

Club in Munich, Consus by Vasile Dumitrescu and Germans in Romania Association 

led by H.Scheiner. "In the process of setting up report showed that taking into 

account that the unit exile was not carried through to the present, the undersigned 

wish to work on national land, to reach the desired drive as soon [... ]. In conclusion 

emphasizes that the protocol signatories will work with anyone who wants to 

contribute to their country's liberation deed or all those who want to participate in 

actions to raise awareness and fight worldwide virtues of the Romanian people and 

gain new friends for Romania” 22 . 

Another organization that wished was noticed by his actions Romanian combatants 

Union which was established in secret on 10 October 1954 in Munich. The aim of this 

union was "uniting all those who fight for the liberation of the country and găseacă 

ways and means to do something positive activity against the communist regime” 23 . 

On the other hand, the security of Romania sensing danger officers conducted the 

actual key informants and agents to determine the most active of the soldiers to give up 

their attacks against the Communist regime in the country. In this respect we play 

paginele few examples of completed files: "The materials received from U.M. 0123 / I 

that George John has links with Renk, head of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs in Bonn which is in connection with the service for which it carries out 

espionage against our country. Kolb Iakob In 1954 he collaborated with West German 

intelligence service from Berlin-Blank Service Department, which passed in RDGa said 

Gheorghe Ion repeatedly came about West German intelligence service in Munich and 

has even material precious.He argued against West German intelligence that has more 

agents in Romania” 24 . 

21 ACNSAS, SIE, nr. 184, ff. 72-73. 

22 Ibidem, pp. 76-77. 

23 Ibidem, pp. 82-83. 

24 ACNSAS, SIE, nr. 163189/4, pp. 23-34.


Gheorghe Gheorghiu spy parachuted into R.P.R. in 1954 said that while it is pride 

abroad learned that George John is contributor to Radio Free Europe and has links with 

U.S. intelligence. He said that in discussions with fugitives and Mircea Dumitriu Basil 

(both spies) they said that George John has ties to American intelligence service for 

Europe, based in Frankfurt / Main. 

All Gheorghiu said that one of the officers on spying line of George John, the 

Romanian fugitive Isbasescu Traian. Of materials received from UM0123 / I and the 

statements made by former colonel Baiulescu Sterian repatriated to the country in 1956 

that another close associate of fugitive Amzăr Gheorghe Dumitru Ion is the Wiesaden 

Germany reported that dealing with people fled RPR query in R.F.G. and working with 

U.S. intelligence service. 

John has a son George namely, George John Nicholas, born in 1919, engineer, 

residing also in Munich. Baiulescu returnee Sterian in 1957, said Gheorghe Ion son 

worked for a period as a clerk in an American camp RFG later was employed at 

American Radio Free Europe. From the data we have U.M. 0123 / I that Gheorghe 

Ion junior as agent of the West German intelligence service. During 1959, a source II 

Department reported that a group of elements in Germany was prepared by West 

German intelligence service to be sent to missions in RPR. In this group were part and 

Gheorghe Ion junior [...]. Regarding the former's past connections to George John in 

particular at what worked in the General Staff and the Romanian Legation in Berlin, 

most were identified and classified information to determine their present activity.No 

material obtained showing that the fugitive would be related to any element of these 

categories. "Material received by courier FrankfurtMain resistance of 16 May 1962, a 

letter No.65 / E "On 8 April 1962 on territory RFGermană.Din OSAR up discussions 

so far and collected on the OSRA data revealed the following: Problem setting up 

OSAR discussed for the first time in December 1961 the leaders of the Romanian 

fugitives organizations Paris, the issue of setting up a headquarters to manage and 

coordinate the entire emigration Oscar line. At this there was a special emphasis on 

attracting Romanian fugitives from Germany. To this end Emilian Ion fugitive was 

tasked to publish elements among the fugitives and VD mentioning that among the 

latter to start with those who were part of the teaching Romanian or German army. 

Following these tasks Romanian Ion Emilian contact fugitives and VD which tells 

about the establishment, organization and struggle OSAR they carry it to liberate the 

country. From his statement that so far has failed in Germany to enroll than 7 members 

arguing that the fact that it is very difficult because the organization has a very secret 

character privinc composition and its members. Emilian Ion whenever talking to those 

who intend to attract their attention OSAR on secrecy OSAR discussions and 

intentions. Problems and results in the organization OSAR in Germany Them to the 

Emilian Ion Ion Gheorghe they consult on these issues. 

The idea was inspired creation OSAR OAS activity in France and it is intended that 

the principles OSAR be identified with those of the OAS but adapted to specific 

activity Romanian foreign fugitives organizations. The goal is to enlist OSAR 

organization in the Romanian fugitives all regardless of their political affiliation and

436 


attract their struggle against the hostile country. All purpose was proposed by OSAR 

to collect links to all reactionary organizations in the West and particularly the 

remaining fugitives organizations of socialist countries which are in the West. Emilian 

Ion says that OSAR enjoys the financial support of the moral and material higher 

circles of the FRG, France and the U.S. About Ion Emilian have information from 

several sources that actually work with Gehlen from receiving monthly salary and the 

French intelligence service” 25 

In conclusion, most Romanian military events had the first initiative to attract foreign 

public opinion on the country's communist regime in order to receive support from 

Western authorities are trying to find favorable solutions for the Romanians in the 

country. 

25 Ibidem, pp. 43-45.

THE MUNICH AGREEMENT OF 1938 SEEN 

THROUGH THE EYES OF MOHANDAS 

GANDHI, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND OTHER 

INDIAN INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICIANS 

Tobias WEGER 1 

The protection of minority rights belongs to the finest democratic values a State can 

apply in practical politics. Historians specialized in the past of the 20 th century tend to 

understand minority issues in Europe as a typical product of post World War I history. 

They often try to explain that the European state system created by the international 

powers at the Conferences at Versailles, Saint-Germain-en-Laye or Trianon in 1919 and 

1920 stood at the beginning of all further conflicts which resulted of unjust treatment of 

minorities, especially in Eastern and East Central Europe. These historians are wrong or at 

least reduce a long European development to just a few decades. Various national or ethnic 

groups have always lived within the borders of European states: Germans in the South of 

Denmark, Ukrainians and Lithuanians in Poland, Scots and Irish in the United Kingdom, 

Hungarians and Romanians in the Ottoman Empire, to give you just a few examples. Some 

liberation movements in the early modern period – the anti-Habsburg uprisings in Upper 

Hungary and Transylvania from the 16 th to the 18 th centuries or the Scottish revolutions in 

Great Britain – can actually been considered as a conflict of majorities and minorities. 

These minorities could have an ethnic background, but they could also be defined by social, 

religious or other criteria. 

The juridical novelty of the 19 th and 20 th centuries is the notion of international security 

systems for ethnic and national minorities living in a given state. The newly created or 

restored national states at Versailles, Czechoslovakia and Poland had to sign international 

guaranties for the protection of their minorities. The right to use the mother tongue in 

public life, political representation and the condemnation of different forms of 

discrimination are some important elements of these international treaties. Within these 

states, specific laws were passed to allow minorities to create organizations, political 

parties, to have their own libraries and newspapers. The practical application of these 

rights could depend on many economic, social and political factors from inside as well as 

from outside. Central European history of the 20 th century saw a clash of two major 

political concepts. Western political philosophy was based on the idea of a social contract 

between the state and its citizens, an idea that had been formed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 

and other thinkers of the Enlightenment. In exchange for protection granted to minority 

groups by state authorities, the state could expect civilian loyalty of every member of 

1 Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, Oldenburg, Germany.

438 


those minority groups toward the state. This idea was not popular among all minority 

groups. Some of them considered themselves as an eternally discriminated group, 

especially in cases where they had beforehand belonged to dominating groups – for 

instance Germans or Hungarians – and now had to subordinate their own interests under 

the principles of a new state. They relied on ethnic principles and often had no confidence 

in the good will of democratic politicians. In the interwar period, the governments in 

Berlin and Budapest often misused the existence of German or Hungarian speaking 

groups abroad for their revisionist goals. This gave birth to numerous conflicts previous 

to World War II which in 1938 culminated in the Munich Agreement cutting out the socalled 

“Sudetenland” of the Czechoslovak territory, and the Second Vienna Arbitrage 

ceding parts of Southern Slovakia to Hungary. 

In this paper I would like to emphasize a new perspective on one of the largest minority 

groups in interwar East Central Europe, the German-speaking group in Czechoslovakia. 

Out of a total number of 13.6 million citizens in 1921 (14,7 million in 1930), 3.2 million 

(3.3 million) declared to be of German nationality, which meant every fifth inhabitant of 

the state. 2 Numerous German Bohemians, Moravians and Silesians or Zipser Germans 

were loyal citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic. They agreed with the liberties the state 

legislation assured them and tried to orchestrate their lives with the conditions of that 

state. No longer were they members of the dominating German-speaking group of 

Cisleithania nor of the culturally important German-speaking group of Transleithania, but 

they could contribute to the state’s well-being as an economically, culturally and socially 

important segment of Czechoslovakia’s population. The first president of 

Czechoslovakia, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937) was very much familiar with German 

language and culture. He made a big effort to integrate the German minority into the 

functioning of his state. 3 Though, within the framework of German revisionism on the 

one hand, and growing pan-German interests on the other hand, Berlin politicians 

manipulated German minority politics in neighbouring Czechoslovakia. 4 The economic 

crisis after 1929 favoured the rise of a strong Nazi movement which eventually was 

transformed into Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Homeland Front, after the 

democratic instances in Prague had forbidden the German National Socialist Workers’ 

Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, DNSAP) – an equivalent to the 

NSDAP in the German Reich – in 1933. In the course of the 1930s, Henlein became more 

and more a marionette of German foreign interests, the leader of the so-called Fifth 

Column. He and his followers, who in 1938 represented about four fifths of the total 

German electorate, undermined the stability of the state and coerced Czech and Slovak 

2 Cf. Zdeněk Beneš / Václav Kural: Rozumět dějinám. Vývoj česko-německých vztahů na našém 

území v letech 1848–1948, Praha 2002, p. 56. 

3 Cf. the contributions to the volume: Češi a Němci v pojetí a politice T. G. Masaryka. Sborník z 

mezinárodní konference v Praze, Edited by Masarykův ústav AV ČR, Praha 2004. 

4 Cf. Ronald Smelser: The Sudeten Problem 1933–1938. Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of 

Nazi Foreign Policy, Middletown CT 1975; Rudolf Jaworski: Vorposten oder Minderheit? Der 

sudetendeutsche Volkstumskampf in den Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und 

der ČSR, Stuttgart 1977.

Tobias WEGER: The Munich Agreement of 1938 Seen Through the Eyes of Mohandas … 439 

politicians to fulfil more and more unrealistic demands. This problem rose to an 

international affair, the so-called “Sudeten crisis”, which kept most European powers 

breathless. The culmination of this development is well known: The British and French 

governments, both defenders of “appeasement” towards Nazi Germany, accepted Hitler’s 

claim to annex the Czech border areas, the so-called “Sudetenland”, into the German 

Reich. The Munich Agreement signed in the night of September 29 th 1938 at the NSDAP 

headquarter has ever since been considered as a symbol of the capitulation of democratic 

powers in the face of outrageous claims of a totalitarian system. 

The problem of the Munich Agreement has mainly been analyzed as a bilateral Czech- 

German problem, whereas the international dimension of this issue has been rather 

neglected. When Britain’s prime minister Neville Chamberlain (1869–1940) returned to 

London after signing the Munich Agreement, he compared his action to the impact given 

by his predecessor Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881) at the Berlin Balkan Conference of 

1878 and said the famous phrase: “My good friends, for the second time in our history, a 

British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe 

it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. And now I 

recommend you to go home and get a nice quiet sleep.” 5 

This politically naïve – and in a diplomatic sense even sarcastic – statement was openly 

criticized by many contemporary British journalists, politicians and political advisors, 

even within Chamberlain’s Conservative Party. The concern of Winston Churchill (1874– 

1968) in autumn 1938 is well known. Churchill understood very well that every 

additional concession to Adolf Hitler was nothing else than a further step towards war. 6 

There were also critical reactions to Neville Chamberlain’s policy in a country far away 

from Europe which at the same time was struggling for freedom from British colonial 

domination: India. In a newspaper article published in October 1938, the leading spiritual 

and intellectual personality of the Indian independence movement, Mohandas 

Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) gave a clear and firm statement: 

„England and France […] have quailed before the combined violence of 

Germany and Italy. […] Europe has sold her soul for the sake of seven day’s 

earthly existence. The peace gained at Munich is a triumph of violence; it is 

also its defeat.” 7 

There was another interesting voice from India which reacted directly to the Munich 

Agreement. The Bengal writer Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) was one of Gandhi’s 

close friends. In 1913 Tagore had received the Nobel Price for Literature as the first non- 

European author, and had been a visitor to Czechoslovakia in June 1921 and again in 

5 

Quoted after the entry “peace for our time”, in: Safire’s Political Dictionary. Edited by William 

Safire, Oxford 4 2008, p. 529. 

6 

Cf. Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill. Vol. V: Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939, London 1977, p. 

921–1012. 

7 

Quoted after Sankar Ghose: Mahatma Gandhi, New Delhi 1991, p. 276.

440 


September 1926. 8 Thanks to good Czech and German translations of his poetry, he was 

popular among Czech as well as German speaking readers in Czechoslovakia. 9 The 

Munich Agreement of 1938 was a dreadful experience for him. On October 15, 1938, 

Tagore wrote a letter from India to his friend, the Prague indologist Vincenc Lesný 

(1882–1953): 

“I feel so keenly about the suffering of your people as if I was one of them. 

For what has happened in your country is not a mere local misfortune which 

may at the best claim our sympathy, it is a tragic revelation that the destiny 

of all those principles of humanity for which the people of the West turned 

martyrs for three centuries rests in the hands of cowardly guardians who are 

selling it to save their own skins. […] I feel so humiliated and so helpless 

when I contemplate all this, humiliated to see all the values, which have 

given whatever worth modern civilisation has, betrayed one by one, and 

helpless that we are powerless to prevent it. Our country is itself a victim of 

these wrongs. My words have no power to stay the onslaught of these 

maniacs, not even the power to arrest the desertion of those who erstwhile 

pretended to be the saviours of humanity. I can only remind those who are 

not yet wholly demented that when men turn beasts they sooner or later tear 

each other.” 10 

Not only Tagore, but also a prominent Indian politician knew Czechoslovakia from his 

own experience: Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), the future first Prime Minister of 

independent India. In his autobiography, Nehru too gave an insight of his personal 

feelings after the Munich conference: “Munich was a shock hard to bear […]”, and he 

went on: 

“The challenge of fascism and Nazism was in essence the challenge of 

imperialism. They were twin brothers, with this variation, that imperialism 

functioned abroad in colonies and dependencies, while fascism and Nazism 

functioned in the same way in the home country also. If freedom was to be 

established in the world not only fascism and Nazism had to go but 

imperialism had to be completely liquidated.” 11 

Nehru knew what he was writing about. In the summer of 1938, he had been on a trip to 

Europe, where his daughter Indira – the later Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917– 

1984) – was then studying at Oxford University. In the summer and autumn of 1938, 

8 Cf. Rabinadrát Tagore v Evropě, in: Národní listy, 22/06/1926. 

9 Cf. Karel Hujer: U básníka Rabindranatha Tagore, in: Národní politika, 28/05/1935. 

10 To Vincenc Lesny, in: Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore. Edited by Krishna Dutta and 

Andrew Robinson, Cambridge–New York–Oakleigh 1997, p. 501. 

11 Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography. With Musings on recent events in India. New Edition 

containing an additional chapter: Five Years Later, London 1945, p. 599 and 601.


Nehru travelled between London, Paris, Geneva and Prague. In the Czechoslovak capital, 

he met Czech and Slovak politicians and intellectuals, including the famous writer Karel 

Čapek (1890–1938). But Nehru, who wanted to get a close look at all sides of the 

problem, also got in contact with members of the German Social Democratic Workers’ 

Party (Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, DSAP) who took him on a trip to 

the Czech borderland areas mainly inhabited by German-speaking people. In August 

1938 he visited the industrial towns of Reichenberg/Liberec, Haida/Nový Bor and 

Tetschen-Bodenbach/Děčín-Podmokly. 12 There Nehru became an eye-witness of the 

wide-spread poverty in the time of the post-economic crisis. 

Nehru was deeply depressed by the atmosphere he experienced in Britain and in 

Czechoslovakia, but also by the policy provided by the British government. London had 

sent Lord Walter Runciman (1870–1949) as a special diplomat to Czechoslovakia. Nehru 

analyzed his double role: Runciman should soften up Konrad Henlein (1898–1945) and 

his pro-Nazi fellows of the Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei, SdP), but his 

official goal was, as Nehru stated, “to brake the back of the Czechs” in the name of 

British appeasement policy. “I went to Czechoslovakia and watched at close quarters the 

difficult and intricate game of how to betray your friends and the cause you are supposed 

to stand for on the highest moral grounds.” 13 In a critical article published in the 

Manchester Guardian, Nehru wrote: 

„I returned full of admiration for the admirable temper of the Czechs and the 

democratic Germans who, in face of grave danger and unexampled bullying, 

kept calm and cheerful, eager to do everything to preserve peace, and yet 

fully determined to keep their independence. As events have shown, they are 

prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to satisfy every minority claim and 

preserve peace, but everybody knows that the question at issue is not a 

minority one. If it was a love of minority rights that moved people, who do 

we not hear of the German minority in Italy or the minorities in Poland? The 

question is one of power politics and the Nazi desire to break up the Czech- 

Soviet alliance, to put an end to the one democratic State in Central Europe, 

to reach the Romanian oil fields and wheat, and thus to dominate Europe. 

British policy has encouraged this and tried to weaken the democratic state. 

[…] Recent events in Czechoslovakia and the way the British government, 

directly or through its mediators has bullied and threatened the 

Czechoslovak government at every turn, has produced a feeling of nausea in 

me and I have wondered how any English man with any trace of liberal 

instinct and decency could follow this.“ 14 

12 Cf. Pandit Nehru in Reichenberg, in: Deutsche Zeitung Bohemia, 14/08/1938. 

13 Nehru, An autobiography, p. 605. 

14 Betrayal of Czechoslovakia – Letter to “Manchester Guardian” – September 8, 1938, in: Nehru. 

The First Sixty Years. Presenting in his Own Words the Development of the Political Thought of 

Jawaharlal Nehru and the Background against which it evolved […]. Selected and edited […] by 

Dorothy Norman. Vol. 1, London 1965, p. 580–582, here p. 581.

442 


In the meantime, Nehru received a short letter from Mohandas Ghandi. In this notice, 

Ghandi ironized Chamberlain’s famous words: “What a peace at the cost of honour.” 15 

The attitude brought forward by Gandhi, Nehru and the majority of the Indian National 

Congress was strongly criticized by right-wing politicians in India. Among them was the 

main protagonist of ethnic Hindu nationalism, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), 

who since 1937 was the president of the Hindu Mahatshaba organization. For Savarkar 

who was in close contact with Nazi officials, “Germany was perfectly justified in uniting 

the Austrian and Sudeten Germans under the German Flag”. 16 He called Czechoslovakia 

a “patchwork” nation, where the Sudeten Germans had been made “a mess of” by being 

coerced to live together with Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Hungarians. 17 As it turned out, 

Savarkar and his radical movement was in close relation with the NSDAP which kept a 

local cell even at Bombay. Similar statements came from representatives of the Moslem 

League in India which compared their own fate to that of Sudeten Germans. This was 

their reaction to the beginning cooperation of many reasonable Moslem politicians within 

the Indian National Congress. As we know from today’s perspective, the idea to separate 

Hindu and Moslem territories gained power during World War II, leading to the creation 

of Pakistan and Bangladesh shortly after Indian independence. 

* * * 

In this short paper I could only give a little idea of how democratic solidarity united 

people from a very different geographic and cultural background in the face of totalitarian 

oppression of a sovereign state and a democratic system shortly before the outbreak of 

World War II. 

In a period where Europe is again facing a deep crisis, a lack of mutual confidence and 

solidarity, it might be sometimes helpful to take a look at how our continent is perceived 

from outside. Widespread stereotypes often dating back to a very remote history seem to 

impede our awareness of reality as far as outside standpoints are concerned. Two 

examples are contemporary islamophobia and the non-acceptance of refugees from the 

so-called Third World. The European continent has gained a lot in terms of liberty, 

economic growth and social security since the end of World War II in 1945 and the end 

of communism in Eastern Europe after 1989. The future of our continent will very much 

depend on the question whether Europe will be able to open its eyes beyond the regional 

issues. If we look at these days’ newspapers, it seems that the authoritarian politics 

imposed by Brussels and Berlin to smaller member-states of the European Union 

dominate the public discourse. While this interior disintegration process is going on, 

15 

Quoted in Rajmohan Gandhi: Gandhi. The Man, his People, and the Empire, Cambridge 2007, 

p. 400. 

16 

Quoted in Chetan Bhatt: Hindu Nationalism. Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths, Oxford– 

New York 2001, p. 107. – Cf. Jan Kuhlmann: Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der 

Achsenmächte, Berlin 2003, p. 71. 

17 

Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, p. 106.


people are dying close to our doors, in Syria, or on sinking boats in the Mediterranean 

Sea, trying to get asylum in a still comparatively rich continent. Maybe for us Europeans 

it is time to open our ears and our hearts to what modern intellectuals from the Arab 

world, from Africa, Asia or South America have to say to us. This is a crucial topic for 

the European Union. Europe will act with compassion and solidarity, or it will be 

condemned to be an economically rich, but mentally very poor “fortress” in a world 

getting always “smaller” and more globalized. 

Figure 1: Mohandas Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore in 1940. 

Source: http://web.mahatma.org.in/pictures/images/piccat0001/le_1024_0026.jpg

444 


Figure 2: Jawaharlal Nehru, commemoration stamp of the Indian Post, 1964. 

Source: Own collection

PART I 

4. EUROPE UNITED – REMEMBRANCE, RESPECT AND OPENING

THE RETALIATION AFTER THE HUNGARIAN 

REVOLUTION OF 1956 ACCORDING TO NEW 

HISTORICAL RESEARCH – AN OUTLINE 

1956 and the historical sources 

Péter BENCSIK 1 

Before discussing the historical problems of the post-1956 retaliation, I must say some 

words on the difficulties of interpreting its sources. It is evident, that during the Kádár-era 

no real investigation of these sources was possible. The revolution of 1956 was one of the 

biggest taboos of the communist regime, the main point of its ideology being the 

following sentence: „A counter-revolution took place in Hungary in 1956.” Therefore, 

historians were allowed to write on the events of 1956 as a counter-revolution and only 

reliable’ historians had a possibility to get close to these sources at all. The research 

was made public and available to all historians only from 1989 as a peaceful transition 

took place in Hungary. Archives opened their gates and witnesses started to speak about 

their memories. 

However, there are many problems with these sources. Although there is a huge amount 

of written sources, the greatest bulk of it was made by the communist-led authorities 

(they are police, state security and court files, minutes of the party leadership etc.) This is 

no wonder: anti-communist fighters and other „illegal organizations are rarely 

documenting their activities for common reasons”. 2 Another possibility is oral history. 

But the most important witnesses of the revolution were executed and those who survived 

had changed much during the thirty-two years of the Kádár-regime. After such a long 

time either in prison or in exile, most of their remembrance can be (and really is) 

distorted. It means that we have sources which are the least reliable according to the 

historians. 3 They are one-sided and incomplete, and this is why historians have to treat 

them very carefully and with a highly critical approach. 

In many cases, victims could not be rehabilitated based on surviving court documents 

even after 1990. A judge must rely on the available court files to make a verdict – and 

upon these files the trials seem to be a fair procedure, although they can be camouflaged 

political trials. 

Koncepciós per: communist show trials and secret political trials 

The Hungarian legal history term koncepciós per is usually (but unfortunately 

mistakenly) translated to English as ‘show trial’. However, show trial means a public 

trial, which is constructed, (pre)determined and enforced by political power, usually with 

1 University of Szeged, Hungary. 

2 Tamás Meszerics, Politikai ellenállás ’45–56. Beszélı, 2000/9–10. 

http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/politikai-ellenallas-’45–56 (accessed 15 Sept. 2012.) 

3 Ibid.

446 


fabricated charges and it is quite similar to a theatre performance. In Hungarian using it is 

called kirakatper (literally, a ‘shopwindow trial’) which is only a type of koncepciós 

trials. Most of these trials were carried out secretly and this is why I would like to avoid 

using the term ‘show trial’. Koncepciós per means a trial with a political (pre)conception, 

where the aim of the process is not to find out the truth but to fulfill a political goal. In 

most cases, the confession of witnesses and the defendant was written and learned by 

heart and this was true even with the verdict. In short, every show trial is koncepciós, but 

not every koncepciós trial is a show trial, because it can be also a secret political trial. 

One of the main questions historians have to deal with is whether these post-1956 trials 

were koncepciós or not. In this study I try to summarize the historical debate about this 

topic. 

Retaliation after 1956 

Although the government of János Kádár made several statements that no one will be 

punished due to the fact that he or she participated in the ‘events’, the retorsion started as 

early as in November 1956. The first phase was characterized by unlawful acts carried out 

by the freshly founded party militia and the Soviet KGB. These acts included 

deportations (even to the Soviet Union), internment, beatings and other sadistic tortures, 

mass killings by volley-firing etc. The first trials were carried out from December 1956 

and in the beginning they were often open to the public – but not classic show trials. 

What is more, solicitors usually cited Kádár’s earlier statements on not only the impunity 

mentioned above, but also his words on „the glorious revolution of our people”. These 

brave solicitors were later kept away from the retaliatory trials or even fired. No wonder 

that the effects of these trials were not too impressive to the party leadership. So, these 

trials cannot be considered as show trials: neither solicitors, nor the defendants behaved 

as actors, no one gave them full texts to learn by heart and perform them before the court. 

As they were not show trials, does it mean they were not koncepciós either? The answer 

to this question is not easy, because these trials were ordered by the party leadership and 

they had a political aim. 

In the later stage, trials became closed. Solicitors and judges were selected with much 

more care. New kinds of special tribunals were created. First, martial law was declared, 

then „accelerated” proceedings were introduced (i. e. trials without indictment). Finally, 

people’s tribunals were set up again, first in April in Budapest then in June in another 

four cities to deal with the acts of the „counter-revolutionaries”. These new tribunals were 

created by decrees of the Presidium of the People’s Republic and not by laws. Their main 

points were the following: they wanted to mix political and common crimes, capital 

punishment was expected in most cases, indictment was not necessary. People’s tribunals 

had much more severe peculiarities: they formed their judgments with retroactive effect, 

appeals were not possible in some cases, and reformatio in peius was possible even when 

only the defendant or the solicitor made an appeal – and therefore the decision of the 

court of appeal could have been amended to a worse one. Solicitors were to be chosen 

from a list created by the party officials; naturally, only ‘sound’ and ‘reliable’ lawyers 

were selected. 4 

4 See Frigyes Kahler, Joghalál Magyarországon 1945–1989. Zrínyi, Budapest, 1993. 40–41.; 

Tibor Zinner, A kádári megtorlás rendszere. Hamvas Intézet, Budapest, 2001. 105–160.

Péter BENCSIK: The Retaliation after the Hungarian Revolution … 447 

From mid-1957, trials were not public anymore, they were implemented behind closed 

doors (partly because of international outcry). Most trials (and capital punishments) were 

carried out in 1957 and 1958, including the most famous one, the trial of Imre Nagy, the 

prime minister of the revolution, who was sentenced to death and executed in June 1958. 

The number of executed people is disputed, but most historians claim that there were 229 

death penalties. However, others state that this number is somewhere between 400 and 

500. Most of the 229 executed who are known by name were young men (usually under 

35), fighting as armed rebels. To the astonishment of the party leadership, they were 

mostly workers and therefore members of the ‘ruling’ working class. They were charged 

with plotting against people’s democratic order, armed rebellion and/or murder. 

During the 1990s, two points of view developed among researchers relating these 

retaliatory trials. Historians at the 1956 Institute claimed that these trials were not 

koncepciós, or at least not ‘constructed’, although they had koncepciós elements. This 

standpoint suggests that there is a big difference between the ‘classic’ (pre-1956) 

koncepciós trials and post-1956 retaliatory trials. In the classic trials, confessions were 

forced, victims were tortured both physically and mentally. After 1956, beatings and 

other sadistic act were not common or even only accidental. However, mental or 

psychological torture was general. Classic trials were based on fabricated charges only 

but retaliatory trials were not constructed, charges were based on real facts committed by 

the fighters or ‘rebels’. In the first half of the 1950s, everyone could have been a victim of 

these trials; however, the main problem for the communist authorities after the revolution 

was that the number of the ‘enemies’ (i. e. the revolutionaries) was so high that neither 

the tribunals nor the prisons could cope with such a big mass of ‘criminals’. So, it was not 

likely that innocent people were accused as there were plenty of ‘dangerous counterrevolutionaries’ 

available. There were also big differences between the juridical 

independence of these two periods. Judges were not independent at all before 1956. After 

the revolution, however, they had some room to maneuver and became at least partly 

independent. In a classic trial, defendants had to prove their innocence, but later the 

courts at least tried to prove they were guilty. Post-1956 trials were not entirely false, but 

the facts they contained were distorted and stripped of their original meaning. 5 

Other researchers, who are mainly jurists, stated that many of these trials were entirely 

koncepciós and even constructed. One of them, Frigyes Kahler even tried to redefine the 

term koncepciós trial. According to him, every trial is koncepciós, which has a political 

aim (instead of wanting to reveal the truth) and for that reason, facts in the indictment 

were fictional and/or unfounded. He thinks that even those trials were koncepciós, which 

were based on non-moral laws or decrees or in which the rules of criminal procedure 

were hurt. 6 He also adds that trials and verdicts in both periods were class-orientated: it 

means that the sentence was different due to not only the crimes ‘committed’ but also 

class origin. So, if the accused one was a worker, his punishment was less than someone 

who was considered to be a ‘class-enemy’ (e. g. of bourgeois or aristocratic origin). 

5 Attila Szakolczai, Az ’56-os politikai perek. Rubicon, 1995/6–7. 42–45.; László Eörsi, Válogatás 

1998 történelmi dokumentumfilmjeibıl. Ki volt Tóth Ilona? In: Évkönyv 1999. 1956-os Intézet, 

Budapest, 1999. 363–374.; László Eörsi, Koncepciós perek? História 2006/10. 44–46. 

6 Frigyes Kahler, Adalékok a forradalom utáni koncepciós perek kérdéséhez. A Brusznyai-per 

tanulságai. [Conference presentation at the XX th Century Institute, 22 Oct. 2003.] 

http://www.xxszazadintezet.hu/rendezvenyek/tudomanyos_konferencia_az_1956/kahler_frigyes 

_adalekok_a_forr.html (accessed 20 Sept. 2012.)

448 

Emotional debates and new (?) interpretation of historical sources 


Several historical debates went on between the above mentioned two views (or rather, 

two schools or even two camps). These quarrels usually indulged in personalities. 7 

Without commenting these disputes it is worth noticing that originally they went on 

between the two camps. The sharpest controversies arose from the case of Ilona Tóth, one 

of the female victims of the retaliation, who was executed in June 1957. According to the 

charges, she and her two male fellow-revolutionaries brutally killed a man in a hospital 

where Tóth worked as a medical student. She was also the head of a resistance group 

which issued thousands of political leaflets and also an illegal newspaper after Kádár 

came to power. László Eörsi, a historian from the 1956 Institute believes that they indeed 

commit this manslaughter. However, they did it only to protect the revolution as they 

thought the man was a communist spy – there was a photo of him dressed in the uniform 

of the hated ÁVH, the political police of the dictatorship. So, Tóth must be considered to 

be one of the heroes of 1956, says even Eörsi. The other party (including Gábor Jobbágyi, 

Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss) firmly believes in Tóth’s innocence: they claim that the 

24-year-old girl was tortured and this is why she confessed to the murder. 8 

More recently, however, the debate restarted between two historians from the first 

school who were both fellow-workers of the 1956 Institute. First, Attila Szakolczai 

accused László Eörsi that he was misinterpreting the historical sources of 1956. As he 

noted, Eörsi “became a victim of the Kádárist texts”. 9 As Eörsi read many sources from 

1957 and 1958, he took over their interpretation as well, although in a reversed way (i. e. 

changing the word counter-revolution to revolution etc.), stated Szakolczai. It was not 

only Eörsi who tried to defend himself but also other historians and even a surviving 

revolutionary did so – while others supported Szakolczai’s opinion. 10 The discussion soon 

became emotionally motivated again. Its background was the different attitude to the 

7 Some examples: Gábor Jobbágyi, Ez itt a vértanúk vére. Kairosz, Budapest, 1998.; Attila 

Szakolczai, Szegény történelem. Beszélı, 1999/6. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/szegenytortenelem; 

Gábor Jobbágyi, Szegény 1956-os Intézet, szegény Szakolczai Attila. Beszélı, 

1999/8. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/szegeny-1956-os-intezet-szegeny-szakolczai-attila; Eszter 

Zsófia Tóth, Két könyv a megtorlásról. In: Évkönyv 1999. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999. 375– 

383. 

8 Gábor Jobbágyi, A néma talp. Tóth Ilona az orvosi kar mártírja. Püski, Budapest, 2002.; László 

Eörsi, Jobbágyi Gábor: A néma talp. Élet és Irodalom, 2002/38., 24.; László Eörsi, Tóth Ilona. 

Valóság és mítosz. Beszélı, 2002/6. http://beszelo.c3.hu/02/06/11eorsi.htm; Réka Kiss – Sándor 

M. Kiss, A csalogány elszállt. Tóth Ilona tragikuma. Kairosz, Budapest, 2007.; Eörsi László, 

„Ott, akkor és úgy…” Beszélı, 2007/10. 71–80. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/„ott-akkor-esugy…” 

(accessed 20 Sept. 2012.) 

9 Attila Szakolczai, Népköztársaság tér, 2007. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/20. A more detailed critical 

study under the same title is also available: 

http://www.rev.hu/rev/htdocs/hu/tanulmanyok/1956/nepkoztarsasagter_sza.pdf (Accessed 20 

Sept. 2012.) 

10 László Eörsi, Köztársaság tér 1956–2007. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/22. 

http://www.es.hu/eorsi_laszlo;koztarsasag_ter_1956-2007;2007-06-03.html; Éva Standeisky, Így 

azért ne! Élet és Irodalom, 2007/22. http://www.es.hu/standeisky_eva;igy_azert_ne;2007-06- 

03.html; Radnai György, A szemtanú jogai. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/26. 

http://www.es.hu/kereses/szerzo/Radnai György; Tibor Takács, A források tere. Élet és 

Irodalom, 2007/24. http://www.es.hu/takacs_tibor;a_forrasok_tere;2007-06-17.html

Péter BENCSIK: The Retaliation after the Hungarian Revolution … 449 

sources. Eörsi believes that the investigation methods of the Kádár regime changed 

significantly comparing to the pre-1956 koncepciós trials and therefore retaliatory sources 

tell us mainly the truth – Szakolczai states that they are completely false and/or 

manipulated, so one has to be much more critical to them. 

To demonstrate his truth, Szakolczai chose a single trial and investigated it 

meticulously. It is the case of another famous (or even infamous) female victim of the 

retaliation, Piroska Jankó (who was not sentenced to death, contrary to Ilona Tóth). 

According to her verdict, she killed an officer on 30 October 1956 with a knife. There 

were rumours that she (or the mob around her) even tore out the heart of the colonel. 

(This story was so fabulous that it was left out even from the charges.) Szakolczai 

examined the surviving sources very carefully. His method is similar to Frigyes Kahler, 

Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss: 11 instead of a brief survey of a great bulk of sources 

(which seems to be Eörsi’s method as he was able to produce a whole new book on 

different rebel groups in almost every year reading the minutes of the investigations and 

court files of several trials 12 ), he made a very detailed search, e. g. comparing the 

confessions of witnesses and the defendant and even those told by the same person but at 

another time. Doing so, he found a lot of antagonisms and falsifications. The minutes 

were not written word by word, it was always the investigator who wrote a ‘summary’ of 

what he was told (or, more precisely, of what he expected or hoped he was told). Even 

from these distorted texts it is obvious that the investigators manipulated the witnesses 

and Jankó: not only distorting their words but also giving the words into their mouths. As 

Szakolczai tried to find out the truth, he had to work like solving a puzzle – what is more, 

there were several wrong or false piece among them. There were a lot of problems during 

the investigation. First, Jankó was accused of killing János Asztalos, in which she pleaded 

guilty. Soon it became obvious that Asztalos was not stabbed and Jankó readily agreed 

that her victim was another colonel named József Papp. Although he was really stabbed, 

he was also shot and his death was due to these shots. Contrary to this fact, Jankó was 

still charged with murder. However, Szakolczai even believes that she did not stab the 

dead colonel and was therefore completely innocent. 13 

Eörsi responded quickly, claiming that Jankó did stab the (living or already dead) 

colonel, so she killed or at least wanted to kill him. According to Eörsi, neither this, nor 

the most of the post-1956 trials were koncepciós. The authorities wanted to find out the 

truth (with some minor exceptions), states Eörsi. 14 In his response, Szakolczai writes that 

Eörsi does not care about the details: he thinks that Papp could have been alive when 

11 

See Frigyes Kahler, A Brusznyai-per. Emberi sorsok a politikai megtorlás idején. Kairosz, 

[Budapest], [1998]. Kiss – M. Kiss, op. cit. 

12 

Eörsi’s most important books are the following: Ferencváros 1956. A kerület fegyveres 

csoportjai. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1997.; Corvinisták 1956. A VIII. kerület fegyveres 

csoportjai. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2001.; Mítoszok helyett – 1956. Noran, Budapest, 2003.; 

Széna tériek 1956. 1956-os Intézet–Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, Budapest, 

2004.; Köztársaság tér 1956. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2006.; Angyalföld 1956. Emberek, 

sorsok, emlékek. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2006. (with co-authors); A „Baross-köztársaság”. A 

VII. kerületi felkelıcsoportok, L’Harmattan, Budapest, 2011. 

13 

Attila Szakolczai, Szegény Jankó Piroska. In: Évkönyv 2008. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2008. 

279–374. 

14 

László Eörsi, Koncepciós mítoszrombolás. Beszélı, 2010/1. 

http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/koncepcios-mitoszrombolas (accessed 23 Sept. 2012.)

450 


Jankó could have possibly stabbed him, although he was shot by several bullets (which 

went through his brain and also his heart). He also underlines that “(until now) I have 

never called the post-1956 retaliatory proceedings koncepciós trials” but now he thinks 

that “there were koncepciós trials after 1956 but most proceedings were preconceptual”. 15 

In short, Szakolczai had changed his mind and accepted the view that many trials after 

1956 were constructed, i. e. koncepciós. So he joined to the opinion of those whom he 

criticized some years before. Eörsi was glad to cite Szakolczai’s earlier statements on his 

homepage (with a malicious remark) 16 – but I think if someone changes his opinion due 

to facts which he had not known previously is not a shame. 

Szakolczai wrote a remark also on the case of Ilona Tóth. As he pointed out: “I have 

never taken a commitment on this issue previously with such clarity”, but after he had 

read the book of Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss, he was convinced that Tóth was 

innocent. He even suggests that the two cases are very similar (i. e. they might have the 

same concept [koncepció] behind them): both were young girls, sentenced in the first half 

of 1957 by the same tribunal; both of them pleaded guilty, were charged by murder 

committed very similarly: they stabbed a knife to the chest of a tortured, half-naked man 

who was possibly not alive when they did so etc. 17 

I am not a researcher of these retaliatory trials. However, one thing can be understood 

quite simply from the debate (or, rather, from the quarrel). Both historians are partly right 

but neither wants to understand the other point of view. Both of them misinterpret one 

another. Nevertheless, Szakolczai’s arguments seem to be more convincing. It seems that 

historians must do a closer analysis and a more detailed research. It is certain that we will 

never know the whole truth but I agree with Szakolczai: researchers have to try to get rid 

of the Kádárist framework of interpretation. But in a sense Eörsi is right, too: retaliatory 

trials do differ from the classic koncepciós trials. Altogether, these differences seem to be 

smaller than we thought previously. 

15 

Attila Szakolczai, Piroska és farkasai. Beszélı, 2010/2–3. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/piroskaes-farkasai 

(accessed 23 Sept. 2012.) 

16 

László Eörsi: Koncepciós mítoszrombolás III. 

http://www.eorsilaszlo.hu/eorsilaszlo.hu/el/cikkek/elegyes/326.doc (accessed 23 Sept. 2012). The 

debate went on for a while even in Beszélı, but it became again highly emotional and endulged in 

personalities (including both parties). 

17 

Attila Szakoczai, Itt a mítosz, hol a mítosz?! Beszélı, 2010/4. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/itt-amitosz-hol-a-mitosz 

(accessed 23 Sept. 2012.)

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 

AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC - A COMPARISON 


Christina BICK 1 

In Western civilization human rights are commonly understood as “inalienable 

fundamental rights to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a 

human being.” [1] Main characteristics of human rights are, that they are universal – 

which means everywhere applicable – and egalitarian – which means they are the same 

for everyone. Human rights are a part of the fundamental rights of states. Because of the 

significance of these rights lots of international agreements deal with them. For the 

comparison of this paper only the Constitutions are relevant. 

The Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the German Democratic Republic, had a 

Constitution, governing the rights and duties of their citizens. Whilst in the Federal 

Republic of Germany, the “Grundgesetz” of 23. May 1949 [2] was in force, the 

Constitution of 06.04.1968 was effective in the German Democratic Republic. [3] 

The Grundgesetz as well as the Constitution of the federal Republic of Germany both 

entailed a section on basic rights, containing the fundamental rights. Those were set out in 

the first main part of the Grundgesetz in articles 1-19. In contrast fundamental rights of 

the German Democratic Republic were set out in the second main part of the Constitution 

in articles 19-40, while the first main part introduced the political basis of the regime. 

Hence both codifications contained provisions for the implementation of human rights. 

Nevertheless determining which rights existed respectively is not always that simple, 

since the wording of the Constitutions is often similar but the understanding of 

regulations mostly varies. 

In a comparison one can therefore not simply oppose those basic rights, but has to 

examine how fundamental rights are being interpreted and noticed. Especially the 

different background on state theories is to be considered, which entails a whole different 

concept of state and law. Particularly with regard to the character of human rights totally 

different concepts stand vis-à-vis. 

2. Basics of human rights in both states 

After the End of World War II and the separation of Germany both states had 

significantly been affected by the occupying powers in their understanding of state and law. 

1 Chairs of European and International Economic Law and Public Economic Law, Carl von 

Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany.

452 

2.1. Basic concept of the GDR 


The theoretical foundation of the legal system of the German Democratic Republic is 

the Marxism-Leninism. [4] Its doctrine of the socialistic concept of law interpreted the 

law as „an instrument for the realization of the policy of the Marxist-Leninist party, 

which is not besides and least of all above politics. Thus in this concept politics took 

precedence over the law. [5] In the Marxism-Leninism concept of a state, the law was 

merely of instrumental nature, while the leadership role was with the party. This 

interpretation of law was affirmed in the context of the Babelsberg-conference in 1958, 

which took place to clarify the meaning of fundamental legal principles in the German 

Democratic Republic. [6] 

Insofar the focus lay on the system which constituted the surrounding of the people. 

This is also reflected in the view of the design of human rights. The concept of 

“inalienable and inevitable human rights” was alien to the concept of law of the German 

Democratic Republic. Law was not derived from the people, but rather from the 

respective necessities of the state, which already arose from article 19 of the Constitution. 

According to this article the fundamental rights catalogue did not rely on human rights 

being predetermined laws to the state, but merely guaranteed the people socialistic 

legality and legal certainty. 

After initial denial the idea of basic rights as subjective rights prevailed even in the 

legal theory of the Marxism- Leninism. Notwithstanding no concrete claims of the citizen 

against the state could be derived from them. The Reason which was consulted for that 

was the “Dogma of the harmony of interests” [7] after which the main objectives of the 

society, the objectives of the state and the objectives of law are correspondent to the main 

interests and objectives of the each individual. [8] The western understanding of 

fundamental rights as defense rights against the state was totally alien to the Marxism- 

Leninism. Even though corresponding to article 2 II of the Constitution the human being 

represented the center of the socialistic society, the fundamental rights should not be an 

instrument to broaden ones single freedoms within state and society but rather to 

demonstrate the prosperity of social relations and clarify the role or the individual as 

social being. 

2.2. Basic concept of the FRG 

In contrast the Grundgesetz, based on the classic western concept of human rights, tried 

to influence the system thru the people by putting emphasis on the people. This already 

derived out of article 1 by which human dignity was proclaimed indefeasible. Human 

rights were according to that “the basis of each human community, peace and justice in 

the world.” Paragraph 2 of the article supplemented the legal commitment of the basic 

rights – particularly with regard to the state. 

Nevertheless the importance of this article for the state and its concept of law arose not 

only reflected by its central position at the beginning of the Grundgesetz but also by the 

special safeguard of the unchangeable fundamental principle (Ewigkeitsklausel) of article 

79 paragraph 3 GG, by which was secured that article 1 and its inherent could in general 

not be changed by Constitutional amendment. [9]

Christina BICK: Human Rights in the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany … 453 

3. Fundamental Rights 

The different starting points of the doctrine of fundamental rights in both German states 

lead to a diverging interpretation and result in practice – even in where the wording of the 

rights had nearly been consistent. This can be seen in the comparison of selected rights. 

3.1. Equality before the Law 

Equality was approved in the German states as follows: 

GDR - Constitution German Basic Law 

Article 20 

(1) Each citizen of the German Democratic 

Republic has independently of its nationality, 

his race, his world-descriptive or religious 

confession, his social origin and position the 

same rights and obligations. Conscience and 

faith liberty are ensured. All citizens are alike 

before the law. 

(2) Men and woman is equal and has same 

legal status within all ranges of the social, 

national and personal life. The promotion of 

the woman, particularly in the vocational 

qualification, is a social and national task. 

Article 3 

(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. 

(2) Men and women shall have equal rights. 

The state shall promote the actual 

implementation of equal rights for women and 

men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages 

that now exist. 

(3) No person shall be favoured or disfavoured 

because of sex, parentage, race, language, 

homeland and origin, faith, or religious or 

political opinions. No person shall be 

disfavoured because of disability. 

Two kinds of equal treatment were protected according to both laws: equality before the 

law and equality of men and women. 

Notwithstanding the distinct sociopolitical objective and Constitutional entitlement with 

regard to equality, the Constitutional reality diverged from it. In actuality women were 

underprivileged in both states, even though women in the GDR had a higher degree of 

qualified education and greater access to higher positions than those in the FRG. [10] 

In terms of the scope of application the provisions of the two states drifted apart. 

Whereas the principle of equality in the GDR was applied only to citizens of the state, the 

right was exercised likewise by all people in the FRG. The restriction of the German 

Democratic Republic lead to the use of a different set of norms for the punishment for 

offenses of foreigners – including nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany. [11] 

A violation of the equality occurred mostly at the filling of jobs in public services. In 

the Federal Republic of Germany this violation was limited to certain areas, like the 

profession of teachers which, due to the maxim of the confessional education of teachers, 

could lead to a discrimination of heretics. 

In contrast, discrimination in the German Democratic Republic took place quite often. 

Scores of public and social positions in the GDR were reserved for those people that 

exceled at showing their political attitude. It was impossible to get a leading position in 

the national education, judiciary, military, security agency of the state, police, the statecontrolled 

mass-medias or the national industry without being a member or close 

sympathizer of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). In contrast the 

nonattendance of the “youth dedication”, the conscientious objection or the nonparticipation 

of at least one of the organizations of the GDR verifiable lead to a direct

454 


discrimination. [12] However, such a kind of discrimination was considered to be 

consistent with the Constitution. By reason of the classification of a citizen as an entity of 

the society which is not free to choose the participation in the social life but who has the 

duty to advocate for the community, it was clear that in case of a lack of such a 

commitment those citizens could not profit of the Constitutional rights. [13] 

3.2. Freedom of opinion 

Example of an apparently different provision of a fundamental right is the freedom of opinion. 

GDR-Constitution German Basic Law 

Article 27 

(1) Every citizen of the German Democratic 

Republic has the right, in accordance with 

the spirit and the aims of this Constitution, 

to express his opinion freely and publicly. 

This right is not limited by any service or 

employment relationship. Nobody may be 

placed at a disadvantage for using this right. 

(2) Freedom of the press, radio and television 

are guaranteed. 

Article 5 

(1) Every person shall have the right freely to 

express and disseminate his opinions in speech, 

writing and pictures, and to inform himself 

without hindrance from generally accessible 

sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of 

reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall 

be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 

(2) These rights shall find their limits in the 

provisions of general laws, in provisions for the 

protection of young persons, and in the right to 

personal honour. 

(3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching 

shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not 

release any person from allegiance to the 

Constitution. 

The freedom of opinion was protected extensively in the Grundgesetz. Criticism of the 

regime as well as the promotion of diverse ideological, religious or political orientations 

were safeguarded. 

In contrast, the regulation of the GDR conducted a clear restriction of the freedom of 

opinion. Opinions were only protected provided that they corresponded to the objectives 

of the Constitution. One of these objectives was article 1 of the Constitution, which stated 

the role of the Marxist-Leninist task of the SED in state and society. On basis of that not 

only all individual expressions of opinion against the state were prohibited [14], but it 

was also regulated, that the press, the broadcasting and television services were only 

allowed to approve such expressions of opinion that contained ideas of the Socialism 

[15]. Thus the exercise of the freedom of opinion was indeed not really restricted by the 

wording of the article but more by the ideology of the SED. 

Next to that the Constitution of the GDR lacked of significant provisions for the 

exercise of the freedom of opinion. The right to freely inform oneself as well as the 

freedom of arts, science, research and teaching were not mentioned. Science and 

Research were contained in article 17 of the Constitution in the framework of the basics 

of the socialistic social and legal order. They were explained as having as its objective the 

protection and enrichment of the society and the citizens. Interpreting this norm leads to 

the clear result that any criticism of the political or economic system of the GDR was 

prohibited. The same is true for art and culture in the GDR. The relevant provision of 

article 18 paragraph 1 of the Constitution is restricted by the term “socialist culture”.


In contrast to other fundamental rights the divergent legal conception becomes obvious 

already by the different positions of the provision in the Constitutions – on the one hand 

in the part of the fundamental rights and on the other hand in the part of the basics of the 

fundamentals of the state authority. 

3.3. Freedom of assembly 

Whereas the GDR-Constitution does not undertake any subdivision, the Grundgesetz 

differentiates between indoor and outdoor assemblies. 


Article 28 

(1) All citizens have the right to assemble 

peacefully within the framework of the 

principles and aims of the Constitution. 

(2) The use of material prerequisites for 

unhindered exercise of this right, of assembly 

buildings, streets and places of demonstration, 

printing works and means of communication, is 

guaranteed. 

Article 8 

(1) All Germans shall have the right to 

assemble peacefully and unarmed without 

prior notification or permission. 

(2) In the case of outdoor assemblies, this 

right may be restricted by or pursuant to a 

law. 

Indoor assemblies are solely liable to the limitations of paragraph 1 – especially the rule 

of conducting them without weapons. Outdoor assemblies are next to that restriction 

liable to further limitations which were regulated by law. According to that outdoor 

demonstrations had to be registered in advance. Additionally the option for the public 

authorities existed to impose conditions to those assemblies. 

The fact, that the GDR-Constitution did not entail the limitation of conducting 

assemblies without weapons is striking. Reason for that was the will to protect assemblies 

were supported by the state like assemblies of the company task force of the SED or the 

“Free German Youth” that commonly took place as armed marches. The wording “within 

the framework of the principles and aims of the Constitution” de facto leads to an 

immense restriction of the freedom of assembly. Within an official commentary of the 

fundamental rights it is specified that there was a certain catalogue of protected 

assemblies. By this catalogue numerous assemblies which represented group interests 

were restricted as that was understood as an infringement of the common will of the 

Socialism. In addition assemblies that were considered as “contradicting the Socialism” 

were prohibited. The examination whether such thing was available rested with the SED. 

[16] 

For the supervision of these restrictions the GDR introduced the “regulation on the 

obligatory registration of events [17], whereupon the organizer had to give full particulars 

of the topic, speakers, used material and literature in advance. 

3.4. Right of personality 

The right of personality was ensured by article 30 of the GDR-Constitution. In contrast 

it was guaranteed as the second norm of the Grundgesetz directly behind the protection of 

human dignity.

456 


Article 30 

(1) The person and liberty of every citizen of the 

German Democratic Republic are inviolable. 

(2) Limitations are permissible only in connection 

with punishable acts or curative treatment and 

must be legally based. In this respect the rights of 

such citizens may be limited only in so far as is 

legally permissible and unavoidable. 

(3) Every citizen has the right to the assistance of 

state and social organs for the protection of his 

liberty and the inviolability of his person. 


Article 2 

(1) Every person shall have the right to 

free development of his personality insofar 

as he does not violate the rights of others or 

offend against the Constitutional order or 

the moral law. 

(2) Every person shall have the right to life 

and physical integrity. Freedom of the 

person shall be inviolable. These rights 

may be interfered with only pursuant to a 

law. 

According to the wording both articles look alike. Not before considering the respective 

social order this impression must be revisited. 

With regard to the content they are far from each other. The right of personality had not 

been a value by itself. An accompanying commentary to the Constitution illustrated that 

owing to the consideration of the right of personality as a freedom of the socialistic 

personality the personal rights and duties of the citizens were directly linked to their 

obedience to the law and their discipline. [18] 

The Grundgesetz instead contains article 2 that constitutes a kind of a sweeping clause 

on which other fundamental laws rely. In this respect the position of the article at the top 

of the list of rights enshrined in the Grundgesetz. 

By the above mentioned the conflicting objectives of both Constitutions become 

apparent. Whereas the self-fulfillment played an immense role in the Federal Republic of 

Germany, the same right was subject to several restrictions in the GDR. It was not only 

restricted by the legal norms but also by moral norms. The socialistic concept determined 

the recognition of the state and the people. 

In the FRG on the other hand individual opinions prevailed over concepts of morality in 

so far as that did not constitute a threat to other objects of legal protection. [19]. 

3.5. Inviolability of the home 

Rules with regard to the home had a different focus in the GDR and the FRG. The 

Grundgesetz/ German Basic Law merely concerned itself with the order of the 

inviolability of the home whilst the GDR-Constitution mainly focuses on the social right 

of living space. 

DDR-Verfassung German Basic Law 

Article 37 

(1) Every citizen of the German Democratic Republic has 

the right to dwelling space for himself and his family in 

accordance with economic possibilities and local conditions. 

The state is obligated to implement this right by 

promoting the construction of housing, the maintenance 

of existing housing, and public control of the just 

distribution of dwelling space. 

(2) There is legal protection against eviction. 

(3) Every citizen has the right to the inviolability of his home. 

Article 13 

(1) The home is inviolable. 

(2) Searches may be authorized 

only by a judge or, when time is 

of the essence, by other authorities 

designated by the laws, and may 

be carried out only in the manner 

therein prescribed.


Both Constitutions contained an almost identical wording relating to the prevention of 

the principle of the inviolability of the home. 

The Grundgesetz/ German Basic Law additionally comprised detailed information on 

how to ensure it. For a house search a judicial order was needed which was only allowed 

to be issued in situations where there was imminent danger. 

The Constitution of the GDR contained not further instructions at all. The further 

determination of the content was subject to the commentary. With regard to that the 

inviolability of the home was extended not only to the interference of the state but also to 

wrongful acts of landlords or other people. [20] State intervention instead was hardly 

restricted in matters of house searches under GDR law. 

Notwithstanding the similar phrasing the two Constitutions had a different agenda. The 

Grundgesetz basically safeguarded citizens from state intervention whereas the GDR- 

Constitution protected against private interference and left the door open for interventions 

of the state. [21] 

The purpose of the Constitution of a right to ensure and apportion living space had no 

counterpart in the Gundgesetz. Reason for that is the absence of the collective thinking of 

the socialism. In the Federal Republic of Germany solely simple acts contained 

provisions to hold shelters available for homeless persons. In practice such a placement 

lead to a complete loss of the social status. [22] 

3.6. Protection of the familiy 

The provisions on the protection of the family, marriage and children were almost equal 

in the GDR and the FRG. However some differences can be identified that depended on 

the different social systems. Particularly related to the education of the children the 

different target courses and the related arrangement of law became evident. 

DDR-Verfassung Grundgesetz/ German Basic Law 

Article 38 

(4) It is the right and the supreme duty of parents 

to educate their children to become healthy, 

happy, competent, universally educated and 

patriotic citizens. Parents have a right to a close 

and trustful cooperation with the social state and 

state educational institutions. 

Article 6 

(2) The care and upbringing of children is 

the natural right of parents and a duty 

primarily incumbent upon them. The state 

shall watch over them in the performance of 

this duty. 

The main difference is obvious. The care and upbringing of the children is in no way 

connected with a political or ideological proviso in the Grundgesetz. The GDR- 

Constitution instead gives the clear order to accord the children a socialistically steeped 

education. 

4. Conclusion 

The different concepts of law of the two German Constitutions visualize the difference 

of the wording of the law and its content. 

The respective theory of the state of the GDR and the FRG and the resulting concept of 

law lead to completely divergent rights in situations where provisions are verbalized in a 

similar manner. This directly affected the understanding of the concept of human rights.

458 


The Grundgesetz/ German Basic Law put the concept of human rights in the center and 

based all legal norms on it. In contrast the understanding of human rights in the socialistic 

meaning as an element to safeguard the socialistic body of thought and not the basis of 

the law lead to entirely different rights. 

The concrete comparison discloses miscellaneous. 

Provisions of the same wording experience divergent interpretation, similar norms 

contain different sets of rules or completely different scopes or protection. Even the 

concept of the role of equal rights and the arrangement in the Constitution is tied to the 

ideological context. 

So the question arises whether or not human rights had been achieved in both states. 

This is not an easy question. 

After the reunification the Marxism-Leninism vanished and with it the Marxist-Leninist 

concept of human rights. And whilst the van of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 

(SED) at its 40 th anniversary still claimed to have achieved human rights within the 

territory of the GDR [23], Erich Honecker declared after the breakdown of the GRD with 

regard to the human rights understanding of the Marxism-Leninism that “the concept had 

been too weak in theory and practice”. [24] 

But, what about human rights in the Federal Republic of Germany? The Grundgesetz 

still exists. And, it is also true that violations of human rights still occur. For example 

men and women are still not completely equal in reality. That means even if the wording 

promises human rights the people and the state are responsible for their achievement. 

References 

1. Sepúlveda, M., van Banning, T.: Human Rights Reference Handbook. University for 

Peace, Costa Rica, 2004, p. 3, l. 1. 

2. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949, BGBl. 1949, S. 

1, as amended on 21.12.1983, BGBl. 1983 I, S. 1481. 

3. Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 06. April 1968, GBl 1968 

I, S. 199, as amended by the Gesetz zur Änderung der Verfassung der Deutschen 

Demokratischen Republik of 07. Oktober 1974, GBl. 1974 I, Nr. 47, S. 432. 

4. Institut für Theorie des Staates und des Rechts der Akademie der Wissenschaft der 

DDR (ed.): Marxistisch-leninistische Staats- und Rechtstheorie. Staatsverlag der 

DDR, Berlin (Ost), 1975. 

5. Haney, G.: Grundlagen der Theorie des sozialistischen Staates und Rechts, Institut 

des Staates und des Rechts, Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig, 3. ed., 1967. 

6. Ulbrich, B.: Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft „Walter 

Ulbricht“ 1948-1971, Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1997, p. 118f. 

7. Brunner, G: Einführung in das Recht der DDR, C. H. Beck, München, 1979, p. 86. 

8. Institut für Theorie des Staates und des Rechts der Akademie der Wissenschaft der 

DDR (ed.): Marxistisch-leninistische allgemeine Theorie des Staates und des Rechts, 

Staatsverlag der DDR, 1975, p. 352. 

9. BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30. Juni 2009, para. 217. 

10. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Die Grundrechte in beiden deutschen Staaten, Neue 

Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. ed., Bonn, 1985, p.14f. 


Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. ed., Bonn, 1985, p.15.



Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. ed, Bonn, 1985, p.17f. 

13. Sorgenicht, K., Weichelt, W., Riemann, T., Semler, H-J.: Verfassung der Deutschen 

Demokratischen Republik Band 1: Dokumente, Kommentar, Staatsverlag der 

Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2. ed., Berlin, 1969, p. 240f. 

14. Poppe, E.: Grundrechte des Bürgers in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Staatsverlag 

der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 1980, p. 143. 



Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2. ed, Berlin, 1969, p. 110f. 



Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2. ed., Berlin, 1969, p. 113f. 

17. Verordnung über die Durchführung von Veranstaltungen, GBl. 1971 II, Nr. 10, p.69. 

18. Poppe, E.: Grundrechte des Bürgers in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Staatsverlag 

der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 1980, p. 155. 


Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. ed., Bonn, 1985, p.11f. 



Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2. Auflage, Berlin, 1969, p. 163. 


Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. Auflage, Bonn, 1985, p.53f. 


Gesellschaft GmbH, 5. Auflage, Bonn, 1985, p.55. 

23. Sindermann, H.: Arbeite mit, plane mit, regiere mit – das ist unsere Devise, in: 

Einheit, 1989, p. 804-809. 

24. Honecker, E.: Moabiter Notizen: Letztes schriftliches Zeugnis und 

Gesprächsprotokolle vom BRD-Besuch 1987 aus dem persönlichen Besitz Erich 

Honeckers, edition ost, Berlin, 1994.

460 

Map of West and East Germany 

Remembrance in Time

EUROPEAN EVOLUTION: FUNDAMENTAL 

FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 


Christina BICK 1 , Lars HANEBERG 2 

Against the background of the National Socialism and the Second World War it is not 

surprising that the unification of Europe was not based on a corporate feeling or an 

emotional commitment. Europe was unified in misery, destruction, expanses of rubble, 

prison camps and millions of dead persons. Emotional pleas for a corporate feeling 

including Germany would have been unimaginable. [1] 

Nevertheless there had been a passionate motion for Europe after the World War II. It 

was based on the idea of an economic cooperation but was characterized by a politic 

nature. Within the so called Schumann-Plan the peacekeeping in Western Europe, the 

unification of Europe by means of an economic fundament on which a political 

unification could be based and the overcoming of the years of oppositions among 

Germany and France were referred to as substantive concerns. Pivotal point of the plan 

was the consolidation of strategic goods for the reconstruction and the wartime economy. 

This was a learned lesson of the Treaty of Versailles, which tried to establish a stable 

peace framework by means of reparations and assignments of guilt and failed. The 

Schuman Plan was a method of small steps. 

The European integration can be divided into three phases: the start-up phase from 1950 

to the mid of the 1970s, the phase of consolidation and stagnation from the mid of the 

1970s until the mid of the 1980s and the phase of a closer political supranationality. [2] 

This closer cooperation and Europeanization can also be seen in the change of the 

values of the EU – especially the growing importance of fundamental rights. 

2. Definition of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights 

In the European Union (EU) fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights have to be 

distinguished. 

Fundamental freedoms constitute the right to trade, live, work and invest money freely 

within the EU; which in principle are all economic rights. 

The first and most important EU objective was the establishment of a common market – an 

economic unit intended to eliminate or markedly reduce trade barriers among its members. 

Due to the constitutive significance for the trade flows within a common market the free 

movement of goods (art. 28-37 TFEU), persons (art. 45-55 TFEU), services (art. 56-62 TFEU) 

and capital (art. 63-66 TFEU) are referred to as fundamental freedoms [3]. [4] 

In contrast fundamental rights are rights derived from natural law and therefore deemed 

1 

Chairs of European and International Economic Law and Public Economic Law, Carl von Ossietzky 

University of Oldenburg, Germany. 

2 

Chair of Accounting and Corporate Governance, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany.

462 


to receive the highest level of protection against government interference. [5] 

According to art. 6 EU fundamental rights are now protected in the EU under three 

diverse and complementary perspectives: as general principles of the EU, as defined by 

the European Charter and as protected by the European Convention of human rights. 

Up to this state of affairs in the protection of the freedoms and rights and the 

comprehension of the dimension of them a long development had to take place. 

3. Genesis 

The increasing importance of the protection of fundamental rights during the European 

Integration becomes apparent by its progressive transcription. Neither the European Coal 

and Steel Community (ECSC) nor the European Economic Community (EEC) possessed 

rules for the protection of fundamental rights. Given the fact that the European integration 

started as a reaction to the massive violations of human rights during the Second World 

War the question occurs why. 

The ECSC had been established as a mere economic organization. The ones that were 

bound by it were big affiliated groups as well as the member states themselves. Thus the 

protection of fundamental rights – in the sense they were understood at that time [6] – 

seemed to have no connection with it. Therefore the exemption of fundamental rights 

from the reconstruction and integration process had been no explicit one. In fact it 

happened at the same time that in connection with the Council of Europe fundamental 

rights were noted in the European Convention of Human Rights. Both the ECSC and the 

EEC were based on the same motivation; they just seemed to have no interrelation. [7] 

3.1. Development of fundamental rights by the ECJ 

In the absence of contractual provisions the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had to take 

over the development of the protection of fundamental rights. 

Initially the ECJ did not show any sensitivity with regard to fundamental rights. [8] The 

Court dismissed several cases [9] which were based on the infringement of national 

fundamental rights without even mentioning the legal argument for it. Reasons for this 

were that the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community as the basis of 

the decision neither contained fundamental rights itself nor had the structure of a 

framework agreement with the possibility for a teleological interpretation; secondly that 

the ECSC had been an independent international organization, whose autonomy would 

have been limited by giving national fundamental rights the possibility of legal control of 

its acts; and thirdly that the ECJ itself was of the opinion of having no right to judge 

about national law. [10] By doing so, the judges avoided a confrontation with the 

European Court for Human rights in Strasbourg as well as the national Constitutional 

Courts. 

Only a few years later in 1963 and 1964 the ECJ declared the autonomy of the 

Community legal order in its “Van Gend en Loos” [11] and “Costa vs. ENEL” [12] 

decisions. In “Van Gend en Loos” the Court developed the principle of direct effect, 

which means that provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 

Community are capable of creating legal rights which can be enforced by both natural 

and legal persons before the courts of the Community's member states [13]. In “Costa 

vs. ENEL” the court established the supremacy of European law over national law. By

Christina BICK et al.: European Evolution: Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights 463 

these decisions acts of the community could directly interfere with the legal sphere of 

the nationals. Because of this the member states feared that the protection against 

community acts could not been provided by the ECJ in the sphere of fundamental 

rights. So the Luxembourg Court faced the opposition of the Constitutional Courts of 

Italy [14] and Germany [15] which did not accept such a primacy of Community law 

when fundamental rights as protected by the national Constitution could have been at 

stake. In Germany the BVerfG actually construed an exception from the supremacy of 

European law. The opposition of Germany and Italy had not been by chance. Both 

countries have a fascistic background where fundamental rights have been spurned, 

why they both installed a court to protect individual fundamental rights. This explains 

why these two courts could not take a violation of fundamental rights, no matter from 

what direction. [16] 

Although the decisions of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Italian Corte 

constituzionale had not been taken in 1969 the academic discourse pointed into that 

direction. Karlsruhe and Rome threatened to declare European legal acts as inapplicable 

in case of a violation of national fundamental rights. This endangered the consistent 

application of the Community law to an extremely high degree. 

To counter this national opposition and the lack of an explicit reference to fundamental 

rights in the founding Treaties, the Court of Justice developed a very clever and original 

legal practice. 

Ten years after its first decision on fundamental rights the ECJ made an about-turn in its 

“Stauder” decision. [17] Like in the former decisions national fundamental rights were 

brought forward against community acts. But in this case the ECJ ruled that national 

fundamental rights could by way of judgmental comparative law become applicable as 

general principles of law. [18] Thereby the protection of fundamental rights had been 

adopted on community level. This decision was specified in the ruling Internationale 

Handelsgesellschaft [19]. The ECJ interpreted fundamental rights as an integral part of 

the general principles of community law which must be applied. This new approach was 

on the one hand based on the framework-character of the EEC-Treaty. And on the other 

hand on the constitutional context which had substantially changed since 1959 due to the 

“Frontini e Pozzani” and “Solange-I” judgements. 

In general the question if a breach of a fundamental right cannot be reviewed by the 

national constitutional law, which was stressed in the Hauer decision [20], but only by 

community law. In the decision the ECJ states the general commitment to fundamental 

rights and explains the method to define them in the absence of a codified list of 

rights. It developed a sort of European fundamental rights as a part of the general 

principles of community law. The Court derives them on the one hand from the 

common constitutional traditions of the member states and on the one hand the ECHR. 

[21] 

The following case-law on fundamental rights of the ECJ comprised two functions. 

On the one hand the ECJ had to create and define individual fundamental rights and on 

the other hand it had to safeguard reaching a certain level of fundamental rights not 

only with regard to the fundamental rights as such but also with regard to the 

dogmatics of it. [22] 

What can be seen is that the need for a decision about fundamental rights normally 

appeared in the context of fundamental rights.

464 

3.2. Codification of fundamental rights 


Already in 1977 the legal practice of the ECJ was approved by the political organs of 

the community. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted a 

common decision on the protection of fundamental rights [23] in which they stressed the 

overriding meaning of the respect for fundamental rights. 

In article 6 paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht a commitment to the 

fundamental freedoms was explicitly mentioned for the first time. However a 

binding and explicit list of fundamental rights was missing. In fact article 6 

paragraph 2 EU acknowledged the previous adjudication of fundamental rights of the 

European Court of Justice. 

The choice of words of the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1992 also made 

clear, that the EEC, which originally had been focused on economic integration, 

meanwhile had changed to a Union also focused on political integration. In the 

Maastricht Treaty the creation of a European Union (EU) and a European 

Community (EC) was agreed upon. Besides the introduction of the European 

Monetary Union, this Treaty brought about significant political innovations, e.g. the 

introduction of an EU-citizenship for every citizen of a member state which 

complements but not replaces the national citizenship (Art. 17 EC) as well as mainly 

intergovernmental cooperation among the member states in the area of Foreign- and 

Security-Policy 

This line towards a stronger political orientation of the EU later was confirmed by the 

Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000). The Treaty of Nice also added a 

sanctioning mechanism in article 7 EU for member states in breach of the provisions of 

article 6. 

Indeed a written warranty of fundamental rights existed but a written catalogue of 

fundamental rights was missing. Two solutions were possible: The accession of the 

ECHR or the composition of an own catalogue of fundamental rights. In 1979 the 

Commission deliberated the accession of the ECHR. Two questions occurred: if the EU 

(as being no state) could be a member of the ECHR and if the EC-Treaties allowed an 

accession. Both questions had to be denied at that time. After several changes the 

accession would be possible since 1 st June 2010 and therefore also planned by the organs 

of the EU. 

Under German initiative, the European Council of Cologne which convened in June 

1999 took a very significant step for building a catalogue of fundamental rights within the 

EU legal order. The aim of this initiative was set out in paragraph 44 of the Council 

conclusions: “The European Council takes the view that, at the present stage of 

development of the European Union, the fundamental rights applicable at Union level 

should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evident.” The Council’s main 

concern was to make the rights more visible for the EU citizens. This intention was 

explicitly set forth in the Annex IV of the Cologne Conclusions. According to the 

Council, protection of fundamental rights was a founding principle of the Union and an 

indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy. On being constituted in December of that 

year the "body" entitled itself the European Convention. [24] 

The Convention adopted the draft on 2 October 2000 and it was solemnly proclaimed 

on 7 December 2000. It was at the same time, however, decided to defer making a 

decision on the Charter's legal status. [25]

Christina BICK et al.: European Evolution: Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights 465 

A modified Charter formed part of the defunct European Constitution. After that treaty's 

failure, its replacement, the Lisbon Treaty, also gave force to the Charter albeit by 

referencing it as an independent document rather than by incorporating it into the treaty 

itself. However, both the version included in the Constitution and the one referenced by 

the Lisbon Treaty were amended versions. 

On its coming into force with the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, Justice 

Commissioner Viviane Reding proposed that Commissioners should swear to uphold all 

EU treaties and the Charter. On 3 May 2010, the European Commission swore a solemn 

declaration at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, pledging to respect the EU 

Treaties and to be completely independent in carrying out their duties during their 

mandate. For the first time, the Commissioners also explicitly pledged to respect the new 

Charter of Fundamental Rights. [26] 

5. Conclusion 

It is worth noting that with the doctrine of the EU “general principles” stemming from 

the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, the EU judges have not only 

created a strong common ground both for the national and European legal orders but also 

an evolving mechanism mirroring the evolution of the national Constitutional orders and 

of the Member States international relations. 

The interaction between the national and European level makes it possible to match the 

evolution of the EU society notably when fundamental rights are at stake. It is therefore 

not surprising that in sixty years several “generations” of fundamental rights came to the 

attention of the European Judges and legislators. 

Therefore, it took some time before the doctrine of “general principles” (as a legal 

cross-fertilization mechanism between the national and European level) had been 

mirrored in the Treaties but it happened in ’93 with the Maastricht Treaty, confirmed by 

the Amsterdam Treaty and now clearly stated in the Lisbon treaty. 

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the protection of fundamental rights has 

become one of the vital aspects of European Union activity. That means there has been a 

fundamental change of the nature of the European construction which was born mainly as 

an economy oriented organization. 

Notwithstanding the recent critics of the German Constitutional Court, the EU system of 

protection is now much more articulated than before and the possibility for an individual 

to challenge the EU acts has been improved. 

This evolution from mere economic fundamental rights to fundamental freedoms clearly 

stresses the change of the EU from an economic organization to an political union with 

several rights against their own and other member states, the EU and other private parties. 

References 

1. Haltern, U.: Europarecht – Dogmatik im Kontext, 2. edition, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 

2007, p. 30, marginal nr. 48. 

2. Haltern, U.: Europarecht – Dogmatik im Kontext, 2. edition, Mohr Siebeck, 

Tübingen, 2007, p. 30, marginal nr. 49f. 

3. ECJ Public Prosecutor v. Guerrino Casati, 203/80, 11.11.1981, ECR 2595, nr. 8.

466 


4. Streinz, R.: Allgemeine Lehren der Grundfreiheiten. Vom Diskriminierungsverbot 

zum Beschränkungsverbot, § 152, nr. 1, in: Handbuch der Grundrechte in 

Deutschland und Europa, Merten, D., Papier, H.-J. (Ed.). C.F. Müller, München, 

2010, p. 687-726. 

5. Wild, S.: Webster`s new world law dictionary, Wiley Publishing, Hoboken New 

Jersey, 2006, fundamental rights. 

6. Marshall, T. H.: Citizenship and Social Class – and other essays, Cambridge Univ. 

Press, London, 1950. 


Tübingen, 2007, pp.497f. 

8. Walter, C.: Geschichte und Entwicklung der Europäischen Grundrechte und 

Grundfreiheiten. In: Ehlers, D. (Ed.): Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 

De Gruyter Recht, Berlin, 2003, pp. 8f. 

9. e.g. ECJ Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft u.a., 19/59, v. 12.05.1959, ECR 

1960, 85. 

10. ECJ Stork, 1/58, 04.02.1959, ECR 1959, nr. 63. 

11. ECJ Van Gend en Loos, 26/62, v. 15.07.1963, ECR 1963, 1. 

12. ECJ Costa vs. ENEL, 6/64, v. 15.07.1964, ECR 1964, 1253. 

13. Craig, P., de Búrca, G.: EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., Oxford 

University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 182. 

14. Frontini e Pozzani, 07.03.1974, n. 14. 

15. Solange I, 01.05.1976, BverGE, 37, p. 271. 

16. Halter, U.: Europarecht – Dogmatik im Kontext, 2. edition, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 

2007, pp. 503f. 

17. ECJ Stauder, 29/69, v. 12.11.1969, ECR 1969, 419. 

18. ECJ Stauder, 29/69, v. 12.11.1969, ECR 1969, 419, nr. 7. 

19. ECJ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, 17.12.1970, ECR 1970, 1125, 935f. 

20. ECJ Hauer, 44/79, 13.12.1979, ECR 1979, 3727, rn. 14. 

21. ECJ Hauer, 44/79, 13.12.1979, ECR 1979, 3727, rn. 15. 


Tübingen, 2007, p. 523f. 

23. ECR 1977, nr. C 103, 1. 

24. European Parliament, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 21. 

February 2001, retrieved 23 December 2009. 

25. European Council, Nice 7–10 December 2000: Conclusions Of The Presidency, 

European Parliament, 11 December 2000, retrieved 23 December 2009 

26. IP/10/487, European Commission swears oath to respect the EU Treaties, 

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/487.

ABOUT TEACHING HISTORY - 2012 

Zoltán FARKAS 1 

’History is interesting – for us, history teachers. But the students, who are sitting in the classroom, 

are interested in totally different matters: conflicts with friends, their parents, their lovers, and 

other kins of things, things which history has to compete with.’ 

(László Lırinc) 

It seems to be a bit irrational effort to give a proper overview about the last twenty years in 

less than twenty minutes. The main reason for this is that from the change of regime lots of 

reforms, political turns effected and bothered the teaching activities. But of course the 

personal experiences of the last two decades do not simplify the fulfillment of our task. So 

that is why such retrospection may be subjective, and not only the experiences but the length 

of the elapsed time forces one to select carefully. My paper introduces the following 

elements and shows how they effected the history teaching of the last twenty years. 

First I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the dilemmas. If we look back at 

those years we see that the euphoric anticipation is our major memory which manifested 

in the professional reform. We thought that time that a new history teaching could be 

formed free from ideological voices, which is neutral and based on scientific research and 

which can transmit a meaningful future towards the students. History teachers saw it 

clearly, that it brings major changes in the content of the material – reflecting the needs of 

the society - which is supported by a methodological renewal. But the majority of the 

history teachers looked at this process as a devaluation in the profession and it turned out 

shortly afterwards that the expectations would not be fulfilled. On the one hand the group 

of history teachers was divided by the new approaches of history and on the other there 

was a lack of a national educational consensus which would grow out of a professional 

basis and of course the politics also had an impact on history teaching. A hoped and 

unified theory from the historical scholarship did not exist, because it based on an 

illusion, the history only presented the different narratives instead of the truth. This 

required the total reform of the methods of history teaching but the history teachers did 

not prove to be constructive. 

Another question was whether history teaching should be basically about quality or 

quantity. The teachers tried to exclude this dilemma and they escaped in a way with using 

the positivist approach in teaching. They reasoned that there was the entrance exams, and 

the general education but actually it was a way of surviving and an efficient method to 

use because they had to lack the scientific support. This resulted in the students having a 

wide lexical knowledge consisting only the data, so they had a ’crossword – knowledge’. 

That is why the interest in history, which had existed at the time of the change of the 

regime disappeared in a short time which is not surprising as the students –and the 

teachers themselves – were forced to adopt the new educational model. 

1 SZTE Ságvári Endre Gyakorló Gimnázium, Hungary.

468 


The reform and transformation of the school- and educational system started in such a 

context, which had the serious effect that in such an atmosphere of uncertainty the history 

teachers begin to worry about the number of the lessons and they became skeptic about 

the reforms and changes. This type of burn-out can be understood because the discussions 

around the new core curriculum even raised the question whether there is a need for the 

history as a schools subject at all and other subjects dealing the present should be placed 

in the curriculum like economics, social studied, etc.. In this situation the history teachers 

focused on the safety of their subject – regardless of their professional ideology and party 

affiliation- and they swept the questions of the reform under the carpet (’conflict avoiding 

consensus’ György Jakab). 

This school subject finally survived and thanks to the core curriculum inner content 

changes began which also had to face with the protest of the history teachers. The reason 

for this is that in 1995 in the 5th and 6th grades the chronological history teaching was 

terminated and a new cultural field, the human and society covered the subject instead of 

history and lots of new modules were introduced which endangered the independence and 

integrating role of the history subject. Ottó Szabolcs even talked about ’the Trianon of the 

Hungarian history teaching’. In 2000 the original state was restored in the 5th and 6th 

grades of the primary education and the structure of the subject was also re-introduced, 

the content material was directly regulated and the schools system itself again got the socalled 

8+4 structure. The next government made another correction, wider cultural fields 

were introduced again instead of the previous schools subjects and the competences were 

emphasized instead of the subject content without even clarifying the significance of 

these competences in the core curriculum and in the frame curricula. This was not 

changed after the 2008 supervision. The 2012 core curriculum also consists of principles 

and the direct guidance (lesson-numbers, material, requirements) can be found in the 

frame curricula. What is for sure at this moment that the number of the frame curricula 

and of the students books will also decrease in the future and the teachers accepts these 

changes well because of the previous failures in the subject reform. 

Because of the lack of the consensus between the educational experts and the practicing 

history teachers the significance of most of the reforms was not realized or the teachers’ 

interest in introducing them was not raised and another solution was chosen, the so-called 

’Trojan Horse’ which means that they trusted in those teachers in the school faculties, 

who were following the reform ideas and these teachers had to convey the efficiency of 

these reforms towards their colleagues ( like a ’hidden curriculum’). This could not be 

successful because of the rate of these teachers in the schools and it resulted in the 

growing frustration between the ’parties’ in the schools and mainly those who were open 

to the reforms. The reforms and the professional renewal were neglected by the majority 

which resulted in failing to introduce even the necessary methodological ones. So the 

history teachers could not / can not find their places because a new generation (’digital 

natives’) sit in the classroom and the teachers lost their previous role, was basically about 

being the ultimate source of knowledge. The situation could not be solved even with 

the digital devices provided by the government. In this situation the teachers 

themselves cried for help, that is for professional support and refresher courses but 

their methodological needs and requirements were not fulfilled because of the state of 

the history-didactics of the time – even if it is true that other school subjects have to 

cope with similar problems.

Zoltán FARKAS: About Teaching History - 2012 469 

Another problem and value crisis emerged because of the introduction of the new 

module subjects because - as it was mentioned above – it was thought that they endanger 

the existence of history as a school subject. The history teachers protected the subject 

with formally integrating them with history and this way they gained more lessons for 

history teaching. The problem with this solution is that the essential content material of 

these subjects got lost. The point of the consensus between those who represented the 

traditional methods and who followed the reform is that during the discussions related to 

the core curriculum the interests of both sides were served and the curricula fulfilled both 

the quantitative and the skill-developing requirements however they did not try to create a 

balance between them and it was left to the teachers who could not solve the problem on 

their own. The new history books aimed to help them but it turned out that a perfect 

solution can not be expected from these books and this was the history teachers became 

the prisoners of their own subject and under the pressure of the teaching material and of 

the school leaving exam they had to face with further frustration. 

The history books seemed to serve the interests of the society in the cross-fire of the 

professional and educational policy debates and they even carried the possibility of the 

professional renewal and reform. Due to the principle of free choice the accreditation 

process did not make an end of the continuously published student books. They could 

fulfill the requirements of the new, two-level system of the school leaving exam, 

introduced in 2005. This is proved by the fact that the source-based books are widely 

used; they are inductive teaching aids and handle the once misunderstood competence 

problem in its proper place. 

They major change regarding the reform was the introduction of the two-level school 

leaving exam as in the result-based educational system this exam had a very important 

role because it not only closed the process of the secondary education but it became the 

basic condition and tool of the entrance examination system. Its significance is looked as 

revolutionary by some methodologists (e.g. Tamás Kıfalvi) because after fifteen years of 

continuous efforts for reform (evolution) it brought a powerful change, which is basically 

due to the fact that the new system of the school leaving examination is a result of a 

cross-governmental professional work. The other reason for this is that this new system 

could combine the transmission of factual knowledge, the improvement of skills and of 

the values (previously called competences). The history subject seemed to be 

strengthened after the professional debates because it is possible to take a school leaving 

exam at both existing levels (up to the present) and there is also a written part in the exam 

in addition the oral part. (It is also important that the OKTV / National Study Competition 

of Secondary Schools/ 2 still consists the history subject which also strengthened the 

subject but it could only happen with the alignment with the system of the school leaving 

exam.) As a result of the new style of the school leaving exam such topics like economy, 

society, way of life and local history also gained ground. Lots of teaching materials, 

books were published during the last seven years, the students’ books also were 

transformed to fit the style of the new type of exam which can be seen as a success in 

methodology but we also have to mention that there are materials which are misleading. 

But in addition to the advantages mentioned so far (the new methods, contents and 

skills, the higher prestige of the subject) we have to take a look at the complains referring 

to the new exam, for example it is difficult to reform the exam, there is a need for 

2 The transtalor’s note.

470 


refresher courses for teachers and what the most serious factor is that however the 

necessary changes could be introduced easily it is hard to achieve positive results 

regardless of the actual government. To sum it up one can say that the two-level system 

of the school leaving exam is a success for the group of history teachers ( there is a 

consent in this question between the two organizations of history teachers, the Teaching 

Faculty of the Hungarian History Association and the TTE). 

The history teaching went through a serious twenty years consisting of lots of turns but 

there are a number of questions and dilemmas to be answered and solved and these 

solutions would be great results for the teaching community. It is important to list these 

issues here because the discussion of these topics can be a serious step towards the 

solution. We have to be able to find a balance between the national, global and European 

trends in teaching because they are crucial if we look at the identity of the future 

generation because the young wait for the answers and guidance from their history 

teachers who know more about the past. What also have to be balanced are the 

methodology, the educational policy and the world of everyday teaching and the proper 

knowledge transfer can be achieved through regular and direct refresher courses for 

teachers (see LLL. Life Long Learning). 3 In our changing world the teacher roles also 

transform rapidly and the ’knowing what’ and ’knowing how’ that is the forces of 

selection and the formation of the obligatory learning material are also tasks that need 

responsible answers in which the teachers can not be left alone and their awareness 

should be raised that in addition to the past they have to prepare their students to the 

present as well. This means more pressure on teachers and their financial and social honor 

have to be thought over again. 

And how complicated task it is, it can be seen from the fact that the teachers used to 

deal with past can not neglect the requirements of the digital generation anymore and they 

have to become familiar with the idea of using digital devices in their history lessons. It is 

again a difficult task because of the conditions available in the average Hungarian schools 

(just think of the fact that our students can gain any information via their iPad and they are 

in constant contact with the web unlike their teacher). This is strongly related to the fact that 

our students seem to be less and less motivated, interested and their general knowledge 

imperfect. Is it a true picture about the present generation or we have to re-think (or 

reorganize) our perspective? It must be such a complex system of problems which causes 

problems not only for the history teachers and it can not be solved on their own. 

The future of the examination system raises further questions: is it possible to adapt it to 

the new requirements and to balance it with the needs of primary and tertiary education. 

On the one hand it is necessary to change and re-think the present system but as we have 

seen it is not enough to find the proper answers but they have to be accepted by the 

teachers’ community because this was they will not feel it as obligation and pressure but 

they can become interested in these changes. On the other hand there is a need for a 

proper and precise teacher-revision during the fulfillment what should be looked rather as 

professional support instead of an outer control. 

As history teachers it would be good if we ourselves could prove (for the students and 

the whole Hungarian society) that we are able to learn from the past and that our present 

and future can be optimized with the help of our experience, because no matter how 

enchanting and edifying the past is our decisions should be made in the present. 

3 The translator’s note.

WIDENING THE PUBLIC ACCESS TO 

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS IN BULGARIA IN 

THE TIME OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 


Abstract: The subject of this article is related to ensuring the right of public access to archival 

documents in Bulgaria over the last two decades. The changes in legal regulations that led to the 

declassification of the massive amounts of archived documents are presented in the context of the 

recommendations of the European Union in this regard. Special attention is given to the 

completion and improvement of the scientific apparatus of the archives, which involves real access 

to documents. 

The achieved level of public access to archival documents is one of the criteria of a 

democratic society. That’s why this became an issue of great significance for the states in 

the so-called Eastern Bloc after the fall from power of their communist regimes and when 

these states took their path to democracy and European integration. The subject of this 

article are the changes in the legal regulations and practice regarding the widening of the 

access to archival documents in Bulgaria in the period from the beginning of the 90’s of 

the 20 th century up to the present day. 

The elimination of the Bulgarian Communist Party from the helm of the state after 10 th 

of November 1989 inevitably affected the status and the activity of the party archives. 

Until then they had functioned as a fully autonomous body and the access to archival 

documents had been extremely restricted and strongly controlled. On 8 th of July 1993 

under the growing social and political pressure the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian 

Socialist Party came to an agreement with the Central Administration of Archives 

(nowadays State Agency “Archives”), on the basis of which the archival documents from 

the Central Party Archive (established in 1946) were placed for further preservation into 

the Central State Archive, and those of the former regional party archives – into the 

corresponding territorial state archives. These archival documents can be accesses on an 

equal footing under the established usage of the system of state archives. 

The access to the records centres of the Central Military Archive (renamed to State 

Military Historical Archive in 2007), the Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 

the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also gradually widening, which is a 

result of the started process of declassification of records concerning the repressive 

regime of the totalitarian state or records, whose terms of information preservation have 

expired. In 1997 an act was enforced that regulated the access to the records of the former 

State Security and the former Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff 1 , which act was 

repealed in 2002, when the Classified Information Preservation Act was enforced 2 . 


472 


By the latter normative act, in accordance with the legislation of the member states of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the usage and the conditions are regulated that rule 

the access to information that is state or official secret or foreign classified information. 

General terms valid for the whole country are specified for preservation of classified 

information as follows: for top secret documents – 30 years since their creation, for secret 

ones – 15 years, for confidential ones – 5 years, and for official secret ones – 2 years. The 

State Commission for Information Security (SCIS), which was established by this act, 

could permit prolongation of these terms if the national interests require this, but not by 

more than the initially defined terms. After the regulated term has expired and the 

information is declassified by the agencies that have created the records or by their 

successors, the records are to be transferred to the state archives. As a result of the 

enforcing of this act a great number of records from the period 1944-1989, as well as 

records from the Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the period 1923-1944, 

are now easy of access by the citizens. 

By the right of the Access and Disclosure of Documents and Announcing Affiliation 

of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the 

Bulgarian National Armed Services Act 3 , published on 18 th of December 2006, a 

centralized records centre was established to preserve and give access to the records 

of these agencies from the period 9 th of September 1944 to 16 th of July 1991. 

According to the act and the Regulations of the Commission established in connection 

with this act 4 everyone has the right of access to this category of records “for 

research, publishing and investigation activity” in accordance with the Public 

Information Access Act. The access rules are regulated in Chapter 4 of the Act and 

Chapter 5 of the Regulations of the Commission. 

The Public Information Access Act, the Classified Information Preservation Act and the 

Personal Data Preservation Act, that have been passed in the beginning of 21 st century, 

are direct result of the efforts of our state to join the European Union structures and the 

resulting necessity to synchronize the Bulgarian legislation in accordance with the EU 

one. 

At the end of the 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 st century the access to archival 

documents is one of the most discussed issues among the international archive 

community. In 1997 the 32 nd International Conference of the Round Table on Archives 

(CITRA) adopted Archive Access Recommendation. In its interpreting report it is pointed 

out that the archives present a basic and indispensable part of the cultural heritage and 

preserve the nations’ memories, and the tenacity of the mankind memory depends on the 

archives to a great extent. It is stressed that this conclusion is gaining special importance 

for Europe with a view to the increasing public interest to history and historical truth, the 

administrative reforms taking place in the states that have taken their path to democracy 

as well as because of the exceptional breadth of the changes in the field of record 

creation, which is due to the expansion of the public power and the technological 

development 5 . According to the Recommendation the general principles and conditions 

for access to archival documents in each state should be included in its archives 

concerning legislation and should be coordinated and harmonized with the acts 

concerning related fields. They should guarantee free access to public records to each 

citizen regardless of his or her nationality and profession, and in order to accomplish it 

the catalogues should cover all the records, contained in the corresponding archive group 

and mark the records with restricted access, as well.

Anka IGNATOVA: Widening the Public Access to Archival Documents in Bulgaria … 

The conformity of the member states of EU with the general access principles, given by 

the Recommendation (which was endorsed by the Committee of the Ministers of the 

European Union on 12 th of July 2000) 6 , is of basic significance also for the building of a 

common European archives space. The cooperation between the state archives of the EU 

member states, which started in the beginning of the 90’s of the 20 th century, is entering a 

new development stage as a result of the enlargement of EU. According to the 

recommendation of the European Council (2005/835/CE) from 14 th of November 2005 

for effective actions and a strengthened cooperation in the field of archives in Europe 7 , a 

European Archivеs Group (EAG) was created by the European Commission. Its members 

are experts, representing the state archives in the member states and the EU institutions. 

Among the five basic priority fields of activity of EAG is the creating and maintenance of 

an Internet portal that gives access to the documents and archives in Europe 

(http://www.apenet.eu). This portal is planned as part of the “library” portal 

EUROPEANA (http://www.europeana.eu/portal) and will aid the realization of the 

concept of a single starting point of multilingual access to the cultural and scientific 

heritage of Europe in electronic format. 

The necessity of coordination of our normative acts in the field of archive work with the 

European legislation and the above mentioned Recommendation of the European Council 

from 14 th of November 2005 is the basic motive for the drawing up of a completely new 

archival bill, which was voted into law by the 15 th National Assembly of the Republic of 

Bulgaria on 29 th of June 2007. A number of formulations underlie the National Archival 

Fund Act 8 , which aim at widening of the access to archival documents. 

The new archival act entitles various public institutions (museums, libraries, community 

centres, institutes, churches, etc.) to keep historically formed collections of archive 

documents. However they are obliged, as the state and official records centres do, to place 

them at public disposal according to the regulations of the State Agency “Archives”. The 

private archives, which certainly will emerge in the future, are also obliged to place at 

public disposal the documents that are assessed as historically valuable. Valuable 

documents, received as inheritance, gift, from a will or other sources are to be declared as 

well. This requirement, which existed also in the old archive act, is practically unrealized 

so far. 

The cases of limited access are precisely defined in the act. Permission for access to 

archival documents, as well as rejection, is given in written form by the head of the 

corresponding archives office, where the rejection is subject to appeal by the applicant 

through the legally established rule. The state archives documents that contain citizens’ 

personal data and were given for consultations before the enforcement of the Personal 

Data Preservation Act are still available for access and this is done in the established way. 

The rules for use of the documents from the National Archive Fund are given by a 

regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers 9 . 

The archive offices are obliged to ensure public access of the users to the documents 

preserved by them, and for that reason a system of finding aids is created and maintained. 

According to the requirements of the new act this system is public and also contains data 

on the access limitations. Already in 2006 a number of state archives began to take into 

account the removed level of classification for information security in the system of 

finding aids and the archive items 10 . To ensure a real access to the documents not only the 

availability of the corresponding system of finding aids but also its quality is of great 

significance. Therefore their actualization and improvement, also with the view to the 

473

474 


automating of the scientific finding aids, is one of the priority tasks of the State Archives. 

Since 2000 as part of the series “Archival Reference Books” 14 volumes have been 

published, including guide-books, inventories, catalogues to help the user of archival 

documentation 11 . And since April 2012 the contents of all guide-books in this series, 

among them also the ones issued in 2000 and 2003 in two volumes about the Central 

Party Archive, are available in Internet 12 . Through the rubric “Archival Reference Books” 

in the site of the State Agency “Archives”, which has a new vision this year, an on-line 

access is given to the summaries of the archives groups in all the funds of state archives 

(the Central State Archive, the State Military Historical Archive, and the territorial 

archives), to a small number of inventories, and recently to the digitalized texts of the old 

guide-books of state archives. 

In Internet one can find also archive reference books of the Scientific Archive of the 

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and of the Manuscript-Documental and Literary Heritage 

Division of the St. Cyril and St. Methodius National Library in Sofia. For the time being 

only a part of the rest agency records centres with permanent document composition give 

access to their systems of finding aids locally. Difficult of access is also the available 

system of finding aids as well as the archive documents themselves, which are preserved 

in museums, libraries and other cultural, scientific and religious institutions. With the 

creation and maintenance of the Register of the National Archive Fund, which is going to 

be a united data base, not only centralization of the information on all documents valuable 

for the state and the society will be achieved but also publicity of the archival collections 

and documents that are property of firms and citizens will be ensured, and the 

possibilities for preservation and usage of the National Archive Fund will be widened. 

To overcome the significant delay in terms of completion of the National Archive Fund 

with electronic documents, which will allow their public access, it is of the first 

importance to adopt the Regulation of the Conditions and Order of Protection, 

Preservation, Access and Usage of Valuable Electronic Documents in State archives 

provided for by the act. The Regulation draft is electronically published for discussion on 

14 th of April 2012 13 . 

The widening of the access to the texts of the documents themselves is helped by 

their publishing in both ways – electronically and as hard copy. For example, since 

1998 within the framework of the document series “Archivite govoryat” (“Archives 

talk”, in Bulgarian) the State Agency “Archives” has managed to publish 64 volumes 

with written historical sources about the Bulgarian history derived from Bulgarian 

and foreign archives depositories 14 , while the Commission for the Access and 

Disclosure of Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the 

State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Services 

has published nine volumes with documents from its funds, some of which also on 

electronic data storages. The electronic versions of all documental publications are 

accessible through the Commission’s site 15 . The already several years ongoing 

activity for building of Digital Archive should be regarded as part of the policy of the 

State Agency “Archives” for widening and facilitating of the access to the preserved 

documents on a level corresponding to the today’s requirements 16 . Besides this longterm 

strategic initiative will better the protection of the original documents by using 

their electronic copies instead of the original ones and will provide possibilities for 

the participation of the Agency in national and international projects, related to 

on-line access to archival documents such as Archives Portal Europe, Europeana,

Anka IGNATOVA: Widening the Public Access to Archival Documents in Bulgaria … 

World Digital Library etc. At the same time, the agreement for cooperation between 

the State Agency “Archives” and Wikipedia, which was signed in March 2012 and is 

the fifth agreement of such kind in the world, will help the Bulgarian documental 

heritage to reach more people 17 . 

In conclusion we would like to point out that the issue of access to archival 

documents in Bulgaria, as well as in the rest ex-socialist countries, has an important 

social significance in the years of transition to democracy and European integration. 

The process of declassification of documents (relevant to the repressive regime or 

whose terms of information preservation has expired), which started in the beginning 

of the 90’s of the 20 th century, is becoming a large-scale event in the beginning of the 

21 st century. Then the legal aspect of the issue of access to archival documents from 

the National Archive Fund is also solved in the spirit of the European 

strategies and legislation. To implement a real (or so called “intellectual”) access to these 

documents a longer period of time will be needed until the Register of the National 

Archive Fund is fully built. The started process of digitalizing of archival documents, 

directly relevant to the commitments of Bulgaria as a EU member state for the building of 

a common European archive space, will contribute to their wider usage as part of the 

documental memory of the nation, Europe and the world, which is an essential necessity 

for the today’s information society. 

References 

1 

Държавен вестник, бр. 63 от 6.08.1997 г. [State Gazette, issue 63 of 6 August 1997] 

2 

Държавен вестник, бр. 45 от 30.04.2002 г. [State Gazette, issue 45 of 30 April 2002] 

3 

Държавен вестник, бр. 102 от 19.12.2006 г. [State Gazette, issue 102 of 19 December 2006] 

4 

Правилник за дейността на Комисията за разкриване на документите и за обявяване на 

принадлежност на български граждани към Държавна сигурност и разузнавателните 

служби на Българската народна армия, обн. в Държавен вестник, бр. 41 от 22.05.2007 г. 

[Rules of Procedure of Committee for Disclosing of Documents and Announcing Affiliation of 

Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National 

Army, promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 41 of 22 May 2007.] 

5 

Недялкова, Р. ХХХІІ Международна конференция на Кръглата маса – Архивен преглед, 

1997, №3-4, 31-32. [Nedyalkova, R. XXXII International Conference of the Round Table – 

Archival Review, 1997, №3-4, pp. 31-32.] 

6 

Recommendation № R (2000) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a European 

policy on access to archives – https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=366245. 

7 

Сouncil recommendation of 14 November 2005 on priority actions to increase cooperation in the 

field of archives in Europe (2005/835/EC) 

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_312/l_31220051129en00550056.pdf 

8 

Държавен вестник, бр. 57 от 13.07.2007 г. [State Gazette, issue 57 of 13 July 2007.] 

9 

Наредба за реда за използване на документите от Националния архивен фонд, обн. 

Държавен вестник, бр.10 от 5.02.2010 г., посл. изм. Държавен вестник, бр. 8 от 27.01.2012 

г. [Regulation for the procedure of use of the National Archival Fonds' records, promulgated in 

the State Gazette, issue 10 of 5 February 2010, last amended – State Gazette, issue 8 of 27 

January 2012.] 

– http://www.archives.government.bg/uploaded_files//naredba2.pdf 

475

476 


10 Отчет за дейността на Главно управление на архивите при Министерския съвет през 2006 

г. – Архивен преглед, 2007, №1-2, с. 22. [Activity report of the General Department of 

Archives at the Council of Ministers in 2006 – Archival Review, 2007, №1-2, р. 22.] 

11 http://www.archives.government.bg/279-%D0%90%D1%80%D1%85%D0%B8%D0%B2% 

D0%BD%D0%B8_%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%87%D0% 

BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8 

12 Пътеводител по фондовете на БКП, съхранявани в Централния държавен архив. Състав. С. 

Цветански, Т. Димитров. С., 2000, 464 с.; Пътеводител по мемоарните документи за БКП, 

съхранявани в Централния държавен архив. Състав. С. Цветански, С., 2003, 544 с. 

[Guidebook for BCP funds held in the Central State Archives. Composition S. Tsvetanski, T. 

Dimitrov. Sofia 2000, 464 p.; Guidebook for BCP memoir documents stored in the Central State 

Archive. Composition. S. Tsvetanski, Sofia, 2003, 544 p.] 

13 http://www.mtitc.government.bg/upload/docs/Proekt_Nar_3_042012.doc 

14 http://www.archives.government.bg/280-%D0%90%D1%80%D1%85%D0%B8%D0%B2% 

D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8F%D1% 

82 

15 http://www.comdos.bg/Нашите_издания 

16 http://www.archives.government.bg/435-%D0%94%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%82% 

D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD_%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%85%D0%B8%D0%B2 

17 http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/71993/dyrjavnite_arhivi_v_uikipedija

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 

RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SOVIET UNION 

DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD AND 

NOWADAYS 

I. Foreign trade of the Soviet Union 

Anasztázia KEREKES 1 

In the Soviet economy the foreign trade played only a minor role. In 1985, for example, 

exports and imports each accounted for only 4 percent of the Soviet gross national 

product. Tha soviet Union maintained this low level because it could draw upon a large 

energy and raw material base, and because it historically had pursued a policy of selfsufficiency. 

The Soviet Union conducted the bulk of its foreign economic activities with 

communist countries, particularly those of Eastern Europe. In 1988 Soviet trade with 

socialist countries amounted to 62 percent of total Soviet foreign trade. 2 

Trade with the industrialized West, especially the United States, fluctuated, influenced 

by political relations between East and West, as well as by the Soviet Union's short-term 

needs. In the 1970s, during the period of detente, trade with the West gained in 

importance at the expense of trade with socialist countries. In the early and mid-1980s, 

when relations between the superpowers were poor, however, Soviet trade with the West 

decreased in favor of increased integration with Eastern Europe. 3 

Commodity composition of Soviet trade differed by region. The Soviet Union imported 

manufactured, agricultural, and consumer goods from socialist countries in exchange for 

energy and manufactured goods. The Soviet Union earned hard currency by exporting 

crude oil, natural gas and its refined products and other primary products to the 

industrialized West and then used this currency to buy sophisticated manufactures and 

agricultural products, primarily grain. 4 

I.I. Western Europe and the Soviet Union 

In the mid-1980s, West European exports to the Soviet Union were marginal, less than 

0.5 percent of the combined gross national product of countries of the OECD. OECD 

countries provided the Soviet Union with high-technology and industrial equipment, 

chemicals, metals, and agricultural products. In return, Western Europe received oil and 

natural gas from the Soviet Union. Although oil and gas were the primary Soviet exports 


2 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12784.html 

3 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12784.html 

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_trade_of_the_Soviet_Union

478 


to Western Europe, they represented only a small percentage of Western Europe's 

substantial fuel imports: Soviet oil provided 3 percent and natural gas 2 percent of the 

energy consumed in Western Europe. The completion of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod 

export pipeline project increased the importance of Soviet natural gas to Western 

Europe in the second half of the 1980s. In 1984 France, Austria, the Federal Republic 

of Germany began receiving natural gas from western Siberia through the pipeline, for 

which the Soviet Union was paid by hard currency, pumping equipment, and largediameter 

pipelines. By 1990 the Soviet Union expected to supply 3 percent of all 

natural gas imported by Western Europe, including 30 percent of West Germany's gas 

imports. 5 

Despite the poor relations between the superpowers in the early and mid-1980s, 

Western Europe tried to improve international relations with the Soviet Union. One major 

step in this direction was the normalization of relations between Comecon and the 

European Economic Community (EEC). After the start of the Cold War in the late 1940s, 

the USSR conducted most of its foreign trade with other Communist countries and tried 

to make the bloc of Communist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia economically 

independent of the West. Beginning in the 1960s the Soviet leadership sought more 

Western technology and grain to compensate for the shortcomings of the USSR’s planned 

economy, but in the 1980s the other members of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual 

Economic Assistance (COMECON) still accounted for almost two-thirds of Soviet 

foreign trade. Like other Soviet economic activities, foreign trade was centrally planned 

and administered. 6 

II. Changes in the foreign trade after USSR collapse 

After the breakup of the USSR, these patterns changed. Russia’s foreign trade volume 

declined sharply and after the breakup of the USSR, reformers in the Yeltsin government 

sought to integrate Russia into the global economy. Since the nineties, Russia has 

changed and its partnerships have evolved. While the soviet foreign trade played only a 

minor role in the Soviet economy, nowadays it becomes the key sector of the russian 

economy. In the international economic relationships we can discern two main vectors: 

one is the EU and the other one is the post soviet region. Russia and Europe have 

structured and increased their cooperation in the last decade, and some Europeans are 

advocating closer cooperation with Russia. At the same time, Russia has reinforced its 

cooperation with the two fastest growing nations, India and China. A question therefore 

arises: to which extent could Russia's stronger cooperation with India and China affect 

future European–Russian cooperation? As a whole the diversification of Russia’s 

partnerships could be beneficial to European-Russian relations and give them a sounder 

basis, as Moscow has not shown less interest for Europe and its foreign policy has 

become more balanced and less exclusive 7 . 

5 http://www.mongabay.com/history/soviet_union/soviet_union-western_europe.html 

6 http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/Soviet%20Union%20Study_9.pdf 

7 http://www.countriesquest.com/europe/russia/economy/foreign_economic_relations_trade_and_in 

vestment.htm

Anasztázia KEREKE: International Economic Relationships of the Soviet Union … 479 

III. EU and Russian Federation 

Nowadays the European Union and the Russian Federation have a strong trade 

relationship, and the bilateral trade and investments continue to grow rapidly. Russia is 

Europe’s largest neighbour and one of its main partners. In the past decades, the 

relationship between Europe and Russia evolved from one of reciprocal hostility during 

the Cold War to a partnership. Each side is working towards strengthening the 

partnership, even though their relations have not met each partner’s expectations and 

Russia’s recent evolution is transforming them. Each has become a priority partner for the 

other and their relations are well developed and well-structured today. In addition to the 

well-developed bilateral relations with some of the European Union (EU) Member States, 

Russia has developed strong relations with the EU as a whole. (Mathieu, 2008) 

III.1. Relationships between EU Member States and Russia 

A key determinant in the development of the relations between the EU and Russia will 

be the position of some of new EU Member States, especially Poland and Lithuania, 

which have been quite critical towards Russia and the EU-Russia cooperation. It was 

clearly illustrated by their blocking of the talks on the replacement of the initial PCA. The 

Russian leadership has adopted a more confident posture on the international scene and 

openly criticized the West and Europe, for instance on NATO’s expansion or on the 

establishment of US missile defense infrastructure in Europe. 

Russia has emerged as the most divisive issue in the European Union since Donald 

Rumsfeld split the European club into ‘new’ and ‘old’ member states. We can identify 

five distinct policy approaches to Russia shared by old and new members alike: 

‘Trojan Horses’ (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU 

system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; 

‘Strategic Partners’ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special 

relationship’ with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies; 

‘Friendly Pragmatists’ (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, 

Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close relationship with Russia 

and tend to put their business interests above political goals; 

‘Frosty Pragmatists’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the 

Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business 

interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human 

rights or other issues; and ‘New Cold Warriors’ (Lithuania and Poland) who have an 

overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU 

negotiations with Russia. 

Broadly speaking, the EU is split between two approaches – and each of the five groups 

tends towards one of the main policy paradigms. At one end of the spectrum are those 

who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a 

process of ‘creeping integration.’ They favour involving Russia in as many institutions as 

possible and encouraging Russian investment in the EU’s energy sector, even if Russia 

sometimes breaks the rules. At the other end are member states who see and treat Russia 

as a threat. (Leonard–Popescu, 2007)

480 

III.2. Foreign trade with the EU 


The EU is by far Russia's main trading partner, accounting for 47.1% of its overall trade 

turnover in 2010. It is also by far the most important investor in Russia. It is estimated 

that up to 75% of FDI stocks in Russia come from the EU Member States. Trade between 

Russia and the EU has significantly increased over the past decade. Between 2000 and 

2006, in a gradual way, EU’s exports to Russia more than tripled and imports from Russia 

more than doubled. But trade figures show a clear asymmetry. In 2007, the EU27 

represented more than 55% of Russia’s exports and 44% of Russia’s imports. On the 

other hand, in 2006 Russia represented 10% of the EU25 imports and 6.2% of its 

exports. 8 (Fig. 1) 

Fig. 1. EU and Russia trade in goods 2000-2010 

Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf 

Then, while Russia mainly imports manufactured products from the EU, which 

accounted for more than 70% of Russia’s imports from the EU in 2006, the EU imports 

mainly energy from Russia, which represents more than 65% of EU’s imports in 2006, a 

percentage that has increased over the past years. 

The EU dependence on Russian energy products has to be put into perspective. Russian 

oil and gas represent 30% and 44% of the EU27 total imports, respectively. (World Bank, 

2011) (Fig. 2) 

But the level of dependence varies greatly within Europe. For instance, Russian gas 

imports represent the entire Estonian and Finnish gas consumption, but less than 25% of 

France’s one. On the other hand, the EU market is crucial for Russia as it exports more 

than half of its energy products to Europe. (Mathieu, 2008) 

8 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/russias_next_transition_en.pdf

Anasztázia KEREKE: International Economic Relationships of the Soviet Union … 481 

The main EU interests in Russia include fostering the political and economic stability of 

the country and maintaining a stable supply of energy. 

Fig. 2. EU-27 trade 

Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf 

From 1991 until 2006, some 2.7 billion euros were provided to Russia in assistance 

within the framework of the programme of Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth 

of Independent States (TACIS), which was designed to enhance the transition process 

towards market economy and democracy in countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 

TACIS has been the biggest programme of assistance to the Russian Federation which 

was ended in 2006. It was focusing mainly on the four common spaces, and funded by the 

Union through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), even 

though Russia is not part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). (Mathieu, 2008) 

III.3. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been the framework of the EU-Russia 

relationship for more than a decade. It was signed in 1994 and came into effect on 1st of 

December 1997. The agreement regulates the political and economic relations between 

the EU and Russia and is the legal basis for the EU's bilateral trade and investment 

relations with Russia. 

The EU and the Russian Federation are currently negotiating a new agreement to 

provide the contractual framework for EU-Russia relations in the years to come, replacing 

the 10-year old PCA. This new legally binding agreement should provide a 

comprehensive framework for bilateral relations with stable, predictable and balanced 

rules for bilateral trade and investment. In May 2003, during the Saint Petersburg 

Summit, both partners decided to reinforce their partnership in the framework of the PCA 

by creating four “common spaces”: 

- a Common Economic Space – to establish an open and integrated market 

between the EU and Russia;

482 


- a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice – to facilitate ease of 

movement between EU and Russia within a context free of terrorist threat, 

organised crime and corruption; 

- a Common Space of External Security - to cooperate on security and crisis 

management in order to address global and regional challenges; 

- a Common Space of Research and Education – to create and reinforce bonds 

between the EU and Russian research and education communities. 

In May 2005, the Moscow Summit adopted objectives and roadmaps for the 

implementation of those common spaces. (Mathieu, 2008) 

III.4. Russia's WTO accession 

For a long time, at the centre of EU-Russia relations were the ongoing WTO accession 

negotiations. Now that these negotiations were completed and Russia is expected to 

formally become a member no later than in summer-2012. Russia's WTO accession 

process started already in 1993. In this process, the EU and US signed their respective 

bilateral market access deals with Russia in 2004 and 2006. In total, Russia concluded 56 

such bilateral deals with interested members of the WTO. On 16th of December last year, 

finalized terms of Russia's WTO membership were unanimously approved by the WTO 

Members at the 8th WTO Ministerial Conference. Following this WTO decision, Russia 

will have 220 days to complete its domestic ratification of the Accession Protocol and is 

likely to formally become a Member sometime before autumn 2012. 9 

The EU has been a strong supporter of Russia's WTO membership since the very start 

of the process to the end of it. Russia being the third largest trading partner of the EU, and 

the EU being the first trading partner for Russia, the value of Russia's WTO membership 

for both sides cannot be overstated. It is of fundamental importance for Russia's 

economic reform, sustainable growth and investment climate. Moreover, the EU firmly 

believes that Russia's WTO membership will bring opportunities for a qualitatively new 

step in EU-Russia economic relations. 10 

Once Russia formally becomes a member, it will also benefit from the rights and 

obligations set by the multilateral trading system of the WTO, including the possibility of 

recourse to the intergovernmental trade dispute settlement. Russia's WTO Membership 

will give a major boost to further development of their economic relationship. 11 

References 

1. Leonard M. Popescu N. (2007): A power audit of EU-Russia relations, Europes 

council on foreign relations, Internet: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR-EU- 

Russia-power-audit.pdf, letöltve: 2012.04.25 

2. Mathieu C. (2008): Assessing Russia's space cooperation with China and India - 

Opportunities and challenges for Europe. Acta Astronautica, 66, 355 - 361. p. 

3. World Bank (2011): Growing Risks, 26th Russian Economic Report, internet: 

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/305499- 

1245838520910/6238985-1316082024531/RER26_ENG.pdf. 

9 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ 

10 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ 

11 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/

EUROPE - UNITED IN FREEDOM AND 

DIVERSITY? 

Gregory MOUANGA 1 

The relevance of article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights to the 

jurisprudence on the status of residence permit 

“In varietateconcordia, Europe – United in Diversity!” 

This motto is a result of decades of war and destruction, of fear and terror in Europe. 

The European Convention of Human Rights is one of many different pillars Europe is 

build on and which is the issue of the effort to build a Europe on principles of peace and 

humanity, of progress and cooperation. 

The following talk will give an overview into the jurisprudence on Article 8 of 

European Convention of Human Right, in short form the ECHR, dueto the residence 

permit status of migrants. The ECHR constitutes an important building block in favour of 

an individual protection of personal interests. 

The possibilities of article with the background of an Iron Curtain 

Against the background of a heritage of two world wars and the boundary of the Iron 

Curtain during the Cold War in the second half of the twentieth century, the right to respect 

private and family life, home, and correspondence fits in that development of Europe. 

The Iron Curtain stands for a gridlock in migration, for a wall across from fluctuation 

and diversity. In the USSR the freedom of movement was restricted by the propiska - a 

residence permit prohibiting massive movements of people. Originally, the idea to 

construct a national control of migration was an experience of immense and uncontrolled 

movements during the revolution and civil war in the nineteen- twenties. 2 

During the cold war international migration was highly restricted: a movement between 

Western Europe countries and countries of the Eastern bloc was nearly impossible due to 

border control and security systems. Therefore, actual migration was possible in the 

matter of state controlled movements - movements as an instrument of political 

repression. 3 

1 Hanse Law School, Carl-von-Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, Germany. 

2 Nozhenko (2010), Focus Migration - Länderprofil 20: „Russische Föderation“ (ISSN 1864- 

6220),Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (Hrsg.), p. 2. 


6220),Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (Hrsg.), p. 2.

484 


Forced resettlements were the expression of a totalitarian system in the USSR. It was an 

instrument to penalize lateral thinker and persons who were not conform to the soviet 

system. 

Those individuals were labeled as “suspicious elements” and taken out of their families 

and personal environment. 4 

Due to this background, Article 8 of the ECHR can be seen in the light of a fundamental 

right on family life which protects individuals from state interventions connected to 

migration or repressive movements. Nowadays especially for the right of residence, 

Article 8 established scope for marital and non-marital relationships and families. While 

the number of Immigration and applications for asylum has significantly increased during 

the end of the eighties, many states and governments have tightened their rules for 

residence and asylum policies. 

The respect for family life in article 8 is given to individuals without defining the object 

of legal protection itself. Obviously the principle of article 8 needs to be interpreted sui 

generis. But the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights has already given 

substance to an open or abstract legal concept in article 8 by decades of jurisprudence in 

that matter. 5 

Article 8 of the ECHR applies where families and family structures are adversely 

affected by state measures and might provide a protection of “family life” concerning 

residence permit creating a new legal situation for individuals. 

The jurisprudence of article 8 on family-constellations 

For this reason, it is necessary to have a view on the jurisprudence and its definition of 

“family life” according to three different concepts of relationships, namely marital 

relationships, Non-marital relationships and Parent-child relationships. 

The first constellation, the marital relationship between husband and wife, is an 

undeniable case of “family life”. Decisions of cases like Abdulaziz 6 , Cabales 7 or 

Balkandali 8 define the main features of family life. 

The cases of Abdulaziz and Balkandali affected two women who have married their 

foreign husbands in Great Britain. After the marriage both husbands applied for a 

residence permit which was refused by state institutions. State authorities argued that 

there exists no “family life” and no reason for a residence permit if they did not have a 

common household before. 9 


6220), Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (Hrsg.), p. 2. 

5 Sander (2008), Der Schutz des Aufenthalts durch Artikel 8 der Europäischen 

Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 51. 

6 ECHR, date of judgment 28.5.1985, Application No: 9214/80. 

7 ECHR, date of judgment 28.5.1985,Application No: 9473/81. 



Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 52 et seqq., et seqq..

Gregory MOUANGA: Europe - United in Freedom and Diversity? 485 

The case Cabalesaffected the British government and Mrs.Cabales who has married her 

Philippine husband under Philippine law. The immigration authorities doubted the 

effectiveness of the marriage under Philippine law and not until several years later her 

husband could entry with a visa and the marriage could be consummated under British 

law. In these cases the European Court of Human rights asserts that the term “family” 

under article 8 approves a marital relationship - a marital relationship which does not 

necessarily imply a common household as a condition for a “family life”. Other facts like 

the plan of living together the duration of a relationship or a child in-common could 

prospectively open the scope of the article. 10 

Apart from that, a distinction between marital relationship and a fictitious marriage is 

indispensable. That kind of marriage which is formally closed but without a will on a 

relationship is not protected under term of “family life” in article 8 ECHR. Obviously, 

the problem lies in the proof of evidence. For state institutions a fictitious marriage is 

hard to prove and according to this there are not many cases of fictitious marital 

relationships where a “family life” was denied. 11 

But not only marital relationships can open the scope of application of article 8, which 

leads me to the second constellation of family concepts, namely “Non-marital 

relationships”. 

According to the European Court of Human Rights, non-marital relationships could 

also demonstrate a “family life”. 

An example of that is the case of Johnston 12 , in whichthe Court decidedthat the term 

family is not restricted to marital relationships. A family could also exist in a non-marital 

relationship when a de facto “family” outside of marriage may be given. 

However, in that constellation the duration of the relationship, a common household, a 

child in common or other circumstances are playing a more important role. The level of 

protection of article 8 seems to depend on the intensity of the relationship. 13 

This was the decisive factor in the case of Gorman 14 , a British man, who was allied to a 

Nigerian woman during his job in Nigeria. After he left, Gorman supported her and they 

frequently met in France or Nigeria. A meeting in the United Kingdom was not possible 

given that the immigration authorities denied a tourism visa. 15 

The commission left it open if that kind of relationship already fulfills a non-marital 

relationship and opened the scope of article 8. If engagement already fulfills a level of 

protection in article 8 as a non-marital relationship is also not really clear. 


Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 52 et seq.. 


Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 55 et seq. 




14 European Commission of Human Rights, date of judgment 9.4.1997, no. 32339/96. 


Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 62.

486 


The case of Patel 16 deals with an Indian man who lived together with his blind mother 

and his fiancée in the United Kingdom and was deported after a high prison sentence. The 

commission approved an intervention of article 8 without reasoning relationships in 

engagement. 17 

In the case of Wakefield 18 the commission left the decision about relationships in 

engagement open even if there is no “family life” due to circumstances like 

imprisonment. 

The principles of the cases Adulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali which were established 

for marital-relationships might be seen controversially, because a “family” was formed by 

marriage, but the common household was not really established. 

In cases of engagement, where the formal act of a marital-relationship does not exist 

yet, the criteria of a non-marital relationship (duration, children in common or other 

circumstances for a constant relationship) should be taken. The commission followed this 

view in the decision Wakefield and left open more distinct implications about the 

relationship. 

In cases of a homosexual and non-marital relationship article 8 ECHR does not even 

open the scope of application even if the couple raises a child together. However, the 

relationship between a homosexual father and a homosexual mother toward a common 

child constitutes a “family” in the sense of article 8 based on the biological relation. 19 

But as a result of modern evolution and change in society, commission and the 

European Court of Human Rights should open the scope for new “family”- constellations. 

By the way however measures of a member state which discriminates homosexual 

relationships in the field of residence might open the scope of application of article 14 

ECHR and have to be justified. 

Nevertheless the question arises if the traditional belief in a heterosexual marriage still 

reflects the spirit of the 21 century. 

The third constellation of “family concepts” is the relationships between parents and 

children. 

In cases of minor children usually the parent-child relationship demonstrates a “family 

life” in the sense of the convention. 

Even if the parents do not life together anymore at the date of the child’s birth, the 

presence of children constitutes a “family life” ipso iure that means without an inquiry of 

the real fact of living together. But the constituted “family life” could be dispensed ex 

post (retrospectively). This view will be just advanced in extraordinary, which usually 

means that the parents have only rare or no contact at all. 20 






Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 63 et seqq., et seqq.. 


Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 67 et seq..

Gregory MOUANGA: Europe - United in Freedom and Diversity? 487 

Exempt from “extraordinary circumstances” are the following: emigration of the 

parents, deportation, imprisonment or the accommodation of the child in a foster family 

or in youth institutions - but only if the familiar relationship is not totally broken. A short 

break in relationship does not show to advantage. Also divorce does not hinder the 

relationship between parent and child in the judicial definition of “family life”, as well the 

child’s custody. 21 

Originally, the jurisprudence according to the parent-child relationship was only 

applicable to legitimate children. Nevertheless, in the cases of Keegan 22 and Kroon 23 the 

European Court of Human Rights decided that “family life” does also existipso iure for 

illegitimate children: The main factor is that the parents lived in a relationship before. 

The principles of the relationship between parents and minors cannot be assigned to the 

relationship between parents and full aged children. Jurisprudence does see a “family 

life” between adults just in the case of a dependency which gets ahead of a normal, 

emotional scale. This is accepted in cases of financial dependency or other reasons like 

invalidity or serious illness. 24 

According to the jurisprudence of the commission and European Court of Human 

Rights the relationship to stepchildren or adopted children comes falls in the category of 

“family life” if there existed an actual lived performed relationship. A “family life” ipso 

iure cannot be seen in view of problems which could appear during the procedure of 

adoption. 25 

Conclusion 

Three types of relationships and its jurisprudence could be observed. Article 8 of the 

ECHR offers to individuals a protection against state measures. 

The scope of article 8 the admission of “family life” could have consequences on the 

residence permit status of foreign people. Consistently state authorities have to issue new 

residence permits due to the implementation of the protection of “family life” in marital 

relationships. But also a non-marital relationships or a parent-child relationship could 

open the scope of article 8. 

However Article 8 ECHR is liable to limits like welfare of the children or very serious 

delinquency which could hinder the scope of protection or justify contrary states 

measures. To go into detail about the limits of article 8 due to residence permit would go 

beyond the scope. 








Menschenrechtskonvention, Duncker& Humblot, p. 73.

488 


Undoubtedly, the jurisprudence on the residence permit status established a protection 

of “family life” in the field of relationships between different cultures and nationalities. 

For the future the development of the jurisprudence and the application of national 

lawyers in practice will be interesting. 

Building a Europe united, in freedom and diversity means that we have to strengthen 

families and new family structures. In matters of residence permit cultural-mixed families 

epitomize the motto of European Union: “In varietate Concordia – United in 

Diversity!”

EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION OF 

MINORITIES – PROBLEMS AND 

PERSPECTIVES 

Violeta STOYCHEVA 1 

Abstract: The relevance of the issue of educational integration of minorities, and in particular, the 

Roma in Bulgaria, is determined by the new realities, highlighted in the multilevel strategy for the 

development of the EU in the 21 century “Europe 2020”. In search of adequate answers to the 

challenges, related to the social inclusion of the Roma community, it is necessary to analyse both 

the existing problems and the created good practices in education. This text is focused on the 

major barriers, which determine the traditionally low educational level of the Roma community. 

As an alternative, there are discussed different examples of social inclusion, applied on the 

territory of Veliko Turnovo region, presenting a model of successful multicultural interaction. 

What is the status of the Roma in the EU? 

The Roma are one of the biggest but poorest and least integrated minorities in the EU. 

Their number in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, is estimated between 7% and 

10% of the entire population [1]. 

In different studies [2] on the Roma, it is emphasized that in almost every aspect of life 

their situation is worse than the average: the Roma have higher infant mortality rates, a 

shorter average life span, lower incomes, higher unemployment rates and respectively – 

higher levels of poverty, as a result of which they face large-scale social exclusion[3]. 

Though the financial and political investment recently allocated by the EU, the huge gap 

between this community and the majority still exists. Despite the de jure recognition by 

the European Parliament in April 2005 of the necessity of specific measures to overcome 

the segregation of the Roma minority [4] compared to other ethnic minorities and groups 

in the Member States, the Roma are facing the highest levels of discrimination regarding 

the access to housing, employment, education and health care. This fact has been 

confirmed by 77% of the Europeans, according to who the Roma origin is a barrier in 

society, almost the same as disability [5]. According to the metaphorical definition of the 

former Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Vladimír 

Špidla, the Roma are “Europe’s forgotten citizens” [6]. 

The issue of the Roma minority in the EU has gained wide publicity after the events in 

France in the summer of 2010, when the illegal camps of groups of Roma from Bulgaria 

and Romania were destroyed and they were sent back to their countries. The expulsion of 


490 


these immigrants became a political issue of international significance, and the ensuing 

dispute between Paris and Brussels put the situation of the European Roma in the focus of 

public attention. According to Lívia Járóka (MEP of Roma origin, European People’s 

Party, Hungary), the case with France signifies that, in addition to the countries with 

prevailing Roma population, the big Member States have also admitted that they are 

facing a common problem – the failure of Roma integration in the last 20 years. In search 

of a way out, MEP Járóka has declared herself in favour of a new strategy for solving the 

Roma issue at the European level that will substitute the „ good resolutions, empty words 

and window-dressing from the politicians.” The new political stirring in the Community 

can be summarized through the words of the Hungarian State Secretary for European 

Affairs Enikı Gyıri, according to who the strategy for solving the Roma issues should be 

“on the basis of social inclusion, not on a basis of ethnicity”. “Access to work and 

education is what moves us forward” – concludes Gyıri [7]. 

The words of the State Secretary Gyıri should be understood in the context of the new 

EU Strategy, according to which the integration of the Roma should not be dealt with as a 

separate policy, but integrated “with the mainstream policies”. This means that a special 

attention is paid to the particular situation of the Roma within all EU policies that aim to 

improve the economic situation, health living conditions, employment opportunities, 

cultural understanding and education of all Europeans. 

Including education as one of the main tools for full Roma integration in Member 

States, makes it an important and particularly sensitive issue in the work of state 

institutions in the countries with compact Roma population like Bulgaria. 

What is the status of the Roma minority in Bulgaria? 

The Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 does not use the term minority. Instead, minorities 

are referred to as “citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian” [8]. Experts define the 

Roma in Bulgaria as an “inter-group ethnic community” [9]. Generally Roma consider 

themselves as an ethnic minority. The group is characterised as non-homogeneous and 

consists of numerous subgroups, which identity is formed under the influence of different 

factors – language (or dialect), life style, occupation (or profession), limitations of 

endogamy. A telling point is the fact that some groups of this population prefer to call 

themselves “Gypsies” instead of “Roma people” or entirely differentiate themselves from 

the latter. 

The data in the Table 1 outline the dynamics in the demography of the Roma population 

in the previous century and the beginning of the 21 century. 

The exact number of the Roma in Bulgaria is difficult to establish, as at censuses a great 

part of them prefer to self-identify as Turks, Bulgarians or Vlachs. 

According to data from the last census in 2011, the Roma community constitutes 4.9% 

of the total population. As ethnicity is determined on the basis of the self-identification of 

the censured person, we can assume that the reported share and absolute number of the 

Roma population in 2011 of 325 343 is in fact much higher. According to different 

sources, the number of the Roma varies between 600 000 and 900 000. 

According to the statistics of 2011 as “mother tongue”:

Violeta STOYCHEVA: Educational Integration of Minorities … 491 

• 272 710 people or 85% of the Roma indicated the Roma language; 

• 24 033 people or 7.5% – the Bulgarian language; 

• 21 440 people or 6.7% – the Turkish language. 

Table 1. Number and share of the Roma (1900-2011) [10] 

Year Number Percentage 

1900 89 549 2.4 

1910 122 296 2.8 

1920 98 451 2.0 

1934 149 385 2.5 

1946 170 011 2.4 

1956 197 865 2.6 

1965 148 874 1.8 

1975 18 323 0.2 

1992 313 396 3.7 

2001 370 908 4.7 

2011 325 343 4.9 

By religious denomination, the majority of those who self-identified as Roma indicated 

Eastern Orthodox – 84 867 people (37%). Protestantism is indicated by 23 289 people 

(10%) of the Roma community, 42 201 (18%) chose Muslim denomination, 30 491 did 

not choose any affiliation, while 49 491 did not self-identify by denomination [11]. 

The diversity among the Roma population as regards mother tongue and religion, the 

dynamic demographic picture and the changes in the structure of the ethnic groups by age 

should be taken into account when discussing different issues related to the education of 

this community. 

What is the normative framework of the educational policies regarding minorities? 

Education is one of the main tools of the strategy for achieving the full integration of 

Roma in Bulgaria. At the level of the normative basis, strategies and programmes, 

minority issues are well covered by legal regulations, intentions and actions [12]. They 

are harmonized with the legal provisions of the EU and different international 

organizations [13]. Since the adoption of the Framework Programme for Equal 

Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society in 1999, the official Bulgarian policy towards 

this community has been defined as “integration of Roma”. Its implementation is ensured 

by concrete strategies and action plans, adopted by different ministries [14]. 

The general strategic objectives for educational integration of children and students 

from ethnic minorities, in particular Roma, are:

492 


• To ensure the right of equal access to qualitative education to children and students 

from ethnic minorities; 

• To preserve and develop the cultural identity of children and students from ethnic 

minorities; 

• To establish preconditions for successful socialisation of children and students from 

ethnic minorities; 

• To transform cultural diversity into a source and a factor for mutual knowledge and 

spiritual development of the teenagers and creation of atmosphere of common 

respect, tolerance and understanding, etc [15]. 

The philosophy of the above mentioned official documents is purely political: the 

problems of any group cannot be solved by others without its direct and efficient 

participation. Therefore, solving the issue of Roma integration/inclusion is a question of 

representation of the respective group (minority) in governance. However, the fact is that 

the active participation of the Roma as a subject and object of different strategic 

documents is still only wishful thinking, as in reality the social problems related to them 

are increasingly expanding and deepening [16], which makes Roma integration a 

challenge for the whole Bulgarian society. 

Which are the main problems with Roma educational integration? 

One of the problems is related to the existing educational imbalance between the different 

ethnic groups [17], the status of the Roma community being the most dramatic. The data 

in Table 2 illustrate the educational status of the Bulgarian Roma in the beginning of the 

transition to democracy. 

Level of 

education 

Table 2. Relative share of the Roma by level of education (2001) 

Total Share Roma Share 

Higher 882 795 20,7% 443 0,3% 

Secondary 2 063 011 48,4% 11 075 6,9% 

Basic 1 051 338 24,7% 71 521 44,8% 

Primary 182 111 4,3% 43 819 27,4% 

Primary – 

unfinished 

30 727 0,7% 12 445 7,8% 

Illiterate 49 475 1,2% 20 341 12,7% 

Total 4 259 457 159 644


According to the official statistics [18] from 2001, 72.2% of the Roma had primary or 

basic education, 7.8% – primary unfinished, and 1.2% were illiterate. Only 0.3% 

managed to move to the group of higher education graduates, which characterizes the 

educational level of the Roma in the beginning of the 21 st century as very low. This fact 

preserves its negative character in the following years as well. 

The statistics from 2011 shows that the total number of illiterate people in Bulgaria is 

currently 112 778 and their share in the population aged 9 and above is 1.5%. For those 

who self-identify as Bulgarians it is 0.5%, for the Turkish ethnic group – 4.7%, while for 

the Roma group – 11.8%. 

Among children aged between 7 and 15 years, which should be covered by the 

education system but do not attend school as of 1.02.2011, differences are also observed 

significant regarding their self-identification to the three ethnic groups. In the Roma 

ethnic group 23.02% of this age group does not go to school, in the Turkish ethnic group 

this percentage is 11.9% and in the Bulgarian – 5.6%. A rough idea about the actual 

dimensions of these percentages give the data of the Regional Inspectorates of Education 

(RIE), according to which in the last several years the total number of Roma pupils in the 

country from grades 1 to 12 is about 90 000–95 000, i.e. the Roma children constitute 

between 10% and 11% of all pupils covered by the national education system. 

Another alarming fact from the last census in 2011 is the inclusion of the category 

“never attended school”. The number of those people, who have never been part of the 

education system, is 81 000 or 1.2 % of the population aged 7 and above. The trend of 

continuous increase of illiteracy refers mainly to the Roma community. The share of 

the illiterate Roma aged 15–64 in the period between the last two censuses has 

increased by approximately 50 %. This turns them into a risk factor, especially the 

young people below 24. 

When the low education level of the Roma community is being discussed, it is 

necessary to distinguish between two factors: on the one hand, the group of Roma 

children, who do not start going to school at all, and on the other – the Roma pupils, who 

drop out of the education system. According to data, announced by the media, only for 

2010–2011 school year approximately 20 000 children in the country did not start school. 

Although not all of these children are Roma, it is a fact that together with the age 

increases the number of those not attending any educational institution. According to 

Teodora Krumova [19], leader of the Roma organization Amalipe in Veliko Tarnovo, in 

grade 1the Roma children are about 25%, in grade 8 they are below 8%, while in grade 9 

they are even below 3%, i.e. for every 100 Roma children, who start in grade1, only 14 

continue to the secondary level of education and reach grade 10 of the compulsory school 

age. For the other ethnic groups – of the Bulgarians and the Turks, this problem also 

exists, but its scope and the difficulties are not of this size and complexity as with the 

Roma, i.e. the Roma community is considered as the group, which permanently has the 

lowest level of education. 

Most studies addressing Roma issues find several main groups of reasons for school 

dropout: social, economic, ethno-cultural, psychological and pedagogical [20]. 

Social reasons are related most of all with family relationships. For a Roma child “the 

home” is not just a place to live. To be “at home” means to live with the family in an 

environment that creates the feeling of belonging to a something. However, many

494 


children do not have a home in that sense but grow up in one-parent families, with a step 

parent or under the guardianship of grandparents that have assumed the functions of the 

parents, who are working abroad. 

Social reasons are closely related to the economic ones. In many cases the families of 

dropout pupils of Roma origin most often rely on temporary employment, monthly 

allowances for children and social benefits. Only 30% of these families live on incomes 

from permanent employment. This means that in many families the older children do not 

attend school regularly as they have to help in the daily maintenance of the household or 

look after their younger brothers and sisters. According to sociological data, a large 

number of families send their children from the age of 12 to 16 to work in the 

construction business or help in gathering scraps. 

The ethno cultural specificity of the Roma community as a reason for school dropout 

can be seen in particular in the early marriages of the girls, who stop attending school at 

the age of 12–13. According to official data, every 10 th girl under 16 drops out of school 

in order to raise her first child. It is very important to underline in this case that the 

preserved traditional values and life style in the Roma community still hinder the 

attractiveness of school and education due to the lack of direct link with an immediate 

practical use. 

The pedagogical reasons also have a strong impact on school dropout. They can be seen 

in different areas. Lagging behind at school is one of the main reasons for the lack of 

motivation of Roma children. According to a sociological survey commissioned by the 

Ministry of Education, Youth and Science (MEYS), published by the National Institute 

for Heads of Schools Training in April 2011, the biggest part of the dropouts pointed out 

that they had given up school because of the difficult lessons in grade 5. 87.6% of all 

dropouts cannot “jump over the lath” between primary and lower secondary school, and 

22% drop out from school forever, because it is not interesting for them. According to 

teachers, working in schools with a high number of children from the ethnic minorities, 

the problems are interrelated and refer to: failure to cope with the material, poor grades, 

low level of Bulgarian language, difficult communication with classmates and teachers, 

ignoring the order and non-observing discipline at school. Another reason is related to the 

fact that most often the parents of those children, who fail to continue their education, 

have low education (primary, basic) or have no education at all. 

There are other reasons as well for school non-attendance by Roma children. Part of 

them are directly or indirectly connected to ethnic stereotypes – language barrier, 

religion, migration of Roma families [21], different system of values, forming of compact 

isolated groups of Roma people, ethnic division amongst pupils, insufficient awareness of 

the ethnic characteristics of Roma people, influence of a foreign culture (Turkisation), 

unpreparedness of the teachers to work with bilingual children, ethnicities’ lack of 

knowledge about each other [22]. In reality, despite the well-structured legal basis, there 

is no integrated state framework with clearly formulated texts regarding the provision of 

funds, desegregation and participation of parents from the vulnerable groups as parties in 

the common mechanism in the process of equal access to education. The fact is that for 

solving such an important issue mainly external donors and funds are relied on.


What are the prospects to the educational integration of the Roma? 

Special attention should be paid to enhancing the scope of the compulsory pre-school 

preparation and all-day training of children in primary school, including the opening of 

semi-boarding forms of education in the receiving schools. The amendments of the Law 

on National Education introduced compulsory attendance of kindergarten at the age of 5 

so that in grade 1 the children should be able to speak fluently Bulgarian. 

Daily transportation of the pupils from the remote or small settlements to the respective 

school is ensured, as well as free textbooks and aids for the socially vulnerable children 

from grades 2 to 8 and free breakfast. 

The specialized programs of the MEYS provide for consultations and additional classes 

to assist pupils at the primary and lower secondary stage who have difficulties to acquire 

the material. 

The variety of out-of-class project activities focused on the integration of children and 

parents in the school and out-of-school environment is being enhanced. This aims at 

making school more attractive for Roma children. Apart from giving them additional 

knowledge and skills, which are interesting, the children have the opportunity to study as 

an optional subject Ethnic Folklore – Roma Folklore, as well as Roma language as a 

mother tongue. 

The following examples from the region of Veliko Tarnovo represent only a small part 

of the numerous initiatives aimed at stimulating Roma educational integration. 

• In the town of Elena has been established a school centre – Youth zone for civil 

education, personal development and social integration. 

• In the town of Lyskovets is working a Children’s Centre as a social enterprise, run 

jointly with the Future for Us Association. 

• In eight settlements of the municipality of Polski Trambesh have been appointed 

mediators between the Roma community and the local authorities to ensure more 

effective protection of the rights and the interests of the community. 

• In all municipalities of the region are organized different events related to the 

preservation of the religion, language, traditions, crafts and cultural heritage of the 

minority groups. At Sts. Cyril and Methodius Secondary Comprehensive School in 

Zlataritsa has been established a museum exhibition of ethnic groups. 

In addition to the local and the regional authorities, a number of non-governmental 

organizations also take part in the work on the integration of the minorities in the region 

of Veliko Tarnovo. Particularly active in that respect are the Amalipe Center of 

Intercultural Dialogue and Tolerance [23] and the European Information Centre (Veliko 

Tarnovo), Roma – Together Association (Polski Trambesh), Future for Us Association 

(Lyaskovets), Center Maria Association (Gorna Oryahovitsa), Civil Society Association 

(Elena). 

Thanks to the Amalipe Center, the establishment of special community development 

centres, providing locally various social services for the Roma, has been initiated across 

the country. In the field of education these centres have the aim to encourage the selforganisation 

of the Roma community, to empower Roma parents to participate in school 

life and make the school the centre of community life.

496 


Based on the opinion of the experts from the administration of Veliko Tarnovo Region, 

education, health and social care are the main fields, in which local authorities can help 

in finding financial aid from European funds for the integration of different ethnic and 

religious groups. 

Conclusion 

The continuing problems related to the social integration of the Roma are a clear 

indicator that the developed policies in education should be oriented towards increasing 

the quality of the human potential and responding to the requirements of the labour 

market. To achieve it, a more systematic approach should be applied and a better 

coordination should be achieved between local authorities and social and economic 

partners, including schools, business, business associations, labour offices, nongovernmental 

organizations. There is a need of changes in the well-known models for 

financial support from the European funds, as well as a strict coordination in the policies 

at the national and local level to ensure the sustainability of the created good practices. 

An important condition for the successful implementation of the integration activities is 

the social commitment and the activity of the Roma community. In the context of the 

Strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training “ET 2020” and the 

new strategy “Europe 2020”, the ensuring of equal access and quality education for the 

Roma is an opportunity for better professional development and income for them. On the 

other hand, our society should accept the Roma community as a Bulgarian potential, on 

which depends the increase of the potential for prosperity of the whole Bulgarian economy. 

References 

1. The social and economic integration of the Roma in Europe. Brussels, 7.4.2010, 

COM(2010)133 final. – http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 

=COM:2010:0133:FIN:EN:PDF; See also: European Commission. The Situation of 

Roma in an Enlarged European Union. 2004. – 

http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?policyArea=&type=0&country=0&year 

=2004&advSearchKey=+the+situation+of+roma+in+an+enlarged++&mode=advance 

dSubmit&langId=en. Accessed: 13-11-2011; An EU Framework for National Roma 

Integration Strategies up to 2020. Brussels, 5.4.2011, COM(2011) 173 final, p. 2. 

2. Томова, И. Циганите в преходния период. София: Международен център по 

проблемите на малцинствата и културните взаимодействия, 1995. (Tomova, I. 

The Gypsies in the Transition Period. Sofia, International Centre for Minority Studies 

and Inter cultural Relations); Ringold, D., M. A. Orenstein, E. Wilkens. Roma in an 

Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle. World Bank, Washington, USA, 

2003; COM(2011) 66; COM(2011) 173 final. 

3. Report on public policies for Roma integration in Bulgaria and the main problems of 

socio-economic inclusion of Roma within the project „EU INCLUSIVE” - Data 

transfer and sharing of best practices between Romania, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy 

regarding the inclusion the Roma population. Sofia, 26.01.2012, pp. 26 and next; For 

more information see the site of UNDP: http://roma.undp.sk/; 

http://vulnerability.undp.sk/. Accessed: 18-04-2012.


4. European Parliament resolution of 28 April 2005 on the situation of the Roma in the 

EU, Brussels. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference 

=P6-TA-2005-0151&language=EN. Accessed: 13-11-2011. 

5. Ibidem. For more information visit the site of European Union Agency for 

Fundamental Rights (FRA). http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/roma/roma_en.htm. 

Accessed: 13-11-2011. 

6. Data in Focus Report 1: The Roma. European Union Minorities and Discrimination 

Survey. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Budapest, 2009. – 

http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2010/eu-midis-data-focus-report-1-roma. 

Accessed: 13-11-2011. 

7. Data from the news on the EU policy on Roma in the period August–October 2010 

published on Europe Gateway. Accessed: 13-11-2011. 

8. Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. Report Submitted Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 

of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Bulgaria. 

September 1999, p. 6. – http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/fcnm-reports-bulgariango.PDF. 

9. Advancing Education of Roma in Bulgaria. Country Assessment and the Roma 

Education Fund’s Strategic Directions. Roma Education Fund, 2007, p. 20. 

10. Ромите в България: Информационен справочник. (Roma in Bulgaria). София: 

Институт „Отворено общество”, 2008. 

11. NSI, Ibidem. 

12. The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria prohibits any form of discrimination and 

guarantees the equality of citizens (Art.6). The Law on Protection against 

Discrimination transposes the European Directives on equality – 43/2000/ЕС, 

78/2000/ЕС, 75/117/EEC, 97/80/EC, 76/207/EEC and regulates the protection 

against any form of discrimination. Such protection is also regulated in the Labour 

Code (LC); Civil Procedure Code (CPC); Penal Code (PC); Penal Procedure Code 

(PPC); Social Security Code (SSC); Law on Employment Promotion; Law on Civil 

Servants; Law on National Education; Law on Higher Education; Law on Health and 

Safety at Work; Law on Child Protection etc. Special protection is ensured through 

Law on Protection against Discrimination, Law on Countering Trafficking in Human 

Beings, Law on Protection against Domestic Violence, Law on the Ombudsman. 

13. National Demographic Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria (2006–2020; National 

Action Plan for the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015); Employment Strategy 

(2004–2010); National Strategy for the Child (2004–2006); Joint Memorandum on 

Social Inclusion; National Poverty Reduction and Social Exclusion Strategy etc. 

14. A Short-term strategy for the implementation of the state policy for equal integration 

of Roma community in the Bulgarian national culture (2000-2001); Framework 

Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society, Council of 

Ministers’ Protocol 18/22.04.1999; Action Plan for the implementation of the 

Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in the Bulgarian Society 

2003/4, Resolution 693/6.10.2003; National Action Plan for the Decade of Roma 

Inclusion (2005–2015), Council of Ministers’ Protocol 15/14.04.2005; Strategy for 

educational integration of children and students from the ethnic minorities, approved 

on 11.06.2004 by the Minister of Education and Science, and Action Plan by 2009.

498 


15. See Strategy for educational integration of children and students from the ethnic 

minorities, 2004. Ministry of Education and Science, Sofia, 

http://www.ncedi.government.bg/en/1_EDUCSTRAT.htm; Monitoring report for 

2010 on the implementation of the National Action Plan under the initiative “Decade 

of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015”, Sofia; Programme for the Development of 

Education, Science and Youth Policies in the Republic of Bulgaria (2009–2013), 

Ministry of Education, Youth and Science, Sofia. 

16. Методиева, М. Невидимият провал. (Metodieva, M. The Invisible Failure). – IN: 

Politiki, Open Society Institute, Issue 4, 2011. – 

http://politiki.bg/?cy=210&lang=1&a0i=223733&a0m=readInternal&a0p_id=823. 

Accessed: 23-04-2012. 

17. Simeonova, M., D. Korudhzieva, L. Petrova. The Roma Population in Bulgaria: The 

New Challenges. Sofia, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2007, p.5. 

18. Ibidem. 

19. Крумова, Т. Образователната ни система все още е етноцентрирана. 

(Krumova, T. Our education system is still ethnic-centred) – Интервю на Агенция 

„Фокус”, 15.09.2010. 

20. Вж Причини за отпадане на децата от училище. Витоша Рисърч. (Reasons for 

dropping out of the children of school. Vitosha Research). София, 2006; Advancing 

Education of Roma in Bulgaria, Оp. cit. 

21. Such reasons were pointed out by the municipal experts at the focus groups held in 

April and May 2011 in the municipalities of Elena, Polski Trambesh and Zlataritsa 

(region of Veliko Tarnovo), in which the author participated personally. Minutes of 

focus groups. Personal archive of the author. 

22. Бужашка, Б. Някои проблеми на образованието сред малцинствените 

общности. (Buzhashka, B. Some problems of education in minority communities), 

София. 

23. For more information see: http://www.geocities.com/amalipe2002/. Accessed: 

23-04-2012.

ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN THE BALTIC 

STATES – ON WINNERS AND LOSERS 


Rolf WINKELMANN 1 

The revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe deeply moved the peoples and affected 

their life. A lot of hopes, that could not be expressed openly during the communist and 

soviet era developed. The regime-change in Central and Eastern Europe did not just mean 

freedom of occupation and suppression, but also a massive change in everyday life of the 

peoples. A change of their habits, their personal living and working situation and their 

life-style came as a result of the historical change – not only in the Baltic States but in the 

whole former Warsaw-pact states. 

It is possible to differentiate between three different kinds of transition. First there is 

the political transition that includes the construction of a complete new democratic 

political system. Second the economic transition – the total change of the economic order 

from planned economy into a capitalistic order. And, third and last social transition. All 

three are interdependent in different ways. The German sociologist Claus Offe called it 

the „dilemma of duality“(das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit). In countries like the Baltic 

States occurred another problem. They had not only to transform their political and 

economic system but also had to build up the state and the nation. The last part is still 

difficult due to the heritage of the soviet occupation and the hundreds of thousand ethnic 

Russians who were settled in Estonia, Latvia and to a smaller degree in Lithuania. 

The economic and political transition was at first a question of institutionalization. 

Establishing a democratic constitution and determining a capitalistic economy is a rather 

short process. More interesting in this case are the results of the institutionalization of 

capitalism in the Baltic States. In this case I follow the question, who belongs to the 

group of ‘winners of the economic transition’ and the ‘losers of the transition’. As this 

article refers to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I will make the attempt and take a look at 

the characteristics of both groups instead of just describing the groups for every country. 

This approach seems to be appropriate. The Baltic States are often summarized as equal. 

This is true and not true at the same time. Their newest history is shaped by parallelism 

that means they gained independence from Tsarist Russia about the same time, their 

independence was abolished at the same time by Stalin’s Soviet Union and they reached 

re-independence de facto in 1991. The time of occupation led to a levelling of many 

social differences in these three societies. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have started the 

transition process at the same time and entered the European Union in May 2004. This 

shows that they have a lot of things in common. On the other hand there are several 

1 Lecturer within the Institute of Social Sciences, Carl-von-Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, 

Germany.

500 


distinctions. The three countries use different languages, the structure of the population is 

different, especially related to ethnic minorities and they have differences laying in their 

economic structure. Lithuania has a bigger agricultural sector than Estonia and Latvia. 

The size of the population also differs immensely with Estonia as the smallest nation and 

Lithuania as the biggest nation. 

2. Social transition 

The social transition, the structural changes of social relationships and characteristics of 

the society, did not start at zero. The connection with the economic is very tight. The 

societies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were shaped by the interwar years 1918-1940 

and the period of the soviet occupation 1940-1991. Many people hoped their countries 

will experience a rapid growth, westernisation and economic adaption to Western Europe 

in a very short period of time. But this turns out as a nice but unrealistic dream. The 

transition process in the Central and Eastern European countries is characterized by a 

complete restructuring that goes along with different kind of changes and insecurity [1]. 

Especially the negative implications of capitalism struck the people during this process 

– unemployment, insecurity etc. The new situation is not shaped by state decreed equality 

but the transition process leads to social stratification. After 20 years of independence and 

more years of the economic transition process, the main question should not be how the 

process works but what the results of this process are. Who belongs to the winners and 

looser of this complex economic process? This discourse is very important as there is still 

a threat that belonging to the group of looser could turn into a permanent situation for 

these people. In the end it is possible to say that a stiffened group of loser turn into a kind 

of social explosive that threatens the social stability of a society and the new adapted 

democracy. 

For unknown reasons, the state of the art is, that this question is rather rarely asked in 

case of the Baltic States. One reason surely is that most of the scientists working on 

Central and Eastern Europe refer to the ‘standard’ countries like Poland, Ukraine, 

Hungary, Czech Republic and Russia. Research on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is still a 

niche. 

Therefore in the following chapters three questions should be of interest of this article: 

1.) Who belongs to the winners and losers of the economic transition? 

2.) Is it possible to define these groups based on empirical findings? 

3.) What categorisation is possible? 

I will start with the basic question of a general classification. 

3. Definition of winners and losers 

It is an odd conclusion, that every economic transition has winners and losers. For this 

reason also in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania both groups appear on the scene after the 

initiation of the transition and general downfall of the economy. At the beginning of the 

transition nobody knows exactly who will become a winner or a loser of this process. The 

most realistic way is a post-transition analysis in which slow social processes are 

evaluated and conclusions are drawn, because the development of these groups need time 

to develop. On the other hand, there is no closing definition of this problem. For this 

reason, I try to define some characteristics of both groups.

Rolf WINKELMANN: Economic transition in the Baltic States – On winners and losers 501 

3.1. Winners of the economic transition 

I will start with the winners of the economic transition in the Baltic States. According to 

several studies the main group consists of people who were young at the beginning of the 

transition-period. In our case this group consists of people born in the early seventies of 

the last century. At this time these people were about 18 years old. Their advantage lies in 

the new opportunities the new time offers them. Especially in the Baltic States they had a 

good chance to enter the public administration as these states try to get rid of the predemocratic 

staffs that often consists of ethnic Russians who came to the soviet republics 

between the late forties and early eighties. Estonia and Latvia especially saw the 

chance to swap the staffs. One should keep in mind, that Mart Laar (Estonia) was 32 

years old, when he became the first prime minister of post-soviet Estonia in 1992. The 

opportunities young people had in this time also shows that social mobility was 

existent and that the social heritage of the soviet period loose stability and support 

social mobility [2]. But it was a rather short period than the children of the ‘singing 

revolution’ had nearly indefinite chances to find and secure their place in the new 

society. Nowadays the young generation faces similar problems like in other Eastern 

and Western European states. 

Among the winners of the economic transition in the Baltic States are of course the 

people who at the beginning already made a fortune. Collecting wealth in post-soviet 

Europe occurred in different ways. There are entrepreneurs who had an idea that made 

them rich. But many other wealthy people reached that level through corruption, theft, 

and cozenage. But in both ways, legally and illegally, some kind of network was always 

important and helpful. 

But also the old economic elites often belong to the winners of the transition. Using 

their personal networks and their know-how offers them the possibility to secure their old 

status also in the new time of democracy and capitalism. On the other hand, neither in 

Estonia, nor in Latvia and Lithuania most of the members of the political elite did not 

change into the new economic elite. Therefore we can say, that economic elites changes 

through newcomer but mainly not from the old political elite [3]. 

Next to the young people who were willingly take a risk one can generally say that 

educated people among the group of the middle aged people were successful too, 

unless their competences are still needed and who are able to adapt to the new 

economic system quickly. One way to define winners and losers is based on data from 

the United Nations, as I showed above. Another attempt to describe winners and losers 

is based on economic development. The introduction of capitalism automatically leads 

to income inequality. As a result, people with a stagnating or decreasing level of 

wealth belong to the group of loser, while people with a steadily increasing status 

belong to the winner of the economic transition. The winners of the economic 

transition can be defined as members of a group with an above the average income and 

higher positions in the private sector. [4]In Estonia, for example, 26 % of the people 

that left school between 1995 and 2002, belong to the winner of the economic 

transition. They entered higher management positions due to their education. During 

this time, the social mobility still existed [5]. 

People working in western companies and organisations definitely belong to the winner 

of the transition. They earn most of the time an above the average income. Well-paid jobs 

are existing in new sectors like banks and insurance companies [6].

502 

3.2. Losers of the economic transition 


Among the losers of the economic transition in the Baltic States belong, without a 

doubt, the older people. Interesting, especially in the case of Estonia, Latvia and 

Lithuania, ethnic belonging does not matter.[7] The older people are not in the position to 

adapt to the new institutionalised order with its permanent changes.[8] Also the pension 

the elderly are paid already during the Soviet-Union is too small to lead a decent life. In 

the Baltic States, like in other Central and East European states too, many pensioners are 

begging. For western tourists it is obvious in the capitals Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, but 

also in Budapest. In rural areas, older people sometimes have the possibility of 

subsistence farming. The share of poor pensioners in the Baltic States doubles the 

equivalent share in Western Europe.[9] People who in 1991 were in their mid-fifties also 

faced a heavy burden. This group has problems to find new jobs in the new economy and 

for this reason face a lower pension, as the newly established social security systems do 

not adapt quickly to the new situation during the transition period. The results are until 

today devastating. They often cannot afford medicine and other extraordinary expenses. 

But not only people who were in their mid-fifties at the beginning of the economic 

transition, but also people under 50 are threatens by poverty. These people do not have 

enough time to save money for their pension as they do not spend enough time in paid 

jobs. 

In general, poverty is an expression of being a ‚loser’ of the economic transition. In the 

beginning, the loss of purchasing power hit nearly everyone in these societies [11]. 

Therefore one cannot use this generalising term ‘loser’. 

According to United Nations data, poverty is widespread in the Baltic States. About 35 

% of the population has a purchasing power of less than 4 US-$. Relative poverty is a 

little bit less widespread. But children in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to the 

category of ‘relative poor’. Children poverty reflects between 40 and 50 % of all children 

in these countries in the beginning of the transition period. The economic transition 

shows first signs of growth in the middle of the nineties and the overall poverty 

decreases. But, the income gap according to the GINI-Index is tremendous. To offer a 

short summary. In the early nineties about 50 % of the population in these three countries 

belong to the losers of the transition due to low income. Nowadays the data are better but 

still, after a few years of economic boom-times, approximately 30 % of the population 

lives below the poverty line according to the data of UNICEF (referring to purchasing 

power parity). Actually we can find specific risks that can lead to poverty. Especially 

children are still a risk to become poor as a family. At the end of the nineties of the last 

century, about 50 % of families with three children or more are poor. If we refer to the 

minimum of four US-$ instead of two US-$, the results look better but still, for example 

in Latvia, 7 % of these families are poor. We can estimate that about 10 % of families 

with three and more children are poor [12]. 

Among the group of losers of the economic transition belong also professions that join a 

good reputation in soviet times and lost their attractiveness during the transition – 

professions that are worse paid also nowadays and that suffer a lack of qualified staff (e.g. 

nursery). But also jobs in the educational sector belong to the less paid and less attractive 

positions (e.g. teacher) or experience a decrease through the reduction in the state budget. 

The mentioned sectors in general experience a loss of quality [13] In the actual economic 

and financial crisis, these groups again suffer a decrease of their income [14].


In general, women do not belong to the winner of the transition [15]. After the end of 

propagated gender equality, their situation changed dramatically. Women are demote 

to the „traditional“ role in the households and excluded from employment [16]. A 

more conservative attitude about the place of women in the society, disguised in the 

Soviet Union, comes to light again. The situation improves, also due to better 

education of women, but the improvement is still small.[17] Until today, the gender 

related wage gap is one of the characteristic of the situation. In Estonia, women earn 

about 31 % less than men in similar professions, in Latvia 13 % and in Lithuania 21 

%. The European average is about 17 %.[18] Even the educational status of women 

improve, they still have difficulties to enter higher management positions. The 

reduction of kindergartens does not help women to escape from their classical role as 

mothers. Women were also not able to establish organisations with the power to 

support their (economic) interests – not to mention the representation in the 

parliaments, even in Latvia and Lithuania women entered positions as prime ministers 

and head of state [19]. 

4. Territories and the economic transition 

Not only individuals belong to the groups of winners and losers. Also towns and 

regions can be judged this way. The region of Riga has a double high GDP-per head 

share than the region of Latgale. The later one definitely suffers during the economic 

transition.[20] In other words: The more distant the towns and regions are from the 

capitals, the higher is the chance that they belong to the loser of the transition and the 

higher the socio-economic differences are. Differences between urban and rural areas 

are not unusual, but in transitional countries the results are migration and 

unemployment. The transition of the agricultural sector is rather unsuccessful in 

Central and Eastern Europe. In Lithuania the kolkhoz were splitted into farmings with 

an average size of 3 hectares – this size is only usable for subsistence farming. Until 

1995 the average size increases to 7 hectares. The weakness of farms in the Baltic 

States becomes more obvious if we keep in mind, that at the end of the last century, 

their productivity is 50 % below the level of 1989. The result is also a decrease of jobs 

in this sector [21], without a redistribution of rural jobs and internal migration [22]. 

The lack of profits makes the workforce in rural areas losers of the economic 

transition. Even after the EU-accession and promotion by the EU there are still huge 

differences in this sector. Producers of milk and meat products are the gainer of the 

new possibilities in the EU, while producers of pork do not belong to the winners. In 

contrast to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has a different economic structure. In 

Lithuania, agriculture is still an important sector of the economy [23]. 

To draw a conclusion, we can explain the reasons for the worse situation of rural areas. 

After the transition, family farming is the main method of farming. They have to take 

higher risks (workforce, investments, modernisation of farms) to prepare for the EUcommon 

market and standards. On the other hand, they have to organise this with nearly 

no capital. Another problem for the agricultural sector is, that through restitution, farms 

get into the hands of people without any idea what to do with this. This increases the rural 

problems. Many farms are inefficient and mainly subsistence farming [24]. This does not 

mean rural areas are doomed for eternity. Also rural areas can prosper, but this will need 

time and innovations.

504 

5. Conclusion 


It is on the one hand difficult to define exactly who belongs to the winners and losers of 

the economic transition in the Baltic States. I think I show some ways how to identify 

these groups. Next to the widespread approaches like income, I show that gender is also 

an approach to differentiate between the two groups. Also the place of living influences 

the individual situation and the classification as winners and losers. Here the difference is 

between the situation in urban and rural areas. Especially the urban areas with the capitals 

belong to the gainers of the economic transition. 

Even I refer to the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania I believe that these 

structures are transferable to the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. 

References 

1. Nugin, R., Onken, E.-C.: Defining success in a changing society: Self-evaluation and 

social reflections of a coming elite in the Baltic states, in: Journal of Baltic Studies, 

Vol.41, No.4 2010, pp.449-471, p.450. 



Vol.41, No.4 2010, pp.449-471, p.451f. 

3. Berend, I. T.: From the Soviet bloc to the European Union. The economic and social 

transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973, Cambridge University 

Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.244. 



Vol.41, No.4 2010, pp.449-471, p.455. 



Vol.41, No.4 2010, pp.449-471, p.454. 

6. http://news.err.ee/economy/2fdcde9f-6fcb-479b-82d9-d9bedc1b3226.Accessed: 

15.09.2012 

7. Gruber, D.: Zuhause in Estland? Eine Untersuchung zur sozialen Integration 

ethnischer Russen an der Außengrenze der Europäischen Union, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 

2008, p.171. 

9. Berend, Ivan T.: From the Soviet bloc to the European Union. The economic and 

social transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973, Cambridge 

University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.179. 

10. O’Connor, K.: The history of the Baltic states, Greenwood Publishing Group, 

London, 2003, p.183. 




13. Mart Laar claims that even he as the prime minister of Estonia lost a huge amount of 

his savings due to the collapse of the Estonian banking system in the early nineties. 

In: Laar, M.: Das estnische Wirtschaftswunder. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2002, 

p.117.





15. O’Connor, K.: The history of the Baltic states, Greenwood Publishing Group 

,London, 2003, p.183. 

16. http://news.err.ee/politics/44436b98-3e2c-45dc-8319-0045379926f3.Accessed: 

16.09.2012 

17. Kanopiene, V.: Women and the economy. In: LaFont, S. (Ed.): Women in transition. 

Voices from Lithuania, State University of New York Press, New York, 1998. S.68- 

80, p.79. 

18. Motiejunaite, A.: Female Employment in Lithuania. Testing three popular 

explanations, in: Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.41, Nr.2 2010, pp.237-258, p.237. 


London, 2003, p.185. 

20. http://www.bbn.ee (Estonians skeptical of gender quotas: 15.02.2011 / Eurostat: men 

in Estonia earn 31% more than women: 02.06.2011). Accessed: 16.09.2012 


London, 2003, p.185. 






Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 147, 149. 



Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.181.

506 

Remembrance in Time

PART I 

5. EUROPEAN PROJECT “PAST MEMORY FOR A FUTURE OPEN 

SOCIETY”

LIFE WITHOUT FREEDOM 

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN 

VELIKO-TARNOVO – BULGARIA 

Violeta STOYCHEVA 1 

Abstract: The paper aim is to do a short description of the actions developed in the frame of the 

International Conference "Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe – Hopes, Disappointments, 

Recapitulations". This event, organized at Veliko-Tarnovo University by the team of 

Contemporary History Department was sustained by the European project OPENNESS - "Past 

Memory for a Future Open Society". 

19th March 2012 – WELCOME DAY 

The first event of the OPENNESS project was held at the University of Veliko 

Tarnovo, BULGARIA (Annex 1 - Programme of the international meeting). 

On the first day of the workshop symbolic meeting of the guests was provided at the 

historic hill Tsarevets where in 12-14 century have been palaces of the Bulgarian kings. 

Veliko-Tarnovo – Past and future 


508 


Assist. Prof. Violeta Petrova, supported by specialist – guides from the Regional 

History Museum – Veliko Tarnovo and youth volunteers managed to show some of the 

memorable places of the host city, a symbol of the idea of historical continuity and 

intergenerational dialogue. 

After the cultural route, in the Hall of Business Hotel "Akvaya" was held Welcome 

meeting. On behalf of the hosts, guests were greeted by Assoc. Prof. Milen Mihov, 

deputy rector of the "St. Cyril and St. Methodius" University of Veliko Tarnovo and the 

head of the Department of Early-modern and Modern Bulgarian History. 

Veliko-Tarnovo – Organizational meeting 

The coordinators of the partner countries presented national teams participating in the 

project. Then Mr. Florentin Olteanu, President of Negru Voda Cultural Fondation, 

Romania, presented the conceptual design of the project. Prof. Elena Helerea, project 

coordinator, moderated plenary discussion, during which were discussed the planned 

activities on the project. 

20th March 2012 – PROJECT EVENTS 

The events of the international seminar program over the next two days were held in 

"Europe" Hall of the University of Veliko Tarnovo. 

The official opening of the Documentary exhibition "LIFE WITHOUT FREEDOM" 

started at 9:30 am. On behalf of the hosts welcome speech to the guests gave Assoc. Prof. 

Milen Mihov. Assist. Prof. Anka Ignatova submit the documents collected by the 

Bulgarian team with the support of the State Military Archive - V. Tarnovo, State 

Archive - V. Tarnovo and State Archive - Russe. The guests had opportunity to see 

original artifacts associated with repression and anticommunist resistance provided by 

state funds archival institutions, as well as personal documents of repressed from the 

region of Veliko Tarnovo.

Violeta STOYCHEVA: Life without Freedom 509 

Documentary exhibition "Life wthout Freedom" launching 

Professor Milen MIHOV – On the exhibition concept

510 

Documentary exhibition has sparked great interest 


The participants in international seminar examined and visiting exhibition "WAR IN 

THE AIR", prepared by a team from various institutions, including the Archives State 

Agency - Sofia, Sofia University and the State Security or of the intelligence services of 

the Bulgarian National Army resulted in rendering judgments. 

At 10.00 am Prof. Plamen LEGKOSTUP, Dr Hab., Rector of "St Cyril and St Methodius" 

University of Veliko Tarnovo, opened the conference on the theme: "Communist 

Regimes in Eastern Europe – Hopes, Disappointments, Recapitulations". Welcome 

speech to the participants gave Prof. Florentin Oltyanu, president of the Foundation 

"Negru Voda". Prof. Elena Helerea presented the program "Europe for Citizens" with the 

financial support that make this project. Assoc. Prof. Livia Sangeorzan announced the 

idea of a website of the project, with the voluntary participation of national teams to be 

presented, in addition to English and the languages of the partner countries. During the 

conference were presented 34 scientific papers. Except the project participants – from 

University of Veliko Tаrnovo, Transilvania University of Brasov и Casa Muresenilor 

Muzeum of Brasov (Romania), Federal Institute for Culture and History of German in 

Eastern Europe и Carl Von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (Germany) and Emlekpont 

Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely (Hungary), in the scientific forum was attended 

researchers, educators and professionals from Regional Museum of History – Veliko 

Tarnovo, Sofia University, New Bulgarian University – Sofia, HIS-BAS – Sofia, 

Archives State Agency – Sofia, National Academy of Art – Sofia and from Skopje, 

Macedonia. With its research performed and 3 students by created at the University of 

Tarnovo for project students Workshop "History and Memory".


Opening the Conference 

Debated and new considerations on the subject 

"Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe – Hopes, Disappointments, Recapitulations"

512 

Students’ communications and considerations 


The presented topics were combined into 3 thematic rounds: Power, Ideology, 

Community; Everyday life and Social changes and Living Memory of Communism. 

The reports of the participants were interesting, some of them – too controversial, as 

evidenced and lively discussions among the participants at the end of each panel. 

21nd March 2012 – PROJECT EVENTS 

In the morning session from 09.30 to 12.30 continued the work of the conference. In 

his epilogue Assoc. Prof. Milen Mihov proposed initiative that international scientific 

forum to get sustainability and conferences to become annual. 

At 14:00 pm was opened Documentary exhibition „Images from Communist Gulag – 

Radu Bercea”. Florentin Olteanu, President of Negru Voda Cultural Fondation, presented 

biographical information about the life and work of Romanian artist Radu Bercea (1959- 

1964), a former political prisoner. 

The exhibition put the bridge to the organized by hosts ROUND TABLE, moderated 

by Assist. Prof. Lora Doncheva. It was attended by the participation of politically 

repressed people, and children of persecuted by the communist regime. 

The meeting was very emotional. Besides to students and lecturers from different 

departments, interest to the event were shown and students from the Club for Oral History 

at PGEE "M. Lomonosov " in Gorna Oryahovitsa.


Intervention of Florentin OLTEANU, the president of Cultural Foundation Negru Vodă 

from Fagaras, on Radu Bercea – plastic artist and a former political prisoner between 

1959 – 1964. 

The poster of the International Conference "Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe – 

Hopes, Disappointments, Recapitulations", 19-22 March, Veliko – Târnovo, Bulgaria

514 


The poster of the exhibition Radu Bercea - Images From The Romanian Gulag, 

19 of March, 2012, Veliko – Târnovo, Bulgaria 

The students have received certificates of participation


Debates on the terror in communist regime 

Overall in the event participated 25 guests from abroad and more than 60 people from 

Veliko Tarnovo region and country - researchers and academics, museum workers and 

associates in archival institutions, teachers, students, pupils from the high school degree, 

repressed by the communist regime, children to victims of communist terror, and ordinary 

citizens (Annex 2 - List of participants in the meeting). 

In the evening participants in the seminar were able to see the show "Tsarevets - sound 

and light."

516 

22 March 2012 – CULTURE PROGRAMME 


At the end of the international meeting, the participants received a certificate of 

participation. Discussed the program for the next visit in May in Oldenburg, Germany. 

Violeta Petrova and Iliyana Gancheva did their best guests to be included in the 

celebrations of the Day of the town of Veliko Tarnovo. Special attention was paid to visit 

in Prison-Museum in Veliko Tarnovo, which was the site of repression in the mid 50-ies 

of the XX century. 

Due to the local and regional media event was widely reported and publicized among 

the local community in Veliko Tarnovo region and in other cities in North Bulgaria.

A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE – MEMORY, UNITY 

AND DIVERSITY 

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN 

OLDENDURG – GERMANY 

Jürgen TAEGER 1 


International Conference "A democratic Europe – memory, unity and diversity”". This event, 

organized at the Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, the Federal Institute for Culture and 

History of Germans in Eastern Europe and the Hanse Law School, was sustained by the European 

project OPENNESS - "Past Memory for a Future Open Society". 

From the 7 th May to the 10 th May 2012 the conference „A democratic Europe – 

memory, unity and diversity”, which was the 2 nd event of the European Project 

“OPENNESS – Past memory for a future open society“, was held in Oldenburg 

(Germany). The conference was organized by the Carl von Ossietzky University of 

Oldenburg, the Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe 

and the Hanse Law School. 39 local and 29 international persons participated in the 

conference, which took place at the Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans 

in Eastern Europe. 

After the arrival of the participants a reception of the Mayor of Oldenburg was prepared 

in the Town Hall of Oldenburg on 7 th May 2012. 

The conference was opened by Prof. Dr. Jürgen Taeger (Carl von Ossietzky University 

of Oldenburg – Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law), Hon.-Prof. 

Dr. Konrad Gündisch (Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern 

Europe; Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg – Department of History) and Prof. 

Dr.-Ing. Elena Helerea (Transilvania University of Brasov; Member of Negru Voda 

Cultural Foundation Fagaras). The conference was subdivided into four subject blocks: 

“Historical insights – opportunities and setbacks to personal freedom”, “In the process of 

democratization”, “European Union – Fundamental Rights” and “Minorities in Eastern 

Europe and beyond – Experiences and Perspectives”. All together the conference 

enclosed twenty presentations of local and international contributors. 

The subject block “Historical insights – opportunities and setbacks to personal freedom” 

enclosed the following presentations: “Inviolability of the private property as a main goal 

of the democratic society. Bulgarian experience after the adoption of Tarnovo`s 

constitution” by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nikolay Prodanov (University of Veliko Tarnovo), 

1 Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Carl von Ossietzky University of 

Oldenburg, Germany.

518 


“Democratic alternative for the development of Bulgaria, marked in the constitutional 

opposition projects (1946-1047)” by Assist. Prof. Dr. Lora Doncheva (University of 

Veliko Tarnovo), “Role of women and the changes of the family life in the communist 

period in Hungary” by Szilvia Sass (Emlékpont Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely) and 

“The GULAG through the eyes of a Hungarian survivor” by Péter Báló (Emlékpont 

Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely). 

The next subject block “In the process of democratization” enclosed the following 

presentations: “Past memory for a future open society – using a new web technology” by 

Ass. Prof. Dr. Livia Sangeorzan (Transilvania University of Brasov; Member of Negru 

Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras), “Democratic Macedonia – out of Tito`s grip” by 

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Milen Mihov (University of Veliko Tarnovo), “Homo Mnesicus Militans 

in the historical phase marked, dominately by Globalism of the open Era named 

Antropocen” by Prof. Dr. Liviu Alexandru Sofonea (Transilvania University of Brasov; 

Member of Negru Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras), “Wider public access to archive 

documents in Bulgaria during the time of European integration” by Assist. Prof. Dr. Anka 

Ignatova (University of Veliko Tarnovo) and “The EU as a Democracy-Inducing Agent: 

Evidence from Turkey” by Prof. Dr. Torsten J. Selck and Berna Öney (Carl von 

Ossietzky University of Oldenburg – Department of Social Sciences). 

The subject block “European Union – Fundamental Rights” enclosed the following 

presentations: “Protecting of Fundamental Rights – Respecting Pluralism of the Media” 

by Dr. Tim Torsten Schwithal (Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg – Department 

of Business Administration, Economics and Law), “Danish Cartoons Controversy: 

Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion in the Jurisprudence of the European 

Court of Human Rights” by Daniela Schmidt (Hanse Law School), “Europe united in 

freedom and diversity? The relevance of Art. 8 EHCR to the jurisprudence on the 

residence permit status of migrants” by Gregory Mouanga (Hanse Law School), “The 

European Union – An elitist project?” by Björn Hoops (Hanse Law School) and “The 

European Union`s Charter of rights: how much fundamental rights does a federation 

need?” by Prof. Dr. Gerhard Hoogers (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen). 

The final subject block “Minorities in Eastern Europe and beyond – Experiences and 

Perspectives” enclosed the following presentations: “Calvary of the German population 

from Fagaras Country after the II World War” by Prof. Florentin Olteanu (President of 

Negru Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras), “Values of Saxon civilization in the heritage 

of the Fagaras Museum” by Dr. Elena Bajenaru (Director of Tara Fagarasului Museum; 

Member of Negru Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras), “Perpetrators – Victims – Active 

Partners: The Germans of Romania between 1940 and 2011” by Hon.-Prof. Dr. Konrad 

Gündisch (Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe; Carl 

von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg – Department of History), “The German Minority 

in Czechoslovakia through the eyes of Wilson, Masaryk, Gandhi and Churchill” by 

Dr. Tobias Weger (Federal Institute for Culture and History of Germans in Eastern 

Europe; Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg – Department of History), “The 

integration of the Roma into the European Union” by Anja Schröder (Hanse Law School) 

and “Educational integration of minorities in Bulgaria” by Assist. Prof. Violetta Petrova 

(University of Veliko Tarnovo). 

During the conference the following exhibitions were opened: “Europe Today”, 

“Europe in Times of Pre-Illuminism” and “Images from Communist Gulag – Radu 

Bercea”, artist, former political prisoner in the period 1959-1964”.

Jürgen TAEGER: A Democratic Europe – Memory, Unity and Diversity 519 

On Europe Day, 9 th May 2012, an excursion to the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen was 

arranged. After a visit of the Europe Direct Information Centre including a presentation 

about the chances of regions in a unifying Europe, the participants of the conference were 

welcomed in the Town Hall of Bremen. 

Afterwards the participants were invited to visit the Research Centre for East European 

Studies, University of Bremen, where a presentation about the archive and library 

holdings on dissidents and repression in Communist Eastern Europe was held. 

The Europe Day was completed with a sightseeing of the historic centre of Bremen. The 

conference was closed by Prof. Dr. Jürgen Taeger, Hon.-Prof. Dr. Konrad Gündisch and 

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Elena Helerea on 10 th May 2012. 

Afterwards an excursion of the participants was arranged to the region of Ammerland 

including a visit of the town Bad Zwischenahn and a visit of a traditional nursery garden 

which is part of the company “Bruns Pflanzen-Export GmbH & CO. KG”. 

Images of the Oldenburg event 

Poster of the International Conference 

„A democratic Europe – memory, unity and diversity”, Oldenburg, 7-10 May 2012

520 


Active participation of the 

debates 

In front of the exhibition 

poster “Europe Today” 

Professor Liviu Sofonea 

presenting the exhibition 

“Radu Bercea - Images 

from Communist Gulag”

Jürgen TAEGER: A Democratic Europe – Memory, Unity and Diversity 521 

Visit to the Europe Direct Information Centre in Bremen 

Welcome to the participants of the conference in the Town Hall of Bremen 

Visit the Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen

522 

Excursion in the Ammerland region 

Remembrance in Time

MEMORY, RESPECT AND OPENNESS - 

EVENT ORGANIZED IN 

FĂGĂRAŞ – SÂMBĂTA, ROMANIA 

Elena HELEREA 1 , Florentin OLTEANU 2 


event organized in Romania and sustained by the European project “OPENNESS- Past Memory 

for a Future Open Society". This event, organized in the period 1 – 6 August 2012 by Negru Vodă 

Cultural Foundation of Făgăraş, Transilvania University of Brasov, Casa Mureşenilor Museum of 

Braşov, Civil Society Associaton, comprised many activities, all developed under the slogan 

Memory, Respect and Openness, involving the citizens and young people in reflecting upon the 

causes and the consequences yielded by the values destruction and distortion during the period of 

the communist regime set within East-European countries. 

Introduction 

The event held between 1-6 August, 2012 in Romania, and supported by the European 

project "OPENNESS - Past Memory for a Future Open Society", was a complex one, 

including: 

- The International Symposium with the topic “Communist Regimes – Recent 

Memory for an Open Society” held in Făgăraş and at the Constantin Brâncoveanu 

Academy in Sâmbăta de Sus; 

- The summer school, organized as a workshop and documentation visits, the 

participants being invited people of the Symposium and pupils and students from 

Făgăraş and Braşov; 

- The itinerant exhibition "Memory, Respect, Openness” launching. 

To these activities have participated professors, historians, curators, witnesses of the 

terror during the communist regime instauration, and descendants of those who suffered 

from the terror during the communist regime instauration, in total, 59 local partners, 10 

partners from Bulgaria, 7 from Hungary, 7 from Germany and 5 guests from Moldova. 

International Symposium with the topic “Communist Regimes – Recent Memory for 

an Open Society” 

The Symposium was held between 1-3 August, 2012. On 1-st August, 2012, took place 

the opening of the Symposium, organized in Făgăraş city, at the Festive Hall (Room Diet) 



524 


of the Făgăraş Fortress 3 . On this event have attended guests from abroad, representatives 

of local authorities and of Negru Voda Cultural Foundation and a large audience: 

students, professors and other guests. 

The meeting, chaired by Professor Florentin Olteanu - President of the Negru Voda 

Cultural Foundation Fagaras, started with the presentation of the event and participants 

from Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Moldova and Romania. The Mayor of the Fagaras 

City, Constantin Sorin MĂNDUC welcomed the guests with good wishes, a fruitful 

activity and a pleasant staying in Fagaras, recommending some unique sights in the area. 

Professor Dr. Eng. Elena Helerea made a brief presentation of the project „OPENNESS- 

Live Memory for an Open Society”. 

The presentation was followed by a brief artistic program supported by the Românaşi 

choral group, led by Professor Mioara Marinca. 

The Symposium participants’ accommodation was made at the Constantin Brancoveanu 

Academy in Sâmbăta de Sus, in the magnificent mountain scenery in which is placed the 

famous monastic complex of the Sâmbăta Monastery. 

The official opening of the symposium "Communist regimes - Recent Memory for an 

Open Society", which took place on the morning of August 2-nd, benefited from the 

presence and opening word of the representative partners and organizer institutions: Prof. 

Florentin Olteanu, Prof. Dr. Elena Helerea, Dr. Cosmin Budeancă as representative of the 

Civil Society Association, Father Michael from the Brancoveanu Academy, Octavian 

Bjoza from the Association of Former Political Prisoners of Romania. 

The translation was provided by Professor Mariana Streza and by the university lecturer 

Dr. Mihaela Popescu. 

The papers were held in plenary and on sections, with a complex topic: 

I –Communist regimes - Repression and resistance 

II –Policies of the communist regimes 

III –The memory museums of the communism 

IV –United Europe - Memory, Respect and Open. 

A total of 37 communications were presented by participants from Romania. The 

participants from abroad have made a significant contribution: 5 communications from 

Hungary, 5 communications from Bulgaria, 3 communications from Germany, and 4 

communications from Moldova. 

With interventions and debates attended the guests from the partner institutions of the 

project OPENNESS: Negru Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras, Transilvania University 

of Braşov, Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the 

Romanian Exile, respectively Civil Society Association Museum, Casa Muresenilor - 

3 The Fagaras Fortress had a troubled history: Between September 1950 - April 1960 were 

imprisoned here over 4000 former employees of the Information Services, State Security and 

Gendarmerie, military magistrates and diplomats. Between the walls of the majestic medieval 

monument were also imprisoned many citizens of the city, arrested by the Security because they 

supported the anticommunist resistance from the mountains and the participation of other forms of 

opposition to the country communization. Specific to the Fagaras prison is that most of the 

prisoners were considered "lagaristi", meaning imprisoned without trials and no convictions. As a 

result of the inhumane conditions of detention, 166 people have died here, belonging to all these 

socio-professional categories: generals, officers and NCOs, officers, peasants and workers.

Elena HELEREA et al.: Memory, Respect and Openness -Event Organized in Făgăraş ... 

Brasov. As chairmen, a special contribution in the symposium progress was brought by 

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Livia Sangeorzan and by Curator Ovid Savu. 

The 5 guests from Chisinau, Republik of Moldavia represented prestigious institutions: 

Institute of Cultural Heritage of the Moldova and Institute for Encyclopedia Studies of the 

Moldova of the Academy of Sciences, Museum of Ethnography and Natural History and 

the National School of Political and Administrative Studies. 

The 18 participants invited from Romania represented renowned institutions from 

Romania: National Council for the Security Archives Study, Romanian Academy in 

Timisoara Branch and George BariŃiu Institute of History from Cluj - Napoca, Faculty of 

History from the University of Bucharest, Spiru Haret University, Bucharest, Babes- 

Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of History from the University of Oradea, 

Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Baptist Theological Institute of Bucharest, 

Romanian Navy Museum from Constanta, Valer Literat Museum of Fagaras, Stephen 

Odobleja Foundation from Drobeta-Turnu Severin. 

Upon completion of the Symposium, a plenary session was held in which were scored 

the Symposium conclusions: 

- The symposium brought together participants from five European countries: Romania, 

Moldova, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany; 

- Through the addressed topics, by the discussions of the 8 sections of the Symposium, 

it can be said that the Symposium objectives were accomplished; 

- Relevant results were presented regarding the investigation of the period for 

communist regime instauration in Central and Eastern Europe. 

- The participants acknowledged the need for respect of human rights and the rule of 

law, to promote the fundamental values recognized today by all Europeans. 

The summer school 

In parallel with the Symposium, the summer school was held as a workshop and 

documentation visits. 

The organizing of the workshop started from the premise that the understanding and the 

knowledge of the recent past leads to a thorough understanding of the present realities 

and of the need for human rights and the rule of law, of the social cohesion in terms of 

equal opportunities and elimination of discrimination of any kind based on nationality, 

language, religion, gender, race and disability. 

Under the title „Memory and History - Generations in Dialogue”, the workshop was 

organized in two sessions as communication and debate, following: 

- A better understanding of the Stalinist period by young people to enable them to reflect on 

the illegitimate and criminal nature of the Communist regime in Eastern European space; 

- Awareness of the destructive nature of the oppressive regimes and the need to defend 

democratic values. 

There were emotional meetings, interviews with witnesses and victims of the repressive 

communist system, survivors and descendants of the anticommunist resistance. 

The president of the Association of Former Political Prisoners in Romania, Octav Bjoza 

impressed with his memories from the hell of the communist prisons. 

Heated debates provoked the testimonies of dramatic destinies of some famous 

personalities: Stefan Odobleja, Alexandru Herlea, Radu Bercea and others, cited by Elena 

Helerea, Liviu Sofonea, Cristian Raul Vintilă, Stefan Odobleja jr., Gheorghe Mihai, 

Lucretia Olteanu, Laura LeluŃiu and Ovidiu Savu. 

525

526 


The communications of the young researchers from Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary - 

Anasztazia Kerekes, Péter Blazovich, Mariya Atanasova Zhelyazkova, Nedyalko 

Stoyanov, Haneberg Lars - have completed the workshop discussions. 

A first study visit was organized in Dragus village, famous for preserving the traditions, 

but also for the changes arise out of the modernization projects with European funding 

application, and it was an unique moment through the warm reception of the diligent 

hosts, beauty of the place and the way of preserving traditions in the modernizing 

conditions for raising the standard of civilization. 

Have impressed the pride of the locals for the beauty of this village located at the foot of 

the Fagaras Mountains, with wide streets and elegant houses, crossed by creeks with clear 

waters. The locals are, rightly, proud of the history, traditions, unique costumes and crafts 

that have made them famous. The same pride is felt in their exploit of the local resources 

projects for creating a tourist area with hostels, lodges, workshops, ski slope etc. The 

participants were welcomed to the new Tourist Information Centre and they received 

leaflets, brochures, maps and CDs on Dragus tourist area and surroundings. 

The school from Drăguş impressed with nice and useful arranged classes with modern 

means of education, library and village museum. A special moment, agreed by all guests 

from Romania and abroad, was when the hosts invited them to wear the beautiful 

costumes from Dragus, the pictures preserving the warm atmosphere of the visited places. 

Dragus visit ended on the household of the well known craftsmen Ana and Dumitru 

Sofonea. Ana Sofonea is known for the beauty of the traditional costumes that she swes 

with artistry, and Dumitru Sofonea is one of the most famous furrier from Fagaras. Both 

have participated, over the years, in numerous exhibitions, in the country and abroad, 

organized by the Village Museum in Bucharest, bringing numerous awards and 

international recognition. 

On 4th of August 2012, a documentation visit to the objectives of Sibiu – European 

Capital City in 2007 was proposed, dedicated to the knowledge of Transylvanian 

traditions of culture and civilization. 

During the visit to Sibiu German Forum a dialogue with the subject of “German 

civilization values in Romania – Calvary suffered by ethnic German population during 

the communist establishment "and „Sibiu-European Cultural Capital” was held. 

Mr. Helmut Lerner, head of the Cultural Department of the Forum, supported by 

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Adrian Mailat, presented special ome considerations regarding the image 

in time of the Saxons ,important Transylvanian community with a history of over 850 

years. The images on Saxon fortified churches, Saxon settlements which blends 

harmoniously into the natural landscape and the institutions that governed social relations 

within society have impressed. The Saxon community was a model for other communities 

with who have lived in harmony, building together the Transylvanian civilization. 

The issue of the Saxons’ painful deportation in the Soviet Union after World War II and 

the grave violations of human rights and standards of living by the Nazism and Stalinism 

were also addressed. It was emphasized that Europe must be united, a state must never be 

abandoned to the totalitarian terror and war. ,,This should never happen again "- it is an 

expression of hope, after the horrors and sufferings caused by war. 

The program continued with a visit to the famous National Museum of History and Art, 

Brukenthal. The History Museum arranged in the Altemberger House, Palace Brukenthal 

art collections – The European Art Galleries with its famous masterpieces of the 

Brukenthal collection were visited and at the Blue House could be admired the Romanian 

Art Gallery. Brukenthal Museum impressed by the exceptional value of its heritage of art 

and its enhancement in Europe.


The Sibiu presence ended with a visit at the Popular Technology Museum which is a 

part from ASTRA National Complex Museum in Sibiu, one of the largest outdoor 

museums in Romania that includes creations of Romanian pre-industrial civilization of 

the traditional folk. The Museum visitors were impressed by the wide variety of topics: 

grain mills, presses, ovens, whirlpool, pive of cloth, hydraulic saws and popular industrial 

installations. 

The itinerant exhibition release "Memory, Respect, Openness” 

The itinerant Exhibition "Memory, Respect, Openness” was conceived as a complex of 

exhibitions, which were developed during the 4 events organized within the project 

OPENNESS: 

• The first step was the one from the University St. Kiril and Metodius from Veliko 

Tarnovo, where the opening of the documentary exhibition "Life without Freedom" 

was officially lounched. Alongside this exhibition was presented and the exhibition 

organized by the Foundation of Fagaras Negru Voda "Images from Communist 

Gulag” with peintures of Radu Bercea, plastic artist, former political prisoner in the 

period 1959-1964. 

• The second stage was held in Oldenburg – Germany in the day of 8 May, by 

launching the exhibition "Europe Today", next to the two exhibitions: "Life without 

Freedom" (from Bulgaria) and "Images from Communist Gulag - Radu Bercea” 

(from Romania). 

• The opening of the Fagaras exhibition was held at the NegruVodă Cultural 

Foundation of Făgăraş on 1-st August 2012. The exhibits of the well known artist 

Radu BERCEA were presented by Prof. Lucretia Olteanu and Prof. Florentin 

Olteanu. The participants from the opening exhibition and also the visitors were 

impressed, many of them rediscovering the painful realities evoked by the repressive 

communist system survivors, found also in the exhibition of the Radu Bercea artist. 

• The itinerant exhibition was lunched also at the event organized at the Emlékpont 

Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary, where were reunit components of the 

exhibitions organized in Veliko Tarnovo, Oldemburg and Fagaras. 

To note that Emlékpont Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely will organize in 2013 a special 

exhibition with Radu Bercea peintures with „Images from Communist Gulag”. 

The interest of guests was captured and the muzeizare experimental model of the 

Fagaras anticommunism resistance ,Repression and terror in Fagaras 1945-1960 ", 

conducted by Negru Voda Fagaras Cultural Foundation. 

The day of 5th August 2012 

This day was dedicated to knowing the Monachal Complex - Brancoveanu Monastery 

and Constantin Brâncoveanu Academy, traditional spiritual center of Fagaras, and then 

thematic tour in the Fagaras Mountains. 

At the Brâncoveanu Monastery were visited the Library and the Museum of the Bishop 

Antonie Plămădeală, both including several independent documents about the history and 

culture of the Balkans, and numerous collections of objects collected largely by the 

Bishop Antonie Plămădeală. In the vicinity of the Monastery was visited the traditional 

crafts fair. 

527

528 


After lunch, the thematic trip in the Fagaras mountains was organized, following the 

partisans who fought against the Communism instauration. 

The trip with the bus on the most spectaculos road in the mountain „Transfagarasan” to 

the Balea Fall continued with the cableway to the Balea Lake. From this altitude Fagaras 

takes place in a wonderful panoramic alive map. In these dominant places, hard to reach, 

the young anticommunism fighters have found a refuge. 

The day of 6th August 2012 

In this day the final meeting was held, in which, were presented the conclusions of the 

organized actions. There were awarded the participation diplomas. 

An emotional moment was the closing word of vice-rector Assoc.Prof. Dr. Mihail 

Mihoc from the St. Kiril and St. Metodius University of Veliko Tarnovo, that handed to 

the President of Negru Voda Cultural Foundation Fagaras a painting with the images of 

the Veliko Tarnovo town, as a sign of friendship of the guests from abroad. Additions 

were made to the final program event of the project OPENNESS, held in September in 

Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary. 

The opening of the Symposium, organized in Făgăraş city, at the Festive Hall (Room 

Diet) of Fagaras County Museum


Opening word of Octavian Bjoza,the president of the Association of Former Political 

Prisoners in Romania 

Prof. Dr. Liviu Sofonea and Father Michael from the Brancoveanu Academy 

at the plen session of Symposium 

529

530 

Participants to the sesion of International Symposium 

Invited people are impresed by the symposium communications 

Remembrance in Time


Debates during the workshop organized in the frame of Summer school 

Bulgarian team at the workshop 

531

532 

The itinerant Exhibition "Memory, Respect, Openness” launching 


Debateaat tne launching the Exhibition "Memory, Respect, Openness”


The hosts invited gusete to wear the beautiful costumes from Dragus 

Visit to Cistercian Monastity of Cartisoara, on the rute of Sibiu visit 

533

534 

On the rute of Fagaras mountains, 

where the anticommunism fighters have found a refuge 

Remembrance in Time

REMEMBRANCE IN TIME. 

MEMORIAL MUSEUMS 

THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN 

HÓDMEZİVÁSÁRHELY - HUNGARY 

Szilvia SASS 1 


International Colloquium "Remembrance in time – memorial museums”. This event, organized at 

Emlékpont Museum of Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary, was sustained by the European project 

OPENNESS - "Past Memory for a Future Open Society". 

The fourth event of the OPENNESS project was held at the Emlékpont Museum of 

Hódmezıvásárhely. The guests, arriving at the conference, were received by Csaba 

Markó – the Head of the Cabinet Office, in the ceremonial hall of the Town Hall. After 

the speech of Mr. Markó, Péter Blazovich – the Managing Director of Emlékpont, Elena 

Helerea – the Member of Negru Voda Foundation and Professor Liviu Alexandru 

Sofonea told the words of welcome. 

1 Emlékpont Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely, Hungary.

536 

In the ceremonial hall of the Town Hall of Hódmezıvásárhely 


The participants of the conference arrived at the museum by 10 a.m. on the 4 th of 

September, and after the words of welcome by Gábor Vincze (the Head of the Historians 

of the Emlékpont Museum) and Elena Helerea, Szilvia Sass gave a guided tour on the 

permanent exhibition. 

After a short coffee break at 11:55 the participants started to hold their presentations 

related to the topic of the conference: “Remembrance in time – Memorial Museums”. 

In the first panel the presentations were related to the activity and materials of 

museums, representing the communist period.

Szilvia SASS: Remembrance in Time – Memorial Museums 537 

After the first panel the participants had lunch, and then the communications went on. 

The topic of the presentations of the second panel was the teaching and researching 

methods and possibilities of the communist past. 

Communications and debates in the colloquium

538 


In the third part of the day the past was approached from economic and political 

aspects. 

On the event of Hódmezıvásárhely there were 26 communications held. On the behalf 

of the Emlékpont Péter Blazovich talked about the researching possibilities of the 

communist past at the archives; Péter Báló’s presentation was about the White Guard 

Movement; Tamás Mészáros spoke about the persecution of the local kulaks. 

Anasztázia Kerekes held her presentation about the economic role of Hungary within 

Europe. There were further three presentations held by the colleagues of the Emlékpont: 

Collective Persecution of the Hungarian Minorities of the Carpathian Basin (by Gábor 

Vincze); The Teaching Methods of the Socialist Hungary (by Csilla Gál) and the 

Hungarian Internment Camps (by Szilvia Sass). 

Students attending the communication on the Stakhanovist movement 

Further five local people held their communication, and there was also a presentation by 

Martijn Mollema – a student from the Amsterdam University. 

The participants of the conference from Germany, Bulgaria and Romania also held very 

interesting and useful communications. 

The second day of the program was organized around the traditions: in the morning the 

participants of the conference visited the pottery workshop of Sándor Ambrus. 

After lunch – to 3 p.m. the guests could listen to several case studies, for example about 

Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, or the fate of the Hungarian citizens of Bulgaria after 1944. After the 

communications Péter Báló and Szilvia Sass guided the participants in Hódmezıvásárhely: 

the guests visited the Synagogue, the Kossuth Square, the Tornyai Museum and the local 

skanzen at the end. The dinner of the day of traditions consisted of specialties of the 

Hungarian cuisine.


On Thursday the museum-teaching was in the main role: in the morning two classes of 

the local high-schools visited the conference room of the Emlékpont. There were two 

programs for them: the first was a presentation about the Stakhanovist movement by 

Szilvia Sass. The second class participated on a discussion with three guests, who 

participated in the revolution of 1956 at Hódmezıvásárhely. The participants of the 

discussion were Dr. Lajos Csoma, Dr. László Szappanos and Dr. György Szappanos – 

they talked about the events of the revolution of 1956 in Hódmezıvásárhely, the 

retaliations and their life after the revolution. The discussion was moderated by Tamás 

Mészáros. 

In the afternoon there were some more communications, and then Tamás Mészáros held 

a guided tour at the temporary exhibition (Detected Arts) of the museum. 

In front of Emlékpont Museum

540 

Guiding the visitors in Emlékpont Museum 

Studying the concept of museum 

Remembrance in Time


Ivan – the soviet soldier 

Remembrance in time

542 


The conference was closed by Elena Helerea – the main organizer of the project. She 

summarized the events and conclusions of the four conferences and told the tasks that 

should be executed after the conference. 

The cultural actions have been organized in the last day of the event: visit to Emlékpont 

Museum and the Móra Ferenc Museum. 

Bulgarian team at Móra Ferenc Museum 

Visiting the Móra Ferenc Museum

OPENNESS - 

A NEW WEB DEVELOPMENT 

USING MODERN WEB TECHNOLOGIES 

Livia SANGEORZAN, Elena HELEREA 1 

Abstract: Inside the project Action 4 - Active European Remembrance aiming at preserving the 

sites and archives associated with de deportations as well as the commemorating of victims of 

Nazism and Stalinism - Past Memory for a Future Open Society with the Acronym: OPENNESS, it 

was developed a WEB application, called OPENNESS, which present information (documents and 

images) regarding the implementation of the actions developed for strengthening the 

understanding and developing the human values, in the democracy spirit and integration in a 

Europe United. The WEB application is designed in five languages (Romanian, English, 

Bulgarian, Germany and Hungary) with the possibility that every partner can read the information 

posted in their own native language. The design of the WEB site was realized taking into account 

the partners desires. The logo (from the graphic perspective) of the WEB site was designed to 

suggest the semantic load of the existing information inside the website and is one that was took 

from the project REMEMBER - Keep Alive The Past Memory for the Future, which benefited by 

financial support from the European Union, in the same framework, the program “Europe for 

Citizen”. Openness project is a continuation of this project REMEMBERS. 

The application is a dynamic website that was developed using modern technologies like HTML5, 

CSS3, XML, PHP and jQuery. 

Within the project OPENNESS - Past Memory for a Future Open Society, developed in 

the frame of the program Europe for Citizen, Action 4 - Active European Remembrance, 

aiming at preserving the sites and archives associated with de deportations as well as the 

commemorating of victims of Nazism and Stalinism, a web application called 

“Openness” was proposed. 

The project was developed under the slogan “Remembrance, Respect, Openness” and 

present information (documents and images) to make the young people and not only 

them, to reflect upon the causes and the consequences yielded by the values destruction 

and distortion during the period of the communist regime set within East-European 

countries. 

The design of the WEB site was realized taking into account the partners desires. The 

logo (from the graphic perspective) of the WEB site was designed to suggest the semantic 

load of the existing information inside the website and is one that was took from the last 

project REMEMBER - Keep Alive The Past Memory for the Future, which benefited by 

financial support from the European Union, in the same framework, the program “Europe 

for Citizen”. In fact, Openness project is a continuation of this project REMEMBER. 

1 Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania.

544 


In order to be accessed and transmitted the information to several groups of people, with 

different ages and cultures, the Web site is designed in the four languages of the project, 

corresponding to the country partners (Romanian, Bulgarian, Germany and Hungary), and 

in English, the official language of the project. 

For the conversion of the text written in English, in the native language, each partner 

has the opportunity to use directly the provided XML file (Fig.1). The XML (EXtensible 

Markup Language) permits to create common information formats and also to share both 

the format and the data on the World Wide Web [8]. For our Web site, we find a common 

way to give the translation in the 4 native languages with XML, so we can share 

information in a consistent way. 

The four events developed in each partner country: Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and 

Romania are presented in a suggestive mode, including in the Web site pictures from each 

event. 

The markup language HTML5 permits to structure the content of a Website and to 

present it in an elegant manner. HTML5 is the fifth revision of the HTML standard. 

HTML5 adds many new syntactic features, like the new , and 

elements and also other new elements, such as , , 

and , that allow to enrich the semantic content of documents. 

The structure of the Website OPENNESS respects the new standard programming 

language HTML5 (HyperText Markup Language), for describing the contents and 

appearance of Web pages (text and graphic images) regarding how this will be displayed 

and interacts with other elements in the Web site [8]. 

The name of each country are listed in the navigation bar. For each country a drop-down 

list is open with two elements, namely: the event which took place in that location and 

photos of the event. 

The data for the four events are shown: 

� International Symposium Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe – Hopes, 

Disappointment, Recapitulations and Exhibition Life without freedom, that took place 

in Bulgaria, in the period 19 – 22 March 2012, at St. Cyril and St. Methodius 

University, Veliko-Tarnovo (Bulgaria); 

� Colloquium and Exhibition A Democratic Europe – Remembrance, Unity and 

Cultural Diversity, Also, Celebration of Europe Day – 9 May 2012, that took place in 

Germany, in the period 7 – 10 May 2012, at Carl Von Ossietzky University, 

Oldenburg; 

� International Symposium Communist Regimes – Past Memory for an Open Society 

and Exhibition Memory, Respect, Openness, that took place in Romania, in the period 

1 – 6 August 2012, at Fagaras – Sambata de Sus; 

� Colloquium Anti-Communist Resistance in Museums and Memorials and 

Documentary visit, that took place in Hungary, in the period 3 – 7 September 2012, at 

EmlekPoint Museum, Hódmezıvásárhely. 

To mark the best stages of the events, we realized here a dropdown list which includes 

the following aspects: poster from the event, the program of the event, the list of 

international participants, and the list of local participants and how on make the 

dissemination of the event (Fig.2 - Fig.5).

Livia SANGEORZAN et al.: OPENNESS - A New Web Development … 545 

The element dissemination from the list opens also a drop-down list that contains all the 

important newspapers, in which on present the significant moments from this event (Fig.3). 

Photos from events are structured by days in the period when the event took place. Photos 

from events are structured in conference photos and photos from the locations visited during 

the event (Fig.4, Fig.5). Each set of photos are insert in an interesting photo gallery, which is 

built with facilities offered by CSS3 and jQuery (Fig.6, Fig.7). 

CSS3 ( Cascading Style Sheet) attaches a style, an aspect for a HTML document. 

jQuery is a free and open source JavaScript library that is used to navigate HTML 

documents, handle events and perform animations. 

The application is a dynamic website that was developed using technologies HTML5, 

CSS3, PHP, XML and jQuery. The application uses at implementation level the server 

application PHP. The language PHP has a special flexibility which permits to be used 

with other technologies. 

These languages/technologies make possible to obtain remarkable results. 

The written application in PHP is posted on a Web server and is accessible to any 

visitors. 

The site is so constructed such that one can add new information anytime by the 

administrator. 


Many thanks to Mr. George G. Sangeorzan from Hillside Product Design Ltd, Teignmouth, 

U.K, Product Designer, for creating the logo of the site. 

Also, many thanks to Mr. George A. Urs, student from University Transilvania of Brasov, 

Faculty of Mathematics and Informatics, Applied Informatics in German language, for the 

participation to the design of the site. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. Tim O’Reilly (2006), Web 2.0 Compact Definition: Trying Again. Retrieved on 

2007-01-20. 

2. L. Sangeorzan, Web Tehnologies and Web Design, Printing House of Transilvania 

Universitaty of Brasov, 2009, ISBN 978-973-598-523-3. 

3. L. Sângeorzan, C. L. Aldea, Internet Technologies, 2003, pg. 160, ISBN 

973-635-176-9. 

4. L. Welling, L. Thomson, PHP and MySQL Web Development, Sams Publishing, 

USA, 2001, ISBN 0- 672-31784-2. 

5. J. Greenspan, B. Bulger, MySQL/ PHP Database Applications, M&T Books, ISBN 

0-7645-3537-4. 

6. L. Sângeorzan, The Bearing Quality Inspected with a Software Based on Web 

Technologies, The 6-th International DAAAM Baltic Conference Industrial 

Engineering, 24-26 April 2008, Tallin, Estonia, pg. 171-182, ISBN 978-9985-59- 

783-5. 

7. E. Helerea, G. Mailat, F. Olteanu, Calvary –Deportations and Destinies, 

International Symposium’s Proceedings, 22-26 July 2010, Făgăraş, România, pg.307, 

ISBN 978-973-754-7. 

8. http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/definition/XML

546 

9. http://www.remember.negruvoda.ro/ 


Fig.1. The XML files to translate the acronym in Romanian language and 

Bulgarian language 

Fig.2. The first event in Bulgaria: 

”Life without freedom” 

Fig.3. The dissemination for the event in 

Bulgaria

Livia SANGEORZAN et al.: OPENNESS - A New Web Development … 547 

Fig.4. The mode of organization of photos from the events that took place in Bulgaria and 

Oldenburg 

Fig.5. The mode of organization of photos from the events that took place in Romanian and 

Hungary

548 

Fig.6. Photo gallery from Bulgarian and Germany events 

Fig.7. Photo gallery from Romanian and Hungary events 

Remembrance in Time

PART II 


COMMUNIST REGIMES – 

RECENT MEMORY FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY (in Romanian language) 

PARTEA II 

Lucrari susŃinute la Simpozionul InternaŃional 

REGIMURILE COMUNISTE – 

MEMORIE RECENTĂ PENTRU O SOCIETATE DESCHISĂ

DOSARELE DE ARHIVĂ – 

SURSE DE CERCETARE A PROBLEMEI 

LICHIDĂRII LĂCAŞELOR DE CULT DIN 

RSSM 

Manole BRIHUNEł 1 

Ultimul timp în atenŃia cercetătorilor din domeniul istoriei au intrat numeroase dosare 

anterior secrete, care au reliefat numeroase probleme cu care s-a confruntat biserica 

moldovenească în timpul regimului comunist. GraŃie documentelor de arhivă, a 

memoriilor participanŃilor la evenimente, literaturii de specialitate, putem contura câteva 

etape de închidere a bisericilor. Astfel, în 1918–1940, ia amploare deosebită lichidarea 

bisericilor parohiale din satele din stânga Nistrului, adaptarea clădirilor la nevoile 

gospodăreşti, arderea cărŃilor şi distrugerea icoanelor. După 28 iunie 1940 are loc şi prima 

tentativă de închidere a mănăstirilor basarabene, comunitatea monahală de la Frumoasa 

fiind lichidată. 

După posibilitatea redeschiderii unor lăcaşuri de cult în 1941–1944, biserica 

moldovenească cunoaşte cel de-al doilea val de lichidare masivă a bisericilor şi 

mănăstirilor, 1944–1963. Cel mai mare „avânt” în lupta cu credinŃa a fost înregistrat în 

1959–1960. Unele comunităŃi au opus o rezistenŃă specifică, mai cu seamă monahiile de 

la Răciula. Fiecare biserică şi mănăstire a avut o soartă aparte, dosare întregi de lichidare, 

fiind invocate motive ideologice, economice şi politice de constrângere şi denaturare. 

Dosarele de arhivă vin în ajutorul cercetătorului implicat în studiul problemei anunŃate. În 

dese cazuri, ele permit completarea informaŃiilor privind modalitatea de lichidare, 

utilizarea edificiului de colhozul din localitate, soarta dificilă a preotului paroh sau 

stareŃul mănăstirii, care au stat chiar şi în arest la domiciliu sau ajungându-se la 15 ani de 

detenŃie (stareŃa mănăstirii Răciula). Un interes aparte denotă modificarea aspectului 

arhitectural al bisericilor, mănăstirilor, stăreŃiei şi a chiliilor. Totodată, graŃie dosarelor de 

arhivă şi a imaginilor anexate, a fost posibilă identificarea aspectului unor edificii de cult 

distruse irecuperabil. 

Din start menŃionăm că în prezent cercetătorii apelează la dosarele privind perioada 

sovietică, păstrate în fondurile Arhivei NaŃionale a Republicii Moldova (ANRM) şi a 

Arhivei OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova (AOSPRM), care şi 

reprezintă majoritatea covârşitoare a documentelor. Accesul istoricilor şi al teologilor la 

dosarele din fondurile 2848, 3305, 3046 din ANRM şi fondul 51 din AOSPRM a devenit 

posibil graŃie procesului de democratizare din Ńară, recent desecretizate şi deschise pentru 

1 Muzeul de Etnografie şi Istorie Naturală din Chişinău, Republica Moldova 

549

cercetare. O problemă apărută odată cu deschiderea accesului la dosarele secrete este 

tratarea lor adecvată şi corespunzătoare, reieşind din mai mulŃi factori, politic, economic, 

religios sau cultural. De un real folos în restabilirea istoricului vieŃii bisericeşti din 

perioada sovietică îl prezintă la fel memoriile persoanelor care au avut de trecut prin 

calvarul intimidării, lichidării lăcaşelor sfinte, persecutări etc. DiscuŃiile cu feŃele 

bisericeşti, călugării şi călugăriŃele mănăstirilor lichidate, simpli Ńărani care au reuşit să 

păstreze vreo icoană sau carte liturgică în timp ce toate odoarele erau aruncate în foc, au 

extins substanŃial subiectul nostru de cercetare. 

Totodată, numeroase documente privind funcŃionarea bisericilor şi mănăstirilor în 

perioada sovietică se păstrează în arhiva curentă a Mitropoliei Moldovei, care deşi nu este 

atât de numeroasă cantitativ, oferă informaŃii preŃioase şi concrete la tema abordată. 

Pornind de la sursele disponibile în prezent cercetătorilor din domeniul istoriei, ne 

propunem să schiŃăm câteva probleme legate de istoria şi arta ecleziastică, restabilirea 

cărora în acea perioadă zbiuciumată a fost posibilă exclusiv în baza dosarelor de arhivă 

din fondurile menŃionate anterior. Astfel, valoarea documentelor de arhivă creşte odată cu 

informaŃiile prezentate în filele dosarelor, variind de la simple scrisori ale locuitorilor de 

la sate pentru a nu li se închidă biserica la rapoarte ale împuterniciŃilor administraŃiei 

sovietice privind activitatea pe teren, lucrul ideologic etc. În sfânta naivitate că 

fărădelegile sunt făcute de administraŃia locală fără ştirea conducerii supreme, unele 

stareŃe a mănăstirilor care urmau să fie lichidate, semnau scrisori menŃionând că vor fi 

„ascultătoare şi supuse”. Au fost documentate cazuri când s-au scris cereri chiar şi în 

adresa comandantului Kliment Voroşilov sau Nikita Hruşciov, în speranŃa că vor 

soluŃiona problema lichidării lăcaşelor de cult, iar în telegrama de condolenaŃe în 1953 la 

moartea lui Stalin, ultimul fusese apreciat de clerul şi enoriaşii din RSSM drept 

„conducător iubit, edificator înŃelept a binelui poporului, învăŃător” şi respectiv, „lipsa de 

cuvinte pentru a-şi exprima profundul regret şi jalea care a copleşit întreaga Ńară...” 

(semnat: Nectarie, episcop de Chişinău şi a Moldovei) 1 . 

De altfel, pentru fiecare persoană nou venită la mănăstire erau adunate date biografice 

cât mai complete pentru a putea fi folosite ulterior la intimidarea monahilor şi a rudelor 

sale. Aceste mici SV depistate în fondurile arhivistice la fel prezintă un compartiment 

nevalorificat la moment de cercetători, dar care prezintă o deosebită atenŃie la capitolul 

dinamica comunităŃilor monahale, categoriile de vârstă, gen, studii, statut socialeconomic 

deŃinut în societate etc. 

Foarte amplu în dosarele de arhive este reflectată problema lichidării lăcaşelor de cult, 

cu detalii privind lucrul ideologic, pregătirea comunităŃii monahale, infiltrarea 

persoanelor de încredere pentru denigrarea monahilor. În rapoartele semnate de cei mai 

odioşi reprezentanŃi ai ideologiei sovietice, împuternicitul pe problemele Bisericii 

Ortodoxe Ruse, P. Romenski şi A. Oleinic, figurează fraze victorioase, gen „... consider 

că mănăstirea de monahii Călărăşăuca, în rezultatul activităŃii organelor de partid şi 

sovietice, conlucrarea cu muncitorii şi locuitorii din satele învecinate, dar şi discuŃiile 

cu unii reprezentanŃi mai loiali ai comunităŃii monahale, a fost lichidată” (semnat A. 

Oleinic, 20 iunie 1961) 2 . Una din măsurile principale includea şi discuŃiile cu 

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vieŃuitorii tineri, plini de forŃă de la mănăstirea în vederea părăsirii comunităŃilor 

monahale, angajarea la lucru în colhoz şi perspectivele muncitorilor la uzine, din 

considerentele că obştea de monahi bolnavi şi bătrâni sigur că poate fi desfiinŃată mai 

lesne, invocându-se imposibilitatea lucrării pământului, lipsa mijloacelor financiare, 

diferite maladii etc 3 . 

La prima etapă, sigur că soarta celor care au părăsit mănăstirile sau bisericile erau 

comodă, dar sunt bine cunoscute, graŃie dosarelor de arhivă, momente care vin să 

confirme că foştii călugări erau foarte greu angajaŃi la serviciu, iar autorităŃilor sovietice li 

se raporta imediat dacă „preotul X. a citit elevilor o lecŃie la biologie privind modul de 

viaŃă al albinilor” sau că în satul GrinăuŃi, Briceni, fostul diacon activa ca învăŃător de 

muzică la şcoala din localitate. Sau cum la sărbătorile de paşi o fabrică de panificaŃie a 

produs nişte copturi cu denumirea „chec de primăvară”, folosind reŃeta bunicilor privind 

cozonacul tradiŃional sau cum sătenii dintr-o localitate refuzau să facă proceduri 

medicale, medic fiind o fostă preoteasă 4 . Se lucra la acest capitol foarte insistent, prin 

diferite modalităŃi oamenii fiind obligaŃi să semneze cereri de închidere a bisericii, 

alungarea preotului din sat, reguzul de a activa alături de fostele feŃe bisericeşti. 

Compartimentul scrisori şi cereri semnate în speranŃa de a salva credinŃa este completat 

de rapoarte care vizează activitatea economică, culturală, dinamica comunităŃii monahale, 

date despre conducerea mănăstirii sau parohul bisericii. Astfel, informaŃiile în cauză au 

permis restabilirea tabloului privind reducerea drastică a terenurilor agricole, a viilor şi 

livezilor mănăstireşti, intimidarea feŃelor bisericeşti şi a monahilor, arderea cărŃilor sfinte 

şi devastarea podoabelor de preŃ. De altfel, autorităŃile sovietice urmăreau funcŃionarea 

bisericilor şi mănăstirilor foarte atent, cel mai mic venit semnalat de la vinderea 

lumânărilor sau oficierea unor taine creştine (botez, cununie sau înmormântare conform 

regulilor) punea în gardă organele locale. De exemplu, în 1954 se semnala că s-a mărit 

producŃia fabricii eparhiale de lumânări din Chişinău, au crescut veniturile bisericilor de 

la vânzarea lumânărilor, a crescut la fel frecventarea bisericilor (care deveneau deseori 

neîncăpătoare pentru toŃi enoriaşii), fapte care deranjau mult activiştii de partid şi care nu 

au întârziat să vină imediat cu unele recomandări 5 . Astfel, doar la mănăstirea Răciula, de 

hram şi la alte sărbători creştine, se adunau peste 3000 de persoane din satele din 

vecinătate. Era o problemă dificilă pentru autorităŃi şi reparaŃia bisericilor, făcută cu 

cheltuiala comunităŃii, care donau mijloace băneşti, materii de construcŃie, partricipau 

personal la reparaŃii sau reconstrucŃii 6 . 

De facto, situaŃia materială a lăcaşelor sfinte din RSSM care începe să se amelioreze la 

începutul anilor 1950, după cum sesizăm din dosarele de arhivă, a condiŃionat noi 

represiuni asupra bisericii, generate de hotărârea Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM din 16 

octombrie 1958, sub nr. 1159, care prevedea reducerea numărului bisericilor şi 

mănăstirilor prin lichidarea lor 7 . În acest, context, sunt relatate şi unele litigii privind 

imobilele şi proprietatea funciară a bisericilor şi mănăstirilor, care erau constrânse să 

cedeze binebol în folosul colhozului din localitate pământul arabil şi acareturile sale. 

Astfel, în 1949, stareŃul mănăstirii Pripiceni-Curchi se plânge privind confiscarea morii 

de către colhoz, iar veniturile acestei mori erau folosite pentru întreŃinerea comunităŃii 

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monahale şi a bisericii. Era la fel o măsură de constrângere, arhivele prezentând 

numeroase dovezi privind desfrâul autorităŃilor sovietice la acest capitol. 

MenŃionăm cu această ocazie că în ansamblu, anume aceste domenii sunt reflectate cu 

predelecŃie în majoritatea publicaŃiilor contemporane privind activitatea bisericii din 

RSSM în anii 1944–1991. Totodată, există compartimente care au fost elicidate doar 

fragmentar, în studii cu alt caracter. În acest context, intenŃia noastră este de a scoate în 

evidenŃă modalitatea de lichidare a bisericilor şi mănăstirilor prin prisma distrugerii 

monumentelor de arhitectură, formarea unor comisii specializate care confirmau situaŃia 

precară a edificiilor şi respectiv, recomandau închiderea şi distrugerea lor. Totodată, lipsa 

enoriaşilor şi a unui preot facilita scoaterea bisericilor de la evidenŃă, după care actul 

privind starea de avariere gravă a clădirii era un lucru venit de la sine, urmând după asta 

demolarea şi folosirea pietrelor de construcŃie de administraŃia locală. O altă variantă, în 

cazul dacă pereŃii nu erau foarte deterioraŃi, prezenta demontarea turlelor, crucilor şi 

folosirea clădirii drept grajd, hambar, garaj. Totodată, un factor important era şi scoaterea 

din funcŃie a preotului anume de autoritatea bisericească supremă din Moldova, episcopul 

de Chişinău şi Moldova Venedict informând în permanenŃă împuternicitul P. Romenski 

privind acetele semnate. Astfel, se semnala că deşi un preot sau ieromonah a fost înlăturat 

de la slujbă, el continuă să facă slujbe (motivele nu se explică, dar luând în calcul că peste 

2-3 ani se scotea de la evidenŃă şi biserica), ne dăm prea bine seama că era un prim pas în 

lichidarea bisericii sau a comunităŃii monahale. Totodată, pentru a nu forma o comunitate 

a enoriaşilor stabilă, de a nu face nişte legături etc., preoŃii erau transferaŃi de la o parohie 

la alta foarte des, uneori de două ori pe ani, fiind trimişi cu slujba dintr-o parohie din 

nordul republicii într-un sat de la sud şi invers. 

De altfel, ştiind valoarea podoabelor şi veşmintelor liturgice, erau frecvente cazurile de 

jaf a bisericilor şi mănăstirilor, iar lipsa odoarelor de preŃ şi a celor necesare pentru 

oficierea slijbelor era la fel invocată drept motiv pentru închiderea unor biserici (biserica 

Sfântul Dumitru din Orhei, biserica Acoperământul Maicii Domnului din satul CineşeuŃi, 

Rezina ş.a.). 

În aşa mod, după trecerea în revistă a subiectelor deschise spre cercetare în baza 

dosarelor de arhivă depistate, ne propunem să facem o analiză pe cât e posibil de detaliată 

privind închiderea, demontarea şi distrugerea patrimoniului ecleziastic, a arhitecturii 

bisericeşti. Vom exemplifica prin informaŃiile preluate din câteva dosare de arhivă, care 

vin să confirme că în perioada dezmăŃului sovietic, patrimoniul bisericesc a fost secat nu 

numai prin arderea cărŃilor liturgice sau a podoabelor preŃioase, dar şi prin lichidarea 

bisericilor ca edificii de cul. În acest context, dosarele de arhivă ne varsă lumină şi asupra 

unor etape în lichidarea bisericilor. 

Astfel, în ianuarie 1960 a fost întocmit un act care prevedea analiza situaŃiei bisericii din 

satl Gârlea, Costeşti. Un grup de muncitori-constructori conduşi de deputaŃii sovietului 

sătesc au stabilit că „biserica este de lemn; pereŃii sunt foarte deformaŃi, aplecându-se în 

interior, deformând axa centrală care poate duce inevitabil la căderea pereŃilor; tavanul a 

putrezit şi riscă să se prăbuşească; podeau de lemn e putredă şi ruptă în mai multe locuri; 

majoritatea lemnului, bârnelor sunt mâncate de carii; acoperişul a suferit foarte mult şi e 

pe cale de a se prăbuşi”. Comisia a decis soarta bisericii vechi de lemn foarte simplu: din 

cauza situaŃiei avariate în care s-a ajuns, este imposibilă exploatarea clădirii, şi respectiv, 

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închiderea ei”. Constatăm cu această ocazie că clădirile bisericilor mai ales de lemn, 

construite cel târziu la începutul sec. XIX (conform legislaŃiei din arhitectură, în sec. XIX 

practic se interzice ridicarea edificiilor de cult de lemn), au fost aduse deseori intenŃionat 

la situaŃii avariate. Anume prin indiferenŃa autorităŃilor, lipsa mijloacelor financiare şi 

materiale de construcŃie pentru reparaŃia/restaurarea bisericilor, s-a ajuns la distrugerea 

edificiilor 8 . Clădirile vechi, istorice ale bisericilor din RSSM au suferit fiind aduse la 

„necorespundere tehnică pentru exploatare”, pe când clădirile aflate într-o stare tehnică 

bună – biserici, chilii, stăreŃii –, erau exploatate fără reticenŃă în calitate de cluburi de 

cultură, spitale, grajduri şi hambare, fapt care a condiŃionat pe parcursul deceniilor 

distrugerea lor prin denaturarea originalităŃii arhitecturale, înlăturarea picturii bisericeşti, 

schimbarea acoperişurilor etc. 

Anii 1944–1960 au adus cele mai serioase prejudicii arhitecturii originale ecleziastice. 

Spre marele nostru noroc, unele dosare posedă mici anexe fotografice, adevărate mărturii 

ale aspectului bisericilor cu puŃin timp înainte de demolare. Arhitectura edificiilor de cult 

denotă acoperişuri originale, ferestre arcuite, interesante grile metalice la ferestre, decorul 

cornişelor într-un stil geometric, crucile care încoronau cupolele bisericeşti – toate au 

avut de suferit de urgia timpului. În 1953, un grup de specialişti în construcŃie a întocmit 

un proces-verbal privind starea de conservare a bisericii de piatră din satul RăscăieŃi, 

Olăneşti. Invocându-se faptul că în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial biserica 

avut mult de suferit din cauza atacurilor de artilerie, iarăşi s-a ajuns la concluzia de 

lichidare a clădirii, fără a se propune restaurarea şi reparaŃia edificiului, la fel un fost 

exemplu ilustru al arhitecturii ecleziastice din sec. XIX 9 . La momentul distrugerii 

definitive a bisericii, erau dărâmaŃi practic totalmente pereŃii, ferestrele scoase, 

iconostasul devastat, acoperişul spart. Ceva mai bine se păstrase clădirea clopotniŃei în 

două nivele: deşi au suferit mult pereŃii, a căzut complet tencuiala, crucea încorona în 

continuare turla clopotniŃei. 

Aceeaşi soartă a avut-o biserica din satul Palanca, Olăneşti, care în 1953 a fost 

desfiinŃată şi, respectiv, demolarea lor. Clădirea cruciformă, ridicată din piatră, ferestre 

arcuite în partea de sus şi nişte pseudo-ferestre în pereŃii laterali, dar şi alte elemente 

decorative, posedă evidente semne de uzură tehnică, acoperişul fiind în iarbă crescută, iar 

pereŃii – în proporŃie de 60-70% dărâmaŃi 10 . Comisia de expertizare a prezentat 

următoarele documente: actul tehnic privind starea de avariere a bisericii; decizia 

sovietului sătesc din 29 iunie 1953; decizia sovietului raional Olăneşti din 16 iulie 1953 şi 

trei imagini din exterior şi interior ca demonstraŃie a stării bisericii. Rolul covârşitor în 

demolarea bisericii de la Palanca l-a avut însuşi împuternicitul în problemele Bisericii 

Ortodoxe Ruse P. Romenski, care personal a examinat biserica, şi a decis folosirea 

materialelor de construcŃie în scopul construcŃiei unui club de cultură şi a maternităŃii în 

localitate. Biserica în consecinŃă, a fost distrusă şi dispărută ca monument de artă 

ecleziastică datând cu sec. XIX. 

O altă biserică din acelaşi raion Olăneşti, satul Purcari, era amplasată la 18 m de şcoala 

din localitate. De frica să nu se prăbuşească peste clădirea şcolii, comisa formată din 

administraŃia locală şi nişte constructori, a decis lichidarea clădirii, iar piatra folosită după 

demontarea clădirii în scopurile administraŃiei sovietice locale 11 . Şi iarăşi este evident 

rolul decis al împuternicitului P. Romenski, care personal a evaluat clădirea şi a decis 

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demontarea ei cu folosirea ulterioară a materialelor de construcŃie. Certificatul tehnic al 

bisericii privind situaŃia în anul 1953, relata următoarele: biserica nu este funcŃională din 

1944; acoperişul şi bolta au putrezit; uşile şi ferestrele lipsă; pereŃii posedă numeroase 

fisuri destul de mari; enoriaşii nu ridică problema reparaŃiei bisericii; reparaŃia nu este 

oportună, luând în calcul starea avariată 12 . 

Deseori, printre motivele principale invocate la demontarea bisericilor se menŃionau 

operaŃiile militare care au agravat situaŃia, fără a nominaliza factorul antropic, indiferenŃa 

şi intenŃiile autorităŃilor asovietice de a duce clădirile în stare avariată, refuzându-le 

reparaŃia şi restaurarea, fapte care au şi condiŃionat lichidarea lor drept edificii de cult. S-a 

păstrat o singură imagine a bisericii, de format mic, dar care ne permite să restabilm în 

ansamblu originalitatea arhitecturii de cult: a fost ridicată din piatră şi cărămidă, ferestre 

cu partea de sus semicirculară, grile metalice sofisticate; muchiile pereŃilor sunt decoraŃi 

prin motive geometrice; decorul ferestrelor este foarte interesant, formând un 

ancandarment zimŃat în partea de sus, completând armonios cadrul ferestrei. 

În unele cazuri, dosarele de arhivă ne-a păstrat şi dimensiunile bisericilor care urmau să 

fie distruse. Astfel, biserica de la Copanca, Tiraspol, era ridicată din piatră, lungimea de 

25 de m şi lăŃimea de 8 m.; acoperişul era lipsă, pereŃii posedă numeroase crăpături care 

riscă să prăbuşească întreaga clădire 13 . Mai bine de 10 ani biserica nu a fost reparată, fiind 

lăsată în voia soartei, din care motiv s-a decis demolarea clădirii şi folosirea materialelor 

de construcŃie pentru ridicarea unor obiective de menire social-culturală din localitate. 

În pofida faptului că numeroase clădiri au fost distruse, unele informaŃii din dosarele de 

arhivă vin să ne prezintă faptul că se permitea demolarea edificiilor de cult numai după 

constatarea stării grave avariate a acestora, cu evidente pericole pentru imobilele din 

împrejurimi. În asemenea situaŃie, biserica din satul Calfa, deşi a fost formată o comisie 

specială de lichidare care a semnat un aviz privind starea gravaă avariată, clădirea nu a 

fost demolată. Biserica din Calfa era ridicată din piatră şi cărămidă, în plan cruciformă, 

bolta de forma unui bulb aplatizat este încoronată cu o cruce metalică. Edificiul se 

încadrează în tipul bisericilor cu clopotniŃă alăturată, cu ferestre arcuite în partea de sus, 

acoperişul octogonal, crucea de pe clopotniŃă lipsă 14 . Lungimea bisericii este de 25 m., 

lăŃimea 8 m. 

Cu totul altă soartă, fiind ajunse la demontare, au avut bisericile din alte sate. Astfel, 

biserica din satul Furceni, Orhei, conform fotografiei anexate, nu prezintă semne 

evidente de clădire avaritaă, s-a insistat asupra închiderii. Pornind de la deciziile 

comisiei privind starea de avariere a clădirilor şi imposibilitatea utilizării de către 

comunitate drept obiectiv de cult, s-a insistat asupra reconstrucŃiei clădirilor (prin 

demontarea turlelor şi ridicarea unui nou acoperiş din foaie de ardezie, de regulă, în 2- 

4 ape; scoaterea crucilor, devastarea interiorului bisericilor etc.), după care utilizarea 

clădirilor în calitate de hambare pentru păstrarea grânelor 15 . La fel, a fost distrusă 

biserica din satul Pohărniceni, Orhei, în dosarul de arhivă fiind anexată poza văduvită a 

iconostasului devastat 16 . Materialul ilustrativ anexat la dosar permite şi în acest caz 

stabilirea particularităŃilor arhitectural-constructive ale bisericii: pereŃii ridicaŃi din piatră 

brută, neşlefuită, acoperişul la acel moment practic lipsă, în unele porŃiuni crescut cu 

iarbă etc. Raportul comisiei de specialişti-constructori a semnalat că în biserica din 

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satul Pohărniceni este lipsă acoperişul; podelele sunt distruse completamente; 

ferestrele şi uşile sunt rupte, dărâmate; la fel pereŃii prezintă urme evidente de uzură, 

sunt porniŃi spre surpare; a avut de suferit şi tencuiala clădirii, ca rezultat al operaŃiilor 

militare din anul 1944. Verdicul a fost şi mai dur: nu prezintă oportunitate de 

restabilire şi reparaŃie, din care cauză s-a optat pentru demolarea clădirii. 

Evaluarea tehnică a bisericii din satl Selişte, Orhei, a stabilit următorii parametri ai 

clădirii: suprafaŃa totală 161,6 m.p., fundamentul de piatră este săpat pe un sol lutos; are o 

adâncime de 1,8 m. pereŃii din piatră au o grosime de 75 cm., sunt practic deformaŃi, 

posedă numeroase fisuri şi găuri enorme 17 . PereŃii de nord şi de est sunt aplecaŃi pe 

verticală fiind pe calea alunecării; sunt dărâmate ferestrele şi uşa bisericii. ClopotniŃa a 

avut de suferit în proporŃie de 80 de %, lipsesc acoperişul, sunt dărâmaŃi pereŃii de 

susŃinere etc. În consecinŃă, raportul comisiei sună în felul următor: pereŃii fundamentali 

ai bisericii nu se supun restabilirii; este necesară imediata demolare mai ales a clădirii 

clopotniŃei. 

În 1954 au avut loc demolări masive şi în cadrul bisericilor mănăstireşti. În aşa mod, 

scrisoarea împuternicitului în problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse P. Romenski, propune 

demolarea bisericii complexului monahal Hâncu unde este amplasată o casă de odihnă, 

din cauza că „încurcă la formarea unui parc în centrul casei”, iar pietrel vor fi utilizate 

pentru ridicarea unui nou spaŃiu locativ 18 . Un rol deosebit, după cum se vede în 

promovarea noului mod de viaŃă, l-a avut anume acest consiliu în problemele Bisericii 

Ortodoxe Ruse, la decizia căruia rămânea demolarea, închiderea şi lichidarea bisericilor, 

mănăstirilor. Astfel, dacă la demolarea bisericii mănăstirii Hâncu acest consiliu a dat 

acordul şi nu avut obiecŃii, atunci în cazul clădirii bisericii mănăstirii de călugări 

Hârjauca, se menŃiona că „consiliu nu dă acordul la demolarea bisericii, considerând 

această decizie încă nerentabilă, este necesr temporar o abŃinere [de la demolarea 

bisericilor – n.n. – M.B.]” 19 . A avut de suferit în timpul lichidării complexului monahal şi 

blocul de chilii de la mănăstirea HârbovăŃ. Impactul negativ este atât de mare, încât şi 

după două decenii de la redeschidere, blocul de piatră a chiliilor în două nivele, cu un 

acoperiş în două ape, acoperit cu tablă de ardezie, rămâne pustiit, într-o stare avariată 

gravă, cu pereŃii porniŃi spre delasare. Utilizarea nestingherită în anii sovietici a clădirilor 

bisericeşti, demontarea turlelor, clopotniŃelor, crucilor şi răstignirilor, nivelarea 

cimitirelor unde şi-au găsit odihna de veci marii ctitori şi importante feŃe bisericeşti, au 

fost măsuri folosite de sovietici intenŃionat pentru distrugerea credinŃei. Tot la capitolul 

edificii mănăstireşti care au avut de suferit în urma autorităŃilor sovietice, se înscrie şi 

schitul łipova. Deşi biserica schitului a fost declarată oficial monument de arheologie şi 

istorie 20 , toate edificiile de cult şi anexele gospodăreşti ale complexului monahal au 

trecut, în 1949, în folosinŃa Ministerului ÎnvăŃământului al RSSM, biserica fiind trecută 

sub ocrotirea statului 21 . 

În vizorul autorităŃilor ateiste au intrat nu numai edificiile de cult, dar şi troiŃele, 

răstignirile plasate la răscruce, lângă fântâni. Asemenea plângeri ale populaŃiei privind 

profanarea troiŃelor sau rapoarte ale administraŃiei locale privind distrugerea pieselor de 

cult, au fost la fel depistate în filele dosarelor de arhivă. Astfel, în satul Suhuluceni, 

Teleneşti, unde în centrul satului a fost ridicată o troiŃă, care din păcate, prin 1954 a ajuns 

555

într-o stare gravă, iar urmaşii ctitorilor troiŃei au decis reînnoirea ei. TroiŃa a fost 

reînnoită, reparată şi instalată nu pe locul vechi, dar în curtea unui locatar, să nu deranjeze 

circulaŃia pe drum. Însă activiştii de partid, fiind în stare de ebrietate, au stricat sticla 

troiŃei, au profanat-o, dărâmând cu toporul chipurile sfinte din lemn. TroiŃa afost dusă la 

râu, sfărâmată şi distrusă. A doua zi, cei vinovaŃi au propus suma de 3500 ruble pentru 

aplanarea conflictului, însă ctitorii troiŃei au refuzat, căutând dreptate la autorităŃile 

raionale 22 . Totodată, sunt numeroase rapoarte şi cereri privind necesitatea transferului 

trioŃelor şi răstignirilor mai aproape de biserică sau cimitir, fiindcă amplasate lângă casele 

de cultură, erau deseori ponegrite şi distruse. Un transfer similar a avut loc în satul 

Pelenia, BălŃi, când troiŃa de metal a fost mutată din centrul satului lângă biserică 23 . 

Şi în satul Mileştii Mici, Ialoveni, administraŃia sovietică a încercat prin anii 1960 să 

distrugă răstignirile considerate rămăşiŃe ale trecutului, să le şteargă din vatra satului, 

respectiv, din memoria sătenilor. Acest fapt a reuşit doar parŃial, deoarece creştinii au 

transferat crucifixele în cimitirul satului. Cu regret, nefiind plasate în locul lor firesc, de 

unde şi lipsa măsurilor de protecŃie şi îngrijirea loc ocazională, răstignirile de lemn cu 

timpul ajung într-o stare deplorabilă. De altfel, biserica Sfântul Nicolae din Mileştii Mici 

a fost deposedată de podoabe, la 7 iunie 1951 reprezentantul executivului sovietului de 

deputaŃi I.F. Goldştein transmite în folosinŃa comunităŃii ortodoxe din Mileştii Mici atât 

imobilul, cât şi inventarul liturgic. La acest Contract de dare în folosinŃă este anexată şi o 

listă de inventar, printre care figurează piese de orfevrărie preŃioasă, cărŃi vechi, icoane 

etc. Ulterior, în 1962, a urmat închiderea lăcaşului 24 . De altfel, situaŃia cu lichidarea 

bisericilor şi deposedarea lor de bunuri era specifică nu numai pentru anii 1944–1962, 

deoarece asemenea cazuri au fost semnalate şi prin anii 1980. Astfel, o nouă lovitură 

enoriaşii din Mileştii Mici au primi la 8 septembrie 1981, când directorul muzeului din 

satul Văsieni, Cutuzov (actualmente Ialoveni), împreună cu muzeograful principal, au 

întocmit un act, cu nr. 88, în conformitate cu care 19 piese din patrimoniul bisericesc au 

fost trecute la balanŃa aşa-numitului muzeu al łinutului Natal din satul Văsieni pentru „a 

fi prezentate la expoziŃia muzeului”. În această listă de inventariere au fost incluse, după 

cum urmează trei icoane Iisus Hristos şi Maica Domnulu (aflate într-o stare 

satisfăcătoare), icoana Iisus Hristos (una bucată), icoane dedicate sfinŃilor Nicolai, Pavel, 

Ioan, Petru, Andrei, Dumnezeu-Tatăl, Sfânta Treime (toate într-o stare satisfăcătoare sau 

bună), un candelabru mare şi o cristelniŃă ambele bine păstrate; patru piese ce Ńin de 

vestimentaŃia liturgică, aflate într-o stare deplorabilă 25 . 

MenŃionăm că majoritatea bisericilor şi mănăstirilor înainte de lichidare erau măsurate 

şi ineventariate, furnizând date preŃioase privind inventarul liturgic şi veşmintele 

bisericeşti, cărŃile sfinte, starea de păstrare a clădirilor. Un asemenea inventar s-a păstra 

cu referinŃă la biserica Sfânta terime din satul CucuieŃi, Râşcani 26 . Biserica era de piatră, 

cu un singur pristol, acoperişul din tablă metalică, curtea bisericii era împrejmuită cu un 

gard de piatră. 

O serie de dosare de arhivă nu furnizează şi unele informaŃii prvind evaluarea 

imobilelor, preŃul lor în anumite etape. Astfel, din dosarul de inventariere din anul 1946, 

am stabilit că biserica din satul Antonovca, Olăneşti, cu hramul Sfântul Nicolae, era din 

piatră, acoperită cu metal negru. Era distrusă în proporŃie de 50%. A fost evaluată la suma 

de 25 000 ruble. 

556

O altă biserică închisă în acea perioadă, anume din satul Tomai, Ceadâr-Lunga, comisia 

stabilind la fel starea avariată a edificiului. Însă în acest caz doi membri ai comisiei, 

ingineri-tehnicieni, au refuzat semnarea actului privind demolarea clădirii, şi au raportat 

împuternicitului în problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse despre starea satisfăcătoare a 

clădirii, necesitatea unor reparaŃii şi posibilitatea efectuării în continuare a serviciilor 

divine 27 . 

Aparte pot fi clasificate dosarele cu referinŃă la funcŃionarea locaşelor de cult în 

raioanele din stânga Nistrului, care au ajuns sub dominanta ideologiei sovietice încă din 

1918. Astfel, biserica din satul Lunga, Dubăsari, a fost ridicată în 1897, iar în 1936 

clădirea biserici a fost transferată pentru deschiderea aici a unui club de pioneri. A fost 

demolat acoperişul, scoase turlele, topită crucea 28 . În 1942 biserica a revenit la misiunea 

sa, fiind funcŃională până în 1948. În 1952, la adunarea colhoznicilor din localitate, s-a 

decis transferarea clădirii bisericii care stătea pustiită, sub un hambar de cereale. Însă în 

1956 sătenii au colectat peste 12 mii ruble pentru restabilirea bisericii, oficierea serviului 

divin, au cerut şi numirea unui preot pentru biserica din satul Lunga. 

Şi biserica din satul Nezavertailovca, raionul Slobozia, în 1952, conform certificatului 

tehnic, nu se utiliza din cauza vechimii clădirii, motiv care a şi fost invocat la închiderea 

edificiului şi utilizarea lui în scopuri gospodăreşti. Conform raportului comisiei de 

evaluare a situaŃiei, s-a menŃionat că „clădirea nu are aspect de biserică, fiind lipsă turlele, 

cu crucile de lemn plasate direct pe acoperişul vechi; nu este funcŃională mai bine de trei 

ani; curtea este înpărăginită, copacii din ogradă rupŃi; ca atare lipseşte comunitatea 

enoriaşilor care ar frecventa această biserică; preotul şi diaconul nu sunt în sat; 

lucrează numai aşa-numitul starostele bisericii, dar care nu a prezentat acte de 

împuternicire, adică un proces-verbal al şedinŃei comunităŃii unde a fost aleasă în 

această funcŃie; la fel nu activează comisia de revizie şi nici comitetul bisericesc în 

componenŃa a 20 de persoane” 29 . 

Şi în satul Hruşca, Camenca, se insista la demolarea elementelor arhitecturale care 

diferenŃiază o biserică: cupolele, turlele, crucea, clopotniŃa, interiorul, pentru a utiliza 

clădirea edificiului în scopuri strict gospodăreşti 30 . Şi în acest caz, precum şi în 

majoritatea situaŃiilor de închidire, demolare şi utilizare după bunul plac al edificiilor de 

cult, aşa-numita propunere privind aceste măsuri vine în mod obligatoriu de la săteni 

conduşi de activiştii de partid în râvna de a construi noua orânduire socialistă. 

Tot cu referinŃă la raionul Camenca, satul Hrustovaia, menŃionăm faptul că erau 

demolate şi lichidate nu numai bisericile şi complexele monahale, dar şi cimitirele satului. 

Astfel, în 1947 comitetul bisericesc scria o plângere că unul din cele două cimitire din 

satul Hrustovaia, anume cimitirul vechi, este plasat nemijlocit alături de curtea bisericii 

cu hramul Naşterea Maicii Domnului. ClopotniŃa deja este distrusă, intrare în biserică se 

face prin cimitir, împrejmuit cu un gard de piatră şi poartă de metal, comune pentru 

cimitir şi biserică. În cimitir se păstrează pietre şi cruci funerare vechi. Însă în pofida 

semnificaŃiei profunde a cimitirului, gospodarii caselor din vecinătate în mod obraznic au 

făcut păşune din cimitir. Comunitatea enoriaşilor se obliga să restabilească grădină 

fructiferă, să facă ordine în cimitir şi curtea bisericii, să achite întreaga rentă funciară, 

numai să păstreze biserica şi cimitirul vechi pentru săteni. 

557

AutorităŃile ecleziastice superioare la fel nu totdeauna apărau interesele parohiilor şi 

enoriaşilor. Astfel, în 1952, arhiepiscopul de Mojaisk Macarie, şeful gospodăriei din 

cadrul Sfântului Sinod de la Moscova, a expediat în adresa episcopului de Chişinău 

Nectarie, o scrisoare în care menŃiona că consiliul în problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse 

nu va examina cererile eparhiilor privind acordarea mijloacelor financiare reparaŃiei şi 

restaurării edificiilor de cult. Cererile privind procurarea materialelor de construcŃie vor fi 

prezentate personal împuterniciŃilor înproblemele bisericii cu argumentarea necesară 

privind procurarea materialelor. În cazul reparaŃiei monumnetelor de arhitectură şi istorie, 

devizul de cheltuieli va fi coordonat cu organele de resort, în vizorul cărora se află 

monumentele 31 . 

Astfel, doar câteva dosare cercetate de noi au scos în evidenŃă o problemă majoră pusă 

în referinŃă cu modalităŃile de lichidare a bisericilor şi complexelor monahale, demolarea 

şi devastarea lor, scopul final fiind distrugerea patrimoniului arhitectural al Ńării. 

Fondurile de arhivă ne-au furnizat suficiente date informaŃionale privind subiectul 

abordat de noi, iar imaginile anexate în rare cazuri permit restabilirea aspectului original 

al edificiului, distrus în acele timpuri. În concluzie, menŃionăm că arhivele de stat sunt 

deŃinătoare de importante informaŃii, marea majoritate a cărora nu a fost deloc 

valorificată. Fiind la început de cale privind cercetarea noastră, am discutat pe marginea 

subiectului patrimoniului arhitectural distrus, subiect care rămâne a fi dezvoltat şi 

completat cu informaŃii privind istoricul bisericii, reactivarea şi funcŃionarea lor după 

1989, dar şi analiza inventarului liturgic şi a veşmintelor preŃioase, aspecte care au fost 

analizate doar tangenŃial în lucrarea dată. În ansamblu, doar coroborarea datelor istorice, a 

memoriilor culese de la martorii evenimentelor, adică istoria verbală, cu informaŃiile 

depistate în dosarele arhivelor de stat ne va permite să creăm un tablou pe cât se poate de 

amplu şi veridic privind toate aspectele (economic, politic, social, cuiltural) legate de 

funcŃionarea bisericilor şi mănăstirilor în perioada ateismului militant atât în localităŃile 

din stânga Nistrului (aflate sub dominanta sovietică încă din 1918), cât şi în spaŃiul prutonistrean, 

pentru perioada 1944–1989, inclusiv şi impactul primei ocupaŃii sovietice a 

teritoriului în 1940–1941. 

ReferinŃe 


dosar 518, f. 29-30. 

2. Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova (în continuare 

AOSPRM), fond 51, inv. 21, dosar 235, f. 9. 







558

9. ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 518, f. 69-71. 






15. ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 7a-8. 

16. ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 8a. 




20. În 1947, conform deciziei Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM, în lista monumnetelor de 

istorie şi arhitectură au fost incluse următoarele edificii de cult, dar statutul de 

monument oricum a permis lichidarea şi demolarea lor: biserica Măzărache, Sfântul 

Ilie, Sfântul Gheorghe, Catedrala Veche (Chişinău); biserica de piatră de Căuşăni; 

ansamblul arhitectural al Catedralei noi cu clopotniŃă (Chişinău), complexele 

monahale din Hârjauca, Căpriana, Suruceni, Saharna, Rudi, Japca, Călărăşăuca, 

łipova şi Butuceni. 


22. ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 85 


24. ANRM, fond R – 3046, inv. 2, dosar 193, f. 3-6. 

25. Arhiva personală M. BrihuneŃ. 







1 ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 518, f. 29-30. 

2 AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 21, dosar 235, f. 9. 


4 AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 5, f. 76-77. 








12 ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 518, f. 99. 



15 ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 7a-8. 

16 ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 8a. 


559

18 

ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 531, f. 47. 

19 


20 

În 1947, conform deciziei Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM, în lista monumnetelor de istorie şi arhitectură 

au fost incluse următoarele edificii de cult, dar statutul de monument oricum a permis lichidarea şi demolarea 

lor: biserica Măzărache, Sfântul Ilie, Sfântul Gheorghe, Catedrala Veche (Chişinău); biserica de piatră de 

Căuşăni; ansamblul arhitectural al Catedralei noi cu clopotniŃă (Chişinău), complexele monahale din 

Hârjauca, Căpriana, Suruceni, Saharna, Rudi, Japca, Călărăşăuca, łipova şi Butuceni. 

21 


22 


23 

ANRM, fond 3046, inv. 1, dosar 24, f. 188-190. 

24 

ANRM, fond R – 3046, inv. 2, dosar 193, f. 3-6. 

25 

Arhiva personală M. BrihuneŃ. 

26 


27 


28 


29 

ANRM, fond 2848, inv. 10, dosar 518, f. 17-21. 

30 


31 


560

COMISIA COJOCARU 

Viorica OLARU-CEMÎRTAN 1 

Condamnarea comunismului, ca fenomen social-politic care a afectat Estul Europei şi în 

mod special Ńările captive în colosul sovietic, a fost o prioritate pe agenda academică şi 

politică a Europei. În majoritatea acestor Ńări la momentul dat activează instituŃii 

academice, de cercetare şi fonduri pentru a dezvălui lumii întregi ce a însemnat flagelul 

comunismului intrenaŃional şi crimele acestuia împotriva umanităŃii. La 14 ianuarie 

2011, prin Decretul Preşedintelui interimar al Republicii Moldova, Mihai Ghimpu, a fost 

formată Comisia pentru studierea şi aprecierea regimului comunist totalitar din Republica 

Moldova. Acest eveniment era aşteptat de mai mult timp de către comunitatea academică, 

civilă a Ńării şi a fost un prilej pentru dezbateri. 

ComponenŃa comisiei : preşedintele - Gheorghe Cojocaru, doctor în istorie, 

vicepreşedinte - Igor Caşu, doctor în istorie, vicepreşedinte - Sergiu MusteaŃă, doctor în 

istorie, secretar - Mihail Taşca, doctor în drept 

Membrii comisiei : Vasile Bahnaru, doctor habilitat în filologie, Vladimir Beşleagă, 

scriitor, Ion Casian, avocat, Sergiu Chrică, doctor habilitat în economie, Lilia Crudu, 

politolog, Andrei Cuşco, doctor în istorie, Demir Dragnev, doctor habilitat în istorie, 

Nicolae Enciu, doctor habilitat în istorie, Andrei Eşanu, doctor habilitat în istorie, Victor 

Juc, doctor în filozofie, Alexandru Moşanu, doctor habilitat în istorie, Gheorghe Negru, 

doctor în istorie, Petru Negură, doctor în sociologie, Viorica Olaru-Cemîrtan, doctor în 

istorie, Gheorghe Palade, doctor în istorie, Pavel Parasca, doctor habilitat în istorie, 

Anatol Petrencu, doctor habilitat în istorie, Elena Postica, doctor în istorie, Ion Sârbu, 

doctor habilitat în filozofie, Andrei Smochină, doctor habilitat în drept, Veaceslav 

Stăvilă, doctor în istorie, Igor Şarov, doctor în istorie, Ion Şişcanu, doctor habilitat în 

istorie, Ludmila Tihonov, doctor în istorie, Octavian łâcu, doctor în istorie, Ion Varta, 

doctor în istorie. 

În continuare, prezentăm raportul comisiei, cu argumentele şi recomadările expuse. 

În urma valorificării istoriografei din perioada comunistă şi postcomunistă, a literaturii 

istorice apărute în străinătate, precum şi a unui vast volum de documente de arhivă, 

multe dintre care au fost accesate în premieră, Comisia a propus o sinteză cuprinzătoare 

asupra epocii totalitare comuniste cuprinse între anii 1917 / 1924 şi 1991. Această epocă 

are ca puncte de reper instaurarea dictaturii comuniste în Republica Autonomă Sovietică 

Socialistă Moldovenească (RASSM) din cadrul Ucrainei Sovietice, în stânga Nistrului, 

transplantul de sistem comunist pe malul drept al Nistrului, în Basarabia, în 1940, odată 

1 Universitatea Liberă InternaŃională din Moldova, Chisinau, Republica Moldova 

561

eocuparea acestui teritoriu în 1944, restabilirea şi consolidarea regimului totalitar de tip 

sovietic, anchilozarea şi năruirea acestuia odată cu ieşirea din captivitatea comunistă a 

popoarelor însetate de libertate şi prăbuşirea URSS în 1991. 

Potrivit constatărilor Comisiei, experimentul bolşevic totalitar a fost iniŃiat pe malul 

stâng al Nistrului, ca parte a URSS, în timp ce pe malul drept, în Basarabia românească, 

se puneau bazele unei democraŃii incipiente, astfel că Nistrul a despărŃit nu atât două 

maluri sau două state, cât două sisteme: unul democratic şi altul totalitar. Secolul XX a 

demonstrat că totalitarismul nu numai că este incompatibil cu valorile democratice, el este 

duşmanul de moarte al democraŃiei. Un regim totalitar reprezintă antipodul unei 

democraŃii. Acest regim este unul opresiv şi represiv, cu o ideologie de stat oficială, care 

se sprijină pe un singur partid politic, aşa-numitul Partid Unic, în frunte cu „marele 

conducător”, pe o poliŃie secretă omniprezentă şi care deŃine monopolul asupra 

economiei, culturii şi informaŃiei. În pornirea dictaturii bolşevice de a întemeia o lume 

nouă, bazată pe criterii de clasă şi pe ura de clasă, fostei Republici Autonome Sovietice 

Socialiste Moldoveneşti i s-a rezervat un rol aparte. Formarea acestei entităŃi la frontierea 

pe Nistru cu România trebuia să servească planurilor sovietice de anexare a Basarabiei şi, 

în acelaşi timp, să contribuie la extinderea spaŃiului revoluŃiei mondiale proletare în 

direcŃia Balcanilor. O serie de mărturii documentare din cele mai diverse probează cu 

toată claritatea atitudinea ostilă şi agresivă a regimului bolşevic şi a InternaŃionalei a III-a 

Comuniste faŃă de Basarabia românească, intenŃia exportului de revoluŃie pe orice căi 

posibile. Deşi prezentată ca o entitate de stat autonomă, RASS Moldovenească a fost în 

realitate un „cap de pod” în planurile expansioniste sovietice, evoluând din 1924 până în 

1940 spre îngustarea drastică a caracteristicilor proprii unei pretinse entităŃi de stat, spre 

statutul unei regiuni obişnuite a Ucrainei Sovietice. 

În RASSM, ca peste tot în URSS, puterea partidului unic bolşevic, a aparatului de partid 

şi administrativ, se baza pe o sumă de principii care încălcau brutal drepturile 

fundamentale ale omului. Între acestea fiind: anularea proprietăŃii private şi „socializarea” 

mijloacelor principale de producŃie şi a produsului muncii, un vast aparat represiv pentru 

constrângerea cetăŃenilor şi menŃinerea puterii, inhibarea personalităŃii, conştiinŃei şi 

iniŃiativei civice, un sistem de control total şi denunŃ general, izolarea de lumea externă. 

La acestea se adaugă: atribuirea unui rol hipertrofiat ideologiei comuniste şi promovarea 

unei multitudini de falsuri şi mituri, în scopul educării maselor în spiritul credinŃei oarbe 

în „conducătorul” unic, în „justeŃea” liniei partidului şi infailibilităŃii acestuia, 

propaganda privind caracterul temporar al greutăŃilor, datorate „uneltirilor” duşmanilor 

interni şi externi ai statului sovietic, promisiunea minciunoasă privind „raiul comunist” 

care urma să fie construit cât de curând. 

Regimul totalitar bolşevic a transformat republica autonomă de peste Nistru într-un 

adevărat poligon pentru efectuarea celor mai oribile experimente politice, sociale, 

economice, culturale şi identitare. Comisia a efectuat o radiografie a acestor politici şi 

practici totalitare, derulate în anii 1924-1940 în RASS Moldovenească, şi a evaluat 

natura şi costurile lor. 

562

Colectivizarea forŃată de la începutul anilor `30, prin aplicarea constrângerii şi violenŃei 

în raporturile dintre regimul bolşevic şi Ńărănime, prin instrumentarea unor măsuri 

administrative şi de excomunicare împotriva Ńăranilor înstăriŃi, prin asmuŃarea Ńăranilor 

săraci şi mijlocaşi împotriva aşa-numitor „culaci”, s-a soldat cu anularea proprietăŃii 

private la sat, cu un nou război civil împotriva Ńăranilor, cu foametea înspăimântătoare din 

anii 1932-1933. La 7 august 1932, când foametea făcea ravagii în Ucraina, intra în 

vigoare faimoasa Lege „despre cele cinci spice de grâu”, în redacŃia lui I. Stalin, care 

chiar şi pentru cele mai mici furturi prevedea împuşcarea şi, doar în cazuri destul de rare, 

era prevăzută o pedeapsă mai „blândă” – 10 ani de închisoare. Legea a lovit sălbatic în 

Ńăranii înfometaŃi care, în situaŃia disperată în care s-au pomenit din cauza politicilor 

criminale de rechiziŃie, erau condamnaŃi să recurgă la furtul din averea colhozurilor, 

pentru a se salva de la moarte. La 27 decembrie 1932 a fost instituit sistemul de 

paşapoarte sovietice, dar, numai pentru populaŃia urbană, nu şi pentru Ńărani, care erau 

condamnaŃi să moară în satele lor, rămase fără nici o rezervă de cereale. 

Foametea cumplită, represiunile şi deportările operate de autorităŃile comuniste, au 

generat un exod masiv de populaŃie – fuga peste Nistru, în România. Pentru curmarea 

acestui exod, care constituia o dovadă concludentă a eşecului catastrofal al politicilor 

promovate de autorităŃile comuniste, s-a recurs la fortificarea pazei frontierei sovietice, 

însoŃită de utilizarea armelor contra transfugilor înfometaŃi. În 1932, Comitetul pentru 

Ajutorarea RefugiaŃilor Transnistreni a expediat Ligii NaŃiunilor, un memoriu în care se 

menŃiona: „… Neavând din ce alege, ei îşi părăsesc pământurile şi căminele lor 

strămoşeşti şi în disperarea oarbă de a-şi salva singura avere ce le-a mai rămas pe lume, 

darul lui Dumnezeu, viaŃa, se aventurează să fugă peste Nistru, în România. … Regimul 

sovietic, însă, nu ştie de milă şi astfel moldovenii fugari sunt împuşcaŃi în masă cu 

mitralierele, cu zecile, cu sutele, fără nici o cruŃare pe tot lungul Nistrului…”. 

Numărul victimelor foametei din anii 1932-1933 din RASSM n-a fost stabilit, 

deocamdată, cu exactitate, fiind vorba de zeci de mii de oameni. 

Marea Epurare din anii`30 din URSS a lovit din plin şi în RASS Moldovenească. 

Mecanismul terorii în masă nu făcea distincŃii între victime, nu admitea indulgenŃe. Sub 

ghilotina aşa-numitei „Troika speciale”, au căzut unii după alŃii Ńărani, intelectuali, 

muncitori, preoŃi, oameni nevinovaŃi care nu au avut parte nici de un proces de judecată, 

nici de o înmormântare creştină. Victime deveneau înşişi responsabilii din ierarhiile de 

partid şi administrative. Originea socială „burgheză”, statutul de „culac”, întreŃinerea 

contactelor cu rudele din „Ńările capitaliste” serveau drept capete de acuzare ca „duşman 

al poporului” la adresa oricui. Răspunzând comandamentelor politice ale Partidului 

Comunist, organele de represiune ale regimului se întreceau să condamne nu pentru 

infracŃiuni reale, ci pentru infracŃiuni inventate, nesocotind legile şi dreptul uman, 

semânând în urma lor moarte, durere şi umilinŃă. 

Comisia a demonstrat că regimul totalitar comunist se face responsabil de crime 

culturale, împotriva spiritului şi identităŃii moldovenilor de peste Nistru şi, ulterior, după 

1940, a celor din Basarabia, prin impunerea unei „limbi” literare moldoveneşti 

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contrafăcute, conform unor principii aberante „de clasă”, şi prin inventarea, în lipsa 

oricăror resorturi istorice şi etnoculturale, a unei „naŃiuni” moldoveneşti, distincte de cea 

română. Regimul comunist se face vinovat de reprimarea şi mutilarea conştiinŃei noastre 

naŃionale, de suprimarea spiritului nostru liber, de orchestrarea unui război cultural, 

identitar, propagandistic şi informaŃional în toată legea împotriva fraŃilor de pe cele două 

maluri ale Nistrului, împotriva fraŃilor de pe cele două maluri ale Prutului, cu consecinŃe 

dramatice pentru integralitatea noastră lingvistică şi etnoculturală. Or, nimic nu poate fi 

mai tragic decât un război între fraŃi, nimic nu poate fi mai criminal. 

În 1989, când s-au împlinit 50 de ani de la declanşarea celui de-al Doilea Război 

Mondial, Congresul DeputaŃilor Poporului din URSS a condamnat semnarea Protocolului 

adiŃional secret sovieto-nazist din 23 august 1939 prin care se delimitau sferele de 

influenŃă din Estul Europei pe contul unor terŃe Ńări, declarându-l caduc din momentul 

semnării. La 23 iunie 1990 Sovietul Suprem al RSS Moldova a denunŃat Pactul sovietonazist 

şi protocolul adiŃional secret şi consecinŃele lui pentru Basarabia şi Nordul 

Bucovinei. Reiterând această poziŃie, în baza unor analize şi date riguros documentate, 

Comisia subliniază că la 28 iunie 1940 URSS a comis un atentat asupra integrităŃii 

teritoriale a României, un act de ocupare militară şi politică a Basarabiei, Nordului 

Bucovinei şi łinutului HerŃa, contrar voinŃei populaŃii din aceste teritorii, prin dictat şi 

ameninŃarea cu recurgerea la forŃă, un act nedrept de anexiune teritorială. În teritoriile 

anexate cu forŃa la URSS s-a realizat piesă cu piesă un transplant de sistem sovietic, s-a 

reprodus regimul terorii, al propagării urii de clasă şi al ideologiei inumane a Partidului 

Comunist Unic. Formarea Republicii Sovietice Socialiste Moldoveneşti, printr-o decizie 

arbitrară formală a Sovietului Suprem al URSS, în afara teritoriului naŃional şi reducerea 

la tăcere a vocii oamenilor, prin desconsiderarea literei ConstituŃiei sovietice, care nu 

prevedea dreptul URSS de a forma noi republici, ci doar de a admite în federaŃia 

sovietică, a fost o consecinŃă directă a acestui act de ocupaŃie. Ruperea în bucăŃi a 

Basarabiei, a teritoriului şi a corpului uman concrescut de secole cu spaŃiul dintre Prut şi 

Nistru, în contradicŃie cu adevărul istoric şi cu realităŃile etnice existente în acea vreme, 

se înscrie în seria de acte abuzive comise de regimul totalitar comunist împotriva unei 

mari colectivităŃi de oameni. 

Comisia a constatat că în 1940-1941 în Basarabia au fost repetaŃi anii 1937 şi 1938, anii 

Marii Terori din Uniunea Sovietică, reluaŃi apoi în anii postbelici. Organele sovietice de 

represiune au lovit cu bestialitate în puŃinii intelectuali şi fruntaşi ai vieŃii publice rămaşi 

între Prut şi Nistru, condamnându-i la ani grei în gulagurile staliniste, soarta scriitorului 

Nicolae Costenco servind drept exemplu dramatic al modului în care Sovietele au urmărit 

să anihileze cugetul liber, au efectuat execuŃii sumare, dosind urmele asasinării a sute şi 

mii de oameni nevinovaŃi în subsolurile NKVD sau în gropile cu var. Omorurile în masă, 

impunerea unor taxe şi impozite sufocante Ńăranilor, prigoana preoŃilor şi Bisericii, 

anularea limbii române şi interzicerea alfabetului românesc, inversarea scării valorilor şi 

instaurarea unei atmosfere de frică şi teroare generalizate au fost alte efecte ale actului de 

ocupaŃie sovietică din 28 Iunie 1940. 

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În urmă cu aproape 70 de ani, în noaptea de 12 spre 13 Iunie 1941, plânsetul şi jalea s-a 

aşternut peste Basarabia. Fruntea comunităŃilor locale, pilonii de rezistenŃă din tată în fiu 

ai satelor noastre moldoveneşti, ucraineşti, găgăuze, bulgăreşti, ruse sau mixte, ai 

târguşoarelor evreieşti, familii întregi, bărbaŃi, femei, copii şi bătrâni, din Basarabia şi 

până în Nordul Bucovinei, au fost urcaŃi cu baionetele la spate în vagoanele de vite şi duşi 

spre întinsurile Siberiei, de unde mulŃi nu s-au mai întors. Documentele de arhivă 

consultate de membrii Comisiei relevă date cutremurătoare: până şi noi-născuŃii în „bouvagonul” 

sovietic erau trecuŃi şi ei, alături de părinŃii lor, pe lista „duşmanilor 

poporului”(!…). OperaŃiunea de deportare a fost iniŃiată, autorizată şi supervizată de 

Biroul Politic al CC al PC(b) din toată Uniunea, iar structurile de partid, de Securitate şi 

de Interne ale URSS şi ale RSSM au fost baza logistică a mecanismului represiv. Cu 

regret, o parte din executanŃii operaŃiunii de deportare din 12-13 iunie 1941 au fost 

recrutaŃi dintre localnici, în marea lor majoritate, delatori şi oportunişti, elemente 

declasate, care urmăreau un beneficiu strict personal. 

La indicaŃiile exprese ale Biroului Politic al CC al PCUS, Consililui de Miniştri al 

URSS şi al Ministerului SecurităŃii de Stat al URSS, maşina totalitară sovietică de tocat 

oameni şi popoare va mai lovi încă de două ori în plină forŃă în populaŃia din RSS 

Moldovenească: la 6 iulie 1949, în urma adoptării Hotărârii strict secrete a Consilului de 

Miniştri al RSSM Nr. 509 din 28 iunie 1949 cu privire la deportarea din RSS 

Moldovenească a familiilor chiaburilor, foştilor moşieri şi a marilor comercianŃi, şi la 1 

aprilie 1951, în baza Hotărârii Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM din 24 martie 1951 cu 

privire la confiscarea şi utilizarea averii celor deportaŃi de pe teritoriul RSS Moldoveneşti, 

fiind vizat aşa-numitul „contingent antisovietic” al confesiunii „Martorii lui Iehova”. 

OperaŃiunile de deportare au fost planificate de organele de represiune ca nişte operaŃiuni 

militare în toată regula împotriva populaŃiei civile. Culmea justiŃiei de tip sovietic a fost 

că oamenii mai întâi erau ridicaŃi de la vetrele lor, deportaŃi dincolo de munŃii Ural, după 

care li se dresau dosare penale de „duşmani ai poporului”(!). Creierul acestor „crime 

împotriva umanităŃii”, după cum le-a calificat Sovietul Suprem al RSS Moldova la 23 

iunie 1990, a fost conducerea de partid, factorul oficial împuternicit cu luarea unei 

decizii – Consiliul de Miniştri al RSSM, iar executanŃi – organele de securitate, de interne 

şi de justiŃie ale URSS şi ale RSSM. 

Comisia pentru studierea şi aprecierea regimului comunist totalitar a evaluat numărul 

persoanelor deportate şi supuse represiunilor în anii 1929-1951 la peste 90 de mii de 

persoane. 

Un efect scontat al deportării din 1949 a fost înregimentarea accelerată şi masivă a 

Ńăranilor în colhozuri, aşa-numita colectivizare sau „ofensivă decisivă a socialismului 

asupra satului” dintre Prut şi Nistru. Legarea Ńăranului de glia colhoznică, prin dictatul 

regimului bolşevic, a avut drept urmare lichidarea proprietăŃii private şi pierderea 

sentimentului de iniŃiativă economică la sate, desŃărănirea şi dezmoştenirea clasei 

Ńăranilor. Odată cu încheierea colectivizării, a fost instituit un mecanism special al 

relaŃiilor de producere şi repartiŃie, mecanism care permitea statului sovietic să controleze 

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în totalitate producŃia agricolă, Ńăranii primind de la stat doar minimul necesar pentru a 

supravieŃui şi a munci din greu pe terenurile colhoznice. 

Concluziile Comisiei atestă că foametea cumplită din anii 1946-1947 nu a fost o 

consecinŃă nemijlocită a secetei, ci a politicii economice şi sociale a regimului totalitar 

comunist faŃă de populaŃia din RSS Moldovenească, a sistemului sovietic de acces la 

produsele alimentare. Conform datelor statistice acumulate de Comisie, în urma foametei 

au decedat circa 200 de mii de oameni. Vina pentru decesele în masă din cauza foametei 

revine atât lui I.Stalin şi conducerii sovietice de la Kremlin, cât şi Biroului CC al PC(b) 

din toată Uniunea pentru pentru RSS Moldovenească, preşedinte – V. Ivanov, 

Comitetului Central al PC(b) din Moldova în frunte cu prim-secretarul N. Salogor, 

Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM, în frunte cu preşedintele acestuia, N. Coval, 

împuternicitului Consiliului de Miniştri al URSS pentru colectările de cereale în RSSM, 

A. Sîci, altor responsabili din structurile de partid şi administrative, care au decis destinul 

oamenilor simpli. Anume vârfurile Partidului Comunist se fac vinovate de rechiziŃionarea 

inumană a ultimelor produse agricole, rămase prin podurile caselor, lăsând familiile 

înfometate fără o fărâmă de pâine pe masă, ceea ce a constituit cauza principală a 

îmbolnăvirii şi deceselor în masă. Prin politica promovată în anii 1946-1947, ca şi în anii 

următori, autorităŃile sovietice ignorau cu desăvârşire viaŃa şi dreptul la viaŃă al omului, 

normele morale fundamentale, obligatorii pentru instituŃiile unui stat. Foametea din 

RSSM a fost un fenomen provocat prin politica regimului comunist, a fost o crimă 

monstruoasă de care acesta se face direct vinovat. Pentru această crimă, comisă 

premeditat împotriva populaŃiei paşnice, a copiilor şi bătrânilor, a oamenilor în plină 

vârstă, de toate etniile şi confesiile, regimul totalitar comunist trebuie condamnat moral, 

politic şi juridic. 

Activitatea desfăşurată de Comisia pentru studierea şi aprecierea regimului comunist 

totalitar este (şi) un prilej pentru omagierea personalităŃilor care au reprezentat onoarea şi 

demnitatea noastră în acele vremuri de teroare. Primele manifestări de rezistenŃă 

antisovietică s-au înregistrat îndată după ocuparea Basarabiei la 28 Iunie 1940. O 

mărturie în acest sens sunt acŃiunile de rezistenŃă ale membrilor organizaŃiei clandestine a 

unor tineri din Orhei, care au militat împotriva ocupantului sovietic, în apărarea libertăŃii, 

limbii române şi valorilor noastre naŃionale. Pe parcursul anilor 1945-1953, pe teritoriul 

raioanelor Bravicea, Călăraşi, Corneşti, Chişcăreni, Chiperceni, Orhei, Răspopeni, 

Rezina, Susleni, Sângerei, Teleneşti a fost înregistrat un număr considerabil de acŃiuni 

armate împotriva instituŃiilor de stat şi activiştilor locali, întreprinse de către membrii 

grupului în frunte cu faimosul Filimon Bodiu, de către organizaŃiie clandestine „Armata 

Neagră” şi „Partidul Democrat Agrar”. Una dintre cele mai mari şi mai bine organizate 

formaŃiuni de rezistenŃă antisovietică în zonele rurale, „Partidul Democrat Agrar”, a 

activat (în anii 1950-1953) sub conducerea lui Simion Zlatan, originar din satul Popenchi, 

RîbniŃa, şi Vasile Odobescu, originar din satul Cuizăuca, Chiperceni. La Soroca s-a 

înfiripat organizaŃia „Arcaşii lui Ştefan”, în raioanele Chişinău, Hânceşti şi Cărpineni a 

activat o altă organizaŃie conspirativă anticomunustă – „Partidul LibertăŃii”, iar la BălŃi – 

566

„Uniunea Democratică a LibertăŃii”. CombatanŃii căzuŃi pradă organelor de represiune au 

fost condamnaŃi la moarte sau la privaŃiune îndelungată de libertate, iar propaganda 

comunistă a urmărit să-i compromită şi să le şteargă numele din memoria noastră 

colectivă. Astăzi a sosit momentul să ne plecăm fruntea în memoria acestor oameni 

simpli, al căror efort şi sacrificiu manifestate în încleştarea inegală, de moarte, cu regimul 

comunist pentru libertatea şi demnitatea umană este impresionant. 

Nu trebuie să-i uităm nici pe cei care, în bătălia cu obscurantismul şi cenzura sovietică, 

i-au readus în manualele şcolare pe Mihai Eminescu, Vasile Alecsandri, Ion Creangă, au 

afirmat latinitatea limbii, culturii şi fiinŃei noastre naŃionale într-o epocă în care orice gest 

în acest sens era pasibil de excomunicarea din sânul societăŃii sau de pedeapsa cu ani grei 

de privaŃiune de libertate. Un Panteon al istoriei şi culturii noastre ar trebui să-i includă 

pe: Vasile Coroban, George Meniuc, Grigore Vieru, Vlad IoviŃă, Vasile Vasilache, Ion 

Vasilenco, Gheorghe Vodă, Mihai Grecu, Emil Loteanu, Lidia Istrati, Ion Vatamanu şi 

mulŃi alŃii. Un exemplu de verticalitate intelectuală, de rezistenŃă prin cultură şi de apărare 

a limbii noastre române îl reprezintă operele scriitorilor: Ion DruŃă, Dumitru Matcovschi, 

Mihai Cimpoi, Serafim Saca, Petru Cărare, Nicolae Dabija, Ion Hadârcă, Valentin 

Mândâcanu, Vladimir Beşleagă şi alŃii. Fapta temerară a muncitorului Gheorghe 

Muruziuc, care în noaptea de 28 iunie 1966, a arborat Tricolorul de-asupra Fabricii de 

Zahăr din Alexăndreni, raionul Sângerei (rămas acolo timp de 5 ore), protestul Liliei 

Neagu şi Asei Andruh din 1970 împotriva rusificării şi deznaŃionalizării, activitatea 

Frontului NaŃional Patriotic de eliberare de sub ocupaŃia sovietică, din care făceau parte 

Alexandru Usatiuc –Bulgăr şi colaboratorii săi apropiaŃi Gheorghe Ghimpu şi Valeriu 

Graur, alte manifestări cu caracter civic şi naŃional, precum şi mişcarea de emancipare 

naŃională din anii `80 punctează o linie de rezistenŃă, atât cât a fost, care trece ca un fir 

roşu prin toată perioada sovietică. Meritul acestor personalităŃi este imens: ele ne-au Ńinut 

trează conştiinŃa noastră de sine, ne-au învăŃat că dincolo de nevoia omului de adaptare la 

mediu şi la condiŃiile înconjurătoare, după cum au procedat mulŃi dintre noi, există valori 

şi idealuri perene. 

În vremurile grele ale inchiziŃiei comuniste ne-am potolit setea de adevăr, Ńinându-ne 

urechea strâns lipită de aparatele de radio pentru a prinde undele Europei Libere, BBCului, 

ale Radio Vatican şi Radio Libertatea. Nimeni şi nimic nu a putut să ne forŃeze să 

renunŃăm la nevoia de a ne rupe din universul carceral spiritual, nici regimul cu toată 

armata sa de opresiune, nici un asemenea „campion al deznaŃionalizării”, ca Ivan Bodul, 

prim-secretar al CC al PCM în anii 1961-1980. 

În centrul investigaŃiilor Comisiei s-au aflat şi aspectele sociale şi economice ale 

evoluŃiilor din RSS Moldovenească. Comisia nu a trecut cu vederea procesele de 

industrializare şi urbanizare sau cadrul de asistenŃă socială oferit din partea statului 

sovietic cetăŃeanului simplu. Ceea ce relevă, concluziile Comisiei este că industria RSSM 

devine total dependentă de centrele industriale ale URSS, din care, în schimbul 

produselor agricole şi producŃiei industriei alimentare, se importau petrol şi cărbune, 

fontă şi oŃel, mase plastice şi metale neferoase, tractoare, camioane şi automobile, 

567

excavatoare şi maşini agricole, maşini-unelte şi utilaje industriale, obiecte de consum 

popular. În situaŃia în care producŃia republicii nu se dezvolta pe o bază proprie, ci pe 

materia primă importată, dreptul RSS Moldoveneşti la o existenŃă independentă era o 

ficŃiune. Mai mult decât atât, majoritatea întreprinderilor industriale şi, totodată, cele mai 

rentabile, au fost amplasate pe teritoriul fostei RASSM, ceea ce constituia, de asemenea, 

rezultatul unei politici cu bătaie lungă. DeŃinând pârghiile de conducere, ministerele 

panunionale şi unional-republicane au promovat politica afluenŃei masive pe teritoriul 

RSSM a populaŃiei din exteriorul republicii, adusă pentru construcŃia unor noi 

întreprinderi industriale în condiŃiile unui surplus local de forŃe de muncă. Această 

politică a condus la reducerea substanŃială a cotei populaŃiei autohtone în sfera 

industrială, la devalorizarea statutului limbii, culturii şi tradiŃiilor noastre în diverse 

ramuri ale economiei, la instruirea, în instituŃiile de învăŃământ superior şi mediu, 

preponderent, sau chiar exclusiv, în limba rusă. În urma „industrializării rapide”, s-a 

ajuns, pe de o parte, la înglobarea rigidă a RSSM în complexul militar-industrial 

panunional, la aservirea industriei locale resurselor de materii prime ale URSS şi 

finanŃarea ei centralizată, iar pe de altă parte, la grave dezechilibre etnodemografice. 

ConsecinŃele ecologice ale politicii social-economice promovate de regimul comunist 

pe parcursul deceniilor postbelice au fost, de asemenea, dezastruoase. 

Ar putea urma replica oponenŃilor noştri: oamenii aveau un serviciu, o pensie asigurată, 

servicii medicale de stat, învăŃământul era gratuit. Aşa este. Statul socialist şi-a asumat 

rolul de filantrop paternal, dar acest paternalism era al unui stat producător al 

iresponsabilităŃii şi dependenŃei indivizilor atât în domeniul vieŃii publice, cât şi în cel al 

vieŃii private. Or, într-un stat totalitar, egalitatea poate fi maximizată doar pe seama 

libertăŃii, astfel încât egalitatea şi fraternitatea autentică sunt distruse. Iată de ce, trecutul 

totalitar nu ne poate oferi soluŃii pentru prezentul şi viitorul nostru şi al copiilor noştri. 

Principalul pilon al regimului totalitar comunist a fost Partidul Comunist Unic care a 

confiscat autoritatea publică. Conducerea de partid a comandat şi a comis crime în masă, 

represiuni şi deportări calificate drept crime împotriva umanităŃii, a instrumentat o 

ideologie represivă, a exercitat un control cvazitotal asupra societăŃii şi indivizilor aparte. 

Partidul Comunist şi organele sale de represiune sunt principalii responsabili de toate 

ororile produse în epoca sovietică. Obedient ordinelor conducerii PCUS, CC al PCM s-a 

opus până în ultimul moment procesului de suveranizare şi dobândire a independenŃei de 

stat a Republicii Moldova, fiind declarat, după puciul din august 1991 de la Moscova, în 

afara legii. 

Comisia a stabilit că Republica Moldova de astăzi este rodul şi rezultatul mişcării de 

emancipare democratică şi naŃională de la sfârşitul anilor `80 ai secolului trecut, este 

expresia actului de voinŃă politică de secesiune de fosta URSS şi de integrare plenară în 

lumea liberă şi democratică. 

Comisia a efectuat o inventariere a crimelor, ororilor, atrocităŃilor abuzurilor şi 

nedreptăŃilor comise de regimul totalitar comunist între anii `20 – `90 ai secolului XX, 

care include: 

568

1) extinderea dictaturii Partidului Comunist Unic în zonele incluse în RASS 

Moldovenească şi misiunea de subminare şi subversiune a acestei entităŃi în raport 

cu România şi populaŃia din Basarabia, de cap de pod al revoluŃiei mondiale 

bolşevice; 

2) instituirea unui mecanism diabolic de represiune (CeKa, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, 

NKGB, MGB, KGB, JustiŃie şi Procuratură) şi aplicarea terorii în masă; 

3) decretarea şi aplicarea unei legislaŃii discriminatorii antiumane; 

4) impunerea unei ideologii a urii de clasă, a urii faŃă de fiinŃa şi demnitatea umană, 

exacerbarea propagandei anticreştine şi a xenofobiei; 

5) mutilarea spirituală a moldovenilor prin impunerea unei limbi artificiale, străine de 

limba română, şi a unei identităŃi contrafăcute ideologic; 

6) interzicerea cugetului liber, a dreptului de asociere, a liberei iniŃiative, 

exterminarea şi marginalizarea intelectualităŃii; 

7) lichidarea Ńărănimii ca clasă prin colectivizarea forŃată şi deportările de la 

începutul anilor `30 ai secolului XX; 

8) foametea cumplită din anii 1932-1933; 

9) declanşarea represiunilor împotriva aşa-numitelor „elemente antisovietice” şi 

„naŃionaliste” de la mijlocul anilor `30 ai secolului trecut, deportarea şi 

exterminarea în masă a oamenilor prin deciziile unor instituŃii extrajudiciare, ale 

aşa-numitelor „troika”; 

10) ocuparea, prin dictat, la 28 Iunie 1940 a Basarabiei, Nordului Bucovinei şi 

Ținutului HerŃa în urma tranzacŃiei sovieto-germane din 23 august 1939 şi a 

înŃelegerilor secrete ulterioare dintre URSS şi Germania nazistă; 

11) realizarea unui transplant de sistem sovietic în teritoriile româneşti ocupate şi 

impunerea cu forŃa a regimului totalitar comunist; 

12) aplicarea terorii împotriva fruntaşilor vieŃii publice, intelectualilor, slujitorilor 

cultelor şi oamenilor simpli rămaşi în teritoriile ocupate, comiterea unor asasinate 

din motive de ură de clasă; 

13) exodul forŃat al zecilor de mii de oameni, intelectuali, în primul rând, din teritoriile 

ocupate de URSS; 

14) formarea abuzivă a RSS Moldoveneşti şi sfârtecarea teritorială a Basarabiei; 

15) 15) interzicerea alfabetului românesc şi a limbii române şi impunerea alfabetului 

rusesc, prin Hotărârea Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului al URSS din 11 

noiembrie 1940; 

16) anularea abuzivă a dreptului la cetăŃenia română prin Decretul Prezidiului 

Sovietului Suprem al URSS cu privire la restabilirea cetăŃeniei sovietice de către 

locuitorii Basarabiei şi la dobândirea ei de către locuitorii Bucovinei de Nord din 8 

martie 1941; 

17) deportarea în regiunile îndepărtate ale URSS a zecilor de mii de oameni nevinovaŃi 

la 13 iunie 1941; 

569

18) mobilizările forŃate antebelice şi postbelice a zecilor de mii de tineri pe şantierele 

de muncă (FZO) din URSS şi înrolarea lor în Armata Sovietică; 

19) arestările şi epurările operate de organele sovietice de represiune în primii ani 

postbelici; 

20) foametea organizată din 1946-1947; 

21) deportarea în regiunile îndepărtate ale URSS a zecilor de mii de oameni nevinovaŃi 

la 6 iulie 1949; 

22) lichidarea proprietăŃii private, confiscarea bunurilor materiale ale Ńăranilor şi 

colectivizarea satului; 

23) prigoana împotriva Bisericii şi a slujitorilor cultelor, închiderea, profanarea şi 

demolarea locaşurilor de cult; 

24) deportarea pentru credinŃă în regiunile îndepărtate ale URSS la 1 aprilie 1951 a 

credincioşilor confesiunii „Martorii lui Iehova”; 

25) ofensiva ideologică şi propagandistică împotriva scriitorilor şi valorilor noastre 

naŃionale; 

26) sovietizarea, rusificarea şi deznaŃionalizarea populaŃiei prin sistemul de educaŃie şi 

cultură, aparatul administrativ, mass-media şi propogandă; 

27) manipularea şi deformarea conştiinŃei identitare prin falsificarea istoriei, 

impunerea unor ritualuri, monumente şi simboluri străine firii noastre; 

28) negarea identităŃii româneşti a populaŃiei majoritare şi inocularea românofobiei; 

29) instrumentarea unui regim al „terorii memoriei”, al controlului, al constrângerilor 

şi al persecuŃiilor individualităŃii umane pentru cea mai mică încercare de gândire 

liberă în raport cu regimul totalitar comunist; 

30) promovarea unei industrializări şi urbanizări de tip colonial, cu grave consecinŃe 

pe plan etnodemografic; 

31) înregistrarea unor mari dezechilibre ecologice şi a unor urmări nefaste pentru 

sănătatea populaŃiei în urma experimentelor în sfera agriculturii bazate pe 

chimizarea şi concentrarea excesivă a producŃiei agricole; 

32) formarea unei caste privilegiate a aparatului de partid, a nomenclaturii care a 

consfiscat şi a concentrat puterea absolută,a profitat de aceasta şi a parazitat pe 

spatele cetăŃenilor simpli, servind interese străine. 

Plecînd de la cele expuse, Comisia susŃine ferm şi univoc că regimul totalitar comunist a 

fost de la început şi până în ultimul moment al existenŃei sale un regim criminal şi 

represiv, abuziv şi inuman, lipsit de orice urmă de legitimitate. Transplantat din RASSM 

în Basarabia în urma unui act de dictat, acesta a fost totodată un regim de ocupaŃie străină 

sovietică, din acea clipă şi până la înlăturarea şi prăbuşirea sa în anii 1990-1991. 

Comisia propune condamnarea oficială a regimului totalitar comunist din RASS 

Moldovenească şi RSS Moldovenească drept unul care a comis acte de genocid şi crime 

împotriva umanităŃii, prin teroare în masă, represiune politică, foamete organizată, 

deportări, violarea demnităŃii umane şi drepturilor fundamentale ale omului. 

570

Comisia propune onorarea şi comemorarea tuturor victimelor regimului totalitar 

comunist, tuturor victimelor Holocaustului, tuturor celor care, în anii crunŃi de teroare, 

represiune şi opresiune, au avut de pătimit, precum şi tuturor celor care în aceşti ani, prin 

fapta, verticalitatea şi cuvântul lor au opus rezistenŃă regimului totalitar comunist, 

punându-şi viaŃa şi libertatea în pericol. 

Având în vedere necesitatea debarasării de moştenirea grea a regimului totalitar 

comunist, a distanŃării ireversibile de acest regim, în spiritul recomandărilor în materie ale 

Consiliului Europei, OSCE şi Uniunii Europene, Comisia formulează următoarele 

propuneri: 

1) condamnarea regimului totalitar comunist din RASSM şi RSSM drept unul care a 

comis crime împotriva umanităŃii, precum şi condamnarea morală a acŃiunilor 

tuturor acelor persoane car au participat la comiterea crimelor regimului totalitar 

comunist; 

2) interzicerea utilizării noŃiunii de „comunist” şi a derivatelor acesteia în titulaturile 

formaŃiunilor politice, în denumirile unor instituŃii şi întreprinderi publice şi 

private, precum şi interzicerea utilizării şi propagării în scopuri politice în spaŃiul 

public a simbolurilor totalitare, deopotrivă, comuniste şi naziste, în conformitate cu 

RezoluŃia OSCE din 2009 cu privire la reunirea Europei divizate prin promovarea 

Drepturilor Omului şi LibertăŃilor Civile în sec. XXI; 

3) elaborarea şi adoptarea neamânată a Legii LustraŃiei; 

4) repunerea victimelor regimului totalitar comunist şi a urmaşilor lor în drepturile 

lor juridice, morale şi materiale depline prin amendarea cadrului juridic în vigoare 

sau adoptarea unei Legi noi; 

5) eternizarea memoriei victimelor regimului totalitar comunist şi a participanŃilor la 

mişcarea de rezistenŃă prin ridicarea în oraşul Chişinău a unui complex memorial, 

deschiderea unor muzee locale, instalarea unor plăci comemorative în locurile 

comiterii crimelor şi ororilor comuniste; 

6) declararea zilei de 23 august ca Zi Europeană a Comemorării Victimelor 

Regimurilor Totalitare şi Autoritare, care să fie marcată cu demnitate şi 

imparŃialitate, în consens cu RezoluŃia din 2009 a Parlamentului European cu 

privire la conştiinŃa europeană şi totalitarismul; 

7) declararea zilelor de 13 iunie (1941), 6 iulie (1949) şi 1 aprilie (1951), în care au 

avut loc deportări masive, drept zile naŃionale de comemorare a victimelor 

regimului totalitar comunist; 

8) formarea unei comisii de experŃi care să evalueze daunele materiale pricinuite de 

regimul totalitar comunist; 

9) aprobarea unui program de stat pe termen lung privind investigarea în profunzime 

a regimului totalitar comunist; 

571

10) reorganizarea Arhivei OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova în 

Arhiva Regimului Totalitar Comunist din Republica Moldova, cu transmiterea 

tuturor fondurilor de arhivă din depozitele speciale ale Ministerului de Interne, 

Serviciului de InformaŃie şi Securitate, Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi al 

Integrării Europene, a fondurilor Procuraturii Generale, precum şi a altor fonduri 

ce reflectă esenŃa regimului totalitar comunist în fondurile arhivei respective şi 

asigurarea accesului neîngrădit la toate aceste fonduri; 

11) crearea unui Institut de Studiere a Totalitarismului; 

12) elaborarea unui manual de istorie a regimului totalitar comunist şi introducerea în 

sistemul de instruire şi educaŃie preuniversitară a unui curs de istorie a 

totalitarismului; 

13) încurajarea desfăşurării în mass-media a dezbaterilor publice privind esenŃa 

inumană a regimurilor totalitare, comuniste şi naziste. 

14) abrogarea Legii nr. 546-XV din 19 decembrie 2003 privind adoptarea ConcepŃiei 

politicii naŃionale a Republicii Moldova, concepŃia fiind una tributară trecutului şi 

ideologiei totalitare, incompatibilă cu parcursul european al societăŃii noastre. 

Avansând acest set de propuneri, Comisia subliniază că unele din ele pot fi realizate fără 

întârziere, altele într-un termen mediu sau îndelungat, importantă fiind continuarea sub 

diferite forme, în cadrul unor diverse instituŃii – preuniversitare, universitare, de 

cercetare, mass-media etc. – a activităŃilor iniŃiate prin instituirea sa. Numai astfel vor 

putea fi obŃinute rezultate reale în asanarea climatului social, politic şi moral din 

societate. 

Comisia are convingerea că numai prin asumarea adevărului istoric ne vom putea simŃi 

într-adevăr oameni liberi, vom fi mai puternici, mai deschişi către noi înşine şi către 

lumea externă, mai uniŃi, vom avea mai multă încredere în forŃele noastre şi în ziua de 

mâine, în viitorul nostru european. 

Comisia face un apel la bunul nostru simŃ şi la memoria noastră colectivă. 

Nu avem dreptul să uităm, nu avem dreptul să fim indiferenŃi. Prin asumarea şi însuşirea 

adevărului istoric, nu vom permite niciodată nimănui să pună la îndoială dreptul nostru la 

o viaŃă demnă şi liberă într-o societate liberă, prosperă şi democratică. O reconciliere 

civică este necesară, dar o reconciliere civică este posibilă numai prin asumarea 

adevărului istoric, oricât de greu şi de amar ar fi acesta. 

572

ÎNTÂISTĂTĂTORII BISERICII 

ORTODOXE DIN R.S.S.M. ŞI POLITICA 

RELIGIOASĂ SOVIETICĂ ÎN PERIOADA 

ANILOR 1945 – 1962 

Romeo CEMÎRTAN 1 

Politica antireligioasă promovată de statul sovietic în perioada interbelică, în 

rezultatul căreia peste 50 mii de preoŃi şi călugări au fost ucişi sau trimişi în lagărele de 

muncă, zeci de mii de biserici au fost închise şi majoritatea şcolilor teologice au fost 

lichidate, a fost schimbată, brusc, în timpul celui de-al doilea război mondial. Stalin se 

adresează Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse pentru a primi sprijin atât moral, cât şi material în 

eforturile de război cu Germania nazistă. În anul 1943, pentru a discuta problema 

relaŃiilor dintre Biserică şi stat, Stalin se întâlneşte cu mitropolitul-vicar Serghei 

(Stragorodski), mitropolitul de Leningrad şi Novgorod Alexie (Simanski) şi exarhul 

Ucrainei, mitropolitul de Kiev şi GaliŃia Nicolae (Iaruşevici). În urma acestei întâlniri, 

la 8 septembrie 1943, la Moscova, a avut loc Sinodul care l-a ales patriarh (după 18 ani 

de întrerupere) pe mitropolitul Serghie. Întâistătătorii Bisericii Ruse au adoptat un 

mesaj de recunoştinŃă adresat guvernului sovietic, în care au subliniat în mod deosebit 

"atitudinea plină de înŃelegere" a lui Stalin faŃă de nevoile Bisericii Ruse şi au promis 

să-şi înmulŃească lucrarea "pentru salvarea patriei" 2 . 

Una dintre multiplele preocupări ale ierarhiei ruse în primii ani postbelici a fost şi 

înfiinŃarea noilor eparhii pe teritoriul łărilor Baltice şi al Basarabiei. Astfel, invocând 

dreptul istoric şi canonic asupra teritoriului anexat la U.R.S.S., Biserica Rusă 

reînfiinŃează Episcopia de Chişinău şi în decembrie 1944 îl trimite la conducerea 

eparhiei pe episcopul Ieronim Zaharov (decembrie 1944 – februarie 1947) 3 . Referitor la 

activitatea acestui ierarh am găsit în dosarele de la Arhiva NaŃională câteva menŃiuni 

importante pentru stabilirea raportului dintre Biserică şi stat în R.S.S.M. în primii ani 

de după război. Atitudinea episcopului Ieronim faŃă de conducerea statului sovietic, 

care se află în perfectă concordanŃă cu politica generală a Bisericii Ruse în relaŃiile ei 

cu statul ateist, este exprimată clar în telegramele trimise către I. V. Stalin cu ocazia 

anumitor aniversări. De exemplu, la data de 07.11.1945, Ieronim, episcopul de Chişinău 

1 Muzeul NaŃional de Etnografie şi Istorie Naturală a Moldovei, Chisinau, Republica Moldova. 

2 Mai multe detalii vezi la Pr.Lector Chiril Pistrui, Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă 1918-1958, în 

Mitropolia Ardealului, anul V, nr. 1-2, Sibiu, 1960 şi Boris Souvarine, Stalin. Studiu istoric al 

bolşevismului. Procesul comunismului, trad. Doina Jela Despois, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1999. 

3 Păcurariu Mircea, Basarabia, aspecte din istoria Bisericii şi a neamului românesc, Iaşi, 1993, p. 

125. 

573

şi Moldova, trimite o telegramă la Moscova cu următorul conŃinut: „În fericita zi, în 

care aniversăm 28 ani de la Marea RevoluŃie din Octombrie, ziua care a fost încununată 

cu eterna şi biruitoare slavă, Eparhia Ortodoxă Moldovenească, eliberată din ghearele 

dihaniei fasciste, vă salută, Iosif Vissarionovici, ca pe un conducător genial şi umbrit de 

slavă veşnică, şi roagă pe Dumnezeu să Vă dăruiască Dumneavoastră şi armatei roşii 

glorioase, pe care o conduceŃi, şi tuturor celor care muncesc pentru binele şi slava 

Patriei noastre, mulŃi ani în pace. Cu ocazia acestei sărbători, pentru ajutorarea familiei 

afectate a eroilor armatei roşii, Vă rugăm să primiŃi două sute mii ruble – un cadou 

modest, exprimarea bucuriei noastre” 4 . Această elogiere este însoŃită de un aport 

material consistent, contribuŃia Bisericii pentru susŃinerea statului. Statul sovietic a 

înŃeles că religia poate fi o ramură economică profitabilă a Ńării. De aceea, cu ocazia 

aniversarii primului an de la biruinŃa asupra fascismului, contribuŃia din partea 

episcopului Ieronim se măreşte la 400 mii ruble 5 , o sumă enormă pentru anii de după 

război. Desigur, aceste sume enorme de bani erau strânse de la cele câteva sute de 

parohii existente care activau într-o Ńară distrusă de război şi de noua stăpânire. 

Colectarea abuzivă de bani şi diferite taxe impuse de episcopie a stârnit o reacŃie 

adecvată din partea credincioşilor şi a clerului. Astfel, la data de 17.09.1946, 

împuternicitul P. Romenschii a înregistrat sub numărul 3578 o plângere colectivă a 

credincioşilor împotriva abuzurilor comise de episcopul Ieronim 6 . Despre ce fel de 

abuzuri este vorba, aflăm din scrisoarea adresată lui Stalin de câŃiva preoŃi şi dascăli din 

R.S.S.M. în vara anului 1946 7 . În această scrisoare se spune că în timpul stăpânirii 

române clerul era mulŃumit, iar în prezent Biserica din R.S.S.M. este condusă de 

Ieronim, care nu este canonic. Acest arhiereu îşi permite să strige la preoŃi şi să-i insulte 

în cel mai neruşinat mod, numindu-i „huligani, mincinoşi, tâmpiŃi”, alungându-i prin 

„cară-te de aici!”. PreoŃii arată că Ieronim este corupt, căci „cine din cler îi dă lui 

Ieronim o mie de ruble pe acela îl primeşte şi este mai blând”, iar „hirotonia dascălilor 

tineri în treapta preoŃilor costă de la 5 până la 10 mii ruble”. Se mai preciza că arhiereul 

„nu dă voie preoŃilor să se transfere dintr-o parohie în altă sau să părăsească eparhia”. 

Chiar dacă patriarhul Alexei I a fost informat despre toate aceste abuzuri, nu a fost luată 

nici o măsură. Cei 15 preoŃi semnatari ai plângerii veneau cu propunerea explicită: 

Ieronim să fie transferat în Rusia, iar în Moldova să fie ales un alt arhiereu, mai blând şi 

destoinic. Ca reacŃie la această plângere, Consiliul de Miniştri din R.S.S.M., reprezentat 

de I. Ivanov, se adresează lui P. Romenschii pentru a primi explicaŃii în privinŃa 

atitudinii de nemulŃumire a clerului faŃă de Ieronim. Se cerea de stabilit cine sunt şi ce 

reprezintă cei care s-au jeluit, care au fost motivele ce au dus la apariŃia acestei plângeri 

şi dacă este adevărat că majoritatea clerului din R.S.S.M. este nemulŃumită de 

4 Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova în continuare ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5, f. 118. 

5 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10, f. 97. 

6 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12, f. 175. 

7 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12, f. 109. 

574

Ieronim. 8 . În urma cercetărilor efectuate, s-a constatat că unii preoŃi nici nu-l recunosc 

pe episcopul Ieronim ca ierarh local şi fac slujbe de sine stătător 9 . Au mai fost 

dezvăluite cazuri în care anumiŃi preoŃi au fost destituiŃi doar pentru folosirea în timpul 

slujbei a altei limbi decât cea slavonă 10 . 

Referitor la limba în care se oficia slujba divină în R.S.S.M., în primii ani de după 

război, putem constata o situaŃie confuză. Fiind parte componentă a Patriarhiei Ruse, 

clerul Episcopiei Chişinăului era obligat să oficieze serviciul divin în limba slavonă, 

însă majoritatea preoŃilor rămaşi în Basarabia sub ocupaŃia sovietică nu o cunoşteau şi 

slujeau în continuare în limba română sau în limbile minorităŃilor naŃionale. În 

administraŃia bisericească, limba de circulaŃie era rusă, care rămânea a fi necunoscută 

pentru mulŃi preoŃi. Abia din 1949 erau admise unele scrisori şi plângeri redactate în 

limba „moldovenească”, majoritatea fiind traduse în limba rusă. De asemenea, 

slavonizarea şi rusificarea clerului şi a credincioşilor se făcea şi prin intermediul 

cărŃilor de rugăciuni tipărite la Chişinău în slavona veche în 1946 11 . Impunerea forŃată a 

limbii slavone şi a celei ruse în Biserica Ortodoxă din R.S.S.M. a fost unul din motivele 

principale ale nemulŃumirii clerului şi a enoriaşilor faŃă de activitatea pastorală 

desfăşurată de episcopul Ieronim. 

Pusă în faŃa multor probe compromiŃătoare, Patriarhia Rusă, sub presiunea statului, a 

fost nevoită să-l înlocuiască pe episcopul Ieronim cu episcopul Benedict Poleacov 

(februarie 1947 – iunie 1948). Despre activitatea acestui episcop în cadrul eparhiei 

Chişinăului nu am găsit până acum nicio informaŃie relevantă. Luând în considerare 

termenul foarte scurt de păstorire şi perioada de activitate episcopală care a coincis cu 

organizarea de către autorităŃile sovietice a foametei în rândul populaŃiei autohtone cu 

scopul determinării lor de a accepta colectivizarea, putem presupune că autorităŃile 

republicane au rămas nesatisfăcute de colaborarea lor cu episcopul Benedict. Sub 

pretextul că ar fi un simpatizant al mişcării inochentiste din RSSM 12 , Patriarhia Rusă, la 

insistenŃa lui P. Romenschi, îl înlocuieşte cu episcopul Nectarie Grigoriev (iunie 1948 – 

9 martie 1969). 

Pentru a îmbunătăŃi şi a întări raportul dintre Biserica Ortodoxă şi stat în favoarea 

celui din urmă, P. Romenschii primeşte directivă de la Moscova de a se implica mai 

activ în problemele interne ale Episcopiei de Chişinău. În acest scop, episcopul 

Nectarie era obligat să se consulte cu împuternicitul pe problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe 

Ruse înainte de a lua decizii în sferele de activitate misionară, pastorală sau liturgică. 

Cu timpul, relaŃia dintre P. Romenschii şi episcopul Nectarie s-a transformat într-o 

colaborare activă şi „rodnică” prezentată de către primul ca „o atitudine normală şi 

8 

Adresarea, a fost înregistrată cu nr. 3184, la 23.08.1946, Ibidem, f. 148. 

9 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5, ff. 22 şi 24. 

10 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10, f. 61. 

11 


12 

Pasat,V.I.,Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, док. № 58, сc. 278-286. 

575

profesională” 13 . Numai pe parcursul anului 1949, episcopul Nectarie a fost primit de 

împuternicitul P. Romenschii de 9 ori pentru a discuta problemele religioase de caracter 

general 14 . La aceste întâlniri au fost discutate următoarele probleme: 

a. „Convocarea adunării protopopilor despre care am informat mai înainte şi am 

primit aviz pozitiv pentru desfăşurare; 

b. Convocarea adunării stareŃilor şi a stareŃelor mănăstirilor cu scopul de a ridica 

atât starea economică a mănăstirilor, cât şi starea morală, disciplina şi ascultarea 

monahală. Împuternicitul a catalogat aceste intenŃii ca fiind nedorite şi periculoase 

pentru că ar mări influenŃa mănăstirilor asupra credincioşilor; 

c. Editarea Tipicului bisericesc în limba moldovenească. IniŃiativa a fost respinsă 

pe motiv că bisericile din R.S.S.M sunt suprasaturate cu literatură bisericească; 

d. Statutul bisericilor: bisericile închise din parohiile mari să fie reactivate, iar în 

locul lor să fie închise bisericile din parohiile mici, iniŃiativa fiind respinsă” 15 . 

Analizând documentul citat mai sus, constatăm următoarele: 

1. P. Romenschii primea de la Moscova directive care vizau problemele Eparhiei 

Chişinăului. Misiunea lui principală, de fapt consta în monitorizarea şi evaluarea vieŃii 

religioase din R.S.S.M. pentru transmiterea informaŃiilor adunate Consiliului pentru 

Problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe din cadrul Consiliului Miniştrilor U.R.S.S., care era 

investit cu puterea decizională în sfera bisericească. 

2. Nicio activitate pastorală sau administrativă nu era permisă fără avizul 

Consiliului abilitat, ceea ce era un amestec flagrant din partea puterii civile în domeniul 

religios. 

3. Statul sovietic, prin toate mijloacele legale şi ilegale, urmărea să discrediteze 

mănăstirile basarabene care au devenit centre de rezistenŃă în faŃă politicii antireligioase 

a statului. 

4. Pentru a diminua religiozitatea în rândul populaŃiei erau închise cele mai mari şi 

prospere parohii, deoarece cele mici şi slabe cu timpul dispăreau de la sine, fără niciun 

efort din partea statului. 

5. Era interzisă tipărirea cărŃilor de cult în limba „moldovenească”, cu scopul de a 

diminua activitatea liturgică şi a slavoniza cultul divin atât de nepopular în rândul 

clerului basarabean. 

Toate aceste doleanŃe, înaintate în 1949 împuternicitului P. Romenschii, erau 

rezultatul nu atât a râvnei pastorale din partea Episcopului Nectarie, cât a numărului 

mare de plângeri şi petiŃii adresate administraŃiei eparhiale din Chişinău de către 

enoriaşii din toată republica. 

13 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 64, (vezi Anexa 27). 

14 Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din R. Mpldova în continuare AOSP, F. 51, i. 9, d. 44, f. 

13 

15 AOSP, F. 51, i. 9, d. 44, f. 14. 

576

De fapt, situaŃia în sfera bisericească sub păstorirea lui Nectarie, în comparaŃie cu cea 

din perioada lui Ieronim, nu s-a îmbunătăŃit deloc. Chiar dacă în perioada anilor 1950- 

1956, numărul preoŃilor a înregistrat o creştere semnificativă, iar cea a bisericilor 

deschise a înregistrat o stabilitate relativă, perioada respectivă o putem caracteriza ca un 

declin spiritual continuu, care era provocat de corupŃia conducerii bisericeşti, de 

prevalarea în rândul clericilor a intereselor materiale asupra celor duhovniceşti, de 

neglijarea şi chiar asuprirea valorilor tradiŃionale româneşti în favoarea celor slave şi de 

crearea artificială a naŃiunii şi a limbii „moldoveneşti”. 

Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă din R.S.S.M., din nefericire, a fost printre primii susŃinători ai 

elaborării ideologiei moldoveneşti, promovând de la amvon limba şi istoria 

„moldovenească” 16 . Această nouă ideologie era convenabilă atât statului sovietic, cât şi 

conducerii Patriarhiei Ruse. Dacă în perioada Ńaristă, pentru a deosebi populaŃia din 

teritoriul abuziv anexat în 1812 de restul Moldovei istorice, autorităŃile ruse au numit-o 

„basarabeană”, atunci în 1940 şi după 1944, românii din Basarabia de data aceasta erau 

numiŃi „moldoveni”, iar teritoriul, Moldavia. Toate aceste manipulări aveau ca scop 

ruperea populaŃiei din stânga Prutului de tulpina ei românească şi crearea unei naŃiuni 

alternative celei româneşti, care să se identifice cultural şi ideologic cu slavii. Şi pe plan 

bisericesc, crearea naŃiunii „moldoveneşti” era oportună. În perioada ăn care Biserica 

Rusă era supusă represiunilor de către bolşevici, Biserica Ortodoxă Română a fost 

ridicată la rangul de Patriarhie. În 1928 în cadrul acestei Patriarhii, a fost înfiinŃată 

Mitropolia Basarabiei, recunoscută de toate Bisericile Autocefale. Prin urmare, crearea 

eparhiei ruse pe teritoriul Basarabiei, populat în majoritatea de români, era o încălcare 

gravă a canoanelor bisericeşti care reglementează disputele jurisdicŃionale între două 

Biserici Autocefale. Însă, în cazul în care populaŃia din Basarabia este de altă naŃiune 

decât cea românească, deci „moldovenească”, atunci Biserica Rusă avea tot dreptul 

acordat de statutul ei de Biserică Misionară, să înfiinŃeze noi eparhii pe teritorii nou 

anexate unde se află alte naŃiuni şi care nu au Biserică Autocefală. Astfel, Biserica Rusă 

a condiŃionat jurisdicŃia bisericească teritorială de extinderea politică a statului ateist. 

Un alt argument în susŃinerea prezenŃei canonice a Bisericii Ruse în Basarabia era 

existenŃa eparhiei ruse la Chişinău în perioada Ńaristă, prin urmare, în 1940 şi în 1944 a 

fost reactivată această eparhie. Însă apelarea la acest argument denotă o nerecunoaştere 

a voinŃei populaŃiei din cele trei Principate româneşti de a constitui o naŃiune şi un stat 

unitar, fapt contestat pe plan internaŃional în 1921 numai de autorităŃile sovietice. 

Aşadar, negarea de către Patriarhia Rusă a apartenenŃei româneşti a populaŃiei 

autohtone din Basarabia este o continuare a politicii antiromâneşti promovată de statul 

sovietic în perioada interbelică. Astfel, Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă din R.S.S.M. a devenit 

un instrument abil folosit de autorităŃile comuniste pentru a anihila cultura şi identitatea 

românească a populaŃiei autohtone. 

16 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 24, f. 177. 

577

Lupta cu naŃionalismul în rândul clericilor, dar şi transformarea slujirii bisericeşti întrun 

business profitabil, a mărit numărul celor nemulŃumiŃi de activitatea pastorală a lui 

Nectarie. Unii, nemaidorind să plătească taxe neoficiale episcopiei, cum era cazul 

preotului Samuil Salamon, activau ilegal, slujind în bisericile închise din diferite 

localităŃi 17 . Este surprinzător că aceşti preoŃi erau toleraŃi şi chiar ajutaŃi de autorităŃile 

locale care cunoşteau destul de bine situaŃia internă din Eparhia Chişinăului. Despre 

fenomenul preoŃilor călători, etichetaŃi ca „răzvrătiŃi impostori”, episcopul Nectarie 

raporta lui P. Romenschii că „autorităŃile locale în mai multe raioane nu întreprind 

măsuri reale pentru stoparea activităŃii pseudopreoŃilor, care nu sunt înregistraŃi dar 

slujesc pe la biserici închise şi la casa oamenilor. Aceşti impostori prejudiciază statul şi, 

fiind nepedepsiŃi, îşi răspândesc în mai multe raioane activitatea” 18 . 

AlŃi preoŃi, pentru a-şi face dreptate, plecau la Patriarhia de la Moscova cerând 

permisiunea de a sluji în parohiile Eparhiei Chişinău. Un astfel de preot, cu numele 

Filaret Şundeac, a fost arestat în 1955 şi judecat penal conform art. 110 şi 180/1 ale 

Codului Penal al U.R.S.S. La interogatoriu el a declarat că are permisiunea de a sluji în 

biserica din satul Crocmaz, raionul Olăneşti, de la însuşi patriarhul Alexei I al 

Moscovei, însă Episcopul Nectarie i-a luat această permisiune pentru că el a refuzat să-i 

plătească episcopului 10 mii de ruble ∗ pentru procurarea unei maşini şi nu ducea 

cadouri reprezentanŃilor eparhiei 19 . Implicarea lui Nectarie în sfera economică a devenit 

atât de mare încât unele din departamentele financiare raionale, pentru a încasa 

impozitele pe venit de la clerici, care erau ilegale, se adresau direct la episcop pentru ca 

el să-i impună să plătească 20 . Râvna ierarhului pentru binele patriei era apreciată de 

autorităŃile sovietice în felul următor: „În timpul aflării sale în R.S.S.M., arhiepiscopul 

Nectarie s-a recomandat pozitiv şi a dat dovadă de loialitate şi aspiraŃii patriotice” 21 . 

Pentru aceste merite deosebite, Patriarhia Rusă, în februarie 1956, i-a acordat rangul de 

arhiepiscop al Chişinăului şi al Moldovei 22 . 

Ca reacŃie la abuzurile din partea episcopului Nectarie şi în dorinŃa de a le opri, un 

grup de preoŃi în frunte cu arhimandritul Macarie (Misail ChiriŃă), fiind încurajaŃi de 

schimbările politice din U.R.S.S., adresează în primăvara anului 1956 o scrisoare 

mareşalului Jucov în care cere sprijinul pentru Biserica din Moldova în vederea 

redobândirii statutului de Mitropolie şi obŃinerii autonomiei în cadrul Patriarhiei 

Moscovei. De asemenea, în această scrisoare era exprimată dorinŃa ca întâistătătorul 

17 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 56, f. 59. 

18 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 15. 

∗ Pentru comparaŃie; chiria apartamentului cu o cameră în Chişinău costa 100 ruble lunar, un 

muncitor, în mediu, primea 200 ruble lunar, iar P. Romenschii, în 1956, avea salariu lunar de la 

1200 la 1400 ruble (ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 88). 

19 ANRM, F. 3046, i 1, d. 56, f. 32. 

20 ANRM, F. 3046, i 1, d. 56, f. 176. 

21 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, f. 62. 

22 Ibidem. 

578

Bisericii din Moldova să fie de naŃionalitate moldovean şi să cunoască limba 

moldovenească pentru că poporul moldav „are unele tradiŃii naŃionale şi religioase total 

străine spiritualităŃii ruse...”. Arhiepiscopul Nectarie nu cunoştea limba română, chiar 

dacă păstorea această eparhie de 7 ani şi „de aceea nu este în stare să satisfacă cerinŃele 

religioase ale moldovenilor, care în Moldova sunt 95%”. În scrisoare se mai precizează 

dorinŃa Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova de a rămâne în cadrul Patriarhiei Ruse, însă cu 

statut de „soră mai mică” 23 . 

Scrisoarea cu caracter separatist a avut un efect de bombă şi a stârnit reacŃii dure din 

partea Consiliului pentru problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse din cadrul Consiliului de 

Miniştri ai U.R.S.S. cu sediul la Moscova. Într-o notă informativă de urgenŃă, 24 G. 

Carpov, preşedintele Consiliului, trimite lui P. Romenschii scrisoarea arhimandritului 

Macarie (Misail ChiriŃă) adresată mareşalului Jucov în privinŃa autonomiei Bisericii 

Ortodoxe din Moldova şi cere să atragă atenŃia asupra acŃiunilor lui Macarie, luând 

măsuri pentru ca el să nu-şi poată populariza intenŃiile sale şi să nu informeze Consiliul 

despre ceea ce P. Romenschii ştie în această privinŃă 25 . Din această notă informativă, 

dar şi din caracterizarea dată Arhiepiscopului Nectarie de către împuternicitul P. 

Romenschii 26 , deducem că autorităŃile sovietice erau conştiente de carenŃele arhiereului, 

dar pentru slugărnicia sa faŃă de regimul sovietic şi în scopul discreditării Bisericii, îl 

tolerau şi îl promovau. Pentru a lua situaŃia sub control şi a preveni răspândirea 

sentimentelor separatiste în rândul clerului moldovenesc, în perioada zilelor de 12-17 

iunie 1956, în Chişinău au fost cu inspecŃie Ivan Ivanovici Ivanov şi Medvedev, 

membrii Consiliului pentru problemele B.O.Ruse în cadrul Consiliului de Miniştri 

U.R.S.S. 27 La rândul său, Patriarhul Alexei I a propus arhiepiscopului Nectarie ca în 

iulie 1956, mănăstirile moldoveneşti să fie inspectate de către mitropolitul Serafim 

Luchianov, care fusese în FranŃa şi episcopul Teodor, care fusese în Argentina 28 . łinta 

inspectării nu era una întâmplătoare, atât arhimandritul Macarie, cât şi unii semnatari ai 

scrisorii adresate lui Jucov proveneau din mediul monahal care era cel mai reticent faŃă 

de activitatea bisericească promovată de Biserica Rusă în R.S.S.M. 

Campania de verificări şi inspectări cauzată de scrisoarea arhimandritului Macarie a 

culminat cu vizita neoficială a patriarhului Moscovei, Alexei I 29 , la Chişinău, în 

perioada zilelor 1-2 septembrie 1956. Având un caracter neoficial, această deplasare a 

patriarhului la Chişinău a vizat cel mai probabil situaŃia internă a Bisericii Ortodoxe 

din republică. Patriarhul s-a întâlnit şi cu împuternicitul P. Romenschii. Rezultatele şi 

23 

Ibidem, ff. 106 şi 106a. 

24 

Notă informativă de urgenŃă, nr.1113, 19 aprilie 1956. 

25 


26 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64, ff. 60-62. 

27 


28 


29 

ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1 d. 65, ff. 79-81. 

579

deciziile luate în cadrul aceste vizite rămân necunoscute, însă este cert că ele au fost 

decisive în evoluŃia raportului dintre Biserica şi stat în R.S.S.M. 

În privinŃa corupŃiei şi neglijării nevoilor spirituale ale credincioşilor din 

Arhiepiscopia Chişinăului, situaŃia nu s-a schimbat nici în următorii ani. Fiind dojenit 

de multe plângeri şi scrisori anonime, patriarhul Alexie I era nevoit în 1959 să-i trimită 

lui Nectarie un mesaj descurajator: „La Patriarhia din Moscova şi mie personal, în 

Odesa, continuă să vină plângeri de la credincioşii din parohiile şi mănăstirile eparhiei 

Chişinăului şi Moldovei. Ele se referă la faptul că parohiile rămân fără slujitori şi 

nevoile spirituale ale credincioşilor rămân nesatisfăcute, ceea ce contravine legii. 

Propun PreasfinŃiei Voastre să-mi prezentaŃi un raport în scris pentru luarea atitudinii. 

Patriarhul Alexei I” 30 . Însă această situaŃie era caracteristică nu numai eparhiei 

Chişinăului, amploarea decăderii moral-spirituale în rândul ierarhilor ruşi a ajuns 

dramatică, încât patriarhul Alexei I a fost nevoit să trimită pe data de 25 martie 1959 o 

circulară în toate eparhiile ale Patriarhiei Ruse. În această circulară, patriarhul apelează 

a două oară la ierarhi în privinŃa stopării avarismului existent printre ei. Erau 

înregistrate multe cazuri în care când unii dintre ierarhi, din contul economiilor 

eparhiale şi-au petrecut timpul la sanatorii, şi-au cumpărat autoturisme personale, şi-au 

desfăşurat cu fast zilele onomastice, astfel provocând sminteli mari în rândul 

credincioşilor. Acest exemplu era nociv şi pentru clerul aflat sub directă ascultare. 

Patriarhul dă câteva exemple de corupŃie a ierarhilor fără a pronunŃa numele: într-o 

eparhie, un ierarh a cheltuit timp de jumătate de an cinci sute de mii de ruble, în scopul 

procurării caselor şi a maşinilor pentru rudele sale. Altul a cumpărat o vilă pe banii 

eparhiali pentru nişte persoane apropiate care nu aveau nicio tangenŃă cu sfera 

bisericească. Un alt exemplu demonstra cum un ierarh, trecând dintr-o eparhie în altă, a 

prejudiciat eparhia cu 700 de mii de ruble, sumă pe care nu o poate nicidecum restitui. 

Există şi astfel de ierarhi care, transferându-se dintr-o eparhie în alta, aduceau cu sine 

lucruri şi obiecte din eparhia anterioară, pe care le credeau personale. Circulara se 

încheie cu un apel în vederea opririi acestor fărădelegi. În caz contrar, arhiereii erau 

ameninŃaŃi cu revizii şi controale, care, după părerea patriarhului „vor slăbi din 

autoritatea ierarhului” 31 . 

Ca reacŃie la situaŃia deplorabilă în sfera bisericească, autorităŃile sovietice, sub 

pretextul luptei împotriva corupŃiei şi decăderii morale în sânul Bisericii, au demarat, în 

primăvara anului 1959, o campanie antireligioasă pe tot cuprinsul U.R.S.S. Pentru 

Eparhia Chişinăului, represiunile împotriva Bisericii au fost cele mai drastice şi de 

amploare. La începutul acestei campanii antireligioase, arhiepiscopul Nectarie, fiind 

asaltat de zeci de plângeri şi apeluri din partea clerului şi a credincioşilor, protestează şi 

prezintă împuternicitului P. Romenschii 15 cazuri de amestec flagrant în treburile 

Bisericii din partea autorităŃile locale. Printre aceste acŃiuni se numără: închiderea 

30 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1 d. 93, f. 20. 

31 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, ff. 26-28. 

580

isericilor, interzicerea strângerii banilor pentru reparaŃia bisericilor, interzicerea de a 

face slujbe în casa oamenilor, interzicerea de a bate clopotele, interzicerea de a sluji în 

zilele lucrătoare, intimidarea preoŃilor prin acuzaŃii false de huliganism, confiscarea 

documentelor oficiale ale preoŃilor etc. 32 . Însă, datorită relaŃiei prestabilite de mai mulŃi 

ani dintre Biserica Ortodoxă şi statul sovietic, arhiepiscopul Nectarie era dispus să 

colaboreze în continuare cu autorităŃile laice în privinŃa ridicării culturii şi a conştiinŃei 

ateiste în rândul populaŃiei autohtone. 

Paralel cu represiunile statului împotriva religiozităŃii populaŃiei din R.S.S.M., 

conducerea Bisericii Ruse, fiind presată de stat, înăsprea condiŃiile de activitate 

liturgico-sacramentală a preoŃilor. Astfel, într-o circulară a lui Nectarie, adresată în 

1959 tuturor protopopilor şi egumenilor din eparhia sa, se recomandă să nu se instaleze 

crucifixe la intersecŃii, locuri publice şi fântâni. Cele existente se impuneau a fi 

evacuate în cimitire. Aceste acŃiuni trebuiau să fie executate împreună cu autorităŃile 

locale. De asemenea, se interzicea oficierea slujbelor în faŃa fântânilor şi a 

crucifixelor 33 . Într-un alt document emis în acelaşi an de Cancelaria Patriarhiei 

Moscovei şi adresat tuturor eparhiilor, se interzice ca persoanele sub 18 ani să slujească 

în altar. Se aminteşte că prin legea din 1929 sunt interzise slujbele religioase în locurile 

publice. Se interziceau vizitele preoŃilor în casele credincioşilor la sărbătorile de Paşti şi 

de Crăciun. De asemenea, se interzicea efectuarea de rugăciuni la gospodăriile 

oamenilor din mediul rural, dacă nu aveau avizul autorităŃilor locale. În aceeaşi ordine 

de idei, se interzicea închirierea caselor şi apartamentelor de către preoŃi, în scopul de a 

oficia slujbe religioase. Erau interzise şi acŃiunile de caritate, oricare ar fi forma lor 34 . 

Cei care încălcau aceste prevederi erau pasibili de răspundere penală şi depunere din 

treapta preoŃiei. 

De asemenea, în 1959, represiunile sovietice au vizat şi bastioanele spiritualităŃii 

ortodoxe naŃionale din R.S.S.M. – mănăstirile basarabene. Arhiepiscopul Nectarie, fără 

nicio obiecŃie, a aprobat decretul emis de către Consiliul de Miniştri al R.S.S.M la 5 

iunie 1959, prin care se ordona închiderea a mai multor mănăstiri. Pentru lichidarea 

acestor lăcaşuri sfinte, ierarhul a creat o comisie, compusă din membrii administraŃiei 

eparhiale. Această comisie se ocupa atât cu pregătirea psihologică a vieŃuitorilor din 

mănăstirile vizate pentru desfiinŃare, cât şi cu gestionarea averii lăsate după lichidarea 

complexelor monahale. ApariŃia membrilor acestei comisii la vreo mănăstire era un 

semn sigur că ea va fi închisă, iar clădirile ei - predate autorităŃilor locale. De obicei, 

această decizie era întâmpinată cu resemnare din către stareŃii şi egumenii care nu 

îndrăzneau să încalce votul ascultării. Orice revoltă din partea lor era catalogată atât ca 

o manifestare antisovietică, deci antistatală, cât şi ca o încălcare a canoanelor bisericeşti 

care se referă la subordonarea ierarhică. Numai într-un singur caz, la mănăstirea 

32 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, ff. 55-57. 

33 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105, f. 22. 

34 Ibidem, f. 24. 

581

Răciula, atât stareŃa, cât şi poporul satului Răciula şi a satelor vecine, pe data de 23 şi 

24 iunie au arătat nesupunere şi neascultare în primul rând faŃă de autoritatea 

bisericească din R.S.S.M. şi apoi faŃă de autorităŃile locale 35 . Cel mai revoltător fapt 

care a stârnit indignarea populaŃiei din Răciula era că ierarhul, în loc să apere turma 

duhovnicească, era între primii care o trăda, „unindu-se cu necuratul”. Într-o scrisoare 

anonimă, adresată patriarhului Alexei I a Rusiei, referitor la tragedia de la Răciula, 

conducătorii Bisericii erau numiŃi Ana şi Caiafa. În scrisoare se reproşează că 

„populaŃia din Răciula este pe cale de dispariŃie şi nu are cine s-o apere”, iar ierarhii 

Bisericii L-au lăsat pe Hristos şi s-au unit cu necuratul” 36 . Însă, autorităŃile sovietice 

apreciau foarte mult contribuŃia lui Nectarie la lichidarea mănăstirilor basarabene: „Se 

cuvine de menŃionat, că la lichidarea mănăstirilor Pripiceni şi Dobruşa a contribuit în 

mare măsură munca depusă de administraŃia eparhiei; ca rezultat... episcopul Nectarie a 

dispus să fie din timp evacuaŃi din mănăstiri aceia dintre monahi care desfăşurau o 

activitate de subminare împotriva închiderii mănăstirilor. Toată munca practică de 

lichidare a acestor mănăstiri a fost efectuată nemijlocit de reprezentanŃii eparhiei” 37 . 

Prin urmare, putem afirma că revolta de la mănăstirea Răciula avea nu numai un 

caracter antistatal, cum afirmă majoritatea cercetătorilor din domeniu, dar şi unul 

religios, manifestat prin nesupunere faŃă de ierarhul local. 

Colaborarea arhiepiscopului Nectarie cu structurile sovietice în detrimentul autorităŃii 

spirituale a continuat şi în anii următori. Cu aprobarea ierarhului, în anii 1959-1960, au 

fost închise încă 171 de biserici din întreaga republică, desfiinŃate - 10 mănăstiri, 

demişi - 88 de preoŃi, iar în 1961, închise - 44 de biserici, două mănăstiri şi demişi - 31 

de preoŃi. Prin urmare, anii 1959-1961 au fost cei mai tragici pentru întreaga perioada 

sovietică a Bisericii Ortodoxe din Basarabia. 

Persoana arhiepiscopului Nectarie a fost cea mai marcantă pentru viaŃa bisericească 

din Basarabia din perioada sovietică, fiind un reprezentant fidel al colaboraŃionismului 

dintre Biserica Ortodoxă şi statul sovietic. Subminarea sferei bisericeşti în folosul celei 

laice, în cazul lui Nectarie, se prezintă cel mai clar în scrisoarea deschisă publicată în 

1960 de arhiepiscop în „Jurnalul Patriarhiei Moscovei”, în care acuză S.U.A. de 

amestec în viaŃa altor state, susŃinând poziŃia lui N. Hruşciov 38 . Această loialitate se 

demonstra în perioada când în R.S.S.M., conform „politicii culturale noi”, promovate în 

Basarabia de acelaşi Hruşciov, erau închise sute de biserici, izgoniŃi călugării din 

mănăstiri, destituiŃi zeci de preoŃi şi intimidaŃi sute de mii de enoriaşi. Explicarea 

loialităŃii lui Nectarie faŃă de conducerea sovietică se descoperă într-un document strict 

secret, provenit din arhivele KGB-ului în care se descrie activitatea agenturii operative 

35 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, ff. 13-14 şi 17-18. 

36 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 93, f. 6. 

37 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 91, f. 48. 

38 ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105, ff. 120-121. 

582

şi de profilaxie în lupta împotriva acŃiunilor duşmănoase ale clericilor din anul 1959 39 . 

Printre numele conspirative înşiruite în acest document apare pe primul loc cel de 

„KazanŃev”. Despre acest agent al KGB-ului se afirmă că deŃine funcŃie de conducere în 

eparhie. Din descrierea activităŃii agentului „KazanŃev”, putem afirma că sub acest 

nume se ascundea însuşi arhiepiscopul Nectarie care, probabil era recrutat de KGB încă 

din timpul aflării sale în puşcăria de la Moscova, în anii 1944-1946, de unde a ieşit fără 

a fi supus procesului judiciar. AfirmaŃia dată poate fi susŃinută şi de alegerea numelui 

conspirativ al ierarhului rus. Se ştie că Nectarie era originar din regiunea Cazani din 

Rusia, în oraşul Cazani absolvind studiile teologice. Prin urmare, lucrătorii securităŃii 

sovietice i-au dat numele conspirativ de KazanŃev în cinstea oraşului de unde a început 

cariera ierarhică a agentului recrutat. Acest mod de infiltrare a agenŃilor securităŃii în 

sânul Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse era tradiŃional pentru perioada sovietică. Presupunem că 

ierarhii ruşi care au urmat după arhiepiscopul Nectarie au fost, de asemenea, agenŃi ai 

KGB-ului şi au contribuit la diminuarea religiozităŃii din R.S.S.M. Desecretizarea 

dosarelor personale din arhivele S.I.S. a R. Moldova va ajuta la elucidarea acestei 

pagini negre din istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe din R. Moldova. 

Este regretabilă constatarea că atitudinea şi contribuŃia întâistătătorilor Bisericii 

Ortodoxe din R.S.S.M faŃă de persecutarea sentimentului religios şi a tradiŃiilor 

naŃionale de către autorităŃile sovietice în perioada anilor 1945-1962 a fost una 

antiromânească şi, de multe ori, contrară statutului lor de conducători ai Bisericii. 

IntimidaŃi sau ispitiŃi de cele lumeşti, ierarhii bisericeşti prezentaŃi în această lucrare au 

dat dovadă şi de slăbiciune duhovnicească, deseori uitând că „raŃiunea de a fi a Bisericii 

este de a propovădui Evanghelia, aşa cum a cerut Mântuitorul Hristos Apostolilor Săi 

după Înviere şi, prin ei, urmaşilor lor şi Bisericii întregi, şi de a împărtăşi oamenilor, 

prin Sfintele Taine, harul mântuirii” 40 . Dar, în pofida aşteptărilor din partea statului 

ateist, misiunea Bisericii Ortodoxe a continuat, fiind prezentă şi biruitoare în sufletele 

sutelor de mii de basarabeni care au rămas fideli Bisericii Apostolilor şi a SfinŃilor 

PărinŃi. 

BIBLIOGRAFIE 

1. Pasat,V.I., Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, док. № 58, сc. 278-286. 

2. Pasat,V.I., Trudnîe straniŃî istorii Moldovî, 1940-1950, Moscova, Terra, 1994, pp. 

651-653, tradus de V. Beşleagă în Cruci răsturnate de regim, Mănăstirea Răciula. 

1959, Editura PrutInternaŃional, 2006, pp. 186-188. 

39 V.I. Pasat, Trudnîe straniŃî istorii Moldovî, 1940-1950, Moscova, Terra, 1994, pp. 651-653, 

tradus de V. Beşleagă în Cruci răsturnate de regim, Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959, Editura Prut 

InternaŃional, 2006, pp. 186-188. 

40 Pr. Prof. Gheorghe Petraru, Ortodoxie şi Prozelitism”, editura Trinitas, Iaşi, 2000, p. 31. 

583

3. Păcurariu Mircea, Basarabia, aspecte din istoria Bisericii şi a neamului românesc, 

Iaşi, 1993, p. 125. 

4. Petraru Gheorghe Pr. Prof., Ortodoxie şi Prozelitism”, Editura Trinitas,Iaşi, 2000, 

p. 31. 

5. Pistrui Chiril, Pr.Lector, Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă 1918-1958, în Mitropolia 

Ardealului, anul V, nr. 1-2, Sibiu, 1960. 

6. Souvarine Boris, Stalin. Studiu istoric al bolşevismului. Procesul comunismului, 

trad. Doina Jela Despois, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1999. 

7. Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova în continuare ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 5. 

8. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 10. 

9. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 12. 

10. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 24. 

11. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 56. 

12. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 64. 

13. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1,d. 65. 

14. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 91. 

15. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1,d. 93. 

16. ANRM, F. 3046, i. 1, d. 105. 

17. Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din R. Moldova, F. 51, i. 9, d. 44. 

584

FUNCłIONAREA MĂNĂSTIRILOR 

DE MONAHII HIROVA ŞI TABĂRA SUB 

DOMINANTA IDEOLOGIEI SOVIETICE 

Liliana CONDRATICOVA 1 

Mănăstirile de monahii prezintă, în opinia noastră, un fenomen special. Istoria activităŃii 

acestor mănăstiri în diferite perioade cuprinde clarificarea numeroaselor aspecte de o 

semnificaŃie majoră, inclusiv statutul juridic şi economic, stratificarea socială şi dinamica 

comunităŃii monahale, tipologia mănăstirii (cu trai de sine sau mod de viaŃă separat), viaŃa 

spirituală etc. Diversificarea surselor de cercetare şi coroborarea datelor istorice cu cele 

din domeniile adiacente (psihologie, artă, etnografie) a permis abordarea unei serii de 

probleme puse în referinŃă cu motivaŃia plecării la mănăstire, a optării spre o viaŃă 

monahală ascetă, procesul de „feminizare” a mănăstirilor din contul sporirii numărului 

lor, raporturile între diferite ranguri monahale în cadrul comunităŃii, rolul stareŃeiegumenă 

în afirmarea şi consolidarea obştii etc. În viziunea noastră, cercetarea aspectelor 

menŃionate devine şi mai marcantă, reieşind din limitele cronologice de cercetare, adică 

funcŃionarea sub dominanta ateismului sovietic a două mănăstiri de maici, amplasate la o 

depărtare simbolică una de alta. 

Creşterea comunităŃii monahale din mănăstirile vizate a fost condiŃionată în primul rând de 

nevoia spirituală a femeilor văduvite, necăsătorite, rămase fără susŃinerea copiilor, mai ales 

după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. ImportanŃa şi numărul mare al mănăstirilor este 

confirmat şi de faptul că în 1940, în Rusia sovietică nu funcŃiona nici o mănăstire, însă odată 

cu anexarea Ucrainei, Basarabiei, Belarusiei şi a łărilor Baltice numărul lor se ridică la 46, 

inclusiv 24 de mănăstiri basarabene, dintre care cinci mănăstiri idioritmice (cu trai de sine). 

Conform deciziilor Comisaritului Norodnic al URSS nr. 1130-436 c „Despre mănăstirile 

ortodoxe”, pe parcursul unui deceniu mănăstirile au fost impuse la prestări şi impozite 

excesive, iar mănăstirile basarabene şi cele ucrainene au fost constrânse să contribuie 

inclusiv şi cu produse alimentare şi financiar la ridicarea Ńării după război şi „construcŃia” 

socialismului 1 . Totodată, notăm că anume în cadrul mănăstirilor de maici au fost concentrate 

cele mai valoroase şi cunoscute ateliere de creaŃie, precum ar fi ateliere de confecŃionare a 

veşmintelor şi a covoarelor, de broderie şi croşetare. ActivităŃile meşteşugăreşti şi artistice au 

fost favorizate, în ambele cazuri, de statutul idioritmic al mănăstirilor. Modul de viaŃă separat 

permitea monahiilor şi surorilor de ascultare să lucreze în casele-chilii care le aparŃineau şi să 

comercializeze produsele muncii sale. 

1 Institutul Patrimoniului Cultural, Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei, 

Chisinau, Republica Moldova 

585

În continuare, ne propunem să restabilim istoricul acestor mănăstiri începând cu anul 

1944 până la lichidarea lor şi desfiinŃarea comunităŃilor monahale, stabilind momente 

comune şi particularizate în destinul lor tragic. Analiza funcŃionării mănăstirilor Hirova şi 

Tabăra este realizată reieşind din dezvoltarea economică în perioada sovietică, situaŃia 

obştii monahale şi a arhitecturii complexelor monahale, transformate în variate clădiri la 

necesităŃile colhozurilor din localitate (cluburi săteşti, spitale pentru alienaŃi, orfelinate). 

Tabelele anexate privind dinamica comunităŃii monahale, reducerea semnificativă a 

domeniului mănăstiresc şi starea edificiilor arhitecturale vine să exemplifice situaŃia 

dezastruoasă în care au ajuns aceste mănăstiri doar în câteva decenii de dominaŃie a 

ideologiei ateiste. 

Mănăstirea Tabăra cu hramul Adormirea Maicii Domnului este amplasată în mijlocul 

localităŃii cu acelaşi nume (satul Tabăra raionul Orhei, Republica Moldova), pe malul 

râului Vatici, într-un loc înconjurat de păduri. A fost întemeiată în 1779 de vătavul Darie 

Carp de la Furceni 2 . 

Instaurarea regimului sovietic în Basarabia (1940) a avut un impact negativ asupra 

bisericii autohtone, fiind închise biserici şi mănăstiri, care au fost devastate şi privată de 

bunurile acumulate. În aşa mod şi mănăstirea Tabăra în perioada primei ocupaŃii sovietice 

(1940–1941) a fost deposedată de toate animalele 3 . 

După dezastrul provocat timp de un an de autorităŃile sovietice, în 1941–1944, 

mănăstirea Tabăra a înregistrat anumite progrese la capitolul comunitate monahală şi 

dezvoltare economică. În aceşti ani, stăreŃia mănăstirii a revenit pe seama monahiei 

Tamara (Maria Alenic), care s-a născut în 1901, a făcut şcoală medie, era necăsătorită, în 

1931 a fost secretar, iar din 25 martie 1938 a fost numită stareŃă a mănăstirii Tabăra 4 . În 

1941–1942, la mănăstire îşi căutau alinarea sufletească 64 de monahii şi 36 surori de 

ascultare 5 . Peste un an, numărul lor se ridică la 75 de monahii şi 29 surori de ascultare 6 , 

fapt care exprimă convingător rolul mănăstirilor şi căutarea unui sprijin spiritual şi 

material de către femeile din satele din vecinătate. Casiera mănăstirii era monahia 

Neonila (Natalia Manoli), care a fost şi blagocină. Veşmântar şi ecleziarhă a fost monahia 

Micdonia (Maria Ciorbă). FuncŃia de veşmântar a fost îndeplinită ulterior şi de monahia 

Manefa (Maria Vulpe). 

După 1944, câteva monahii ale mănăstirii Tabăra împreună cu stareŃa s-au retras 

împreună cu armata în România 7 . La mănăstire au rămas 73 de maici şi 78 de surori 

ascultătoare 8 , iar stăreŃia a revenit monahiei Mavra (Limari) 9 . Şi în următorul an, în 1945, 

la mănăstirea Tabăra sunt documentate 151 de vieŃuitoare 10 , inclusiv 15 minore dintre 

care 7 persoane intrate în mănăstire erau sub 12 ani; şapte monahi şi preoŃi-duhovnici. În 

1947, odată cu declanşarea primului val al represaliilor asupra bisericii ortodoxe, numărul 

monahiilor se reduce practic de trei ori, ajungând la 52 11 . 

Pentru a evalua pagubele enorme cauzate de dominaŃia regimului sovietic, amintim că 

cu puŃin timp înainte de război, mănăstirea Tabăra avea în posesia sa 55 de ha de pământ, 

vie, livadă, grădină de zarzavat, numeroase bovine 12 . În timpul războiului, situaŃia 

economică de la mănăstirea Tabăra a fost stabilă 13 . FuncŃionau cu succes atelierul de 

scărmănat lâna, alesul covoarelor, de obiecte casnice. Odată cu venirea sovieticilor la 

putere, mănăstirea avea în folosinŃa sa 30,5 ha pământ arabil, majoritatea măicuŃelor 

lucrând pământul şi via de pe lângă casele lor 14 . Politica autorităŃilor sovietice era bazată 

586

pe folosirea forŃei de muncă şi a măiestriei vieŃuitoarelor de la mănăstiri. Astfel, la 31 

ianuarie 1945 a fost semnat un contract între preşedintele cooperativei de consum din 

RSSM, A. Kovaliov şi mănăstirile de monahii Tabora, Răciula, Vărzăreşti, Frumoasa, 

Hârjauca (fiindcă aici erau cele mai numeroase şi apreciate ateliere de confecŃionare a 

covoarelor şi vestimentaŃiei). Conform contractului, maicile primeau de la stat lână în 

schimbul unei remunerări băneşti, o prelucrau şi confecŃionau variate articole, cele mai 

solicitate fiind covoarele 15 . Statul nu putea îngădui posedarea de mănăstiri a unor terenuri 

agricole semnificative, care au şi fost metodic sechestrate în folosul colhozurilor nou 

formate. Astfel, în 1945, mănăstirea Tabăra stăpânea doar 20 ha de teren arabil, 1 ha 

grădină, 1 ha viŃă-de-vie, în total 28 de ha de pământ; reducându-se şi numărul animalelor 

(doi cai, o vacă, 4 ovine) 16 . Monahiile care trăiau în casele lor posedau pământ arabil între 

0,5 şi 2 ha, grădini, livezi, ceva din ovine şi caprine, nişte păsări. 

Impozitarea şi reducerea constantă a terenurilor agricole creau supărare în rândurile 

clerului, nemulŃumire atestată nu numai în biserica din Moldova, dar şi Ucraina şi łările 

Baltice. Din această raŃiune, pentru a calma spiritele şi a atenua consecinŃele reformelor 

sale, statul sovietic a adoptat, în 1948, o lege conform căreia mănăstirile au fost eliberate 

pentru un timp de achitarea impozitului pe construcŃii şi renta funciară 17 . 

Armele sovieticilor, deopotrivă cu constrângerea economică, erau completate prin 

calomnia clerului, dezacordul, instigarea la invidie, nesupunere faŃă de administrarea 

mănăstirii etc. În acest context, sunt semnificative scrisorile şi comentariile stareŃei 

Mavra (Limari) în organele de conducere pentru a limpezi situaŃia, care convenea 

autorităŃilor. Astfel, în 1948 ea a scris o plângere în care a amintit că în mănăstire 

funcŃionează un atelier de confecŃionare a covoarelor, dar în sat a fost organizat 

intenŃionat încă un artel de aşa gen denumit „Pobeda”, unde lucrează fetele din sate, dar 

au fost cooptate şi 7 ascultătoare tinere. Ea ruga să se facă o dispoziŃie conform căreia 

vieŃuitoarele din mănăstire să lucreze numai în atelierul mănăstiresc, de altfel sunt create 

numeroase probleme disciplinare etc. 18 , stareŃa sesizând prea bine intenŃiile de a deschide 

atelierul din sat. 

Lesne de înŃeles că plângerile stareŃei nu au oprit, în 1949, prima tentativă de închidere 

a mănăstirii de monahii Tabăra. Astfel, din „considerentele că mănăstirile reprezintă 

nucleul fanatismului religios etc.”, CC al PC (b) din RSSM, în adresarea către CC al PC 

(b) al URSS, a cerut aprobarea restrângerii activităŃii bisericii şi a reducerii numărului de 

mănăstiri, inclusiv şi Tabăra 19 . În situaŃia creată, organele locale sovietice au ocupat cu 

forŃa câteva case-chilii ale mănăstirii Tabăra, provocând nesupunere, violenŃe, au fost 

impuse impozite suplimentare; oamenii din sat, din colhozul din localitate erau trimişi să 

se alimenteze la trapeza mănăstirească 20 . 

La începutul anilor 1950, pe timpul stăreŃiei egumenei Sepfora (Chiriacova), 

comunitatea monahală rămâne în creştere continuă, atingând cifra de 207 de persoane, 

inclusiv 81 de monahii şi 126 de surori de ascultare 21 . Această dinamică pozitivă se 

datorează stării anevoioase din economia Moldovei postbelice, căutarea consolării la 

mănăstiri mai ales de femeile văduvite, dar şi lichidarea altor comunităŃi monahale din 

Ńară, vieŃuitoarele căutându-şi refugiu în sfintele lăcaşe rămase funcŃionale. Conform 

vârstei, în mănăstire era o minoră, 25 de vieŃuitoare între 18 şi şi 30 de ani, 32 de 

vieŃuitoare sub 40 de ani, 35 de monahii sub 50 de ani, 12 persoane cu vârsta de 50-55 de 

587

ani, 13 persoane sub 60 de ani, 34 de vieŃuitoare sub 70 de ani şi 36 de persoane peste 70 

de ani, inclusiv 11 vieŃuitoare peste 80 de ani 22 . 

Din 1953 şi până la desfiinŃarea mănăstirii (1960), comunitatea monahală a fost 

administrată pe rând de monahia Raisa (Cebotari) 23 şi monahia Serafima. Este perioada 

celui de-al doilea val privind lichidarea bisericilor şi mănăstirilor, politica autorităŃilor 

sovietice de reducere a terenurilor mănăstireşti, constrângere impozitară şi presiune luând 

o amploare nemaivăzută. Astfel, în 1951, au fost sechestrate câte 0,5 ha de pământ 

posedat de fiecare monahie în parte; în total comunitatea deŃinea numai 11,55 ha de 

pământ, dintre care 8 ha teren arabil, 0,8 ha viŃă-de-vie şi 1,35 ha livadă 24 . Terenurile de 

pe lângă casele monahiilor se reduc drastic, făcând imposibilă întreŃinerea fiecărei 

vieŃuitoare în parte, dar şi a bisericilor şi anexelor gospodăreşti. 

Prin 1952, a fost răspândită vestea că după lichidarea mănăstirii Tabăra va funcŃiona în 

continuare numai atelierul de confecŃionare a covoarelor, condus de preşedintele Isai 

Vasserman, un evreu, care a fost şi unul din primii iniŃiatori de închidere a mănăstirii. 

Printre monahii la fel existau dornice de a continua activitatea în atelierul de covoare, 

precum erau Vera (Garştea), Xenia (Donescu) ş.a. Preşedintele atelierul a declarat fără 

reticenŃă că va alunga din mănăstirea Tabăra pe orice monahie care nu va scrie cerere de 

intrare în atelierul de confecŃionare a covoarelor, şi respectiv, de renunŃare la viaŃa 

monahală 25 . 

Constatăm că atelierul deschis, prin promovarea libertinismului, nesupunerea faŃă de 

conducerea mănăstirii etc., a avut un obiectiv scontat, anume să conducă comunitatea 

monahală la ideea necesităŃii autolichidării mănăstirii Tabăra. Totodată, mândria acestui 

atelier, renumitele covoare moldoveneşti, erau bine cunoscute şi apreciate în Ńară şi peste 

hotarele ei, reprezentând o adevărată valoare istorico-artistică, din care considerente se 

opta pentru păstrarea atelierului mănăstiresc. 

În aceste circumstanŃe, considerăm oportună plasarea unor informaŃii privind atelierul 

de la mănăstirea Tabăra care era amplasat într-o clădire mănăstirească, la o distanŃă de 10 

m de mănăstire şi 20 m de clădirea stăreŃiei 26 . Până în 1952, între administraŃia mănăstirii 

şi conducerea atelierului a fost semnat un acord, conform căruia aici puteau lucra numai 

vieŃuitoarele mănăstirii, iar depozitul de materie primă era plasat în afara complexului 

monahal. Însă în 1952 preşedintele atelierului a modificat acordul, a permis cooptarea în 

atelier a locuitoarelor din satele învecinate, a instalat radioul, fapt care deranja mult 

stareŃa mănăstirii. În conformitate cu cele expuse, episcopul Nectarie urma să decidă sau 

să lichideze atelierul din sat sau să închidă mănăstirea. În cazul lichidării primului, 

atelierul de Ńesut covoare din cadrul mănăstiri rămânea fără materie primă de lucru, pe 

când producŃia acestui atelier se considera cea mai bună în RSSM, de mare căutare. 

În 1954, în speranŃa achitării tuturor impozitelor şi a livrării chiar şi peste normă a unor 

produse, monahiile de la Tabăra credeau că nu vor împărtăşi aceeaşi soartă ca mănăstirile 

deja desfiinŃate la acea dată 27 . Însă la 1 ianuarie 1955 terenurile mănăstireşti au fost 

mărginite din nou, ajungând la doar 9,46 ha de pământ, dintre care 7,44 ha de teren arabil; 

0,82 ha de grădină şi 0,89 ha de viŃă-de-vie 28 . Pământul mănăstirii fusese secularizat, din 

care considerente unele călugăriŃe erau somate să lucreze la fabrica de covoare din 

localitate. Constatăm în acest context că sugrumarea economică a fost o măsură majoră în 

588

procesul de lichidare a mănăstirilor. Astfel, în 1957, împuternicitul pentru problemele 

bisericii P. Romenski venise cu nişte propuneri privind reducerea folosirii pământului de 

către mănăstiri, în conformitate cu care s-a micşorat semnificativ terenul, pământurile 

fiind cedate necondiŃionat în folosul colhozului din localitate. În aşa mod, mănăstirea 

Tabăra avea dreptul să uziteze numai de pământul aflat în perimetrul curŃii sale 29 . 

Observăm că politica statului în domeniul economiei şi ideologiei a prins roade, 

lichidarea comunităŃii monahale de la Tabăra fiind un lucru indiscutabil şi foarte dureros. 

Monahiile s-au opus în măsura posibilităŃilor, dar zădarnic. În 1952, egumena mănăstirii 

împreună cu soborul maicilor a scris o scrisoare în care cu lacrimi în ochi au explicat că 

au crescut la mănăstire din copilărie, tot aici au îmbătrânit. Şi că „Ele se obligă să fie 

foarte ascultătoare, cuminte, să fie supuse, numai să nu li se închidă mănăstirea, să li se 

permită traiul în continuare la Tabăra” 30 . În scurt timp, stareŃa mănăstirii egumena 

Sepfora a scris o nouă scrisoare, precum că după discuŃia cu protopopul Iacov Baderău, în 

mănăstire au fost răspândite zvonuri că comunitatea monahală va fi desfiinŃată timp de 

două săptămâni. Monahia Tavifa (Ursu) a avut de suferit din cauza preşedintelui 

atelierului, încercând prin diferite posibilităŃi să menŃină o disciplină severă la mănăstire, 

pentru care fapt a fost eliberată din atelier, şi ca consecinŃă, a rămas fără surse de 

existenŃă. 

Mănăstirea Tabăra era prezentată pentru autorităŃi „drept un rău extrem de mare şi ca un 

enorm pericol pentru populaŃia satului Tabăra, în mijlocul căreia se află” 31 . Subliniem 

faptul că tendinŃa de a desfiinŃa mănăstirile se poate urmări pe tot parcursul perioadei. 

Cele şase mănăstiri scoase de la evidenŃă în 1958, au fost de fapt în scurt timp închise. 

La 1 ianuarie 1959, la Tabăra erau 188 de vieŃuitoare, inclusiv 95 de monahii 32 . Din 

numărul total, 171 de monahii locuiau în propriile case-chilii, iar 17 de vieŃuitoare – în 

stăreŃie. Tot în acelaşi an pământurile mănăstireşti s-au redus la doar 1,48 ha de pământ, 

inclusiv 1,3 ha teren arabil 33 . În aşa mod, lichidarea mănăstirii, pe timpuri foarte 

numeroasă şi stabilă economic, în asemenea condiŃii a fost realizată fără eforturi 

suplimentare în prima jumătate a anului 1960 34 . MenŃionăm cu această ocazie că a fost 

realizată o muncă ideologică de pregătire a lichidării mănăstirii, citite lecŃii antireligioase 

de lectori ateişti, interzisă aşezarea romilor prin apropiere, care au ieşit în apărarea 

comunităŃilor monahale. A fost creată şi o comisie specială, în număr de 13 persoane, 

activişti de partid, care era preocupată nemijlocit de lichidarea mănăstirii Tabăra şi 

transferarea monahiilor la lucru în atelierul de covoare. Pentru a folosi forŃele de muncă şi 

măiestria monahiilor, la Străşeni era planificată, în 1960, de a fi construită o fabrică nouă 

de covoare 35 . Din cele 180 de vieŃuitoare, mai bine de jumătate erau în etate. Cele mai 

tinere, se spunea în hotărârea Consiliului, dacă vor dori să se roage, vor putea frecventa 

bisericile din satele învecinate, plasate la 3-6 km de mănăstirea Tabăra. 

În 1960, după numeroase eforturi de intimidare a comunităŃii monahale, mănăstirea 

Tabăra a fost desfiinŃată. Majoritatea călugăriŃelor au rămas pe la casele lor, care 

împrejmuiau cele două biserici. Astăzi, maicile bătrâne de la Tabăra mărturisesc că au 

suferit foarte mult şi au suportat cu greu faptul că mănăstirea a fost transformată într-un 

loc al dezmăŃului. Cu această ocazie subliniem că o deosebită atenŃie merită covoarele 

Ńesute de monahiile de la Tabăra şi care prezintă un inestimabil izvor de studiu al artei 

589

decorative naŃionale, posedând o deosebită valoare istorico-artistică 36 . O vreme, hărnicia 

călugăriŃelor de la Tabăra a fost exploatată de comunişti. O fabrică de Ńesut covoare le-a 

făcut renumite în fosta RSSM. Covoarele alese de meşteriŃele de la mănăstirea Tabăra 

dintotdeauna au trezit admiraŃia colecŃionarilor şi amatorilor de artă. Numai în 1959, din 

180 de vieŃuitoare, 80 lucrau la alesul covoarelor. După închiderea mănăstirii în 1960, 

monahiile iscusite în arta covorului tradiŃional, au fost impuse să lucreze în atelier, iar 

după 1971 – în cadrul AsociaŃiei Meşteşugarilor din RSSM. Printre cele mai cunoscute 

monahii specializate în confecŃionarea covoarelor în acele timpuri au fost Nionila Manoli, 

Olga Leah, Vera Garştea, Mavra Limar ş.a. Împodobirea căsuŃelor de azi ale monahiilor 

reprezintă cea mai elocventă exemplificare privind rolul covoarelor în destinul mănăstirii 

Tabăra. 

La lichidarea mănăstirii, au avut de suferit şi clădirile complexului monahal, cele două 

biserici, stăreŃia, trapeza. Astfel, biserica Adormirea Maicii Domnului a fost transformată 

în club, iar mai târziu – în depozit de cereale, după care a rămas pustie până în 1989, fapt 

care a condiŃionat devastarea ei nestingherită şi distrugerea arhitecturii originale. În 

cealaltă biserică cu hramul Sfânta Treime, s-a instalat, până în anul 1989, şcoala din 

localitate. Fiind amplasate aici instituŃii de stat, până la redeschiderea mănăstirii, 

bisericile au avut parte de oarecare îngrijire. 

Mănăstirea de monahii Hirova îşi începe istoria în anul 1803. Este aşezată în mijlocul 

pădurii, pe panta de sud a unei coline, într-o vale a pârâului Hirov (Ciurova) de unde şi i 

se trage numele, satul Nicolăeuca, raionul Orhei 37 . Despre nivelul de dezvoltare a 

mănăstirii, cu puŃin înainte de instaurarea în 1944 a regimului sovietic, vorbesc doar 

câteva cifre estimative. Astfel, pe timpul stareŃiei Taisiei (Paciu), care a revenit după 

1941 la mănăstirea Hirova (fiind emigrată în 1940 în România), comunitatea monahală 

era destul de numeroasă, incluzând 166 de vieŃuitoare, dintre care două egumene, 80 de 

monahii, 26 de surori cu ascultare canonică şi 58 de surori fără ascultare canonică 38 . În 

1942–1943, la Hirova erau deja 171 de vieŃuitoare, inclusiv două egumene, 90 de 

monahii, 33 de surori şi 45 de surori fără ascultare canonică 39 . Casiera mănăstirii era 

monahia Dionisia (Zanosieva), arhondară era monahia Iroida (Lupaşcu), economă – 

monahia Asinefa (Roşca), ecleziarhă – monahia Olga (Temcin), egumenă – Taisia 

(Şevcencu) şi Severiana (Mihălache). 

În aşa mod constatăm cu certitudine că după cel de-a Doilea Război Mondial, 

mănăstirea Hirova era prosperă şi stabilă. Conform politicii autorităŃilor sovietice de 

lichidare a locaşelor de cult, a fost decretată fuzionarea mănăstirii de maici Frumoasa cu 

mănăstirea Hirova 40 . În condiŃiile create, stareŃa mănăstirii Frumoasa, monahia Eupraxia 

(Nour), împreună cu maicile şi surorile, au mers la mănăstirea Hirova. În aceste 

circumstanŃe, numărul comunităŃii monahale de la 100 de persoane (în 1944) s-a ridicat la 

163 de persoane (în 1948), inclusiv 80 de monahii 41 . În timpul fuzionării mănăstirii 

Frumoasa şi Hirova, stareŃă la Hirova era monahia Dionisia (Zanusieva), revenită după 

1944 de la Frumoasa. În anii dificili de foamete şi represalii, multe femei, văduve, rămase 

590

fără copii, căutau alinare anume la mănăstiri. Numai în 1947–1948, la Hirova au intrat 15 

persoane noi, dintre care trei minore 42 . 

Fiind o mănăstire idioritmică, monahiile se întreŃineau din roadele muncii sale. La 

mănăstire funcŃionau la fel ateliere de confecŃionare a covoarelor şi a stofelor în baza 

contractelor cu „Moldpotrebsoiuz” (Uniunea moldovenească de consum), dar din 1948 

activitatea atelierelor a fost sistată din cauza lipsei de materie primă, care trebuia să fie 

furnizate de uniune 43 . Procesul de reducere a terenurilor agricole pornit de autorităŃile 

sovietice a dus la reducerea constantă a terenurilor agricole, astfel ca în 1953, la Hirova în 

folosinŃa comunităŃii monahale au rămas din cele 42 ha de pământ (în 1948) cu doar 

14,55 ha 44 . 

Reducând la maxim pământurile mănăstireşti şi intimidând în permanenŃă comunitatea 

monahală, autorităŃile comuniste au venit prin 1948 cu primele „recomandări” de 

închidere a mănăstirii Hirova. În situaŃia creată şi analizând situaŃia din mănăstirile 

moldoveneşti, secretarul CC al PC (b) al RSS Moldovenească N. Koval, în raportul său 

cu privire la măsurile de ameliorare a lucrului de culturalizare şi propagandă 

antireligioasă în republică, a recomandat ca mănăstirea Hirova să fie închisă în 1949 45 , 

rămânând însă pentru un timp funcŃională alături de încă patru mănăstiri de maici 

(Vărzăreşti, Cuşălăuca, Tabăra şi Răciula) 46 . În perioada 1952–1957 numărul monahiilor 

la Hirova, sub conducerea monahiei Pahomia (Dascăl) 47 şi ulterior a monahiei Tavifa 

(Zemfir) 48 , a fost destul de constant, aprox. 170 de persoane 49 . 

Trecând de primul val de atac asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova, s-a nutrit 

speranŃa că mănăstirile vor fi funcŃionale în continuare. S-a reuşit, în 1954, chiar şi 

reparaŃia bisericilor mănăstirii Hirova, la care au participat locuitorii satului Nicolăeuca, 

donând suma de 10 000 rub 50 . 

La 1 ianuarie 1957, comunitatea monahală de la Hirova era prosperă, deloc predispusă 

pentru închidere pe motiv că ar fi una slab dezvoltată sau puŃin numeroasă precum 

pretindeau, de regulă, oficialităŃile sovietice 51 . Sub ascultarea stareŃei egumena Tavifa 

(Ursu), din cele 162 de vieŃuitoare, la Hirova erau 73 de surori de ascultare, cinci călugări 

şi un frate ascultător. Tabloul de vârstă al monahiilor se prezintă astfel: o persoană 

minoră, 50 de vieŃuitoare între 19–40 de ani, 48 de persoane cu vârsta de 41–55 de ani, 63 

de persoane cu vârsta peste 55 de ani. În rândurile comunităŃii monahale au fost 

documentate persoane care se opuneau categoric împotriva regimului duşmănos. Istoria 

ne readuce câteva nume, anume monahia Maximilia (Maximila Grigorievna Coban) 52 şi 

monahia Evlampia (Manoli Evlampia) 53 . 

În plan economic, deşi oferind unele libertăŃi bisericii locale, politica oficialităŃilor 

sovietice a fost axată în continuare pe obligativitatea predării statului, atât de mănăstirile 

moldoveneşti, cât şi de toate gospodăriile individuale, a unei cantităŃi fixe de produse 

alimentare, grâne, lactate, carne ş.a. Spre exemplu, în 1956, mănăstirea Hirova a avut de 

achitat statului, conform planului, 300 kg carne, prestând, de facto, 500 (200 kg avans 

pentru anul 1957) 54 . În condiŃiile create, mănăstirea Hirova, care deŃinea un loc de frunte 

591

printre comunităŃile monahale graŃie numărului mare de vieŃuitoare şi stabilităŃii sale 

economice, din cauza impozitelor şi prestărilor nemoderate, a ajuns să decadă cu timpul. 

În aşa mod, în 1959 se revine asupra problemei lichidării mănăstirii, în conformitate cu 

„Propunerile privind reducerea numărului mănăstirilor” pregătite pentru şedinŃa biroului 

CC al PC al RSSM din 23 ianuarie 1959, semnate de P. Romenski, N. ŞilinŃev şi S. 

Kolesnik 55 . Astfel, în „Anexa” la Hotărârea Consiliului de Miniştri al RSSM din 5 iunie 

1959, în lista celor nouă mănăstiri preconizate pentru închidere, a fost inclusă şi cea de la 

Hirova, vieŃuitoarele urmând să fie transferate în aşezămintele rămase active, Răciula 

(închisă tot în 1959) şi Japca (unica mănăstire de monahii rămasă activă în perioada 

sovietică) 56 . Monahiile s-au baricadat în biserica mănăstirii, aflându-se acolo asediate, în 

rugăciune şi post, nouă zile, până în momentul în care au fost scoase cu forŃa. SituaŃia 

privind componenŃa numerică şi de vârstă a celor 165 de vieŃuitoare în anul închiderii 

mănăstirii era următoare: 16 persoane cu vârsta între 18 şi 30 de ani; 20 de monahii de 

30-40 de ani; 28 de persoane de 40-50 de ani; 15 monahii de 50-55 de ani; 30 de persoane 

de 55-60 de ani; 42 de vieŃuitoare de 60-70 de ani; 17 persoane sunt trecute de 70 de ani 

şi încă patru monahii au peste 80 de ani 57 . Până la 1 iulie 1959 mănăstirea urma să fie 

închisă, iar clădirile complexului monahal pregătite pentru transferarea aici a casei de 

copii din satul Hâjdieni. În timpul lichidării mănăstirii, monahiile de la Hirova au opus 

rezistenŃă, după amploarea celor de la mănăstirile Cunicea şi Răciula 58 . La 3 iulie 1959, 

deja se raporta că mănăstirea Hirova a fost lichidată 59 . Majoritatea maicilor au fost 

somate să se încadreze la muncă în colhozul din localitate la 6 aiulie 1959 au fost 

angajate 60 de monahii), iar cele în etate au rămas pe la casele-chiliile lor 60 . 

În aceste împrejurări, au avut de suferit nu numai monahiile de la Hirova. Astfel, la 

momentul lichidării mănăstirii, funcŃia de preot-duhovnic era îndeplinită de arhimandritul 

Serafim (Dabija) cu studii la Seminarul Teologic din Chişinău, îndrumat de părintele 

Dumitru Balaur din Răzeni. Părintele Serafim a fost arestat în 1947 şi condamnat la ani 

grei de Siberie. După revenirea sa din exil, a fost pentru o scurtă perioadă preot la Piatra, 

Orhei, şi duhovnic al mănăstirii de maici de la Hirova. În 1959, a fost învinuit că ar fi pus 

la cale şi ar fi încurajat revolta monahiilor, atunci când au fost somate să părăsească 

locaşul ce urma să fie închis. În urma acestor evenimente, părintele Serafim a fost impus 

să plece mai departe de casă, într-un sat din Maramureş, în Transcarpatia ucraineană, 

unde a decedat în 1985 61 . 

Ofensiva violentă a barbarismului nu a luat sfârşit însă odată cu închiderea mănăstirii. 

După desfiinŃarea comunităŃii monahale, clădirile complexului monahal au fost transmise 

în administrarea autorităŃilor locale. Biserica cu hramul Sf. Nicolae a ajuns să fie 

transformată de autorităŃi într-un depozit de cărbuni, iar ulterior în depozit de produse 

agricole. Cealaltă biserică, cu hramul Cuv. Semion Stâlpnicul, a suferit schimbări 

radicale, adăpostind, între 1962 şi 1967, un spital pentru copiii cu handicap, iar mai târziu 

a fost folosită în scopuri gospodăreşti de administraŃia colhozului din localitate. 

Urgia comunismului s-a răsfrânt şi asupra celor trecuŃi la veşnice, fiind devastate 

morminte ale ctitorilor, stareŃelor şi monahiilor din cimitirele ambelor mănăstiri, Tabăra 

592

şi Hirova. Astfel, zădarnică a fost căutarea prin cimitirul de lângă mănăstirea Hirova a 

mormântului egumenei Militina (Theodosia Efrem Trandasir) 62 , ultima stareŃă a 

mănăstirii de monahii Saharna, care după închiderea mănăstirii, s-a reîntors la Hirova, 

unde cândva a fost primită în monahism. A decedat în anul 1970 şi a fost înmormântată în 

cimitirul vechi al mănăstirii 63 . 

Tot în acest context este relevantă istoria celor două cimitire ale eroilor români. Se ştie 

cu precizie că în timpul dominaŃiei sovietice, monahiile de la mănăstirea Tabăra au 

păstrat în mare secret o listă a militarilor din Armata Română înmormântaŃi în satul 

Tabăra. Profesoara Raisa Bârnaz de la şcoala din localitate a relatat: „Lista eroilor români 

înmormântaŃi în cimitirul de la Tabăra este adevărată. Fiind linia frontului aici, pe Dealul 

Culii, când cădeau, erau aduşi la mănăstire să li se facă prohodul. ToŃi au fost 

înmormântaŃi creştineşte. Chiar dacă se găseau numai părŃi din trupul lor, se reconstituia 

identitatea din acte şi se înmormântau cum se cuvine unui creştin. Cei cunoscuŃi au fost 

trecuŃi într-o listă păstrată aici, la mănăstire, de către maici. Lista s-a păstrat la mănăstire 

şi cuprinde nume de ostaşi români căzuŃi în retragerea din 1944. „MăicuŃele au ascuns 

lista după ce s-a închis mănăstirea, în 1960, pentru că se zicea despre eroii aceia că sunt 

fascişti…”. Majoritatea militarilor români au fost înmormântaŃi pe deal. Cei cu grad 

superior, separat, ceilalŃi, în gropi comune. Pe timpuri, cimitirul mai avea rămăşiŃe de 

cruci din lemn. Prin 1968 acolo au fost date locuri de casă. AutorităŃile locale au oferit 

locul cimitirului pentru doritorii de a-şi ridica case, dar aşa şi nu a îndrăznit nimeni să 

înceapă construcŃia. Acum, crucile instalate din nou în cimitir posedă doar un caracter 

simbolic, pentru că nu mai corespunde locul mormintelor. În lista întocmită de călugăriŃe 

sunt trecuŃi peste 70 de morŃi de prin localităŃile apropiate. Cei din România, în general, 

nu sunt cunoscuŃi şi zac în gropile comune 64 . 

Şi în cimitirul satului Nicolăeuca, nu departe de mănăstirea Hirova, se află 15 gropi 

comune, în care şi-au găsit odihna veşnică ostaşii români căzuŃi în luptele din 13–14 iulie 

1941. În bătălia de la cota 243 din pădurea Morozenilor au căzut 100 de ostaşi români. 

Maicile de la mănăstire au avut grijă mult timp pe ascuns de aceste morminte. 

Reconstruirea cimitirului a fost iniŃiată de Oficiul NaŃional pentru Cultul Eroilor din 

România, iar AsociaŃia Culturală România din inima mea a instalat o troiŃă în acest 

cimitir. Au putut fi identificate numele a 42 de ostaşi români din Divizia 5 Infanterie 65 . 

Constatăm că în perioada dominaŃiei ideologiei comuniste, mănăstirile de monahii cu 

trai de sine Tabăra şi Hirova au avut un destin tragic, trecând printr-un adevărat calvar. 

Politica autorităŃilor sovietice, fundamentată pe constrângerea economică şi intimidarea 

comunităŃii monahale, distrugerea inventarului liturgic şi transformarea clădirilor 

complexelor monahale în cluburi unde se cântă şi se dansează nestingherit, a dus în final, 

la lichidarea, în 1959–1960, a două mănăstiri foarte numeroase şi stabile economic. Pe 

parcursul a mai bine de trei decenii clădirile monahale au avut de suferit enorm, fiind 

folosite de autorităŃile locale, monahiile silite să lucreze în colhozuri, căsuŃele lor cu tot 

pământul anexat au revenit colhozului sau unor activişti din sat. Impactul negativ al 

desfiinŃării comunităŃii monahale şi lichidarea mănăstirilor este resimŃit şi actualmente, 

593

după 20 de ani de independenŃă. Rămase fără pământ, cu bisericile devastate, două 

mănăstiri încearcă să facă faŃă greutăŃilor, să întreŃină comunitatea monahiilor practic 

toate în etate, să restaureze bisericile, stăreŃiile şi anexele gospodăreşti, sperând că vor 

atinge măreŃia de odinioară a mănăstirilor, Hirova şi Tabăra. 

References 

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2005, c. 337-341 (Монашество и монастыри в России. XI–XX века. Исторические 

очерки. Москва, Наука, 2005, с. 337-341). Monahismul şi mănăstirile din Rusia. 

Secolele XI–XX. SchiŃe istorice. Moscova, 2005. 

2. DesfiinŃarea schitului Fântâna Doamnei In: Arhivele Basarabiei, Chişinău, 1936, an. 8, 

nr. 2, p. 59-61. 


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ŞtiinŃele Naturii şi Muzeologie. S.N. Volumul 13 (26). Etnografie şi Muzeologie. 

Chişinău, 2010, p. 229-240. 

4. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 1687, f. 14, 192. 




8. Beşleagă. V.: Cruci răsturnate de regim. Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959, Chişinău. Prut 

InternaŃional, 2006, p. 54-55. 


10. Pravoslavie v Moldove. Vlasti, Ńercovi, veruiuşcie. 1940–1991. (Ortodoxia în 

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autorul prefaŃei V. Pasat), Moscova, 2009, vol. I, doc. 28). Православие в Молдавии. 

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166-168, док. 28. 


12. Micşunescu, Dimitrie P.: Vizitând mănăstiri basarabene şi bucovinene. Bucureşti. 

Tipografia ziarului „Universul”, 1937, p. 61. 


14. Beşleagă, V.: Cruci răsturnate.., p. 54-55. 

15. Agachi, Al.: Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu (1677–2010), Chişinău. Pontos, 2010, p. 163; 

ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 6, f. 4-5. 

16. Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, c. 166-168, док. 28. 



594

19. Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova (în continuare: 

AOSPRM), fond 51, inv. 9, dosar 44, f. 45-50. 

20. Agachi, Al.: Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu, p. 165. 



23. ANRM, fond P – 3046, inv. 1, dosar 43, f. 12. 


25. ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 46, f. 19-24. 

26. Православие в Молдавии, Том. 1, c. 645-654, док. 159-162. 





31. Beşleagă, V.: Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 53. 

32. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 82, f. 259; AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 188, 

f. 138. 




36. Condraticova, L.: Covoarele tradiŃionale din colecŃia mănăstirilor moldoveneşti – 

parte a patrimoniului naŃional In: Patrimoniul bisericesc – recuperarea trecutului. 

Rezumatele conferinŃei naŃionale din 5 mai 2012. Chişinău, 2012, p. 18-20. 

37. ANRM, fond 208, inv. 2, dosar 3273, f. 8 verso; Arbure, Z.: DicŃionar geografic al 

Basarabiei. Chişinău. Museum, 2001, p. 113. 

38. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 211, f. 190. „Formularele de serviciu ale mănăstirilor 

din Eparhia Chişinăului pentru anul 1941”. 

39. ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 212, f. 162-190, „Formularele de serviciu ale 

mănăstirilor din Eparhia Chişinăului pentru anul 1942”. 


41. Beşleagă, V.: Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 54-55; Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, 

c. 165-179, док. 28. 


43. Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, c. 352-366. „Raportul împuternicitului pentru 

biserica ortodoxă rusă din RSSM P. Romenski privind mănăstirile aflate pe teritoriul 

RSSM în anul 1948”, док. 80. 

44. Beşleagă, V.: Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 54-55. 

45. AOSPRM. Fond 51, inv. 9, dosar 44. 

46. Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, c. 610, док. 144. 

47. Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, c. 714, док. 182. 


595

49. Православие в Молдавии,Том 1, c. 589-591, док. 142; ANRM, fond 3046, inv. 1, 

dosar 76, f. 30. 






55. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 17, dosar 37. 



58. AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 169, f. 46; Монашество и монастыри в России, 

с. 341. 

59. Православие в Молдавии, том 2, c. 669, док. 243. 


61. http://personalitatibasarabene.info/arhimandrit-serafim-dabija-1985062008.html, 

accesat 5 aprilie 2012 

62. S-a născut în 1890 în satul Vărăncău, raionul RâbniŃa, într-o familie înstărită de 

Ńărani. A făcut şcoală primară. La 10 martie 1920, a fost primită în ascultare la 

mănăstirea Hirova, fiind tunsă în călugărie tot aici, la 10 noiembrie 1932. La 19 aprilie 

1935, odată cu transferul călugărilor de la mănăstirea Saharna şi stabilirea aici a 

monahiilor, insistă să fie transferată la Saharna. Prin ordinul nr. 611 din 6 iulie 1936 a 

fost numită casieră a mănăstirii. A îndeplinit această funcŃie în anii celui de-al Doilea 

Război Mondial, iar în primii ani postbelici a fost numită stareŃă a mănăstirii. 

63. ANRM. Fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 212; Arhiva personală L. Condraticova. 

64. http://mitropoliabasarabiei.md/news/217/, accesat 5 noiembrie 2011 

65.Cimitirul eroilor romani de la Hirova in: 

http://celalaltunivers.blogspot.com/2007/07/hirova-mnstirea-uitat.html, accesat 20 

noiembrie 2011 

1 

Monaşestvo i monastiri v Rossii. XI–XX veca. Istoriceschie ocerchi. Moscva, Nauca, 2005, c. 

337-341 (Монашество и монастыри в России. XI–XX века. Исторические очерки. 

Москва, Наука, 2005, с. 337-341). Monahismul şi mănăstirile din Rusia. Secolele XI–XX. 

SchiŃe istorice. Moscova, 2005. 

2 

DesfiinŃarea schitului Fântâna Doamnei în: Arhivele Basarabiei, Chişinău, 1936, an. 8, nr. 2, p. 

59-61. 

3 

Arhiva NaŃională a Republicii Moldova (în continuare: ANRM), fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 167, f. 

9-11; GuŃuleac A. Profanarea şi distrugerea patrimoniului bisericesc sub prima ocupaŃie 

sovietică (1940–1941) În: Buletin ştiinŃific. Revistă de Etnografie, ŞtiinŃele Naturii şi 

Muzeologie. S.N. volumul 13 (26). Etnografie şi Muzeologie. Chişinău, 2010, p. 229-240. 

4 

ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 1687, f. 14, 192. 

5 

ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 212. 

6 


7 

ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 1, dosar 3446. 

596

8 Beşleagă V. Cruci răsturnate de regim. Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959, Chişinău, Prut International, 

2006, p. 54-55. 

9 ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 24, f. 3. 

10 Pravoslavie v Moldove. Vlasti, Ńercovi, veruiuşcie. 1940–1991. (Ortodoxia în Moldova. Puterea, 

biserica, enoriaşii. 1940–1991, în 4 volume. Red. resp., alcătuitor şi autorul prefaŃei V. Pasat), 

Moscova, 2009, vol. I, doc. 28). Православие в Молдавии. Власть, церковь, верующие. 1940– 

1991. В 4-х томах. 1940–1953, Отв. редактор, составитель и автор предисловия В. Пасат, 

Москва, РОССПЭН, 2009, том 1, c. 166-168, док. 28. 

11 ANRM, fond 3046, inv. 2, dosar 361. 

12 Micşunescu Dimitrie P., Vizitând mănăstiri basarabene şi bucovinene. Bucureşti, Tipografia 

ziarului „Universul”, 1937, p. 61. 


14 Beşleagă V., Cruci răsturnate.., p. 54-55. 

15 Agachi Al., Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu (1677–2010), Chişinău, Pontos, 2010, p. 163; ANRM, 

fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 6, f. 4-5. 

16 Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, c. 166-168, док. 28. 



19 Arhiva OrganizaŃiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova (în continuare: AOSPRM), fond 

51, inv. 9, dosar 44, f. 45-50. 

20 Agachi Al., Istoria Mănăstirii Hâncu, p. 165. 



23 ANRM, fond P – 3046, inv. 1, dosar 43, f. 12; Православие в Молдавии. Том 2, c. 351, док. c. 

351. 


25 ANRM, fond P-3046, inv. 1, dosar 46, f. 19-24. 

26 Православие в Молдавии, Том. 1, c. 645-654, док. 159-162. 





31 Beşleagă Vladmir, Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 53. 

32 AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 82, f. 259; AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 188, f. 138. 




36 Condraticova L., Covoarele tradiŃionale din colecŃia mănăstirilor moldoveneşti – parte a 

patrimoniului naŃional în: Patrimoniul bisericesc – recuperarea trecutului. Rezumatele conferinŃei 

naŃionale din 5 mai 2012. Chişinău, 2012, p. 18-20. 

37 ANRM, fond 208, inv. 2, dosar 3273, f. 8 verso; Arbure Z., DicŃionar geografic al Basarabiei. 

Chişinău, Museum, 2001, p. 113. 

38 ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 211, f. 190. „Formularele de serviciu ale mănăstirilor din 

Eparhia Chişinăului pentru anul 1941”. 

39 ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 212, f. 162-190, „Formularele de serviciu ale mănăstirilor din 

Eparhia Chişinăului pentru anul 1942”. 


597

41 Beşleagă Vladmir, Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 54-55; Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, c. 

165-179, док. 28. 


43 Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, c. 352-366. „Raportul împuternicitului pentru biserica 

ortodoxă rusă din RSSM P. Romenski privind mănăstirile aflate pe teritoriul RSSM în anul 

1948”, док. 80. 

44 Beşleagă Vladmir, Cruci răsturnate de regim, p. 54-55. 

45 AOSPRM. Fond 51, inv. 9, dosar 44. 

46 Православие в Молдавии. Том 1, c. 610, док. 144. 

47 Православие в Молдавии, Том 1, c. 714, док. 182. 


49 Православие в Молдавии,Том 1, c. 589-591, док. 142; ANRM, fond 3046, inv. 1, dosar 76, f. 

30. 



52 ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 211. S-a născut în anul 1880, a învăŃat în schit unde a venit în 

1894, a fost călugărită în 1920. A fost numită stareŃă la orfelinatul preoŃesc din Chişinău 

(1927); blagocină a mănăstirii Hirova (1935); tipicăriŃă în strana de stânga. 

53 ANRM, fond 1135, inv. 3, dosar 211. S-a născut în anul 1903, originară dintr-o familie de Ńărani 

din satul ScorŃeni, judeŃul Orhei; a studiat carte la mănăstire, unde a intrat în 1923, a fost 

călugărită în 1936. 


55 AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 17, dosar 37. 



58 AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 19, dosar 169, f. 46; Монашество и монастыри в России. XI–XX 

века. Исторические очерки. Москва, Наука, 2005, с. 341. 

59 Православие в Молдавии, том 2, c. 669, док. 243. 


61 http://personalitatibasarabene.info/arhimandrit-serafim-dabija-1985062008.html, accesat 5 

aprilie 2012 

62 S-a născut în 1890 în satul Vărăncău, raionul RâbniŃa, într-o familie înstărită de Ńărani. A făcut 

şcoală primară. La 10 martie 1920, a fost primită în ascultare la mănăstirea Hirova, fiind tunsă 

în călugărie tot aici, la 10 noiembrie 1932. La 19 aprilie 1935, odată cu transferul călugărilor 

de la mănăstirea Saharna şi stabilirea aici a monahiilor, insistă să fie transferată la Saharna. 

Prin ordinul nr. 611 din 6 iulie 1936 a fost numită casieră a mănăstirii. A îndeplinit această 

funcŃie în anii celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, iar în primii ani postbelici a fost numită 

stareŃă a mănăstirii. 

63 ANRM. Fond 1135, inv. 2, dosar 212; Arhiva personală L. Condraticova. 

64 http://mitropoliabasarabiei.md/news/217/, accesat 5 noiembrie 2011 

65 Cimitirul eroilor romani de la Hirova in http://celalaltunivers.blogspot.com/2007/07/hirovamnstirea-uitat.html, 

accesat 20 noiembrie 2011. 

598

Tabelul 1. Domeniul mănăstirilor Hirova şi Tabăra (1944–1960) 

Perioada 

Pământ deŃinut [ha] 

Tabăra Hirova 

1944 30,5 42 

1945 Total – 28 de ha, inclusiv 20 ha de teren arabil, 1 

ha grădină, 1 ha viŃă-de-vie 

1951 Total –11.55 ha, dintre care 8 ha teren arabil, 0.8 

ha viŃă-de-vie şi 1,35 ha livadă 

1953 14.55 

1955 Total – 9.46 ha, dintre care 7.44 ha teren arabil; 

0.82 ha grădină şi 0,89 ha viŃă-de-vie 

1959 Total – 1.48 ha de pământ, inclusiv 1.3 ha teren 

arabil 

Tabelul 2. Dinamica comunităŃii monahale de la Hirova şi Tabăra (1944–1960) 

Perioada Numărul total de monahii 

Hirova Tabăra 

1944 100 151 

1945 151 

1944–1945 163 

1947–1948 13 52 

1 ianuarie 1951 207 

1952 173 

1957 170 

1.I.1957– 

12.VI.1959 

162 188 

1960 180 

Tabelul 3. Dimensiunile clădirilor complexului monahal Tabăra 

Clădirea 

Dimensiuni 

Nr interioare /exterioare 

chiliilor [m 2 ] [m 2 ] 

StăreŃia 7 100.5 129.0 

Casa preotului duhovnic 4 48.0 60.0 

Căminul 4 84.0 91.0 

Total 232.5 280.0 

599

Anexe gospodăreşti 3 44.0 60.0 

Grajdul pentru cai 15.0 24.0 

Trei hambare 111.0 151.0 

Total 170 235 

Atelierul de confecŃionare a 5 124.0 155.0 

covoarelor 

Biserica de vară 160.0 216.0 

Biserica de iarnă 107.0 140.0 

Total 267.0 356.0 

Tabelul 4. Dimensiunile clădirilor complexului monahal Hirova 

Clădirea Nr 

chiliilor 

600 

Mărimile 

interioare/exterioare 

[m 2 ] [m 2 ] 

Casa egumenei 6 92.0 135.0 

Casa preotului 4 46.2 64.0 

Căminul cu două nivele 7 114.1 - 

Total 252.5 280.6 

Bucătăria 5 49.3 - 

Hambarul 3 84.4 75.1 

Grajdul 3 75.6 107.8 

Vinăria 2 59.9 80.3 

Sâsâiacul - 33.6 37.3 

Total 302.8 343.6 

Biserica de iarnă - 76.5 94.0 

Biserica de vară - 180.0 254.6 

Total 256.5 348.6

CONDAMNAREA JUDICIARĂ A CRIMELOR 

COMUNISMULUI - CROCHIU DE ACT 

NORMATIV 

Iuliu CRĂCANĂ 1 

Analiza regimului comunist duce în mod inevitabil către aceeaşi concluzie: regimul 

comunist totalitar din România a fost un regim ilegitim şi criminal. Ilegitim pentru că a 

fost instaurat împotriva voinŃei majorităŃii poporului român, criminal pentru că a fost 

instaurat şi menŃinut prin comiterea de „crime”. Nu există criminal fără crimă decât ca 

figură de stil. Iar dreptul nu este un gen literar. 

Capcana în care se cade în mod frecvent în discursul public, însă, este confuzia 

contraproductivă între două componente esenŃiale ale regimului în discuŃie. Pe de o parte 

avem de-a face cu un construct politic bazat pe viziunea ideologică asupra societăŃii cu 

originea în scrierile lui Marx şi Engels. Impus cu forŃa de trupele sovietice cu acordul 

marilor puteri, a adus schimbări economice şi sociale radicale care, odată înfăptuite, nu 

pot intra în sfera juridică sub formă de infracŃiuni. Mai mult decât atât, anumite 

transformări statale, juridice, economice şi chiar culturale cu siguranŃă discutabile, dar nu 

ilegitime decât, poate, doar prin modul originar de implementare şi, mai ales, nu 

criminale, au fost asumate firesc de statul român de după 1989 care a preluat toate 

instituŃiile statale ale României comuniste. 

Pe de cealaltă parte, avem represiunea şi cei care au exercitat-o, unii dintre ei având 

această atribuŃie trecută în fişa postului. Şi aici pot apărea confuzii, căci nici o instituŃie 

nu a avut un rol exclusiv represiv sau criminal. Acelaşi legiuitor care a adoptat legislaŃia 

represivă, se poate lăuda astăzi cu modernizarea Romaniei. Acelaşi guvern care înfiinŃa 

lagăre şi deporta administrativ sate întregi, se poate prevala astăzi de construirea a sute de 

mii de locuinŃe, a unor obiective de infrastructură şi industriale, aceeaşi justiŃie care a 

trimis în închisoare la comandă politică sute de mii de oameni încălcând toate principiile 

de drept şi chiar legile regimului, se poate lăuda astăzi că a scăzut rata infracŃionalităŃii, 

că judeca imparŃial în procese civile etc. Securitatea însăşi, instituŃie creată în scop 

exclusiv represiv, îşi poate face un titlu de glorie din atribuŃiile privind apărarea 

securităŃii naŃionale sau din activităŃile de spionaj specifice oricărui serviciu secret. 

Persoanele care au lucrat în aceste instituŃii se pot prevala de aceleaşi justificări. 

1 CNSAS - Consiliul NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii, Bucuresti, România. 

601

Prin declaraŃia Preşedintelui României din decembrie 2006, statul român a condamnat 

sistemul comunist totalitar din România pentru faptul că a fost impus prin dictat străin, 

pentru atacul împotriva societăŃii civile, a pluralismului politic şi economic, nimicirea 

partidelor democratice, distrugerea pieŃei libere, exterminarea prin asasinat, deportări, 

muncă forŃată, întemniŃarea a sute de mii de oameni. Mai mult decât atât, prin acte 

normative specifice sau decizii ale instanŃelor, statul român actual a sancŃionat statul 

român comunist prin acte de retrocedări ale proprietăŃii, de anulare a unor sentinŃe 

politice, de despăgubiri materiale pentru suferinŃe şi încălcări ale drepturilor omului. Prin 

aceste măsuri reparatorii, dreptul românesc recunoaşte ipoteza juridică generală că faptele 

enunŃate mai sus sunt amendabile. 

Teoria dreptului prevede, însă, mai multe tipuri de sancŃiuni în funcŃie de scopul 

urmărit: sancŃiuni de anulare a actelor ilicite, sancŃiuni reparatorii, sancŃiuni disciplinare, 

sancŃiuni contravenŃionale, sancŃiuni penale. Primele dintre ele au fost deja puse în 

practică. Chestiunea privind pedepsirea crimelor comunismului nu poate fi rezolvată din 

punct de vedere juridic decât prin sancŃiunea penală, ultima, cea mai gravă şi cea mai 

importantă, o sancŃiune care să arate că statul român ar fi capabil să şi pedepsească pe 

vinovaŃi, nu doar să recompenseze suferinŃa. Răsplătirea cu bani şi proprietăŃi a foştilor 

deŃinuŃi politici ne duce în situaŃia bizară în care sunt recompensaŃi în acelaşi timp şi 

foştii lucrători ai aparatului represiv care beneficiază în continuare de privilegiile şi 

drepturile acordate de statul român comunist dar şi foştii persecutaŃi politici, conform 

legii nr. 221/2009. 

Deşi opinia generală este aceea că regimul nu este identic cu ideologia pe care se 

bazează, el fiind înfăptuit de oameni prin faptele lor, ne confruntăm cu paradoxul că doar 

regimul a fost condamnat dar nu şi cei care l-au instaurat şi care l-au menŃinut. 

DeclaraŃia preşedintelui nu a fost transpusă într-o normă juridică care să aibă 

proprietatea de a fi stabilită sau recunoscută de stat, care să exprime voinŃa de stat şi a 

cărei respectare obligatorie să fie garantată de forŃa coercitivă a statului. 

Întorcându-ne la celelalte tipuri de sancŃiuni în afara celei penale, vom trece în revistă şi 

„lustraŃia”, ca manifestare a unei vagi intenŃie punitive a statelor foste comuniste. 

LustraŃia prezintă şi ea unele aspecte controversate. În România, Legea lustraŃiei, dând 

curs punctului 8 al ProclamaŃiei de la Timişoara care urmărea asanarea clasei politice şi 

decizionale, propune responsabilităŃi pentru activiştii de partid, „acei oameni care şi-au 

abandonat profesiile lor pentru a sluji partidul comunist şi a beneficia de privilegiile 

deosebite oferite de acesta”. Ori, întorcându-ne la justiŃie, apartenenŃa la partidul 

comunist sau deŃinerea anumitor funcŃii nu poate face obiectul unei infracŃiuni. JustiŃia 

operează cu cazuri particulare, grade de vinovăŃie şi probe. Trebuie dovedit dacă, în 

exercitarea funcŃiei respective, o persoană a comis sau nu anumite fapte. 

In urma unei analize a avatarurilor legii lustraŃiei din România cu toate problemele 

ideologice, legislative şi de drept pe care aceasta le înglobează, istoricul Florin Abraham 

critică faptul că Legea lustraŃiei introduce două mecanisme de aplicare: autolustraŃia şi 

lustrabilitatea demonstrată şi concluzionează că, pentru o reconciliere cu trecutul totalitar, 

singura formă viabilă este nu de a căuta forme juridice pentru o „politică a revanşei” ci de 

602

a pedepsi, acolo unde este posibil, în mod individual sau de grup, responsabilităŃile 

directe, concrete şi indiscutabile, pe calea proceselor, în care cei acuzaŃi să îşi poată pleda 

nevinovăŃia 2 . 

Din cele de mai sus şi în conformitate cu teoria generală a dreptului tragem o primă 

concluzie: răspunderea pentru crimele comunismului nu poate fi decât individuală şi nu 

pe grupuri. Spre deosebire de soluŃiile administrative sau legislative care pot stabili 

sancŃiuni pentru categorii de cetăŃeni sau fapte, justiŃia operează cu cazuri individuale. 

Doar aşa pot fi stabilite gradele de vinovăŃie, doar aşa cel judecat se poate apăra, doar aşa 

se pot administra probe sau circumstanŃe atenuante. 

Pe cale de consecinŃă, pentru orice „crimă a comunismului”, trebuie în mod obligatoriu 

să se desfăşoare un proces în sens juridic, iar acesta nu poate avea loc decât în cadrul 

„justiŃiei”. El trebuie conŃină următoarele elemente: examinarea vinovăŃiei trebuie să fie 

individuală, completă, non-arbitrară, echitabilă, iar judecătorii să nu fie în acelaşi timp şi 

parte şi arbitrii. 

Pe cele de consecinŃă deducem obligativitatea ca procesele să se desfăşoare după toate 

normele dreptului şi justiŃiei, identificată de noi ca o a treia condiŃie. Trebuie să existe o 

diferenŃă, însă: crimele comunismului nu vor putea fi judecate de instanŃele ordinare. 

Astfel de procese nu vor putea avea loc fără abateri de la norma generală de drept. 

Având în vedere că justiŃia a fost instrumentalizată de o sumă de instituŃii funciar 

represive, şi amintim aici rolul justiŃiei din legile de organizare a justiŃiei din timpul 

regimului comunist, este posibil ca judecătorii mai în vârstă care să judece aceste procese 

să fi fost implicaŃi în activitatea represivă. Totodată, având în vedere că justiŃia este o 

castă, nu numai ca familie ci şi ca permanentizare a relaŃiei discipol-maestru, este posibil 

ca judecătorii, chiar mai tineri, să fie în acelaşi timp parte şi arbitri. FacultăŃile de drept 

omit în mod programatic să îi înveŃe pe viitori jurişti despre adevărata faŃă a dreptului 

totalitar din timpul regimului comunist şi despre represiunea politică, dovadă stând 

cursurile de Istorie a statului şi dreptului românesc materie obligatorie în programa 

anului I, cursuri ale căror autori ori nu tratează perioada comunistă, ori au o abordare 

elogioasă la adresa dreptului şi justiŃiei comuniste. Astfel o a treia condiŃie obligatorie 

pentru un proces corect aceste procese să fie judecate de o instanŃă specială. 

Pe lângă o instanŃă specială, va fi nevoie de infracŃiuni specifice. Acestea ar trebui 

introduse într-o lege elaborată ad-hoc care sa prevadă sancŃiuni penale pentru fapte 

constând în crime şi represiune politică. Ideea, rostogolită la infinit, că vinovaŃii nu pot fi 

judecaŃi decât după legislaŃia comunistă, nu a dus şi nu poate să ducă la nici un fel de 

rezultate deoarece este contraproductivă. LegislaŃia comunistă a fost elaborată în funcŃie 

de alt context politic într-o paradigmă total diferită. După 1989, legislaŃia a continuat să 

producă efecte, Codul penal din 1968 a rămas în vigoare, iar el nu cuprinde încriminarea 

„persecuŃiilor din motive politice”. O astfel de infracŃiune introdusă acum nu poate 

acŃiona retroactiv. Chiar dacă, imediat după 1989, s-ar fi intenŃionat judecarea abuzurilor 

2 Florin Abraham, Între moral şi ilegal: problema responsabilităŃii din perspectiva Legii lustraŃiei 

în România, în „Arhinele Totalitarismului”, anul XVIII, Nr. 68-69, 3-4/2010, 126-141. 

603

care au încălcat legislaŃia în vigoare, nu s-ar fi putut din cauza efectelor produse de cele 

două amnistii, din 1988 şi cea din 1990 (Decretul nr. 3 din 4 ianuarie 1990 privind 

aminstierea unor infracŃiuni şi graŃierea unor pedepse aministia orice infracŃiune „pentru 

care Codul Penal sau legile speciale prevedeau o pedeapsă privativă de libertate până la 3 

ani inclusiv sau amendă”) 3 . Un alt impediment este acela al prescrierii tuturor 

infracŃiunilor, România neintroducând în Codul penal imprescribilitatea crimelor de 

război şi a crimelor împotriva umanităŃii aşa cum prevedea ConvenŃia ONU asupra 

imprescriptibilităŃii crimelor de război şi a crimelor împotriva umanităŃii pe care 

România a ratificat-o la data de 15 septembrie 1969. 

Desigur că elaborarea si adoptarea unui astfel de act normativ ar ridica astăzi o serie de 

probleme de drept intern si internaŃional, nemaivorbind de conjunctura politică şi de 

utilitatea lui socială. Pe scurt, considerăm că un astfel de act normativ este astăzi 

imposibil de adoptat. Din punct de vedere juridic, s-ar argumenta că un act normativ care 

să introducă în sistemul judiciar românesc o instanŃă specială şi infracŃiuni specifice ar 

încălca principiul de drept al neretroactivităŃii legii penale şi principiul de drept procesual 

consfiinŃit prin art. 126 alin. 5 din ConstituŃie care interzice înfiinŃarea unor instanŃe 

extraordinare. Continuarea articolului permite însă înfiinŃarea unor instanŃe speciale: 

„Prin lege organică pot fi înfiinŃate instanŃe specializate în anumite materii, cu 

posibilitatea participării, după caz, a unor persoane din afara magistraturii”. 

Mai mult, toate aceste principii au mai fost încălcate în legislaŃia românească. O lege a 

instituit o instanŃă extraordinară şi a introdus infracŃiuni noi pe care urma să le aplice 

retroactiv: Legea nr. 312 din 24 aprilie 1945 pentru urmărirea şi sancŃionarea celor 

vinovaŃi de dezastrul Ńării sau de crime de război. 

Actul normativ care, deşi nu era în cooncordanŃă cu ConstituŃia din 1923, în vigoare la 

acea dată, a trecut cu brio de Înalta Curte de CasaŃie şi JustiŃie, Curtea constituŃională de 

atunci. Având în vedere caracterul neconstituŃional al legii, încă de la primul proces 

întemeiat pe Legea nr. 312/1945, s-a ridicat excepŃia de neconstituŃionalitate a 

prevederilor acesteia. AvocaŃii apărării, în procesul lotului Generalului Macici, au 

susŃinut că măsurile penal-jurisdicŃionale excepŃionale ar fi nesocotit dispoziŃiile 

constituŃiilor din 1866 şi 1923 – repuse in vigoare la 2 septembrie 1944 şi rămase 

nemodificate - prin aceea că: 

„1. Instituiau un tribunal excepŃional cu caracteristicile unui adevărat juriu, în 

vederea judecării unor anumite infracŃiuni, imputate unor persoane mai înainte 

determinate, sustrăgând astfel acele persoane de la judecătorii lor fireşti, care, pentru 

membrii armatei erau judecătorii instanŃelor militare, iar pentru civili, judecătorii 

instanŃelor de drept comun; 

2. ÎncredinŃau atribuŃiile de acuzatori publici unor persoane din afara corpului 

judecătoresc şi permiteau a se ordona arestarea de către aceşti acuzatori şi de Consiliul 

de Miniştri cu încălcarea art. 14 al ConstituŃiei din 1923 şi a principiului separaŃiunii 

puterilor în stat; 

3 Monitorul Oficial, nr. 2, 5 ianuarie 1990. 

604

3. Prevedeau pedeapsa cu moartea pentru alte fapte decât acelea săvârşite în timp 

de război şi sancŃionate de Codul JustiŃiei Militare; 

4. Prevedeau confiscarea averilor şi aceasta nu numai pentru cei găsiŃi vinovaŃi, 

dar şi pentru soŃiile şi copiii lor; 

5. Prevedeau sancŃionarea sau agravarea pedepselor din legile anterioare, pentru 

faptele care, la data săvârşirii lor, nu constituiau infracŃiune ori erau pedepsite mai 

uşor, nesocotind astfel principiul neretroactivităŃii legilor penale; 

6. Restrângeau dreptul de recurs într-o măsură mare, împiedicând funcŃionarea 

normală a acestei căi de atac (...); 

7. Se supuneau controlului jurisdicŃional acte de comandament cu caracter militar 

ş.a. 4 . 

Deşi motivele invocate erau întemeiate, prin Decizia nr. 15/1945, Înalta Curte de 

CasaŃie şi JustiŃie secŃiuni unite, a respins în cadrul şedinŃei din 31 mai 1945 cererea de 

pronunŃare asupra neconstituŃionalităŃii legii. Răspunsul negativ al supremei instanŃe se 

subsuma ideii caracterului excepŃional al situaŃiei şi legii, astfel că, în materia specială 

reglementată de Legea nr. 312/1945, nu-şi găseau aplicarea dispoziŃiile restrictive ale 

constituŃiilor din 1866 şi 1923. Din acest motiv, Înalta Curte de CasaŃie şi JustiŃie a 

socotit că nu putea fi limitat dreptul legiuitorului ca, într-un interes public superior, să 

incrimineze anumite fapte şi să considere ca infractori pe autorii lor, chiar atunci când 

acestea ar fi săvârşite de către militari şi în îndeplinirea unei misiuni militare ş.a. 

Prin constituirea unor tribunale extraordinare, în vederea unor anumite procese, Legea 

nr. 312/1945 viola art. 101 din ConstituŃie care prevedea că „nici o jurisdicŃiune nu se 

poate înfiinŃa decât numai în puterea unei legi. Comisiuni şi tribunale extraordinare nu se 

pot crea sub nici un fel de numire şi sub nici un fel de cuvânt în vederea unor anume 

procese, fie civile, fie penale, sau în vederea judecării unor anume persoane”. Pe de altă 

parte, nici ConvenŃia de ArmistiŃiu nu obliga statul român să înfiinŃeze tribunale 

extraordinare, art. 4 stabilind numai o colaborare a Guvernului şi Înaltului Comandament 

Român cu Înaltul Comandament Aliat la arestarea şi judecarea persoanelor acuzate de 

crime de război, fără vorbească despre instituirea unei instanŃe speciale de judecată 5 . Prin 

urmare, în cazul acestei prevederi neconstituŃionale, legiuitorul nu se putea prevala de 

primatul dreptului internaŃional asupra dreptului intern. Pe lângă acestea legea 312/1945 

încălca unul dintre, dacă nu cel mai important, principiiile de drept penal, cel al 

neretroactivitaŃii legii. Pe de altă parte, odată cu Procesele de la Nuremberg, s-a statuat că 

o instanŃă extraordinară poate judeca retroactiv abuzurile comise de un guvern asupra 

propriilor cetăŃeni chiar dacă „constituiau sau nu violări ale dreptului intern al Ńării în care 

au fost comise” 6 . 

4 ConstituŃionalitatea legii pentru sancŃionarea crimelor de război şi a vinovaŃilor pt dezastrul 

Ńării, în „JustiŃia Nouă”, anul I, decembrie, 1945. 

5 A.N.I.C., fond Consiliul de Miniştri, dosar nr. 787/70/1945, f. 6. 

6 Statutul Tribunalului Militar InternaŃional – ConvenŃia de la Londra din 8 august 1945, art. 6, l. c. 

605

Cu alte cuvinte legea naŃională nu poate fi invocată drept scuză pentru astfel de fapte. 

Pe de altă parte, fără o lege nouă, retroactivă care să le pedepsească, abuzurile şi crimele 

împotriva cetăŃenilor proprii nu vor putea fi pedepsite niciodată. 

Actul normativ a avut susŃinerea Conventiei de ArmistiŃiu din care faceau parte garanŃii 

tradiŃionali ai democraŃiei – S.U.A. şi Marea Britanie. SentinŃele date pe baza acestei legi 

produc efecte şi astăzi. Toate acestea sunt argumente pentru ca o astfel de lege poate fi 

luată drept model pentru demersul nostru. 

Legea nr. 312 din 24 aprilie 1945 pentru urmărirea şi sancŃionarea celor vinovaŃi de 

dezastrul Ńării sau de crime de război face parte decât dintre normele penale complete, 

conŃinând în structura sa toate cele trei părŃi: ipoteza, dispoziŃia şi sancŃiunea. Ea a fost 

modelul nostru, un model imperfect dar util pentru a înŃelege cum ar fi putut arăta o lege 

care să stea la baza real proces al comunismului. 

Pentru a o aduce în actualitate, am operat şi câteva modificări. Am păstrat termenul de 

acuzator public dar termenul de Tribunalul Poporului l-am înlocuit cu termenul de 

Tribunalul Special. Contextul istoric al legii nr. 312/1945 făcea ca acuzarea să fie sub 

controlul Consiliului de Miniştri. Am considerat că societatea civilă şi partidele politice, 

trebuie să joace un rol determinant în acuzare şi judecare astfel că acuzatorii publici şi 

judecătorii Tribunalului Special să fie numiŃi la propunerea ministrului justiŃiei, a 

partidelor politice parlamentare şi a reprezentanŃilor societăŃii civile, iar semnalarea 

faptelor încriminate să poată fi făcută de orice cetăŃean român, cu domiciliul în Ńară sau 

în străinătate, de presa scrisă sau audiovizuală, de partidele politice sau de organizaŃiile 

neguvernamentale legal constituite. Am păstrat în text, din Legea 312/1945 prevederea 

privind confiscarea averii în folosul statului cu titlu de despăgubire. Am păstrat şi cele 

două tipuri de infracŃiuni, în funcŃie de faptele, politice sau represive înfăptuite. 

Proiect de lege pentru urmărirea şi sancŃionarea celor vinovaŃi pentru instaurarea 

şi menŃinerea regimului comunist sau de crime de politice. 

Tehnica legislativă 

şi condiŃii enunŃate 

606 

Textul proiectului 

ART. 1 

Sunt vinovaŃi de crime politice cei care: 

a) Având răspunderea politică efectivă au săvârşit instaurarea 

comunismului; 

b) După 23 august 1944, au militat pentru pregătirea sau 

desăvârşirea faptelor de mai sus prin grai, prin scris sau prin orice 

alte mijloace. 

ART. 2 

Sunt vinovaŃi de represiune prin săvârşirea de crime politice cei 

care:

Răspunderea 

individuală - 

infracŃiuni 

specifice. 

Pedeapsă 

a) Au ordonat sau săvârşit atentate, răpiri sau asasinări de 

persoane în Ńară sau străinătate împotriva contestatarilor 

regimului cu scopul de a provoca teamă sau panică în rândul 

celorlalŃi contestatari sau potenŃiali contestatari ai regimului; 

b) N-au respectat legislaŃia internaŃională cu privire la 

drepturile omului; 

c) Au supus la un tratament inuman pe arestaŃii sau deŃinuŃii 

politici; 

d) Au ordonat sau desăvârşit acte de teroare, cruzime sau de 

suprimare asupra populaŃiei; 

e) Au ordonat sau săvârşit represiuni colective sau 

individuale în scop de persecuŃie politică asupra populaŃiei civile; 

f) Au ordonat sau organizat munci excesive în condiŃii de 

detenŃie în scopul exterminării unor persoane; 

g) ComandanŃii, directorii, supraveghetorii şi paznicii de 

închisori, de lagăre şi colonii de muncă sau de internaŃi politici, 

de deportaŃi sau de deŃinuŃi politici, care au supus la tratamente 

neomenoase pe cei aflaŃi sub puterea lor; 

h) OfiŃerii de MiliŃie şi Securitate sau anchetatorii cu orice 

titlu în chestiuni cu caracter politic care au comis acte de 

violenŃă, torturi sau alte mijloace ilegale de constrângere; 

i) Procurorii sau judecătorii civili ori militari care au ajutat 

sau săvârşit - cu intenŃie – înscenări judiciare cu scop politic, acte 

de represiune nedreaptă şi de cercetare abuzivă; 

n) Au ordonat edictarea de legi sau măsuri nedrepte şi 

represive, ori au practicat - cu intenŃie - o execuŃie excesivă a 

legilor cu caracter politic; 

o) S-au pus în slujba ideologiei comuniste şi au contribuit 

prin fapte proprii la realizarea scopurilor politice în detrimentul 

intereselor poporului român. 

ART. 3 

Cei vinovaŃi de faptele prevăzute la art. 1 şi art. 2 alin. m - o, 

se vor pedepsi... 

Cei vinovaŃi de faptele prevăzute de art. 2. alin. a - j se vor 

pedepsi cu... 

Cei vinovaŃi de faptele prevăzute de art. 2, alin. k - l se vor 

pedepsi cu... 

Instigatorii şi coautorii celor vinovaŃi pentru faptele 

prevăzute de prezenta lege se vor pedepsi cu aceleaşi pedepse. 

Complicii, favorizatorii şi tăinuitorii celor vinovaŃi pentru 

faptele prevăzute de prezenta lege se vor pedepsi cu o pedeapsă 

mai uşoară cu un grad decât acea prevăzută pentru autorul 

principal. 

607

Acuzare şi instanŃă 

specială. 

Pe lângă aceste pedepse, se va pronunŃa şi degradaŃiune civică, 

precum şi confiscarea averii în folosul statului cu titlu de 

despăgubire. 

ART. 4 

Ministrul justiŃiei va institui un număr de acuzatori publici 

însărcinaŃi cu cercetarea şi instruirea celor învinuiŃi de săvârşirea 

faptelor prevăzute de prezenta lege, precum şi instigatorilor, 

coautorilor, complicilor, favorizatorilor şi tăinuitorilor lor. 

Unul dintre acuzatorii publici va avea însărcinarea de şef al 

acuzatorilor publici. 

Acuzatorii publici vor fi numiŃi dintre cetăŃenii români, 

majori, fără deosebire de sex, putând fi numiŃi şi dintre 

funcŃionarii publici. 

Numirea se va face prin decret prezidenŃial, la propunerea 

ministrului justiŃiei, a partidelor politice parlamentare şi a 

reprezentanŃilor societăŃii civile. 

Organele de cercetare şi instrucŃie vor funcŃiona pe lângă 

Ministerul JustiŃiei, având sediul în Bucureşti, iar la caz de 

necesitate şi în oraşele de reşedinŃă ale CurŃilor de Apel. 

ART. 5 

Acuzatorii publici vor cerceta toate cazurile semnalate de 

orice cetăŃean român, cu domiciliul în Ńară sau în străinătate, de 

presa scrisă sau audiovizuală, de partidele politice sau de 

organizaŃiile neguvernamentale legal constituite. Ei se vor putea 

sesiza şi din oficiu. 

Ei vor putea lua orice măsuri asigurătoare asupra bunurilor 

bănuitului şi ale altor persoane fizice sau juridice, măsuri care 

vor rămâne în fiinŃă până la judecare. Acuzatorii publici vor 

putea ridica, în totul sau în parte, măsurile de asigurare. 

ART. 6 

Acuzatorii publici au dreptul de a face orice investigaŃiuni şi 

culege orice probe, uzând şi de toate drepturile şi puterile 

acordate de codul de procedură penală procurorului. 

Ei vor putea fi ajutaŃi de magistraŃi, grefieri sau jurişti, precum 

şi de specialişti în domeniul financiar, de experŃi şi funcŃionari 

care vor fi numiŃi sau delegaŃi de ministrul justiŃiei. 

Acuzatorii publici au dreptul a cere ca dispoziŃiunile lor să fie 

executate atât de organele puterii judecătoreşti cât şi de cele ale 

puterii executive de orice categorie. Ei vor putea cere să fie 

asistaŃi, în orice împrejurare de organele forŃei publice. De 

asemenea ei vor putea face orice descinderi, percheziŃiuni, a 

ridica orice corpuri delicte, orice acte de la particulari sau de la 

orice autoritate civilă sau militară, chiar şi acte cu caracter secret. 

608

Toate instituŃiile publice sunt datoare să dea concursul 

acuzatorilor publici sub sancŃiunea dispoziŃiunilor legii. 

ART. 7 

În urma cercetărilor întreprinse, acuzatorul public va întocmi 

actul de acuzare. 

ART. 8 

Judecarea faptelor prevăzute de prezenta lege se va face de 

Tribunalul Special. 

ART. 9 

Tribunalul Special este compus din: 

a) Judecători numiŃi de ministrul justiŃiei dintre magistraŃi; 

b) Judecători speciali, cetăŃeni români, majori, bărbaŃi sau 

femei, numiŃi printr-o procedură specială, la propunerea 

ministrului justiŃiei, a partidelor politice parlamentare şi a 

reprezentanŃilor societăŃii civile. 

ART. 10 

Ministrul justiŃiei va alcătui unul sau mai multe complete de 

judecată ale Tribunalului Special după necesitate. 

Completul de judecată va fi format din nouă membri dintre care 

doi vor fi magistraŃi numiŃi şi şapte vor fi dintre judecătorii 

poporului. 

Judecătorii poporului din completul de judecată vor fi traşi la 

sorŃi de ministrul justiŃiei. 

Completul de judecată va fi prezidat de magistratul numit, care 

este cel mai mare în grad sau cel mai vechiu în acelaşi grad. 

ART. 11 

Completele de judecată vor funcŃiona în Bucureşti. 

Ministrul justiŃiei va putea forma complete de judecată şi în 

oraşele de reşedinŃe ale celorlalte CurŃi de Apel. În acest caz 

aceste complete vor fi competente a judeca pe infractorii care au 

săvârşit faptele în cuprinsul circumscripŃiei CurŃii de Apel 

respective. 

Infractorii care au săvârşit fapte în afara hotarelor Ńării vor fi 

judecaŃi de Tribunalul Special din Bucureşti. 

Instigatorii, coautorii, complicii, favorizatorii şi tăinuitorii vor 

fi judecaŃi de aceeaşi instanŃă. 

ART. 12 

Preşedintele deschide şedinŃa, dispune să se facă apelul părŃilor 

şi al martorilor, ia interogatoriul de identitate al acuzatului şi 

ordonă a se da citire actului de acuzare. Apoi procedează la 

interogarea acuzatului şi audierea martorilor după care dă 

cuvântul acuzatorului public şi apărării, astfel că apărarea să aibă 

cea din urmă cuvântul. 

609

Preşedintele declară desbaterile închise, după care tribunalul 

pronunŃă hotărîrea sa. 

Hotărîrea va fi motivată şi va putea fi atacată cu recurs la Înalta 

Curte de CasaŃie şi JustiŃie. 

Recursul se declară oral înaintea instanŃei de judecată şi va fi 

judecat în trei zile de la primirea dosarului. Motivele recursului 

se vor propune şi dezvolta prin memoriu scris, depus până în ziua 

termenului de judecată. 

Recursul suspendă executarea pedepsei numai în cazul când s-a 

pronunŃat pedeapsa cu moartea. 

Hotărîrea va fi executată de procurorii Tribunalului de judeŃ de 

la reşedinŃa instanŃei care a pronunŃat-o. 

610

ACłIUNILE DE LUPTĂ ALE FORłELOR 

NAVALE FLUVIALE ROMÂNEŞTI 

DESFĂŞURATE PE TIMPUL EVACUĂRII 

BASARABIEI (28-30 IUNIE 1940) ŞI 

ELIBERĂRII ACESTEIA (22 IUNIE-IULIE 1941) 

Olimpiu Manuel GLODARENCO, Florin STAN, 

Dan Ionel CIOCOIU 1 

În condiŃiile ultimatumului sovietic din data de 26 iunie 1940, prin care România a fost 

obligată să cedeze Basarabia şi nordul Bucovinei, Marina Regală a desfăşurat operaŃiuni 

de evacuare a unităŃilor militare şi a refugiaŃilor. În perioada următoare, forŃele navale 

fluviale au descurajat incursiunile trupelor bolşevice, încălcarea apelor teritoriale 

naŃionale şi acŃiunile provocatoare ale acestora. Odată cu declanşarea “Planului 

Barbarosa”, marina română a intervenit cu toate forŃele pentru eliberarea teritoriilor 

ocupate cu un an în urmă, acŃionând pe Dunăre, în sudul Basarabiei, până la nimicirea 

inamicului şi deplasarea frontului în afara zonei acesteia de acŃiune. 

1. Scurt istoric al forŃelor fluviale române 

Pentru a aborda acŃiunile marinei dunărene române, este necesar a face o scurtă 

incursiune în istoria acestei categorii de forŃă, pentru a evidenŃia importanŃa pe care statul 

nostru a dat-o frontierei fluviale, prin dotări corespunzătoare. 

În a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, în domeniul construcŃiilor navale militare sau 

înregistrat numeroase progrese, printre acestea înscriindu-se şi realizarea unui nou tip 

de navă de luptă, un mic cuirasat pentru fluviu, dar folosit, uneori, chiar pentru paza 

coastei maritime. Prima navă de acest tip, purtând denumirea MONITOR, opera 

inginerului american Erickson, a fost destinată îndeplinirii unor misiuni de luptă pe fluviu 

în timpul războiului de secesiune (1861-1865). AparŃinând flotei statelor americane din 

nord, această navă a fost trimisă să acŃioneze împotriva fregatei confederate MERRIMAC 

(prima navă cuirasată) care stăpânea gura unui fluviu. Prin operaŃiunile executate, 

MONITOR şi-a îndeplinit în bune condiŃiuni misiunea, obligând fregata inamică să se 

retragă. EntuziasmaŃi de acest succes, nordiştii au continuat să construiască numeroase 

astfel de nave, numite monitoare după numele prototipului 2 . 

1 Muzeul Marinei Române, ConstanŃa, România. 

2 Joannès Tramond, André Reussner, Éléments d’ histoire maritime et coloniale contemporaine, 

(1815-1914), Société d’Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, Paris, 1932, pp. 101-110. 

611

În acelaşi timp, noul tip de navă americană a găsit adepŃi şi printre marinele fluviale ale 

altor state, în rândul acestora înscriindu-se şi România 3 . Încă de la sfârşitul secolului al 

XIX-lea, ideea construcŃiei unor nave de luptă blindate pentru flotila de Dunăre a prins 

contur, întrucât în 1898 s-a votat o lege prin care se deschidea, pe seama Ministerului de 

Război, un credit de 20 milioane lei, din care 4 milioane erau acordate marinei, pentru 

construcŃia a două monitoare fluviale, a trei torpiloare, şi pentru procurarea armamentului 

necesar acestor nave 4 . 

Deşi creditului alocat prin această lege i s-a dat o altă întrebuinŃare, ideea construirii 

monitoarelor nu a fost abandonată. În anul 1905, ministrul de război, generalul Grigore 

Manu, a obŃinut de la guvern, pentru marină, un credit de 12 milioane lei destinat 

construcŃiei de nave şi armament naval. Locotenent-comandorul Petre Demetriade, în 

calitate de director al marinei în Ministerul de Război, un ofiŃer energic şi deosebit de 

inimos, a dat cea mai bună întrebuinŃare acestor bani, aşa cum aprecia mai târziu, într-una 

din lucrările sale contraamiralul Nicolae Negrescu 5 , comandând la şantierul naval din 

Triest 4 monitoare, iar la un şantier naval din Anglia 8 vedete fluviale, nave care au 

constituit prima escadră de luptă pe Dunăre a Ńării noastre. 

Monitoarele, a căror construcŃie la „Stabilimento Technico Triestino” din Triest a fost 

supravegheată de căpitan-comandorul Constantin Bălescu 6 , aveau următoarele 

caracteristici principale: deplasament 680 tone, lungime 63 m, lăŃime 10,16 m, pescaj 

maxim 1,60 m, şi o viteză de 23,1 km/oră 7 . Aceste nave erau propulsate de două motoare 

cu triplă expansiune de 800 C.P. şi aveau un echipaj de 113 oameni. În ceea ce priveşte 

armamentul acestor nave, date fiind misiunile specifice pe care urmau să le îndeplinească, 

s-a considerat necesar să fie armate cu tunuri de calibru 120 mm şi tunuri mai mici de 47 

mm. Avându-se în vedere necesitatea executării unor trageri de artilerie asupra 

adăposturilor trupelor de pe maluri, ascunse prin văi sau protejate de diferite obstacole, sa 

hotărât ca monitoarele să fie armate şi cu obuziere. Întreg acest material de artilerie a 

fost comandat la uzinele „Skoda-Werke” din Pilsen. În calitate de preşedinte al comisiei 

de supraveghere, căpitan-comandorul Bălescu a fost trimis la Pilsen pentru a urmări 

procesul de fabricaŃie a tunurilor şi cuiraselor tunurilor, care urmau să înzestreze 

monitoarele. Din Jurnalul comisiei de recepŃie a marinei aflăm că la 1 martie 1906 a fost 

recepŃionat un prim lot de armament necesar monitoarelor, format din 3 tunuri de 120 

mm, 2 obuziere de 120 mm şi 4 tunuri de 47 mm 8 . La aceeaşi uzină din Pilsen a fost 

comandată şi pulberea necesară muniŃiei armamentului monitoarelor, în legătură cu care 

se fac precizări într-o corespondenŃă din toamna anului 1906, între reprezentanŃii uzinei 

„Skoda” şi Ministerul de Război român 9 . La începutul anului 1907, construcŃia părŃilor 

3 

Lt.Cdor Ion Bălănescu, Răsboiul naval pe înŃelesul tuturor, Bucureşti, 1915, pp. 48-49. 

4 

X X X, Monitorul Oficial, nr. 42 din 27 mai-8 iunie 1898, p. 1466. 

5 

C.A. Nicolae Negrescu, Rolul marinei în războiul pentru întregirea neamului şi recompensa 

finală, Bucureşti, 1920, p. 162. 

6 

X X X, Revista marinei, nr.4/1929, pp. 3-5. 

7 

X X X, Calendarul maritim /1914, pp. 256-257. 

8 


9 


612

componente ale monitoarelor era încheiată, iar armamentul lor consta din câte 3 tunuri 

„Skoda” cu calibru de 120 mm instalate 2 în prova şi unul în pupa, care urmau să fie 

protejate de turele cuirasate, câte 2 obuziere „Skoda” cu calibru de 120 mm, câte 4 tunuri 

„Skoda” cu calibru de 47 mm şi câte 2 mitraliere de 6,5 mm instalate pe spardec 10 . 

În privinŃa blindajului monitoarelor, acesta avea grosimi diferite, în funcŃie de gradul de 

expunere la loviturile de artilerie. Astfel, în borduri, avea o grosime de 76 mm, pe punte 

de 25 mm, iar turelele aveau un blindaj de 50-75 mm grosime. 

Întrucât trecerea prin strâmtori a navelor de război de orice tip era interzisă conform 

tratatelor în vigoare, monitoarele nu au putut fi asamblate în şantierul constructor, ci au 

fost transportate pe tronsoane, pe calea ferată, până la GalaŃi. Pe o cală improvizată a 

Arsenalului Marinei din GalaŃi, navele au fost montate şi nituite definitiv, operaŃiunea 

desfăşurându-se sub conducerea unui inginer al şantierului naval din Triest şi sub 

supravegherea, în continuare, a căpitan comandorului Bălescu 11 . 

La 19 septembrie 1907, într-un cadru solemn, a avut loc, la Arsenalul Marinei din 

GalaŃi, ceremonia lansării celor 4 monitoare 12 , care au primit numele unor personalităŃi 

politice româneşti din a doua jumătate al secolului al XIX-lea: MIHAIL 

KOGĂLNICEANU, LASCĂR CATARGIU, ALEXANDRU LAHOVARI şi ION C. 

BRĂTIANU. 

În iunie 1913 a izbucnit Al Doilea Război Balcanic, provocat de Bulgaria, care a atacat 

foştii aliaŃi din Primul Război Balcanic. Dorind să contracareze orice încercare de 

constituire a unei hegemonii în Balcani, guvernul român a decis intrarea în război 

împotriva Bulgariei. Campania navală a durat până în august 1913, timp în care Cartierul 

General al Marinei s-a aflat la Turnu Măgurele. Marina Militară, prin intermediul 

Escadrei de Dunăre a asigurat trecerea peste Dunăre a trupelor, a executat paza pe apă a 

podurilor şi a altor obiective, debarcări de trupe, transporturi de materiale, inclusiv 

locomotive şi vagoane, transporturi de provizii şi răniŃi 13 . 

În timpul Primului Război Mondial, Marina Militară română a îndeplinit misiuni 

diverse, dintre care cele mai importante au fost: atacul, la 14 august 1916, a flotei austroungare 

în portul Rusciuk, acŃiunea navelor Escadrei de Dunăre în apărarea capului de pod 

de la Turtucaia şi protejarea retragerii trupelor române din această zonă, susŃinerea 

flancului drept al armatei de uscat din Dobrogea de către navele Flotei de operaŃiuni, sub 

focul artileriei germane 14 . 

Referindu-se la modul în care flota a susŃinut trupele noastre de uscat, reuşind să 

înainteze sub tirul a şapte baterii grele germane, în amintirile sale, contraamiralul N. 

Negrescu arăta că Zilele de urmărire a flancului stâng al armatei germane din Dobrogea 

şi zilele de la Rasova vor forma, pururea, pagini de glorie, pentru mica dar brava şi 

neobosita flotilă română. 

10 Lt.Cdor Ion Bălănescu, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 

11 X X X, Registrul matricol al monitorului ALEXANDRU LAHOVARI. 

12 X X X, Marea Noastră nr. 7-8/1938, p. 264. 

13 George Petre, Ion Bitoleanu, TradiŃii navale româneşti, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991, p. 

117. 

14 ibidem, pp. 190-206. 

613

Cu toate că în toamna anului 1916 flota a înregistrat o serie de succese, reuşind să 

înainteze sub tirul bateriilor germane şi chiar să elibereze o serie de localităŃi din 

Dobrogea, ocupate anterior de inamic, odată cu retragerea armatei române în Moldova, 

pentru refacere, în decembrie 1916, şi-a încetat acŃiunile ofensive şi s-a limitat la operaŃii 

cu caracter defensiv, în special protejarea evacuării întregului parc de nave al marinei pe 

braŃul Chilia. În anul 1917, Marina Militară, alături de armata de uscat, a contribuit la 

apărarea frontului de pe Dunăre, bombardând cu artileria navelor, bateriile inamice de la 

Tulcea, şi la asigurarea transporturilor pe apă între GalaŃi şi gurile Dunării 15 . 

În ultimul an de război (1918) flotei i-a revenit una dintre cele mai dificile misiuni şi 

anume deminarea Dunării şi a mării în vederea reluării navigaŃiei în timp de pace. 

După încheierea Primului Război Mondial, în anul 1919, sub influenŃa mişcării 

bolşevice, unii marinari revoluŃionari au trecut la reorganizarea şi pregătirea unei răscoale 

generale a marinei române. Centrul acestei răscoale a devenit Chilia Nouă unde erau 

concentrate principalele nave ale flotei de Dunăre. Mişcarea, izbucnită iniŃial pe 

monitoarele LASCĂR CATARGIU şi MIHAIL KOGĂLNICEANU, s-a extins 

cuprinzând mase mai largi de marinari. Mai mult decât atât, s-a încercat ca această 

mişcare de pe monitoare să fie coordonată cu încercările de organizare a unor tulburări 

roşii în GalaŃi, Tulcea, Vâlcov, Reni, Ismail şi cu cea din unităŃile militare din porturile 

Chilia, Tulcea, Ismail. A fost instituit un comitet de acŃiune pentru conducerea şi 

pregătirea răscoalei, care şi-a început activitatea în luna aprilie 1919, fiind format din 5 

marinari, un caporal şi un soldat de pe monitorul MIHAIL KOGĂLNICEANU, doi 

sergenŃi de pe monitorul LASCĂR CATARGIU şi un sergent de la vedete. Pentru 

ilustrarea momentului, este semnificativă o mărturie a contraamiralului Dorin Iacomi. 

Acesta, în momentul izbucnirii răscoalei marinarilor din anul 1919, îndeplinea funcŃiile 

de ofiŃer secund şi de comandant al artileriei pe monitorul I.C. BRĂTIANU. Referitor la 

condiŃiile de viaŃă care au generat revolta marinarilor, el relatează următoarele: Echipajul 

a aruncat în Dunăre ciorba de linte şi a început a discuta în cazarmă despre cele 

întâmplate. Unii s-au resemnat, alŃii au propus indignaŃi să se reacŃioneze, chiar violent, 

aplicând anumite sancŃiuni unor ofiŃeri, maiştri şi reangajaŃi, apoi să ridice pavilionul 

roşu revoluŃionar, după cum au făcut, cândva, marinarii ruşi, şi cele două monitoare de 

pe braŃul Chilia să iasă în mare şi să ralieze flota roşie sovietică, unde o fi fost aceasta, 

să propună comandant al grupului revoluŃionar pe sergentul timonier Gheorghe 

Cimpoieru, care se bucura de încrederea echipajului şi de simpatia tuturor marinarilor 16 . 

În urma unui denunŃ, marinarii rebeli au fost arestaŃi şi trimişi în judecată, în total vreo 

24 de oameni. Procesul s-a judecat la Curtea MarŃială a Corpului III Armată. Opt acuzaŃi 

au fost condamnaŃi la moarte, printre care şi Cimpoieru Gheorghe, iar restul la muncă 

silnică. În timpul recursului judecat la ConstanŃa, unul dintre apărătorii marinarilor 

condamnaŃi la moarte sau muncă silnică va fi acelaşi Iacomi Dorin. Curtea MarŃială de la 

15 ibidem, pp. 209-211. 

16 Arh. M.Ap.N., fond C.M.M., dosar 287/1919, fila 469. 

614

ConstanŃa a comutat pedepsele de condamnare la moarte şi muncă silnică pe viaŃă, cu 

altele ce presupuneau privaŃiunea de libertate un număr mai mic de ani 17 . 

În perioada imediat următoare terminării războiului, în dotarea Diviziei de Dunăre au 

intrat trei monitoare provenite de la fosta flotă austro-ungară, care au fost botezaze cu 

numele provinciilor româneşti reintrate în graniŃele fireşti, ARDEAL, BUCOVINA şi 

BASARABIA 18 . 

2. Misiunile efectuate de marina militară română pe timpul evacuării Basarabiei 

Pe data de 26 iunie 1940, Uniunea Sovietică a transmis României un ultimatum prin 

care Ńara noastră era obligată să cedeze Basarabia şi nordul Bucovinei. În aceste condiŃii, 

toate forŃele navale române au adoptat măsuri de întărire a sistemului de supraveghere, 

pentru a putea preveni un atac al inamicului. Pe data de 27, contraamiralul Alexandru 

Gheorghiu, comandantul Diviziei de Dunăre a instaurat starea de alarmă la toate forŃele 

din subordine şi a stabilit un dispozitiv de pază şi ordine în porturile basarabene şi 

realizare a evacuării unităŃilor militare, structurilor administrative şi tuturor refugiaŃilor. 

Pentru a executa această complexă sarcină, Ministerul Aerului şi Marinei i-a dat în sprijin 

toate navele fluviale şi autorităŃile portuare. Monitoarele au asigurat acoperirea la Vâlcov, 

Chilia Nouă, Ismail şi Reni 19 . 

AcŃiunea de evacuare a debutat în ziua de 28 iunie, fiind mobilizate toate navele civile, 

anume remorchere, pasagere, şlepuri şi şalupe, aparŃinând statului sau companiilor 

particulare, care, împreună cu navele militare au executat traversarea fluviului cu trupe 

terestre, armament şi muniŃie 20 . 

Pe timpul evacuării au avut loc numeroase incidente, pe care marinarii români le-au 

rezolvat cu promptitudine. Este vorba, în principal, de aproximativ 25 de mii de persoane, 

marea lor majoritate evrei, care produceau tulburări în Tulcea şi GalaŃi, şi care cereau 

trecerea pe malul stâng al Prutului; transportul acestora a fost realizat în zilele de 29 şi 30, 

de la GalaŃi la Reni, şi de la Tulcea la Ismail 21 . 

O situaŃie deosebită s-a creeat în diferite localităŃi, precum Chilia, Ismail sau Vâlcov. 

Acolo, autorităŃile şi forŃele de ordine şi-au părăsit posturile, astfel că rolul de poliŃie a 

fost suplinit de marinari, care au folosit, de multe ori, armamentul din dotare. Pe 29 iunie, 

la Ismail s-a constituit un soviet local, iar grupuri înarmate de civili au tras asupra armatei 

în retragere, marina răspunzând corespunzător, evacuarea terminându-se în jurul orelor 

12.00. De asemenea, localitatea Reni a fost ocupată de trupele sovietice în dimineaŃa zilei 

de 30 iunie, navele româneşti retrăgându-se spre GalaŃi. Armata inamicului a devansat cu 

o zi termenul specificat în actul ultimativ, astfel că o mare cantitate de armament şi 

muniŃie, dar şi arhive, a fost capturată de acesta 22 . 

17 

Georgeta Borandă, Istoricul monitoarelor româneeşti, în Momente din istoria Marinei Române 

– Lucrări de cercetare, 1984, fila 34. 

18 

George Petre, Ion Bitoleanu, op. cit., p. 236. 

19 

Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, Glorie şi dramă. Marina Regală Română 1940-1945, Editura “Ion 

Cristoiu”, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 26. 

20 ibidem, p. 27. 

21 ibidem. 

22 ibidem. 

615

Deoarece armata sovietică acŃiona în mod imprevizibil şi neconform cu ultimatumul, 

pentru a asigura linia Dunării au fost dislocate trei batalioane de infanterie marină în 

sectoarele Periprava-Chilia, Sulina-Sfântu Gheorghe şi Tulcea, cu misiunea de a riposta 

unor eventuale treceri ale adversarului în Delta Dunării. De asemenea, pentru a sublinia 

libertatea de navigaŃie pe Dunăre, Divizia de Dunăre a ordonat remorcherului GIURGIU 

să execute un marş de la GalaŃi la Tulcea, cu toate că autorităŃile sovietice afirmaseră că 

nu recunoşteau statutul internaŃional al fluviului. După data de 4 iulie a fost reluată 

navigaŃia, nesocotind ameninŃările inamicului 23 . 

Pentru a stabili frontiera pe uscat şi pe fluviu, guvernul român a numit o comisie, din 

componenŃa căreia făcea parte şi contraamiralul Alexandru Gheorghiu, care, ambarcată 

pe nava de pasageri TRANSILVANIA, s-a deplasat la Odessa, pe 29 iunie, discuŃiile 

durând până pe 7 iulie, graniŃa fixându-se pe braŃul Chilia şi vărsarea în mare a Musurei 24 . 

Cu toate că pretenŃiile sovietice au fost satisfăcute, în perioada care a urmat au fost 

semnalate numeroase incidente la graniŃă. Dintre acestea amintim 25 : 

• Un grup de monitoare inamice a debarcat, în noaptea de 25 spre 26 octombrie 1940, 

trupe pe ostroavele Dalerul Mare şi Salangic, fiind capturaaŃi câŃiva militari români; 

• În dimineaŃa zilei de 5 noiembrie 1940, sovieticii au ocupat ostrovul dintre braŃul 

Musura şi Stari-Stambul, ceea ce a avut drept efect modificarea graniŃei; 

• La începutul anului următor, inamicul a desfăşurat acŃiuni care demonstrau intenŃia 

de a ocupa Gurile Dunării, fapt care a generat replica forŃelor româneşti. 

Toate aceste acte provocatoare au creat o stare tensionată în cadrul forŃelor navale, 

care au trebuit să organizeze o observare continuă a inamicului şi să realizeze o minare 

eficientă a căilor de acces spre obiectivele proprii. 

3. OperaŃiile desfăşurate de forŃele fluviale în condiŃiile declanşării Planului 

“Barbarosa” 

La 22 iunie 1941, forŃele navale române se compuneau 26 din două mari grupuri de nave, 

corespunzător specificului naval şi planurilor de război: ForŃele fluviale şi ForŃele 

maritime. 

ForŃele fluviale, destinate să formeze pivotul sectorului de sud al frontului de răsărit, 

sprijinit pe Dunăre, pe o lungime de 155 de km, de la Gura Prutului până la Periprava, 

avea o atitudine defensivă activă, în timp ce stânga frontului terestru executa o amplă 

mişcare de învăluire cu direcŃia generală sud-est. 

ForŃele maritime aveau misiunea de a contribui la apărarea litoralului în sectoarele 

bazelor navale şi de a proteja liniile maritime. 

23 ibidem, pp. 27-28. 

24 ibidem. 

25 ibidem, pp. 29-31. 

26 Dorin Mara, Marina Regală a României în cel de Al Doilea Război Mondial, Editura 

Economică, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 30. 

616

Aceste două mari grupări de forŃe au acŃionat potrivit Planului de întrebuinŃare a 

Marinei Militare la începutul ostilităŃilor, şi modificărilor ulterioare aduse în cursul 

războiului, potrivit fazelor de desfăşurare a operaŃiunilor pe Frontul de Est. 

ForŃele sovietice 27 realizau o superioritate absolută, care le permitea să dezvolte 

operaŃiuni ofensive. Marina sovietică dispunea de nave cu un deplasament total de peste 

200.000 tone şi tunuri de la calibru de 302 mm la 20 mm, totalizând peste 700 guri de 

foc. Navele sovietice aveau la bord un număr însemnat de mine şi de torpile. În acelaşi 

timp, marina română, dispunea de doar 28.000 tone, iar numărul tunurilor, înglobând 

toate calibrele, de la 150 mm la 20 mm, abia ajungea la 120 guri de foc. 

ForŃele navale şi de litoral româneşti, existente la Dunăre şi mare, în afară de 

inferioritatea lor numerică faŃă de forŃele sovietice, mai prezentau o serie de dificultăŃi din 

punct de vedere calitativ, în sensul că majoritatea navelor, fiind vechi şi uzate, nu mai 

corespundea cerinŃelor războiului. Mijloacele de dragaj erau insuficiente şi incomplet 

echipate, ceea ce limita foarte mult întrebuinŃarea forŃelor navale în zonele succeptibile de 

a fi minate. La acestea se adăugau lipsurile mari în aviaŃia maritimă. 

DisproporŃia dintre cele două marine scoate în evidenŃă greaua misiune a forŃelor 

române, care s-au găsit, din prima zi de război, singură în faŃa flotei sovietice. Cu 

mijloacele modeste de care dispunea, trebuia să-şi apere litoralul, să asigure transporturile 

aliaŃilor în Marea Neagră, să îndeplinească alte misiuni la fel de importante şi dificile. De 

menŃionat că, până la căderea Sevastopolului, toate misiunile de luptă, toate acŃiunile din 

Marea Neagră au fost executate, exclusiv, cu mijloacele marinei române 28 . 

Sovieticii au avut sectorul fluvial foarte bine organizat şi bine dotat, sub toate raporturile 29 . 

Puncte fortificate foarte tari, prevăzute cu multă artilerie de calibru mare, pe care s-a sprijinit 

întreaga apărare sovietică pe fluviu, fuseseră organizate la Reni şi Vâlcov. 

Zona Giurgiuleşti – Reni a constituit pivotul întregii apărări a Dunării de Jos. Dat fiind 

importanŃa acestei zone, sovieticii au organizat, din timp, importante lucrări din beton, şi 

au instalat artilerie de calibru mare. De asemenea, au menŃinut în zonă trei monitoare tip 

„Martinof” şi un număr apreciabil de nave rapide, vedete, şalupe armate etc. 

De la Reni la Ceatalul Ismail, sovieticii au avut, în tot lungul Dunării, mijloace de 

observare şi supraveghere protejate de artilerie foarte puternică. 

La Ismail, inamicul a avut forŃe numeroase, dispozitivul trupelor de uscat fiind întărit cu 

şlepuri şi ambarcaŃiuni uşoare – vedete, tancuri amfibii – ceea ce ducea la concluzia că, în 

regiunea Ismail – Chilia Nouă, acesta era organizat ofensiv. Pentru acelaşi motiv, a avut 

în zonă trei monitoare, dintre care două de tip „Udarnic”, blindate, cu tunuri de 130 mm. 

Între Cartal, Ismail şi Chilia Nouă au fost dispuse numeroase aerodromuri principale şi 

secundare, foarte aproape de zona de luptă, cu centrul de comandă şi aprovizionare la 

Ismail. 

27 ibidem, p. 29. 

28 Până în toamnă, în Marea Neagră sosesc nave uşoare germane şi italiene: 6 vedete torpiloare şi 8 

vedete dragoare germane; 5 submarine de 36 tone., 4 vedete M.A.S. şi 4 şalupe italiene. În luna 

februarie 1943 au mai sosit 3 submarine germane de 250 t, iar la sfârşitul anului încă 3 astfel de 

nave. 

29 Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 

617

La Vâlcov, sovieticii au dispus de forŃe terestre mai puŃine, însă încadrate cu artilerie 

numeroasă. 

ForŃele inamice, în totalitatea lor, au combinat flancul stâng al frontului, bine fixat pe 

Dunăre, acoperind retragerea trupelor lor din sudul Basarabiei. Au continuat acŃiunile 

artileriei de coastă şi de pe nave, combinate cu o intensă activitate aeriană de 

bombardament şi cu acŃiuni terestre – treceri şi capete de pod menite să Ńină pe loc 

eventuala noastră ofensivă şi să-şi asigure evacuările şi retragerile. Debarcări de trupe sau 

efectuat pentru ocuparea punctelor importante de pe malul drept al Dunării şi 

neutralizarea acŃiunii forŃelor proprii în vederea asigurării libertăŃii de navigaŃie pe braŃul 

Chilia. 

Dispozitivul românesc, de la GalaŃi la mare, a avut, în linii mari, următoarea înfăŃişare 30 : 

În zona Brăila – GalaŃi se afla dislocat un grup de 4 monitoare, 2 vedete fluviale, un 

grup arme sub apă, şalupe armate, de patrulare şi nave auxiliare care, sprijinite de artileria 

armatei de uscat de la GalaŃi, avea misiunea principală de a interzice, cu orice preŃ, orice 

încercare a forŃelor sovietice de a trece în amonte, periclitând siguranŃa oraşului GalaŃi 

iar, ca misiune secundară, să acŃioneze în aşa fel încât să distrugă monitoarele sovietice 

de la Reni, cu indicaŃia de a nu efectua acŃiuni riscante, monitoarele noastre trebuind 

păstrate, pe cât posibil, intacte pentru operaŃiuni ulterioare. Tot în această zonă, în 

apropiere de Cotul Pisicii, s-a instalat un baraj de mine şi s-a instituit un puternic sistem 

de supraveghere şi observare. 

În zona Cotul Pisicii – Isaccea, până la Ceatal, apărarea malului românesc a fost dată, 

exclusiv, trupelor de uscat (Divizia 10 Infanterie) care, folosindu-se de mijloacele 

marinei, (compania de observare), avea principala misiune de a opri orice infiltrare 

sovietică pe malul nostru şi de a distruge navele ce ar încerca să se retragă în aval iar, ca 

misiune secundară, să desfiinŃeze bateriile sovietice de la Ceatal şi să susŃină cu foc, la 

cerere, eventualele acŃiuni ale grupurilor noastre fluviale. 

Zona Ceatal – Tulcea – până la mare avea în dispozitiv Detaşamentul Maritim nr.1, 

alcătuit din 3 batalioane de infanterie marină cu artileria de însoŃire şi nave uşoare. 

OperaŃiunile din această zonă au fost conduse de Divizia 10 Infanterie. Misiunea 

Detaşamentului Maritim era, în principal, de a se menŃine pe poziŃii cu orice preŃ, de a se 

opune oricărei încercări de debarcare la Sulina – Sf. Gheorghe iar, ca misiune secundară, 

de a încerca ocuparea Vâlcovului cu mijloacele pe care le avea la dispoziŃie. 

Pentru coordonarea acŃiunilor dintre unităŃile din Deltă şi Divizia 10 Infanterie, şi ca o 

întărire a acestor forŃe, s-a constituit, la Tulcea, o grupare tactică formată din două 

monitoare, patru vedete şi o grupare arme sub apă, care avea misiunea de a organiza 

baraje de mine pentru interzicerea trecerii navelor sovietice dintr-o zonă în alta şi de a 

ajuta, cu forŃele sale mobile, acŃiunile trupelor de uscat, constituindu-se şi ca o întărire a 

apărării zonei Tulcea. 

Campania pe Dunăre s-a împărŃit în două perioade distincte şi anume: 

• Perioada I, până la retragerea sovieticilor din Basarabia – 22 iulie; 

• Perioada a II-a, după retragerea sovieticilor din Basarabia. 

30 Dorin Mara, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 

618

La 22 iunie 1941, ora 03.15 s-a declanşat războiul. Ordinele de operaŃii în marina 

militară au fost trimise prin curieri speciali în zilele de 18, 19 şi 20 iunie. 

Încă înainte de începerea războiului, navele Flotilei de Dunăre au executat adevărate 

acŃiuni de luptă 31 . În noaptea de 20 – 21 iunie s-a instalat un baraj format din 16 mine 

lansate pe 2 linii în sectorul milei 76. Minele erau din stocul din războiul 1916 – 1918, cu 

aprindere de la mal. 

În noaptea următoare, 21 – 22, mai precis în dimineaŃa zilei de 22, la ora 02.30, vedetele 

blindate 5 şi 6 au realizat o operaŃie de minare, cu mine magnetice, în faŃa Chiliei Vechi 

(km 4,4 – 4,5), fiind lansate 10 mine pe 2 linii, cu distanŃa între mine de 100 de metri. 

La ora 03.15, întreaga artilerie, de la GalaŃi la mare, a deschis un foc viu asupra 

poziŃiilor sovietice, concomitent executându-se şi unele incursiuni pe malul stâng, care au 

fost respinse de inamic. Ciocanul de foc a durat 45 minute, iar reacŃia sovietică a fost 

neînsemnată pe întregul front dunărean. Şi deoparte şi de alta, tragerile au avut un 

caracter intermitent. FrecvenŃa cea mai mare au avut-o tragerile în cele trei sectoare: 

GalaŃi – Cotul Pisicii, respectiv Reni – Giurgiuleşti, Tulcea – Ismail şi Chilia – Vâlcov. 

Dintre aceste sectoare, doar în zona Chilia, după toate indicaŃiile, gruparea sovietică a 

atacat dispozitivul nostru cu intenŃia să pună stăpânire pe întreaga deltă a Chiliei, să taie 

legătura dintre Tulcea şi Sulina, să treacă în Dobrogea pentru a întoarce, eventual, frontul 

românesc pe la Măcin – Brăila spre Valea Prahovei. În acest sector, de la început, timp de 

3 zile fără întrerupere, adversarul a bombardat intens întreaga zonă cu aviaŃia şi artileria 32 . 

Pe 26 iunie, după o pregătire de artilerie executată cu focul concentrat a 5 baterii, din care 

2 grele, asupra Chiliei Vechi, la ora 03.00, trupele sovietice au debarcat pe malul 

românesc, fiind ajutate şi de 8 vedete. Superioritatea zdrobitoare a sovieticilor a făcut ca 

trupele proprii să bată în retragere, înregistrând pierderi grele. Din considerente strategice 

sovieticii nu au dezvoltat succesul acestei acŃiuni 33 . 

În zona GalaŃi – Reni s-au executat trageri de artilerie de către monitoarele româneşti 

asupra poziŃiilor sovietice, în principal în scopul de a evalua forŃele de care dispuneau 

acestea, şi dispozitivul lor. FrecvenŃa tragerilor a fost mare, în multe perioade, zilnic cu 

câte unul sau două dueluri. De fiecare dată, sovieticii au răspuns prin tragerile bateriilor 

dispuse la Giurgiuleşti şi cu artileria de pe monitoare, asupra oraşului GalaŃi şi a navelor 

proprii. Rezultatele acestor trageri au fost neînsemnate. Deşi reduse ca număr, tragerile de 

artilerie au fost mai consistente în zona Tulcea – Ismail. Sovieticii au bombardat, 

sistematic, localităŃile Lascăr Catargiu şi Ceatalchioi, pe care le-a şi ocupat pentru 

perioade scurte de timp 34 . 

31 Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 

32 X X X, Dosar Răsboiul neamului contra bolşevismului. OperaŃiunile Marinei Regale Române, 

Biblioteca Muzeului Marinei Române, fila 22. 

33 Cpt. R.1 Ion Raicu, Marina militară română în campania din anii 1941-1944, în dosarul 

Momente din istoria marinei române. Lucrări de cercetare, Biblioteca Muzeului Marinei 

Române, 1986, pp. 111-112. 

34 ibidem, p. 112. 

619

Pe 27 iunie, la ora 03.10, trei vedete sovietice de la Ismail au pornit spre Ceatal pentru a 

intra pe Dunăre, însă vedetele româneşti 1 şi 3 au angajat lupta cu acestea şi le-au respins, 

o vedetă sovietică fiind incendiată, iar celelalte două retrăgându-se spre Ismail 35 . 

Ca urmare a desfăşurării acŃiunilor de luptă pe frontul de uscat, sovieticii şi-au retras, în 

noaptea de 8 spre 9 iulie, forŃele fluviale din regiunea Reni – Isaccea, către Ismail. În 

timpul nopŃii, către ora 22.00, profitând de o ceaŃă groasă, aceştia au manevrat 

monitoarele din lacul Cuhurlui în Dunăre. Foarte bine camuflate, cu motoarele stopate, 

precedate de trei vedete, acestea s-au lăsat duse de curent spre Ceatal. Posturile româneşti 

de observare au alarmat bateriile de artilerie şi gruparea tactică Tulcea. S-a început, astfel, 

un tir de artilerie, însă imprecis. Navele sovietice au pornit motoarele cu toată viteza în 

dreptul milei 45, şi au trecut prin focul de baraj executat de monitorul MIHAIL 

KOGĂLNICEANU, care trăgea de la mila 42, şi de tirul artileriei de calibru mic de la 

Pătlăgeanca, ajungând la Ismail 36 . 

În această perioadă a continuat acŃiunea de urcare a Dunării. Nava puitor de mine 

AURORA a executat instalarea unui baraj de mine la gura Sulinei şi a lansat mine de 

curent împotriva monitoarelor sovietice. Pe 15 iulie, după aproape o lună de război, după 

îndeplinirea misiunilor primite, nava AURORA s-a scufundat în zona Tulcea, sub 

bombardamentele aviaŃiei sovietice, odată cu şlepurile DANIEL 7 şi AGAPIA 37 . 

În prima lună de război, navele şi echipajele româneşti au fost Ńinute într-o continuă 

alarmă şi atacuri aeriene, fără niciun răgaz de odihnă şi refacere. Au fost supuse atacurilor 

aeriene toate satele din Deltă şi oraşele Sulina, Tulcea, GalaŃi, Brăila. 

Frontul de uscat din Basarabia înaintând către sud, a determinat o retragere bruscă a 

forŃelor din dispozitivul fluvial sovietic, în ziua de 19 iulie. În zona Reni – Ismail, 

inamicul a incendiat propriile depozite de muniŃii şi materiale deoarece nu a avut timpul 

necesar pentru evacuare. La ora 04.30, navele sovietice, 3 monitoare şi 11 vedete, au 

trecut prin faŃa localităŃii Periprava trăgând din mers cu tot armamentul. După două ore, a 

avut loc o altă trecere, iar pe braŃul Oceacov a fost evacuat, către mare, grosul forŃelor 

inamice. De asemenea, s-a evacuat Vâlcovul în grabă către Jibrieni 38 . 

A doua zi, 20 iulie, o companie de debarcare marină românească a ocupat Reni. 

Concomitent, a pornit acŃiunea de dragare a barajelor de mine proprii de pe Dunăre, dar şi 

a celor inamice, pentru că a fost minată şi de sovietici, începând de la Cotul Pisicii spre 

Reni, Isaccea şi Ceatal. Monitoarele de la GalaŃi s-au deplasat în aval, acostând, către ora 

20.00, în dreptul localităŃii Pătlăgeanca, pe braŃul Chilia. În aceeaşi zi, un detaşament al 

Diviziei 10 Infanterie a trecut Dunărea fără împotriviri, dovadă că zona fusese părăsită. 

De asemenea, Grupul fluvial nr. 2 de la Tulcea a dragat între mila 48 şi Ceatal – Ismail, 

iar a doua zi a reluat dragajul către Ismail cu 3 vedete şi 3 barcaze amenajate în acest 

scop. Ulterior, s-a executat dragarea barajului de la Pătlăgeanca, deschizând drum unui 

convoi format din 3 pasagere şi 6 şlepuri încărcate cu trupe ale Diviziei 10 Infanterie. 

35 ibidem. 

36 ibidem, p. 113. 

37 ibidem, p. 111. 

38 Jipa Rotaru, Ioan Damaschin, op. cit., p. 57. 

620

Câteva ore mai târziu au sosit la Tulcea 16 şlepuri cu 4 remorchere pentru transportarea 

eşalonului al doilea de trupe 39 . 

În zorii zilei de 21 iulie, trupele Batalionului 15 Infanterie Marină a ocupat Chilia 

Veche, trecând, apoi, în Chilia Nouă, iar Batalionul 17 Infanterie a ocupat Vâlcovul şi a 

continuat deplasarea către Jibrieni. Astfel, în dimineaŃa zilei de 22 iunie, întreaga Deltă şi 

gurile Dunării se aflau sub controlul românesc 40 . 

După această etapă a început, pentru Flotila Fluvială, operaŃia dificilă şi continuă, cu 

eforturi de zi şi noapte, pentru asigurarea navigaŃiei şi curăŃirea stufărişurilor şi tuturor 

canalelor de mine, obuze neexplodate sau bombe de avion. Divizia de Dunăre şi-a mutat 

punctul de comandă la Tulcea, pentru a fi mai aproape de viitorul teatru de operaŃiuni. 

Monitoarele au realizat siguranŃa dragajului şi a transporturilor de la GalaŃi la Vâlcov. 

Remorchere, şalupe, vedete, ziua şi noaptea, au asigurat transporturile de muniŃii şi a 

aprovizionărilor de tot felul 41 . 

După sosirea trupelor Corpului II Armată în zonă, batalioanele de infanterie marină au 

primit ordin să înainteze pe litoral către Cetatea Albă pentru curăŃarea malului, ocuparea 

observatoarelor şi stabilirea legăturilor cu Sulina 42 . 

În cadrul acŃiunilor de dragaj au fost descoperite mine în afara zonelor minate de forŃele 

proprii. În ziua de 24 iulie, remorcherul CERNA a sărit pe o mină, la mila 69, şi s-a 

scufundat imediat. Pe 25, remorcherul BICAZ a fost lovit de o mină la mila 61,5 şi a 

eşuat pe uscat, iar remorcherul HELIDOU s-a scufundat la mila 42,5. În aceiaşi zi, pe 

braŃul Chilia, la km 112, remorcherele AMURG şi MUREŞUL s-au abordat 43 . 

Ca o consecinŃă a eliberării Basarabiei, litoralul românesc s-a mărit până la Limanul 

Nistrului, de aceea s-a constituit „Gruparea tactică Liman”, sub comanda comandorului 

Nicolae Bardescu, subordonată Diviziei de Dunăre, care a instalat Batalionul 17 

Infanterie Marină de-a lungul coastei basarabene, cu posturi fixe de observare marină la 

Zolocani, Burnas şi Budochi. Acestei grupări i s-au pus, în mod treptat, la dispoziŃie, 

şalupe, bărci, mijloace de transport, ulterior alte nave şi vedete fluviale 44 . 

În etapa următoare, pe tot lungul Dunării maritime, s-a continuat, cu intensitate, 

activitatea de transporturi de trupe, muniŃii şi aprovizionări, toate executate cu ajutorul 

sau sub protecŃia Diviziei de Dunăre. 

39 


40 

Cpt. R.1 Ion Raicu, op. cit., p. 112. 

41 

ibidem. 

42 


43 

ibidem. 

44 

ibidem. 

621

DICTATURA ALIMENTARĂ – 

FACTOR DECISIV ÎN DECLANŞAREA 

FOAMETEI DIN RUSIA ŞI UCRAINA 

SOVIETICĂ, 1918-1923 

Vadim GUZUN 1 

Aşa-numita „Mare RevoluŃie” din octombrie 1917 a marcat prăbuşirea Imperiului Rus, 

respectiv, apariŃia celui sovietic. Perspectiva transformărilor radicale de ordin politic, 

economic, social şi cultural, chiar dacă, într-o primă etapă, nu a avut caracter cert, a fost 

clară încă din primii ani de existenŃă ai statului din vecinătatea estică a României. Unul 

din mijloacele care a favorizat conservarea puterii de către bolşevici, a fost cel alimentar. 

Preluarea controlului asupra resurselor alimentare a presupus nu doar aprovizionarea 

proletariatului, armatei, imensului aparat represiv în curs de formare, ci şi subordonarea 

marii mase a populaŃiei. Pe fondul războiului civil, dezorganizării economiei şi al izolării 

internaŃionale, soluŃia regimului a constat în drenarea rezervelor necesare supravieŃuirii 

din mediul rural. Studiul se ocupă de „lupta pentru pâine” - proces care s-a finalizat cu 

lichidarea fizică a Ńăranilor ostili şi convertirea supravieŃuitorilor la ideologia bazată pe 

principii comunist-socialiste. 

În baza surselor din fostele arhive sovietice, publicate după dezintegrarea URSS, dar şi 

a unor izvoare tematice autohtone, ne propunem să reconstituim contextul politic intern 

din Rusia şi Ucraina sovietică. Mijloacele violente aplicate la scară extinsă de regimul 

bolşevic explică modul în care a fost posibilă sovietizarea prin foamete a zeci de milioane 

de oameni într-un interval de timp extrem de scurt, rezistenŃa masivă a populaŃiei. 

Demersul facilitează înŃelegerea factorilor de ordin subiectiv şi obiectiv care au 

determinat esenŃa foametei sovietice, a reacŃiei autorităŃilor şi a populaŃiei afectate. 

Modelul foametelor staliniste din anii 1931-1933 şi din 1946-1947 se regăseşte în prima 

mare foamete, leninistă, care a atins apogeul în anii 1921-1922. Interesul faŃă de tragedia 

etnicilor români din URSS, problema subsidiară a refugiaŃilor sovietici în România şi 

tentativele de subminare a autorităŃii de stat în Basarabia justifică atenŃia acordată 

materialelor referitoare la situaŃia din Transnistria. 

1 Academia Română, Bucureşti, România 

622

1. Instalarea dictaturii alimentare 

RevoluŃia bolşevică şi războiul civil au subminat profund şi irevocabil situaŃia internă 

din fostul Imperiu Rus. SituaŃia sanitară şi alimentară de la oraşe devenise insuportabilă. 

În anul 1918, condiŃiile de trai, cu mult sub limita suportabilului, erau marcate de lipsa 

alimentelor: raŃia zilnică a unui muncitor era sub jumătatea nivelului minim necesar 

supravieŃuirii. Nici intelectualii nu făceau excepŃie, savanŃi cu renume mondial sufereau 

din cauza crizei alimentare urbane, considerată de unii cercetători ca fiind mai curând o 

problemă de distribuire şi schimb decât una de producŃie, în condiŃiile în care transportul 

feroviar paralizat nu era în măsură să asigure fluxul alimentar normal. O altă cauză 

principală a crizei urbane era refuzul Ńăranilor de a-şi vinde produsele în schimbul banilor 

ce nu mai aveau nicio valoare. Încercarea executivului de achiziŃionare a produselor 

agricole la preŃuri fixe a avut efect contrar, obligând Ńăranii să reducă suprafeŃele 

cultivate 2 . 

În acest context, afirmaŃia potrivit căreia Rusia revenea la mijloacele de producŃie şi de 

trai din Evul Mediu, apare ca pertinentă. În plus, pe fondul recoltei nu tocmai bune din 

anul 1917, rezervele alimentare din anul 1918 au fost afectate pe măsură. În unele regiuni, 

cerealele de care dispuneau Ńăranii nu numai că nu asigurau necesarul pentru campania 

agricolă, dar nu erau suficiente pentru întreŃinerea familiilor. În timp ce locuitorii din 

astfel de regiuni mergeau în zonele mai favorizate, pentru a procura cereale, milioane de 

orăşeni se mutau la sate, astfel încât, de exemplu, în intervalul 1918-1920, potrivit unor 

surse, populaŃia Petersburgului s-a diminuat cu aproape 75%. UnităŃile economice care 

mai funcŃionau se asociau în cooperative, transportau produsele lor la Ńară şi le schimbau 

pe harnă. Primăvara anului 1918 a fost marcată de generalizarea acestui fenomen şi a 

aprofundat absenteismul muncitorilor de la uzine şi fabrici, ajungând în unele locuri la 

80% 3 . Declinul economic a fost accelerat şi de faptul că, la nivelul anului 1919, 

proprietatea marilor unităŃi industriale trecuse la stat în proporŃie de 90%, iar spre 

sfârşitul anului 1920 toate societăŃile care aveau mai mult de 5 angajaŃi fuseseră 

naŃionalizate 4 . 

Comunismul de război, ca expresie a „centralismului socialist” şi subordonării militare a 

economiei 5 , a reprezentat soluŃia bolşevică la criză. La 9 mai 1918 se legifera că orice 

surplus de cereale aparŃine statului, reprezentanŃii puterii fiind convinşi că dacă nu vor 

reuşi să-şi extindă controlul asupra mediului rural, revoluŃia va fi anihilată sub povara 

oraşelor înfometate. „Lupta pentru pâine” nu era un simplu slogan, devenise expresia 

luptei noului regim pentru supravieŃuire. Unul din instrumentele cele mai eficiente ale 

acestei lupte a constat în organizarea brigăzilor înarmate de rechiziŃionare, al căror modus 

2 

O. Figes, A people`s tragedy: a history of the Russian Revolution, New York, Penguin Books, 

2007, p. 607-608. 

3 

Ibidem, p. 611-612. 

4 

I.T. Berend, Decades of crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, Berkeley, 

University of California Press, 2001, p. 205. 

5 

I.V. Bîstrova, „Государство и экономика в 1920-е годы: борьба идей и реальность”, în 

Отечественная история nr. 3, 1993, p. 19-20. 

623

operandi consta în ocuparea localităŃilor şi confiscarea violentă a cerealelor 6 . Apelul din 

31 mai 1918 al Prezidiumului Sovietului Petrograd de înrolare în detaşamentele de 

aprovizionare, anunŃa că, la 29 mai, adunarea tuturor organizaŃiilor muncitorilor, 

marinarilor, soldaŃilor şi ceferiştilor a decis trimiterea celor mai buni oameni sub lozinca: 

„La Ńară după pâine pentru Petrogradul înfometat!”. „Tovarăşi, timpul nu aşteaptă. 

ÎnscrieŃi-vă în Sovietele raionale. AdresaŃi-vă în Smolnîi, cam. 41. Avem nevoie de sute 

şi mii de muncitori cinstiŃi! Să trecem la fapte!”, se încheia strigarea Sovietului 

menŃionat 7 . 

Printre măsurile care urmau să asigure instalarea dictaturii alimentare s-a numărat 

introducerea, în lunile iunie şi iulie 1918, a cartelelor de raŃionalizare alimentară de patru 

categorii, mai întâi în capitală, apoi în alte oraşe, foametea urbană atingând apogeul la 

finele anului 1918 - începutul anului 1919 8 . Conflictul dintre mediul urban şi cel rural, 

crimele la care instigau liderii din Petrograd sunt confirmate şi de militarii români din 

Corpul I de voluntari: „Oraşele însă au nevoie de grâul de la Ńară. Fără el oraşele nu pot 

trăi. Şi sătenii refuză să li-l dea gratuit sau pe preŃurile fixate de Soviete”. Cei care au 

invadat satele erau comparaŃi cu nişte „haite flămânde”, iar bazinul de recrutare al 

„detaşamentelor de rechiziŃie” era descris cu exactitate: gărzi roşii, miliŃii populare, 

armată, muncitorii de la oraşe, prizonieri unguri şi nemŃi, „pe care le asmut asupra satelor 

ca să ridice cu forŃa grâul de care au nevoie oraşele”. Raidurile s-au lovit de opoziŃia 

armată a Ńăranilor, fiind înregistrate adevărate bătălii cu „aceşti corbi, descinşi de la 

oraşe” 9 . 

Tonul campaniei de colectare a fost dat de Kremlin, aceasta fiind una din priorităŃile 

regimului. Scrisoarea lui V.I. Lenin către A.D. łiuriupa, comisarul Aprovizionării, din 5 

august 1918, privind colectarea din judeŃul EleŃk, gubernia Orlov, este relevantă în acest 

sens. Unitatea administrativă fiind una „de unde se putea lua multă pâine”, Lenin ordona: 

„Să fie trimise imediat, cu rapiditate maximă, în judeŃul EleŃk, toate detaşamentele 

alimentare, de recoltare şi de rechiziŃionare, cu maximul de batoze şi utilaje (dacă se 

poate) pentru uscarea rapidă a pâinii ş.a. Să se dea sarcina ca judeŃul să fie curăŃat de tot 

de surplusul de pâine. Asta, probabil, va da câteva milioane de puduri de pâine” 10 . La 8 

august Lenin acuza „burghezimea contrarevoluŃionară” de blocarea executivului în 

activitatea de combatere a foametei şi cerea Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului 

intensificarea „terorii în masă necruŃătoare” împotriva „trădătorilor care prin 

intensificarea foametei încercau să ajute jefuitorii străini”. . Potrivit fondatorului statului 

sovietic, „lupta eroică cu foametea” trebuia să contribuie la instalarea dictaturii 

6 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 614-619. Vezi exemplele prezentate de autor. 

7 I.M. Volkov, L.M. Papin, D.K. Şelestov, Сборник документов и материалов по истории 

СССР советского периода (1917-1958), Moscova, Editura UniversităŃii din Moscova, 1966, p. 

83. 

8 S. Adamets, Guerre civile et famine en Russie. Le pouvoir bolchevicue et la population face a la 

catastrophe demographique (1917-1923), Paris, Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 2003, p. 64, 75, 91. 

9 V. NiŃulescu, Douăzeci de luni în Rusia şi Siberia, vol. II „Anii 1918-1919. În capitala 

Sovietelor. CredinŃele din Siberia”, Bucureşti, Tipografiile Române Unite, p. 64-65. 

10 Vezi scrisoarea în I. MinŃ, E. GorodeŃki, Документы по истории гражданской войны в 

СССР, vol. I, Moscova, Editura Politizdat, 1941, p. 165. 

624

proletariatului, Ńăranii care deŃineau surplus de cereale trebuiau declaraŃi „duşmani ai 

poporului”, arestaŃi şi condamnaŃi, pâinea ascunsă şi nedeclarată - ridicată fără nicio plată, 

comercianŃii de cereale care se opuneau - executaŃi pe loc dacă erau înarmaŃi 11 . 

Pentru a înŃelege contrareacŃia Ńărănimii, cităm instrucŃiunea primului lider bolşevic 

către preşedintele Consiliului Comisarilor Guberniei Penza, preşedintele Comitetului 

Gubernial al RKP(b) 12 şi preşedintele Comitetului Executiv Gubernial, din 11 august 

1918: „Tovarăşi, răscoala a cinci voloste kulăceşti trebuie să conducă la suprimare 

nemiloasă. Aceasta este în interesul întregii revoluŃii, deoarece se dă ultima luptă decisivă 

cu kulăcimea. Trebuie dat exemplu: 1) să fie spânzuraŃi (neapărat spânzuraŃi - să vadă 

poporul) nu mai puŃin de 100 kulaci cunoscuŃi, bogătaşi şi dintre cei care sug sângele, 2) 

să se publice numele acestora, 3) să li se ia toată pâinea, 4) să fie desemnaŃi ostaticii, 

potrivit telegramei de ieri. Să se acŃioneze astfel încât pe o rază de o sută de verste 

poporul să vadă, să tremure, să ştie, să strige: sunt sugrumaŃi şi vor fi sugrumaŃi kulacii 

care sug sângele”. Revolta la care se referea Lenin (cuprinsese un număr de 8 voloste din 

gubernia Penza ca urmare a politicii de aprovizionare) a fost lichidată la 12 august 1918. 

łăranii care au participat la asasinarea a 5 agenŃi alimentari şi a 3 membri ai sovietului 

local din satul Kucika, judeŃul Penza, precum şi organizatorii revoltei au fost împuşcaŃi 13 . 

Doar în intervalul iulie-august 1918 au fost înregistrate peste 200 de revolte împotriva 

comandourilor alimentare, care căutau şi calificau cerealele ascunse ca fiind surplus şi nu 

rezerve vitale. Confruntarea dintre populaŃia civilă şi expediŃiile de rechiziŃionare atinsese 

cote dramatice, producând victime de ambele părŃi, mai ales atunci când alternativa 

familiilor numeroase cărora li se confiscau toate produsele era foarte clară. Replica unui 

sat din regiunea Samara la jefuirea alimentelor şi executarea sumară a câtorva Ńărani, a 

constat în decapitarea celor 12 membri ai brigăzii alimentare, precum şi expunerea 

capetelor activiştilor ucişi la intrarea în sat, în semn de avertisment pentru alte brigăzi. 

Trei săptămâni mai târziu satul a fost bombardat de armată, iar ulterior ars până la temelii. 

Un alt mijloc utilizat de autorităŃile bolşevice a constat în organizarea „detaşamentelor de 

blocare” – acestea controlau şi confiscau produsele celor care încercau să ajungă în oraşe. 

Pe lângă cereale se confiscau mijloacele băneşti, hainele şi băuturile alcoolice 14 . 

O altă metodă de „colectare” a cerealelor care a viciat societatea rurală a constat în 

divizarea artificială a Ńăranilor în „bogaŃi” şi „săraci”, în utilizarea celor din urmă sub 

forma comitetelor Ńăranilor săraci. Comitetele respective au fost organizate la nivel local 

sub conducerea Comisariatului Agricol şi a Comitetului Central Executiv al Sovietelor. 

Potrivit decretului VłIK 15 din 11 iunie 1918, semnat de Lenin în calitate de preşedinte 

Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului, combedî erau competente să distribuie pâinea, să 

susŃină organele locale de aprovizionare în activitatea de confiscare a „surplusului din 

mâinile kulacilor şi bogătaşilor”, beneficiau de privilegii la distribuirea produselor 

11 Ibidem, p. 165-166. Vezi apelul lui Lenin către Consiliul Comisarilor Poporului. 

12 Abreviere din limba rusă pentru Partidul Comunist Rus (bolşevic). 

13 I.N. Amiantov, I.A. Ahapkin, V.N. Stepanov, В.И. Ленин. Неизвестные документы. 1891- 

1922 гг., Moscova, Editura Rosspen, 2000, p. 246-247. 

14 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 618-620, 622-623. 

15 Abreviere din limba rusă pentru Comitetul Executiv Central Panrus al Sovietelor. 

625

confiscate şi reduceri la cumpărarea pâinii confiscate de la aşa-numiŃii kulaci 16 . În 

localităŃile în care „surplusul” se confisca în totalitate, comitetele beneficiau de o 

reducere de 50% la cumpărarea produselor de primă necesitate şi a utilajelor agricole, iar 

în cele în care „ajutau energic organele alimentare” erau remunerate cu acordarea în 

folosinŃă gratuită a utilajelor agricole mai sofisticate 17 . 

2. Colectarea totală - formă a terorismului de stat 

Un act normativ cu efect distrugător asupra producătorilor agricoli, semnat de Lenin, la 

11 ianuarie 1919, a fost Decretul Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului privind razverstka 18 

între guberniile producătoare de cereale şi furaje supuse punerii la dispoziŃia statului. În 

scopul asigurării aprovizionării urgente cu pâine a Armatei Roşii şi a „raioanelor fără 

pâine” s-au stabilit reguli stricte de înstrăinare a „surplusului de cereale şi furaje în 

folosul statului”. Razverstka se aplica cerealelor destinate comercializării, dar şi celor 

destinate campaniei agricole şi presupunea preluarea cerealelor şi furajelor de la populaŃie 

la preŃuri fixate de stat (derizorii) în termene foarte scurte - 1 martie, respectiv, 15 iunie. 

łăranilor care nu respectau termenele de predare a cotelor li se confiscau rezervele 

descoperite de agenŃii alimentari, iar cei care ascundeau rezervele sau se opuneau predării 

urmau să fie sancŃionaŃi, inclusiv cu măsura confiscării averii sau a închisorii. Astfel, 

întreaga agricultură a fost subordonată intereselor statului sau, mai bine zis, imensului 

aparat administrativ-poliŃienesc şi armatei 19 . 

În fapt, la nivelul anului 1919 Ńăranul nu mai putea reŃine din producŃia proprie decât 

strictul necesar familiei sale - restul trebuia predat statului, urmând să primească în 

schimb mărfuri industriale. Aici interveneau, pe de o parte, rezistenŃa Ńăranilor care 

ascundeau surplusul agricol, iar pe de altă parte, măsurile de rechiziŃionare. Sătenii au 

răspuns în foarte multe regiuni cu „sângeroase şi permanente” revolte 20 . În Siberia, în 

lunca râului Uda, revoluŃia distrusese orice rentabilitate a creşterii vitelor ce luase 

amploare înainte de război, iar autorii rechiziŃiilor aparŃineau ambelor tabere: „Când roşii, 

când albii jefuiesc populaŃia de tot ce găsesc în hambare şi în preajma casei. Au 

rechiziŃionat şi armele de vânătoare; vânatul şi fiarele sălbatice s-au înmulŃit, constituind 

adesea un pericol pentru viaŃa oamenilor şi a animalelor domestice”. Într-un sat din Taiga, 

în luna august 1919, voluntarii români au descoperit unul din cele mai vechi mijloace de 

ascundere a cerealelor şi a îmbrăcămintei de iarnă: săparea unor morminte în cimitire. În 

16 

Preferăm tremenul celui de „chiabur”, care, în traducere comună, desemnează Ńăranul înstărit 

deposedat de bunuri şi persecutat. În fapt, atât regimul leninist, cât şi cel stalinist au extins cu mult 

sfera de aplicare a conceptului. 

17 

I.M. Volkov ş.a., Сборник документов и материалов…, op. cit., p. 83-85. 

18 

Pазверстка (rusă) – impozit ce consta în obligaŃia livrării către stat a surplusului de produse 

alimentare. 

19 

Ibidem, p. 112-113. 

20 

E. Bufnea, CruciaŃi, tirani şi bandiŃi, vol. II „În Siberia lui Kolceak”,Baia Mare, Editura Marist, 

2008, p. 25. 

626

plus, voluntarii confirmau refuzul Ńăranilor de a munci şi intensificarea rechiziŃiilor ca 

urmare a „drasticelor măsuri” pentru aprovizionarea armatei 21 . 

Un mijloc de presiune prin care statul „stimula” drenarea cerealelor, cu caracter 

eminamente terorist, era luarea de ostatici. Exemple relevante în acest sens găsim într-un 

volum de documente pe tema rezistenŃei anticomuniste din Siberia Occidentală. Având în 

vedere situaŃia alimentară „dificilă”, adjunctul şefului Biroului Politic al JudeŃului Işimsk 

şi adjunctul comisarului gubernial al aprovizionării Tiumeni, la începutul lunii decembrie 

1920, ordonau „arestarea imediată a tuturor kulacilor, fără nicio excepŃie”, dintr-un număr 

de 8 voloste. Se dispunea ca populaŃia să fie informată că sătenii sunt luaŃi ca ostatici 

până la executarea în întregime de către judeŃ a impozitului alimentar. Din telegrama 

comisarului aprovizionării judeŃului Tobolsk rezultă că în plasa Abalax a fost detaşat un 

detaşament din 35 membri pentru confiscarea averilor, ca urmare a neachitării obligaŃiilor 

faŃă de stat, menŃionându-se că, în prealabil, au fost luaŃi ostateci 10 Ńărani. La 10 

decembrie 1920 comisarul gubernial al aprovizionării, nemulŃumit de rezultatele 

confiscărilor din volostea Ghilev, arăta că, pentru asigurarea îndeplinirii la termen a 

razverstka, se impunea „o răfuială brutală şi nemiloasă cu kulacii”. În plus, G.S. 

Indenbaum cerea ca în fiecare localitate să fie capturaŃi 10 ostateci 22 . 

Prezintă interes şi câteva exemple pe tema instaurării regimului comunist în Siberia, 

accesibile cercetătorilor după prăbuşirea URSS. La 22 mai 1920, preşedintele Biroului 

Siberian al Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist cerea centrelor guberniale să ia 

măsuri drastice faŃă de cei care se opuneau predării cerealelor şi faŃă de liderii locali care 

nu respectau planul, pregătirea unor „detaşamente alimentare înarmate sigure” şi 

aplicarea forŃei. Câteva zile mai târziu, Sibrevkom 23 arăta că Siberia livrase centrului doar 

4.600 vagoane de pâine, 618 vagoane de carne, 60.000 puduri grăsimi şi reproşa stoparea 

„criminală” a colectărilor. PreşedinŃii locali care nu respectau planurile alimentare, 

„kulacii care nu au predat pâine şi au instigat populaŃia la neplata impozitului” urmau să 

fie internaŃi în lagăre de concentrare. În articolul „Lupta cu foametea”, preşedintele 

Sibprodkom 24 îşi exprima nemulŃumirea faŃă de colectarea până la 1 iunie 1920 a unei 

cantităŃi de doar 14.637.572 puduri de cereale, 2.200.000 puduri de carne, criticând 

pasivitatea liderilor locali şi subliniind că adevărata putere a „organelor alimentare” se 

compunea din armata alimentară şi detaşamentele muncitoreşti. Potrivit lui Koganovici, 

reprimarea Ńăranilor se baza pe principiul: „Nu dictatura alimentară trebuie adaptată la 

circumstanŃe, circumstanŃele trebuie adaptate dictaturii alimentare!” 25 . 

Acelaşi Koganovici, la începutul lunii iulie 1920, estima „surplusul” cerealier din 

gospodăriile Ńăranilor siberieni la 100.000.000 şi constata că această cantitate nu mai 

putea fi preluată „prin mijloace obişnuite”. El propunea o „infuzie” de Ńărani şi muncitori 

21 Ibidem, p. 42, 53-54, 117. 

22 V.I. Şişkin, За советы без коммунистов: Крестьянское восстание в Тюменской губернии. 

1921: Сборник документов, Novosibirsk, Editura Sibirski Hronograf, 2000, p. 52-53, 56, 107. 

23 Abreviere din limba rusă de la Comitetul RevoluŃionar al Siberiei. 

24 Abreviere din limba rusă de la Comitetul Siberian pentru Aprovizionare. 

25 V.I. Şişkin, Cибирская вандея, vol. I „1919-1920”, Moscova, Fondul InternaŃional 

„Demokratia”, 2000, p. 24-27. 

627

din regiunile înfometate ale Rusiei, organizarea detaşamentelor alimentare care să 

acopere guberniile Omsk, Altaisk şi Semipalatinsk – câte unul a câte 100 de membri 

fiecare din cele 200 de raioane. Totalul – 20.000 de membri, a căror activitate de 

rechiziŃionare să fie susŃinută, „în caz de necesitate”, de forŃe regulate ale armatei. Pâinea 

Ńăranilor răsculaŃi, executaŃi fără nici un proces, era confiscată şi distribuită celor care 

susŃineau regimul. La 20 iulie 1920 Lenin semna decizia Consiliului Comisarilor 

Poporului de consolidare a forŃelor de rechiziŃionare a cerealor din Siberia cu încă 6.000 

de muncitori, „predarea totală a surplusului de pâine” urmând să fie asigurată prin 

trimiterea unui număr de 900 de baionete şi 300 de săbii 26 . Numărul mare al unor astfel 

de instrucŃiuni şi decizii denotă presiunea exercitată de la centru către periferie, 

responsabilizarea solidară generalizată a colectorilor locali şi a Ńăranilor aflaŃi „sub 

influenŃa politică negativă a elementelor kulăceşti”. 

Motivul principal al rezistenŃei din Siberia Occidentală era teama de foamete. După 

arestarea şi interogarea unui număr de 15 Ńărani care au participat la o adunare în plasa 

Abatsk, şeful miliŃiei raionale raporta Biroului Politic al JudeŃului Işimsk rezultatul 

anchetei şi evaluarea sa: „împuterniciŃii organelor de aprovizionare au ordonat 

confiscarea tuturor cerealelor, atât a seminŃelor pentru campania agricolă a anului 1921, 

cât şi a celor alimentare. CetăŃenii sunt îngrozitor de neliniştiŃi de aceste ordine în vederea 

foametei. Starea de spirit în raion este extrem de acută. Pâinea se scoate toată, până la 

ultimul bob. CetăŃenii sunt agitaŃi. Organele de aprovizionare acŃionează neserios. Vă rog 

să vă deplasaŃi pentru rezolvarea la faŃa locului. ConsecinŃele vor fi foarte triste, 

anticipând revolte”. Un mijloc draconic de colectare consta în aplicarea sancŃiunilor 

colective. Cităm din ordinul nr. 69 al Comitetului Executiv al Sovietelor Işimsk, din 1 

ianuarie 1921, către toate autorităŃile implicate în campania de colectare: „în toate 

cazurile în care se depistează ascunderea pâinii de către un cetăŃean al comunităŃii, se va 

confisca pâinea întregii comunităŃi, fără nicio limită” 27 . 

Potrivit procesului-verbal al organizaŃiilor sovietice din gubernia Tambov, din 21 iulie 

1919, afectată deja de foamete la acea dată, activiştii de partid recunoşteau că dacă ar fi 

avut la dispoziŃie cerealele din Siberia, Don şi Ucraina nu ar mai fi fost nevoiŃi „să ia 

ultimul funt de pâine Ńăranului”. Dintr-un raport de la sfârşitul anului 1919 rezultă că 

statul obŃinea aproape exclusiv toate cerealele prin confiscări, prin detaşamentele 

constituite conform unor planuri concrete. Izolarea asigura succesul expediŃiilor punitive: 

„De regulă detaşamentele acŃionau dinspre periferia spre centrul fiecărui judeŃ, pentru a 

nu permite trecerea pâinii dintr-un judeŃ în altul; pe toate drumurile au fost instalate 

pichete, pentru a elimina posibilitatea trecerii pâinii în interiorul judeŃului”. Aceste 

detaşamente confiscau întreg surplusul anual. PerfecŃionarea mecanismului de preluare 

forŃată este redată astfel: „Dacă după sistemul din anul trecut Ńăranul putea să refuze, 

deoarece nu risca nimic, anul acesta situaŃia lui s-a schimbat, deoarece riscă toată pâinea 

şi toate vitele pe care le deŃine”. Asemenea rechiziŃii în masă erau însoŃite de ciocniri şi 

26 Ibidem, p. 33-34, 36-37, 40-42. 

27 V.I. Şişkin, За советы без коммунистов…, op cit., p. 79, 90. 

628

evolte, Ńăranii foloseau ca scut uman împotriva detaşamentelor femeile şi copiii. 

RechiziŃii organizau şi unităŃile militare 28 . 

La 11 ianuarie 1920, A.M. Bolişakov arăta într-un raport ce se întâmpla cu cerealele 

confiscate din judeŃul ŞaŃki, gubernia Tambov: „Pe măsura necesităŃii s-a apelat la 

detaşamente pentru ridicarea surplusurilor; uneori se întâlnesc cazuri de luare a ultimei 

pâini, nelăsându-se nici norma Ńăranului. Acest sistem nu ne dă niciun drept să sperăm că 

Ńăranii vor reuşi anul viitor să semene terenurile. Mai mult decât atât, în punctele de 

colectare se află 250 mii puduri de cereale, aşteaptă să fie încărcate şi transportate la 

Centru, dar nu ne dau vagoane. Din cauza spaŃiilor de depozitare improprii grâul începe 

să putrezească”. În aceste condiŃii, potrivit unui raport al Comitetului de Partid Gubernial, 

până la data de 1 februarie 1920, în Tambov s-au colectat 10 milioane puduri de cereale 

din planul de 27 milioane puduri. Se recunoşteau abuzurile comise de agenŃii alimentari. 

Un asemenea caz a fost constatat de L. Serebriakov, secretar de partid, la 24 aprilie 1920, 

în judeŃul Usmanski, gubernia Tambov: „Pâinea strânsă de la Ńărani putrezeşte în staŃiile 

din apropiere, iar Ńăranii se agită. AgitaŃiile se intensifică din cauza faptului că în timpul 

colectării detaşamentele de rechiziŃionare folosesc represiuni inadmisibile: Ńăranii sunt 

bătuŃi, închişi în hambare reci”. Răspunsul satului abuzat a constat în asasinarea în masă a 

comuniştilor implicaŃi în campaniile de colectare 29 . 

Nu întâmplător am prezentat acŃiunile de rechiziŃionare, armata sau unităŃi paramilitare 

jucând un rol important în campaniile alimentare şi de reprimare a revoltelor. În regiunile 

în care „colectarea” a fost mai feroce, în anii 1921-1922 foametea a făcut ravagiile cele 

mai mari 30 . 

RezistenŃa generalizată a Ńăranilor s-a manifestat nu doar sub forme pasive, dar sub cea 

a revoltelor armate, la nivel local şi regional. Dacă în anul 1918 au fost asasinaŃi 200 de 

membri ai „brigăzilor alimentare”, în anul 1919, cifra a urcat până la aproape 5.000, iar în 

1920 – la peste 8.000. 

La nivelul anului 1920 Ucraina sovietică era străbătută de revolte antibolşevice 31 , iar 

Rusia Centrală de Ńăranii răsculaŃi sub conducerea lui Antonov. În Belarus, revoltelele au 

forŃat evacuarea Minskului şi a Smolenskului. Fierbeau regiunile Voronej, Saratov, 

Samara, Simbirsk şi Penza. În munŃii Caucaz numărul răsculaŃilor depăşea 30.000. În 

Siberia s-au remarcat regiunile Tiumeni, Omsk, Celiabinsk, Tobolsk, Ekaterinburg şi 

Tomsk. Activitatea industrială a oraşelor a fost blocată de grevele muncitorilor. RaŃia de 

pâine a fost redusă la 1/3 32 . 

28 V.P. Danilov, L.G. Protasov ş.a., Антоновщина. Крестьянское восстание в Тамбовской 

губернии в 1920-1921 гг., Arhivele de Stat Tambov, Universitatea de Stat din Tambov „G.R. 

Derjavin”, Tambov, 2007, p. 103, 110-113. 

29 Ibidem, p. 114, 124, 134. 

30 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 752-753. 

31 Vezi mişcarea de insurgenŃă a Ńăranilor din Ucraina în perioada 1918-1922 în V.A. Smoli 

(coord.), Iсторiя украiнського селянства, vol. II, Kiev, Editura Naukova Dumka, 2006, p. 7- 

19. 

32 O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 753, 758-759. 

629

3. NEP - Lichidarea focarelor de rezistenŃă 

În darea de seamă susŃinută în cadrul celei de-a IX-a ConferinŃe Panruse RKP(b) din 22 

septembrie 1920 V.I. Lenin declara că situaŃia economică a Rusiei s-a îmbunătăŃit 

semnificativ. Baza satisfacŃiei o reprezentau cele peste 300 milioane puduri de cereale pe 

care le deŃineau Sovietele, precum şi cele peste 100 milioane de puduri de petrol 33 . O 

mişcare ce a caracterizat perioada 1917-1922 şi a asigurat supravieŃuirea populaŃiei 

urbane a fost cea a meşocinicilor (мешочники). Sătenii cărau cu sacii diverse produse 

alimentare în oraşe, peste plafonul legal, pentru a le schimba cu mărfuri industriale. 

Astfel, forma ilegală de aprovizionare compensa incapacitatea statului de aprovizionare a 

populaŃiei, după ce monopolizase domeniul. Fenomenul se va repeta în perioadele de 

criză profundă: la sfârşitul anilor '20 - începutul anilor '30, în timpul celui de al Doilea 

Război Mondial şi după război, în anii 1970-1980. łăranii îşi transportau marfa la 

distanŃe de până la 1.000 de verste; în unele locuri, în Asia Centrală, de exemplu, 

mişcarea a îmbrăcat forme exotice - dintr-o singură gubernie (Akmolinsk) pâinea era 

transportată cu 30.000 de cămile 34 . 

Consumul pe cap de locuitor scăzuse la unele produse cu până la 95% faŃă de anii de 

dinaintea Primului Război Mondial 35 . Subiectul hranei era discutat în toate colŃurile 

Rusiei. La ConferinŃa Muncitorilor Metalurgici, din februarie 1921, Lenin califica situaŃia 

internă în următorii termeni: „În această iarnă Ńăranii sunt într-o situaŃie disperată. łăranii 

trebuie să însămânŃeze întreaga suprafaŃă, altfel vom pieri – indiscutabil!”. Lenin 

recunoaştea că transportul feroviar nu mai era funcŃional, ceea ce însemna imposibilitatea 

transportării pâinii înspre Moscova. SoluŃia adoptată pentru moment a constat în 

înlocuirea rechiziŃiilor abuzive cu impozite şi liberalizarea pieŃei. În fapt, era vorba despre 

o nouă politică economică 36 . În luna martie 1921, deşi recunoaştea acutizarea situaŃiei 

alimentare din cauza colectărilor agricole, Lenin susŃinea că „Ńăranul trebuie să 

flămânzească puŃin, pentru ca astfel să se evite foametea totală a întreprinderilor şi 

oraşelor” – cele care asigurau suportul partidului şi executivului bolşevic 37 . 

Liderii comunişti erau dispuşi să facă orice pentru a salvgarda regimul, inclusiv să 

renunŃe la rechiziŃionarea generalizată şi să permită comercializarea produselor agricole. 

După dezbateri aprinse pe tema variantelor posibile de acŃiune pentru scoaterea 

agriculturii din criză, la 15 martie 1921, Congresul al X-lea al RKP(b) a decis înlocuirea 

razverstka cu impozitul în natură şi a fixat astfel coordonatele trecerii la Novaia 

33 I.N. Amiantov ş.a., В.И. Ленин. Неизвестные документы…, op. cit., p. 387-388. 

34 A.I. Davîdov, Нелегальное снабжение российского населения и власть. 1917-1921 гг., 

Sankt Petersburg, Editura Nauka, 2002, p. 4, 8, 41. 

35 Vezi tabelul comparativ în F.A. Golder, On the trial of the Russian Famine, California, Stanford 

University Press, 1927, p. 10-11. 

36 L. Fischer, Russia`s Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations.1917-1941, New York, 

Harper&Row, Publishers, 1969, p. 53-54. 

37 M. Wehner, „Голод 1921-1922 гг. в Самарской губернии и реакция советского 

правительства”, în Cahiers du monde russe, 1997, vol. 38, Nr. 1, p. 227. 

630

Ekonomiceskaia Politika (NEP) 38 . Decretul VłIK din 21 martie 1921 privind impozitul 

în natură stabilea că noua impozitare trebuie să fie mai redusă decât precedenta, să 

acopere necesităŃile armatei, ale populaŃiei urbane şi neproducătoare de produse agricole, 

dar să fie stabilită astfel încât, după achitarea impozitului, toate rezervele alimentare, 

materiile prime şi furaje să fie lăsate producătorului 39 . Posibilitatea de realizare a 

produselor agricole pe piaŃă era foarte importantă şi cu conexiuni adânci în mentalitatea 

Ńăranului – chiar dacă schimbarea nu a generat rezultate imediate, din punct de vedere 

politic s-a reuşit stoparea numeroaselor revolte populare. 

Noua Economie Politică a înlocuit comunismul militar şi a fost, practic, în opinia unor 

autori, singura posibilitate de ieşire a Rusiei sovietice din dezastrul economic instalat 

odată cu primul război mondial şi cu războiul civil (intervalul 1914-1921), pe parcursul 

cărora povara conflictelor a fost suportată de Ńărănime 40 . Aplicarea noii politici a fost 

amânată de foamete, care în regiuni precum Ucraina, Rostov pe Don, Povoljie ori Siberia 

a durat până în anii 1924-1925, dar şi după acest interval. Prin urmare, se poate vorbi 

despre o aplicare generalizată la nivelul satelor doar în perioada 1925-1927, prea scurtă 

pentru ca aceasta să modeleze sistemul economic şi să asigure o dezvoltare durabilă 41 . 

Apogeul NEP este considerat Decretul din 10 aprilie 1923 privind funcŃionarea 

întreprinderilor industriale de stat în baza trusturilor, care, în fapt, permiteau utilizarea 

oricăror mijloace pentru atingerea unor rezultate satisfăcătoare pentru activitatea 

economică, astfel încât întreprinderile să susŃină bugetul şi nu să fie o povară pentru el 42 . 

În Ucraina sovietică, deşi executivul a decis trecerea la impozitarea în natură, pentru 

recolta din anul 1920 s-a menŃinut sistemul precedent. Conform cotelor reduse, judeŃul 

Balta, de exemplu, trebuia să colecteze 300.000 puduri de pâine, iar judeŃul Tiraspol – 

800.000 de puduri. 12 din 24 de voloste din judeŃul Tiraspol au fost scutite de razverstka 

(6 voloste o îndepliniseră, iar 6 erau din categoria celor mai sărace). În republică 

impozitul în natură a fost introdus din toamna anului 1921. Potrivit deciziei Comitetului 

Executiv Gubernial, la 1 iulie 1921 înceta razverstka, urmând ca produsele industriale să 

fie schimbate cu cele agricole prin intermediul cooperaŃiei şi pieŃei. Apelul Comitetelor 

JudeŃene de Partid şi RevoluŃionar Balta către Ńărani confirmă menŃinerea rolului satului 

de întreŃinere artificială a oraşului: „SchimbaŃi produsele voastre numai în cooperative, 

grăbiŃi-vă să-i ajutaŃi pe muncitorii flămânzi şi să îmbunătăŃiŃi propriile gospodării pe 

calea schimbului liber de mărfuri; reŃineŃi că numai aşa, numai prin ajutor reciproc 

38 Новая экономическая политика (НЭП) (rusă) presupunea coexistenŃa sectorului privat şi a 

celui public; după achitarea impozitului în natură, Ńăranii aveau libertatea de a vinde surplusul de 

produse agricole. 

39 I.M. Volkov ş.a., Сборник документов и материалов…, op. cit., p. 179-180. 

40 Vezi F. Ciuev, Cто сорок бесед с Молотовым: Из дневника Ф. Чуева, Moscova, Editura 

Terra, 1991, p. 185, http://stalinism.ru/books/molotov.doc.zip. 

41 V.P. Danilov, O.V. Hlevniuk, N.V. Muraviov ş.a., Как ломали НЭП. Стенограмы пленумов 

ЦК ВКП(б) 1928-1929, vol. I-V, Moscova, Fondul InternaŃional „Demokratia”, 2000, vol. I, 

p. 5-6. 

42 E.V. Bogomolova, Управление советской экономикой в 20-е годы: опыт регулирования и 

самоорганизации, Institutul InformaŃiei ŞtiinŃifice în domeniul ŞtiinŃelor Sociale, Moscova, 

1993, p. 47-48. 

631

conştient se poate realiza salvarea de la foamete şi ruină, uniunea frăŃească a muncitorilor 

şi Ńăranilor” 43 . 

În anul 1921 au fost lichidate cele mai extinse focare de rezistenŃă. În luna martie a fost 

suprimată cu violenŃă răscoala de la Kronştadt, cauzată de criza politico-economică şi de 

politica comunismului militar - 50.000 de militari au participat la atacul final din noaptea 

de 16-17 martie, peste 10.000 fiind ucişi de cei 12.000-14.000 de răsculaŃi 44 . Aceeaşi 

soartă a avut-o răscoala armată a Ńăranilor din Tambov de sub conducerea eserului A.S. 

Antonov 45 - în lupta decisivă din iunie 1921 au fost ucişi 11.000 de răsculaŃi. În luna 

august 1921 atamanul Mahno s-a refugiat în România. RezistenŃa a fost generată de 

procesul violent de instalare a monopolului alimentar, care s-a transformat în ceea ce este 

calificat expres în documentele regimului din acea perioadă ca „dictatură alimentară”. 

Astfel, natura politică a factorului alimentar, aplicarea forŃei armate în scopul înfrângerii 

reacŃiei fireşti la foamete a producătorilor agricoli au fost asumate şi perpetuate până în 

momentul în care aproape toate resursele au intrat în posesia statului. Utilizarea 

proletariatului împotriva Ńăranilor în „lupta pentru pâine” a aprofundat clivajul dintre cele 

două categorii sociale, iar foametea a asigurat supravieŃuirea regimului. Suprapunerea 

acestei lupte cu efectele condiŃiilor meteorologice a fost devastatoare. 

4. ImportanŃa strategică a cerealelor din Ucraina 

Către primăvara anului 1921 flămânzea un sfert din populaŃia rurală a Rusiei sovietice. 

Epidemiile de tifos şi holera făceau ravagii. Milioane de Ńărani încercau să se salveze 

îndreptându-se înspre centrele industriale, fără să cunoască faptul că se ordonase blocarea 

accesului în oraşele mari, sub pretextul combaterii epidemiilor. S-au înmulŃit cazurile de 

canibalism – doar în Başkiria, în Pugacev şi Buzuluk s-au raportat sute de cazuri, una din 

persoanele anchetate mărturisind că în satul său toată lumea consuma carne de origine 

umană, inclusiv în locuri de alimentaŃie publică. La fel de răspândite erau şi cazurile de 

necrofagie 46 . Cifra populaŃiei afectate de foamete în luna martie 1921 atingea 26 de 

milioane în Rusia şi 7,5 milioane în Ucraina sovietică 47 . Ca urmare a politicii agricole şi 

fiscale bolşevice suprafeŃele agricole cerealiere s-au redus de la 60,4 milioane desiatine în 

1916 până la 46,2 desiatine în anul 1920. În plus, în contul statului, doar în anul 1920, s-a 

confiscat de la Ńărani imensa cantitate de 347 milioane puduri de cereale 48 . În „zona 

43 

Z.M. Ivanova, Левобережные районы Молдавии в 1918-1924 гг. (Исторический очерк), 

Chişinău, Editura ŞtiinŃa, 1979, p. 55-56, 59. 

44 

Vezi V.P. Naumov, A.A. Kosakovski, Кронштадт 1921. Документы о событиях в 

Кронштадте весной 1921 г., Moscova, Fondul InternaŃional „Demokratia”, 1997. 

45 

Vezi R. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik regime, New York, Vintage Books, Random House 

INC, 1995, p. 375-378, 382-388. 

46 

O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 776-777. 

47 

R. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik regime…, op. cit., p. 411. 

48 

V.V. Kondraşin, Голод 1932-1933 годов: Трагедия российской деревни, Moscova, Editura 

Rosspen, 2008, p. 319. 

632

foametei” au fost prinşi aproximativ 70 milioane de oameni – peste 50% din populaŃie, 

iar în epicentru – până la 35 milioane 49 . 

Decretul VłIK din 21 iunie 1921 califica 9 teritorii ca „înfometate”: Astrahan, łariŃin, 

Saratov, Samara, Simbirsk, Viatka, Republica Germanilor de pe Volga, a Tătarilor, 

Maroblasti, iar decretul din 8 august mai recunoaştea 5 gubernii din Republica Autonomă 

Kârgâză (Kazahstan): Uralsk, Orenburg, Bukeev, Aktiubinsk, Kustanai. Prin decretul din 

13 august 1921 erau adăugate pe lista foametei: gubernia Ufa, regiunile Ciuvaşia şi 

Kalmâkia, prin cel din 29 august – Votiaks, în toamnă erau adăugate Republica Başkiria 

şi Celiabinsk, iar în aprilie 1922 – Crimeea, Permi şi 3 gubernii din Ucraina (Zaporojie, 

Ekaterinoslav, DoneŃk) 50 . Potrivit statisticii finale a Comitetului Central al Pomgol din 

anul 1922, populaŃia guberniilor înfometate număra 31.714 mii persoane (23.434 mii în 

Rusia şi 8.280 mii în Ucraina). Aceste date însă sunt incomplete, neincluzând numeroase 

teritorii afectate de foamete (Azerbaidjan, Daghestan, regiunile Kalmîkă, Don, Tersk, 

guberniile Voronej, Tiumeni, Tambov, Stavropol ş.a.) 51 . 

În Ucraina sovietică, foametea din anii 1921-1922 s-a instalat cu precădere după 

lichidarea rezistenŃei antibolşevice. În plus, la nivelul anului 1921, suprafeŃe agricole din 

regiuni precum Nikolaev (65%), Ekaterinoslav (64%), Zaporojie (63%), Odesa (45%), 

DoneŃk (40%) sau Kremenciug (15%) au fost afectate de secetă. Pentru autorităŃi însă 

condiŃiile meteorologice nefavorabile n-au reprezentat motiv temeinic de diminuare a 

presiunii fiscale. Continuarea campaniilor de colectare, inclusiv după instalarea foametei, 

îi determină pe cercetătorii ucraineni să califice sucombarea în masă a populaŃiei ca fiind 

programată. Pentru consolidarea „frontului colectărilor” din regiunile ucrainene afectate 

de foamete s-a apelat nu doar la brigăzi de muncitori şi activişti de partid din centrele 

industriale. În anul 1921 „mobilizarea alimentară” a presupus şi implicarea armatei. 

Comandantul districtului militar Kiev, de exemplu, informa Consiliul Republican al 

Comisarilor Poporului că au participat la asemenea activităŃi în gubernia Volînia 800 

baionete, în Podolia – corpul de cavalerie cu până la 24 escadroane, în Kiev – 2,5 mii 

baionete şi săbii, Poltava – 2.000 baionete, Kremenciug – 200 baionete 52 . 

La 13 martie 1919 Lenin explica muncitorilor feroviari din Petrograd importanŃa 

Ucrainei din punctul de vedere strategic al aprovizionării, de ce trebuiau ajutaŃi 

„tovarăşii”: „Şi executivul sovietic din Ucraina cu privire la noi, când se va pune 

problema pâinii, va pune problema nu din punct de vedere negustoresc, nu aşa cum o 

pune speculantul şi acel mujik care spune: Flămândul va da şi sute ruble pentru un pud, 

scuip pe orice fel de monopol, mă interesează să mă căpătuiesc, iar dacă poporul 

flămânzeşte e cu atât mai bine, o să dea mai mult! (…) Şi executivul ucrainean a spus: 

Prima sarcină este de a ajuta Nordul înfometat!. Ucraina nu poate să reziste dacă nu va 

rezista Nordul epuizat de foamete. Ucraina va rezista şi va învinge cu siguranŃă dacă va 

ajuta Nordul înfometatat. Rezervele de pâine ale Ucrainei sunt gigantice. Nu poate fi luat 

49 


50 

S. Adamets, Guerre civile et famine..., op. cit., p. 123-124. 

51 

I.A. Poliakov, 1921-й: победа над голодом, Moscova, Editura Literaturii Politice, 1975, p. 18- 

19. 

52 

V.A. Smoli, Iсторiя украiнського селянства…, op. cit., p. 20-21, 26. 

633

totul odată. Am trimis în Ucraina forŃele noastre sovietice cele mai bune şi am primit pe o 

singură voce următoare informaŃie: rezervele de pâine sunt imense, dar nu pot fi scoase 

odată, nu avem nici un fel de aparat” 53 . 

La data înfiinŃării Pomgol 54 cifra populaŃiei înfometate era estimată la 10 milioane, iar la 

sfârşitul verii anului 1921 – la 20 milioane persoane. Raportat la datele recensământului 

din 28 august 1920, potrivit estimărilor Pomgol, numărul persoanelor afectate de foamete 

în guberniile din Ucraina sovietică, la 1 aprilie 1922, era următorul: Zaporojie – 

902.9000, Ekaterinoslav – 708.800, DoneŃk – 654.700, Odesa – 400.000; la 1 iunie 1922: 

Zaporojie – 948.600, Ekaterinoslav – 766.000, DoneŃk – 1.228.700, Odesa – 555.000; la 

1 august 1922: Zaporojie – 948.000 (74,6%), Ekaterinoslav –766.000 (43,4%), DoneŃk – 

756.00 (22,8%), Odesa – 555.000 (28,6%). Conform datelor OGPU 55 din februarie 1923, 

în Ekaterinoslav se înregistrau 47.500 înfometaŃi, în Odesa, districtul Herson – 90.000. În 

Ucraina consecinŃele foametei se observau în toate regiunile de sud. În noiembrie 1922, 

Posledgol ucrainean estima numărul persoanelor ce aveau nevoie de ajutor la 1.094.000, 

din care 315.000 copii abandonaŃi sau în orfelinat şi 150.000 gospodării cu rezerve 

alimentare epuizate. Procentul gospodăriilor în pericol era de 14% în gubernia 

Ekaterinoslav (care includea fosta gubernie Zaporojie), 23% - DoneŃk şi 27% - Odesa 

(care includea fosta gubernie Nikolaev) 56 . 

În plină foamete, în anul 1922, din regiuni ucrainene devastate de foamete, inclusiv din 

cele cu populaŃie românească 57 , se scoteau cereale pentru regiuni din Rusia aflate în 

aceeaşi situaŃie. Din gubernia Odesa, de exemplu, s-au scos 58 mii puduri de grâu pentru 

Samara, Ural, łariŃin şi Pugaciov. Abia în anul 1922 Pomgol a aprobat ca o parte din 

fondurile sale să fie direcŃionate şi către RSS Ucraineană - aceasta în condiŃiile în care, 

potrivit datelor Comisiei, la data de 1 mai 1922, în 5 regiuni de câmpie din republică, 

erau afectate de foamete 3.709.556 persoane. La nivelul întregii Ucraine numărul celor 

care aveau nevoie de ajutoare se ridica la 6,6 milioane. Aproape 40% din înfometaŃi erau 

copii, iar ajutoarele publice nu ajungeau decât pentru 7,5% din aceştia. Abia după 

insistenŃe repetate ale conducerii republicane de partid cifra ajutoarelor a fost majorată 

semnificativ, ajungând la aproximativ 1,8 milioane puduri. Pe lângă asistenŃa internă, 1,8 

milioane persoane au beneficiat de asistenŃa organizaŃiilor internaŃionale, care însă s-au 

putut desfăşura abia din toamna anului 1922 58 . 

Transnistria, ca şi alte regiuni din Ucraina, a fost obligată să furnizeze cereale pentru 

FederaŃia Rusă într-o perioadă în care aşa-zisele raioane „donatoare” erau deja calamitate, 

fapt recunoscut oficial, inclusiv prin reducerea impozitelor (în judeŃul Tiraspol, de 

exemplu, până la 50%). Implicarea raioanelor transnistrene se făcea prin intermediul 

53 

I.N. Amiantov ş.a., В.И. Ленин. Неизвестные документы…, op. cit., p. 272-273. 

54 

Abreviere din limba rusă pentru Comisia Centrală pentru Ajutorarea ÎnfometaŃilor. 

55 

Abreviere din limba rusă pentru AdministraŃia Politică de Stat Unită pe lângă Sovietul 

Comisarilor Poporului. 

56 

S. Adamets, Guerre civile et famine…, op. cit., p. 137-139, 149. 

57 

Vezi V. Serhiiciuk, Як нaс морили голодом, Kiev, Universitatea NaŃională din Kiev „Taras 

Şevcenko”, 2006, p. 19. 

58 

V.A. Smolii, Iсторiя украiнського селянства…, op. cit., 2006, p. 21, 25. 

634

comisiilor de ajutorare locale şi judeŃene. La nivelul judeŃului Balta, de la data înfiinŃării 

comisiei judeŃene şi până la 10 ianuarie 1922, au fost strânse pentru înfometaŃii din 

Povoljie 12.888 puduri de alimente şi suma de 1.188.477.392 ruble. În plus, muncitorii 

din judeŃ asigurau cu alimente un număr de 1.500 înfometaŃi din Povoljie. La nivelul 

judeŃului Tiraspol, până la 1 ianuarie 1922 s-au colectat pentru fondul de ajutorare suma 

de 96.705.727 ruble, cereale, făină, păsări, ouă, fructe, legume, sare, zahăr, obiecte din 

aur şi argint. În perioada august 1921 - februarie 1922 comisia judeŃeană de ajutorare a 

trimis în Uralsk, Samara, Pugacev, łariŃîn şi Zaporojie 96 de vagoane de pâine. Doar în 

luna iunie 1921 213 copii ai minerilor din Donbas au fost plasaŃi spre îngrijire în Tiraspol 

şi Grigoriopol, iar în luna octombrie 1921 în Tiraspol au mai fost aduşi din Povoljie 500 

de copii. În anul 1921 în judeŃul Balta erau ajutaŃi 1.481 de refugiaŃi, iar în judeŃul 

Tiraspol – 757 59 . 

O altă circumstanŃă agravantă pentru politica statului este exportul. Cerealele din 

Ucraina, de exemplu, făceau obiect de negociere cu Marea Britanie, Italia, Turcia, 

Finlanda, Japonia. La 13 septembrie 1923, Comitetul Central al RKP(b) stabilea ca „în 

termenul cel mai urgent” „să se arunce” în Germania 10 milioane de puduri de pâine 

(grâu şi secară) 60 . ExplicaŃiile oficiale, din luna decembrie 1922, bazate pe argumentul că 

nici statul, nici populaŃia nu dispunea de mijloacele necesare achiziŃionării surplusului de 

cereale din regiunile neafectate de foamete, în condiŃiile în care, în acelaşi timp, Ńara 

beneficia de ajutoare internaŃionale, nu pot fi acceptate. SituaŃii precum cea în care două 

regiuni vecine (cazul Podoliei şi Odessei) aveau statut diferit – furnizoare de cereale 

pentru export, respectiv, importatoare de cereale sau consumatoare de ajutoare – păreau 

absurde pentru observatorii străini, inexplicabile pentru Ńăranii înfometaŃi, dar acceptabile 

pentru regimul sovietic. ObŃinerea resurselor valutare necesare industrializării era 

considerată mai importantă decât aprovizionarea regiunilor înfometate 61 . 

5. Revenirea la vremurile mongolice. Transnistria 

Sunt valoroase din perspectiva reconstituirii evenimentelor observaŃiile istoricului 

român Alexandru Boldur. Locuind la Moscova în anul 1922, acesta confirmă evoluŃiile pe 

care le-am dezvoltat în secŃiunile anterioare: „Alimentele se scoteau ca dintr-un coş. Nu 

se întreba nimeni ce se va întâmpla dacă conŃinutul coşului va fi epuizat? S-au întors 

vremurile mongolice, când tătarii înarmaŃi veneau să jefuiască pe la oraşe şi la sate. 

łăranul fiind despuiat de tot ce agonisea prin truda grea a producătorului, a pierdut orice 

stimulent pentru a mai semăna. De ce să mai pui sămânŃa în pământ, dacă roadele muncii 

îŃi vor fi luate cu forŃa? łăranul a răspuns cu o împotrivire pasivă, care deseori joacă un 

rol decisiv în viaŃa popoarelor. A încetat să mai semene! Rezultatul nu s-a lăsat mult 

aşteptat. În 1921, pe toată întinderea Uniunii Sovietice s-a instalat cumplita foamete. 

Pentru a supravieŃui, părinŃii îşi mâncau pruncii. ScoarŃa copacilor era socotită bună 

59 Z.M. Ivanova, Левобережные районы Молдавии…, Ibidem, p. 75, 85-86. 

60 V. Serhiiciuk, Як нaс морили…, op. cit., p. 19. 

61 H.H. Fisher, The famine in Soviet Russia…, op. cit., p. 323-324. 

635

pentru supă. Oamenii mureau cu miile. Sate întregi dispăreau” 62 . În publicaŃii sovietice 

pe tema foametei Transnistria apare ca teritoriu „parŃial afectat de seceta din anul 1921” 63 . 

Un alt român care a consemnat foametea este Nichita Smochină. Prin prisma primului 

val de refugiaŃi români din Ucraina, care s-au salvat în România după evenimentele din 

1917 şi în timpul războiului civil, aflăm că situaŃia Transnistriei nu era diferită faŃă de alte 

regiuni ale imperiului. „SituaŃia jalnică a transnistrenilor care zac de foame şi duc mare 

lipsă sub teroarea comunistă” l-a determinat pe N. Smochină, el însuşi refugiat de peste 

Nistru, să facă încă din anul 1921 demersuri pentru organizarea refugiaŃilor români din 

URSS, sensibilizarea opiniei publice şi ajutorarea acestora. La un moment dat, cel care şia 

dedicat întreaga viaŃă luptei de emancipare a transnistrenilor, a cerut acordul 

autorităŃilor de la Bucureşti pentru aducerea în Ńară a copiilor români înfometaŃi de peste 

Nistru, chiar şi din numeroasele localităŃi româneşti de peste Bug. Din considerente 

politice, mai mult sau mai puŃin justificate, propunerea nu a fost agreată, autorităŃile 

limitându-se să accepte refugierea în Ńară a populaŃiei din Transnistria, indiferent de etnie 

şi să ofere asistenŃă în plan intern, astfel încât să împace principiul general al umanităŃii 

cu cel al neamestecului în treburile interne ale statului vecin 64 . 

Iată cum este descrisă prima foamete sovietică şi implicarea României în ajutorarea 

conaŃionalilor din URSS: „În 1922 în Transnistria bântuia o foamete cumplită, încât nici 

câinii nu puteau lătra, iar oamenii ca să poată merge se Ńineau de garduri. Moldovenii 

vânduseră toată zestrea din casă rusnacilor din Podolia şi ajunseseră la atâta mizerie încât 

erau fericiŃi aceia care fierbeau prune crude, cu care se hrăneau. Cei mai mulŃi însă se 

hrăneau cu susai. Ştevia fiartă cu mămăligă era socotită la fel cum era cozonacul pe 

vremuri. Bolile secerau lumea fără milă. Bandele comuniste confiscau de la nenorociŃii 

moldoveni ultimul bob de grâu sau de porumb, unde se mai găsea. Şcolile nu funcŃionau. 

Profesorii umblau pe la Ńărani cerşind precum calicii de altă dată. Cine era mai îndrăzneŃ 

se refugia în Basarabia – România, patria veche a transnistrenilor era socotită ca pământ 

al făgăduinŃei”. Doar în luna iunie 1922 s-au refugiat în tabăra de la CiopleniŃa 

aproximativ 1.000 de etnici români din Transnistria. În asistenŃa înfometaŃilor s-au 

implicat instituŃii de învăŃământ din România, primării, Crucea Roşie Română, 

personalităŃi academice şi politice. Ajutoarele constau în bani, alimente, îmbrăcăminte şi 

încălŃăminte. Relatând despre plasarea copiilor transnistreni în şcoli normale şi licee, 

Smochină menŃiona că nu au existat atâŃia elevi câte oferte din Ardeal şi Muntenia s-au 

primit 65 . 

„Raportul asupra numărului moldovenilor pierduŃi prin colonizare în Siberia, ucidere, 

deportare sau foamete”, având ca temă un sondaj efectuat în localităŃile transnistrene 

Târnauca, Sukleia, Kragaşi (Tiraspol) şi Butur (Dubăsari), a fost elaborat de Gh. 

Bucurescu. Documentul este unul dintre puŃinele care prezintă procentul etnicilor români 

decedaŃi din cauza foametelor din anii 1921-1922 şi din 1932-1933, în comparaŃie cu 

62 

Vezi schiŃa biografică în Al.V. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, Bucureşti, Editura Victor Frunză, 

1992, p. 542. 

63 

I.A. Poliakov, 1921-й: победа над голодом…, op. cit., nepaginat. 

64 

N. Smochină, Memorii, Bucureşti, Editura Academiei Române, 2009, p. 217-218, 221-222. 

65 Ibidem, p. 220, 227-228. 

636

procentul celor care au dispărut prin colonizare, represiuni şi deportări. Din anchetă 

rezultă că numărul redus al victimelor foametei din satele Târnauca, Sukleia, Kragaşi se 

datorează, pe de o parte, apropierii de oraşul Tiraspol şi de frontieră (existând 

posibilitatea aducerii alimentelor din România), iar pe de altă parte – sistemului de 

rechiziŃii mai relaxat în comparaŃie cu localităŃile din interior: „statul n-avea interes să se 

afle că e foamete în Ńară, de aceea n-o luat prea tare”, au existat numeroase cazuri de 

„umflaŃi”. Alta era însă situaŃia în Butur – una din localitaŃile care au alcătuit „centrul de 

rezistenŃă moldovenească”. Potrivit datelor oferite de medicul satului, Andrei BărcuŃă, 

51,3% din populaŃia română a sucombat prin foame (500 de morŃi în 1922 şi 200 în anii 

1932-1933). Una din concluziile sondajului inclus în rezultatele cercetării întreprinse de 

Institutul Central de Statistică pe teritoriul Ucrainei, în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război 

Mondial, este că „cel mai mare procent de pierduŃi îl ocupă morŃile din cauza foametei” 66 . 

ParticularităŃi ale situaŃiei din Transnistria găsim şi în literatura istorică din perioada 

sovietică. Potrivit cercetătoarei Z.M. Ivanova, raioanele din stânga Nistrului erau 

„înapoiate din punct de vedere industrial”, iar Ńărănimea reprezenta segmentul social 

dominant. Conform recensământului din anul 1920, în judeŃul Tiraspol, din populaŃia 

totală de 286.248, populaŃia rurală era reprezentată de un număr de 231.380 de persoane, 

iar cea urbană – de 54.868 de persoane. În judeŃul Balta, din numărul de 443.934, 

populaŃuia rurală era reprezentată de 386.859 persoane, iar cea urbană – de 57.075. 

Potrivit aceleeaşi istoriografii, dezastrul economic din Transnistria s-a datorat vecinătăŃii 

cu România, contrarevoluŃiei locale susŃinute de România şi a determinat înlocuirea 

Sovietelor cu comitete revoluŃionare. Obiectivul principal declarat al revkom-urilor consta 

în „susŃinerea şi consolidarea ordinii revoluŃionare şi mobilizarea resurselor umane şi 

materiale pentru Armata Roşie”. . În fapt, principala politică desfăşurată prin aceste 

comitete şi soviete locale a constat în aplicarea principiilor comunismului militar, 

respectiv, în confiscarea „surplusului” de cereale, a terenurilor, vitelor şi inventarului 

agricol 67 . 

În condiŃiile foametei din alte regiuni, activiştii de partid organizau pe malul stâng al 

Nistrului mitinguri şi Ńineau lecŃii Ńăranilor cu privire la situaŃia internă şi internaŃională. 

Mesajul principal transmis de putere viza caracterul „de clasă” al politicii fiscale. 

JudeŃului Tiraspol, grav afectat de recolta proastă, i se cerea să strângă o cantitate de 510 

mii puduri de pâine, iar judeŃului Balta – 2.400 mii. În luna noiembrie 1921 impozitul în 

natură în cele două judeŃe transnistrene a fost îndeplinit în proporŃie de 80%. łăranii care 

achitau obligaŃiile erau trecuŃi pe „tabla roşie”, iar cei care nu reuşeau – pe „tabla neagră”. 

łăranii erau acuzaŃi de „sufocarea” statului prin foamete, prin descompunerea aparatului 

fiscal, racolarea de agenŃi din rândurile colectorilor, lansarea zvonurilor privind iminenŃa 

prăbuşirii puterii sovietice. În aceste condiŃii, către data de 1 aprilie 1922, agricultorii 

judeŃului Balta achitaseră impozitul pe produse cerealiere în proporŃie de 100%, iar cei 

66 

A. GolopenŃia, Românii de la Est de Bug, vol. II, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2006, p. 

636-640. 

67 

Z.M. Ivanova, Левобережные районы Молдавии…, op. cit., p. 8, 45, 49. 

637

din Tiraspol – în proporŃie de 98% (la cereale), - 80% (la produsele din carne), 100% (la 

fructe) 68 . 

Cifrele menŃionate ne orientează către concluzia că nu se renunŃase la ideea utilizării 

pârghiilor fiscale nici după abandonarea oficială a politicii comunismului de război. 

PanicaŃi de intensificarea foametei Ńăranii transnistreni se revoltau în masă. Deşi către 

vara anului 1921 organele judeŃene Tiraspol şi Balta raportau că rezistenŃa a fost 

eradicată, se recunoştea că adversarii regimului „încercau să zădărnicească prodnalog-ul 

şi astfel să intensifice foametea”. În judeŃul Balta erau răspândite proclamaŃii prin care 

Ńăranii erau instigaŃi să boicoteze impozitul şi să nu execute oridinele autorităŃilor 

sovietice. Cele mai frecvente acŃiuni de rezistenŃă vizau „acte teroriste” comise împotriva 

lucrătorilor de partid şi sovietici. O formă de sabotare a fost arderea listelor 

contribuabililor. În satul Ploti, judeŃul Balta, a fost asasinat comisarul militar judeŃean 

Ciorbă, în Pesciana un grup de „bandiŃi” s-a răfuit cu 10 militari, în volostea 

Liubomirovski a fost asasinat secretarul de partid Baidacenko, iar în Gandrabur – 

activistul Iulin, în Pujaikovo, judeŃul Balta, o bandă a pătruns în sediul şcolii în care îşi 

desfăşura activitatea comisia pentru impozite, l-au răpit şi l-au asasinat pe preşedinte. În 

judeŃul menŃionat, doar în primele zile ale lunii octombrie 1921 bandele lui Zabolotnîi şi 

Chirşu au asasinat aproximativ 20 de preşedinŃi de revkom-uri săteşti şi de voloste, plus 

40 de activişti de partid 69 . 

Rezultatele vizitei pe care a făcut-o preşedintele Comitetului Executiv Central M.I. 

Kalinin în gubernia Odesa, în luna februarie 1922, reflectă situaŃia alimentară în raioanele 

din imediata apropire a frontierei române: 84 de voloste din gubernia Odesa (din totalul 

de 133) au fost declarate ca fiind afectate de foamete. La nivelul judeŃului Tiraspol 16 

voloste (din totalul de 24) au fost declarate ca fiind afectate - Slobozia, Coronian, 

Grigoriopol, Dubăsari, Parcani, łebrik, Poniatov, Rozaliev, Tiraspol, Katarjin, Doibani, 

Lunga, Taşlâk, Mălăeşti 1, Novo-Petrovsk şi Ploskov. În judeŃul Balta flămânzeau, 

potrivit datelor oficiale, 10 voloste (din totalul de 34). Cifrele privind numărul 

înfometaŃilor creşteau de la o lună la alta. În judeŃul Tiraspol erau înregistraŃi în luna 

aprilie 1922 - 57.863 de înfometaŃi (21,75% din numărul total al populaŃiei), în luna mai – 

58.936 (22,15% din numărul total), iar în iunie – 80.334 (30,19% din numărul total). În 

judeŃul Balta, în luna aprilie figurau 20.000 de înfometaŃi (4,8% din numărul total), în 

luna mai – 28.519 (6,85% din numărul total), iar în luna iunie – 43.745 (10,51% din 

numărul total) 70 . 

6. OGPU confirmă: condamnaŃi la foamete 

În documentele poliŃiei politice sovietice publicate după dezintegrarea URSS referirile 

la foamete sunt frecvente. Presiunea exercitată de autorităŃi asupra populaŃiei sau 

comportamentul inuman faŃă de cei care abia ieşiseră din faza acută a dezastrului erau 

constatate şi comunicate de OGPU factorilor de decizie. Sinteza situaŃiei politico- 

68 Ibidem, p. 64-67. 

69 Ibidem, p. 71-75. 

70 Ibidem, p. 87. 

638

economice în perioada mai-iunie 1922, de exemplu, confirma că în Caucaz (Don, Tersk, 

Kuban, Stavropol, Gorsk, Daghestan, Cabardină, Karaciaevo-Cerkesk, Georgia, Armenia 

şi Azerbaidjan), în pofida foametei, presiunea fiscală nu a încetat: „Printre Ńărani, nu chiar 

satisfăcător, ca urmare a foametei, se desfăşoară impozitarea, generând reproşuri 

puternice la adresa puterii. Trebuie precizat că în această regiune, foametea, până la 

sfârşitul lunii iunie, cum se vede din sinteze, încă nu s-a încheiat şi cu atât îi este mai greu 

Ńăranului sărac să achite impozitele”. „Fanatismul naŃional şi religios”, „ura seculară faŃă 

de Rusia asupritoare” au fost alte realităŃi cu care s-a confruntat regimul în procesul de 

sovietizare. În această perioadă, dacă în Kirghizia foametea se diminuase, în guberniile 

vestice ale Siberiei situaŃia rămânea „extrem de dificilă”, zilnic decedând sute de 

persoane 71 . 

Sinteza OGPU pentru luna octombrie 1922 sublinia că deteriorarea atitudinii Ńăranilor 

faŃă de regim era determinată de considerente exclusiv economice. Zaporojie, Nikolaev, 

Podolia şi Kiev au fost incluse în categoria „regiunilor nesigure”. Colectarea forŃată a 

impozitului în natură constituia cauza exclusivă a deteriorării stării de spirit şi agravării 

foametei. Analiştii OGPU recunoşteau caracterul excesiv al fiscalităŃii; expresia 

„condamnare la foamete” le aparŃine şi scoate în evidenŃă componenta artificială a 

tragediei. Un alt factor ce aprofunda nemulŃumirea populară faŃă de impozitul în natură îl 

reprezentau abuzurile comise de organele locale, care „inspiră Ńăranilor atitudinea 

pesimistă faŃă de toate acŃiunile puterii sovietice şi îi subminează autoritatea acolo unde 

era la înălŃime suficientă”. Erau prezentate exemple concrete: inspectorul din Pamfilovo, 

gubernia Tomsk, dezbrăca contribuabilii până la piele şi îi închidea în hambare reci, dacă 

aceştia nu-i asigurau prânzul; în judeŃul Kargopolsk, gubernia Vologodskaia, pentru 

neachitarea impozitului, a fost arestat un sat întreg; în Altai „alimentariştii” îi băteau pe 

membrii sovietelor şi ai comitetelor executive; în judeŃul BejeŃk, gubernia Tveri, 

„detaşamente alimentare” utilizau bătaia în masă a Ńăranilor ş.a. 72 . 

InformaŃiile operative furnizate de OGPU din Siberia pentru intervalul 9-16 noiembrie 

1922 constatau aceeaşi stare de spirit deprimantă a Ńăranilor. PopulaŃia judeŃelor Tiukalin 

şi Tarsk, în iarna care urma, era condamnată la foame tot din considerente fiscale: 

„pâinea, ca şi în judeŃele neroditoare, în general, este puŃină şi se găseşte numai la cei 

înstăriŃi, motiv pentru care, în lipsa pâinii, impozitul s-a achitat în produse din carne, 

slănină, unt, adică, aproape în toate cazurile s-au măcelărit animalele şi s-au comercializat 

în schimbul pâinii. Odată cu exterminarea şi vânzarea animalelor Ńăranii au fost privaŃi de 

singura posibilitate de a supravieŃui în această iarnă”. Atitudinea duşmănoasă a populaŃiei 

era alimentată de „anormalităŃile prea mari” şi „fenomenele ilegale” din procesul de 

impozitare agricolă: cifre de control exagerate (perceperea unor cote de 10 ori mai mari 

decât ceea ce s-a semănat); eludarea normelor de executare silită; aplicarea măsurilor 

„prea severe” de către tribunalele revoluŃionare (pentru neplată, în 24 de ore, familii 

71 G.N. Sevostianov, A.N. Saharov, I.F. Pogonii ş.a., «Совершенно секретно» Лубянка – 

Сталину о положении в стране (1922-1934 гг.), Moscova, Centrul Editorial al Institutului 

Istoriei Ruse al Academiei Ruse de ŞtiinŃe, 2001, vol. I „1922-1923”, partea I-a, doc. nr. 11, p. 

178-179, 182, 185. 

72 Ibidem, doc. nr. 16, p. 279-282. 

639

întregi erau aruncate în stradă, iar casele – executate silit); atitudinea brutală a 

administraŃiei fiscale şi batjocorirea Ńăranilor 73 . 

Raportul de activitate al Comitetului Executiv al volostei Mălăeşti, cu populaŃie 

majoritar românească, din judeŃul Tiraspol, din 26 februarie 1923, confirma caracterul 

convenŃional al momentului de vârf al foametei. În unele regiuni, cum a fost şi cea 

transnistreană, foametea a continuat după anii 1921-1922: „Foametea, deşi nu a căpătat 

încă dimensiuni stihiinice, deja cuprinde o parte importantă a populaŃiei, care deja are 

nevoie de susŃinere materială, iar în scurt timp va flămânzi în adevăratul sens al 

cuvântului. Din numărul total de 20.497 suflete ce populează volostea, după renumărarea 

înfometaŃilor au fost identificate 3.152 persoane, din care 1.961 - adulŃi şi 1.191 – 

copii” 74 . Acest lucru nu înseamnă că presiunea fiscală exercitată de stat a slăbit, din 

contră, autorităŃile au continuat să colecteze impozitele cu preŃul foametei. RealităŃile 

politico-economice din stânga Nistrului infirmă sensul comun al termenului „colectare”. 

Astfel cum am arătat mai sus, Sovietele au perseverat în deposedarea criminală a 

populaŃiei de resursele vitale necesare supravieŃuirii. Potrivit buletinului operativ al 

OGPU nr. 29/232 din 7 februarie 1923 pentru gubernia Odesa, dacă starea de spirit a 

muncitorilor era satisfăcătoare, cea a „maselor Ńărăneşti” rămânea încă marcată de 

impozitare 75 . 

La nivelul lunii aprilie-mai 1923, cauzele deteriorării situaŃiei economice a Ńăranilor, 

deseori obligaŃi să-şi vândă ultima bucată de pâine, erau comune diverselor regiuni: 

numărul excesiv al impozitelor, nesistematizarea fiscală, cotele fiscale exagerate, 

suprapunerea scadenŃelor cu campania agricolă. Deşi suficiente elemente argumentează o 

puternică componentă social-politică a foametei (în unele regiuni chiar identitară), aceasta 

era prezentată de OGPU ca „factor economic”. La acea dată, cele mai multe gubernii 

înfometate oferea Povoljie – 9, urmată de Regiunea Nord-Occidentală – 5; în total, în 32 

gubernii şi republici foametea nu fisese lichidată. Pe fondul reducerii ajutoarelor, 

epuizării definitive a resurselor, epidemiilor, numărul absolut al înfometaŃilor, în 

comparaŃie cu perioadele de bilanŃ anterioare, în unele regiuni, chiar a crescut. În timp ce 

locuitorii se alimentau cu surogate şi hoituri, iar în Karelia, de exemplu, adaugau coajă de 

pin în pâine, cu rare excepŃii, unităŃile Armatei Roşii erau aprovizionate „într-o măsură 

suficientă şi regulat” 76 . 

Statisticile elaborate la nivelul lunilor iulie-septembrie 1923 indicau ca motive ale 

deteriorării sitiaŃiei din mediul rural campania de colectare a impozitului agricol unic, 

epuizarea rezervelor alimentare, perspectiva proastă pentru noua recoltă, precum şi 

calamităŃile naturale. Regiunile afectate rămâneau aproximativ aceleaşi pe care le-am 

73 

Ibidem, doc. nr. 43, p. 469-471. 

74 

V.K. Vizer, Z.M. Ivanova, I.I. Terehina, Советское строительство в левобережных 

районах Молдавии 1921-1924. Сборник документов и материалов, Chişinău, 1977, doc. 195, 

p. 261-263. 

75 

G.N. Sevostianov ş.a. «Совершенно секретно»…, op. cit., vol. I „1922-1923”, partea a II-a, 

doc. nr. 75, p. 628. 

76 

Ibidem, p. 867-871, doc. nr. 118, sinteza politico-economică a URSS pentru lunile aprilie-mai 

1923, din 16 iulie 1923. 

640

enumerat mai sus. Doar în judeŃul Slavogorodski, gubernia Omsk, flămânzeau 10.000 

persoane, iar în judeŃul Sebejski, gubernia Vitebsk - până la 20.000, în regiunea Zariansk 

flămânzea 40% din populaŃie. Pentru iarna 1923-1924 analiştii OGPU anticipau intrarea 

în zona foametei a unor noi gubernii. InsuficienŃa seminŃelor fiind semnificativă, situaŃia 

era agravată de rezultatul „extrem de nesatisfăcător” al campaniei agricole de toamnă. 

Regiuni întregi afectate de calamităŃi naturale, neprimind niciun fel de ajutor, „puneau 

bazele înrobirii sărăcimii, aflate în dependenŃă economică totală faŃă de kulăcime”. La 

periferiile Uniunii se intensifica propaganda antisovietică şi antifiscală. Dacă în Ucraina 

influenŃa „elementelor antisovietice” rămânea la fel de semnificativă, în Orient se acutiza 

„duşmănia naŃională” între Ńăranii ruşi şi populaŃia locală 77 . 

NemulŃumiri legate de caracterul exagerat al impozitului unic se vor înregistra şi în anul 

1924, după achitarea obligaŃiilor către stat Ńăranii rămâneau fără pâine. În luna ianuarie 

1924 flămânzea populaŃia din Karelia (75%), Buriatia (35%), Kustanaisk, Arhanghelsk, 

Fergan sau Kamciatka 78 . Din cauza dezinteresării Ńăranilor faŃă de activităŃile agricole în 

favoarea exclusivă a statului, epuizării rezervelor alimentare, dar mai ales a demoralizării, 

foametea va înregistra cote latente până în momentul în care va redobândi forme acute ce 

vor atinge apogeul în anii 1931-1933. Au existat şi segmente intermediare de acutizare – 

un asemenea interval dramatic a fost 1924-1925, timp în care teritoriul din stânga 

Nistrului, inclusiv RASS Moldovenească, s-au confruntat cu o nouă foamete 79 . Este însă 

şi cazul Nagorno-Karabah sau al Autonomiei Germanilor de pe Volga. Pauperizarea a 

fost o constantă, iar insuficienŃa ajutoarelor de care au beneficiat înfometaŃii - o 

certitudine confirmată nu doar de mărturiile supravieŃuitorilor, dar şi de rapoartele strictsecrete 

ale OGPU, care asigurau informarea impecabilă a decidenŃilor. 

ConsideraŃii finale 

RechiziŃiile şi factorii meteorologici au constituit cauze principale ale dezastrului 

umanitar, însă rolul decisiv l-au avut campaniile de rechiziŃionare – acestea au anticipat 

fenomenele meteorologice şi l-au privat pe Ńăran de rezerve vitale 80 . RechiziŃiile masive şi 

forŃate ale „surplusului” de cereale şi alte produse agricole, în fapt, au reprezentat 

confiscarea tuturor acelor rezerve alimentare la care Ńăranii apelau în anii agricoli dificili, 

marcaŃi de secetă, ger sau dăunători. De exemplu, în Autonomia Germanilor de pe Volga, 

în intervalul 1921-1922, au fost rechiziŃionate 41,9% din cerealele recoltate 81 . Deşi 

suntem de acord că rezultatele nefaste ale oricărui război asupra populaŃiei civile şi a 

economiei oricărei Ńări rămân înafara oricărei discuŃii, nu împărtăşim exacerbarea în 

77 

Ibidem, p. 911-914, doc. nr. 120, sinteza OGPU din luna septembrie 1923. 

78 

G.N. Sevostianov ş.a. «Совершенно секретно»…, op. cit., vol. I „1922-1923”, partea a II-a, p. 

26-29, 43-44, doc. nr. 1 şi 2. 

79 

C. Stratievschi, „Годы трудные, годы голодные (1924-1926 гг.) в АМССР”, în Revista de 

Istorie a Moldovei nr. 1(69), 2007, p. 3-19. În opinia noastră autorul pune un accent 

disproporŃionat asupra cauzelor de ordin obiectiv. 

80 

O. Figes, A people`s tragedy…, op. cit., p. 752, 775-777. Vezi cazurile prezentate de autor. 

81 Ibidem, p. 412. 

641

defavoarea mijloacelor criminale utilizate de bolşevici 82 . Privarea Ńăranilor de rezervele 

alimentare a fost organizată deliberat, cu asumarea consecinŃelor fatale pentru zecile de 

milioane de Ńărani, iar pe de altă parte, comunismul de război a fost aplicat în scopul 

supravieŃuirii politice a regimului, mediul urban şi aparatul represiv fiind aprovizionate 

cu prioritate. Factorul subiectiv a jucat un rol principal şi nu unul conjunctural în 

declanşarea mecanismului foametei, aceasta fiind o consecinŃă directă a politicii 

comuniste, care a depăşit cu mult sfera agrară. 

Dintre măsurile concrete utilizate de putere în realizarea obiectivului de acaparare a 

resurselor alimentare reŃinem: 1) naŃionalizarea sistemului bancar şi a marilor proprietăŃi 

industriale şi agricole, dublată de desfiinŃarea comerŃului particular; 2) direcŃionarea unei 

propagande agresive împotriva satului, având ca scop demoralizarea Ńăranilor (majoritari) 

care nu susŃineau regimul ori se opuneau acŃiunilor abuzive de confiscare a proprietăŃii şi 

a rezervelor alimentare; 3) raŃionalizarea alimentară în mediul urban corespunzător 

nivelului de „acceptare” a regimului, inclusiv prin introducerea sistemului cartelelor; 4) 

antagonizarea populaŃiei, inclusiv prin divizarea oraş-sat, Ńărani bogaŃi-Ńărani săraci; 5) 

organizarea aşa-numitelor „detaşamente de aprovizionare”, înarmarea şi trimiterea 

acestora în mediul rural pentru a sprijini liderii bolşevici locali în campaniile de 

rechiziŃionare totală a cerealelor; 6) izolarea zonelor ce se confruntau cu dificultăŃi 

alimentare şi blocarea accesului Ńăranilor şi a produselor agricole în mediul urban; 7) 

tolerarea şi încurajarea abuzurilor comise de reprezentanŃii locali şi regionali ai puterii; 8) 

acordarea de privilegii alimentare, inclusiv în ceea ce priveşte ajutoarele. 

În încheiere, subliniem particularităŃile dictaturii alimentare ce se regăsesc în izvoarele 

pe care se bazează comunicarea: 

1) deciziile majore privind controlul asupra resurselor alimentare au fost adoptate la 

nivel central şi transmise de către liderii principali reprezentanŃilor din teritoriu; 

2) suprimarea violentă a opoziŃiei faŃă de politicile cu impact în domeniul 

aprovizionării, inclusiv prin implicarea armatei şi a poliŃiei secrete; 

3) utilizarea foametei ca pretext pentru declanşarea ofensivei împotriva religiei, 

confiscarea obiectelor de cult şi reprimarea reprezentanŃilor bisericii; 

4) conştientizarea faptului că pierderea de către stat a „luptei pentru pâine” însemna 

pierderea celei pentru subordonarea satului; 

5) responsabilizarea solidară generalizată în cazul refuzului de predare a cereale lor - 

luarea de ostatici şi organizarea expediŃiilor punitive fiind printre cele mai grave; 

6) renunŃarea tardivă la rechiziŃionarea generalizată şi permiterea comercializării 

produselor agricole astfel încât prevenirea foametei a devenit imposibilă; 

7) exportul cerealelor în condiŃiile în care foametea nu fusese eradicată complet şi 

obligarea unor regiuni înfometate să contribuie la ajutorarea altor regiuni. 

82 Vezi, de exemplu, V.V. Kondraşin, Голод 1932-1933 годов…, op. cit., p. 318-319. 

642

Memento 

HOMO JURIS – 

PROFESORUL ALEXANDRU HERLEA 

(1907 – 1979) 

Elena HELEREA 1 

RelaŃiile de conlucrare din societatea umană sunt, într-un stat de drept, ordonate 

normativ prin reguli juridice, morale, religioase, tehnice şi altele, prefigurate spontan sau 

construite, care dau coerenŃă şi consistenŃă convieŃuirii comunitare. Ordinea normativă, 

care este totdeauna şi socială, relevă mai multe dimensiuni, una din aceste dimensiuni 

fiind ceea juridică. Din aceasta rezidă calitatea naturală a omului ca juris, aşa cum 

dimensiunea morală relevă calitatea omului, de asemeni naturală, de fiinŃă morală. 

Împărtăşim opinia că originar juridicitatea, moralitatea, religiozitatea şi tehnicitatea stau 

dimpreună şi evoluează împreună, configurate într-o unitate culturală, determinată de 

acelaşi orizont axiologic - valori şi principii. 

Normele juridice sunt tot atîta de obligatorii pentru Homo Juris ca şi cele morale pentru 

Homo Moralis, ca şi cele pentru Homo Ludens. Dar, norma juridică este fie imperativă 

(onerativă sau interdictivă), fie permisivă, conturînd spaŃii particulare de libertate, prin 

care consacră libertatea însăşi. 

Homo Juris este subiect de drept, care intră în raporturi juridice concrete, cu drepturi şi 

obligaŃii în respectul legilor în vigoare: numai membrii unei societăŃi colaborează şi 

convieŃuiesc într-o ordine normativă juridică care dă măsura acelei societăŃi cît priveşte 

co-laborarea şi con-vieŃuirea. Co-laborarea este garantată prin organizarea prescriptivă a 

faptelor şi actelor subiectului de drept strîns legate de proprietate, con-vieŃuirea este 

garantată prin organizarea prescriptivă a manifestărilor societale a persoanei fizice şi a 

celei juridice [1]. 

Nu în toate societăŃile Homo Juris este recunoscut, stimat, apreciat. Perioada de 

instaurare a regimului comunist în România este o dovadă, iar viaŃa, opera şi destinul 

profesorului universitar doctor jurist Alexandru Herlea este mărturie vie. Destinul său 

tragic este exemplar pentru oameni de asemenea anvergură morală, ce şi-au facut un Ńel 

din a apăra, cu propria-i viaŃă, norma de drept şi legea. 

1 Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania. 

643

Activitatea profesorului Alexandru Herlea 

Evocarea profesorului de drept civil de la Academia Comercială din Cluj – Braşov, 

Alexandru Herlea, în cadrul celei de a şaptea ediŃii a Simposionului International intitulat 

REGIMURILE COMUNISTE - MEMORIE RECENTĂ PENTRU O SOCIETATE 

DESCHISĂ a fost aleasă pentru o serie de considerente. 

Virgil Ierunca în emisiunea : « Despre Alexandru Herlea », difuzată la postul de radio 

Europa Liberă, în februarie 1981 şi publicată ulterior, în 1994, în revista « Memoria » 

afirma că [2]: « ... m-am oprit la profesorul Herlea pentru că el constituie un caz-tip al 

cărturarului naŃional-Ńărănist care avea să plătească cu ani de temniŃă şi muncă forŃată 

pentru vina de a fi crezut în democraŃie, de a fi militat pentru ea; după cum avea să 

plătească şi pentru faptul de a fi fost un cărturar generos, un jurist şi un istoric 

„cosmopolit” - cum se spunea sub stalinişti – colaborând cu centre de cultură occidentală. 

Dacă mai adăugăm că avea şi o origine socială „nesănătoasă”, înŃelegem şi mai repede de 

ce profesorul Herlea avea să devină o victimă exemplară a ienicerilor stalinişti...». 

In alegerea subiectului prezentării, am mai fost sensibilizată şi de legăturile profesorului 

Alexandru Herlea cu Braşovul şi cu învăŃământul superior al acestuia precum şi de 

originile sale transilvane. 

Alexadru Herlea descinde dintr-o veche familie din Ardeal, prezentă în viaŃa religioasă, 

politică şi culturală a vremurilor. Ii amintesc pe Nicolae RaŃiu (duhovnicul lui Horea), 

episcopul Vasile Moga şi mulŃi alŃi protopopi din aceeaşi familie, pe deputaŃii din dietele 

Transilvaniei Grigore RaŃiu, Ioan RaŃiu, Ioan Balaş, pe memorandiştii Nicolae Herlea şi 

Rubin PatiŃa, pe ofiterii Teodor Stanislau, baronul Gheorghe Balaş şi Remus Herlea, pe 

juriştii şi înalŃii funcŃionari Iosif Pop, Gheorghe Balaş, Dominic RaŃiu, Zaharie 

Munteanu, Constantin Moga, Alexandru Herlea, personalităŃi din învăŃământ şi cultură: 

Ioan Moga, Moise Fulea, Gheorghe Dima, Lucian Blaga, Dorin Pavel. 

Dar principalul argument pentru care această comunicare îşi găseşte locul în cadrul 

simpozionului este cel privitor la felul în care funcŃiona justiŃia în Romaniaă şi rolul 

criminal al Securitatii. Asupra acestor aspecte voi insista. 

Sub influenŃa tradiŃiei familiare, din frageda tinereŃe, profesorul Herlea se angajează în 

viaŃa cetăŃii, înŃelegând să militeze pentru o evoluŃie bazată pe marile valori de libertate, 

democraŃie, justiŃie şi dreptate socială. 

Personalitate bine conturată, Alexandru Herlea va milita pe diverse planuri. 

Politic, se situează în aripa stângă a PNT fiind candidat în mai multe alegeri 

parlamentare – secretar al grupului de deputaŃi hunedoreni în Parlament (1932). Profund 

opus tuturor formelor de totalitarism, se angajază în denunŃarea derivelor totalitare de 

dreapta care erau puternic prezente în viaŃa politică de la sfârşitul anilor ’30 şi în timpul 

războiului. La Braşov este unul din cei mai activi membri ai grupării de democraŃi strânşi 

644

în jurul revistei «Tara de mâine», condusă de Victor Jinga, rectorul Academiei 

Comerciale, unde Herlea era profesor de drept civil. Acest grup întocmeşte în primavara 

lui 1944 un manifest intitulat «Proiect de enunŃări principiale şi programatice» în care se 

denunŃa războiul şi toate formele de totalitarism şi se expune un proiect pentru 

organizarea politică şi socială a României după terminarea războiului. Se preconizează o 

societate bazată pe marile valori enunŃate mai sus, cu o economie de piaŃă unde 

cooperaŃia liberă ocupa un loc important. 

Ca jurnalist, Alexandru Herlea este prezent în multe publicaŃii ale vremii cu articole 

referitoare la marile probleme politice, sociale, economice ale timpului. Este redactor sef 

al ziarului «Solia» din Oraştie şi membru în biroul de conducere al Sindicatului Presei din 

Ardeal şi Banat. 

Ca avocat, desfăşoară o campanie susŃinută de apărare a micilor proprietari din MunŃii 

Apuseni, deposedaŃi în mod abuziv de societatea «Mica». Procesele «Mica», în care a 

pledat Alexandru Herlea, ajunse la Curtea de CasaŃie, au avut un larg răsunet, denunŃând 

venalitatea unor organe judiciare şi a unor oameni politici marcanŃi ai vremii. Sa-mi fie 

îngăduit să compar aceste procese cu ce se întamplă astăzi la Roşia Montana. Apărarea 

Roşiei Montana se situează pe linia continuitătii apărării marilor valori pentru care 

Alexandru Herlea s-a bătut toată viaŃa. Angajamentul fiului său, a profesorului Alexandru 

Herlea junior, întru apărarea Roşiei Montana, nu face decat să afirme continuarea tradiŃiei 

familiei. 

Ca om de ştiinŃă, cercetator şi profesor [3], Alexandru Herlea este un specialist 

recunoscut în domeniul proprietăŃii imobiliare şi în cel al istoriei dreptului din 

Transilvania. Dintre lucrările sale citez: 

• «Minele de aur din MunŃii Apuseni şi drepturile statului asupra acestor mine» 

(1940), 

• «CărŃile de proprietate în Transilvania» (1943), 

• «O falsă concepŃie despre proprietatea agrară medievală» (1944), 

• «Publicitatea imobiliară reală» (1947), 

• « Elemente umaniste în vechiul drept românesc», 

• «JurisdiŃia în Transilvania şi probele primitive», 

• «RelaŃii interteritoriale între populaŃiile Tărilor Române», 

• «JustiŃia penală în Transilvania în secolul XVI », 

• «CondiŃiile istorice ale elaborării ConstituŃiilor aprobate din Transilvania şi urmările 

lor social-politice asupra populaŃiei româneşti ». 

Ultimele nu vor fi publicate decât după moartea sa, în volumul intitulat «Studii de 

istorie a dreptului» (1983) [4], care vede lumina tiparului prin grija soŃiei sale, profesoara 

Silvia Herlea. 

645

«Aprobatae Constitutiones», o lucrare fundamentală pentru istoriografia Transilvaniei 

pe care Alexandru Herlea a tradus-o si analizat-o, nu va fi publicată decât în 1998, după 

ce, cu un an înainte, apăruse cel de al treilea volum din «Studii de istorie a dreptului» [5]. 

Toate vor fi publicate de către editura Dacia din Cluj, sub îngrijirea lui Liviu Marcu şi 

Valeriu Sotropa. Mai multe din lucrarile sale vor fi publicate în străinătate, cum este cazul 

lucrării « Sur l’histoire de la condition juridique de l’enfant en Roumanie», publicat la 

Bruxelles, în «Recueils de la société Jean Bodin» (1977). 

Doctor în ştiinŃe juridice şi doctor în ştiinŃe economice şi politice, Alexandru Herlea nu 

a rămas izolat într-un turn de fildeş ci a fost şi un mare pedagog şi animator al cercetării. 

Pe lângă Catedra de Drept civil al cărui titular era la Academia Comercială din Braşov, 

organizează un prestigios seminar care funcŃionează până în 1947, când este dat afară la 

primele epurări din învăŃământul superior. 

Dupa pensionare (de la ieşirea din a doua detenŃie şi până la pensionare, a ocupat un 

modest post de documentalist la Institutul de Istorie al Academiei «Nicolae Iorga»), în 

anul 1974 crează « AsociaŃia de istorie comparativa a institutiilor şi dreptului» pe care o 

afiliază la «Association Internationale d’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions» din Paris şi 

la Societatea «Jean Bodin» din Bruxelles şi fondează revista de limba franceză 

«Recherches sur l’histoire des institutions et du droit», care continuă să apară şi astăzi. 

AsociaŃia regrupa un număr important de fosti detinuŃi politici, printre care şi Corneliu 

Coposu care, în acest cadru, a putut pentru prima dată să ia cuvântul în public după 

ieşirea sa din puşcărie; îi era recunoscător lui Herlea pentru aceasta. Printre membrii 

asociaŃiei, foşti detinuŃi politici, îi menŃionez pe Victor Jinga, Alexandru Constantinescu, 

Ovid Sachelarie, Petre Strihan, Ion Jovin, Constantin Bucşan, Vasile Netea, Tudor 

Voinea, Salvador Brădeanu, George Fotino, Romulus Vulcănescu, Alexandru 

Valimărescu. 

Procesul de la Braşov şi prima întemniŃare 

Să ne oprim acuma asupra celor două procese în care a fost condamnat Alexandru 

Herlea, la un total de 25 de ani de temniŃă. 

Cunoscut ca un om de centru stânga, lui Alexandru Herlea i se fac, dupa 23 august 

1944, numeroase propuneri de colaborare, începând cu cele ale lui Petru Groza şi Mihail 

Ralea. El le refuză şi se angajază cu curaj în denunŃarea comunizării României şi a 

ocupaŃiei sovietice. 

In priăvara lui 1949 raspunde la solicitarea făcută de către Comitetul NaŃional din exil 

condus de generalul Rădescu de elaborare a unui document care să analizeze situaŃia 

politică, socială şi economică din Ńară. Această solicitare i se trimite de la Paris lui Victor 

Anca; acesta informează mai mulŃi fruntaşi naŃional Ńărănişti precum Eugen HaŃeganu, 

Dumitru Gerota, Ion Lugoşianu, Bibi Popescu, Vasile Munteanu, Gabriel Tepelea şi face 

apel la Victor Jinga şi Alexandru Herlea pentru redactarea documentului. Memoriul 

realizat este trimis la Paris de unde se cere un complement de informaŃie. Această cerere 

646

este interceptată de către Securitate (care violează valiza diplomatică a Ambasadei 

FranŃei prin care se comunica) şi Anexa redactată de către Herlea şi Jinga este, la rândul 

ei, sesizată înaintea expedierii. Securitatea organizează două procese: unul la Bucureşti, 

avându-l ca şef de lot pe Victor Anca şi celălalt, la Braşov, cu şef de lot Victor Jinga şi 

Alexandru Herlea. Victor Anca este condamnat la 10 ani şi ceilalŃi membri ai lotului, 

până la 7 ani. La Brasov, Jinga şi Herlea sunt condamnaŃi la 5 ani fiecare iar ceilalŃi 

membri ai lotului al pedepse mai mici. Relativa clemenŃă a tribunalului militar din Braşov 

s-a datorat preşedintelui Completului de Judecata, colonelul Lazăr, care nu a executat 

dispoziŃiile de condamnare la 15 ani date de Securitate, fapt pentru care va fi dat afară din 

magistratură şi arestat. 

Cei 5 ani de detenŃie sunt efectuaŃi de Herlea la închisoarea din Braşov (1 an) şi 4 ani la 

Canalul Dunărea – Marea Neagră, din care 3 ani în lagărul de la Peninsula – Valea 

Neagra. La inchisoarea din Braşov este bătut crunt de către securistul Mayer care îl 

răneşte grav. Va fi operat numai peste un an la Canal de către doctorul deŃinut Achile 

Sari, fără anestezie şi cu un bisturiu improvizat dintr-un cuŃit de bucătărie. In diversele 

publicaŃii despre Canal apare figura luminoasă a profesorului Herlea care s-a purtat cu 

multă demnitate şi curaj. Mentionez: «Testamentul din morgă» a lui Remus Radina, [6], 

«Morminte fără cruce » a lui Cicerone IoniŃoiu [7] si scrierile lui Nicolae Carje si 

Alexandru Bratu. 

Familia profesorului Herlea va fi şi ea persecutata in aceasta perioada. Sotia sa, Silvia 

Herlea, profesoară de liceu şi asistent universitar, este dată afară din învăŃământ şi 

obligată să divorŃeze pentru a găsi un loc de muncă într-o fabrică. Familia, mama cu cei 

doi copii, dintre care cel mic grav bolnav, va fi evacuată din locuinŃă în 1952. Copilul 

bolnav va deceda după câŃiva ani, in 1957. Să amintesc că şi mama Silviei Herlea, sora 

profesorului Ion Lupaş (închis şi el 5 ani la Sighet) a fost arestată şi deŃinută în 1952. 

A doua întemnitare: Inscenările SecurităŃii 

Dupa eliberarea sa din închisoare, în august 1954, Alexandru Herlea lucrează un an ca 

cioplitor de piatră, singurul post pe care l-a putut ocupa. In toamna anului 1955 devine 

şeful oficiului juridic (post nou creat) al GOSTAT-ului din regiunea Braşov. Organizează 

acest oficiu pentru care recruteaza 17 avocaŃi, profesionişti de primă mână, majoritatea 

foşti deŃinuti politici. Pentru Ministerul Agriculturii elaborează un studiu privind 

proprietatea imobiliară a statului adoptat de către acesta ca bază teoretică de organizare a 

teritoriului. 

Profesorul Herlea este, după ieşirea sa din puşcarie urmărit îndeaproape. Securitatea 

recurge la tot felul de metode pentru al re-aresta. Securitatea trebuia să-şi justifice 

existenŃa şi să menŃină atmosfera de teroare în Ńară, mai ales după revoluŃia din Ungaria 

din toamna anului 1956. 

Prima încercare de re-întemniŃare a lui Herlea are loc în primavara lui 1958 când 

Securitatea propune unui funcŃionar de la Banca Agricolă (Mitan) să declare că a furat cei 

peste 100.000 de lei (pe care îi delapidase şi pentru care, conform legii, ar fi fost 

647

condamnat la moarte) din ordinul lui Herlea, care urmărea sabotarea economiei naŃionale. 

Inscenarea fiind prea cusută cu aŃă albă (prof. Barba, de la Institutul Politehnic din 

Braşov, expert contabil, refuză să-l semneze, găsindu-l absurd), Securitatea imaginează 

un alt scenariu. 

Arestează mai multe persoane şi convinge pe preotul Ilie Piso din Zărneşti şi pe 

doctorul Gogonea din Sibiu să declare că Herlea a organizat o acŃiune contrarevoluŃionară 

de răsturnare a regimului. Se constituie un lot de 18 persoane, cu Herlea şef 

de lot, Eugen Lazăr sub-şef al naŃional-ştilor şi Măluşel sub-şef al legionarilor. 

Ancheta este condusă de ofiŃerii de securitate Urzică şi Alexandrescu care nu recurg 

numai la puneri în scenă dar şi torturează fizic şi moral. Ambii, ajunşi la gradul de 

generali, au beneficiat după decembrie 1989 de pensiile indecente, atribuite ofiŃerilor de 

securitate. Unul din aceştia, care mai este şi astăzi în viaŃă, continuă să se bucure de toate 

privilegiile, în timp ce foştilor deŃinuŃi politici şi familiilor lor li se acordă compensaŃii 

derizorii pe motivul că statul nu are bani. Are însă bani să plătească exorbitantele pensii 

ale criminalilor. 

Dar, să revenim la proces. Asupra lui Herlea se fac presiuni brutale pentru a-l determina 

să declare că a acŃionat din ordinul lui Mihai Popovici (unul din importanŃii vicepreşedinŃi 

ai PNT) şi a înscena astfel un mare proces naŃional. Profesorul Herlea nu 

cedează, şi atunci, după doi ani de anchetă, se deschide la Braşov procesul lotului format 

din cele 18 persoane. Procurorul cere condamnarea la moarte a lui Herlea. Acesta 

păstrase însă un alibi hotărâtor pe care nu-l va divulga decât în ziua procesului, ştiind prea 

bine că Securitatea putea oricând să modifice orice. Dosarul constituit de Securitate 

afirma că şedinŃa de constituire a organizatiei contra-revolutionare a avut loc în vara lui 

1954, de ziua onomastica (Sfantul Ilie – 20 iulie) a preotului Piso, în locuinŃa acestuia de 

la Zărnesti. Ori, Herlea a fost eliberat de la Canal în august 1954, aflându-se, deci, în ziua 

cu pricina în inchisoare. Este condamnat totuşi la 20 de ani de temniŃă, în ciuda evidentei 

înscenări. Ulterior, doctorul Gogonea care se afla închis împreună cu Herlea (grav 

bolnav) la Jilava revine asupra falsei mărturii, informând procuratura că în privinŃa lui 

Herlea a minŃit. Părintele Piso refuză însă să retracteze. 

In acest proces mulŃi inculpaŃi au avut o atitudine demnă şi morală. Avocatul Mălusel si 

economistul Lazăr, cei doi sub-sefi de lot, în ciuda torturilor, nu s-au pretat la declaraŃii 

false şi nu au făcut jocul SecurităŃii. Ei au fost condamnati la câte 18 ani fiecare. Cei care 

nu au putut rezista torturilor fizice şi morale şi nu au revenit nici la proces asupra falselor 

declaraŃii au fost şi ei răsplătiŃi cu câŃiva ani de temniŃă. 

In aceeaşi zi cu procesul Herlea s-a judecat la tribunalul militar din Braşov un alt proces 

politic, al cărui şef de lot era profesorul Victor Jinga. Acesta, învinuit de propagandă 

împotriva statului, a fost condamnat la 10 ani închisoare. 

Din fişa de penitenciar 

Consemnam mai jos Fişa de penitenciar a profesorului Alexndru Herlea, extrasă de pe 

site-ul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului 

Românesc [8]. 

648

Herlea Al. Alexandru, n. în 24 iunie 1907 la Vinerea, Alba, fiul lui Alexandru şi Dora, 

dom. Orăştie, Huneadoara, contabil (), prof. univ., fără avere/dr. în Drept, căs. Silvia 1 

băiat, PNł, arestat în 15 VIII 1949, P. Or. Stalin (15 X 1949), cond. de TM Stalin 

(541/50) la 5 ani cor. pt. uneltire, Poarta Albă (20 II 1951), Valea Neagră, Poarta Albă 

(6 V 1951), Valea Neagră (13 V 1951), Poarta Albă (26 XI 1953), elib. în 13 VIII 

1954. Cu. dom. la Braşov, str. S. Pârvulescu 7, jurisconsult Trust GAS Braşov (prof. 

univ.), fără avere, arestat în 16 III 1959, Codlea (22 III 1961), cond. de TM Reg. III 

Cluj (68/1961), la 20 ani MS pt. uneltire, Jilava (8 VIII 1961), Văcăreşti (21 VIII 

1962), Jilava (27 X 1962), Văcăreşti (14 XI 1962), Jilava (29 XII 1962), elib. în 16 I 

1963, graŃiat D. 5/ 1963. [FJ]. 

Pro memoria 

De o mare sensibilitate, Alexandru Herlea a fost şi poet. Cu puŃin înainte de a muri a 

reuşit să scoată la editura «Litera» trei plachete de poezii intitulate «La porŃile gândului », 

« Pe puntea întrebărilor» şi «Cronica neliniştii ». Peste o mie de poezii i-au fost 

confiscate de Securitate şi nu au fost încă găsite. Cum i-au fost confiscate la diferite 

perchiziŃii alte manuscrise cu caracter memorialistic sau ştiinŃific care nici ele nu au fost 

recuperate. Mai există însă, din fericire, câteva manuscrise, memorii şi amintiri, pe care 

Alexandru Herlea le-a redactat spre sfârşitul vieŃii şi care se află în posesia fiului său. 

In concluzie, doresc să subliniez că profesorul Alexandru Herlea, demn continuator al 

familiei sale, a fost la rândul său, un cărturar deschizător de drumuri, un exemplu de 

luptător pentru identitatea naŃională şi pentru marile valori ale civilizaŃiei europene. 

Probitatea sa ştiinŃifică şi umanismul său au marcat profund pe cei care l-au cunoscut. 

Multumiri 

Aduc mulŃumiri fiului profesorului, profesor dr.ing. Alexandru Herlea junior 2 , care mi-a 

pus la dispoziŃie o bogată documentaŃie, mergând de la publicaŃii la unele documente din 

dosarele CNSAS. Ele mi-au permis să realizez această comunicare. Doctor honoris causa 

a Universitatii Transilvania din Brasov, fost ministru al Integrarii Europene, Alexandru 

Herlea junior a jucat un rol eminent în procesul de deschidere a negocierilor de aderare a 

României la Uniunea Europeană, prin care România, depăşind vicisitudinile istoriei, a 

revenit în marea familie europenă, pe care n-ar fi trebuit s-o părăsească niciodată. 

MulŃumesc, de asemenea, prof. Olteanu Florentin, care mi-a furnizat numeroase 

informaŃii de spre calvarul întemniŃărilor şi deportărilor din România. 

2 Alexandru Herlea junior a donat Bibliotecii Universitatii Transilvania din Brasov biblioteca 

tatalui sau, care conŃine si diferitele publicaŃii ale acestuia. 

649

BIBLIOGRAFIE 

[1] Gheorghe Mihai: Homo juris – Patrimonium technicus. Sesiunea CRIGFST Medias, 

2012 (în curs de publicare) 

[2] Virgil Ierunca: Despre Alexandru Herlea. Evocare la postul de Radio Euriopa Liberă, 

februarie 1981, Memoria, Revista gandirii arestate, Editată de FundaŃia Culturală 

Memoria, sub egiuda Uniunii Scriitorilor din Romania, Nr. 12. 

[2] Traian Dumitrescu, Valeriu Mircea: Monografiile si biografiile corpului profesoral 

al Academiei de Inalte Studii Comerciale şi Industriale şi al ISEP-ului Brasov 

(1927/1929 – 1948 si 1948-1950). Vol. 3, ASE Bucuresti. 

[3] Alexandru Herlea: Studii de istoria dreptului. Organizarea de stat. Editura Dacia, 

Cluj-Napoca, 1983. 

[4] Alexandru Herlea: Studii de istoria dreptului. Vol.3. Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 

1997. 

[5] Remus Radina: Testamentul din morgă. Editura Jurnalul Literar, Bucureşti, 2008. 

[6] Cicerone IoniŃoiu: Morminte fără cruce. Jon Dumitru Verlag, Munchen, 1982. 

[7] Fise de penitenciar, http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/fise_detinuti_politici/ 

Iconografie 

Fig. 1. Profesorul Alexandru Herlea, înainte de prima arestare, 1949. 

650

Fig. 2. Fişa personală a Prof. Alexandru Herlea, de la CNSAS, la prima arestare, în 1949. 

651

Fig. 3.Fişa personală a Prof. Alexandru Herlea, de la CNSAS, la a doua arestare, în 1959. 

652

O VIAłĂ DEDICATĂ BISERICII UNITE ŞI 

NEAMULUI ROMÂNESC - PREOTUL ŞI 

DASCĂLUL DR. AUREL LELUłIU (1914 – 1980) 

Introducere 

Laura-Mihaela LELUłIU 1 , Ovidiu-Constantin SAVU 2 

Istoria bisericii greco-catolice din România sau Biserica Unită cu Roma, cum a mai fost 

și este cunoscută iși are originile și primele planuri de înființare la sfârșitul secolului al 

XVII- lea. Pornind de la problemelel sociale și politice ale românilor ardeleni, apariția 

acestui cult, desprins din cel ortodox, românesc, își are începuturile în Transilvania 

secolului al XVII -lea și începutul secolului următor. Practic, din punctul de vedere al 

ritulului nu se schimbă aproape deloc față de cultul ortodox, sărbatorile sunt la fel, doar 

că ierahul superior este văzut în Papa de la Roma, iar în loc de Sfântul Duh, în timpul 

slujbei, apare cuvântul Spiritul Sfânt. 

Timp de peste două secole Biserica greco-catolică din Transilvania a jucat un rol activ 

din punct de vedere religios, cultural și educativ în rândul românilor din această 

provincie. Școlile Blajului, capitala religioasă și administrativă de după sec.XVIII a 

greco-catolicilor, a dat sute și mii de preoți, dascăli, învățatori, profesori, care și-au adus 

contribuția nemijlocită la emanciparea românilor ardeleni. 

Această perioadă din istorie coincide și cu lipsa de drepturi și libertăți a românilor 

ardeleni, pentru care au luptat cu ajutorul penei, a scrisului și a memoriilor reprezentanții 

inteligenței românilor transilvăneni. 

La sfârșitul celui de al doilea război mondial, situația României, ca și a întregului bloc 

de state din Europa de est si centru a intrat sub influența politică a Rusiei sovietice. 

La sfârșitul anului 1948 poziția și securitatea Bisericii greco-catolice, a prelaților și 

enoriașilor a fost grav periclitată de hotărârile guvernului comunist, care prin acte ilegale 

vor interzice cultul greco-catolic[1], prin ”înglobarea„ sau ”absorția” lui, forțată în cadrul 

cultului ortodox român. 

În România, înainte de interzicerea cultului existau aproximativ 1,5 milioane de 

credincioși greco-catolici, cu 1725 de biserici, 1594 de preoți, 34 de canonici, 75 de 

prelați, împărțiți în 5 dioceze. 

1 Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania. 

2 Casa Mureşenilor Museum, Braşov, Romania. 

653

În anul 1948 titularii acestor scaune episcopale erau Ioan Suciu pentru zonele Alba- 

Iulia și Făgăraș, Iuliu Hossu pentru Cluj, Valeriu Traian Frențiu la Oradea, Ioan Bălan la 

Lugoj și Alexandru Rusu în Maramureș. Și la București exista un vicar general, în 

persoana lui Vasile Aftenie, care fusese numit în 1940 pentru Alba și Făgăraș, dar a 

rămas la București. 

Toate această organizare administrativă și religioasă a fost desființată în urma ordinelor 

date de comuniștii români, ajutați de cei sovietici, care prevedeau desființarea cultului 

Greco- Catolic din România, precum și preluarea întregului patrimoniu mobil și imobil al 

acestui cult de către cel ortodox [1], [5]. 

Greco-catolicii români au activat totuși, în ilegalitate, și după anul 1948, mai ales prin 

activtatea episcopului Vasile Suciu, a viitorului cardinal Alexandru Todea, dar și a 

preoților și prelaților mai puțin cunoscuți. Cei care s-au opus acestei înglobari forțate în 

rândul ortodocșilor români au fost închiși la pușcarie, puși sub supravegherea organelor 

de Securitate sau ținuți sub regim de domiciliu forțat. 

Studiul nostru nu își propune să analizeze subiectiv și partinic o situație și o realitate 

istorică, ci doar să constate, să descopere, cu ajutorul documentelor și a studiilor de 

istorie orală, activitatea unui fost preot greco-catolic, dr. Aurel Leluțiu, originar din zona 

Făgărașului. Preotul greco-catolic, dr. Aurel Leluțiu a fost închis la pușcarie, pentru că a 

continuat oficierea cultului religios în care a fost botezat și instruit la școli importante 

de la Blaj sau Roma. În cei peste 20 de ani de la schimbările democratice din jurul anului 

1989, produse în țari din Europa centrală și de est s-a pus întrebarea, de ce s-a făcut 

această neligiuire, cui a aparținut ideea desfințarii Cultului Unit, în România, Ucraina, 

Cehoslovacia?! 

Această întrebare a fost pusă și pentru situașia de la noi din șară. Au fost și sunt 

cercetători români și străini care au răspuns acestei întrebari, prin studiile și cercetarile 

întreprinse de ei. Avem în vederea aici pe Andre Kom, originar din Olanda, care are un 

studiu foarte obiectiv privind ”Unificarea Bisericii Unite cu Biserica Ortodoxă Română 

în 1948”. O altă cercetare miniușioasă pe domeniu a făcut cercetătoarea rusă Tatiana 

Volokitina, iar de la noi s-au ocupat de acest domeniu, printre alșii, Cristian Vasile, 

Amrius Bucur, Marius Oprea, Ovidiu Bozgan, Lucreșia Scurtu, Vasile Marcu și altii. 

Activitatea Preotului Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu 

În cadrul celei de a şaptea ediŃii a Simpozionului International intitulat „Regimurile 

comuniste - memorie recentă pentru o societate deschisă ” am ales să-l prezentăm pe 

Preotul Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu din mai multe considerente. 

În primul rând, Părintele Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu a fost o personalitate unică, care a fost 

angajată total în viaŃa spirituală a cetăŃii şi a naŃiunii. ViaŃă sa a fost dedicată Bisericii 

Unite şi neamului românesc, iar aceast simplu fapt i-a determinat destinul, dânsul 

devinind o victimă a staliniştilor, fiindu-i înscenate mai multe procese şi apoi fiind 

condamnat la mulŃi ani de detenŃie. 

654

Un alt argument pentru care această comunicare îşi găseşte explicaŃia în faptul că a-l 

evoca pe Părintele Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu, unchiul meu din partea tatalui este o datorie 

de onoare a familiei noastre [2], [3]. 

Cel care avea să devină Preotul Profesor Aurel LeuŃii s-a născut în 21 aprilie 1914, în 

satul Oltet-Făgăras, fiind al patrulea fiu al familiei de Ńărani Alexandru si Maria LeuŃii. 

Tatăl său moare în timpul primului război mondial, asa că unchiul său, căpitanul 

Alexandru LeuŃii, a rămas să se îngrijească de el. Astfel, tânărul adolescent Aurel LeuŃii 

împreună cu fratele său Ioan, prin grija unchiului său, căpitanul Alexandru LeuŃii, ajunge 

la Orfelinatul din Sibiu, urmând apoi între anii 1928-1932 Liceul ”Aurel Vlădici” din 

Orăştie si Liceul “Gh. Lazăr“ din Sibiu. 

Proaspăt absolvent de bacalaureat, în anul 1932, tânărul Aurel Lelutiu, la numai 18 ani, 

este trimis la Roma, unde va studia timp de nouă ani, în perioada, 1932- 1941. 

Acest fapt este atestat de documentul nr.135 din 26.10.1932 al Oficiului Parohial 

Român Unit, Viştea de Jos – Făgăraş, semnat de preotul Nicolae sandru. Prin acest 

document tânărul Aurel Lelutiu este anunŃat că, “din ordinul Reverendisimului Iacob 

Popa, prepozit de Blaj, adus de domnul A. Rogozea, epitropul din Drăguş, era invitat ca 

pe data de 28 octombrie 1932, să fie prezent la Blaj, pentru a pleca la studii, la Institutul 

De Propaganda Fide de la Roma, însoŃit de Reverendul dr. Augustin Tătar ". 

Marele său prieten, Alexandru Todea, viitorul cardinal, îl va găsi acolo la Roma peste 

doi ani (1934) şi-l va părăsi în 1940, în timp ce Aurel Lelutiu va mai rămâne încă un an, 

luând două doctorate - unul în Teologie bizantină, altul în ştiinŃele ecleziastice orientale, 

ambele obŃinute cu notǎ maximă "magna cum laude probatus". 

În data de 25.03.1939, la Sărbătoarea religioasă a Bunei Vestiri, ambii au fost 

hirotonisiŃi diaconi [4]. 

În timp ce era la Roma, moare binefăcătorul său, unchiul Alexandru; într-o scrisoare 

trimisă acasă la Oltet, îşi exprimă convingerea că tot ce ni se întâmplă este din voia 

Domnului si trebuie deci primit cu supunere, la fel cum Isus a primit suferinŃa si moartea 

pe Cruce. 

Reîntors în tară, în anul 1942, Mitropolia Română Unită de la Blaj l- a numit profesor 

de Religie la Liceul "Sfântul Vasile cel Mare" din Blaj, iar episcopul Ioan Suciu l-a numit 

profesor de Filosofie morală la Academia Teologică din Blaj(conform documentului 

nr.3252/ 1947, semnat de vestitul episcop Ioan Suciu). 

Când, în ianuarie 1945, vicarul Târgu Mureşului, Iosif Pop, avea nevoie de profesori la 

Liceul "Papiu Ilarian", părintele Aurel Lelutiu a sosit prompt acolo, ajutând la restaurarea 

învăŃământului românesc. 

Procesele si întemniŃările 

În anul 1948 începe prigoana Bisericii Unite (Greco-Catolice), de aceasta nefiind scutit 

nici Părintele profesor Dr. Aurel Lelutiu. Părintele profesor dr. Aurel Lelutiu a ocupat 

înainte de anul 1948, postul de Director spiritual al comunităŃii CongregaŃiei Maicii 

Domnului din Blaj, dar în acelaşi an este arestat împreună cu grupul de călugăriŃe de aici 

si dus la mănăstirea Obreja, lângă Blaj. 

655

În anul 1951, a fost arestat si a fost dus la Bucureşti la Ministerul de Interne, apoi 

judecat si condamnat pe viaŃă în procesul NunŃiaturii, la Tribunalul Militar Bucureşti, 

pedeapsă comutată apoi în 25 de ani, din care a executat 14. 

Eliberarea sa din Penitenciarul de la Gherla a fost făcută în ziua de 23 august 1964, 

conform ordinului nr. 3950 din 31.07.1964. În biletul de eliberare din Penitenciarul din 

Gherla, nr. 3950 din 31.VII.1964, se precizează faptul că a fost condamnat pentru 

"crimă de uneltire", prin sentinŃa nr. 396/ 1952. 

În perioada detenŃiei a trecut prin închisorile de la Jilava, Sighet, Râmnicul Sărat, Piteşti 

si Gherla. În închisori a fost statornic în credinŃa si a avut o comportare demnă. Era foarte 

aspru cu sine însuşi dar foarte îngăduitor fată de ceilalŃi oameni [4], [5]. 

Reîntors acasă, s-a stabilit în Blaj, unde săvârşea zilnic Sfânta Liturghie cu participarea 

unui mare număr de credincioşi, în ciuda supravegherii foarte severe a SecurităŃii, si era 

duhovnicul mai multor familii de intelectuali. 

După eliberarea din închisori, s-a stabilit la Blaj, dar a activat în acelaşi timp la Oltet si 

la Bucureşti, fiind si superiorul CongregaŃiei Inimii Neprihănite. 

Părintele Aurel Lelutiu, împreună cu episcopii greco-catolici, era si coautorul unor 

memorii si rapoarte către guvernul tării si către Sfântul Scaun, redactate în speranŃa unui 

dialog cu autorităŃile statale, pentru dreptul la existentă al Bisericii Greco- Catolice. 

Decesul neaşteptat al Părintelui Aurel Lelutiu a survenit în data de 23 decembrie 1980, 

în gara din Blaj, în urma unui infarct miocardic. 

Pro memoria 

In concluzie, prin demersul nostru am dorit să evocăm peronalitatea Preotului si 

dascălului dr. Aurel Lelutiu, cel care a trăit cu adevărat o viaŃă dedicată Bisericii Unite 

(Greco - Catolice) si neamului românesc. Părintele Aurel Lelutiu a suferit umil în 

închisorile comuniste, fără a ceda presiunilor făcute pentru trecerea la Ortodoxie, fiind o 

personalitate înzestrată de Marele Creator cu alese însuşiri sufleteşti si duhovniceşti, un 

model de slujitor al neamului său, un luptător pentru identitatea naŃională. 

Multumiri 

Aduc mulŃumiri mamei mele Doamna Maria LeluŃiu, soŃia tatălui meu decedat 

Profesorul Inginer Aurel LeluŃiu, nepotul Preotului profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu, care pe 

lângă interviul acordat, ne-a pus la dispoziŃie un bogat material, o amplă documentaŃie, 

fiindu-ne astfel posibil să realizăm această comunicare. MulŃumim, de asemenea 

unchiului meu Domnului Inginer Emil LeluŃiu , nepotul Preotului profesor dr. Aurel 

LeluŃiu, care prin interviul acordat ne-a furnizat numeroase date, informaŃii despre viaŃa şi 

întemniŃările Preotului profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu [2], [4]. 

Bibliografie 

1. Cristian Vasile: Între Vatican şi Kremlin - Biserica Greco-Catolica in timpul 

regimului comunist,, Editura Curtea Veche, București , 2003, ISBN 973-8356-89-X. 

656

2. Interviu cu Doamna Maria LeluŃiu , soŃia Profesorului Inginer Aurel LeluŃiu, nepotul 

Preotului profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu 

3. http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/biserici/preoti_gre 

co_catolici_3/ 

4. Interviu cu Domnul Inginer Emil LeluŃiu , nepotul Preotului profesor dr. Aurel 

LeluŃiu 

5. Iuliu CheŃan : Preotul profesor dr. Aurel LeluŃiu - "Un erou şi un martir uitat?" , 

"Unirea" nr. 6,7/ Blaj, 1995. 

Iconografie 

Fig. 1. Certificatul de naştere al Preotului Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu. 

657

Fig. 2. Fotografii ale Preotului Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu la Roma. 

658

Fig. 3. Atestatele diplomelor de doctorat. 

659

Fig. 4. Atestatul hirotonisirii Preotului Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu. 

Fig. 5. Fotografie cu Preotul Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu scriind în camera sa. 

660

Fig. 6. Fotografie a Preotului Profesor Aurel LeluŃiu. 

Fig. 7. Fotografii ale Preotului Aurel LeluŃiu efecuate dupa eliberarea din închisoare. 

661

Fig. 8. Biletul de eliberare din închisoarea Gherla. 

662

ASPECTE ALE „REZISTENłEI CREATIVE” 

ÎN ROMÂNIA COMUNISTĂ 

Manuela MARIN 1 

Problematica maselor în studierea regimurilor de extrema dreapta şi stânga a intrat în 

atenŃia istoricilor străini după cel de al doilea război mondial, odată cu formularea 

modelului totalitar. Contestând premisele acestui model în ceea ce priveşte natura 

raporturilor dintre mase şi regimul politic şi apelând la metodele istoriei sociale în 

contextul evoluŃiei istorice a statului sovietic în perioada interbelică, şcoala revizionistă a 

adus în discuŃie pe lângă subiectele bazei sociale a stalinismului, a conflictelor dintre 

centru-periferie şi a slăbiciunii administrative a statului sovietic, şi pe cel al rezistenŃei. 

Astfel, în atenŃia reprezentanŃilor acestei şcoli au intrat atât formele rezistenŃei active, cât 

mai ales cele ale rezistenŃei pasive a populaŃiei faŃă de regimul sovietic, analizate în 

contextul acŃiunilor unor clase sociale distincte (Ńărani, muncitori). Dacă în cazul 

rezistenŃei active, formele sale sunt clar delimitate (de exemplu, demonstraŃii, întâlniri de 

protest, greve, petiŃii) şi plasează pe subiecŃii săi în opoziŃie deschisă, directă faŃă de 

autoritate, în cel al rezistenŃei pasive lucrurile nu sunt întotdeauna la fel de clare. Evident 

influenŃaŃi de lucrările lui James C. Scott, istoricii care au abordat acest subiect au făcut-o 

din două perspective distincte: prima include rezistenŃa pasivă ca parte a 

comportamentului unor clase/grupuri subordonate, iar cea de a doua precizează clar că 

formele opoziŃiei pasive sunt specifice categoriei oamenilor simpli (legat de acest ultim 

aspect, unii autori fac chiar o distincŃie clară între disidenŃă, ca formă de opoziŃie 

specifică intelectualilor şi cea a rezistenŃei pasive care ar caracteriza modul de raportare 

al individului simplu la un regimul politic de tip autoritar). 

În consecinŃă, rezistenŃa pasivă face referire la acele forme ale rezistenŃei cotidiene, în 

accepŃiunea sintagmei oferită de James C. Scott. Acestea permit individului să-şi 

urmărească în activitatea sa curentă propriile interese, manipulând, reinterpretând şi 

adaptând regulile jocului oficial, fără însă a oferi temeiuri justificate unei confruntări sau 

intervenŃii directe din partea autorităŃii împotriva cărei sunt îndreptate aceste acte ale 

rezistenŃei pasive. Printre aceste forme ale opoziŃiei pasive, James C. Scott a inclus 

întârzieri în iniŃierea unor acŃiuni, neglijenŃă, sabotaj, furt, disimulare, falsă supunere, 

ignoranŃă disimulată, zvonuri, bârfe, cântece, glume, gesturi, etc. Toate acestea sunt parte 

a ceea ce el numea hidden transcripts (transcrieri ascunse). Ele desemnează acele 

discursuri, gesturi, practici neoficiale angajate din partea unor grupuri subordonate care 

1 Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca (CNCS-UEFISCU, proiect numărul PN II-RU 

410/2010). 

663

contrazic, modifică sau reinterpretează practicile similare iniŃiate în spaŃiul public şi care 

caracterizează ansamblul relaŃiilor acestora cu cei faŃă de care se subordonează. În 

expresia lui Scott, acest mod specific de interacŃionare în spaŃiul public a grupurilor 

subordonate cu cei deŃin puterea şi care contrazice poziŃia lor exprimată prin hidden 

transcripts poartă denumirea de public transcripts (transcrieri publice). Pentru că aceste 

două tipuri de transcrieri sunt rezultatul unui proces de dominaŃie, dinamica şi conŃinutul 

lor reflectă lupta constantă dintre cei care sunt dominaŃi şi cei care domină, cu atât mai cu 

mult cât transcrierile acestora din urmă influenŃează şi condiŃionează manifestările 

similare a celor cărora li se subordonează. Totodată, transcrierile ascunse, prin 

complexitatea lor (acestea incluzând aşa cum am arătat mai sus gesturi, mimică, 

comportament disimulat, acte de vorbire etc.), permit grupurilor subordonate să-şi creeze 

o subcultură care să confere o semnificaŃie formelor rezistenŃei lor pasive faŃă de linia 

politică oficială şi în acelaşi timp să particularizeze conŃinutul ideatic al spaŃiului social 

ca formă de exprimare a opoziŃiei indirecte, neoficiale faŃă de transcrierea oficială 

specifică exercitării relaŃiilor de putere. 2 

Încercând să definească rezistenŃa ca parte a răspunsului complex pe care societatea l-a 

dat regimului stalinist, Lynne Viola sublinia că nu se poate vorbi doar de o rezistenŃă, ci 

mai degrabă de rezistenŃe sau de acte de rezistenŃă, diferite ca dimensiuni şi conŃinut şi 

având multiple semnificaŃii. Aceasta deoarece actele de rezistenŃă sunt influenŃate şi, în 

acelaşi timp, ilustrează complexitatea societăŃii în care au apărut, cu toate diviziunile 

politice şi sociale interne şi toate forŃele conflictuale care acŃionează în cadrul acesteia. 3 

Sheila Fitzpatrick foloseşte termenul de sedition (în ruseşte kramola) pentru a desemna 

diferitele forme ale rezistenŃei cotidiene în Uniunea Sovietică a anilor 1960-1970. 

Totodată, autoarea menŃionează că aceste forme de opoziŃie cotidiană ale cetăŃenilor 

sovietici reprezentau singurele lor acte politice veritabile, în condiŃiile în care modelul 

democraŃiei populare al statului sovietic le asigura doar o participare simulată la procesul 

decizional-politic. 4 

În monografia sa dedicată oraşului sovietic Magnitogorsk, analizând modul în care 

socialismul era nu doar construit ci şi trăit, Stephen Kotkin introduce sintagma de 

creative resistence (rezistenŃă creativă) pentru a caracteriza modul în care oamenii din 

acel oraş în plină construcŃie reacŃionau la politicile oficiale şi la modul în care acestea 

erau implementate în mod practic. Acest tip de rezistenŃă este definit prin acele mici 

tactici de comportament (little tactics of habit), cum ar fi de exemplu comportament, 

limbaj, atitudine angajate de indivizi pentru a evita sau submina semnificaŃia regulilor 

scrise sau nescrise privind comportamentul adecvat, stabilite în mod oficial. Cu alte 

cuvinte, rezistenŃa creativă reprezenta o reinterpretare originală şi plină de imaginaŃie a 

2 

James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Yale University Press, New Haven, 

1990, p. XI-XII, 2-26. 

3 

Lynne Viola, “Introduction” în Lynne Viola (eds.), Contending with Stalinism. Soviet Power and 

Popular Resistance in the 1930s, Cornel University Press, Ithaca, 2002, pp. 1-14. 

4 

Sheila Fitzpatrick, „Popular Sedition in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union” în Vladimir A. Kozlov, 

Sheila Fitzpatrick, Sergei V. Mironenko, Sedition. Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union 

under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2011, pp. 1-24. 

664

egulilor oficiale în aşa fel încât acestea să servească interesele indivizilor, dar în acelaşi 

timp să şi păstreze aparenŃa necesară de respectare scrupuloasă de către aceştia a 

reglementărilor oficiale. 5 

Aplicând cele menŃionate anterior la subiectul studiului nostru, vom analiza rezistenŃa în 

România comunistă ca parte a existenŃei cotidiene a grupurilor subordonate, care dezvoltă 

o serie de acte de rezistenŃă specifice. Aceste acte, prin diversitatea şi complexitatea lor, 

dau naştere la o formă de subcultură specifică grupului, materializată prin apariŃia şi 

dezvoltarea transcrierilor ascunse. De asemenea, modul în care transcrierile oficiale (în 

cazul nostru, discursul oficial politic şi propagandistic al Partidul Comunist Român) 

influenŃează în mod „creator” conŃinutul celor ascunse va constitui un alt obiectiv al 

analizei noastre. 

Aşa cum am precizat anterior, actele de rezistenŃă cotidiană/creativă au fost rezultatul 

modului în care o parte a populaŃiei a reacŃionat la politicile oficiale şi la modul în care 

aplicarea acestora i-a influenŃat existenŃa de zi cu zi. Cu toate acestea, analiza noastră nu 

va fi una tematică care să identifice acele decizii sau politici oficiale care au generat 

opoziŃie din partea populaŃiei, ci se va concentra pe identificarea şi exemplificarea 

formelor specifice ale acesteia în contextul României comuniste. 

O primă astfel de formă de rezistenŃă a constituit-o discuŃiile politice. În acest context, 

trebuie să menŃionăm că datorită controlul centralizat al Partidul Comunist Român (PCR) 

asupra societăŃii româneşti, aproape orice subiect de conversaŃie dobândea o semnificaŃie 

politică. Un astfel de subiect l-a constituit greutăŃile ivite în aprovizionarea cu alimente a 

populaŃiei pe parcursul anilor 1980. Exprimarea nemulŃumirii populaŃiei faŃă de penuria 

de alimente „în cele mai diverse locuri şi împrejurări începând de la rândul la care se sta 

pentru obŃinerea produselor …şi până la unele locuri de muncă ori chiar şedinŃe 

organizate” era o acŃiune cu miză politică deoarece nega succesul politicilor economice şi 

făcea mai puŃin credibil argumentul paternalist invocat de propaganda românească ca 

scop primordial al activităŃii partidului-stat. Astfel, într-o notă informativă, era citată 

mărturia unui cetăŃean care declara că „am ajuns mai rău ca în timpul războiului, dăm tot 

la capitalişti şi noi stăm în frig la rând”, în timp ce un altul opina că „ar fi mai bine dacă 

statul s-ar gândi la aprovizionare cu ceea ce este necesar şi nu ar arunca oamenii la 

defilare”. 6 În alte cazuri, remarcile cetăŃenilor vizau semnificaŃia unor evenimente politice 

interne. Astfel, într-un dialog surprins într-o altă notă informativă a SecurităŃii din judeŃul 

Arad, un muncitor declara că nu doreşte nici măcar să ştie când va avea loc Congresul al 

XI-lea al PCR „că de luni de zile numai cu Congresul se ocupă şi la radio şi la televizor şi 

ziarele numai de Congres îs pline; te enervează deja atâta propaganda pentru nimic, că 

muncitorii nu pot aştepta nimic bun, dar trebuie să taci”. 7 Un alt cetăŃean nega caracterul 

democratic al orânduirii socialiste şi denunŃa măsurile luate în acest sens de către regimul 

comunist român pentru a păstra aparenŃa participării democratice a cetăŃeanului la viaŃa 

politică: „Degeaba se fac cheltuieli cu propaganda pentru alegeri, pentru că şi dacă n-ar 

5 

Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilization, University, Berkeley, 1995, pp. 

35, 154-155, 220-221. 

6 

Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 13314, vol. 20, f 4, 10. 

7 

Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 13314, vol. 20, f 153. 

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vota nici un român, totuşi cei propuşi vor fi aleşi, iar cei care nu votează pentru 

comunişti, vor fi filaŃi şi trebuie să se aştepte la câte şi mai câte din partea forŃei 

poliŃieneşti”. 8 

O a doua formă de rezistenŃă identificată are în vedere folosirea subversivă a limbajului. 

În acest caz, vom avea în vedere, în primul rând, ceea ce organele de Securitate 

identificau ca fiind „înscrisuri cu conŃinut duşmănos”. 

Astfel, cu ocazia alegerilor de deputaŃi pentru consiliile populare, într-o secŃie de votare 

s-a găsit un bilet „cu menŃiune denigratoare la adresa PCR”, în timp ce într-o altă urnă de 

votare, „pe un buletin era înscrisă obiecŃiunea privind lipsa de opoziŃie în alegeri”. 9 De 

asemenea, organele de Securitate au consemnat faptul că pe coperta revistei Cinema din 

ianuarie 1989, doi tineri au scris pe chipurile cuplului prezidenŃial român „bou şi vacă”, 

ca o expresie a nemulŃumirii lor personale faŃă de situaŃia politică şi economică din 

România. 10 

Proliferarea unor expresii injurioase constituia, de asemenea, un exemplu de folosire 

subversivă a limbajului. Conform documentelor elaborate de Securitate, Ńinta acestui tip 

de comentarii negative era „conducerea superioară de partid şi de stat”. Însă Ńinând cont 

de faptul că Nicolae Ceauşescu era identificat în discursul propagandistic oficial ca fiind 

unicul conducător de partid şi de stat putem afirma că de fapt persoana sa era subiectul 

predilect al expresiilor catalogate ca fiind „denigratoare” sau „calomniatoare”. De obicei, 

acest tip de comentarii era influenŃat de efectele negative ale măsurilor economice iniŃiate 

de regimul comunist român sub conducerea lui Nicolae Ceauşescu. De exemplu, un 

pensionar din oraşul Sebeş era consemnat în documentele SecurităŃii pentru că „a făcut 

afirmaŃii tendenŃioase cu privire la situaŃia social-economică din Ńara noastră şi a adus 

injurii la adresa conducerii superioare de partid şi de stat”. 11 

În cadrul categoriei înscrisurilor „cu conŃinut duşmănos” intrau şi unele scrisori 

redactate de diferiŃi indivizi şi adresate organelor centrale de partid şi de stat sau, după 

caz, posturilor de radio străine, identificate de către Securitate ca având o atitudinea ostilă 

faŃă de regimul comunist de la Bucureşti. 

Într-unul din volumele sale de memorii, Paul Niculescu-Mizil arăta că în timpul 

conducerii lui Nicolae Ceauşescu a funcŃionat un sistem de studiere şi rezolvare a 

scrisorilor trimise de diferiŃi cetăŃeni. 12 Prezentat de propaganda oficială ca fiind o 

manifestare concretă şi elocventă a funcŃionării regimului democraŃiei socialiste, acest 

sistem de examinare şi rezolvare a „propunerilor, sesizărilor şi cererilor oamenilor 

muncii” s-a regăsit la toate nivelele locale şi centrale ale administraŃiei de stat şi de partid, 

ale organizaŃiilor de masă şi obşteşti şi nu în ultimul rând, ca parte a activităŃii desfăşurate 

de mass-media românească. 

8 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 13 314, vol. 20, f . 119 v. 

9 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 13314, vol. 20, f. 53. 

10 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 533, f. 32. 

11 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 336, vol. 2, f. 46. 

12 Paul Niculescu-Mizil, De la Comintern la comunismul naŃional. Despre Consfătuirea partidelor 

comuniste şi muncitoreşti, Moscova, 1969, Editura Evenimentul Românesc, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 

370. 

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În cadrul acestui sistem, cetăŃenii erau încurajaŃi să se adreseze autorităŃilor cu 

propuneri de interes general, cu sesizări privind deficienŃe sau nereguli în activitatea 

unităŃilor economice, cu cereri pentru soluŃionarea unor probleme de interes personal, 

pentru denunŃarea abuzurilor săvârşite de oficialităŃile locale şi nu în ultimul rând pentru 

a-şi exprima punctul de vedere privind problemele curente de politică internă şi externă. 

Acest ultim tip de corespondenŃă între cetăŃeni şi autorităŃi este relevant pentru subiectul 

lucrării noastre din trei motive. În primul rând, aceste scrisori constituie un argument care 

atestă existenŃa şi exprimarea unor opinii personale a diferiŃilor cetăŃeni pe diverse 

subiecte prin intermediul canalelor oficiale. În al doilea rând, o minoritate a celor care se 

adresau autorităŃilor locale exprimau puncte de vedere care puneau sub semnul întrebării 

performanŃele regimului comunist român şi pe cele ale conducătorului său. În al treilea 

rând, scrisorile constituiau cea mai des uzitată formă de diseminare a înscrisurilor „cu 

conŃinut duşmănos”, aşa cum rezultă din datele oferite de documentele interne ale 

organelor centrale de Securitate. 13 

Deoarece documentele elaborate de Securitate pe marginea acestui tip de scrisori erau în 

majoritatea cazurilor rapoarte informative, acestea nu oferă decât detalii generale privind 

motivaŃia încadrării lor la înscrisuri „cu caracter ostil”. Astfel, o persoană a trimis în anul 

1977 organelor centrale de partid şi de stat, precum şi unor persoane particulare şapte 

scrisori „în care calomniază politica partidului şi statului nostru privind drepturile şi 

libertăŃile cetăŃenilor”. 14 Un profesor de limba şi literatura română din judeŃul Cluj a 

expediat 2 scrisori anonime către revista Flacăra şi o scrisoare către CC al PCR în 

intervalul 1983-1984 „prin conŃinutul cărora se aduceau grave calomnii orânduirii 

socialiste din România, totodată ironizându-se unele aspecte ale situaŃiei economice şi 

social-politice, folosind în acelaşi timp un limbaj jignitor şi indecent”. 15 În unele cazuri, 

semnatarii scrisorilor îşi completau „calomniile” şi „comentariile duşmănoase” cu 

ameninŃări cu acte de violenŃă. Pe fondul unor nemulŃumiri personale, un muncitor din 

Sibiu a expediat o scrisoare în care pe ameninŃa „cu acte de violenŃă la adresa conducerii 

de stat”, în timp ce un preot din judeŃul Cluj găsea de cuviinŃă să-şi îndrepte ameninŃările 

sale înspre instituŃia Radioteleviziunii Române şi redacŃiile ziarelor Scânteia şi Făclia. 16 

Scrisorile cetăŃenilor români adresate posturile de radio străine (Radio Europa Liberă, 

Vocea Americii, BBC, Deutsche Welle) intrau, din punctul de vedere al organelor de 

Securitate, în categoria înscrisurilor „cu conŃinut duşmănos” din două motive principale. 

În primul rând, activitatea acestor posturi de radio era apreciată ca fiind ostilă regimului 

comunist de la Bucureşti, pentru că în cadrul emisiunilor lor erau „denigrate sistematic 

politica partidului şi a statului român, realizările obŃinute în construcŃia socialismului …”, 

urmărindu-se „subminarea autorităŃii de stat şi a unităŃii moral-politice a poporului … 

instigarea la dezordine şi protest”. 17 În al doilea rând, prin subiectul lor (cereri de ajutor 

pentru emigrare, descrierea situaŃiei dificile politice şi economice din Ńară, limitarea şi 

13 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16302, vol. 17, f. 31 f, f. 37 f. 

14 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16302, vol. 17, f. 31v. 

15 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 8833, vol. 15, f. 380 f. 

16 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16302, vol. 17, f. 37 v, 39 v. 

17 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16632, vol . 2, f. 189 f-v. 

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încălcarea drepturilor şi libertăŃilor cetăŃenilor), aceste scrisori confereau o notă de 

veridicitate şi o bază argumentaŃională pentru criticile proliferate de emisiunile acestor 

posturi de radio la adresa regimului comunist român. 

Plecând de la cele prezentate mai sus, includerea ambelor categorii de scrisori printre 

mijloacele rezistenŃei creative a populaŃiei faŃă de regimul comunist este justificată din 

mai multe considerente. În primul rând, omul simplu foloseşte un instrument sancŃionat 

oficial, cel al sistemului de studiere şi rezolvare a scrisorilor, pentru a-şi articula şi 

exprima puncte de vedere diferite de linia politică oficială. În al doilea rând, formularea 

unor opinii distincte pe baza unor informaŃii din surse externe este în sine un act de 

rezistenŃă pentru că implică coroborarea şi compararea conŃinutului informaŃiei difuzate 

în mod oficial cu cea receptată prin canale alternative de informare. În acest context, 

conştientizarea din partea omului simplu a existenŃei unei discrepanŃe între versiunea 

oficială asupra prezentului şi cea constituită în urma experienŃei personale şi a 

informaŃiilor primite din exterior stă la baza articulării unui punct de vedere propriu 

asupra situaŃiei curente. În al treilea rând, opŃiunea de a adresa o scrisoare unui post de 

radio străin pentru a face publică o doleanŃă sau o opinie personală contrară liniei politice 

oficiale reprezenta, de asemenea, un act de rezistenŃă pentru că evidenŃia refuzul 

individual de resemnare în faŃa omnipotenŃei regimului comunist. 

Umorul a reprezentat o altă formă de rezistenŃă a populaŃiei faŃă de regimul comunist 

român. ExplicaŃiile Luisei Passerini privind cauzele succesului umorului în timpul 

regimului fascist sunt valabile şi pentru cazul românesc. Pentru a nu intra în conflict cu 

autorităŃile statului, individul trebuia să dea dovadă de un anumit grad de auto-control în 

comportamentul său zilnic. În acest context, glumele şi râsul au devenit cel mai la 

îndemnă debuşeu pentru omul simplu de a se elibera de presiunea psihologică pe care o 

necesita afişarea unei conduite externe conforme normelor oficiale. 18 

Cea mai populară formă de umor din perioada comunistă a fost bancul politic. Bancurile 

politice erau de cele mai multe ori despre Nicolae Ceauşescu, desemnat ca „nea Nicu”, 

despre soŃia sa „LenuŃa” sau despre pe amândoi. Ele invocau după caz figuri 

omniprezente în viaŃa cotidiană a omului simplu (cum ar fi miliŃianul, securistul, 

propagandistul, activistul de partid) sau luau în derizoriu evenimentele de partid 

(congrese, conferinŃe, alegeri, vizitele de lucru ale lui Ceauşescu) sau constituiau o 

manieră de a face haz de necaz când era vorba despre efectele nefericite ale măsurilor 

iniŃiate de către regimul comunist român (criza alimentelor, criza energetică, politica de 

sistematizare a mediul rural, etc.). PotenŃialul subversiv al bancurilor politice era 

confirmat şi de faptul că organismele judeŃene ale SecurităŃii se arătau preocupate de 

identificarea acelor persoane care popularizau „bancuri cu conŃinut calomnios şi 

defăimător la adresa unor înalte personalităŃii din conducerea statului” în cadrul restrâns 

al familiei şi prietenilor. 19 Două elemente importante recomandau includerea bancurile 

politice printre elementele rezistenŃei creative a populaŃiei faŃă de regimul comunist. În 

primul rând, sub masca ironiei extreme şi, uneori, a umorului negru, bancurilor politice 

18 Luisa Passerini, Fascism in Popular Memory : the Cultural Experience of the Turin working 

class, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 86. 

19 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 336 , vol. 2, f. 150 f ; dosar 337, f. 26. 

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accentuau şi mai mult discrepanŃa dintre realitatea prezentată de către propaganda oficială 

şi situaŃia reală a omului simplu şi realizau acest lucru într-o formă diversificată şi 

accesibilă unei mase largi de auditoriu. În al doilea rând, în lipsa unor mijloace alternative 

de informare, bancurile ofereau o analiză critică asupra principalelor evoluŃii interne. În 

acest fel, aceste forme de umor nu doar contestau în mod indirect politicile oficiale şi 

presupusele lor rezultate pozitive, ci şi contribuiau la conturarea unor imagini alternative 

asupra realităŃii cotidiene diferite de cele promovate pe canalele oficiale. 

Pentru a ilustra cele menŃionate anterior, vom analiza două astfel de bancuri. Primul este 

despre vânzarea unor timbre cu figura lui Ceauşescu, care s-ar fi epuizat foarte repede. De 

aceea, reprezentanŃii judeŃelor ar fi venit la Bucureşti să mai ceară. Un singur 

reprezentant judeŃean a venit cu timbrele înapoi reclamând că timbrele nu se lipsesc pe 

plicuri. Dornic să-i demonstreze contrariul, un lucrător de la oficiul poştal, îi explică 

acestuia că dacă scuipă pe spatele timbrului, acesta se lipeşte perfect. Reprezentantul de 

la judeŃ îşi dă o palmă peste frunte, având următoarea revelaŃie: „Ai dracului! Uite de ce 

nu se lipea timbrul! Aştia scuipau pe faŃă!”. 20 Vânzarea timbrelor cu figura lui Ceauşescu 

şi graba cu care s-ar fi epuizat prima tranşă face referire la cultul personalităŃii sale şi la 

faptul că supravieŃuirea politică a liderilor de partid locali depindea de dăruirea cu care 

aceştia nu doar îşi îndeplineau sarcinile de partid, ci şi susŃineau promovarea fenomenului 

adulării şefului suprem al PCR. Figura activistului de partid slab dotat intelectual este cu 

atât mai hilară cu cât acesta nu este doar subiectul unei farse colective puse la cale de 

subordonaŃii săi, ci este în acelaşi timp incapabil să recunoască un act contestatar. 

Un alt banc politic, care a cunoscut diferite variante este acela care îi are ca personaje 

principale fie pe Nicolae Ceauşescu, fie pe soŃia sa. Liderul PCR se arată supărat că nu 

găseşte o anumită pereche de pantofi, în timp ce Elena Ceauşescu se mândreşte în timpul 

unei vizite externe cu o pereche unicat. Motivul este acela că respectiva pereche de 

pantofi ar reprezenta lucrarea de diplomă a lui Ceauşescu. 21 Evident, bancul face aluzie la 

profesia de bază a liderului PCR, cea de cizmar, amănunt omis de cele mai multe ori din 

biografia sa oficială. Aceasta deoarece meseria de cizmar nu era una potrivită pentru un 

lider comunist datorită caracterului său neproletar. Totodată, această omisiune biografică 

era în măsură să neutralizeze posibilele întrebări legate de pregătirea intelectuală a lui 

Nicolae Ceauşescu, care a fost validată, pe baze nefondate, prin titlurile şi distincŃiile 

academice naŃionale şi internaŃionale pe care acesta le-a primit de-a lungul întregii 

perioade a conducerii sale. ExistenŃa acestor bancuri privind începuturile profesionale 

modeste ale liderului comunist român demonstra existenŃa unei contraimagini populare a 

lui Nicolae Ceauşescu care punea sub semnul întrebării principalele aserŃiuni ale 

propagandei comuniste privind biografia sa înainte de accederea în funcŃia supremă de 

partid. 

Un alt exemplu de rezistenŃă populară faŃă de regimul comunist român l-a constituit 

crearea de grupuri conspirative. Deşi cele mai multe dintre exemplele reŃinute în 

documentele SecurităŃii identificau în componenŃa acestor grupuri adolescenŃi, au existat 

20 Călin-Bogdan Ştefănescu, Din bancurile politice ale românilor. 10 ani de umor negru 

românesc, Editura Paideia, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 16. 

21 Ibidem, p. 23, 65. 

669

şi cazuri în care erau implicate şi persoane adulte. Din datele rapoartelor prezentate de 

organele judeŃene ale SecurităŃii rezultă tendinŃa majorităŃii acestor grupuri de a adopta o 

simbolistică şi un mod de organizare de inspiraŃie fascistă (de fapt nazistă). Astfel, un 

grup de 14 liceeni din Drobeta Turnu Severin au folosit între ei salutul hitlerist, au scris 

pe tablă, pe manualele şcolare expresii şi însemne fasciste, confecŃionându-şi din metal în 

cadrul atelierului şcolii o serie de astfel de însemne. 22 Un anturaj similar denumit sugestiv 

Zvastica a fost destrămat de intervenŃia organelor locale de Securitate din judeŃul Bihor. 

InfluenŃaŃi de romanele lui Sven Hassel, cei trei membri ai grupului, elevi în clasa a XII-a 

la un liceu din Oradea, s-au angajat în discuŃii laudative pe marginea acŃiunilor forŃelor 

de comando ale Gestapo-ului din timpul celui de al doilea război mondial şi au inserat în 

materialele personale însemne şi cuvinte specifice vocabularului nazist. 23 InvestigaŃiile 

SecurităŃii au evidenŃiat că unele scrisori cu conŃinut ostil regimului comunist român erau 

semnate în numele unor organizaŃii sau grupuri ilegale. Reluând un exemplu prezentat 

anterior, persoana care a trimis în anul 1977 şapte scrisori în care denunŃa încălcarea 

drepturile şi libertăŃile cetăŃenilor din România le semna în numele unei organizaŃii 

intitulate Făclia Moldovei. 24 

Includerea acestor grupuri/organizaŃii în categoria elementelor rezistenŃei creative este 

justificabilă din mai multe considerente. Primul are în vedere chiar organizarea acestor 

grupuri în afara cadrului legal şi controlat de către PCR. Al doilea motiv priveşte 

caracteristicile organizaŃionale ale grupurilor. Faptul că o parte a tineretului comunist 

identifica în modelul fascist un mijloc mai atractiv de organizare a timpului său liber 

decât cel propus prin intermediul Uniunii Tineretului Comunist (UTC) era o dovadă a 

eşecului educaŃiei politice destinate acestei categorii din populaŃia Ńării. Aceasta deoarece 

fascismul continua să fie identificat de propaganda oficială ca fiind duşmanul ideologic şi 

istoric al comunismului în România. Totodată, existenŃa unei structuri interne ierarhice 

specifice şi a unor elemente proprii de identificare ale fiecărui grup submina eforturile de 

uniformizare promovate prin intermediul organizaŃiilor UTC şi crea potenŃiale surse de 

fidelizare a membrilor săi în afara controlului PCR. Şi nu în ultimul rând, coagularea unor 

anturaje era în măsură să intensifice şi să diversifice comportamentele care punea sub 

semnul întrebării linia politică oficială, cum ar fi de exemplu, ascultarea şi comentarea 

ştirilor de la posturile de radio străine sau încercări colective de trecere ilegală a 

frontierei. Într-un context politic diferit de cel din statele fostului bloc sovietic, 

constituirea de astfel de grupuri/organizaŃii ar fi fost catalogată ca o materializare a 

dreptului fiecărui cetăŃean de adunare sau ca o simplă manifestare a spirtului rebel 

adolescentin, care tinde să se identifice şi totodată să se distingă în formulele 

spectaculoase şi aventuriere de conformitatea lumii adulte înconjurătoare. Însă, din 

motivele enunŃate anterior, pentru autorităŃile comuniste şi organele de Securitate, 

constituirea acestor grupuri reprezenta prin potenŃialul lor diferenŃiator şi contestatar, o 

ameninŃare minoră, dar deloc neglijabilă în condiŃiile multiplicării sale, la adresa 

monopolului puterii PCR. 

22 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16302, vol. 17, f. 51 f. 

23 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 8833, vol 15, f 203 f. 

24 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 16302, vol. 17, f. 31 v. 

670

Un ultim element al rezistenŃei creative identificat de noi are în vedere mijloacele 

folosite de omul simplu în relaŃiile cu autorităŃile locale. Evident, în atenŃia noastră va 

intra doar acele tipuri de interacŃiuni în urma cărora individul va instrumentaliza creativ 

setul de reglementări oficiale pentru atingerea propriul scop. De exemplu, un grup de 

locuitori ai unei comune din judeŃul Alba ar fi refuzat să se prezinte la vot dacă nu erau 

aprovizionaŃi cu atât de necesarele butelii. De cele mai multe ori, cei care erau identificaŃi 

ca fiind autori de „înscrisuri duşmănoase”, invocau spre apărarea lor argumentul că s-ar fi 

aflat „sub influenŃa ştirilor audiate la posturile de radio străine” sau că greutăŃile materiale 

sau nemulŃumirile personale i-ar fi împins spre o astfel de faptă necugetată. De asemenea, 

starea de ebrietate a reprezentat întotdeauna un argument la îndemână pentru a explica 

rapid şi convenabil acŃiunile personale îndreptate împotriva regimului comunist român. 25 

Articolul nostru a vizat identificarea şi exemplificarea cu date furnizate de documentele 

create de organele SecurităŃii a principalelor tipuri de acte de rezistenŃă creativă a 

populaŃiei faŃă de regimul comunist român. În acest sens, am identificat în discuŃiile 

politice, „înscrisurile cu conŃinut duşmănos”, umorul, crearea de grupuri conspirative şi 

nu în ultimul rând, instrumentalizarea în interes personal a interacŃiunii cu oficialităŃile 

expresii concrete ale rezistenŃei omului simplu în faŃa omnipotenŃei şi omniprezenŃei 

partidului-stat. Exemplele prezentate anterior oferă o imagine parŃială şi mai nuanŃată a 

raporturilor individului cu regimul comunist de la Bucureşti. În cadrul acestui tip de 

relaŃie, individul se dovedeşte a fi capabil de a formula opinii contrare versiunii PCR 

asupra realităŃii, de a folosi canalele sancŃionate sau nesancŃionate oficial pentru a-şi le 

face cunoscute şi nu în ultimul rând de a adopta un comportament menit să pună sub 

semnul întrebării edificiul organizaŃional şi educaŃional al regimului comunist român. 

25 Arhiva CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 337, f. 11 f, 20 f ; dosar 393, f. 155, 212 ; dosar 429, 

f. 48 f-v, etc. 

671

CAZUL „TITOIŞTILOR” SÂRBI: PROMOTORI, 

APOI ŞI VICTIME ALE COMUNISMULUI 

ROMÂNESC 

Andrei MILIN 1 , Miodrag MILIN 2 

Episodul „antifascist” al preoŃilor sârbi din anul 1942 

Oarecum paradoxal rădăcinile antifascismului sârbesc din România trebuie căutate mai 

degrabă pe coridoarele Palatului episcopal din Timişoara decât în ipoteticele celule ale 

PCR-ului bănăŃean. 

În debutul anului 1942 horthiştii unguri au dezlănŃuit o furibundă represiune 

anticomunistă – antisârbească în Bacica anexată, culminând cu execuŃiile în masă de la 

Novi-Sad (peste 2500 de victime, poate chiar 4000, după unele surse). 

Simpatiile preoŃimii sârbe, înŃelept ghidate de către vicarul episcopal Slobodan Kostici, 

se îndreptau spre autorităŃile române care au dovedit un grad ridicat de toleranŃă şi chiar 

de înŃelegere pentru soarta critică a sârbilor, loviŃi crunt de urgia cotropitoare a 

războiului. 

În Serbia propriu-zisă, cotropită de germani, se înfiripa de-acum şi rezistenŃa 

antifascistă, dezvoltată pe două canale: cei dintâi s-au organizat cetnicii (cetaşi, partizanii 

pro-monarhici), trecând în clandestinitate cu structurile armatei iugoslave, ce-au 

supravieŃuit războiului din aprilie 1941 şi ocupaŃiei străine (germane, ungare, croate, 

bulgare, italiene). Simpatii pro-monarhice 3 nutrea şi vicarul Kostici de la Timişoara. Fiul 

său Nemanja trăia la Belgrad şi intrase de la început în mişcarea cetnică de rezistenŃă. 

O a doua mişcare de rezistenŃă, cea a partizanilor pro-comunişti, a prins viaŃă sub 

semnul solidarităŃii proletare cu Uniunea Sovietică, odată cu declanşarea atacului 

Germaniei şi a sateliŃilor acesteia, din 22 iunie 1941. Din nefericire, cele două rezistenŃe 

au mers paralel, sporind în timp neîncrederea reciprocă şi intrând, în cele din urmă, pe o 

pantă întunecoasă a războiului civil fratricid. 

După cum ne relatează şi sursele SiguranŃei statului 4 la mijlocul lunii august 1942 şi-a 

făcut apariŃia la Timişoara maiorul Duşan Ristici, omul de încredere al colonelului (apoi 

1 Romania Academy – Subsidiary of Timisoara, Romania. 

2 Banat Village Museum, Timisoara, Romania. 

3 Deopotrivă româneşti şi iugoslave, care au reînnodat o luminoasă tradiŃie sârbo-română, prin 

căsătoria dinastică a prinŃesei Mărioara cu regele Alexandru Karaghiorghievici. 

4 Arhivele Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii (CNSAS) Bucureşti, Fond 

documentar, D. 12535, vol. 25, f. 184 – 185 (Raport general, copie, nedatat, 1942). 

672

generalului)-comandant cetnic Draja Mihailovici. Părintele Kostici a convocat pe 18 

august o adunare generală a Consistoriului eparhial din Timişoara, reunindu-i pe 

reprezentanŃii de frunte ai sârbilor din România (preoŃi, călugări, avocaŃi, jurnalişti, 

învăŃători...). Au luat parte şi cei veniŃi din Serbia, maiorul Ristici şi tânărul Nemanja 

Kostici. Făcându-se ecou al îndemnurilor maiorului sârb, vicarul i-a sfătuit pe cei reuniŃi 

(în jur de 60 de persoane) să se organizeze în formaŃiune de apărare , împotriva unor 

posibile acte de agresiune, la cazul că ungurii vor ocupa întregul Banat, spre a se evita o 

altă tragedie, precum cea cu luni în urmă, de la Novi-Sad. 

În fruntea acestei structuri civile de autoapărare a fost avansată persoana lui Radivoi 

(Rada) Fenlaciki, referent şcolar la acea dată şi cunoscut cleric cu vederi de stânga, prosovietice. 

5 Precaut însă, părintele-învăŃător va declina periculoasa ofertă şi întreaga 

acŃiune a rămas cumva „în aer”, spre dezamăgirea afişată a celor doi Kostici, tatăl şi fiul. 

Totul s-a sfârşit, în urma sesizării Gestapo-ului din Serbia, printr-un simulacru juridic, 

în cursul anului 1943: au fost condamnaŃi, oarecum simbolic, principalii instigatori care sau 

bucurat însă în continuare de acceptul (şi implicit protecŃia) autorităŃilor române, de aşi 

îndeplini în mod nestingherit atribuŃiile oficierii cultului. 6 

Fronturile iugoslave-bănăŃene; Antifascismul panslav şi „democratizarea” României 

Între timp, sub influenŃa molipsitoare a noului curs al operaŃiunilor de război, în satele 

sârbeşti din Câmpia Banatului luau fiinŃă structuri (celule) comuniste iugoslave pentru 

Banatul de nord (cu centrul la Diniaş), dublate şi de structuri militare (detaşamente de 

partizani). Înglobând peste 2000 7 de voluntari din Banatul românesc, acestea au fost 

pregătite şi echipate în centrele de recrutare ale Regiunii militare Voivodina de la Kikinda 

şi VârşeŃ (Banatul de nord) şi de la Biserica Albă (Banatul de sud). Cele dintâi astfel de 

formaŃiuni de partizani au fost dirijate pe sângerosul front de luptă din Srem şi Slavonia 

(împotriva „ustaşilor” croaŃi-fascişti ai lui Ante Pavelici); iar cei din sudul Banatului (din 

Clisura Dunării) s-au constituit, la 11 decembrie 1944, în „Consiliul voluntarilor sârbi din 

Clisura Dunării şi Iugoslavia” 8 , luând totodată parte la luptele pentru eliberarea 

Belgradului şi apoi, pe frontul din Srem. Din starea de exaltare ce аtinsese şi populaŃia 

5 

Fusese prizonier în Rusia pe vremea bolşevicilor şi afişase opinii politice „mai slobode”. 

6 

Vezi întreaga relatare în Miodrag Milin, Sârbii din România în secolul XX, Editura Argonaut, 

Cluj-Napoca, 2012, p. 35 - 42 

7 

2096, din surse iugoslave. Vezi discuŃia în jurul acestei probleme în Andrei Milin, Miodrag 

Milin, łvetco Mihailov, Sârbii din România în vremea Comunismului. Arhivă sonoră şi 

manualul pătimirii, Timişoara, 2011, p.322 

8 

La adunarea constitutivă a acestui consiliu sârbesc pentru clisura bănăŃeană a fost deschis 

exprimată menirea sa: ”... va milita pentru alipirea Clisurei noastre la Iugoslavia democrată şi 

federativă.” (Arhiv Srbije, Beograd, Fond DJ – 125, Odbor Slovena dobrovoljaca Banatske 

klisure 1945 – 1946 (Consiliul slavilor voluntari din clisura bănăŃeană...). Proces-verbal al 

primei şedinŃe a Consiliului sârbilor voluntari din clisura bănăŃeană în Iugoslavia, 11 decembrie 

1944, p. 1 

673

sârbească („iugoslavă”) 9 lucuitoare în capitala României se deduce o pornire 

asemănătoare celei manifestate de cei din sudul Banatului şi nu numai. 

PrezenŃa Armatei roşii la Dunăre şi în Ńinuturile unde trăia minoritatea sârbă a agitat 

spiritele; căci de decenii ei suportau povara discriminării din cauza originii slave, fără de 

discernământ şi pe nedrept asociată de clasa politică interbelică românească odiosului 

spectru al Comunismului ce bântuia tot mai ameninŃător dinspre est. Aşa s-a ajuns că 

soldaŃii Armatei roşii, personificare vie a spaŃiului originar slav (măcar şi comunist, al 

marii patrii Rusia slavă), au stârnit necontrolate avalanşe de emoŃii printre sârbii 

autohtoni şi pravoslavnici. 

O asemenea stare de euforie dezlănŃuită a minorităŃii sârbe a durat câteva luni bune, 

până prin vara anului 1945, fiind marcată de o serie de evenimente şi manifestaŃii de 

natură să neliniştească autorităŃile române şi au suscitat întemeiate bănuieli cu privire la 

intenŃiile reale ale sârbilor din Banatul românesc şi Clisura Dunării. 

Doar simpla apariŃia Armatei roşii a scos la iveală un raport cu totul diferit al sârbilor 

faŃă de ostaşii sovietici în comparŃie cu majoritatea populaŃiei. În timp ce prezenŃa 

sovieticilor (şi implicit, răsturnarea de la 23 august) au fost percepute de români cu 

răceală şi oarecare îngrijorare după experienŃa anilor de război prin Rusia, iar de către 

germanii bănăŃeni cu duşmănia trădării dublată şi de spaima ancestrală a supravieŃuirii în 

vremuri critice, sârbii au adoptat o conduită radical schimbată: prin satele lor din pustă şi 

la Timişoara ei au salutat noile desfăşurări prin însufleŃite adunări publice de masă şi 

solidarizări entuziaste cu un mesaj sovietic nedescifrat şi ca atare neînŃeles, pe care, în 

mod cu totul eronat, îl credeau ca venind dinspre o Rusie străbună, binefăcătoare, 

generoasă şi izbăvitoare de rele, blajină şi pravoslavnică; aşa constatăm bune oficii la tot 

9 Spre ilustrare, reproducem adeziunea „iugoslavilor bucureşteni” către mareşalul Tito: /Traducere/ 

Mareşalului Iugoslaviei Josip Broz – Tito 

Tovarăşe Mareşal,Noi, iugoslavii care ne aflăm la Bucureşti, reuniŃi în adunarea noastră 

constitutivă a Frontului de Eliberare NaŃională, Vă salutăm, cel mai bun fiu al popoarelor 

noastre, iar prin Dumneavoastră armata populară de eliberare care sub conducerea Voastră 

înŃeleaptă aduce victorie după victorie în lupta grea şi supraomenească pentru eliberarea 

popoarelor noastre de sub jugul cotropitorului şi al slugilor sale.Suntem deosebit de fericiŃi şi ne 

mândrim că putem din acest loc comun al nostru, liber şi deschis, să ne exprimăm dragostea 

pentru conducătorul popoarelor Iugoslaviei şi organizatorul noii Iugoslavii democrate şi 

federative, pentru un viitor mai bun şi mai fericit al nostru al tuturor iugoslavilor.[sublin. 

noastră, M. M.] Vă promitem să ajutăm, cu toate mijloacele de care putem dispune, lupta 

măreaŃă a fraŃilor noştri din patrie, în fruntea căreia staŃi Dumneavoastră şi că, în mod deschis, 

prin luptă şi sânge, vom promova şi întări înfăptuita frăŃie şi unitate şi printre noi iugoslavii în 

România. [sublin. M. M.] 

Dragă Mareşale, bazează-te şi pe noi, noi cei departe în spaŃiu de patria şi fraŃii noştri, dar cu 

inimile şi iubirea atât de apropiaŃi.Trăiască speranŃa comună a popoarelor noastre, Armata 

populară de eliberare a Iugoslaviei!TrăiascăMareşalul Iugoslaviei, tovarăşul Tito! Trăiască 

Iugoslavia cea nouă democrată şi federativă! Moarte fascismului – Libertate poporului! 

Bucureşti, 3. 12. 1944, Consiliul Frontului deEliberare NaŃională al Iugoslavilor din România 

(Arhiva Iugoslaviei, Belgrad, Arhiva Iosip Broz Tito, F. 836 KPJ II-9 B/35, f. 1) 

674

pasul pentru „eliberatori”, oferte cordiale pentru găzduire, colecte de alimente pentru 

soldaŃi şi material sanitar răniŃi... 

Iată cum, oficial eliberatoare, de fapt Armate roşie era pentru români şi nemŃi mai 

degradă o temută forŃă străină şi oarecum, atotputernică, de ocupaŃie; în timp ce pentru 

sârbi ea a apărut, din senin, ca un preŃios şi la îndemână sprijin al strădaniilor lor, până 

acum zădărnicite, de a-şi câştiga un statut mai favorabil şi o egalitate, cel puŃin reală, cu 

populaŃia românească majoritară (eventual şi cu un substanŃial bonus, pentru conduita 

justă şi pătimirile de rasă îndurate în război, ca popor eroic, afişând în propria-i percepŃie 

o verticalitate istorică şi ca atare, pe nedrept victimizat). 

ÎncurajaŃi de această prezenŃă „binefăcătoare” a Armatei roşii, curând după 23 august 

masa Ńăranilor sârbii s-au pătruns de un val subit de „antifascism militant” şi de o 

nestăvilită „vocaŃie” a democraŃiei, impuse cu de-a sila majoritarilor „reticenŃi”: s-au 

pornit să preia autoritatea publică din mâinile discreditatelor consilii „antonesciene” în 

satele şi comunele lor şi să-şi facă singuri dreptate, împotriva reprezentanŃilor (totuşi, încă 

legitimi!) ai regimului urât, din pricina activităŃilor adesea sub oprobiul CurŃii MarŃiale, 

mai cu seamă faŃă de minoritarii aceştia până de curând detestaŃi. 

OrganizaŃiile antifasciste de prin sate, serios infiltrate şi cu refugiaŃi-partizani de prin 

teritoriile sârbeşti-iugoslave aflate sub ocupaŃie, până atunci ilegale, au ieşit acum să 

acŃioneze public, luând astfel fiinŃă Frontul Antifascist Slav (FAS), ca organizaŃie 

umbrelă nu doar a sârbilor (deşi ei erau, de departe, cei mai numeroşi) ci şi a altor 

minorităŃi slave din Banat, convenabil raliate sub aripa protectoare a antifascismului în 

vogă. Curând, deja în octombrie 1944, FAS s-a pornit să editeze la Timişoara ziarul 

„Pravda”, ca purtător oficial al său de opinie, asupra „noii direcŃii” în democratizarea 

României. 10 MulŃi transfugi sau dezertori militari, din varii motive, s-au alăturat noii 

direcŃii mustind de promisiuni. 

În felul acesta, spre deosebire de marea majoritate a românilor, conştient sau doar din 

instinct ori oportunism, la sârbi s-a încropit de îndată o fragilă pojghiŃă ideologică de 

comunism; iar prin prezenŃa dătătoare de speranŃă a armatei de-un sânge, au asociat-o 

aceasta cu sentimente de patriotism, antifascism, panslavism şi la urmă un gen de 

„reciprocitate slavă” la care erau cu toŃii deopotrivă de sensibili. 

Iată cum sârbii din România au reprezentat, în Banat, unul din cele mai solide suporturi 

ale PCR, o parte esenŃială în strădaniile comuniştilor, susŃinuŃi de tancurile ruseşti, de a 

acapara puterea politică. Cealaltă parte, întruchipată de organele legale de stat şi legitime 

ale Regatului României, nu era prea încântată de evoluŃia noii stări şi s-a străduit să 

stârpească încercările de dezavuare a instituŃiilor statului român prin Banat. 

Conflictele iscate între minoritari şi autorităŃi, stricto sensu subunităŃile săteşti ale 

Jandarmeriei, au apărut dintr-o proiecŃie simplificată în cursul războiului ca întruchipare 

a fascismului şi pe care, alături de „fraŃii ruşi” trebuia să-l combată. O asemenea psihoză 

a avut rădăcini mai adânci; şi anume, poziŃia discriminată a minorităŃii naŃionale sârbe 

din anii dinaintea războiului şi chiar agravată prin desfăşurările din anii de război. Odată 

cu declanşarea războiului germanii le-au sfârtecat Ńara-mamă iar românii i-au trimis cu 

10 Pentru detalii Andrei Milin, Miodrag Milin, Uniunea asociaŃiilor culturale democrate slave din 

România (UACDSR) sau Sârbii din România pe baricadele Războiului rece, Timişoara, 2009 

675

de-a sila pe Frontul de est, să lupte împotriva ruşilor cu care împărtăşeau şi originea şi 

credinŃa; şi acest sacrificiu de sine spre folosul unei Românii, cu ale cărei obiective de 

război nu au putut şi nu au dorit de fel să se identifice. Drept rezultat, au apărut astfel 

numeroşi transfugi sustrăgându-se de la serviciul militar şi dezertori de război, care şi-au 

căutat refugiu prin fosta Iugoslavie; iar la sfârşit, odată reveniŃi acasă, să-i afle, ca slujbaşi 

ai statului român, pe aceiaşi jandarmi şi ofiŃeri care i-au prigonit crunt cu puŃină vreme în 

urmă. La primul impact s-a iscat şi un moment detestabil, al actelor de răzbunare, soldate 

şi cu câŃiva ucişi dintre jandarmi. 

În rapoartele Inspectoratului de jandarmi din Timişoara apar o serie de asemenea crime 

şi alte fărădelegi (atacuri armate împotriva posturilor de jandarmi, dezarmarea 

jandarmilor, distrugerea bunurilor, fapte de violenŃă asupra românilor, germanilor şi 

maghiarilor, violuri), puse pe seama „partizanilor sârbi”, cel mai frecvent şi prin 

concursul activ al ostaşilor sovietici. 11 АutorităŃile i-au învinuit pe partizani şi pe unii 

militari sovietici de aceste acte de violenŃă dar şi de răspândirea de zvonuri privind 

alipirea Banatului românesc la noua Iugoslavie comunistă a lui Tito. 12 

Şi în părŃile Clisurii bănăŃene (a Dunării) a fost observată o activitate la fel de susŃinută 

a acestor „partizani sârbi” ce acŃionau sub aripa „revoluŃionară” protectoare a PCR-ului 

cărăşan. După bătălia pentru eliberarea Belgradului [la 20 octombrie n. n.] şi-au făcut 

apariŃia un număr mai mare de sârbi înarmaŃi (şi instruiŃi de cadrele comuniste iugoslave 

în tabăra de la Biserica Albă). Erau localnici care, având asentimentul PCR-ului 

judeŃean (controlat în acea vreme de sârbul Zoran Vuletici, tot din Clisură), s-au constituit 

într-o gardă de apărare 13 , cu însemne sârbeşti (chirilice); aceştia s-au desfăşurat la 

Moldova Veche, Belobreşca, Socol, Câmpia şi de bună-seamă şi la ZlatiŃa, localităŃi cu o 

11 

M. Milin, A. Milin, Sârbii din România şi relaŃiile româno – iugoslave. Studiu şi documente 

(1944 – 1949), Vršac – Timişoara, 2004, nr. 1, p. 72 

12 

„Inspectoratul Regional de PoliŃie Timişoara. Serviciul PoliŃiei de SiguranŃă. 

Nr. 14277 – 1944, Octombrie 21 

Domnului Chestor al PoliŃiei Municipiului Timişoara, Vi se transmite mai jos în copie o notă 

informativă primită la acest inspectorat, pentru a dispune verificarea serioasă şi discretă a celor 

semnalate, raportând cât mai urgent constatările făcute. Inspector regional de PoliŃie, Berescu 

Grigore Şeful serv. PoliŃiei de SiguranŃă, Comisar Dinu Gheorghe 

Copie. Notă 

În ultimul timp se observă pe străzile Timişoarei, în grupe din ce în ce mai mari şi mai multe, 

civili sârbi, şi în uniforme, o parte din ei sunt înarmaŃi, se crede că ar fi curieri între armata lui 

Tito şi armata sovietică din România. Nu s-a observat intrând la Comandamentul Rus, dar s-a 

observat intrând la Episcopia sârbă. În ziua de 17 octombrie 1944 o parte din aceşti sârbi au avut 

o consfătuire la Episcopia sârbească cu reprezentanŃii sârbilor din localitate, bănuim că ar 

intenŃiona alipirea Banatului la Iugoslavia. Tot aceşti sârbi cari vin clandestin în România 

cutrieră tot Banatul românesc şi fac propagandă, printre cetăŃeni români de origine etnică sârbă 

ca să se înroleze în armata Mareşalului Tito ca voluntari...” (Arhivele CNSAS, Fond 

documentar, D. 12535, vol. 25, f. 256) 

13 

Aici trebuie menŃionat un episod rămas în memoria locului, mai degrabă comic decât politic, al 

„Republicii sovietice de la ZlatiŃa” proclamată prin 1920 de câŃiva zurbangii, foşti prizonieri în 

Rusia; episodul s-a încheiat de îndată, prin arestarea de către jandarmi a „revoluŃionarilor” şi 

flagelarea lor în public, cu câte 25 de beŃe de „îndreptare”. (Obs. M.M.) 

676

populaŃie la acea vreme compactă şi aproape exclusiv sârbească. Prin aceste sate aşa-zişii 

partizani , cu precădere dezertori din Armata română, reveniŃi în Ńară de peste graniŃă, sau 

pornit să-i terorizeze pe nemŃi dar şi pe români şi chiar sârbi care nu li s-au alăturat, 

precum şi pe reprezentanŃii locali ai puterii de stat. Organele Jandarmeriei române 

susŃineau că aceşti „partizani sârbi”, beneficiind şi de concursul populaŃiei locale sârbeşti, 

au început să-şi organizeze o administraŃie, o poliŃie şi alte servicii, conform indicaŃiilor 

primite de la Biserica Albă; respectivele localităŃi au luat denumiri sârbeşti iar în 

rapoartele oficiale se utiliza doar limba sârbă. 14 

Totul a culminat cu turul propagandistic prin satele dunărene de pe malul românesc al 

unui ofiŃer superior iugoslav. Acesta, prin discursuri incendiare, îi îndemna pe localnici la 

nesupunere civilă faŃă de autorităŃi, calificate drept „fasciste”. Asemenea acŃiuni vor 

provoca şi reacŃia brutală din partea unităŃilor judeŃene ale Jandarmeriei române 

împotriva „strajei locale” de la Moldova Veche, în noaptea din 27/ 28 ianuarie (de Sfântul 

Sava sârbesc). Jandarmii au năvălit în mijlocul festivităŃii şi au deschis foc, rănind câŃiva 

localnici. Apoi i-au luat la bătaie pe cei de faŃă, au ciuruit cu rafale portretul lui Tito şi au 

vandalizat întreaga comună. 15 După această întâmplare agitaŃia din Clisură s-a potolit 

vizibil. 

Politică regională, diplomaŃie minoritară şi eşec plebiscitar 

După ce au eşuat iniŃiativele de la Dunăre, campania pentru Tito a luat o turnură 

oarecum „diplomatică”. 

În lunile sfârşitului de război Tito se dovedea un factor tot mai activ şi în diplomaŃia din 

Balcani. Iar prezenŃa militară activă iugoslavă genera, deja în acele momente, puseuri de 

tensiune între AliaŃi. Criza greacă, criza de la Triest, stările de fapt din Banatul de vest, 

erau doar câteva din problemele „fierbinŃi” pe agenda „hiperrevoluŃionarului” iugoslav cu 

porniri dictatoriale. 16 Pe zi ce trece Tito a ajuns să-l irite tot mai mult pe Stalin în 

persoană, tulburându-i colaborarea acestuia din spaŃiul balcanic cu aliatul britanic. Stalin 

voia neapărat linişte în Balcani, în acord cu procentele convenite încă în toamna lui 1944 

la Moscova cu premierul Churchill. Acest acord de principiu îi garanta supremaŃia 

absolută în Estul european şi de aceea se ferea de orice posibilă învolburare a scenei prin 

„activismul narcisist” 17 al liderului comunist de la Belgrad. Ca un militant cu vechi stagii 

cominterniste şi Tito era conştient de suspiciunile ce prindeau viaŃă la Moscova şi de 

aceea a evitat, începând cu primăvara lui 1945, să mai meargă personal în capitala 

comunismului mondial, preferând să-şi trimită „locotenenŃii” la consultări şi informări de 

opinie. 

Asemenea discuŃii ale emisarilor iugoslavi cu oracolul de la Moscova au fost în ianuarie 

1945. Stalin, temperând „elanul revoluŃionar” iugoslav, îi povăŃuia pe interlocutori că 

pentru acapararea unor puncte de interes teritorial (stricto sensu Triest, Pecs, Timişoara, 

14 M. Milin, A. Milin, op. cit., 71 - 72 

15 A. Milin, M. Milin, ł. Mihailov, Sârbii din România în vremea Comunismului..., p. 324. 

16 Tony Judt, Epoca Postbelică. O istorie a Europei de după 1945, Polirom [Iaşi], 2008, p.140-142 

17 Ibidem. 

677

ReşiŃa, chiar şi Salonic) era nevoie, pe lângă asigurarea controlului militar şi generarea 

unui puternic curent favorabil de opinie, printr-o formulă plebiscitară de răsunet. 18 

Peste câteva săptămâni, la finele lui martie, s-a produs la Belgrad primirea delegaŃiei 

FAS din România, 19 în frunte cu preşedintele, mai vechea noastră cunoştinŃă, preotul – 

învăŃător Radivoi Fenlaciki. 

Aflăm necesară şi o scurtă relatare privind evoluŃia, între timp, a militantismului 

antifascist sârbesc. De remarcat faptul că cercurile preoŃeşti (sediul eparhial, 56 de 

biserici parohiale, 5 mănăstiri)şi-au păstrat rolul activ în îndrumarea minoritarilor sârbi 

aflaŃi la o nouă cumpănă a destinului lor. Doar că acest grup clerical s-a „fisurat” pe 

măsura noilor schimbări intervenite la Belgrad şi la Bucureşti. Pe de o parte vicarul 

Kostici a continuat să se bucure pentru o vreme de încrederea Patriarhiei sârbe 

(anticomunistă). În paralel însă, în sânul Bisericii Sfântului Sava de la noi s-au erijat şi 

purtătorii noilor idei, „tovarăşii” preoŃi, progresişti şi antifascişti. AlŃi mulŃi antifascişti sau 

„cizelat” şi prin centrele de instruire politică a voluntarilor-partizani de la Biserica 

Albă, VârşeŃ sau Kikinda (unii chiar la Belgrad), îmbrăŃişând, cu elan şi fără de reŃinere, 

ideile radicale ale comuniştilor din război ai lui Tito. 

Iată cum, în acest fel, a rezultat şi o echipă de „delegaŃi” ai FAS din România dornică 

să abordeze problemele viitorului minorităŃii într-un climat nou, „democratic”, după 

reŃetarul belgrădean şi dezicându-se de trecutul odios al „fascismului”şi al „monarhiei” de 

la Bucureşti. Nimic surprinzător, atât timp cât acelaşi îndemn, mobilizator, de a rupe cu 

un trecut detestabil, venea şi dinspre noua putere, întruchipată prin regimul dr. Petru 

Groza, mare prieten al mareşalului belgrădean dar şi al comuniştilor şi antifasciştilor 

sârbi. 

Dacă „antifasciştii”, popi şi comunişti de-a valma, duşi la Belgrad, sorbeau cu aviditate 

frazele ce le erau servite, despre misiunea eliberatoare şi de democratizare viitoare ce 

reveneau slavilor, dr. Petru Groza în schimb, nu era de fel naiv. Venirera noului regim 

„democrat-popular” însemna totodată, la acea dată, şi garantarea integrităŃii teritoriului 

naŃional, cel puŃin pe graniŃa de vest a Ńării. 

18 Vasile Şandru, Conflictul dintre generalissimul I. V. Stalin şi mareşalul I. B. Tito, în „Dosarele 

Istoriei”, nr. 3 (19), Bucureşti, 1998, p. 22 – 24. 

19 Miodrag Milin, Andrei Milin, Sârbii din România şi relaŃiile româno – iugoslave...nr. 7, p. 75 

(Belgrad, 26 martie 1945. Informare, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe al Iugoslaviei, copie, 

ministrul adjunct[generalul Ivan Velebit, obs. M. Milin]. Vizită la ministrul Ivan Şubaşici a 

delegaŃiei „iugoslavilor” din România. Rezumat: Slavii sunt organizaŃi în Frontul Antifascist Slav 

din România şi în Frontul Antifascist al Femeilor Slave, ambele cu sediul la Timişoara. 

Protoporul Slobodan Kostici, administratorul eparhial, are o atitudine rezervată faŃă de 

evenimente. AutorităŃile româneşti prigonesc în continuare elementul slav. PoziŃia duşmănoasă a 

României faŃă de Iugoslavia, după 6 aprilie 1941.Obiectivele organelor slave antifasciste din 

România sunt identice cu Ńelurile mişcării populare de eliberare din Iugoslavia, adică unirea cu 

fraŃii din Iugoslavia democrată şi federativă. DelegaŃia a fost îndrumată să-şi continue munca, 

ferindu-se însă de complicaŃii cu românii. Nu trebuie lezată democraŃia românească şi nu trebuie 

abordate deschis problemele reunirii şi repatrierii. Abordarea chestiunii unirii ar putea periclita 

cauza democraŃiei româneşti şi ar fi de folos elementelor fasciste şi legionarilor.) 

678

Tito, de asemenea, avea în opŃiune o serie de alternative. Pe de o parte , războiul fiind 

încă în curs, cu lupte violente în CroaŃia şi Slovenia şi prezenŃa militară fermă la Triest 

sau în vestul Banatului, 20 una dintre opŃiunile încercate (la Triest, n. n.) a fost anexarea; 

dar, pentru aceasta avea nevoie de acordul Moscovei. Stalin, doritor de linişte în 

Peninsula Balcanică, voia în continuare să evite complicaŃiile cu britanicii, Ńinându-se de 

angajamentul convenit cu Churchill (pentru Iugoslavia raportul de influenŃă era la 

paritate, câte 50%). La răspunsul echivoc al Kremlinului, în sensul că populaŃia vizată 

trebuie să se manifeste activ, să ceară ea modificările de frontieră, conducătorul iugoslav 

a amânat chestiunea; probabil, într-o altă versiune, în consens cu liderul bulgar Dimitrov, 

prevedea soluŃionarea chestiunilor prin absorbŃie, în cadrul unei confederaŃii balcanice 

lărgite, despre care se cugeta intens la acea dată. 21 

Despre congresul care n-a mai avut loc şi falimentul „titoismului” militant 

În primăvara aceasta „fierbinte” a anului 1945 un fapt divers de la Timişoara reŃinea 

atenŃia unor segmente importante ale autorităŃii publice. Se mişcau sârbii. 

Sensul revendicărilor lor, în limbajul stângii comuniste româneşti, era prevestit deja 

printr-un manifest programatic din 10 octombrie 1944. 22 „Tovarăşii şi fraŃii” luau 

cunoştinŃă de faptul că lupta cu reacŃiunea, sinonimă cu statul român de atunci, abia 

începea. Aşteptata schimbare întârziind să se facă PCR a trecut la fapte pe cont propriu, 

difuzând un apel către organismele de masă ale minorităŃilor, în vederea definitivării 

victoriei împotriva fascismului, a strângerii legăturilor „sincere” cu URSS, pedepsirea 

criminalilor de război, reconstrucŃia economică, democratizarea Ńării etc. Consiliul 

antifascist al slavilor (Антифашистички одбор Славена) din România, de fapt identic 

cu stânga sârbă din Banat, îşi însuşea, declarativ şi oficial, limbajul şi opŃiunea PCR 

vizând noua Românie. 23 

CoerenŃa doctrinară a acestor texte ce-şi însuşeau mesajul Platformei – program a PCR 

către FND sugerează că aceeaşi iniŃiativă, care a conceput FND ca un organism aflat sub 

controlul PCR se afla şi la originea acestui Consiliu antifascist slav (CAS). De fapt, 

înclinăm să credem că manifestul din 10 octombrie 1944 reprezenta chiar „certificatul de 

20 Comandamentul Regiunii militare Voivodina era la Becicherecul Mare. Aceasta avea şi la 

Timişoara un reprezentant (Miloş Şaletici), pe lângă autorităŃile statului români şi comisia 

interaliată de control. 

21 Vezi o abordare recentă şi documentată asupra problemei, din surse iugoslave şi sovietice, în 

The Balkans in The Cold War. Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav – Soviet Conflict, 

Edited by Vojislav G. Pavlović, Institute for Balkan Studies of The Serbian Academy of 

Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, 2011 

22 Arhivele naŃionale jud. Timiş, Fond Uniunea AsociaŃiilor Culturale Democrate Slave din 

România (UACDSR), nr. 1/ 1944, f. 47. Manifest imprimat, Другови, браћо!(FraŃi, tovarăşi!), 

10 octombrie 1944 

23 Ibidem, f. 48 (Антифашистички одбор Славена у Румунији. Пројект платформе поднесене 

од стране Централног комитета Комунистичке странке и преко Демократског народног 

фронта предложен свима демократским снагама / Consiliul antifascist slav din România. 

Proiectul Platformei CC al PCR către FND şi toate forŃele democratice), 10 octombrie 1944. 

679

naştere” al primului organism politic sârbesc aşezat la remarca PCR , după formula deja 

verificată ideea generează structura. 

O privire asupra pieselor de arhivă ce au supravieŃuit până la noi lasă să se întrevadă 

gândul că populaŃia sârbă s-a manifestat sub forma unui corp relativ unitar şi coerent, 

uşor de mânuit, dovedindu-se deosebit de receptivă la orice semnal propagandistic 

antigerman (= antifascist) şi-n aceeaşi măsură prosovietic (= democratic). 

În paralel cu mesajul politic de la Bucureşti (cel communist) minoritatea sârbă, mai ales 

cei din zona de locuire relative compactă din Clisura Dunării, era sensibilă şi la mesajul 

communist iugoslav (“titoist”), difuzat din centrele de recrutare amintite, de la Biserica 

Albă şi VârşeŃ. Astfel a putut fiinŃa şi garda (straja) naŃională sârbă de la Moldova Veche, 

ca instrument al luptei antifasciste locale şi – nedeclarat – promotor al opŃiunilor 

comuniste iugoslave. 

Avem, prin urmare, două mesaje politice în competiŃie. Dacă împotriva comuniştilor de 

la Bucureşti forŃele de ordine erau neputincioase, în schimb, împotriva ,,anarhiei” da la 

Moldova Veche s-a intervenit, cum am văzut, în forŃă şi cu o brutală eficienŃă. 

Afirmam că sârbii erau uşor de mânuit, ca masă în folosul stângii comunistoite. Nu 

ştim, deocamdată, când şicum s-a transformat Consiliul antifascist slav în Frontul 

antifascist slav (FAS). Foarte probabil că lucrurile au decurs prin dispoziŃie de sus, după o 

altă regulă asiduu aplicată, a ,,umflării” peste noapte a stângii procomuniste. Iar clişeul, în 

fazele progresive ale multiplicării impunea ca treaptă următoare momentului ,,consiliu” 

pe acela de ,,front”. 

Cert este că, aproape la comandă şi în bloc, la 25 februarie 1945 fosta strajă de la 

Moldova Veche s-a preschimbat în organizaŃia locală a FAS din România 24 . 

Mesajul lui Tito şi mitul lui Stalin aveau deocamdată aceeaşi semnificaŃie locală, fiind 

tot slavi, deci de-ai lor. Comunismul românesc era, în aceeaşi percepŃie de frontieră, ceva 

insignificant şi la început de drum, undeva în partea de jos a piramidei care-şi avea vârful 

la Moscova şi pe Tito pe undeva, prin preajmă. 

Într-o asemenea naivă (încă) percepŃie se putea deduce că stânga românescă avea de 

depăşit obstacole uriaşe, spre a-şi rândui propria ordine socială. Fascismul german era 

departe, ca şi frontal; ,,fascismul” autohton era însă, mai la îndemână de combătut, fiind 

şi lesne de identificat, ca tot ce stătea în calea stângii comunistoide dezlănŃuite: stat, 

monarhie, jandarmeria, justiŃie… Iar sârbii erau gata şi ei să pună mâna, să ajute, mai cu 

seamă că aceasta se petrecea sub semnul îngemănat al celor doi mari; era în aceeaşi 

măsură şi al comuniştilor români, care se dovedeau extrem de zeloşi să recupereze 

,,întârzierile”, cinstind cu veneraŃie tot ce venea dinspre Moscova. 

FAS se afla integrat în structurile oficiale ale Frontulu naŃional democrat (FND), 

platforma extinsă aflată sub control communist, precum fusese şi predecesorul recent, 

CAS. La finele lui februarie 1945 se pare că avem deja o oarecare ierarhie constituită şi în 

organizaŃia restrânsă a antifasciştilor sârbi; ca principali reprezentanŃi ai acestora în 

24 Idem, Fond UACDSR, 4/ 1945, f. 76 – 80. Proces verbal, 25 februarie 1945,şedinŃa de 

constituire a organizaŃiei locale a FAS Moldova Veche. Au aderat 333 membri, preşedinte fiind 

ales localnicul Alexandru Balea. 

680

cadrul organizaŃiei judeŃene Timiş-Torontal a FND sunt menŃionaŃi învăŃătorul timişorean 

Radivoi (Rada) Fenlaciki şi avocatul Borislav Popovici. 25 

După clişeul deja existent FAS avea şi o organizaŃie proprie de femei precum şi una de 

tineret, aceasta din urmă de tot exaltată şi mult mai radicală decât a confraŃilor seniori. 

Apăreau şi două periodice, ,,Pravda” (Dreptatea) şi ,,Omladinska Pravda”(Dreptatea 

Tineretului), purtătoare de opinie a celor două generaŃii de antifascişti, oarecum în 

competiŃie. 

De la ,,Omladinska Pravda” s-a pornit şi iniŃiativa unui ,,congres al tineretrului 

antifascist sârb”, prin care aceştia să-şi clarifice obiectivele şi căile de acŃiune. 26 

Entuziasmul tinerilor s-a extins, molipsitor, asupra întregii comunităŃi sârbeşti. Inutil de 

adăugat că în acele zile şi partizanii iugoslavi circulau în voie, cu socoteală cât şi 

fără, 27 prin Timişoara cât şi prin satele sârbeşti, întreŃinând o atmosferă euforică, panslavă. 

IniŃiativa a tot sporit astfel într-una, vizând reunirea organizaŃiilor locale FAS la 

Timişoara, precum şi invitarea tineretului 28 cât şi a reprezentanŃilor armatei 

iugoslave; 29 aceasta avea la Timişoara un delegat permanent în persoana fostului învăŃător 

25 Ibidem, f. 85. Notă a conducerii FAS către Comit. Jud. Timiş-Torontal al FND (,,...FAS din 

România vă face cunoscut că delegaŃii săi permanenŃi în FND sunt tov. Rada Fenlaciki ca 

membru şi tov. Borislav Popovici ca supleant...”), 28 febr. 1945. 

26 Din relatările profesorului Zdravko Fenlaciki, fiul fruntaşului sârb amintit. Dacă ne este permisă 

o opinie liberă: tinerii „antifascişti” în frunte cu editorul gazetei lor, Pavle Stoianov, adolescent 

îndoctrinat de „securiştii” iugoslavi, forŃau cu orice chip desfăşurarea evenimentelor (convocarea 

şi pregătirea ipoteticului congres), cumva în acord şi chiar cu încurajarea maiorului iugoslav 

Duşan Iovanovici, subaltern al temutului ministru de interne Aleksandar Rankovici şi pe atunci 

,,în misiune” prin România; Acest ,,exces de zel” al tinerilor va fi şi motivul conflictului izbucnit 

curând între Rada Fenlaciki (cel care îşi însuşise la Belgrad vederile mai reticente ale conducerii 

iugoslave, privind expunerea hazardată a minorităŃii sârbe din România) şi acest tânăr, cam 

anarhic şi insubordonat. Din alte informaŃii, (de la tânărul istoric belgradean Vladimir 

Cvetkovici), se ştie că, în pofida ezitărilor conducerii iugoslave, ministrul de interne Rankovici 

insista personal ca proiectatul congres al sârbilor să se Ńină. 

27 Ibidem, f. 86. DispoziŃie a conducerii FAS către organizaŃiile locale, din 21 martie 1945. 

(Traducere: ,, Spre a fi eliminate orice suspiciuni şi neînŃelegeri cu privire la persoanele militare 

ce sosesc din Iugoslavia, pe viitor îi veŃi legitima pe toŃi cetăŃenii iugoslavi , militari sau civili. 

Nu sunt rare cazurile când indivizi apar în uniforme militare cu stea la chipiu, autonumindu-se 

,,partizani” deşi nu posedă acte din Iugoslavia, încât asemenea persoane trebuie urgent deferite 

autorităŃilor locale. Toate persoanele militare din Iugoslavia au datoria să se prezinte la tovarăşul 

Şaletici, care este mandatat din partea Regiunii militare Voivodina spre a controla cetăŃenii 

iugoslavi ...”) 

28 Ibidem, f. 135. InvitaŃie, eliberată de organizaŃia de tineret a FAS Timişoara, 9 aprilie 1945. 

(Traducere: ,,...Vă înştiinŃăm că în zilele de 8 şi 9 mai 1945 se va Ńine primul congres al 

tineretului antifascist slav din România... trimiteŃi-vă delegaŃii la acest prim congres al nostru, 

unde se va manifesta frăŃia şi unitatea tineretului nostru... nevoile noastre sunt comune – comună 

trebuie să ne fie şi lupta!”) 

29 Ibidem, f. 170. Adresa FAS către Consiliul districtual al Frontului naŃional de eliberare pentru 

Banatul de nord, 30 aprilie 1945. (Traducere:,,... Cu cea mai mare bucurie am primit confirmarea 

Dvs. Din 28 aprilie a. c., prin care ne anunŃaŃi că veŃi lua parte la congresul nostru...”) 

681

din Clisura Dunării, Miloş Şaletici. Curând s-a aflat şi un învăŃător slovac de la Nădlac, 

Jan Buban, doritor şi el să se alăture unei astfel de iniŃiative. Organizarea a fost, ca atare, 

regândită, dorindu-se Ńinerea unui congres general al FAS din România. 30 

În fruntea organizatorilor se erijează tânărul şi dinamicul Pavle Stoianov din Diniaş şi 

avocatul timişorean Borislav Popovici. Preşedintele FAS Rada Fenlaciki, mai degrabă un 

moderat, care între timp a primit o serie de atribuŃii de la Minister pe linia învăŃământului 

minoritar, era de acum depăşit de iniŃiativele oarecum necontrolabile ale celorlalŃi 

activişti. 

Că era o stare difuză ne arată un raport care vorbeşte pur şi simplu de... „linia slavă”, ce 

ar îngloba 12300 de membri, din 42 de sate. La acest nivel s-au organizat echipe ce 

cutreierau lumea rurală spre a pregăti congresul. Aceşti delegaŃi trebuiau să întocmească 

şi rapoarte „cu privire la mersul reformei agrare, starea însămânŃărilor...” Iar viitorul 

congres avea să dezbată despre „lupta pentru democratizarea Ńării, pentru drepturi 

democratice în cadrul principiilor democratice (?), ajutorarea naŃiunilor conlocuitoаre, a 

duce lupta contra reacŃiunii şi şovinismului.” 31 

Un alt model de invitaŃii, emis în numele FAS din România, vorbea de începerea 

„Congresului populaŃiei slave democratice din România”, la 8 mai 1945 orele 11 a. m., la 

Sala Manej din cadrul cazărmii timişorene Transilvania. Se spune apoi că aici „se vor 

discuta modalităŃile pentru o mai strânsă şi cât mai efectivă (?) colaborare a popoarelor 

noastre cu democraŃia română în scopul democratizării Ńării, precum şi problemele 

noastre naŃionale în cadrul revendicărilor democratice.” Acest model a fost emis între 3 şi 

5 mai, fiind adresat organelor de stat (prefectului, primarului, organizaŃiilor judeŃene ale 

PCR, FND, MADOSZ, comandantului militar al oraşului Timişoara şi reprezentantului la 

Timişoara al Comisiei intweraliate de control, maiorul sovietic Pundik. 32 

Profesorul Fenlaciki amintindu-şi acele zile (era adolescent), menŃionează că 

desfăşurarea evenimentelor a fost oprită de intervenŃia ofiŃerului sovietic („Ne budet 

kongressa!”); motivaŃia ar fi fost că ministrul Molotov garantase integritatea României. 

Între timp delegaŃii tineretului iugoslab din Becicherec sosiseră deja la Timişoara; dar 

cum au sosit aşa s-au şi înapoiat, cu vaporul, pe Bega. 

łinem să precizăm că nici un material, cât de cât oficial, din cele consultate, nu 

aminteşte, măcar şi în treacăt, problema Banatului sau a rectificării frontierelor în vreun 

fel. Toate referirile sunt doar la democratizarea României şi la necesitatea ca minorităŃile 

să ia parte activă la acest proces. 

Şi totuşi... Pe invitaŃia-model, adresată primarului oraşului Timişoara social-democratul 

Traian Novac 33 acesta aşternuse, în scris de mână: „ Cu ocazia acestui congres a fost 

programat şi intrarea delegaŃilor din Banatul iugoslav înarmaŃi pentru a ocupa oraşul 

Timişoara şi restul Banatului românesc; am aflat la timp această mârşăvie cu concursul 

30 

Relatare a profesorului Zdravko Fenlaciki, căruia-i aducem călduroase mulŃumiri pentru 

preŃioasele şi lămuritoarele informaŃii. 

31 

Ibidem, 1/ 1944 – 1945, f. 80. Raport, Linia slavă, Timişoara, 21 aprilie 1945. 

32 

Ibidem, circulare, f. 178 - 186 

33 

Piesă în posesia familiei, reprodusă în M. Milin, A. Milin, Sârbii din România şi relaŃiile 

româno – iugoslave...nr. 8, p. 78 – 79. 

682

Dr.-ului Petru Groza căruia i-am cerut telefonic să intervie de urgenŃă pe lângă 

Comandamentul rusesc din Bucureşti ca acest congres şă fie interzis ; mi s-a comunicat 

apoi tot de Dr. Groza ... că i-a reuşit să obŃină interzicerea...” Sunau de-acum în van 

revenirile către gen. Vinogradov de la Comisia interaliată din Bucureşti, de a se aproba 

totuşi congresul... 34 

Practic, în paralel, la 7 mai 1945, a fost curmată existenŃa FAS, printr-o directivă a 

PCR 35 , care indica reorganizarea acestei formaŃiuni politice devenită, iată, stânjenitoare 

chiar şi pentru evoluŃia stângii procomuniste din România. Telefonic au fost înştiinŃaŃi 

„că rezolvarea problemei organizaŃiei ... a intrat în faza finală”. Aceasta, mai departe, 

însemna că FAS urma să se transforme într-o organizaŃie „cu caracter cultural-educativ” 

iar activitatea politică era de dorit să şi-o continue „în partidele democratice române, prin 

care vor solicita şi revendicările lor de ordin naŃional.” DelegaŃilor li s-a sugerat că nu era 

necesară o dizolvare formală, schimbarea implicând doar numele şi organul central de 

conducere. Ziarul „Pravda” urma să apară în continuare, „urmând a se ocupa mai mult cu 

problemele democraŃiei româneşti.” 36 

Înclinăm să credem că luarea mai fermă a evenimentelor vieŃii interne sub controlul 

PCR, care între timp a dobândit creditul deplin al aliatului-stăpân sovietic, este adevărata 

cauză a decesului politic al stângii comunistoide slave din România. Comuniştii români 

erau mult mai uşor de Ńinut în frâu de către sovietici (căci doar prin cuvântul de ordine al 

acestora ei puteau nădăjdui la o legitimare pe scena politică) decât orgoliosul Tito şi 

tovarăşii săi anarhici. Iar sperietoara „Banatul – Iugoslavia!” a fost mai mult o diversiune, 

strecurată de autorităŃile de atunci şi întreŃinută artificial în lumea rurală ce trăia şi cugeta 

apolitic, instinctual; motiv suficient pentru declanşarea campaniei pătimaşe şi 

devastatoare de răfuieli politice împotriva sârbilor, când le va veni vremea, la finele 

anilor 40 şi începutul anilor 50. 

34 Arh. Timiş, Fond UACDSR, 4/ 1945, f. 300 – 301. 

35 Ibidem, f. 89. Raport FAS, Timişoara, 30 iunie 1945: „ ...Activitate mai mare nu avem din cauză 

că de la data de 7 mai 1945 nu avem primite nici un fel de directive în scris de la Partid ce să 

facem...”. 

36 Ibidem, f. 88. Referat asupra rezultatului demersului delegaŃiei FAS la Bucureşti în chestia 

dizolvării frontului, semnat B. Popovici, Timişoara, 7 iunie 1945. 

683

STRUCTURI ANTICOMUNISTE ÎN 

JUDEłUL BIHOR: ORGANIZAłIA ROMÂNIA 

INDEPENDENTĂ (1947-1950) 

Gabriel MOISA 1 

După instaurarea regimului comunist în România au luat fiinŃă o serie de centre ale 

rezistenŃei anticomuniste. În general, zonele montane au fost cele care au facilitat 

proliferarea acestor grupuri, dar existenŃa lor a fost mai mult sau mai puŃin efemeră, 

consecinŃă a faptului că au fost sistematic vânate de noul regim politic de la Bucureşti. 

Astăzi, la mai bine de un deceniu şi jumătate de la evenimentele din decembrie 1989, 

istoriografia românească ne oferă o imagine destul de complexă şi bogată asupra 

cunoaşterii mişcărilor de rezistenŃă contrare regimului din diverse regiuni ale României, 

mai puŃin însă a celor din zona Bihorului, deşi acestea nu lipsesc cu desăvârşire 2 . Dar 

vestul Ńării a intrat şi el în circuitul mişcărilor anticomuniste organizate. InformaŃiile 

inedite de arhivã ne permit să afirmăm cu certitudine că aici şi-au desfăşurat activitatea 

mai multe grupuri de rezistenŃă. În Bihor, în anii de care discutăm au existat cel puŃin 

patru asemenea organizaŃii. 

Prima dintre ele era organizaŃia "subversivă" intitulată "Vlad łepeş II". Ea a fost 

semnalată că îşi desfăşura activitatea cu predilecŃie în partea central - sudică a Bihorului 

şi în nordul judeŃului Arad. Şeful acesteia a fost avocatul Constantin Militaru din 

Oradea 3 . ComponenŃii organizaŃiei erau în marea lor majoritate funcŃionari din aparatul 

de stat, ofiŃeri deblocaŃi, elevi, muncitori, iar la sate mai ales intelectualii comunităŃilor 

locale. RamificaŃiile sale cuprindeau pe lângă Oradea şi comunele Vaşcău, PăŃal, Beliu, 

Ucuriş, Lunca, Câmpanii de Sus, Leheceni, Beiuş, Marghita şi Sălard. 

Cea de a doua organizaŃie de rezistenŃă anticomunistă a fost semnalată în zona masivelor 

Codru-Moma şi Bihorului 4 . Centre principale de legătură şi aprovizionare erau comunele 

Susag, Craiova - azi Craiva - din judeŃul Arad, Ucuriş şi DumbrăviŃa de Codru din Bihor. 

1 Universitatea din Oradea, Romania. 

2 G. Moisa, Colectivizare, rezistenŃă şi represiune în vestul României 1948-1951, Editura Muzeului 

łării Crişurilor, Oradea, 1999, 176 p.; G. Moisa, Grupuri de rezistenŃă anticomunistă în lumea 

satului bihorean între anii 1948-1950, în Acta Musei Porolissensis, 2000, 23, p. 309-315; V. Faur, A. 

Faur, O viaŃă de om sub "ochii" securităŃii, Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, 2006, 154 p.; A. Faur, 

Căpitanul Ştefan Popescu - liderul grupului de rezistenŃă din sudul Bihorului (1946-1950), în 

Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George BariŃ" din Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p. 651-657. 

3 Arhivele Serviciului Român de InformaŃii, Fondul documentar ,Dosar nr. 4638 ( în continuare 

A.S.R.I ), f. 72. 

4 Ibidem, f. 71 

684

Grupurile erau formate, conform rapoartelor SecurităŃii, din oameni politici - mai ales 

legionari - care se ascundeau în munŃi, ofiŃeri deblocaŃi şi intelectuali originari din localităŃile 

învecinate cu muntele. De aici aceştia agitau lumea satelor în speranŃa unei revolte. 

Cel de-al treilea grup de rezistenŃă acŃiona în zona Vaşcău - Cărpinet şi în MunŃii 

Bihorului, fiind condus de căpitanul Ştefan Popescu. Fost ofiŃer al armatei române, acesta 

a adunat în jurul său o serie de localnici din zonă care au dat mult de furcă regimului în 

intervalul 1947-1950. Militant de frunte al Partidului NaŃional łărănesc, Ştefan Popescu a 

constituit un grup anticomunist, care a acŃionat în clandestinitate, beneficiind de un suport 

real din partea populaŃiei locale 5 . 

În fine, cel de-al patrulea grup de rezistenŃă se numea OrganizaŃia România 

Independentă şi a fost printre cele mai active în Bihor în perioada 1947-1950. Aceasta a 

luat fiinŃă, cu certitudine, cândva la sfârşitul anului 1947, pentru ca, deja în primăvara lui 

1948, existenŃa sa să fie precis semnalată de Securitate ca având centrul în Oradea. Primul 

ei şef a fost Nistor Bădiceanu. Primul nucleu al acestei organizaŃii a fost format din circa 

20 de tineri în jurul vârstei de 20 de ani 6 . De la început aceasta avea ramificaŃii într-o 

mare parte a judeŃului Bihor, dar şi în vestul judeŃului Sălaj şi oraşul Satu Mare. Printre 

membrii îi regăsim pe: Nistor Bădiceanu, liderul grupului, originar din Chiraleu, judeŃul 

Bihor, elev la liceul "Alexandru Roman" din Oradea, Filip Ioan, din Beiuş, Domocoş 

Ştefan, din Oradea, LeucuŃa Gheorghe, din Oradea, Sarca Eugen, din Ghenetea (judeŃul 

Bihor), Furtos Pavel din Sărsig (judeŃul Bihor), Şerban Tiberiu, din Oradea, Haiaş 

Gheorghe, din Ghenetea (judeŃul Bihor), Ardeleanu Sabin, din Ghenetea (judeŃul Bihor), 

Rus Vasile, din Abram (judeŃul Bihor), Cuc Aurel, din Hidişelul de Sus (judeŃul Bihor), 

Coroiu Tănase, din Vaşcău, Mut Marius, din Satu Mare, Furtos Flaviu, din Sărsig (judeŃul 

Bihor), Broşteanu Aurel, din Sărsig (judeŃul Bihor), Ştreng Traian, din Sărsig (judeŃul 

Bihor), Budaru Leontin, din AbrămuŃ (judeŃul Bihor), Abrudan Lazăr, din MarŃihaz 

(judeŃul Bihor), Costin Iosif, din AbrămuŃ (judeŃul Bihor), Baciu Miron, din Bălaia 

(judeŃul Bihor) şi Molnar Leontin, din AbrămuŃ (judeŃul Bihor). 

Lipsa de experienŃă a membrilor grupului, cauzată în principal de tinereŃea 

componenŃilor săi, a condus la arestarea celor mai mulŃi dintre aceştia. Acest fapt a fost 

posibil ca urmare a infiltrării unui turnător în organizaŃie. Ca urmare a descoperirii 

parŃiale a activităŃii clandestine a acesteia unii dintre fruntaşii OrganizaŃiei România 

Independentă în frunte cu Nistor Bădiceanu au fost prinşi şi arestaŃi în iunie 1948. După 

10 luni de anchete în aresturile SecurităŃii din Oradea şi Cluj, la 24 martie 1949 grupul a 

fost judecat de către Tribunalul Militar din Cluj. Pedepsele date au fost foarte dure şi au 

variat între doi şi şase ani. Cea mai grea pedeapsă a fost a lui Nistor Bădiceanu, 

condamnat la şase ani şi jumătate. 

O parte a organizaŃiei a supravieŃuit însă şi în toamna anului 1948 şi s-a regrupat sub 

conducerea lui Vasile Furtoş, de loc din Sărsig. Punctul de comandă era tot în Oradea şi 

avea ramificaŃii în comunele: Sărsig, Chiribiş, Ciutelec, Varviz, Ciuleşti, Bogeiu, Ghida, 

5 A. Faur, Noi documente despre grupul de rezistenŃă anticomunistă din sudul Bihorului (1946- 

1950), în Istoria - ca experienŃă intelectuală, Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, 2001, p. 393 - 409 

6 A. Brazdă, A. łărău, Revolte Ńărăneşti în documente şi fapte, Editura Imprimeriei de Vest, 

Oradea, 2006, p. 41 

685

Săldăbagiu de Barcău, Marginea, Spinuş, Cenaloş, Ciuhoiu, Hăuceşti, Fegernic, Sarcău, 

Oşorhei, Nădar, Misca, Rontău, Făncica, AbrămuŃ, Sfârnaş, Sălard - din judeŃul Bihor - şi 

Marca, Ip şi PorŃi - din judeŃul Sălaj 7 . 

Primele informaŃii despre activitatea organizaŃiei, în a doua parte a existenŃei sale, au 

fost primite la sfârşitul anului 1948 când, la 27 decembrie, comandantul SecurităŃii 

bihorene, Czeller Ludovic, emite ordine de arestare pentru 155 de persoane care ar fi 

aparŃinut acestei grupări. În Sălaj au fost arestate pe aceleaşi motive, ca membri ai 

aceleaşi grupări, doar 21 8 . Erau semnalate chiar şi pentru Satu Mare reŃineri de persoane 

care au făcut parte din organizaŃie, în număr de 28 din zona Tăşnad - Carei, ceea ce 

dovedeşte că ramificaŃiile grupării s-au întins şi în acest judeŃ. 

InformaŃiile ulterioare legate de mişcare sunt pe linia regrupării forŃelor acesteia la 

nivelul comunelor mai sus amintite. 1949 a fost anul în care s-au intensificat mult 

acŃiunile derulate de această organizaŃie în contextul în care începând cu luna martie în 

România s-a declanşat la scară naŃională procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii. 

InformaŃiile deŃinute de forŃele de Securitate convergeau toate înspre dezvoltarea unor 

acŃiuni potrivnice regimului, toate foarte bine coordonate şi organizate. Primele elemente 

care conduc la concluzia organizării unor acŃiuni "în stil mare" au fost primite de 

Securitate la 11 mai 1949, când se ştia deja că exista un plan în două etape pentru 

rezistenŃă la colectivizare în lumea satelor 9 . 

În prima fază urmau a se rezolva chestiunile legate de logistică prin procurarea 

armamentului, cu sprijinul unor ofiŃeri activi ai armatei române şi organizarea grupurilor de 

acŃiune, iar în a doua parte răscularea comunelor una după alta prin oamenii care făceau 

parte din organizaŃie. S-a reuşit atragerea la nivel local, de partea răsculaŃilor, a unor 

funcŃionari din aparatul de stat, iar la nivel central organizaŃia a reuşit să-şi apropie unele 

elemente din armată, grăniceri, trupe de Securitate şi MiliŃie. La 20 iunie 1949 o bună parte a 

armamentului necesar desfăşurării acŃiunilor era procurat de la unităŃi militare din Oradea şi 

Marghita 10 . Declanşarea acŃiunilor a fost fixată pentru 5 iulie 1949. Există informaŃii 

conform cărora OrganizaŃia România Independentă avea legături cu grupuri de rezistenŃă 

din zona MunŃilor Apuseni fără însă ca acestea să fie foarte bine documentate. În orice caz, 

documentele SecurităŃii pomenesc despre existenŃa acestei posibilităŃi. 

Pe 21 iunie 1949 au început preparativele pentru aplicarea pe teren a planului de acŃiune 

convenit. Şeful OrganizaŃiei România Independentă, Vasile Furtoş, într-o şedinŃă 

conspirativă în casa lui Teodor Molnar din Chiraleu, membru al organizaŃiei, a hotărât 

constituirea aşa numitelor echipe de sacrificiu care vor circula prin toate satele pentru 

declanşarea acŃiunii propriu zise. La şedinŃă au participat mai mulŃi fruntaşi ai mişcării 

care şi-au luat angajamentul că vor merge acolo unde li se va ordona şi vor executa 

întocmai planurile. A doua zi însă Vasile Furtoş este arestat de Securitate 11 . ReŃinerea sa 

imediat după întâlnire şi cunoaşterea detaliilor discuŃiilor din casa lui Teodor Molnar 

indică prezenŃa unui turnător la întâlnire. 

7 A.S.R.I, Fondul documentar,Dosar nr. 4638. 

8 Idem.,Dosar nr. 4640, f. 69. 

9 Idem, Dosar nr.4638 , f. 70 

10 Ibidem 

11 Ibidem, f .71 

686

Pe moment acŃiunea părea compromisă. În aceste condiŃii la, 25 iulie 1949, acasă la 

Nistor Pop din Sărsig, s-au întâlnit câŃiva fruntaşi ai organizaŃiei. Aceştia au hotărât 

amânarea declanşării acŃiunii pentru 1 august 1949. S-a definitivat organizarea fiecărui 

grup de acŃiune. În prima fază urmau a fi 5 grupuri a câte 10 oameni, care aveau misiunea 

specială de a da semnalul declanşării acŃiunilor în toate satele. AcŃiunea a pornit deci cu 

circa 50 de oameni, la care trebuia apoi să se alăture locuitorii satelor. Din aceste grupe 

de sacrificiu făceau parte inclusiv studenŃi care se aflau în vacanŃă 12 . Ei trebuia să asigure 

paza satelor răsculate prin constituirea unor pichete la marginea localităŃilor pentru ca în 

cazul apariŃiei forŃelor de represiune să anunŃe sătenii şi, în măsura posibilităŃilor, să 

reziste până la sosirea de întăriri din aşezările ameninŃate. 

Împrejurările au făcut ca data de 1 august 1949 să fie devansată în ceea ce priveşte 

declanşarea acŃiunilor astfel ca prin 27-28 iulie 1949 acestea să fie în plină desfăşurare în 

partea de nord-est a judeŃului, iar membrii OrganizaŃia România Independentă să fie în 

mijlocul violentelor evenimente care vor urma. Este vorba de declanşarea revoltelor 

Ńărăneşti cauzate de demararea procesului de colectivizare a agriculturii la începutul lui 

martie 1949 şi tot ceea ce a urmat în direcŃia distrugerii satului românesc 13 . Arestările 

care au urmat acestor evenimente au condus la încarcerarea lui Vasile Furtos şi a mai 

multor membrii ai OrganizaŃiei România Independentă. Din acel moment aceasta a 

dispărut din peisajul rezistenŃei anticomuniste româneşti. 

Bibliografie 

1. Aurel Brazdă, Augustin łărău, Revolte Ńărăneşti în documente şi fapte, Editura 

Imprimeriei de Vest, Oradea, 2006. 

2. Faur, Viorel, Faur, Antonio, O viaŃă de om sub "ochii" securităŃii, Editura UniversităŃii 

din Oradea, 2006 Faur, Antonio, Căpitanul Ştefan Popescu - liderul grupului de 

rezistenŃă din sudul Bihorului (1946-1950), în Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George 

BariŃ" din Cluj-Napoca, 2004. 

3. Idem, Noi documente despre grupul de rezistenŃă anticomunistă din sudul Bihorului 

(1946-1950), în Istoria - ca experienŃă intelectuală, Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, 

2001, p. 393 - 409. 

4. Moisa, Gabriel, Colectivizare, rezistenŃă şi represiune în vestul României 1948-1951, 

Editura Muzeului łării Crişurilor, Oradea, 1999. 

5. Idem, Grupuri de rezistenŃă anticomunistă în lumea satului bihorean între anii 1948- 

1950, în Acta Musei Porolissensis, 2000, 23. 

6. Moisa, Gabriel, Primele revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor generate de procesul de 

colectivizare a agriculturii, în Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea. Istorie-Arheologie, 

1996-1997, 6-7. 

7. Idem, Revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor cauzate de debutul procesului de 

colectivizare a agriculturii, în Acta Musei Porolissensis, 2003, 25. 

12 Ibidem 

13 G. Moisa, Primele revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor generate de procesul de colectivizare a 

agriculturii, în Analele UniversităŃii din Oradea. Istorie-Arheologie, 1996-1997, 6-7, p. 311-326; 

Idem, Revolte Ńărăneşti din judeŃul Bihor cauzate de debutul procesului de colectivizare a 

agriculturii, în Acta Musei Porolissensis, 2003, 25, p. 515-529 

687

FOND SECRET, FOND SPECIAL 

Daniel NAZARE 1 

În virtutea stipulaŃiilor ConvenŃiei de ArmistiŃiu încheiate de România şi guvernele 

NaŃiunilor Unite (Moscova, 12 septembrie 1944), s-a introdus cenzurarea publicaŃiilor şi 

manifestărilor cu caracter fascist sau care aduceau atingere NaŃiunilor Unite. În scurt timp 

aceste măsuri au fost deturnate de autorităŃi către cenzura de tip comunist, cu sprijinul 

sovieticilor. După instaurarea Republicii Populare Române, cenzura comunistă a devenit 

atotputernică. Între alte măsuri privind apariŃia ziarelor, difuzarea ştirilor la radio, 

controlului corespondenŃei ş.a., s-a dispus şi epurarea bibliotecilor. O comisie specializată 

avea însărcinarea de a organiza şi coordona „retragerea din comerŃ şi circulaŃie (biblioteci 

publice etc.) a tuturor publicaŃiilor periodice sau neperiodice, tipărite anterior 

ArmistiŃiului, care prin cuprinsul lor ar putea dăuna bunelor noastre relaŃiuni cu NaŃiunile 

Unite şi în special cu U.R.S.S.“ 

La 17 decembrie 1944, apoi la 21 decembrie acelaşi an, au fost aduse la cunoştinŃa 

cititorilor primele liste cu „publicaŃiile ce urmează a fi retrase din edituri, librării, 

biblioteci publice etc.“ Se prevedea, totodată, că doar „bibliotecile cu drept de depozit 

legal şi bibliotecile instituŃiilor de învăŃământ superior pot păstra aceste publicaŃiuni, 

inventariate, închise în dulapuri sau încăperi speciale, sub directa răspundere a şefilor 

acestor instituŃiuni. Ele nu vor putea fi consultate, în scop de studiu, decât cu autorizaŃia 

specială, dată sub proprie răspundere, a şefilor instituŃiilor respective.“ Astfel au apărut 

Fondurile Speciale ale bibliotecilor, desfiinŃate abia după decembrie 1989. 

În bibliotecile din România se păstrează mai multe liste după care s-au făcut epurările 

cărŃilor în 1945-1989: trei volume în 1945, unul în 1946, un masiv volum în 1948, însoŃit 

de un supliment, precum şi unul din 1949. În prefaŃa volumului din 1948 se anunŃa că va 

fi urmat de suplimente anuale şi se afirma necesitatea unor epurări aproape perfecte, 

făcute atât de bine, încât cărŃile să se mai găsească doar în câteva biblioteci ,,oficiale 

documentare“, unde vor putea fi studiate de istoricii viitorului. 

Suplimentul din 1948 este structurat alfabetic, şi nu pe limbi precum cele anterioare. În 

toate volumele întâlnim însă titluri scrise greşit, mai ales cele în limbi străine. Doar 

pentru cele în maghiară au fost făcute tălmăciri româneşti, în unele cazuri aproximative. 

În 1949 a apărut broşura PublicaŃii nedifuzabile. Liste de circulaŃie internă, care 

marchează trecerea la o altă etapă: de la interzicerea publicaŃiilor (1945) la secretizarea 

lor (1949). Până în 1949 nu putem vorbi despre fonduri secrete de bibliotecă, ci doar 

despre fonduri de publicaŃii interzise, pentru că cele din 1945-1948 aveau un pronunŃat 

caracter public. Astfel, în titlul listelor din 1945-1946 apare expresia ,,scoase din 

1 Biblioteca JudeŃeană George BariŃiu, Braşov, Romania. 

688

circulaŃie“, în cel al listelor din 1948 cuvântul ,,interzise“, iar în cel din 1949 

,,nedifuzabile“. Dacă primele indicaŃii vizau doar volumele, revistele şi ziarele aflate în 

instituŃii (inclusiv din biblioteci), cea din 1948 le incrimina şi pe cele deŃinute în locuinŃe 

particulare, din acest motiv broşura respectivă fiind difuzată şi public prin punerea în 

vânzare. 

Lista cu publicaŃiile scoase din circulaŃie în 1945 are 1.828 titluri, cea din 1946 – 2.538, 

iar cea din 1949 – 7.694. 

În decretul-lege din 2 mai 1945 se menŃiona explicit ce trebuia să conŃină aceste liste: 

„toate publicaŃiile periodice şi neperiodice apărute de la 1 ianuarie 1917 până la 23 august 

1944, cuprinzând idei legionare, fasciste, hitleriste, şoviniste, rasiste sau pasagii 

dăunătoare bunelor relaŃii ale României cu NaŃiunile Unite“. În 1948 se aduceau precizări 

suplimentare. Astfel, unele ediŃii ale autorilor clasici „erau interzise pentru spiritul fascist 

în care s-a [sic!] făcut editarea, comentarea şi prezentarea lor“. De asemenea erau 

interzise, fără vreo altă precizare, „toate manualele şcolare anterioare anului 1947, sau 

care nu figurează pe tabloul oficial al manualelor aprobate de Ministerul ÎnvăŃământului“. 

InterdicŃia viza şi „orice hărŃi care înglobează între graniŃele Republicii Populare Române 

teritorii ce nu-i aparŃin“, respectiv Basarabia, nordul Bucovinei, aflate la U.R.S.S., şi 

sudul Dobrogei, cedat Bulgariei. La fel, erau interzise „toate calendarele, almanahurile 

populare etc. de orice fel din perioada 1938/1944“. 

Indexul lucrărilor epurate în 1948 cuprindea nume precum Ion Antonescu, Maria 

Antonescu, Armand Călinescu, Octavian Goga, Iuliu Maniu, Pamfil Şeicaru, Al. Vaida- 

Voevod, Mircea Vulcănescu, membrii familiei regale, ediŃii din Mihai Eminescu, Ion 

Creangă, I.L. Caragiale, alŃi mari scriitori din secolele XIX-XX. 

Aceste liste au fost folosite pentru a scoate din circulaŃie, ca o ironie a sorŃii, chiar şi 

lucrări ale unor lideri comunişti, care nu puteau fi interzise în mod public. În fişiere au 

fost trecute la index şi o serie de titluri care stârnesc nedumerirea, întrucât, o parte dintre 

ele nu se regăsesc şi pe alte liste (mai ales cele apărute după 1950), ele constituind astfel 

o contribuŃie ,,originală“ a cenzorilor locali: Oaia de rasă Karakul; Hrănirea vacilor de 

lapte; Plantarea pomilor roditori; Mulgerea raŃională şi îngrijirea [!] laptelui în micile 

gospodării; Ajutorul U.R.S.S. pentru România obŃinut de guvernul Groza; Alimentarea cu 

apă a centrelor populate; Să alegem pe cei mai buni oameni ai muncii în consiliile de 

conducere a [!] cooperativelor; Adevărata faŃă a democraŃiei burgheze dezvăluită de 

scriitorii noştri; Am văzut zorii comunismului; Sărăcirea oamenilor muncii din Ńările 

capitaliste şi coloniale ca urmare a pregătirilor de război; IntoxicaŃiile animalelor 

domestice; Din munca pescarilor şi piscicultorilor; Ghivecele nutritive; Creşterea şi 

folosirea boilor de muncă; łesături pe gustul oamenilor muncii; Cum combatem râia 

neagră a cartofului; Jefuirea poporului român de către monarhie; Cum s-au obŃinut 

producŃii de peste 60 kg miere pe familii de albine; Combaterea ciorilor ş.a. 

Opera lui Nicolae Iorga a fost în mare parte pusă la index (cele mai multe titluri ale unui 

autor român), iar multe cărŃi ale sale au fost epurate, fără ca titlurile să se regăsească şi în 

listele amintite mai sus. În multe situaŃii, cenzorii au fost ,,creativi“, inclusiv cu sinteza de 

Istoria românilor în 11 volume (1936-1939), care avea un regim diferit în bibliotecile din 

România: în unele toate volumele erau puse la index, în altele doar o parte, în altele 

deloc. Surprizele nu se opresc însă aici. De pildă, în indexul din 1948 se află trecută 

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cartea Neamul românesc în Basarabia, accesibilă însă în unele biblioteci. Avem însă şi 

situaŃia inversă: volumul Neamul românesc în Bucovina al aceluiaşi autor, omis în toate 

broşurile, dar trecut la secret de cenzori locali în unele biblioteci. Un semn cât se poate de 

clar că se opera nu doar cu broşurile, registrele inventar, cataloagele şi fişele cărŃilor, ci 

direct la rafturile din depozite, prin răsfoirea cărŃilor. 

Această lectură fugitivă, de multe ori făcută de oameni incompetenŃi, a dus la epurarea 

multor lucrări. Alte cazuri ciudate: volume care se aflau atât la fondul documentar, cât şi 

la cel secret/special. În această situaŃie un cititor abil putea să ajungă mai repede la ele, 

dacă cerea cota de la fondul documentar. O serie de biblioteci ale unor instituŃii 

indezirabile (inclusiv eclesiastice) au fost vărsate în bibliotecile publice, ştampilele de pe 

cărŃi atestând provenienŃa. O parte dintre aceste volume arată astăzi impecabil în ciuda 

vechimii lor, iar anii de interdicŃie au făcut ca unele dintre ele să rămână cu paginile 

lipite. 

Fondurile documentare au fost desfiinŃate formal în 1968, dar cele secrete (speciale) sau 

menŃinut până în 1989. Fondul secret a devenit fond special, însă esenŃa a rămas 

aceeaşi. InstrucŃiunile elaborate în 1968 recunosc doar fondurile de circulaŃie curentă şi 

pe cele de circulaŃie specială, clasificare menŃinută şi de alte norme din 1981. Anterior 

anului 1965 puŃini îşi asumau riscul de a citi cărŃile trecute la index, fără a beneficia de un 

permis de acces la fondul special. 

Demn de menŃionat este şi faptul că multe cărŃi, puse anterior la index, au fost reeditate 

după 1965, însă cu prefeŃe justificative şi pasaje amputate. Amintim printre acestea scrieri 

de N. Iorga, B.P. Hasdeu, Sextil Puşcariu ş.a., în care erau eliminate fragmente referitoare 

la Basarabia, Bucovina, alte cărŃi în care se făceau referiri critice la bolşevici etc. EdiŃiile 

critice din clasici, operele altor autori moderni apăreau cu „croşete“ (semnele eliminării). 

Asistăm la diminuarea treptată a controlului exercitat asupra lecturii, deşi ne-am fi 

aşteptat, mai ales după 1971, ca măsurile să fie tot mai dure. Consultarea devine 

permisivă, fiind restricŃionaŃi cu precădere cititorii din afara graniŃelor Ńării. 

Ultimul deceniu de comunism seamănă sub anumite aspecte cu primul, dacă ne referim 

la apariŃia unor liste despre ,,autori ale căror lucrări vor fi retrase din circuitul lecturii“. 

Astfel, în 1983 şi 1988, au fost elaborate liste cu 36, respectiv 152 de autori interzişi, în 

cea de-a doua fiind incluşi şi cei din prima listă. 

Într-o astfel de listă „a autorilor ale căror lucrări vor fi retrase din circuitul lecturii“, 

elaborată la 28 iulie 1983, figurau printre alŃii Gabriela Melinescu, Petru Popescu, 

Mariana Şora, Ion Caraion, Dumitru łepeneag, Dana CrivăŃ-Lovinescu, Gelu Ionescu ş.a. 

Scandalul legat de meditaŃia transcendentală a făcut ca unele cărŃi despre yoga să fie 

trecute la index, iar lista din 1988 conŃine şi mai multe cărŃi despre jocul de bridge, 

considerat ,,capitalist“. Nu a existat o practică unitară de marcare în fişiere a trecerii 

acestor cărŃi la fondul special, operaŃiunea fiind făcută în timpi diferiŃi, fără a avea 

coerenŃa din primele două decenii de regim comunist. Se pare că cenzorii locali nu îşi 

ieşiseră cu totul din mână, dar făceau şi confuzii, lăsând spre consultare cărŃi prohibite şi 

trecând la index altele, chiar ale aceluiaşi autor, despre care nu se pomenea în vreun act. 

Există în biblioteci autori trecuŃi cu întreaga operă la index, în special cei prezenŃi în 

lista din 1983, dar şi unii cu o singură carte, mai ales în lista din 1988. Prioritate se acorda 

celor plecaŃi în Occident, prohibiŃi cu toată opera. Uneori chiar librăriile retrăgeau cu 

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întârziere cărŃile autorilor care părăsiseră România. Au fost însă şi lucrări scoase din 

circuitul lecturii din cauza limbajului licenŃios, atingerii unor sensibilităŃi naŃionale, 

antisemitismului. 

Într-o Ńară în care nu se mai găseau alimente, mai ales după 1980, a te mai ocupa de 

punerea la index a unor cărŃi părea un lux inutil. În realitate, lucrurile erau mult mai 

complicate. Au fost identificate o serie de documente prin care se cerea epurarea cărŃilor, 

dar este posibil ca o parte dintre dispoziŃii să fi fost verbale. Cei care aduceau la 

îndeplinire asemenea ordine erau oameni de maximă încredere şi îndeajuns de speriaŃi 

pentru a nu divulga operaŃiunea. 

În prezent, cărŃile pentru care înainte de 1989 se băteau oamenii în librării din cauza 

,,şopârlelor“ strecurate în texte ajung să fie citite tot mai rar. În ciuda acestor temeri, o 

bibliotecă conŃinând lucrările interzise în perioada comunistă ar fi utilă, chiar dacă nu 

vom şti prea curând câte astfel de volume au fost epurate cu adevărat. 

Cât despre cenzura în biblioteci, aceasta rămânea adesea clandestină, greu de 

reconstituit de istorici, având toate aparenŃele unei crime perfecte. 

Works Cited 

1. * * * 160 de ani de la înfiinŃarea primei biblioteci publice la Braşov 1835-1995. 

1996. Braşov: Biblioteca “George BariŃiu”. 

2. Barthes, Roland. 1984. Le Bruissement de la langue. Essais critiques, IV, Paris: 

Editions du Seuil. 

3. Caravia, P., ed. 2000. Gândirea interzisă. Scrieri cenzurate România 1945-1989, 

Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2000. 

4. Chartier, R. 1998. Originile culturale ale revoluŃiei franceze, Timişoara, Editura 

Sedona. 

5. Chartier, R. 1997. Lecturi şi cititori în FranŃa Vechiului Regim, Bucureşti, Editura 

Meridiane, 1997. 

6. Costea, I., I. Kiraly, D. Radosav. 1995. Fond secret. Fond ,,S” special. ContribuŃii la 

istoria fondurilor secrete de bibliotecă din România. Studiu de caz. Biblioteca 

Central Universitară ,,Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia. 

7. Cornea, Andrei. 1988. Scriere şi oralitate în cultura antică. Bucureşti: Editura Cartea 

Românească. 

8. Costea, I., I. Kiraly, D. Radosav. 1995. Fond secret. Fond ,,S” special. ContribuŃii la 

istoria fondurilor secrete de bibliotecă din România. Studiu de caz. Biblioteca 

Central Universitară ,,Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia. 

9. Darnton, Robert. 2000. Marele masacru al pisicii şi alte episoade din istoria 

culturală a FranŃei. Iaşi: Polirom. 

10. Eco, Umberto. 1996. Limitele interpretării. ConstanŃa: Editura Pontica. 

11. * * * Europa Centrală. Nevroze, dileme, utopii., 1997. Iaşi: Polirom. 

12. Ficeac, B. 1999. Cenzura comunistă şi formarea ,,omului nou. Bucureşti: Editura 

Nemira. 

13. M. Kuhlmann, N. Kuntzman, H. Bellour, Cenzura si bibliotecile în secolul XX, 

Amarcord, Timişoara. 1999. 

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14. Marino, A. 2000. Cenzura în România. SchiŃă istorică introductivă. Craiova: Editura 

Aius. 

15. Mocanu, Marin Radu. 2001. Cenzura comunistă – documente. Bucureşti: Editura 

Albatros. 

16. Ornea, Z. ViaŃa lui Titu Maiorescu, vol. I, Bucureşti, Editura Cartea Românească, 

1986. 

17. Petcu, Marian. 1999. Puterea şi cultura: o istorie a cenzurii. Iaşi: Editura Polirom. 

18. Zaciu, M., M. Papahagi, A. Sasu. 1998. DicŃionarul scriitorilor români, D-L, 

Bucureşti: Editura FundaŃiei Culturale 

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Viata şi opera 

Destinul unui vizionar 

Medicul doctor Ştefan Odobleja 

(1902-1978) 

Ştefan Odobleja jr. 1 

Ştefan Odobleja s-a născut la 13 octombrie 1902 în satul Valea HoŃului (azi Ştefan 

Odobleja), comuna Livezile din judeŃul MehedinŃi, într-o familie de Ńărani mijlocaşi. 

Urmează Şcoala elementară în satul natal, apoi Liceul ,,Traian” din Drobeta Turnu- 

Severin, susŃinut material de fratele său Dumitru, care moare de tifos exantematic în timpul 

primului război mondial. 

După absolvirea liceului cu calificativul ,,foarte bine” activează ca învăŃător suplinitor la 

Şcoala generală din satul PuŃinei, comuna Halînga apoi la Şcoala generală româno-turcă din 

insula Ada-Kaleh. 

Directorul liceului ,,Traian”, profesor Theodor Costescu, făcând o plimbare pe insulă 

împreună cu soŃia, undeva pe malul Dunării, l-a surprins pe fostul elev studiind retras pe 

malul apei, obicei ce l-a însoŃit toată viaŃa. Se relaxa înotând, fiind un bun înotător, primind 

acea ,,prana” - energie cosmică care îi dezvolta emulaŃia. 

Trebuie menŃionat faptul că, Liceul ,,Traian” era unul din cele mai renumite din Ńară, 

printre foştii săi elevi numărându-se personalităŃi precum: Ştefam Milcu, Şerban Cioculescu, 

IoviŃ Popescu, Ionescu Şişeşti, care au ajuns membrii ai Academiei Române. 

Cu contribuŃii personale, Theodor Costescu, fost deputat de Mehedinti, a construit la 

Drobeta Turnu- Severin Palatul culturii, inspirat după Scala din Milano. Fiind sprijinit de 

cumnatul său I.C. Bibicescu, a dotat atât Palatul culturii cât şi Biblioteca oraşului, devenită 

Biblioteca Bibicescu. Acest cadru i-a oferit lui Odobleja, ca autodidact, multe cărŃi de 

referinŃă, reviste şi alte publicaŃii, mai ales de avangardă, adică tot ceea ce era nou în lume şi 

se regăsea inserat în inventarul acestei mari biblioteci de excepŃie. 

În Turnu Severin erau invitaŃi mari personalităŃi care Ńineau conferinŃe în cadrul cărora se 

prezentau cele mai noi apariŃii şi cercetări din diferite domenii, Din auditoriu nu a lipsit 

niciodată elevul Ştefan Odobleja care punea întrebări, iar apoi se documenta asupra 

1 FundaŃia ,,Ştefan Odobleja”Drobeta – Turnu Severin, Romania. 

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subiectelor expuse. Urmând sfatul profesorului Theodor Costescu, dă examen la Facultatea 

de Medicină Militară unde reuşeşte şi i se acordă o bursă de studii. 

În timpul studenŃiei, 1922-1928, citeşte mult din diferite domenii, merge din spital în spital, 

face observaŃii şi ajunge la anumite concluzii ştiinŃifice pe care le publică în reviste precum: 

,,Buletinul medico-terapeutic”, ,,Revista sanitară militară”, ,,Mişcarea medicală română”. 

In anul 1928 susŃine teza de doctorat la Institutul de Medicină Legală cu titlul ,,Accidente 

de automobil”, având ca îndrumător pe profesorul Mina Minovici. În acelaşi an, este 

repartizat ca medic de regiment în garnizoana Brăila apoi în Turnu Severin şi după aceea la 

Lugoj. La Lugoj întâlneşte intelectuali cu preocupări şi cu relaŃii internaŃionale, precum 

tipograful Auspitz care îi va publica lucrarea ,,La Phonoscopie” în anul 1935 şi care trimite 

această lucrare spre difuzare Editurii ,,G.Doine” din Paris. Lucrarea ,,La Phonoscopie”, 

prezentată în 1937 la Congresul InternaŃional de Medicina Militară care are loc la Bucureşti, 

este premiată cu premiul ,,Medic General Dr. Papiu Alexandru”, care se acorda celor mai 

meritorii lucrări scrise de medici militari. Congresul de Medicina Militară, fiind 

internaŃional, avea printre participanŃi medici militari ai diferitelor armate, precum ai URSS 

şi SUA. Aceştia, printre care şi Dr. W.S. Bainbridge, şeful delegaŃiei americane, medic în 

Marina militară, şi-au manifestat interes pentru comunicarea făcută de Ştefan Odobleja. Cu 

acest prilej, Ştefan Odobleja distribuie participanŃilor la congres un prospect în limba 

franceză, anunŃând apariŃia lucrării ,,Psihologia consonantistă”. 

In anul 1938 apare primul volum al „Psihologiei consonantiste”, la editura Maloin din Paris, 

iar în 1939 apare cel de-al doilea volum. ApariŃia acestei lucrări este anunŃată în ianuarie 

1941, şi în prestigioasa revistă internaŃională de psihologie ,,Psyhological abstract”, la poziŃia 

643, pag. 51, unde este dată o scurtă descriere a conŃinutului cărŃii. 

Odată cu venirea războiului, dr. Stefan Odobleja este trimis pe front. Ca medic militar, 

participă la război pe frontul de est şi apoi pe frontul de vest. A scăpat cu viaŃă considerând 

că o iconiŃă pe care a purta-o tot timpul asupra sa, l-a ocrotit şi a ieşit teafăr din cele mai 

încrâncenate lupte în urma cărora au rămas puŃini supravieŃuitori. După terminarea războiului 

este numit medic la Spitalul militar din Dej unde întâlneşte pe studenta în medicină Eva Ilieş, 

cu care se căsătoreşte si cu care are trei copii: Ştefan (n.1947), Milena (n.1948 care moare la 

botez) şi Dumitru (n.1949). 

Viata de medic de regiment a fost dificilă, cu multe servituŃi şi nedreptăŃi. Preocupat de 

cercetare, dr. Stefan Odobleja visa să practice medicina în particular într-un cabinet care-i 

putea oferi liniştea necesară studiului. Ori, statutul de medic militar, în perioada 1945-1947, 

era deosebit de incert. 

In 1947 apare o ordonanŃă de trecere în rezervă a cadrele militare, care părea avantajoasă: i 

se oferea o sumă considerabilă de bani (din care a achiziŃionat terenul pentru construirea unei 

case la Turnu Severin) şi o pensie echivalentă cu 75% din salariu. 

In aceeaşi perioadă, dr. Ştefan Odobleja avea şi un ordin de tranfer la Spitalul militar din 

Bucureşti, sprijinit de profesorul universitar dr. Gheorghe Zapan, care îl aprecia pe Odobleja 

şi dorea să-i fie colaborator pentru cercetări în marile clinici din Bucureşti. Intre cele două 

alternative, familia Odobleja alege stabilirea în satul natal. Astfel, dr. Ştefan Odobleja 

se duce la Comisariatul din Craiova, depune cererea de trecere în rezervă şi debarcă în staŃia 

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Balota lăzile militare care erau în trenul de marfă şi se stabileşte în satul natal. Dar visele nu 

durează mult. Retraşi la Ńară, soŃia constată după naşterea primului copil că, este mare 

diferenŃă între viaŃa din Cluj şi traiul în mijlocul unui sat lipsit de curent electric şi asfalt. 

Ştefan Odobleja rămâne părăsit de soŃie, cu un copil în întreŃinere şi cu o pensie foarte mică, 

deoarece ordonanŃa nu a mai fost aplicată. Se adaptează la viaŃa de Ńară, lipsită de orice 

facilităŃi şi în proces de comunizare 2 . 

łinând cont de precaritatea actului medical în mediul sătesc, Ştefan Odobleja le-a fost de un 

real folos sătenilor care au apreciat pe fostul lor coleg de joacă. 

Donează 450 volume de cărŃi Bibliotecii căminului cultural, pentru ca sătenii să se poată 

documenta pe teme de pomicultură, apicultură, legumicultură şi creşterea animalelor. 

Deşi locuieşte la Ńară, menŃine continuu legătura cu Biblioteca ,,Bibicescu”, are 

corespondenŃă cu personalităŃi ale Academiei şi din universităŃi, se abonează la ,,Muncitorul 

sanitar”, ,,România literară”, ,,Contemporanul” şi ,,Urzica”. Radioul ,,Aurion” îi facilita 

ascultarea posturilor de radio Europa liberă şi Vocea Americii, dar şi emisiunile de teatru şi 

„unda veselă”. Subiectele preferate discutate cu foştii camarazi din armată erau dacă vin 

americanii şi contrarevoluŃia din Ungaria. Toare acestea, i-au creat neplăceri, fiind „vizitat” 

des de organele de securitate. 

In sat apare întovărăşirea şi înfiinŃarea ,,GAC”. Începe desproprietărirea Ńăranilor de 

micile lor suprafeŃe de pământ, animalele sunt duse într-un grajd comun. Plugurile, grapiŃele 

şi rariŃele sunt aruncate în ogaş la marginea satului. Apar tractoarele ,,Utos” cu pluguri cu 

care începe să se facă agricultură pe suprafeŃe întinse. Începe depopularea satelor, Ńăranii 

devin muncitori la uzinele din Turnu Severin. 

2 Doresc să descriu viaŃa petrecută la Ńară în acea perioadă dominată de teroarea stalinistă (1947 – 

1960). Încă nu se luaseră măsuri de deposedare a Ńăranilor de uneltele şi atelajele lor, şi, deşi încă 

dăinuia proprietatea privată, se făceau munci colective la arat, săpat, prăşit, secerat, treierat, culesul 

porumbului, depănuşat, la care se făceau clăci cu tinerii, la culesul viilor.În sat era o bogată activitate 

culturală desfăşurată de şcoală, se cânta în cor, aveau loc spectacole regizate de învăŃătorul din sat. 

Erau sărbătorite cu mult fast şi participare sărbătorile de Florii, Paşte, Crăciun şi nedeea satului Sfânta 

Maria Mică la care participau toŃi fii satului. Ce a prezis Ştefan Odobleja a început să apară printre 

personalităŃile satului,care erau preotul, învăŃătorul, dascălul, cinci miliŃieni deoarece era zonă de 

frontieră,iar printre pădurile din jurul satului apărea un partizan Trocan,ce devenise legendar în zonă şi 

pe care tatăl meu îl cunoscuse. La căminul cultural începuseră şedinŃele unde erai obligat să 

participi;tatăl meu mă lua cu el, era interesant pentru mine, activiştii de partid înainte de a lua cuvântul 

se pieptănau,având părul dat cu ulei. Au apărut şi activiştii de partid recrutaŃi din rândul sătenilor, 

aceia care aveau o origine „sănătoasă”. Primul activist a fost Vasile a lui Hoarcă ,îi zicea aşa pentru că 

se îmbăta şi dormea prin şanŃuri horcăind. După ce l-au făcut membru de partid, mergea prin sat şi se 

adresa de sus: „Doctore,dacă nu cureŃi şantul vei avea de-a face cu mine! Popă, dacă nu vărui 

călendrele o s-o păŃeşti!” Se uitau oamenii la el şi nu le venea să creadă. În anul 1956 la moartea lui 

Stalin, activista de partid Anica lui Ianoş era îmbrăcată în doliu şi în mijlocul satului se văicărea: „Ce 

ne facem noi, că a murit tovarăşul Stalin?” Prin aceste cozi de topor s-a colectivizat satul, am asistat la 

scene incredibile, s-a luat pământul de la săteni, s-au strâns animalele şi atelajele. Copii erau trimişi de 

la şcoală să muncească pământul, locuitorii satului au început să migreze către industria din Turnu 

Severin, a început cartelizarea pâinii, satele au fost depopulate. 

695

In această atmosferă, Ştefan Odobleja, pe terenul din Turnu Severin, care fusese ocupat de 

grăniceri, reuşeşte cu timpul să construiască o magazie în care finalizează o cameră de locuit. 

Nu reuşeşte să realizeze construirea unei case pe colŃ, al cărui proiect există şi astăzi făcut de 

arhitectul oraşului, pe nume Militescu, în care ar fi trebuit să aibă mult visatul cabinet. 

Oraşul era declarat închis având statut de oraş de frontieră, motiv pentru care cu greu a reuşit 

să ocupe chiar şi acea magazie, întâi ca flotant şi apoi ca cetăŃean al Severinului. 

Ştefan Odobleja frecventa mereu piese de teatru, concerte de muzică populară. La teatru 

cunoaşte pe ziaristul Ioan Stroe Oancea, fost deŃinut politic - pe motivul că a lucrat la ziarul 

,,Universul” cu Pamfil Şeicaru. Acesta îl introduce în cenaclul ,,Danubius” din Turnu 

Severin, pe care îl frecventează, alături de tineri ca Elena Roman, Valeriu Armeanu şi alŃii. 

Aici prezintă ,,Psihologia consonantistă”, publicată la Paris în 1938-1939, şi au loc dezbateri 

pe marginea acestei lucrări. Aceştia iau legătura cu Dumitru Radu Popescu, preşedintele 

Uniunii Scriitorilor din România şi, gazetari de mare condei, cum era Liviu łimbus, sparg 

gheaŃa şi aduc la cunoştinŃa opiniei publice opera lui Stefan Odobleja. 

Urmează polemici între Ştefan Odobleja şi Nicolae Mărgineanu de la Cluj (acesta a predat 

la Harward University). De asemenea, înaintează memorii Academiei Române, susŃine 

conferinŃe şi ia parte la Congresul International de Cibernetica şi Sisteme din 1975, organizat 

la Bucureşti. 

La Congresul International de Cibernetica şi Sisteme, delegatul României, iniŃial, nu îi dă 

voie lui Ştefan Odobleja să facă o expoziŃie de carte dar nici să-şi expună lucrarea. Atât I.C. 

Birciu cât şi Manea Mănescu erau obedienŃi cabinetului 2 ( Elena Ceauşescu) care, de când 

obŃinuse titlul de „savant de renume mondial” nu mai vroia să audă de oamenii de ştiinŃă 

români de valoare internaŃională, precum Coandă, Odobleja, Paulian. Apăra pe cei care s-au 

limitat la traducerea unor lucrări din limba engleză în limba română, neavând interes să 

menŃioneze că o lucrare de cibernetică a apărut pe pământul românesc. 

Deoarece secŃiunea de Istorie era condusă de prof. dr Masturzo din Italia, acesta îi permite 

lui Odobleja să prezinte lucrarea şi îi acordă timp suficient pentru expunere. John Rose, 

preşedintele Congresului, acceptă să i se publice lucrarea în volumul Congresul International 

de Cibernetica şi Sisteme. Odobleja publică 4 pagini în lucrările congresului, nu fără 

constrângeri, deoarece, I. C. Birciu îi recomandă să renunŃe la anumite paralelisme între 

cibernetica lui Norbert Wiener şi psihologia consonantistă. 

In perioada 21-25 august 1978, are loc Congresul International de Cibernetică şi Sisteme de 

la Amsterdam unde se aniversează 30 ani de cibernetică şi se lansează medalia ,,Norbert 

Wiener” pentru cibernetică. După susŃinerea lucrării lui Ştefan Odobleja intitulată 

,,Diversitate şi unitate în cibernetică”, participanŃii la congres scandează: ,,in România, aveŃi 

un om de aur, merită o statuie de aur”. Delegatul român vine în Ńară şi comunică doctorului 

Ştefan Odobleja pe patul de suferinŃă: ,,D-le, am învins, s-a scandat „40 de ani de 

cibernetică” şi, „România, aveŃi un om de aur, merită o statuie de aur”. ,,MulŃumesc, 

mulŃumesc, pentru mine este prea târziu”. I s-au scurs 2 lacrimi pe obrajii chinuiŃi de boală. 

In dimineaŃa zilei de 4 septembrie 1978, la ora 4, ne părăseşte, arătând către tavan conform 

696

unei înŃelegeri făcute cu mine, dacă întrevede o altă lume, probabil ajunsese în lumea pe care 

o credea mai dreaptă decât aceasta. 

După congresul din 1978 de la Amsterdam, John Rose vine în România şi decernează lui 

Nicolae Ceauşescu medalia ,,Norbert Wiener – 30 ani” pentru merite ştiinŃifice în cibernetică. 

Această decernare s-a făcut ca un târg politic pentru a cumpăra protecŃia conducătorilor Ńării 

(Nicolae şi Elena Ceauşescu) pentru a stopa recunoaşterea oamenilor de ştiinŃă români. Se 

ştie că în acea epocă, cei doi conducători ai României erau gratulaŃi cu titluri academice 

precum ,,,Doctor Honoris Cauza” şi ,,Savant de renume mondial”. Insă, nimic nu a putut opri 

afirmarea operei dr. Ştefan Odobleja, care surprindea prin actualitatea ei cât şi prin 

confirmarea din ce în ce mai mult odată cu trecerea timpului. 

Opera lui Odobleja este mereu actuală şi se înalŃă spre bolta cerească acolo unde este locul 

marilor descoperiri a celor mai inteligente minŃi omeneşti şi ne luminează drumul spre viitor. 

Este o datorie a mea ca, în calitate de preşedinte al FundaŃiei ,,Ştefan Odobleja” ,să prezint 

viaŃa plină de insatisfacŃii, oprelişti, de înjosiri morale cât şi materiale la care a fost supus 

dr.Ştefan Odobleja, autorul Psihologiei consonantiste. 

Despre morala economico-socială 

(Material extras din Psihologia consonantistă, pag.710-712) 

Ștefan Odobleja, autorul Psihologiei Consonantiste, publicată la Paris în anul 1938 (Vol. I) 

şi 1939 (Vol. II), în capitolul „Morala Economico-Socială” face o analiză a caracteristicilor 

doctrinei liberale şi doctrinei socialiste, subliniind diferenŃa între cele două concepte (Tabel 

1). 

Școala liberală Școala socialistă 

Individualistă 

Individul este totul 

Libertatea de acŃiune 

Libera concurenŃă, emulaŃie 

EvoluŃie naturală 

Terapeutică naturalistică 

Ortodoxă,tradiŃionalistă 

Postulează inegalitatea nevoilor și 

valorilor drepturilor și obligaŃiilor 

Bazată pe egoism(mobil foarte puternic) 

Bazată pe iubire și ură 

Excită,exaltă,dinamism 

Muncă atrăgătoare 

AmbiŃie,emulaŃie activitate 

697 

Colectivistă,cosmopolită 

Societatea este totul 

Constrângeri,dirijare 

Reglementare,solidaritate 

EvoluŃie artificială 

Terapeutică intervenŃionistă 

RevoluŃionară,reformistă 

Postulează egalitatea(nevoi,valori 

forŃe,drepturi,obligaŃii) 

Bazată pe altruism(mobil destul de slab) 

Bazată pe iubire 

Inhibă,oprește,pasivitate 

Muncă grea,impusă 

IndolenŃă,neglijenŃă

Prioritatea calităŃii 

Prioritatea elitelor 

Profesiunile libere sunt pe primul plan 

Dictatura financiară 

Proprietatea individuală care se poate 

moșteni 

698 

Prioritatea cantităŃii(masa) 

Prioritatea majorităŃilor 

FuncŃionarismul generalizat la toŃi 

cetăŃenii 

Dictatura birocratică 

Proprietatea socialistă 

La analiza făcută asupra celor două doctrine, dr. Ştefan Odobleja face unele observaŃii. 

- Doctrina socialistă preconizează socializarea bunurilor și abolirea proprietăŃii 

individuale. Este doctrina funcŃionarismului generalizat asupra tuturor indivizilor, 

funcŃionalizarea umanităŃii, egalizarea condiŃiilor de viaŃă, uniformizarea mijloacelor 

de existenŃă, standardizarea umanităŃii, uniformizarea (etica social- economică). Este 

o doctrină democrată, pentru proletarizarea tuturor. Idealul social este cel întrevăzut 

de majorităŃi, de săraci, de dezmoșteniŃii sorŃii. 

- Idealul de iubire, de fraternitate, de solidaritate, de altruism, de egalitate. Pentru cei 

bogaŃi este o doctrină subversivă tinzînd să submineze ordinea de stat: o doctrină 

revoluŃionară și reformatoare, utopică și himerică. 

- Dictatura majorităŃilor - Anomalie complexă: dictatura inculŃilor, dictatura leneșilor, 

dictatura mediocrităŃilor. Orice sistem socialist, nu se poate realiza decât într-un stat 

mondial omogenizat ca rasă, limbă, obiceiuri, tradiŃii, gusturi. Pentru moment, 

această omogenizare este departe de a fi realizată - dacă va fi vreodată - în starea 

actuală a umanităŃii, pe de o parte și a știinŃei, pe de altă parte, socialismul este 

destinat să eșueze. 

Istoria a confirmat că, ceea ce a prezis Dr. Ștefan Odobleja în 1939 s-a realizat în 1989,dar 

să vedem cu ce preŃ a plătit această prezicere.

CONSIDERAłI PRELIMINARE PRIVIND 

STRUCTURA PROPRIETĂłII AGRICOLE ÎN 

łARA FĂGĂRAŞULUI (1950) 


Între documentele depistate pe parcursul investigării unei anume teme, unele au o 

forŃă de expresie aparte, prin aceea că oferă direct imaginea unei realităŃi definitorii pentru 

problematica discutată. Astfel credem că sunt cele două documente pe care le prezentăm mai 

jos, care ilustrează structura proprietăŃilor agricole din două subdiviziuni administrative ale 

fostului judeŃ Făgăraş. Este vorba de “plăşile” Făgăraş şi Arpaşu, două din cele cinci ale 

judeŃului – celelalte trei fiind Voila, Cincu şi Şercaia. (1) 

Primul din aceste documente - “Tabel Nominal de felul categoriilor sociale pe 

gospodării Plasa Făgăraş”. [1950] (2), înregistrează în cifre situaŃia pe categorii de proprietate 

din cele 19 localităŃi. Au fost calculate de noi şi înscrise între paranteze drepte datele 

procentuale ale situaŃiilor. 

Beclean: 0 ha – 7 [2,87 %]; 0-1 ha – 14 [5,74 %]; 1-3 ha – 100 [41,00 %]; 3-5 ha – 98 [40,16 

%]; 5-10 ha – 23 [9,42 %]; 10-20 ha – 2 [0,82 %]; Total – 244 gospodării; 

Berivoii Mari: 0 ha – 7 [5,07 %]; 0-1 ha – 4 [2,90 %]; 1-3 ha – 25 [18,11 %]; 3-5 ha – 48 

[34,78 %]; 5-10 ha – 53 [38,40 %]; 10-20 ha – 1 [0,72 %]; Total – 138 gospodării; 

Berivoii Mici: 0 ha – 6 [3,57 %]; 0-1 ha – 2 [1,19 %]; 1-3 ha – 10 [5,95 %]; 3-5 ha – 20 


Copăcel: 0 ha – 28 [11,29 %]; 0-1 ha – 13 [5,24 %]; 1-3 ha – 37 [14,92 %]; 3-5 ha – 41 


Dejani: 0 ha – 17 [13,07 %]; 0-1 ha – 7 [5,38 %]; 1-3 ha – 52 [40,00 %]; 3-5 ha – 51 [39,23 

%]; 5-10 ha – 3 [2,31 %]; 10-20 ha – 0; Total – 130 gospodării; 

GalaŃi: 0 ha – 18 [5,98 %]; 0-1 ha – 34 [11,29 %]; 1-3 ha – 120 [39,86 %]; 3-5 ha – 110 

[36,54 %]; 5-10 ha – 19 [6,31 %]; 10-20 ha – 0; Total – 301 gospodării; 

Hârseni: 0 ha – 0; 0-1 ha – 10 [6,85 %]; 1-3 ha – 11 [7,53]; 3-5 ha – 34 [23,29 %]; 5-10 ha – 

87 [59,59 %]; 10-20 ha – 4 [2,74 %]; Total – 146 gospodării; 

Hurez: 0 ha – 4 [2,60 %]; 0-1 ha – 4 [2,60 %]; 1-3 ha – 34 [22,08 %]; 3-5 ha – 63 [40,91 %]; 

5-10 ha – 43 [27,92 %]; 10-20 ha – 6 [3,90 %]; Total – 154 gospodării; 

Iaşi: 0 ha – 6 [4,92 %]; 0-1 ha – 1 [0,82 %]; 1-3 ha – 5 [4,10 %]; 3-5 ha – 12 [9,83 %]; 5-10 

ha – 68 [55,73 %]; 10-20 ha – 30 [24,60 %]; Total – 122 gospodării; 

699

Ileni: 0 ha – 0; 0-1 ha – 4 [1,48 %]; 1-3 ha – 39 [14,50 %]; 3-5 ha – 78 [29,00 %]; 5-10 ha – 

122 [45,35 %]; 10-20 ha – 22 [8,18 %]; Total – 269 gospodării; 1 

LuŃa: 0 ha – 2 [0,36 %]; 0-1 ha – 1 [1,39 %]; 1-3 ha – 19 [26,39 %]; 3-5 ha – 34 [47,22 %]; 5- 

10 ha – 16 [22,22 %]; 10-20 ha – 0; Total – 72 gospodării; 

Mărgineni: 0 ha – 9 [4,73 %]; 0-1 ha – 5 [2,63 %]; 1-3 ha – 12 [6,31 %]; 3-5 ha – 19 [10,00 


Săsciori: 0 ha – 4 [4,04 %]; 0-1 ha – 5 [5,05 %]; 1-3 ha – 26 [26,26 %]; 3-5 ha – 30 [30,30 


Râuşor: 0 ha – 11 [6,25 %]; 0-1 ha – 13 [7,38 %]; 1-3 ha – 54 [30,68 %]; 3-5 ha – 57 [32,38 


Săvăstreni: 0 ha – 7 [7,44 %]; 0-1 ha – 3 [3,20 %]; 1-3 ha – 17 [18,08 %]; 3-5 ha – 33 [35,10 


Sebeş: 0 ha – 24 [12,63 %]; 0-1 ha – 12 [6,31 %]; 1-3 ha – 42 [22,10 %]; 3-5 ha – 60 [31,58 


Şona: 0 ha – 0; 0-1 ha – 11 [5,00 %]; 1-3 ha – 48 [21,82 %]; 3-5 ha – 57 [25,60 %]; 5-10 ha – 

92 [41,82 %]; 10-20 ha – 12 [5,45 %]; Total – 220 gospodării; 

Telechi Recea: 0 ha – 4 [2,55 %]; 0-1 ha – 17 [10,83 %]; 1-3 ha – 81 [51,60 %]; 3-5 ha – 45 


Vaida Recea: 0 ha – 8 [4,73 %]; 0-1 ha – 16 [9,46 %]; 1-3 ha – 86 [50,89 %]; 3-5 ha – 52 


---------- 

Total general Plasa Făgăraş: 0 ha – 162 [4,93 %]; 0-1 ha – 176 [5,35 %]; 1-3 ha – 818 [24,89 

%]; 3-5 ha – 942 [28,66 %]; 5-10 ha – 1032 [31,40 %]; 10-20 ha – 157 [4,77 %]; Total – 

3287 gospodării; 

---------- 

Cele 19 sate care compuneau Plasa Făgăraş, prezintă situaŃia: 

0 ha: 

3 sate (Hârseni, Ileni, Şona) nu aveau nici o gospodărie cu 0 ha; 

12 sate aveau între 2-11 gospodării cu 0 ha; Procentual/sat: între 0,36 % - 6,25 %; 

4 sate (Dejani-17, GalaŃi-18, Sebeş-24, Copăcel-28) aveau între 17-28 gospodării cu 

0 ha; Procentual/sat: între 5,98 % - 13,70 %; 

Procentaj plasă - 4,93 %; 

0-1 ha: 

18 sate aveau între 1-17 gospodării cu 0-1 ha; Procentual/sat: între 0,82 %-10,83 %; 

1 sat (GalaŃi) avea 34 gospodării cu 0-1 ha. Procentual/sat 11,29 %; 

Procentaj plasă – 5,35 %; 

1 FundaŃia Culturală ,, Negru Vodă ” Făgăraş 

700

1-3 ha: 

2 sate (Beclean, GalaŃi) aveau 100 şi 120 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat: 41,00 

% şi 39,86 %; 

2 sate (Telechi Recea, Vaida Recea) aveau 81 şi 86 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. 

Procentual/sat 51,60 %-50,89%; 

15 sate aveau între 5 şi 54 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat între 4,10 %-40,00 %; 


3-5 ha: 

2 sate (Beclean, GalaŃi) aveau 98 şi 110 gospodării cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat: 40,16 

%, 36, 54 %; 

17 sate aveau între 12 şi 78 gospodării cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat între 9,83 %-47,22 

%; 


5-10 ha: 

3 sate (Berivoii Mici, Copăcel, Ileni) aveau 119, 122 şi 122 gospodării cu 5-10 ha. 

Procentual/sat: 70,83 %, 49,19 %, 45,35 %; 

4 sate (Iaşi, Hârseni, Şona, Mărgineni) aveau 68, 87, 92, 101 gospodării cu 5-10 ha. 

Procentual/sat: 55,73 %, 59,59 %, 41,82 %, 53,16 %; 

9 sate aveau între 16 şi 53 gospodării cu 5-10 ha. Procentual/sat între 

6,31 %-38,40 %; 

3 sate (Dejani, Vaida Recea, Telechi Recea) aveau 3, 7, 10 gospodării cu 5-10 ha. 

Procentual/sat: între 2,31 %-6,37 %; 


10-20 ha: 

3 sate (Ileni, Iaşi, Mărgineni) aveau 22, 30, 44 gospodării cu 10-20 ha. 

Procentual/sat: 8,18 %, 24,60 %, 23,16 %; 

2 sate (Berivoii Mici, Şona) aveau 11, 12 gospodării cu 10-20 ha. Procentual/sat: 

6,55 %, 5,45 %; 

9 sate aveau între 1-7 gospodării cu 10-20 ha. Procentual/sat: între 0,72 %-5,05 %. 

5 sate (Dejani, GalaŃi, LuŃa, Telechi Recea, Vaida Recea) nu aveau gospodării cu 10- 

20 ha. 

Procentaj plasă: 4,77 %; 

Câteva constatări 

Dine cele 162 gospodării înregistrate cu 0 ha – reprezentând 4,93 % - marea majoritate 

aparŃineau comunităŃilor de Ńigani. La Copăcel, cele 28 de gospodării – reprezentând 11,29 

%, erau grupate în cătunul “Măliniş”, principala lor ocupaŃie fiind confecŃionarea de mături şi 

701

împletituri din nuiele pe care le desfăceau în satele din jur. Aceeaşi a fost situaŃia şi în satul 

Dejani, unde gospodăriile respective alcătuiau comunitatea “Muşunoaie”. (3) 

Această plasă situată central în cadrul judeŃului prezintă şi procentaje semnificative pentru 

categoriile de gospodării cu 3-5 ha – 942, reprezentând 28,66 %, 5-10 ha – 1032, 

reprezentând 31,40 % şi 10-20 ha – 157, reprezentând 4,7 %. Ponderea gospodăriilor cu 3-20 

ha fiind de 64,76 %. 

Al doilea document pe care îl prezentăm ne oferă date privind: “SituaŃia gospodăriilor 

agricole din plasa Arpaşu de Jos, cu structura lor după suprafaŃa de teren arabil pe care o 

folosesc”. (4) 

Arpaşu de Jos: 0-1 ha – 17 [6,11 %]; 1-2 ha – 57; 2-3 ha – 102; [1-3 ha – 57+102=159] 

[57,20 %]; 3-5 ha – 94 [33,81 %]; 5-10 ha – 7 [2,52 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 

30-40 ha – 1 [0,36 %]; Total – 278 gospodării; 

Arpaşu de Sus: 0-1 ha – 59 [15,86 %]; 1-2 ha – 163; 2-3 ha – 115; [1-3 ha – 163+115=278] 

[74,73 %]; 3-5 ha – 32 [8,60 %]; 5-10 ha – 3 [0,80 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 

20-40 ha – 0; Total – 372 gospodării; 

CârŃa: 0-1 ha – 26 [10,52 %]; 1-2 ha – 50; 2-3 ha – 120; [1-3 ha – 50+120=170] [68,82 %]; 3- 

5 ha – 48 [19,43 %]; 5-10 ha – 3 [1,21 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 0; 

Total – 247 gospodării; 

Colun: 0-1 ha – 10 [6,45 %]; 1-2 ha – 30; 2-3 ha – 34; [1-3 ha – 30+34=64] [41,28 %]; 3-5 ha 

– 68 [43,87 %]; 5-10 ha – 13 [8,38 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 0; 


Corbi: 0-1 ha – 4 [4,60 %]; 1-2 ha – 12; 2-3 ha – 26; [1-3 ha – 12+26=38] [43,68 %]; 3-5 ha 

– 34 [39,08 %]; 5-10 ha – 11 [12,64 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 0; 


Feldioara: 0-1 ha – 10 [7,19 %]; 1-2 ha – 46; 2-3 ha – 56; [1-3 ha – 46+56=102] [73,38 %]; 

3-5 ha – 25 [17,98 %]; 5-10 ha – 2 [1,44 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 

0; Total – 139 gospodării; 

Noul Român: 0-1 ha – 11 [4,93 %]; 1-2 ha – 34; 2-3 ha – 58; [1-3 ha – 34+58=92] [41,25 %]; 

3-5 ha – 92 [41,25 %]; 5-10 ha – 26 [11,66 %]; 10-15 ha – 1 [0,45 %]; 15-20 ha – 1 

[0,45 %]; 30-40 ha – 0; Total – 223 gospodării; 

Oprea CârŃişoara: 0-1 ha – 45 [17,44 %]; 1-2 ha – 85; 2-3 ha – 92; [1-3 ha – 85+92=177] 

[68,60 %]; 3-5 ha – 36 [13,95 %]; 5-10 ha – 0; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 


Streza CârŃişoara: 0-1 ha – 43 [22,28 %]; 1-2 ha – 113; 2-3 ha – 27; [1-3 ha – 113+27=140] 

[72,54 %]; 3-5 ha – 10 [5,18 %]; 5-10 ha – 0; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 


Porumbacu de Jos: 0-1 ha – 17 [4,66 %]; 1-2 ha – 65; 2-3 ha – 105; [1-3 ha – 65+105=170] 

[46,57 %]; 3-5 ha – 154 [42,19 %]; 5-10 ha – 24 [6,57 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 

0; 20-40 ha – 0; Total – 365 gospodării; 

702

Porumbacu de Sus: 0-1 ha – 7 [1,90 %]; 1-2 ha – 59; 2-3 ha – 144; [1-3 ha – 59+144=203] 

[55,16 %]; 3-5 ha – 149 [40,49 %]; 5-10 ha – 9 [2,44 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 

20-40 ha – 0; Total – 368 gospodării; 

Sărata: 0-1 ha – 8 [3,25 %]; 1-2 ha – 41 [16,66 %]; 2-3 ha – 87; [1-3 ha – 41+87=128] [52,03 

%]; 3-5 ha – 93 [37,80 %]; 5-10 ha – 17 [6,91 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 

ha – 0; Total – 246 gospodării; 

Scorei: 0-1 ha – 15 [5,22 %]; 1-2 ha – 44; 2-3 ha – 69; [1-3 ha – 44+69=113] [39,37 %]; 3-5 

ha – 142 [49,48 %]; 5-10 ha – 17 [5,92 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 0; 


Ucea de Jos: 0-1 ha – 13 [6,95 %]; 1-2 ha – 24; 2-3 ha – 58; [1-3 ha – 24+58=82] [43,85 %]; 

3-5 ha – 77 [41,17 %]; 5-10 ha – 15 [8,02 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 


Ucea de Sus: 0-1 ha – 13 [6,25 %]; 1-2 ha – 15 [7,21 %]; 2-3 ha – 55; [1-3 ha – 15+55=70] 

[33,65 %]; 3-5 ha – 98 [47,11 %]; 5-10 ha – 27 [12,98 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 

0; 20-40 ha – 0; Total – 208 gospodării; 

Viştea de Jos: 0-1 ha – 9 [3,83 %]; 1-2 ha – 39; 2-3 ha – 64; [1-3 ha – 39+64=103] [43,83 %]; 

3-5 ha – 91 [38,72 %]; 5-10 ha – 32 [13,62 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha 

– 0; Total – 235 gospodării; 

Viştea de Sus: 0-1 ha – 50 [16,45 %]; 1-2 ha – 38; 2-3 ha – 71; [1-3 ha – 38+71=109] [35,85 

%]; 3-5 ha – 111 [36,51 %]; 5-10 ha – 34 [11,18 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20- 

40 ha – 0; Total – 304 gospodării; 

Grânari: 0-1 ha – 5 [8,62 %]; 1-2 ha – 8; 2-3 ha – 7; [1-3 ha – 8+7=15] [25,86 %]; 3-5 ha – 

12 [20,69 %]; 5-10 ha – 26 [44,83 %]; 10-15 ha – 0; 15-20 ha – 0; 20-40 ha – 0; 


Total general Plasa Arpaşu: 0-1 ha – 362 [8,60 %]; 1-2 ha – 923; 2-3 ha – 1290; [1-3 ha – 

923+1290=2213] [52,56 %]; 3-5 ha – 1366 [32,44 %]; 5-10 ha – 266 [6,32 %]; 10-15 

ha – 1 [0,02 %]; 15-20 ha – 1 [0,02 %]; 30-40 ha – 1 [0,02 %]; Total – 4210 

gospodării; 

----------- 

Cele 18 sate care compuneau Plasa Arpaşu, prezintă situaŃia: 

0-1 ha: 

4 sate (Arpaşu de Sus, Viştea de Sus, Oprea CârŃişoara, Streza CârŃişoara) aveau 59, 50, 45, 

43 gospodării cu 0-1 ha. Procentual/sat: 15,86 %, 16,45 %, 17,44 %, 22,28 %. 

14 sate aveau între 4 şi 26 gospodării cu 0-1 ha. Procentual/sat: între 1,90 %-10,52 %; 

Procentaj plasă – 8,60 % 

1-3 ha: 

5 sate (Grânari, Corbi, Colun, Ucea de Jos, Ucea de Sus), aveau 15, 38, 64, 70, 82 

gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat 25,86 %, 43,85 %; 

703

6 sate (Feldioara, Viştea de Jos, Viştea de Sus, Scorei, Sărata, Streza CârŃişoara), 

aveau 102, 103, 109, 113, 128, 140 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat între 25,86 %-73,38 

%; 

5 sate (Arpaşu de Jos, CârŃa, Porumbacu de Jos, Oprea CârŃişoara, Porumbacu de 

Sus), aveau 159, 170, 170, 177, 203 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat 46,55 %-68,82 %; 

1 sat (Arpaşu de Sus), avea 278 gospodării cu 1-3 ha. Procentual/sat: 74,73 %; 


3-5 ha: 

3 sate (Scorei, Porumbacu de Sus, Porumbacu de Jos) aveau 142, 149, 154 gospodării 

cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat: 49,48 %, 40,49 %, 42,19 %; 

6 sate (Viştea de Jos, Noul Român, Sărata, Arpaşu de Jos, Ucea de Sus, Ucea de Sus, 

Viştea de Sus) aveau 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 111 gosp. cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat: 38,72 %, 41,25 

%, 37,80 %, 33,81 %, 47,11 %, 36,51 %; 

2 sate (Colun, Ucea de Jos) aveau 68, 77, gospodării cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat: 43,87 

%, 41,17 %; 

7 sate aveau între 10 şi 48 gospodării, cu 3-5 ha. Procentual/sat: 5,18 %-39,08 %; 


5-10 ha: 

6 sate (Grânari, Porumbacu de Jos, Noul Român, Ucea de Sus, Viştea de Jos, Viştea 

de Sus) aveau 24, 26, 26, 27, 32, 34, gospodării cu 5-10 ha. Procentual/sat între 6,57 %-44,83 

%; 

12 sate aveau între 2 şi 17 gospodării, cu 5-10 ha. Procentual/sat între 0,80 %-12,64 

%; 


10-15 ha: 

1 sat (Noul Român) avea 1 gosp. cu 10-15 ha. Procentual/sat: 0,45 %; 

15-20 ha: 

1 sat (Noul Român) avea 1 gosp. cu 15-20 ha. Procentual/sat: 0,45 %; 

30-40 ha: 

1 sat (Arpaşu de Jos) avea 1 gosp. 30-40 ha. Procentual/sat – 0,36 %; 

Având o diferită structurare a proprietăŃilor – nu sunt înregistrate separat gospodăriile 

cu 0 ha, ele fiind incluse în categoria 0-1 ha, iar cele între 1-3 ha fiind separate pe categoriile 

1-2 ha şi 2-3 ha, am procedat la adaptarea la categoriile situaŃiei din plasa Făgăraş. 

Plasei Arpaşu de Jos îi aparŃine cea mai mare proporŃie a gospodăriilor cu 1-3 ha – 

2213, reprezentând 56,26 %. Gospodăriile cu 3-5 ha – 1366, reprezentau 32,44 %, iar cele cu 

5-10 ha, reprezentau 6,32 %. 

ComparaŃia între cele două plase oferă constatarea ponderii mari a gospodăriilor mici 

în plasa Arpaşu şi a celor mijlocii în plasa Făgăraş. 

704

Nu avem deocamdată informaŃii privitoare la cele câteva proprietăŃi mai mari din 

fostul judeŃ Făgăraş, proprietăŃi desfiinŃate prin Reforma Agrară din 1945 şi Decretul 

83/1949. (5) 

Total general Plasa Arpaşu: Total general Plasa Făgăraş: 

0 ha – 162 [4,93 %]; 

0-1 ha – 176 [5,35 %]; 

0-1 ha – 362 [8,60 %]; 0-1 ha – 162+176=338 [10,28 %]; 

1-2 ha – 923; 2-3 ha – 1290; 

[1-3 ha – 923+1290=2213] [52,56 %]; 1-3 ha – 818 [24,89 %]; 

3-5 ha – 1366 [32,44 %]; 3-5 ha – 942 [28,66 %]; 

5-10 ha – 266 [6,32 %]; 5-10 ha – 1032 [31,40 %]; 

10-15 ha – 1 [0,02 %]; 

15-20 ha – 1 [0,02 %]; 10-20 ha – 157 [4,77 ]; 

30-40 ha – 1 [0,02 %]; 

Total – 4210 gospodării; ``` Total – 3287 gospodării; 

NOTE 

(1) În perioada interbelică, judeŃul era organizat în 3 plăşi: Arpaşu de Jos, Făgăraş şi Şercaia. 

Vezi “Indicatorul statistic al satelor şi unităŃilor administrative din România. Cuprinzând 

rezultatele recensământului general al populaŃiei din 29 decembrie 1930, Bucureşti, 1932, 

pp. 157-159”; După război până la reorganizarea administrativă din 1950, judeŃul era 

organizat în 5 plăşi, Arpaşu de Jos, Făgăraş, Şercaia, Cincu şi Voila (ultima înfiinŃată la 1 

aprilie 1946, “Brazde Făgărăşene”, nr. 13/apr. 1946). 

(2) Arhivele NaŃionale, DirecŃia Jud. Braşov, Fond 499, Pretura Făgăraş, dosar Tabele Com. 

Prov. Plasa Făgăraş, SecŃia Cadre, inv. 57/1949, ff. 61, 93]; 

(3) InformaŃii de la diferiŃi săteni din Copăcel şi Dejani, precum şi din satele apropiate. 

(4) Arhivele NaŃionale, DirecŃia Jud. Braşov, Fond 497, Pretura Arpaşu de Jos, f. ; 

(5) Dispunem în schimb de informaŃii privind soarta unui fost proprietar din jud. Tulcea, 

ajuns în DO la Făgăraş. Este vorba de Boantă A. Gheorghe, născut în 25 feb. 1907 la 

Rahmanu, Tulcea, fiul lui Andrei şi Maria Boantă, a fost trimis cu familia în DO la 

Făgăraş (1949). Tatăl său, Andrei, n. în 16 nov. 1880 la Berivoii Mari, Făgăraş, fiul lui 

Gheorghe şi Eva, colonizat în Dobrogea, la Rahmanu, a ajuns să aibă o frumoasă avere 

(73 ha, 300 oi ş. a.), dar a fost expropriat prin D. 83/1949 şi trimis cu familia în DO la 

Făgăraş (martie 1949). Gheorghe Boantă a fost în repetate rânduri închis câte 2-3 luni în 

Cetate, între 1951-1956. CondiŃiile detenŃiei din celulele în care a fost deŃinut i-a afectat 

serios sănătatea. [Inf. de la Dna Alexandra Palfi, Făgăraş, fiica celui evocat]; 

705

(6) Pentru comparaŃii la nivelul diferitelor categorii cu situaŃia pe Ńară am preluat următorul 

tablou general: 

Clasa de mărime 

Numărul gospodăriilor SuprafaŃa deŃinută 

1930 1948 1930 1948 

Sub 1 ha 18,6 17,5 1,6 2,1 

1-3 ha 33,5 36,1 11,1 17,5 

3-5 ha 22,8 22,6 15,3 21,7 

5-10 ha 17,1 17,9 20,0 29,7 

10-20 ha 5,5 4,7 12,0 15,3 

20-50 ha 1,7 1,0 7,8 7,3 

Peste 50 ha 0,8 0,2 32,2 6,4 

Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 

Sursa: Dezvoltarea economiei RPR 1948-1957. Ed. Academiei, Bucureşti 1958; 

www.scrigroup.com/afaceri/agricultura/AGRICULTURA-ROMAN... 

706

SITUAłIA MUZEELOR MEMORIALE DIN 

ROMÂNIA DUPĂ 1990. MUZEE CONSACRATE 

PERIOADEI COMUNISTE 


În România există aproximatv 100 de case memoriale deschise ca muzee şi 

răspândite pe întreg teritoriul Ńării. Ele sunt dedicate memoriei colective ale unor 

personalităŃi marcante, o parte dintre ele adăpostesc şi expoziŃii cu tematică 

etnografică mai ales dacă sunt deschise în zone rurale. 

Muzeele memoriale sunt instituŃii ce cultură, de instrucŃie şi educaŃie care 

conservă relicve de mare preŃ din viaŃa oamenilor de seamă, sunt temple ale 

recunoştinŃei, pentru care urmaşii sunt datori marilor înaintaşi. În afară de 

obiectele expuse ilustrative sunt clădirile, grădinile reamenajate şi interioarele 

care te duc cu gândul direct la acele timpuri 3 . ExpoziŃiile refac atmosfera de epocă 

a perioadei în care a trăit personalitatea ilustrată. 

Casa muzeu, repspectiv muzeele memoriale este atractivă prin intimitatea şi 

încifrarea personalităŃii unui creator. Obiectul memorial este de fapt cel care face 

trecerea de la o realitate la alta, ajutând vizitatorul să se transpună în timpul 

personalităŃilor redate 4 . 

În Moldova există peste 20 de instituŃii de acest gen începând cu Muzeul 

Literaturii Române din Iaşi care dispune de 12 muzee şi case memoriale. Muzeul 

Literaturii Române a luat fiinŃă ca instituŃie cu personalitate juridică în anul 1990 

prin desprinderea secŃiei de literatură din cadrul Complexului Muzeal NaŃional 

Moldova. 

Bojdeuca lui Ion Creangă din Iaşi, primul muzeu memorial literar din România 

(inaugurat la 15 aprilie 1918), este unul din cele 12 filiale literare din cadrul 

Muzeului Literaturii Române Iaşi. Ion Creangă este unul dintre clasicii literaturii 

1 

Muzeul JudeŃean de Istorie, Brasov, România. 

2 

Muzeul Casa Muresenilor, România. 

3 

Mihai GeleleŃu, Ion Mihăescu, Scriitori în muzee şi case memoriale, Ed. Didactică şi 

pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1979, p. 7. 

4 

Opriş Ioan, Muzeosofia, Ed. Oscar Print, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 54. 

Mulțumim si pe această cale d- rei Andra Tudor de la Colegiul ”N. Titulescu” din Brațov 

pentru tot sprijinul pe care ni l-a acordat la realizarea acestui studiu ți mai ales pentru prezentarea 

lucrării în Ungaria. 

707

omâne. Recunoscut datorită maiestriei basmelor, poveştilor şi povestirilor sale, 

Ion Creangă a intrat în istoria literaturii române, în principal datorită operei 

autobiografice Amintiri din copilarie.CăsuŃa, devenită azi muzeu, l-a găzduit pe 

Ion Creangă, începând din vara anului 1872, după ce fusese răspopit şi nevoit să 

părăsească locuinŃa din incinta Mănăstirii Golia. Humuleşteanul s-a mutat aici, în 

camera din dreapta, având-o ca vecină pe Ecaterina Vartic, cea care avea să-l 

îngrijească până la sfârşitul vieŃii. 

Toate Poveştile şi Amintirile din copilărie au fost scrise în căsuŃa botezată de 

scriitor bojdeucă. În vara şi toamna anului 1876, Mihai Eminescu a locuit aici 

drept chiriaş al lui Creangă. Clădirea care adăposteşte expoziŃia documentară 

referitoare la viaŃa şi opera lui Creangă, biblioteca, precum şi amfiteatrul în aer 

liber au fost construite în perioada 1984-1989 şi inaugurate la 11 iunie 1989, cu 

ocazia centenarului morŃii marelui povestitor 5 . 

Muzeul „Vasile Alecsandri” a fost deschis publicului în 1928, cu sprijinul 

Academiei Române. Casa de la Mirceşti a lui Vasile Alecsandri a devenit muzeu 

memorial în anul 1957 şi a fost reorganizată în 1987, şi restaurată în anii 1991- 

1992, 1998. ExpoziŃia permanentă cuprinde fotografii, tablouri, manuscrise, 

reviste, cărŃi rare, obiecte diverse ce se constituie într-un sugestiv drum al vieŃii şi 

operei lui Alecsandri 6 . Impresionează mai ales atmosfera de epocă, încăperile în 

care sunt expuse mobilier, obiecte de care s-a folosit, suveniruri adunate în 

călătoriile sale. În parcul din faŃa casei se află mausoleul scriitorului, comandat de 

Academia Română în 1928 7 . 

Muzeul „Sf. Ierarh Dosoftei” adăposteşte secŃia de literatură română veche, 

clădirea a fost sediul celei de-a doua tiparniŃe din Iaşi, în perioada 1677-1686. Cu 

prilejul canonizării Mitropolitului Dosoftei (2005), numele muzeului a devenit 

„Sfântul Ierarh Dosoftei – Mitropolitul” 8 . 

Muzeul „Mihai Codreanu”, casa se păstrează aproape în întregime aşa cum arăta 

în timpul vieŃii poetului, cu toate valorile artistice, cu biblioteca, biroul de lucru, 

sufrageria, dormitorul şi toate celelalte anexe 9 . 

Casa Vasile Pogor, este locul în care se Ńineau şedinŃele Junimii. Clădirea a fost 

ridicată între anii 1855-1858 de Vasile Pogor. La sfârşitul lui februarie 1870, aici 

s-au citit primele versuri trimise Convorbirilor literare de Eminescu. Aici, în 

salonul cel mare de la etaj, „salonul Junimii”, au citit scriitori marcanŃi pentru 

5 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-ion-creanga-bojdeuca-9/ 

6 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-vasile-alecsandri-5/ 

7 Lucian Vasiliu, Ioana Coşereanu, Dan Jumară, Cartea muzeelor literare ieşene, Ed, Terra 

Design, Gura Humorului, 2006, p. 15. 


9 http://www.muzeulliteraturiiiasi.ro/muzee/muzeul-mihai-codreanu-vila-sonet-j/ 

708

literatura română: Eminescu, Caragiale, Creangă, Maiorescu, Conta, Xenopol 10 , 

etc. 

Alte filiale ale Muzeului Literaturii Române sunt de asemenea: muzeul „Otilia 

Cazimir” care a devenit muzeu memorial în 1972, muzeul „Mihail Sadoveanu” 

deschis în anul 1980, muzeul George Topârceanu, muzeul „Mihai Eminescu” 

clădirea din Parcul de Cultură Copou a fost inaugurată în anul 1989 ca un omagiu 

adus poetului la Centenarul morŃii sale. Muzeul „Constantin Negruzzi”a fost 

inaugurat la 7 octombrie 1995 cuprinzând astăzi o expoziŃie documentară şi 

reconstituirea muzeografică a patru camere memoriale 11 . 

La Botoşani există de asemenea o casă memorială care nu trebuie trecută cu 

vederea, Casa Memorială Mihai Eminescu de la Ipoteşti este amenajată în locul în 

care a trăit marele poet şi a fost inaugurată în anul 1940. În curtea casei memoriale 

a lui Eminescu se află Casa Papadopol, o casă Ńărănească de epocă în stil 

moldovenesc, care a aparŃinut ultimului proprietar al moşiei Ipoteşti doctorul 

Papadopol. Acesta şi-a donat casa statului român. În prezent, aici se află Muzeul 

de etnografie al Centrului NaŃional de Studii de la Ipoteşti, fiind expuse obiecte 

provenind din vechile gospodării Ńărăneşti. Muzeul prezintă, cronologic, pe 

parcursul a zece spaŃii – simbol, momentele din viaŃa şi opera eminesciană. 

Intrarea în muzeu recrează, metaforic, universul naturii eminesciene: cerul 

înstelat, nisipul mării cu sideful scoicilor redate în gresie şi arborii stilizaŃi, trei 

elemente care se regăsesc permanent. 

Casele memoriale situate în sudul României sunt în număr de aproximativ 40, 

peste 15 dintre ele se găsesc numai în Bucureşti. 

Muzeul NaŃional George Enescu din Bucureşti se află situat în Palatul 

Cantacuzino, în trei săli ale palatului se desfăşoară cronologic expoziŃia 

permanentă, ce cuprinde, între altele, fotografii, manuscrise, documente diverse, 

diplome, decoraŃii, desene, busturi, instrumente muzicale, fracul şi costumul de 

academician al Academiei Române, masca mortuară şi mulajul mâinilor 

artistului 12 . 

Muzeul Theodor Aman din Bucureşti este singura casa-document de epocă 

ramasă în Bucureşti, adapostind o colecŃie de 196 picturi, 400 de desene şi gravuri 

dar şi 50 de plăci de gravură. 

Muzeul memorial „George Călinescu” din Bucureşti prezintă o parte din 

obiectele personale, mobilier, manuscrise, fotografii, documente privitoare la viaŃa 

şi activitatea marelui literat 13 . 


11 ***, Muzeul „Constantin Negruzzi”, Ed. Vasiliana ț98, Iaşi, 2009, p. 2. 

12 http://www.georgeenescu.ro/document_65_istoric_pg_0.htm 

13 http://www.muzeeromania.ro/arta/casa-memoriala-george-calinescu-bucuresti/ 

709

În judeŃul Prahova sunt aproximatv 10 case memoriale, dintre care cele mai 

reprezentative sunt: Muzeul Constantin Stere, muzeul Ion Luca Caragiale, muzeul 

Cezar Petrescu şi muzeul Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu. 

Muzeul Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu a fost deschis pentru public în timpul vieŃii 

acestuia. ExpoziŃia valorifică documente de istoria culturii: fotografii de familie, 

documente, manuscrise, mobilier şi obiecte personale care au aparŃinut 

cărturarului şi fiicei sale (circa 300 de exponate); carte veche, tablouri înfaŃişândui 

pe Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu şi Iulia Haşdeu; arhiva lui Bogdan Petriceicu 

Haşdeu; schiŃele lui pentru Castelul Iulia Haşdeu; primele ediŃii ale operelor lui 

Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu (1838 - 1907) şi ale Iuliei Haşdeu (1869 - 1888) 14 . 

În Transilvania sunt aproape 30 de case memoriale dintre care mai 

reprezentative sunt Casa Mureşenilor şi Casa Ştefan Baciu din Braşov. 

Casa Muresenilor s-a înfiinŃat în anul 1968, ca urmare a donaŃiei făcute de 

urmaşii familiei Mureşianu. Ei puneau astfel în operă testamentul cultural al lui 

Iacob Mureşianu, oferind statului român, în vederea organizării unui muzeu, 

spaŃiul necesar, o foarte valoroasă colecŃie de mobilier, pictură, sculptură şi mai 

ales o arhivă de o inestimabilă valoare culturală, numărând peste 25.000 de 

documente. Muzeul este consacrat memoriei mai multor membri ai acestei familii 

cu mari merite în viaŃa culturală şi politică a vremii lor. subordonat, o perioadă, 

Muzeului JudeŃean de Istorie Braşov, începând din 1998 a devenit muzeu de sine 

stătător. Muzeul ilustrează în special viaŃa şi activitatea poetului Andrei 

Mureşanu, autorul imnului de stat al României, a publicistului Iacob Mureşianu 

(1812 - 1887), a fiului său Aurel Mureşianu (1847 - 1909), gazetar şi publicist, 

continuatorul tatălui la conducerea "Gazetei de Transilvania", şi a compozitorului 

Iacob Mureşianu junior 15 . 

Casa Memorială Ştefan Baciu a fost deschisă în anul 2006 datorită donaŃiei 

familiei Baciu în favoarea deschiderii unui muzeu memorial dedicat personalităŃii 

marelui om de cultură braşovean. Muzeul a fost inaugurat la data de 21 iunie 

2006. Casa memorială expune piese de mobilier Biedermeier, lucrări de artă 

plastică, obiecte, cărŃi (peste 3.600) şi o arhivă numărând 5.800 de documente, 

care au aparŃinut familiei Baciu: prof. Ioan Baciu - tatăl, Elisabeta Baciu - mama, 

Ioana Baciu Mărgineanu - sora, Ovidiu Mărgineanu - cumnat, Ştefan Baciu - poet 

şi Mira Simian Baciu - profesor. 

În judeŃul Alba Iulia se găseşte un alt muzeu reprezentativ pentru instituŃiile de 

acest gen. Casa Memorială „Lucian Blaga” situată în localitatea Lancrăm. Casa a 

fost construită în 1870 de preotul Simion Blaga, bunicul poetului Lucian Blaga. 

ColecŃia prezintă piese de mobilier care au aparŃinut familiei Blaga, obiecte 



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personale ale poetului, manuscrise, ediŃii princeps, fotografii şi o colecŃie 

etnografică locală formată din icoane, textile şi ceramică 16 . 

În judeŃul Cluj, localitatea Ciucea se găseşte organizat Muzeul Memorial 

„Octavian Goga” Complexul muzeal cuprinde castelul, devenit muzeu memorial, 

Casa Ady Endre, construcŃia în stil Ńărănesc, cunoscută sub denumirea de 

sufrageria albă, o bisericuŃă adusă de Goga din satul Gălpâia (Sălaj) şi 

mausoleul. Prima dintre cele două încăperi ale muzeului este biblioteca, ce 

cuprinde peste 9.000 de volume, alături de o ladă maură din lemn de cedru (din 

secolul al XVI-lea), o masă de lucru, o canapea şi câteva scaune. Din bibliotecă 

se pătrunde în birou, în care sunt expuse câteva fotografii de familie, schiŃe de 

Nicolae Grigorescu, candele brâncoveneşti (secolele XVII - XVIII), brâuri 

(cingătoare) cu încrustaŃii din pietre preŃioase, provenite din India, Siria, Turcia, o 

măsuŃă cu tăblierul din faianŃă, originară din Persia (secolul al XVI-lea), o icoană 

bizantină din secolul al XI-lea. Pretutindeni în muzeu se găsesc preŃioase lucrări 

de artă: obiecte din bronz provenite de la Pompei, un goblen francez din secolul al 

XVI-lea, picturi semnate de Theodor Pallady şi Nicolae Dărăscu, un scrin care a 

aparŃinut lui Avram Iancu. Alături de acestea se mai întâlnesc corespondenŃă şi 

manuscrise aparŃinând poetului, publicistului şi omului politic Octavian Goga 

(1881 - 1938). În amintirea poetului maghiar Ady Endre, prieten cu Goga, a fost 

amenajată, la Ciucea, clădirea în care acesta a locuit timp de patru luni. Ea 

cuprinde un interior de casă specific românesc şi altul unguresc 17 . 

În localitatea Lupeni, judeŃul Harghita se găseşte casa memorială „Tamási Áron” 

care a fost inaugurată la 24 septembrie 1972. Este casa părintească a scriitorului, 

construită acum 150 de ani, din lemn cioplit cu acoperiş din şindrilă. În această 

casă s-a născut Tamási Áron la 19 septembrie 1897. ExpoziŃia constă din 

obiectele personale, manuscrise, opere, scrisori, fotografii ale scriitorului. 

În Odorheiul Secuiesc se găseşte o altă casă memorială dedicată poetului, 

traducătorului şi redactorului Tompa László, expoziŃia prezintă date despre viaŃa 

şi activitatea acestuia. 

Am prezentat o expunere a câtorva dintre muzeele memoriale cele mai 

remarcabile existente pe teritoriul României. O bună parte dintre casele memoriale 

existente nu au fost cuprinse în acest studiu, dar acest lucru nu înseamnă că ele 

sunt mai puŃin importante pentru ilustrarea trecutului şi activităŃii personalităŃilor 

care s-au remarcat de-a lungul istoriei prin meritul lor deosebit. Am încercat doar 

să subliniem existenŃa acestor lăcaşe de cultură după anul 1990, o bună parte 

dintre ele se remarcă datorită activităŃilor cultural-educative. 



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Muzeul dedicat Memorialului Durerii de la Sighet este organizat de Sociatatea 

Civică dar pentru deschiderea şi susŃinerea unor astfel de instituŃii dedicate 

memoriei colective s-au făcut numeroase încercări (la Piteşti, la Făgăraş în vechile 

închisori comuniste) neconcretizate până în prezent. 

FundaŃia Academia Civică s-a înfiinŃat la 21 aprilie 1994. Printre scopurile sale 

se numără educaŃia civică, educaŃia tineretului, o bună cunoaştere a trecutului Ńării 

şi, în acest sens, restituirea istoriei contemporane a României, falsificată în anii 

dictaturii comuniste. Principalul proiect este Memorialul Victimelor 

Comunismului şi al RezistenŃei de la Sighet. 

Memorialul Victimelor Comunismului şi al RezistenŃei a fost gândit şi iniŃiat încă 

din 1992 de către preşedinta AlianŃei Civice, Ana Blandiana, realizat împreună cu 

Romulus Rusan şi un important grup de istorici, arhitecŃi şi designeri. 

La 21 aprilie 1994, autoarea proiectului, Ana Blandiana, şi un număr de 175 de 

personalităŃi au întemeiat FundaŃia Academia Civică, având ca scop general 

educaŃia civică şi ca obiectiv imediat crearea Memorialului. 

Prin concurs, alcătuirea proiectului de reabilitare a clădirii a fost încredinŃat 

firmei UMROL din Cluj, iar execuŃia propriu-zisă firmei Stelid din Baia Mare. 

Lucrările au durat până în anul 2000. Pentru că edificiul, vechi de un secol, era 

ruinat şi plin de igrasie, a fost nevoie de refacerea fundaŃiilor, izolaŃiilor, 

acoperişului, iar pereŃii interiori, care oricum fuseseră revopsiŃi şi nu mai 

aminteau perioada anilor 50, au fost văruiŃi în alb. Fiecare celulă a devenit o sală 

de muzeu, în care, întâi într-o formă provizorie, mai apoi definitivă, urmând acum 

o ordine cronologică, au fost amplasate obiecte, fotografii, documente, creându-se 

ambianŃa şi documentaŃia unei săli de muzeu. Într-una din curŃile interioare ale 

fostei închisori, în urma unui concurs de proiecte la care au participat 50 de 

arhitecŃi şi artişti, a fost construit în 1997 un SpaŃiu de Reculegere şi Rugăciune, 

după proiectul arhitectului Radu Mihăilescu, care îmbina stilul antic (sugestia 

tholos-ului grec şi a catacombei creştine) cu o viziune modernă. Pe pereŃii rampei 

de coborâre în spaŃiul subpământean au fost gravate în andezit fumuriu numele a 

aproape opt mii de morŃi din închisorile, lagărele şi locurile de deportare din 

România. Extrem de migăloasă, operaŃia de strângere a numelor morŃilor a 

necesitat zece ani de muncă în cadrul Centrului InternaŃional de Studii asupra 

Comunismului, iar cifra este departe de a acoperi adevărata amploare a 

represiunii. Cele mai multe nume au fost stabilite de dl. Cicerone IoniŃoiu şi de 

regretatul Eugen Şahan, ambii istorici prin vocaŃie şi foşti deŃinuŃi politici. Cât 

priveşte cheltuielile materiale pentru proiectarea şi construirea SpaŃiului de 

Reculegere şi Rugăciune, au fost acoperite în întregime de regretatul sponsor 

Mişu Cârciog din Londra, care rămâne până în prezent principalul donator al 

Memorialului. 

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În anul 2000 a fost adăugat construcŃiei vechi un modul cuprinzând o sală 

modernă de conferinŃe, în care se pot desfăşura simpozioanele, dezbaterile şi 

seminariile, precum şi cursurile şcolii de vară. Sala este dotată cu o instalaŃie de 

traducere simultană, putând fi închiriată pentru manifestări internaŃionale. 

Câteva opere de artă plastică de valoare deosebită completează profilul 

Memorialului, oferindu-i o personalitate specială printre muzeele de istorie. 

Lucrările, donate de autori, impresionează prin simbolistica sacrificiului acceptat 

care le caracterizează. O tapiserie ca „Libertate, te iubim” de Şerbana Drăgoescu, 

pictura „Înviere” de Cristian Paraschiv, sculptura în bronz „Marea Neagră” 

dedicată de Ovidiu Maitec istoricului Gheorghe I. Brătianu şi, în mod copleşitor, 

cele două sculpturi de mari dimensiuni ale lui Camilian Demetrescu intitulate 

„Omagiu deŃinutului politic” (una subintitulată „Înviere”), dau atmosferei trăsături 

dramatice şi înălŃătoare. 

Dar lucrarea de amploare artistică este grupul statuar „Cortegiul SacrificaŃilor”, 

care tinde să devină una din emblemele muzeului. Este vorba de optsprezece 

siluete umane mergând spre un zid care le închide orizontul, aşa cum comunismul 

zăgăduise viaŃa a milioane de oameni. Prezentată în 1997 în lemn, lucrarea a fost 

turnată în anul următor în bronz şi este amplasată azi într-o altă curte interioară a 

fostei închisori. Este punctul preferat unde sute şi mii de turişti se fotografiază la 

trecerea prin Memorial. În sfârşit, una din componentele Memorialului este 

Cimitirul Săracilor, situat la 2,5 km, ansamblu arhitectural dedicat memoriei 

deŃinuŃilor politici morŃi sau executaŃi în închisorile, lagărele şi deportările 

comuniste, precum şi memoriei partizanilor ucişi în luptele cu Securitatea. 

Amenajarea acestui cimitir a început după 1997, când Memorialul Victimelor 

Comunismului şi al RezistenŃei a fost declarat – prin legea nr. 95 – „ansamblu de 

interes naŃional”. 

Prin aceeaşi lege, cimitirul era considerat ca parte a Memorialului, întrucât în 

anii 50 aici fuseseră aruncate în gropi anonime trupurile câtorva zeci dintre 

deŃinuŃii politici morŃi în închisoarea Sighet. 

Nu se ştie cu certitudine câŃi din cei 54 de morŃi au fost îngropaŃi aici şi câŃi în 

alte locuri, întrucât comuniştii au practicat ştergerea urmelor: numele celor 

decedaŃi nu erau nici înregistrate în acte, nici marcate pe mormânt. Mormântul era 

făcut să se piardă, cu timpul, şi el între sutele de morminte anterioare şi ulterioare, 

şi în felul acesta orice indiciu dispărea. 

A fost desenată din brazi o hartă a Ńării, iar în locul de pe hartă al oraşului Sighet 

(socotit un epicentru al acestei represiuni) a fost ridicat un altar-cenotaf. 

În nişa de sub altar au fost depuse zeci de urne cu pământ adus din diferitele 

închisori, lagăre, centre de deportare, locuri de execuŃie. 

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În spatele altarului veghează o cruce în stil bizantin, dăltuită în calcar de 

maestrul pietrar Constantin Marinete, iar în fundal au fost ridicate de-a lungul 

timpului mai multe troiŃe dedicate victimelor de către familii şi asociaŃii. 

Ansamblul mai cuprinde câteva zeci de plăci de andezit pe care sunt sculptate 

nume ale cetăŃenilor români morŃi în deportările din Uniunea Sovietică. Ele 

completează numele morŃilor din închisori şi lagăre, parŃial înregistrate pe plăcile 

din curtea Memorialului 18 . 

Muzeul łăranului Român, alături de colecŃiile cu specific etnografic: de port, 

ceramică, mobilier, icoane pe lemn şi sticlă, xilogravuri, obiecte religioase, 

Ńesături, covoare, unelte, precum şi o importantă colecŃie de artă populară străină, 

are o secŃiune dedicată perioadei comuniste. 

AsociaŃia Memorialul RevoluŃiei 16-22 Decembrie 1989 a fost înfiinŃată în 26 

aprilie 1990 cu scopul statutar de a cinsti memoria victimelor represiunii din 

timpul RevoluŃiei Române din Decembrie 1989. Din 1990 până în 1999 AsociaŃia 

a realizat un complex memorial în Cimitirul Eroilor din Timişoara şi 12 

monumente, ridicate în oraşul nostru în zonele represiunii din Decembrie 1989. 

Începând cu anul 1996, în cadrul Memorialului funcŃionează: 

Centrul NaŃional de Documentare, Cercetare şi Informare Publică privind 

RevoluŃia din Decembrie 1989. 

Primăria municipiului Timişoara a oferit asociaŃiei un imobil din centrul civic al 

oraşului. Este vorba de o clădire din secolul al XVIII-lea, în stil baroc, o 

construcŃie-monument. Clădirea se afla într-o stare avansată de degradare, motiv 

pentru care a fost nevoie de importante lucrări de consolidare şi amenajare, care 

încă nu s-au încheiat 19 . 

Astăzi, deşi au trecut mai bine de 22 de ani de la revoluŃia din decembrie 1989, 

în România nu există şi o altă instituŃie muzeală care să ilustreze din punct de 

vedere istoric perioada de peste 40 de ani de regim comunist în condiŃiile în care 

regimul comunist a făcut numeroase victime în gulagul românesc. Lucrarea îşi 

propune să traseze importanŃa unităŃilor muzeale memoriale după 1990 şi 

necesitatea sprijinirii concrete a altor instituŃii de acest gen dedicate celor peste 40 

de ani de suferinŃe ale poporului român. 

18 Material redactat cu sprijinul doamnei Andreea Fürtos. 

19 http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=home 

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Fig. 1 Ion Creanga’s Hut 

Fig. 2 Mihai Eminescu House from Ipoteşti 

715

Fig. 3 George Enescu Museum 

Fig. 4 Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu Museum 

716

Fig. 5 Casa Mureşenilor Museum in Braşov 

Fig. 6 Octavian Goga Memorial Museum 

717

Fig. 7 Tamási Áron Memorial House 

Fig. 8 Sacrificial Procession 

718

INSTITUTUL DE ISTORIE, LIMBĂ ŞI 

LITERATURĂ SI FABRICAREA ŞTIINłIFICĂ 

A „POPORULUI MOLDOVENESC” ÎN 

RSS MOLDOVENEASCĂ (1946–1961) 

Lidia PRISAC 1 

Politica sovietică referitoare la achiziŃia teritorială – Basarabia, în planul impunerii 

„legitimităŃii ştiinŃifice” de ocupare şi anexare la URSS a fost deosebită faŃă de tot ce 

construise în plan ideologic şi tactic Stalin până la acea vreme. După modelul clasic al 

justificării politicii de expansiune, în cazul spaŃiului dintre Prut şi Nistru, acŃiunile 

autorităŃilor centrale au fost direcŃionate în scopul evidenŃei de unicitate culturală, 

lingvistică, literară şi istorică a noii republici create – RSS Moldovenească. În vederea 

detaşării de România a teritoriului reanexat a fost necesare noi argumente ştiinŃifice 

pentru a conserva identitatea poporului de frontieră între latini şi slavi. Aceasta a 

determinat inventarea istoriei populaŃiei 1 din Moldova sovietică şi impunerea unei 

identităŃi prefabricate 2 prin demonstrarea faptului că moldovenii şi românii reprezintă 

popoare absolut diferite. 

Principalele subiecte ale propagandei oficiale, reflectate în toate actele de cultură, erau 

suferinŃele provocate de români moldovenilor, legăturile istorice şi literare cu Rusia şi 

Ucraina – argument care a fost uşor de cultivat la nivelul misticilor comuniste implantate 

prin sistemul de îndoctrinare şi învăŃământ şi unicitatea etnografică a moldovenilor 3 . 

Principala teză, de esenŃă pur propagandistică, în stilul doctrinei sovietice, vehiculate, era 

mitul „drepturilor primare ale slavilor” asupra Basarabiei şi afirmării încorporării acestea 

la Rusia prin caracterul „absolut progresist de dezvoltare impetuoasă a forŃelor de 

producŃie şi a culturii” 4 . PopulaŃia moldovenească era tratată drept una distinctă de cea 

românească, intenŃiile sovietice ale perioadei 1944–1952 fiind direcŃionate spre 

aneantizarea legăturilor culturale cu România. „Revenirea” Basarabiei în făgaşul URSS 

conform tratărilor însemna „reafirmarea istorică a independenŃei Moldovei (faŃă de 

România) şi un pas major pe calea dezvoltării ei sociale” 5 . 

Ideologia moldovenismului sau „fundamentalismul moldovenesc”, cum a fost numit, a 

fost justificat „ştiinŃific” de istoriografia sovietică moldovenească 6 , care a fost creată din 

ordinul SecŃiei de propagandă a PCUS pentru a atribui identitate unor teritorii şi 

populaŃiilor care le locuiau, rupte prin forŃă din trupul unor Ńări integre din punct de 

vedere teritorial şi transformate în entităŃi teritorial-administrative – republici unionale ale 

1 Institutul Patrimoniului Cultural al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei, Republica Moldova. 

719

URSS 7 . Ceea ce am vrea să subscriem prin acest studiu este analiza activităŃii centrului 

academic sovietic moldovenesc în domeniul istoriei şi analiza formării discursului de 

legitimare a „statului moldovenesc sovietic”, „poporului moldovenesc” şi a continuităŃii 

lui istorice în cadrul URSS. Segmentul cronologic al studiului de faŃă cuprinde anii 1946– 

1961, de la costituirea Institutului de Istorie, Limbă si Literatură până la înfiinŃarea 

Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a RSS Moldoveneşti. Pentru reconstituirea tabloului acestui subiect 

se va apela atât la literatura de specialitate şi sursele de arhivă, cât şi la metoda istoriei 

orale de intervievare a martorilor şi actorilor. 

Contextul istoric al apariŃiei Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură din RSS 

Moldovenească 

Procesul de “exportare” a ideilor marxist-leninisite şi fundamentării teoretice de 

extindere a revoluŃiei bolşevice în teritoriile adiacente URSS a presupus crearea unor 

structuri ştiinŃifice instituŃionale proxime spaŃiilor care intrau în vizorul expansionist al 

nomenclaturii sovietice. Astfel, în stânga Nistrului, după formarea RASS Moldoveneşti la 

12 octombrie 1924, pe lângă Comisariatul Poporului pentru ÎnvăŃământ 

(NARCOMPROS) a fost constituit la 30 decembrie 1926 Comitetul ŞtiinŃific 

Moldovenesc cu statut de instituŃie ştiinŃifică supremă a republicii 8 . Titulatura 

colaboratorilor comitetului era asemănătoare cu cea a colaboratorilor Academiei de 

ŞtiinŃe a URSS – membri de onoare, membri titulari, printre care figurau L. Madan şi G. 

Buciuşcanu, membri corespondenŃi şi colaboratori ştiinŃifici. Acest comitet avea drept 

scop atât “elaborarea problemelor marxism-leninismului; lupta cu falsificările burgheze 

ale marxismului; lupta pentru promovarea strictă a principiilor materialismului dialectic 

şi demascarea reminiscenŃelor idealismului…” 9 cât şi „studierea regiunii şi culturii 

poporului moldovenesc pentru difuzarea cunoştinŃelor ştiinŃifice şi practice” 10 . 

Comitetul ŞtiinŃific Moldovenesc avea în componenŃa sa şi o SecŃie de istorie (fondată 

în 1928), membrii cărea au publicat o serie de broşuri şi articole care elogiau lupta 

bolşevicilor din Basarabia şi de pe malul stâng al Nistrului pentru instaurarea puterii 

sovietice 11 , se blama „ocupaŃia româno-moşierească” a Basarabiei 12 şi erau prezentate 

pozitiv succesele RASSM în „construcŃia socialistă” 13 7. Purtând un pronunŃat caracter 

propagandistic, aceste scrieri aveau un conŃinut declarativ, bazându-se mai mult pe 

impresii personale şi amintiri ale unor martori la evenimente, neglijându-se baza 

documentară. Conducerea de partid şi de stat sovietică era deosebit de interesată de a 

demonstra caracterul „ilegal” al unirii Basarabiei cu România, motiv din care, în martie 

1935 Comitetul ŞtiinŃific Moldovenesc din RASSM a fost denumit Institutul 

Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice în domeniul Culturii, iar în 1939, în baza lui, a fost 

format Institutul Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice în domeniul Istoriei, Economiei, 

Limbii şi Literaturii 14 . 

PublicaŃiile sovietice interbelice, cu referire la spaŃiul dintre Prut şi Nistru atât de 

râvnit de sovietici, promovau insistent o serie de mituri istorico-politice: despre luptătorul 

eroic pentru puterea sovietelor în Basarabia; despre marile succese ale „construcŃiei 

socialiste” în RASSM; despre „regimul sângeros” al „boierilor români”, instaurat în 

Basarabia şi, în sfârşit, mitul despre crearea unei „naŃiuni” moldoveneşti, a unei „limbi 

720

literare moldoveneşti” şi a literaturii noi „socialiste”, scrise în această limbă etc. care erau 

propagate insistent populaŃiei din regiunea transnistreană 15 . 

Odată cu anexarea teritoriului dintre Prut şi Nistru la URSS 16 şi formarea la 2 august 

1940 a RSS Moldoveneşti au fost create condiŃiile politice necesare pentru extinderea 

propagandei „moldovenismului” asupra societăŃii în vederea eradicării etno-naŃionale. În 

acest scop, folosirea istoriei ca instrument de îndoctrinare a fost reluată prin intermediul 

Institutul Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice în domeniul Istoriei, Economiei, Limbii şi 

Literaturii, care a fost transferat de la Tiraspol la Chişinău. Sarcina de a fundamenta 

ştiinŃific anexarea Basarabiei şi a altor teritorii româneşti la URSS i-a revenit lui A. I. 

Manusevici, care, la foarte scurt timp a publicat, într-o revistă de istorie de la Moscova, 

un articol în care prezenta unirea Basarabiei cu România în 1918 drept „o răpire” a ei de 

către „burghezo-moşierii” români 17 . 

Recuperarea Basarabiei în vara anului 1941 şi revenirea ei în hotarele României, a 

impus evacuarea Institutul Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice în domeniul Istoriei, 

Economiei, Limbii şi Literaturii la Buguruslan, regiunea Orenburg (RFSS Rusă), de unde 

a revenit la Chişinău în octombrie 1944, după reanexarea Basarabiei la URSS. 

Institutul care trebuia să promoveze direct sau indirect neadevărul despre trecutul 

istoric al moldovenilor a fost catalagat, în 1946, de către secretarul CC al PC(b)M, M. 

Salogor, printr-un demers adresat şefului DirecŃiei Propagandă şi AgitaŃie a CC al PC(b) 

de la Moscova, G. F. Aleksandrov, în care se referea la sarcinile din agenda cercetării 

„istoriei, culturii materiale, limbii şi literaturii poporului moldovenesc...”, drept inapt de a 

face faŃă sarcinilor propuse, deoarece „.. în trecut nici teritoriul Moldovei, nici istoria 

poporului moldovenesc aproape că nu se studiau” 18 . M. Salogor cerea susŃinerea Hotărârii 

Biroului CC al PC(b)M pentru îmbunătăŃirea lucrului Institutului prin sporirea numărului 

cercetătorilor care până atunci erau doar 15 19 . Astfel, la 11 martie 1946 prin susŃinerea de 

către Prezidiul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a URSS, în baza Institutului Moldovenesc, s-a decis 

crearea Bazei ŞtiinŃifice Moldoveneşti a Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a URSS. 

Se spera că după fondarea acestei Baze, decisă la Moscova, se va produce o cotitură în 

procesul de elaborare sovieto-bolşevică a istoriei Moldovei. Problemele organizatorice, 

structura instituŃională şi direcŃiile principale ale cercetărilor ştiinŃifice au fost puse la 

punct în şedinŃa Biroului CC al PC(b) M din 18 iunie 1947. Printre direcŃiile principale de 

activitate ale Bazei, remise pentru aprobare Prezidiului AŞ a URSS, se preconiza şi 

„studierea istoriei, arheologiei şi etnografiei poporului moldovenesc” 20 . Se argumenta 

necesitatea înfiinŃării Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură, ca instituŃie autonomă, 

compusă din 3 secŃii, prima fiind cea de istorie şi arheologie. Astfel, în urma examinării, 

la 29 iunie 1946, de către Prezidiul AŞ a URSS a demersului conducerii RSS 

Moldoveneşti a fost aprobat, cu unele modificări, proiectele propuse. Directorul Bazei 

ŞtiinŃifice Moldoveneşti a fost numit acad. V. Volghin, vicepreşedintele AŞ a URSS. 

Printre direcŃiile ştiinŃifice prioritare se inscria şi studierea istoriei, arhiologiei şi 

etnografiei poporului moldovenesc, precum şi elaborarea problemelor privind geneza şi 

dezvoltarea limbii moldoveneşti, literaturii, folclorului şi artei populare 21 . 

InsuficienŃa resurselor umane şi financiare au determinat dimensiunile şi structura 

instituŃională modestă a Bazei StiinŃifice Moldoveneşti. Din cele 8 organizaŃii ştiinŃifice 

create, doar una avea statutul de institut – cel de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură restul erau 

721

sectoare cu statut autonom 22 . Director interimar al Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi 

Literatură a fost numit V.M. Senchevici, iar din 1947 dr. I. Ceban. 

Cadrele ştiinŃifice din cadrul Institutului de Istorie Limbă şi Literatură 

Una dintre cele mai acute probleme cu care se confrunta Filiala StiinŃifică 

Moldovenească a AŞ a URSS, la început, era insuficienŃa de cadre ştiinŃifice calificate. 

Astfel, în anii 1942–1943, în sectia de istorie erau angajati doar două persoane: N.V. 

Berezneacov şi V. M. Senchievici 23 . Ulterior pe 14 decembrie 1945, când are loc şedinŃa 

Consiliului StiinŃific al Institutului moldovenesc de cercetări ştiinŃifice, în componenŃa 

sectorului de istorie, pe lângă cei menŃionaŃi, apar şi numele lui R.E. Soboli, A.R. Fin, pe 

lângă aceasta din evacuare li s-a alăturat dr. în istorie N.A. Nartov, de la 27 martie în 

sector a fost transferat cercetătorul ştiinŃific superior C.M. Russev şi din 6 octombrie, tot 

aici, sunt înscrişi I.I. Meteriuc, I.E. Levit şi V.M. Aliasevici 24 . Lipsa cadrelor s-ar explica 

prin reprimarea şi evadarea, din motive ideologice şi politice, a unei părŃi considerabile a 

intelectualităŃii ştiinŃifice şi culturale în anii 1940–1941 şi în primii ani postbelici, pe 

lângă aceasta multe persoane care af fi putut fi încadrate în domeniul ştiinŃei desfăşurau 

activitatea profesională în instituŃiile de învăŃământ superior. Aşa sau altfel, lipsa cadrelor 

se reflecta direct asupra neîndeplinirii planului de activitate ştiinŃific 25 . La una din 

şedinŃele Institutului, V.M. Senchevici cerea să se ia măsuri de a atrage în sectorul de 

istorie a cadrelor profesionale susŃinând „cum să formăm o comunitate istorico-filologică 

moldovenească dacă sectorul de istorie nu numai că nu a atras cadre tinere, ci i-a 

respins” 26 , la care N.V. Berezneacov susŃinea că „a încercat să atragă în calitate de 

colaboratori netitulari pe tovarăşul Grosu, Lojeckin, Slain, Popovici şi pe Roitman de la 

Insitutul Pedagogic, însă aceştea erau mai mult preocupaŃi de predarea temelor 

studenŃilor” 27 . În pofida numărului mic de personal în cadrul sectorului de istorie V.M. 

Senchevici declara „având în vedere că avem cele mai multe unităŃi în statele de personal 

suntem în drept să solicităm sectorului de istorie mai multe rezultate ştiinŃifice decât 

celorlalte sectoare” 28 . Această afirmaŃie ne sugerează că sectorul de istorie avea cele mai 

multe unităti în statele de personal. 

În ceea ce priveşte cadrele didactice, situaŃia nu a fost nici ea prea bună însă în 

perioada postbelică a fost rezolvată pe două căi: prin ajutorul Sovietului Comisarilor 

Norodnici al URSS ce a îndreptat la lucru în Institut absolvenŃi şi doctoranzi ai 

universităŃilor din Moscova şi Leningrad şi prin intermediul specialiştilor în domeniul 

istoriei, economiei, limbii şi literaturii de la Institutul de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice din Moldova 

care activau în calitate de colaboratori la institut 29 . Lista cadrelor didactice se prezenta în 

felul următor: N.V. Berezneakov – candidat în ştiinŃe istorice, şef al Catedrei de istorie, 

absolvent al UniversităŃii din Leningrad, şeful secŃiei de istorie a ICŞ din Moldova, preda 

istoria URSS şi istoriografia; Z.V. UdalŃova – lector superior, absolventă şi doctorandă la 

Universitatea de Stat din Moscova, preda istoria veche şi medie; N.O. PavliŃkaia – 

candidat în ştiinŃe, docent, preda istoria URSS şi cea modernă, absolventă al US din 

Leningrad; V. Senchevici – lector, preda istoria Moldovei, absolvent al Institutului 

Pedagogic din Tiraspol, şeful Institutului de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice din Moldova; I. S. 

Grosul – decanul FacultăŃii de Istorie, candidat în ştiinŃe istorice, lector, şi-a susŃinut teza 

722

de candidat în ştiinŃe istorice pe tema Reforma Ńărănească din 1868 în Moldova (de fapt, 

în Basarabi – n.n.) 30 . Astfel, putem spune că o bună parte a celor care activau în sectorul 

de istorie a Institutul Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice aveau şi o activitate didactică. 

În primul deceniu postbelic, interacŃiunea dintre istorici şi putere era determinată de 

caracterul contradictoriu al funcŃiilor ştiinŃei istorice în Statul sovietic. Pe de o parte, 

istoricii erau permanent verificaŃi şi supravegheaŃi. Bunăoară, la şedinŃa Consiliului 

ştiinŃific al Institutului moldovenesc de cercetări ştiinŃifice din 10 noiembrie 1946, 

preşedintele Comisiei Comitetului Central al PC (b) al Moldovei constată că „o parte din 

lucrători nu sunt suficient pregătiŃi pentru activitatea de cercetare ştiinŃifică...”, „... 

comisia a mai stabilit că unii lucrători ai insitutului nu au interpretări adecvate asupra 

învăŃăturii marxist-leniniste...”, pe lângă aceasta „... comisia crede că una din cauzele 

activităŃii nesatisfăcătoare a Institutului constă în lipsa criticii constructive 31 . 

În RSSM era foarte important ca la momentul angajării specialistul, în perioada 

interbelică şi a războiului, să fi fost sau nu pe teritoriul „ocupat”, dacă a avut contacte (a 

colaborat) sau nu cu „fasciştii români şi germani” 32 . Drept urmare, unor colaboratori 

ştiinŃifici de la Institutul de Istorie, care au făcut, în perioada interbelică, studii în 

România, chiar dacă nu imediat, totuşi li se va aminte acest lucru. 

Statutul de partid unic al puterii sovietice necesita fundamentarea ideologică a 

activităŃii sale şi pregătirea cadrelor pentru şcoala medie ceea ce îi determină să solicite 

lucrătorilor mediului de cercetare „...creşterea politică a colaboratorilor Institutlui 33 . 

Astfel, în lipsa unor cadre suficient de pregătite din punct de vedere al învşŃăturii marxistleniniste 

se pune problema atragerii unor specialişti importanŃi de la Moscova şi 

Leningrad, inclusiv creşterea cadrelor proprii prin implicarea în studiile de doctorat atât 

în republică cât şi în capitala URSS 34 . 

Din punct de vedere etnic în componenŃa Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură 

predominau elementele alogene. „Pe primul loc erau cercetătorii ştiinŃifici evrei, după 

care urmau ruşi, ucraineni, moldovenii erau mai mulŃi reprezentanŃii din regiunea 

transnistreană, iar din cei din partea dreapta a Nistrului erau doar câŃiva şi acei care au 

devenit comunişti înveteraŃi şi au îmbrăŃişat ideile marxist-leniniste. Tonul în institut îl 

dădeau transnistrienii şi evreii” 35 . Conform documentelor de arhivă, din 14 decembrie 

1945, din cei 19 angajaŃi ai Institutului Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice 7 erau evrei, 

4 erau ruşi, 3 erau ucraineni şi 5 erau moldoveni 36 . 

Lista colaboratorilor ştiinŃifici la Institutul Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice în 1945 

Nume, 

prenume, 

patronimic 

Senchevic 

i V.M. 

Berezneac 

ov 

N.V 

Ceban 

I.D. 

Anul 

naşterii 

FuncŃia Studii 

723 

Locul 

studiilor 

NaŃionalitate 

Experie 

nŃa de 

lucru 

Aparteneta 

politică 

1905 director superioare Tiraspol ucrainean 7 ani Membru al 

PC (b) 

1910 şeful 

sectorului 

de istorie 

-//- Leningrad ucrainean 6 ani apartiinic 

1910 şeful 

-//- Tiraspol moldovean 7 ani Membru al 

sectorului 

PC (b) 

de 

şi 

limbă

Iacubanis 

N.B. 

Meniuc 

N.G. 

Corlătean 

u N.G. 

Russev 

E.M. 

Porucic 

V.S. 

Stodulschi 

S.I. 

Ghiliman 

F.M. 

Lempert 

B.D. 

Meşeriuc 

I.I. 

Aliasevici 

V.M. 

NarŃov 

N.A. 

literatură 

1905 şeful 

sectorului 

de 

economie 

1918 lucrător 

ştiinŃific 

superior 

-//- Dnepropet 

rovsk 

superioare 

nefinisa 

te 

724 

ucrainean 1 an Membru al 

PC (b) 

Bucureşti moldovean -//- apartiinic 

1915 -//- superioare CernăuŃi moldovean 2 ani -//- 

1915 -//- -//- Bucureşti rus -//- -//- 

1878 -//- -//- Bucureşti moldovean 1 an -//- 

1891 -//- -//- Kiev rus -//- -//- 

1913 -//- -//- Bucureşti evreu -//- -//- 

1913 -//- -//- Liej evreu -//- 

-//- -//- Moscova rus 2 luni -//- 

lucrator 

ştiinŃific 

inferior 

lucrător 

ştiinŃific 

superior 

şeful 

comerciale 

profesi 

onale 

Chişinău rus 4 luni -//- 

superioare Tiraspol, 

dr. în 

istorie 

evreu 2 ani -//- 

-//- Iaşi evreu 5 luni -//- 

Chideli 

A.S. 

bibliotecii 

Levit I.E. lucrator 

ştiinŃific 

inferior 

-//- Chişinău evreu 4 luni -//- 

Soboli 1908 -//- superioare, Briun evreică 5 luni -//- 

R.E. 

incomp 

lete 

Fin Ş.R. 1919 -//- superioare Bugurusla evreu 1 an Membru al 

n 

Comitet 

ului 

Popular 

as 

securită 

Ńii 

Stat 

de 

Caramanu 

lucrător -//- Leningrad moldovean 1 lună -//- 

Ńa 

ştiinŃific 

N.Ia. 

superior 

Sursa: Arhiva Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei, F. 3, I. 1, D. 14, f. 9-10.

Din ceea ce ne arată tabelul prezentat putem deduce că numărul moldovenilor era 

infim în raport cu alogenii, iar potenŃialul ştiinŃific uman era completat preponderant cu 

reprezentanŃi din alte republici – „... când am venit la lucru în Institut erau doar 3-4 

moldoveni” 37 . Concomitent, la un institut colaboratorii ştiinŃifici sunt destul de puŃini. 

Lucrurile nu se vor schimba cu mult nici mai târziu. Astfel, în 1949, din efectivul de 112 

colaboratori ai Filialei StiinŃifice Moldoveneşti doar 50 erau cercetători ştiinŃifici 38 . La 

scară unională, în 1950 conform statisticilor, activau în calitate de cercetători ştiinŃifici 

doar 126 de moldoveni, ulterior cifra acestora creşte constant. Astfel, în 1955 activau în 

mediul academic 305 cercetători ştiinŃifici moldoveni iar în 1960 efectivul acestora atinge 

cifra de 590 de persoane 39 . 

Din punct de vedere al gradului ştiinŃific, conform datelor de arhivă, Institutului 

Moldovenesc de Cercetări ŞtiinŃifice avea 1 doctori habilitat (profesor) în istorie, 1 

doctori habilitat (profesor) în filologie, 1 doctor în istorie, 1 doctor în filologie, 2 doctori 

în economie şi un docent 40 . 

În ceea ce priveşte scrierile istoricilor, prin intermediul organelor de forŃă şi securitate 

Partidul Comunist îi „ajuta” să însuşească concepŃia leninistă a procesului istoric, 

metodele marxiste de cercetare, astfel încât politica Statului sovietic în domeniul ştiinŃei 

dicta conŃinutul, formele şi metodele de cercetare. Temele de cercetare la Institutul de 

Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură a Bazei ŞtiinŃifice Moldoveneşti a Academiei de ŞtiinŃe din 

URSS se refereau la Istoria Moldovei ca parte componentă a URSS, dezvoltarea 

capitalismului în Moldova, mişcarea revoluŃionară, instaurarea puterii sovietelor etc. Spre 

exemplu lucrările care au apărut la acea perioadă demonstrau tendinŃele istoriografice: 

Structura social-economică şi politică a Moldovei în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVlea 

(F. Grecul, 1950), Dezvoltarea capitalismului în Basarabia în perioada postmodernă 

(I. Budac, 1954), RevoluŃia din anii 1905–1907 în Moldova (I. Budac, 1955), Mişcarea 

revoluŃionară din Moldova în anii 1905–1907 (D. Şemeakov, 1955), łăranii din 

Basarabia 1812–1861 (I. Grosul, 1956), Reforma Ńărănească în Basarabia din aniiʼ60– 

70 ai secolului al XIX-lea (I. Grosul, I. Budac, 1956) 41 etc. Totodată, tematica de 

cercetare nu se oferea oricui, exista o selecŃie bine pusă la punct – „în cercetare se punea 

accentul mai mult pe istoria social-economică a localnicilor. De perioada medievală mai 

mult se ocupau moldovenii, perioada Ńaristă era oferită ruşilor şi transnistrienilor, la 

cercetarea perioadei contemporane şi relaŃiilor moldo-ruso-ucrainene nu toŃi aveau acces, 

doar din cei care aveau relaŃii mai speciale, de rudenie sau care vroiau o avansare pe linie 

de partid...” 42 . 

În încercarea de a explica de ce o parte din istoricii autohtoni erau preocupaŃi în 

cercetările lor de epocile mai vechi, în special cei care au scris despre Evul Mediu, putem 

spune că ei au fost mai puŃin aserviŃi de propaganda oficială, pe când cei care au fost 

îndemnaŃi să scrie despre trecutul proxim s-au dizolvat complet în această maşină a 

minciunii 43 , or, cu alte cuvinte „..doar în acest domeniu se mai putea face ştiinŃă...” 44 . 

Astfel, în linii generale tematica corespundea cerinŃelor politice ale partidului comunist. 

Activitatea Institutului de Istorie Limbă şi Literatură. În primii ani postbelici, 

prioritatea istoricilor sovietici de la Chişinău era condamnarea dură a administraŃiei 

româneşti din anii războiului, combinată cu defăimarea continuă a „ocupaŃiei româno- 

725

oiereşti” a Basarabiei în anii 1918–1940. În paralel erau elogiate relaŃiile de prietenie 

dintre „marele popor rus şi poporul moldovenesc” timp de secole 45 . 

Momentul de cotitură, credem, în fundamentarea propagandistică a ştiinŃei istorice în 

Moldova sovietică a fost Hotărârea Plenarei CC al PCM din 27-29 august 1947 cu privire 

la elaborarea unei sinteze de istorie a Moldovei. 

Deşi prof. N. NarŃov de la Institutul Pedagogic din Chişinău declarase, anterior, că 

elaborase un manual de istorie a Moldovei gata pentru publicare, această lucrare a fost 

respinsă imputându-i-se autorului că nu a inventat o etnogeneză a moldovenilor diferită 

de cea a românilor în justificarea din punct de vedere istoric a existenŃei RSS 

Moldoveneşti ci invers a „urmat firul istoriografiei româneşti...”. Ideea este că soarta i-a 

jucat festa prof. N. NarŃov, care fiind singurul autor ce cunoştea limba română încă în 

vremea activităŃii sale la Tiraspol şi ulterior în evacuaŃie, în URSS, lucrând cu operele 

autorilor români – A. D. Xenopol, D. Onciul, N. Iorga, C. C. Giurescu ş.a., nu a reuşit să 

se detaşeze suficient pentru a nega identitatea românească a moldovenilor şi să „creeze” o 

lucrare pur propagandistică pe placul nomenclaturii sovietice 46 . 

Astfel, rolul nefast în destinul acestei lucrări i-a revenit Plenarei a XIII-lea, raportorul 

principal al cărea, I. S. Zâkov, secretar al CC pentru ideologie, insista că „ocupanŃii 

româno-germani încercau să intoxice conştiinŃa truditorilor cu otrava naŃionalismului, să 

le altoiască ideologia reacŃionară, să le provoace instinctele de cultivare a avuŃiei private, 

să aprindă ura faŃă de popoarele Uniunii Sovietice şi, în special, faŃă de poporul rus”. Pe 

lângă aceasta secretarul CC al PC(b)M se arăta foarte deranjat că „...această ideologie 

străină..., este susŃinută de rămăşiŃele elementelor duşmănoase de clasă, de cei mai aprigi 

duşmani ai poporului moldovenesc, naŃionaliştii moldo-români... care acŃionează spre 

dauna construcŃiei socialiste” şi vine cu constatarea că în cadrul Institutului de Istorie, 

Limbă şi Literatură „se tratează slab temele privind destinele istorice comune ale 

poporului moldovenesc şi rus, despre istoria luptei lor comune împotriva cotropitorilor 

străini, împotriva jugului capitalist” inclusiv şi faptul că în cadrul acestuia încă nu a fost 

alcătuit „un colectiv de istorici specialişti, capabili să redacteze un manual în spiritul 

marxist-leninist de istorie a poporului moldovenesc” 47 . 

În consecinŃă, a fost sugerată ideea că „la istoria Moldovei trebuie editat nu un 

oarecare manual, ci un manual marxist-bolşevic”. Concluzia plenarei a fost că manualul 

de istorie a Moldovei nu poate fi elaborat de o singură persoană, ci de cei mai buni 

istorici în frunte cu CC al PC(b)M „pentru soluŃionarea acestei importante sarcini 

politice” 48 . 

ImportanŃa ideologică a acestei lucrări a fost demonstrată de transferul elaborării ei 

sub controlul direct al CC al PC(b), prin crearea unei comisii din responsabili superiori de 

partid şi de stat, în frunte cu C. U. Cernenko (ulterior – Artiom Lazarev). Colectivul de 

autori a fost ales la şedinŃa Biroului CC al PC (b) M din 1947 şi a inclus trei categorii de 

persoane – cadre considerate locale: I. Grosu, V. Senchevici, F. Grecul, I. Ceban, N. 

Berezneacov, N. Mohov, persoane cu pregătire moscovită printre care acad. L. V. 

Cerepnin, prof. A. D. UdalŃov, prof. C. P. Trapeznikov (funcŃionar la CC al PC(b)U), 

cărora le revenea şi rolul de redactori responsabili sau din alte centre sovietice cum ar fi şi 

T. Passec, M. Tihanova, F. Omelciuk, G. Smirnov, D. Şemeacov şi persoane cu studii în 

726

instituŃiile din România interbelică: V. Cioban, E. Russev, G. Bogaci, A. Kidel 49 , care 

împreună urmau să realizeze planul lucrării 50 . 

Faptul că elaborarea Istoriei Moldovei se făcea la comandă, fiind vorba de o urgenŃă 

pentru propaganda ideologică, este demonstrat de ritmul impus şi strict monitorizat în 

realizarea ei. În martie 1948, Biroul CC al PC(b)M discuta deja problema Cu privire la 

planul editării manualului de istorie a Moldovei aprobând planul desfăşurat al sintezei, 

prezentat la comisie. 

Macheta sintezei nu era altceva decât un produs tipic al erei staliniste târzii 51 , deoarece 

urma o schemă extrem de simplificată şi trăda absenŃa completă de studii ştiinŃifice 

asupra istoriei Moldovei. Singurele surse la care se făceau referiri erau clasicii marxismleninismului 

şi lucrările lui Stalin. Sinteza era plină de declaraŃii categorice asupra 

evenimentelor din trecut bazate pe unele însemnări ale lui Lenin 52 . Structura lucrării se 

baza pe dezvoltarea economică şi lupta de clasă. 

Versiunea mitului moldovenesc al etnogenezei prezentate presupunea că valahii – 

geto-dacii romanizaŃi care au trăit în regiunea dintre Nistru, Dunăre şi CarpaŃi – s-ar fi 

contopit cu populaŃia slavă indigenă. Astfel încât unirea unei părŃi ale valahilor cu slavii 

de sud a dus la etnogeneza românească (sau valahă), iar unirea altei părŃi ale valahilor cu 

slavii de răsărit a produs etnogeneza moldovenească. Cu alte cuvinte, deosebirea dintre 

români şi moldoveni îşi avea originea în faza istorică a „naŃiunii burgheze” din secolul al 

XIX-lea 53 . Aceasta implica o apreciabilă diferenŃă dintre cele două naŃiuni iar limba 

română corespundea conceptului utilizat ca limbă romano-slavă şi/sau moldoveneasăslavă. 

InfluenŃa rusească şi slavă asupra Moldovei istorice era zdrobitoare, toŃi liderii politici 

şi culturali ai acestui pământ se presupunea că ar fi fost influenŃaŃi de „marele popor rus şi 

cultura lui avansată”. Acest ataşament pro-rus culmina cu interpretarea anexării în 1812 a 

Basarabiei, administraŃia Ńaristă (prin influenŃa poporului şi intelectualităŃii ruse) fiind 

apreciată drept un factor pozitiv în pofida tuturor viciilor 54 . 

Ataşamentul pro-rus şi evidenŃierea trăsăturilor specifice istoriei moldoveneşti, nemai 

întâlnite până acum domina conŃinutul lucrării şi prin faptul că se încerca demonstrarea 

rădăcinilor locale ale mişcării revoluŃionare din Basarabia, deşi se ştia că mulŃi dintre 

revoluŃionari erau ucraineni şi ruşi. Spre exemplu, comandantul militar rus Grigori 

Kotovski era glorificat şi prezentat drept faimos fiu al poporului moldav, chiar dacă era 

rus 55 . 

Cu referire la perioada instituirii puterii sovietice în Basarabia, istoricii moldoveni „au 

descoperit” că autorităŃile sovietice au preluat oficial puterea la Chişinău şi în alte oraşe la 

14 ianuarie 1918. Acest nou mit legitima faptul că la 1940 Basarabia a fost „eliberată” iar 

puterea sovietică a fost „restabilită” 56 . 

În urma elaborării lucrării, la 3 septembrie 1949, Biroul CC al PC(b) a adoptat 

Hotărârea Despre editarea machetei primei părŃi a manualului „Curs de istorie a 

Moldovei” stabilind termenul publicării pentru 15 septembrie. Biroul obliga „secŃia 

propagandă şi agitaŃie a CC al PC(b) din Moldova (tov. Cernenko) să organizeze o „largă 

discuŃie” a machetei în mediul ştiinŃific şi didactic din republică 57 ca ulterior conceptul să 

fie prezentat drept unul recunoscut şi aprobat de întreaga societate. Totodată, macheta 

lucrării a fost expediată universităŃilor şi instituŃiilor ştiinŃifice din Moscova, Leningrad, 

727

Kiev, Odesa, Kazan, CernăuŃi, Minsk, Tbilisi, Taşkent şi din alte oraşe din care au venit 

zeci de avize, observaŃii şi deziderate de care s-a Ńinut cont la redactarea textului 

manuscrisului 58 . 

Editarea machetei se înscria în seria de acŃiuni consacrate „jubileului” de 25 de ani de 

la formarea RSSM, rădăcinile cărea erau datate cu anul 1924, când a fost constituită 

RASSM. Cu această ocazie, CC al PC(b) a publicat un material pentru propagandiştii de 

partid, intitulat Douăzeci şi cinci de ani ai RSS Moldoveneşti 59 . Hotărârea despre 

publicarea acestor materiale a fost luată de Biroul CC al PC(b)M la şedinŃa din 4 iunie 

1949, când s-a discutat şi despre sărbătorirea „jubileului”. Printre materialele incluse 

figurează şi Reunificarea poporului moldovenesc şi formarea RSS Moldoveneşti, românii 

basarabeni fiind astfel consideraŃi parte a unui „popor moldovenesc” aparte, a cărui primă 

componentă o formau moldovenii din stânga Nistrului. Peste 10 zile, Biroul discuta şi 

aproba raportul festiv pentru aniversarea RSSM, care se prezintă ca o reproducere a 

conceptului machetei la istoria Moldovei – o dovadă că el a fost elaborat de cei ce 

participau la scrierea manualului. Datorită importanŃei ce i s-a acordat sintezei pentru unii 

autori aceasta a însemnat avântul carierei profesionale. 

La sfârşitul anului 1949, de la Institutul de Istorie al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a URSS, 

care era principalul centru de cercetare în domeniul istoriei, la CC PC(b) din RSSM a 

sosit o scrisoare prin care se anunŃa că discutarea machetei de Istorie a Moldovei va avea 

loc în urma delegării şi confirmării numelor unor persoane pentru participarea la discuŃie. 

Astfel, la Moscova, a fost delegat grupul de autori A. Lazarev, preşedintele Comisiei de 

elaborare a sintezei, N. Mohov, I. Grosul, D. Şemiakov şi N. Berezneakov 60 . În ianuarie 

1950, persoanele enunŃate au asistat la discutarea machetei primului volum al Istoriei 

Moldovei la Institutele de Istorie de la Kiev, Moscova şi Leningrad 61 . De la acestea 

colaboratorii moldoveni au primit „recomandări şi sfaturi preŃioase” de care urmau să Ńină 

cont la elaborarea sintezei. Potrivit celor invitaŃi să comenteze „macheta”, folosirea 

termenului „Moldova” era prea liberală, considerându-se extrem de clar că teritoriul 

Basarabiei nu era identic cu cel al RSSM. Istoricii se întreceau în a argumenta că, 

deoarece regiunea Hotinului aparŃinea acum Ucrainei, revoltele de la Hotin făceau parte 

şi din istoria Ucrainei, şi nu ar trebui tratate în acest manual 62 . 

Astfel, istoria Moldovei era scrisă practic de persoane incompetente în domeniu, cele 

scrise de autorii „autohtoni” fiind recenzate şi în cele mai dese cazuri re-scrise de istoricii 

de la Moscova, Kiev etc. Deşi macheta manuscrisului a fost discutată în cadrul multor 

instituŃii ştiinŃifice şi de învăŃământ din URSS, aceasta rămânea nejustificată ştiinŃific şi 

nu avea un fundament sursologic esenŃial, fără argumentări ferme şi precise. După cum 

menŃiona însuşi A. Lazarev „CC al PC(b) al Moldovei Ńinea la control permanent 

desfăşurarea scrierii şi nivelul ştiinŃific al cursului de sinteză a Istoriei Moldovei. Biroul 

CC PC(b) din Moldova asculta anual la şedinŃele sale raportul preşedintelui comisiei în 

problema dată, aprecia starea de lucruri, «acorda ajutorul necesar», dădea «o serie de noi 

recomandări şi sfaturi» de care Ńineam seama atât în munca organizatorică, cât şi în 

procesul cercetărilor ştiinŃifice” 63 . 

Într-un final, după îndelungate „discuŃii” şi „aprobări” în 1951, în librăriile din 

Chişinău îşi face apariŃia primul dintre cele două volume ale Istoriei RSS Moldoveneşti 64 

sub egida editorilor UdalŃov şi Cerepnin 65 . Lucrarea a fost elaborată în limba rusă şi 

728

publicată în „limba moldovenească” abia în 1954. Faptul se explică nu doar prin 

necunoaşterea de către o bună parte din autori a „limbii moldoveneşti”, ci, mai ales, prin 

practica instituită ca orice publicaŃie istorică şi nu numai să treacă cenzura politică şi 

ideologică la centru 66 . Pe tot parcursul perioadei sovietice absolut toŃi colaboratorii 

ştiinŃifici din cadrul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a RSS Moldoveneşti, cu excepŃia celor de la 

Institutul de Limbă şi Literatură care scriau în „limba moldovenească”, elaborau lucrările 

doar în limba rusă, prejudiciind limba română la care se va reveni în 1991 cu calcuri 

ruseşti 67 . 

Deşi conceptele primului volum erau şubrede aceasta nu a împiedicat apariŃia unor 

recenzii care elogiau lucrarea demonstrând odată în plus caracterul ideologic al ei. Una 

din recenziile absolut pozitive este cea scrisă de P. Ipatenco 68 , care sublinia că „…numai 

în învoielile Moldovei sovietice a putut fi scrisă istoria adevărată a poporului 

moldovenesc” şi că lucrarea „..are o mare însemnătate pentru educarea ideinco-politică 

(sic!) a truditorilor din republica noastră, pentru lichidarea afirmaŃiilor false ale 

istoriografiei române, care schimonosesc adevărul istoric, pentru a otrăvi conştiinŃa 

norodului truditor şi a cleveti marele popor rus” 69 . 

Cu toate acestea, din considerentul că lucrarea era văduvită de prezenŃa izvoarelor 

scrise şi materialelor arheologice referitoare la istoria timpurie, rolul slavilor în 

etnogeneza moldovenilor şi edificarea statului medieval s-au luat măsuri pentru 

intensificarea cercetărilor arheologice prin desfăşurarea unor expediŃii ştiinŃifice. Astfel, 

în noiembrie 1951, în cadrul Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură a fost formată o 

structură nouă denumită ExpediŃia arheologică complexă moldovenească cu direcŃiile: 

epocile străvechi în frunte cu T.S. Passec şi arheologie slavo-moldovenească în frunte cu 

Gh.B. Fiodorov. Scopul acestea era „studierea arheologică consecventă şi sistematică a 

teritoriului Moldovei” şi „unificarea tuturor specialiştilor, care lucrează în acest 

domeniu” 70 . Însăşi definirea celei de-a doua direcŃii demonstrează adevăratele scopuri ale 

acestei instituŃii. Mai târziu, în cadrul expediŃiilor arheologice, materialele care erau 

depistate şi datau cu sec. V–XIV, erau calificate drept slave pentru a dovedi rolul slavilor 

în etnogeneza moldovenilor şi în constituirea statului moldovenesc. 

Moartea lui Stalin în 1953 a însemnat pentru Uniunea Sovietică începutul ieşirii din 

stalinism marcat printr-o încercare iluzorie de „revenire la normele leninislumui” 71 . 

Căutarea noilor căi de abordare a istoriei pornesc odată cu raportul general şi secret 

prezentat de N. Hruşciov la Congresul al XX-lea, pe 24-25 februarie 1956, împotriva 

cultului personalităŃii lui Stalin. SituaŃia cu referire la ştiinŃa istorică a fost lămurită prin 

articolul Congresul al XX-lea şi sarcinile cercetărilor Istoriei Partidului publicat imediat 

după Congres în revista Voprosî istorii. Prin conŃinutul articolului practic se formulau noi 

direcŃii în cercetarea istoriei, fiind declarată prioritatea caracterului ştiinŃific 72 . 

Concomitent, articolul era scris în spiritul respectării deciziilor de partid, istoricii fiind 

chemaŃi să cerceteze istoria de pe principiile leninismului şi să revadă din punct de vedere 

critic principiile expuse în lucrarea Istoria PC(b) din toată Uniunea. Curs scurt a lui 

Stalin. Conform articolului „trăsătura principală a Congresului al XX-lea, care a fost unul 

dintre cele mai importante evenimente după moartea lui V. Lenin, este fidelitatea 

marxism-leninismului” 73 . Astfel, noua politică de destalinizare şi „coexistenŃă paşnică” cu 

occidentul cerea un nou tip de istoriografie, care în opinia lui Hruşciov, ar fi oferit 

729

conducerii partidului o informaŃie preŃioasă despre drumul cel mai bun spre comunism. 

Totodată istoricilor li se fixau trei obiective principale: să se confrunte cu scriitorii şi 

istoricii din Vest la nivel academic (lucru nemaiîntâlnit până în 1953, când publicaŃiile 

occidentale nu se discutau în mod deschis de către savanŃii sovietici); istoricii trebuiau să 

restabilească credibilitatea istoriografiei sau mai bine zis credibilitatea partidului în faŃa 

populaŃiei. Scopul a devenit şi mai important atunci când Hruşciov a decis că Partidul 

Comunist ar trebui să fie, în continuare, un partid al întregii populaŃii unionale şi că 

istoricii ar trebui să contribuie la crearea unui nou tip de om „sovietic”. 

În concluzie, autorul articolului trasează clar limitele libertăŃii de creaŃie a istoricilor, 

menŃionând „... sarcinile noastre sunt clar delimitate de Congresul al XX-lea… este 

necesar de a ajuta cadrele să depăşească cultul personalităŃii, buchereala şi dogmatismul 

şi să-şi construiască lucrul lor pe baza marxismului creativ..., de a urma ferm învăŃătura şi 

metoda leninistă şi a crea lucrări ştiinŃifice noi, îmbibate cu idei noi, spirit creativ şi de 

cercetare sârguincioasă, contribuind astfel la victoria comunismului” 74 . 

Cu toate că ştiinŃa istorică rămânea în continuare în serviciul regimului comunist şi 

ideologiei de partid, cursul „destalinizării dirijate” a contribuit la unele schimbări pozitive 

în ştiinŃa istorică. O trăsătură distinctivă a fost împlinirea setei izvoristice prin încetinirea 

piedicilor accesului în arhive. Spre exemlu, dacă în 1947 în sălile de lectură ale DirecŃiei 

Arhivelor de Stat au avut acces la o parte din documente circa 4000 de persoane, atunci în 

1957 peste 23 000 de persoane 75 . Au fost publicate numeroase culegeri de documente 

referitoare la Istoria URSS şi la istoria universală. A fost reluată editarea culegerilor 

statistice 76 . 

Concomitent, istoricii au obŃinut posibilitatea de a elabora metodologia ştiinŃei chiar 

dacă aceasta era în limitele teoriei marxist-leniniste, tinzând să se elibereze de dogmatism 

prin „înŃelegerea pe nou a lui Marx”, cauza tuturor relelor epocii staliniste fiind 

considerată „vulgarizarea” ştiinŃei 77 . 

În timpul lui Hruşciov în cercetare şi în învăŃământ s-au investit mai mult decât 

oricând. Numărul monografiilor istorice a crescut de la 556 în 1956 la 1602 în 1957. În 

această perioadă, au fost rectificate cele mai flagrante falsificări staliniste ale istoriei. 

Rolul politicii şi individului în istorie au fost reduse la proporŃii mult mai moderate, iar 

naŃionalismul rus a fost forŃat să lase loc reabilitării istoriei aproape a 100 de naŃionalităŃi. 

Cu toate acestea, „eterna prietenie a popoarelor”, inclusiv istoria „realŃiilor româno-ruse” 

şi „anexările progresiste” 78 au rămas în continuare în vigoare, deoarece atâta timp cât 

istoricii se „conformau” celor două mituri, ei erau liberi în opŃiunile lor. 

În cadrul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a URSS „dezgheŃul hruşciovist” a început, în 1956, cu 

o adunare de coordonare pe problemele istorice care a discutat planul cincinal al 

cercetărilor istorice, urmând să fie aprobat la şedinŃa SecŃiei ŞtiinŃe Istorice a AŞ a URSS. 

MulŃi dintre cei prezenŃi la şedinŃă s-au pronunŃat pentru înaintarea unor teme de 

cercetare noi şi de revedere a aprecierilor vechi. Astfel, istoricul P.N. Tretiakov în 

raportul său remarca că în premieră după atâŃea ani a devenit posibil cercetarea creativă a 

unor numeroase direcŃii în istoria contemporană. Însă, în acelaşi timp, erau prezente şi 

acuzaŃii în cerinŃa căutării de noi abordări în studierea istoriei 79 . Asemenea atitudine faŃă 

de activitatea istoricilor este lesne de explicat prin frica conducerii de partid de a pierde 

controlul ideologic în sfera ştiinŃei. 

730

Liberalizarea regimului sovietic nu s-a lăsat mult aşteptat nici în RSSM. Chiar dacă, 

1955, la Chişinău îşi face apariŃia o lucrare consacrată deja formării „naŃiei socialiste 

moldoveneşti” 80 , iar în 1958, cel de-al doilea volum al lucrării Istoria Moldovei, mai 

rezervat în declaraŃii propagandistice 81 , în raport cu primul volum, şi elaborarea 

concepŃiei despre „poporul moldovenesc”, distinct de poporul român şi vorbitor de 

„limbă moldovenească” este considerat încheiată, aceasta nu împiedică activizarea vieŃii 

ştiinŃifice din cadrul Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură, aflat sub tutela partidului. 

Deşi Hruşciov considera că „libertăŃii istoricului” îi trebuiau impuse limite politice din 

considerentul că acesta risca să deducă concluzii din documente de arhive care nu 

conveneau sub raport politic partidului, totuşi aceasta nu i-a împiedicat pe unii istoricii să 

vadă lucrurile nu doar din prismă ideologică. Astfel, un şir de colaboratori ştiinŃifici, 

printre care şi medievistul Demir Dragnev, au posibilitatea să lucreze în arhivele de la 

Moscova, Sankt Petersburg, Kiev, Odesa, şi chiar Bucureşti, Sofia şi Varşovia 82 , 

aducându-şi prinosul prin scoaterea din anonimat a unor importante documente. 

În acelaşi timp, în 1958, drept rezultat al desfăşurării unor ample acŃiuni privind 

reorganizarea Filialei Moldoveneşti a AŞ a URSS în Academia de ŞtiinŃe a RSS 

Moldoveneşti 83 , care într-un final a fost inaugurată la 2 iule 1961, preşedinte devenind 

acad. I. Grosul (1961–1976), Institutul de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură este divizat în 

Institutul de Istorie şi Institutul de Limbă şi Literatură 84 . 

O caracteristică a perioadei hruşcioviste în Moldova sovietică Ńine de „încălzirea”, în 

1958, a relaŃiilor cu România „... chiar N. Mohov merge la Bucureşti, se organizează şi o 

conferinŃă cu acest generic Vekovaia Drujba..., vin doctoranzi, însă toŃi erau pătrunşi de 

marxizm şi atitudine de clasă” 85 . La fel, au loc manifestări ştiinŃifice şi la Chişinău la care 

participă 10 savanŃi de la „Insitutul de Istorie a Culturii Materiale a Academiei Republicii 

Populare Române”, pentru cazarea cărora, pe o durată de 5 zile s-au cheltuit 30 000 de 

ruble 86 . 

În 1959, odată cu publicarea lucrării consacrate constituirii statului moldovenesc, 

elaborată de N. Mohov, istoricii de la Institutul de Istorie se pregătesc pentru o serie de 

manifestări consacrate jubileului de 600 de ani de la formarea statului moldovenesc, 

precum şi a 150 de ani de la „alipirea Moldovei (deci, nu a teritoriului dintre Prut şi 

Nistru) la Rusia”. 

În acelaşi timp, istorici de la Chişinău, în baza unor noi materiale documentare, 

continuă să prezinte referate la congrese şi simpozioane internaŃionale din România. 

Astfel, la împlinirea a 100 de ani de la înfiinŃarea UniversităŃii Al. I. Cuza din Iaşi, o 

delegaŃie de istorici şi scriitori de la Chişinău participă la una din şedinŃele ştiinŃifice 

consacrate acestui eveniment 87 . Drept rezultat se stabilesc colaborări ştiinŃifice a unor 

istorici de la Chişinău cu istoricii de la Iaşi – L. Boicu, I. Caproşu, Al. Zub, N. Grigoraş, 

Gh. Platon ş. a. şi cei de la Bucureşti – A. OŃetea, P.P. Panaitescu, Al. GonŃa, Şt. 

Ştefănescu, N. Stoicescu, Ş. Papacostea, D. Berdinei, M. Berza, P. Cernovodeanu ş.a. 88 , 

precum şi un schimb reciproc de materiale ştiinŃifice. 

Înviorarea gândirii istorice, însă nu a durat mult timp. La 9 martie 1957 ea a fost 

întreruptă de constituirea unei noi limite de cercetare: în primul rând, a fost de facto 

discreditată posibilitatea necoincidenŃei tezelor teoretice şi practicii construcŃiei 

socialiste, mai exact, posibilitatea deformării prevederilor teoretice pe parcursul 

731

construcŃiei socialismului. O astfel de posibilitate a fost prescrisă unei singure perioade, 

iar responsabilitatea pentru aceasta se punea în seama unei singure persoane, concrete. 

Mai mult decât atât, se prevedeau şirul de probleme, în care o astfel de deformare se 

recunoştea a fi admisibilă. Cel mai dramatic era faptul că prin această hotărâre, istoricii 

din nou au fost privaŃi de dreptul de a medita asupra problemelor teoretice, astfel încât 

doar PCUS avea dreptul de a dezvolta bazele teoretice ale marxism-leninismului, şi doar 

el era în stare de a aprecia, în ce măsură practica ar corespunde ideilor şi concluziilor 

teoretice 89 . Deşi istoricii au avut posibilitatea să cunoască realizările cercetărilor colegilor 

de peste hotare, utilizarea experienŃei lor a fost limitată prin canalele ideologice existente 

„critica istoriografiei burgheze, antimarxiste şi revizioniste”.S-a arătat încă odată în plus 

că posibilitatea cercetărilor ştiinŃifice cu adevărat depindea de conjunctura politică, ştiinŃa 

nu s-a eliberat de influenŃele externe, ea a dobândit doar o „libertate limitată”. Fenomenul 

constă în faptul că monopolul asupra adevărului ştiinŃific rămânea în mâinile aparatului 

de partid şi de stat 90 . Pe parcursul anilor 1960, s-a constituit un nou sistem al canoanelor 

ideologice, întărit prin publicarea operelor complete ale lui Lenin. „Libertatea limitată” sa 

răsfrânt direct şi asupra metodologiei istoriei şi izvoarelor, factor care a stagnat 

dezvoltarea ştiinŃei istorice. Astfel, în a doua jumătate a anilor 1950 în realitate a avut loc 

modernizarea ideilor staliniste, prin purificarea lor de formulări odioase 91 . 

Îngrădirea libertăŃilor în cadrul scrierilor istorice în RSSM a avut loc şi din cauza 

tensionării relaŃiilor româno-sovietice. Astfel, colaborările ştiinŃifice şi pătrunderea 

literaturii istorice din România în RSS Moldovenească mai ales din perioada de până la 

1940, apoi şi din anii 1941–1944, care se păstra în fondurile unor biblioteci depozitate în 

fonduri speciale, au fost blocate. Spre exemplu, în februarie 1966, o comisie specială, 

constituită pentru controlul asupra fondului special al Bibliotecii Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a 

RSSM, care întrunea literatura, periodicele şi presa de peste hotare, preponderent din 

România, cu acces strict limitat şi care era accesibil „doar specialiştilor care aveau o 

învoire specială”, constata că „din neglijenŃă” în fondul deschis al bibliotecii au fost 

trecute „fără destul temei şi vreo 50 de cărŃi care nu trebuiau să fie puse la dispoziŃia 

cercetătorilor. Printre ele: C. Stere, Documentări şi lămuriri politice (1930); S. Stoica, 

Iuliu Maniu (1932); I.C. Brătianu, Cuvintele unui mare român (1927); C. Gavanescu, 

Războiul nostru pentru întregirea neamului (1918); La question roumaine, Paris, 1918; 

D. Sturdza, Europa, Rusia şi România (1914); I. Nistor, Unirea Bucovinei (1928); K. 

KiriŃescu, Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României (1916–1919), vol. II; N. Iorga, 

Basarabia noastră (1912); N. Iorga, Românii de peste Nistru (1918) ş. a. Toate acestea 

loveau direct în postulatele istoriografiei sovietice, demonstrând caracterul propagandistic 

al scrierilor istorice de la Chişinău, astfel că respectiva comisie a decis readucerea celor 

50 de cărŃi în fondul special, deoarece erau „... prezentate într-o lumină falsă relaŃiile 

ruso-române... ” şi „...criticată alipirea Basarabiei la Rusia în 1812 şi la URSS în anul 

1940” 92 . 

Abordarea evoluŃiei definiŃiilor identităŃii naŃionale şi ştiinŃei istorice de la înfiinŃarea 

Institutului de Istorie, Limbă şi Literatură până la inaugurarea oficială a Academiei de 

ŞtiinŃe a RSS Moldoveneşti ne face să tragem câteva concluzii. Istoricii marxişti-leninişti 

din RSS Moldovenească incipient N. Berezneakov, V. Senchevici 93 , N. NarŃov, ulterior 

Т. Моhov 94 , I. Grosul 95 , A. Lazarev 96 ş.a. au promovat constant idea moldovenismului 

732

pentru a justifica politica sovietică în regiune. Astfel, ei au creat, în mod artificial, un 

popor numit „moldovenesc” atribuindu-i şi o limbă denumită „moldovenească”, iar 

pentru ai legitima existenŃa şi a-i asigura continuitatea istorică în cadrul URSS acestui 

popor i s-a creat şi un trecut statal. În realizarea acestei construcŃii, istoriografia sovietică 

moldovenească a plecat de la un adevăr istoric: întemeierea statului feudal, Principatul 

Moldovei, de la mijlocul secolului XIV. În continuare însă eşafodajul a fost clădit pe 

neadevăr şi pe o interpretare tendenŃioasă a proceselor istorice din considerentul 

ideologiei şi propagandei sovietice. Potrivit istoricilor sovietici statalitatea medievală, 

Principatul Moldovei, ar fi servit intereselor cotropitorilor străini. Odată cu formarea 

statului român modern, la 24 ianuarie 1859, Principatul Moldovei ar fi fost lichidat şi 

doar revoluŃia bolşevică ar fi permis reconstruirea „statalităŃii sovietice moldoveneşti”. În 

opinia reprezentanŃilor istoriografiei sovietice „statalitatea poporului moldovenesc” a 

cunoscut mai multe etape, trecând prin declararea, la 2 decembrie 1917, a Republicii 

Democratice Moldoveneşti, transformată la 24 ianuarie 1918 în Republica 

Moldovenească Independentă. Următoarea etapă ar fi fost formarea RASSM pe malul 

stâng al Nistrului, în 1924, ca „rezultat al cerinŃelor reprezentanŃilor muncitorimii, 

Ńărănimii şi intelectualităŃii multinaŃionale din zonă”. Însă idealul naŃional al 

moldovenilor s-ar fi înfăptuit în 1940, când „masele muncitoare din Basarabia au 

restabilit puterea sovietică şi s-au reunit cu Patria sovietică”, procesul finalizând prin 

formarea „statalităŃii poporului moldovenesc”. 

Aceste enormităŃi ale istoriografiei sovietice au fost promovate metodic, decenii la 

rând, de către propaganda comunistă din RSSM, ideologia moldovenistă sovietică 

devenind nu doar un argument istoriografic ci şi o politică de substituire a identităŃii 

româneşti în favoarea identităŃii moldoveneşti promovată de autorităŃile centrale sovietice 

prin intermediul ştiinŃei istorice, învăŃământului şi manualelor şcolare, în special a celor 

din domeniul umanitar – abecedar, limba moldovenească şi istorie. 

Lista martorilor 

Demir DRAGNEV, născut la 27 iulie 1936 în s. CureşniŃa, r. Soroca, doctor habilitat în 

ştiinŃe istorice (1992), prof. univ. (1995), director al Institutului de Istorie al Academiei 

de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei (1994–2006), membru corespondent al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a 

Moldovei (1995). Autor a peste 200 de lucrări ştiinŃifice şi ştiinŃifico-didactice, inclusiv 9 

monografii dintre care: Сельское хозяйство феодальной Молдавии -1975; Istoria 

Moldovei din cele mai vechi timpuri până la începutul sec. al XIX-lea -1992; łara 

Moldovei în epoca Luminilor -1999 etc. Lucrează la Institutul de Istorie din 1957. 

Interviu realizat de Lidia Prisac la 26 şi 27 iunie 2012, la Chişinău. 

Ion JARCUłCHI, născut la 29 iunie 1948 în s. Bocşa, r. Făleşti, doctor în istorie (1984), 

conf. cercet. (1995), directorul centrului de Istorie al Institutului de Istorie, Stat şi Drept 

al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei. Autor a peste 70 de lucrări ştiinŃifice, inclusiv 

studiile monografice: Развитие промышленности и торговли в левобережных 

районах молдавского Поднестровья в пореформенный период (1861–1905) -1985; 

Pacea de la Bucureşti (din istoria diplomatică a încheierii Tratatului de pace ruso-turc de 

733

la 16(28) mai 1812) (în colaborare) -1992; Din istoria Transnistriei (în contextul istoriei 

naŃionale) (în colaborare) -2001 etc. Lucrează la Institutul de Istorie din 1978. Interviu 

realizat de Lidia Prisac la 28 iunie 2012, la Chişinău. 

REFERENCES 

nv. 1, dosar 43, f. 25. 

1 King, Charles: Moldovenii, România, Rusia şi politica culturală, Chişinău. Editura Arc, 2002, p. 

63-88. 

2 Cojocaru, Gheorghe: ConştiinŃa istorică, identiate de stat şi identitate etnoculturală în Republica 

Moldova (Reînodarea firului istoriei şi păşirea în moderniate). In: Akademos, 2009, nr. 2 (13), p. 

63. 

3 Молдавия в великой семье республик Советского Союза. Cб. статей, Кишинев, 1941. 

4 King, Charles: Politica culturală sovietică în Basarabia de la anexare până la Perestroikă. In: 

Sub povara graniŃei imperiale (A. Pop (ed.)), Bucureşti. Editura Recif, 1993, p. 89. 


6 Republica Moldova. Edi ie enciclopedică, Chi inău. Enciclopedia Moldovei, 2009, p. 384-390. 

7 Chifu, Iulian: Basarabia sub ocupaŃie sovietică şi tentative contemporane de revenire sub tutela 

Moscovei, Bucureşti. Politeia-SNSPA, 2004, p. 121. 

8 Academia de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei: Istorie şi contemporanietate, 1946–2006, Chişinău. ŞtiinŃa, 

2006, p. 28. 

9 Dolghi, Adrian: Politica statului sovietic în domeniul învăŃământului istoric superior în perioada 

anilor 1944–1965. (În baza materialelor din RSSM), Teză de doctor în istorie, Chi inău, 2010, 

p. 51. 

10 Dragnev, Demir: Istorie şi civilizaŃie medievală şi modernă timpurie în łările Române. Studii şi 

materiale, Chişinău. Cartdidact2012, p. 515. 

11 Нарцов, Н. А. Боротьба за Жовтень на Молдави, Тирасполь, 1932. 

12 Дембо, В. О. Советcкая Молдавия и бессарабский вопрос, Москва, 1925; Idem, 

Бессарабское крестьянство под властью кулаков и помещиков, Москва, 1931, Бантке, С. 

С. 10 лет борьбы против румынских бояр, Москва-Ленинград, 1928; Галайда, К. 

Украденная страна, Москва, 1928. 

13 Борисюк, И. С., Мамаев, П.В. Молдова Совиетикэ, Тираспол, 1938. 

14 Academia de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei: Istorie..., p. 29. 

15 Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 516. 

16 În urma tratatului de neagresiune dintre Germania şi URSS numit şi Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov 

şi în statele baltice au fost înfiinŃate oficial Academii de ŞtiinŃe în stil sovietic. În Lituania 

Academia de ŞtiinŃe a fost înfiinŃată la 16 ianuarie 1941. Vezi: 

http://lma.lt/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=161&Itemid=186&lang= 

en (acceast pe 26 iunie 2012). În Estonia centrul academic înfiinŃat la 28 ianuarie 1938 după 

anexarea la URSS a fost lichidat la 17 iulie 1940 şi reorganizat după modelul sovietic la 28 iunie 

1945. Vezi: http://www.akadeemia.ee/en/academy/history/ (acceast pe 26 iunie 2012). În Letonia 

Academia de ŞtiinŃe a fost înfiinŃată la 14 februarie 1946. Vezi: 

http://www.lza.lv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=279&Itemid=123 (acceast pe 

26 iunie 2012). 

17 Манусевич, А. Я. История захвата Бессарабии Румынией. In: Исторический журнал, 

1940, № 8. Vezi: Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 517. 

734

18 Ibidem, p. 520. 

19 Ibidem. 

20 Ibidem. 


22 JarcuŃchi, Ion: File din istoricul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe (65 de ani de la formarea primelor 

instituŃii academice din Republica Moldova). In: Akademos. Revistă de ŞtiinŃă, Inovare, Cultură 

şi Artă, 2011, nr. 2, p. 15. 

23 Arhiva Academiei de tiin e a Moldovei (În continuare AA M), Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 1, f. 121. 

24 AA M, Fond 3, unv. 1, d. 10, f. 1-3. 

25 Ibidem, f. 3. 

26 Ibidem, f. 11. 

27 Ibidem, f. 8-9. 

28 Ibidem 21-22. 

29 Eremia, Mihai: Facultatea de Istorie din cadrul Institutului Pedagogic Moldovenesc (1941– 

1944). In: ConferinŃa corpului didactico-ştiinŃific „BilanŃul ActivităŃii ştiinŃifice a USM pe anii 

1998/99”, 27 septembrie-2 octombrie 2000, Rezumatele comunicărilor, Chişinău, 2000, p. 294. 

30 Ibidem. 

31 

AA M, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 10, f. 54-56. 

32 

Dolghi, Adrian: op. cit., p. 93. 

33 

AA M, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 10, f. 61. 

34 

Ibidem, f. 63-64. 

35 

Interviu realizat de Lidia Prisac cu membrul corespondent Demir Dragnev la 26 iunie 2012. 

36 

AA M, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 14, f. 9-10. 

37 

Interviu realizat de Lidia Prisac cu membrul corespondent Demir Dragnev la 26 iunie 2012. 

38 JarcuŃchi, Ion: op. cit., p. 34. 

39 Ibidem, p. 40. 

40 AA M, Fond 3, inv. 1, d. 14, f. 29. 


42 Interviu realizat de Lidia Prisac cu membrul corespondent Demir Dragnev la 26 iunie 2012. 

43 urcanu, Ion: Istoriografia din Moldova Sovietică între tiin ă i propagandă. In: Revista de 

Istorie a Moldovei, 1994, nr. 3-4, p. 11; Xenofontov, Ion: Mi carea na ională din RSS 

Moldovenească în istoriografie: premise, evolu ie, consecin e. In: Sfâr itul regimurilor 

comuniste. Cauze. Desfă urare. Consecin e, Cluj-Napoca. Argonaut, 2011, p. 396. 


45 Ibidem, p. 517. 



48 Ibidem, p. 517-524. 

49 Matveev, Sergiu: Procesele etno-culturale din spa iul carpato-nistrean în secolele II-XIV. 

Istoriografia sovietică, Chi inău. Pontos, 2009, p. 22. 

50 Dragnev, Demir: op. cit., p. 524-525. 

51 Dolghi, Adrian, Despre cum s-a scris istoria Moldovei în URSS – un exemplu tipic al imixtiunii 

politicului în via a didacico- tiin ifică. In: Transilvania, Sibiu, 2008, nr. 11, p. 72. 

52 Van Meurs, Wilhelm Petrus: Chestiunea Basarabiei în istoriografia comunistă, Chi inău. 

Editura Arc, 1996, p. 210. 

53 Dolghi, Adrian: Politica statului sovietic în domeniul învăŃământului istoric..., p. 27. 

54 Van Meurs, Wilhelm Petrus: op. cit., p. 223-235. 

735

55 Ibidem, p. 212. 

56 Lazarev, Artem: Cum a fost scrisă istoria Moldovei. In: Nistru, 1989, nr. 2, p. 136. 


58 Ibidem. 

59 Двадцатъ пятъ лет Молдавской Советской Социалистической Республики (материалы 

для докладчиков), Кищинев, 1949. Responsabil de publicaŃie V. I. Ovcinnikov. 


61 Lazarev, Artem: op. cit., p. 135. 

62 Van Meurs, Wilhelm Petrus: op. cit., p. 212. 

63 Lazarev, Artem: op. cit., p. 135-136. 

64 История Молдавской ССР, Кишинев, 1951. 

65 Межвузовское научное совещание по истории на Дону и Северном Кавказе в конце XIXначале 

ХХ вв. In: Тезисы докладов, Ростов-на-Дону, 1958. 



68 Ipatenco, Piotr: Un prinos la dezvoltarea culturii moldoveneşti. In: Moldova Socialistă, 2 iulie 

1952, p. 2. 

69 Ibidem. 


71 Werth, Nicolas: Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Hru ciov la Gorbaciov (1953–1985), 

Bucure ti. Corint, 2000, p. 6. 

72 XX съезд КПСС и задачи исследования истории партии. In: Вопросы истории, 1956, № 3, 

c. 3-12. 


74 Ibidem, p. 12. 

75 Пыжиков, А.В. Историческая наука в годы «оттепели». In: Социально-гуманитарные 

знания, 2000, № 6, с. 223. 

76 Dolghi, Adrian: ConsecinŃele contradictorii ale Congresului XX al PCUS în domeniul 

învăŃământului istoric superior din URSS. In: Studia Universitatis: Revistă ştiinŃifică a 

UniversităŃii de Stat din Moldova. Seria ŞtiinŃe umanistice, 2009, nr. 4, p.56. 

77 Пыжиков, А.В. op. cit., p. 221-230. 

78 AA M, Fond 18, inv. 1, d. 1, d. 40-46. 


80 Грекул, А.В. Формирование и развитие молдавской социалистической нации, Кищинев, 

1955. 

81 Dacă primul volum din punct de vedere al limitelor cronologice era enorm şi era compus din 6 

secŃiuni, cel de-al doilea volum cuprindea doar limitele cronologice de jumătate de secol, de la 

victoria revoluŃiei din februarie în Rusia până la mijlocul secolului al XX-lea, însă era compus 

din 8 secŃiuni. Aceasta pentru a demonstra că de la „instalarea puterii sovietice în RSSM” 

societatea a cunoscut o „înflorire” în toate domeniile vieŃii şi că Basarabia a fost ocupată de 

„România regală” cunoscând în cadrul acesteia „un regres evident”. De la al doilea volum al 

Istorie Moldovei reinterpretarea evenimentelor devine o normă pentru istoriografia 

moldovenească din perioada sovietică. 

82 Cojocaru, Gheorghe: Interviu cu Demir Dragnev, dr. hab. în istorie, prof. univ., membrucorespondent 

al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei, director al Institutului de Istorie al Academiei 

de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei. In: Caiete de Istorie, 2004, nr. 2, p. 29. 

736

83 Spre finele anului 1955, RSS Moldovenească era unica republică din URSS care nu dispunea de 

o organizaŃie ştiinŃifică proprie de genul Academiei de ŞtiinŃe. 

84 Interviu realizat de Lidia Prisac cu dr. Ion JarcuŃchi la 28 iunie 2012. 


86 AA M, Fond 18, inv. 1, d. 5, f. 55-62. 

87 Constantinov, Valentin: Din 1994 a început o nouă companie revanşardă de mistificare şi 

falsificare a istoriei. Interviu cu academicianul Demir Dragnrv la 70 de ani. In: Revista 

Română, Iaşi, 2006, nr. 3, p. 4. 

88 Ibidem. 


90 Сидорова, Л. А. „Оттепель” в исторической науке. Советская историография первого 

послесталинского десятилетия, Москва. Наука, 1997, c. 123. 

91 Dolghi, Adrian: ConsecinŃele contradictorii ale Congresului XX…, p.56-57. 


93 Сенкевичь, В. Исторические связи молдавского народа с великим русским народом, 

Кишинев, 1947. 

94 Мохов, Н. Исторические исследования по формированию молдавского народа, Кишинев, 

1983. 

95 Гросул, И. Историческое значение присоединения Бессарабии к России для судеб 

молдавского народа. In: Вопросы истории, 1962, № 7, c. 31-40. 

96 Лазарев, A. Образование Молдавской ССР, Кишинев. Картя молдовеняскэ, 1949; Лазарев, 

A. Воссоединение молдавского народа в единое советское государство, Кишинев. Картя 

молдовеняскэ, 1965; Лазарев, A. Молдавская советская государственность и 

бессарабский вопрос, Кишинев, 1974 и.др. 

737

PREGĂTIREA ALEGERILOR 

PARLAMENTARE 

DIN ANUL 1946 

Cristina ROMAN 1 

Climatul politic în preajma alegerilor 

Presa comunistă şi organele represive (PoliŃia, Jandarmeria, Serviciul de InformaŃii) 

controlate de guvernul Groza au avut un rol semnificativ în crearea unei stări de spirit 

tensionate în rândul opiniei publice şi al opoziŃiei politice. Strategia electorală a 

guvernului comunist exprimată prin Legea electorală şi programul electoral al Blocului 

Partidelor Democrate avea ca obiectiv esenŃial lichidarea democraŃiei din România. 

Propaganda iniŃiată de SecŃia Centrală a EducaŃiei Politice a Partidului Comunist trebuia 

să aducă după cum susŃinea Iosif Chişinevschi, „90-94% din voturi la alegeri” 2 . 

Campania comunistă de eliminare prin violenŃă a partidelor democratice de pe scena 

politică începută încă din 1945 s-a intensificat la începutul anului 1946. AcŃiunile 

teroriste au început încă din primele luni, cu scopul intimidării membrilor şi 

simpatizanŃilor partidelor „istorice” în perspectiva alegerilor. În luna februarie a avut loc 

un atentat nereuşit la viaŃa lui Dinu Brătianu, în timp ce se îndrepta spre Câmpulung 

Muscel pentru a participa la o întrunire. Pe 22 aprilie, Emil HaŃieganu, fruntaş al 

Partidului NaŃional łărănesc venind cu maşina de la Cluj a fost oprit de un grup de 

comunişti violenŃi fiind agresat. Avea să urmeze Ion Mihalache lider al naŃional 

Ńărăniştilor, căruia i s-a ridicat dreptul de a participa la alegeri pe motiv că a participat ca 

voluntar la războiul antisovietic. 

În ciuda acordului obŃinut în cadrul ConferinŃei de la Moscova în decembrie 1945, 

prin care s-a impus desfăşurarea în cel mai scurt timp a unor alegeri libere în România, 

diplomaŃii occidentali şi-au menŃinut în continuare în corespondenŃa lor rezervele privind 

bunele intenŃii declarate de guvernul comunist de la Bucureşti. În raportul privind 

misiunea sa la Bucureşti, Clark Kerr, ambasadorul Marii Britanii la Moscova declara cu 

mâhnire că l-a părăsit pe Petru Groza, cu sentimentul că este „un pungaş experimentat de 

neclintit”: „Cred că dr. Groza este plin de gânduri ascunse şi că va face tot ce îi stă în 

putinŃă pentru a pune atâtea beŃe în roŃile politicii noastre, câte ruşii îi vor spune. E o 

1 Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, Bucureşti, 

Romania. 

2 Arhivele NaŃionale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), fond CC al PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 52/1946, f. 

22. 

738

treabă melancolică dar nu văd ce se poate face mai mult” 3 . Deşi anglo-amercanii îi 

încurajau în mod repetat pe liderii naŃional-Ńărănişti şi liberali, în cancelariile occidentale 

se cunoşteau încă din 1945 care va fi rezultatul alegerilor de la Bucureşti. Într-un dialog 

cu ambasadorul american Harriman, în decembrie 1945, vicecomisarul sovietic Vîşinski 

prevedea o victorie a guvernului „cu 70 de procente”. Continuând pe aceeaşi linie a 

pronosticurilor, înaintea alegerilor, ambasadorul sovietic la Bucureşti, Serghei 

Kavtaradze susŃinea că partidul comunist prin „anumite tehnici” poate spera chiar la 90 la 

sută din voturi 4 . 

La puŃin timp după primirea în guvern ca miniştri fără portofoliu a celor doi 

reprezentanŃi ai Partidului NaŃional łărănesc şi Partidului NaŃional Liberal, Emil 

HaŃieganu şi Mihail Romniceanu, comuniştii au declanşat o campanie de denigrare şi 

marginalizare a acestora. În cadrul şedinŃei Biroului Politic lărgit din 8 ianuarie 1946, 

Vasile Luca susŃinea că: „În faŃa opiniei publice trebuie demascaŃi, izolaŃi aceşti doi din 

partidele reacŃionare, fără ca această campanie să capete o formă de care s-ar putea lega 

forŃele din străinătate. Este nevoie de o extraordinară dibăcie şi elasticitate pentru a 

îndeplini aceste sarcini, această tactică a Partidului” 5 . La finalul şedinŃei Gheorghiu-Dej 

concluziona: „Trebuie să stabilim un plan de bătaie pentru ziariştii noştri, cum să-i atace 

pe miniştrii Romniceanu şi HaŃieganu. Să le aranjăm curse. Noi le vom face diferite 

şicane şi aceasta cu mare abilitate şi supleŃe. Pot să-l combat prieteneşte în Consiliul de 

Miniştri şi apoi să ies cu dânsul la braŃ şi să-l fac să vorbească în aşa fel ca să audă 

gazetarii” 6 . Fiind fără portofoliu, rolul celor doi miniştri era mult diminuat. Ana Pauker 

avea să remarce acest lucru într-una din intervenŃiile sale: „Hotărârea de la Moscova în 

sensul acesta a vrut să ne ajute: ca guvernul compus din 18 miniştri să rămână cum este, 

cu o schimbare, mă rog, care aproape nu este” 7 . În fapt acordul de la Moscova a adus doar 

o schimbare de faŃadă în guvernul Groza de la Bucureşti, pentru a mai domoli reacŃiile 

anglo-americane faŃă de politica nedemocratică dusă de regimul aflat la putere în 

România. 

Anticipând, parcă ceea ce va urma, Iuliu Maniu condiŃiona participarea la guvernare, 

de primirea unor garanŃii ferme din partea guvernului privind libertatea viitoarelor alegeri 

şi asigurarea libertăŃii presei. Speculând orice opoziŃie venită din partea adeversarului 

politic, comuniştii au criticat atitudinea adoptată de Maniu, considerând că nu respectă 

acordul de la Moscova prin faptul că nu a dovedit colaborare şi loialitate în guvern, 

chemându-şi reprezentantul în timpul şedinŃei de guvern 8 . 

3 

Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Sovietizarea României. PercepŃii anglo-americane (1944- 

1947), Bucureşti, 1993, p. 163. 

4 

Adrian Cioroianu, Pe umerii lui Marx, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 65. 

5 

ANIC, fond CC la PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 5/1946, f. 8. 

6 Ibidem, ff. 15-16. 



739

Liniile directoare ale Partidului Comunist Român în viitoarele alegeri au fost fixate la 

Plenara CC din 27-29 ianuarie 1946 9 . Obiectivul central formulat la Plenară era stabilirea 

unei platforme politice pe baza căreia să fie strânse toate forŃele democratice într-un bloc, 

cu un program „nici al Partidului Comunist, nici al Partidului Social Democrat, al 

niciuneia din aceste forŃe, dar să fie programul refacerii economice şi reconstrucŃiei 

Ńării” 10 . Formularea lui Gheorghiu-Dej suna frumos. Începând cu anul 1947, realitatea se 

va dovedi a fi alta. Programul va fi cel stabilit de Partidul Comunist Român. 

„Bătălia alegerilor” a devenit cuvântul de ordine al liderilor comunişti. Spectacolul 

unei lupte adevărate le era cu totul necesar pentru ca, în final, să proclame că au învins: 

„ne angajăm în bătălia cea mare a alegerilor” enunŃa cu „avânt revoluŃionar”, Teohari 

Georgescu la aceeaşi Plenară 11 . Scenariul cu „bătălia” alegerilor era necesar şi pentru 

rescrierea istoriei, în versiunea P.C.R. Procentul de circa 90%, favorabil blocului 

procomunist, ce va fi anunŃat oficial, va fi reluat ca un fapt real, decenii la rând. 

Pentru formarea „blocului” preconizat, esenŃială era adeziunea Partidului Social 

Democrat din România. A merge separat la alegeri constituia o ameninŃare reală pentru 

Partidul Comunist. Congresul extraordinar al P.S.D.R. a avut loc la 10 martie 1946 la 

Bucureşti. Prin vot deschis, presiuni, şantaje personale şi falsuri flagrante a fost obŃinut 

rezultatul dorit: 232 pentru liste comune propuse de Partidul Comunist, cu 29 contra şi 60 

de abŃineri 12 . Urmarea Congresului extraordinar a fost scindarea Partidului Social 

Democrat în două aripi şi anume: cea condusă de Constantin Titel Petrescu care la 

Congresul din 9 mai 1946 a constituit Partidul Social Democrat-Independent votând 

statutul şi componenŃa nominală a forurilor de conducere ale acestuia şi aripa 

procomunistă condusă de Lothar Rădăceanu şi Ştefan Voitec care a rămas ancorată 

definitv la remorca Partidului Comunist. 

Campania electorală 

Campania pentru alegerile din noiembrie 1946 s-a deosebit faŃă de cele din trecut. Nu 

mai era vorba de alternarea la guvernare. În obiectivul Partidului Comunist s-au aflat 

eliminarea juridică şi fizică a adversarilor. łelul ultim era dizolvarea partidelor de 

opoziŃie şi eliminarea liderilor şi a principalilor aderenŃi. 

Inaugurarea oficială a campaniei electorale guvernamentale a început cu o cuvântare a 

premierului dr. Petru Groza, la Iaşi, la 2 iunie. Cuvântarea a fost un prilej pentru a rosti 

ameninŃări la adresa opoziŃiei. Jandarmeria a fost transformată într-un instrument al 

regimului, cu rapoarte săptămânale, confidenŃiale privind: activitatea partidelor din 

Blocul Partidelor Democrate (Partidul Comunist Român, Social-Democrat-aripa 

procomunistă, NaŃional-Liberal-Gheorghe Tătărescu, Frontul Plugarilor, NaŃional 

Popular, NaŃional-łărănesc-Anton Alexandrescu) a opoziŃiei şi starea de spirit a 

9 

Coord. Virgiliu łârău şi Ioan Marius Bucur, Strategii şi politici electorale în alegerile 

parlamentare din 19 noiembrie 1946, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, pp. 1-90. 

10 

Ibidem, p. 10, p. 15. 

11 


12 

Coord. Ioan Scurtu, România viaŃa politică în documente. 1946, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 

127-128. 

740

populaŃiei. În cadrul şedinŃei Comitetului Central cu activul de bază din 12 iulie 1946, în 

vederea pregătirii alegerilor , Ana Pauker preciza: „Ministerul de Interne are o răspundere 

mare în alegeri, în reuşita alegerilor. Noi putem opri reacŃionarii să vorbească, dar forŃa 

poliŃienească trebuie să fie aceea care să-i puie la locul lor, atunci când fac ce nu trebuie, 

ca să se îndeplinească şi forma legală” 13 . 

La 13 iulie, Ministerul de Interne a elaborat planul operaŃiunilor pe care DirecŃia 

Generală a PoliŃiei trebuia să le efectueze în vederea participării la pregătirea alegerilor. 

La punctul 1 din document se prevedea: „Verificarea întregului aparat poliŃienesc, sub 

raportul capacităŃii profesionale şi al ataşamentului politic. Cei care nu corespund vor fi 

propuşi pentru cadru disponibil, până la data de 31 iulie 1946” 14 . La şedinŃa Comitetului 

Central al P.C.R. din 26 iulie 1946, Vasile Luca a propus noi strategii de lucru cu 

„duşmanul”: „Voi nu ştiŃi ce face duşmanul. Unii se bucură că duşmanul nu activează 

deschis, când ei de fapt lucrează pe ascuns, de la om la om. Noi trebuie să ştim ce şoptesc 

oamenilor la ureche, trebuie să băgăm oamenii noştri în rândurile lor. De aceea trebuie să 

cunoaştem duşmanul, trebuie să-i cunoaştem metodele de lucru şi lozincile, trebuie să 

ştim tot ce face” 15 

La 13 iulie, Regele, aflat sub presiunea constantă a P.C.R. şi a oficialilor sovietici a 

semnat „Legea electorală” şi „Legea pentru organizarea Camerei DeputaŃilor”. Senatul 

era desfiinŃat pentru a uşura controlul Legislativului de către guvern. Protestele partidelor 

din opoziŃie faŃă de această încălcare a ConstituŃiei din 1923 nu au avut niciun rezultat şi 

au fost respinse. Legea electorală din 1946 era o noua încălcare a drepturilor democratice. 

Una dintre prevederile sale interzicea dreptul de a vota şi de a candida: „criminalilor 

ordinari, vinovaŃilor de dezastrul Ńării, conducătorilor fascişti din Ardealul de Nord, 

epuraŃilor, miniştrilor antonescieni” 16 . 

Comisia Electorală Centrală numită de Ministerul JustiŃiei la 23 iulie 1946 a avut un 

rol decorativ deoarece rezultatele oficiale ale votului au fost fixate dinainte de guvern şi 

de conducerea P.C.R. 

Alcătuirea listelor electorale a fost efectuată în grabă, fără a se distribui vreo dovadă 

de înscriere. CetăŃenii erau bombardaŃi zilnic cu materiale de propagandă. Un post 

suplimentar de radio, intitulată „România Liberă” a început să emită din 3 septembrie, în 

favoarea B.P.D. OpoziŃia nu a avut niciodată acces la radio. Presa aservită Partidului 

Comunist a vut un rol important în campanie, contribuind serios la denigrarea opoziŃiei 

politice. La şedinŃa plenară a C.C. al P.C.R. din 9-10 octombrie, Iosif Chişinevschi 

atrăgea atenŃia: „Scânteia a devenit un organ puternic central. A popularizat profund 

platforma noastră. Regulat găsim în Scânteia, semnul B.P.D., soarele. Acum trebuia să 

facă acelaşi lucru întreaga presă.” 17 . Mitingurile coaliŃiei guvernamentale s-au succedat 

nestingherite. Cenzura a fost strictă şi tot mai sporită numai pentru opoziŃie. 

13 

ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Cancelarie, dosar nr. 40/1946, ff. 19-20. 

14 

Cartea Albă a SecurităŃii, doc. Nr. 107, vol. 1, Bucureşti, SRI, 1994. 

15 


16 

Scânteia, 15 iulie 1946, p. 1. 

17 


741

Cele trei partide din opoziŃie, chiar dacă nu au fost formal asociate au urmărit 

obiective apropiate. În prim plan erau corectitudinea şi libertatea alegerilor. FaŃă de 

presiunile, intimidările, violenŃele manifestate de activiştii B.P.D., Ńărăniştii, liberalii şi 

social-democraŃii independenŃi au acŃionat în aşa fel încât să nu dea prilej de intervenŃie 

nici forŃelor de ordine ale statului şi nici bandelor de bătăuşi ai B.P.D. La 21 octombrie a 

apărut Comunicatul prin care P.N.ł., P.N.L. şi P.S.D.I. au constituit opoziŃia naŃională. 

Cele trei partide şi-au sincronizat eforturile pentru apărarea drepturilor Ńării. Liderii 

opoziŃiei au înaintat Regelui, Primului Ministru, Comisiei Aliate (Sovietice) de Control, 

Misiunilor Politice ale S.U.A. şi Angliei la Bucureşti şi miniştrilor de Externe ale celor 

trei mari puteri la Bucureşti, repetate memorii şi scrisori de protest faŃă de felul cum 

guvernul Groza nu îşi respectă angajamentele. Toate acestea nu au avut niciun efect. 

Comisia Aliată (Sovietică) de Control a returnat protestele fără a le deschide. 

În preajma alegerilor P.N.ł. a prezentat Misiunii S.U.A. la Bucureşti cazurile de 

violenŃă şi agresiunile înregistrate până la începutul lunii noiemebrie 1946: şase naŃional- 

Ńărănişti ucişi, 42 grav răniŃi, 100 de percheziŃii domiciliare ale liderilor, un număr 

„impresionant” de cazuri în care difuzarea manifestelor electorale, ale P.N.ł., a fost 

împiedicată. Examinarea rapoartelor de la sediile judeŃene ale opoziŃiei dintr-o 

comunicare a Misiunii S.U.A. din 18 noiembrie 1946, arăta „cu o regularitate constantă, 

o imagine sinistră a arestărilor şi terorii organizate împotriva Ńărăniştilor şi a liberalilor 

cunoscuŃi, supuşi, de fapt, pe faŃă, atacului efectuat de sprijinitorii guvernului” 18 . La 24 

august 1946 după o întâlnire cu dr. Petru Groza, diplomatul american Burton Y. Berry în 

raportul său către Secretarul de Stat relata că după ce a examinat cu mare atenŃie fiecare 

frântură de informaŃie asupra intenŃiilor guvernului Groza privind alegerile a ajuns la 

concluzia inevitabilă că guvernul nu are intenŃia de a organiza alegeri libere şi 

nefalsificate, cerute prin hotărârile de la Moscova. Mai mult, atitudinea guvernului român 

avea sprijinul guvernului sovietic. Concluziona că această situaŃie necesita o decizie din 

partea Statelor Unite. Decizia avea să vină prin recunoaşterea de către S.U.A. şi Marea 

Britanie a faptului împlinit, adică a marii fraude electorale. 

Frauda electorală-planificată în cursul anului 1946 

Încă de la finele lunii ianuarie 1946 liderii P.C.R. programaseră în acord cu directivele 

Moscovei, procentajul cu care coaliŃia guvernamentală trebuia să „câştige” alegerile în 

noiembrie. În ianuarie după încheierea ConferinŃei de la Moscova a miniştrilor Afacerilor 

Externe ai U.R.S.S., S.U.A., Angliei, o comisie tripartită s-a deplasat la Bucureşti pentru 

a pune în aplicare hotărârile privind România. După întrevederile de la Bucureşti, 

Vîşinski a spus lui Harriman că Frontul NaŃional-Democrat al lui Groza va câştiga 70% 

din voturi, Partidul łărănesc 20%, NaŃional-Liberal 10% 19 . „Directivele” ulterioare au 

fixat plafonul la peste 80%. Teohari Georgescu la Plenara C.C. al P.C.R. din 29 ianuarie 

declara: „Nu ne este permis un singur moment să spunem vom avea 70%-80%. Da, 

18 Raportul nr. 1244 din 18 noiembrie 1946, Burton Y. Berry din Bucureşti către 

Secretarul de Stat, N.A.W., 871.00/11-1846. 

19 Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946, Random 

House, New York, p. 528. 

742

tovarăşi vom avea şi mai mult de 80%, dar cu condiŃie nu sprijinindu-ne pe poliŃie, să ne 

iasă din cap acest lucru” 20 . 

La 27 mai reprezentantul politic al Americii la Bucureşti, Burton Y. Berry comunica 

Secretarului de Stat la Washington că Bodnăraş dorea să folosească tactici violente, 

extremiste, ca să asigure 90% pentru echipa guvernamentală, în timp ce Gheorghiu-Dej şi 

Groza ar fi mulŃumiŃi cu 60%, asigurate prin matrapazlâcuri, care ar îngădui opoziŃiei să 

existe 21 . 

După convorbirea avută cu dr. Petru Groza în 24 august, diplomatul american Burton 

Y. Berry concluziona: „În prezent, în România, nu suntem în stare să facem mai mult 

pentru a realiza acceptarea punctului nostru de vedere, decât să menŃinem o linie fermă; 

în aşa fel încât să prevenim sporirea diferenŃei dintre declaraŃiile noastre oficiale şi 

acŃiunea noastră de fiecare zi” 22 . Guvernele de la Washington şi Londra au recunoscut, 

implicit şi explicit, rezultatele „alegerilor” din 19 noiembrie. Au trimis până în octombrie 

note de protest guvernului subliniind, de fiecare dată, cu exemple, faptul că acesta nu-şi 

respecta angajamentele asumate. Aceste note au fost respinse de autorităŃile de la 

Bucureşti care ştiau că aveau sprijinul deplin al Moscovei. Liderii P.N.ł., P.N.L. şi 

P.S.D.I. nu au fost avertizŃi că AliaŃii din Vest aveau de gând să confirme rezultatele 

alegerilor prin semnarea Tratatului de Pace cu România, în februarie 1947, urmat de un 

schimb de reprezentanŃi diplomatici. La 12 septembrie 1946, diplomatul american Roy 

M. Melbourne comunica de la Bucureşti, Secretarului de Stat, la Washington că: 

„Alegerile româneşti sunt acum pe punctul de a fi furate” 23 . Concluzia diplomatului 

american s-a adeverit. La 6 noiembrie 1946 în cursul unei convorbiri dintre Emil 

Bodnăraş, Secretar General la PreşedinŃia Consiliului de Miniştri şi D. Iakovlev, consilier 

la Ambasadei U.R.S.S. la Bucureşti, Bodnăraş susŃinea că Blocul Partidelor Democrate 

va obŃine 344 de mandate 24 . Potrivit datelor oficiale, B.P.D. a obŃinut la 19 noiembrie, 

347 mandate. Cu 13 zile înaintea alegerilor, Emil Bodnăraş a anticipat rezultatul final cu 

o eroare de sub 1%! Sursele documentare prezentate mai sus, din ianuarie şi până în 

noiembrie 1946 sunt dovezi ale faptului că încă cu mult înainte de a se fi pronunŃat 

cetăŃenii, liderii P.C.R. fixaseră procentele de 80-85-90% în beneficiul lor şi al stăpânilor 

de la Moscova. Cifrele oficiale, publicate la câteva zile după „alegeri”, au confirmat 

procentele amintite mai sus. 

Rezultatele alegerilor din 1946 

Într-un raport al lui Adrian Holman, ministru plenipotenŃiar al Marii Britanii la 

Bucureşti, acesta afirma că: „Guvernul şi-a dat seama că toate metodele de falsificare au 

20 

Coord. Virgiliu łârău şi Ioan Marius Bucur, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 

21 

Telegrama nr. 531 din 27 mai 1946, Burton Y. Berry către Secretarul de Stat, N.A.W., 871.00/5- 

2746. 

22 

Telegrama nr. 821 din 24 august 1946, N.A.W., 871.00/8-2446. 

23 

Telegrama nr. 896 din 23 septembrie 1946, N.A.W., 971.00/9-2346. 

24 

Document publicat de Tatiana Pokivailova, sub titlul Metode în desfăşurarea alegerilor din 

România, în „Magazin Istoric”, nr. 11 (344), noiembrie 1955, pp. 11-12. 

743

dat greş. Aşadar, au fost obligaŃi să falsifice cifrele oficiale şi să prezinte ceea ce fusese o 

înfrângere zdrobitoare a guvernului drept o copleşitoare victorie” 25 . 

Pe ordinea de zi a şedinŃei Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.C.R. din 23 noiembrie 1946, 

unul dintre puncte a fost „exploatarea succesului obŃinut în alegeri şi împiedicarea 

provocărilor partidelor istorice”. În stenograma şedinŃei se preciza că: „Se vor utiliza 

actele de violenŃă săvârşite în cursul campaniei electorale de membrii partidelor istorice şi 

se vor alcătui dosare speciale cu aceste documente. Se va pune accent deosebit în presă 

asupra actelor de violenŃă săvârşite de istorici. Pe cale administrativă se vor lua măsuri 

împotriva celor ce răspândesc zvonuri şi se va împiedica alcătuirea de liste sau 

numărătoarea voturilor, urmărite de partidele istorice” 26 . 

În organul central al P.C.R., Scânteia, pe 23 noiembrie erau publicate rezultatele 

falsificate ale alegerilor care, arătau un număr de 4.766.630 de voturi pentru B.P.D. şi 

doar 878.927 pentru Partidul NaŃional łărănesc 27 . România Liberă din 22 noiembrie 

1946 anunŃa pe prima pagină că: „alegerile s-au desfăşurat în linişte şi ordine. Maniştii şi 

brătieniştii au încercat să tulbure desfăşurarea alegerilor provocând dezordini şi incidente 

sângeroase” 28 . 

În România, între 1919 şi 1937 au fost zece alegeri parlamentare. Dintre acestea, 5 au 

exprimat voinŃa alegătorilor fără „retuşuri”, în 1919, 1920, 1928, 1933 şi probabil 1937. 

În celelalte 5 cazuri, autorităŃile au intervenit pentru a obŃine acel minimum 40% din 

total, procent care îngăduia partidului organizator să i se atribuie conform Legii 

electorale, 60% din mandate. Sigur, cei care au pierdut acuzau oficialităŃile de fraudarea 

alegerilor. Dar, în cele 5 cazuri de alegeri din perioada interbelică când au fost „ajustate” 

rezultatele, venirea la putere a liberalilor, Ńărăniştilor, averescanilor sau a unui guvern de 

„Uniune NaŃională” însemna continuitatea realităŃilor esenŃiale economice, sociale şi 

politice ale Ńării. În epoca interbelică erau diferenŃe de abordare de la un guvern la altul 

dar nu de răsturnare a bazelor democratice ale Ńării. 

În 1946 obiectivul era diferit. Câştigarea alegerilor însemna legitimarea programului 

Partidului Comunist, care urmărea sovietizarea Ńării. Falsificarea rezultatelor a fost în 

1946, maximă, niciodată întâlnită în istoria politică a României, după 1859. Cu mici 

excepŃii, niciuna din promisiunile Platformei-Program a B.P.D. nu a fost respectată. La 

acestea s-a adăugat şi distrugerea completă juridic şi fizic a clasei politice formată până în 

1939. În câŃiva ani, a dispărut o întreagă clasă politică, arestată, deportată, scoasă în afara 

legii, odată cu partidele respective. Alegerile din 1946 au deschis calea pentru distrugerea 

societăŃii tradiŃionale româneşti, de tip european, şi punerea ei forŃată în tiparele sovietice 

şi separarea ei de evoluŃia normală a celorlalte Ńări europene. 

25 Florin Constantiniu, Ioan Chiper, op. cit., p. 201. 

26 ANIC, fond CC al PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 56/1946, f. 5. 

27 Scânteia, 23 noiembrie 1946, p. 1. 

28 România Liberă, 22 noiembrie 1946, p. 1. 

744

BISERICILE BAPTISTE DIN ROMÂNIA SUB 

PERSECUłIA REGIMULUI COMUNIST. 

ACłIUNI DE RĂSPUNS ŞI REZISTENłĂ 

Marius SILVEŞAN 1 

Istoria recentă, respectivcea a perioadei comuniste, este una care suscită atât interesul 

specialiştilor cât şi al tinerilor. Pentru a veni în întâmpinarea acestei dorinŃe, dar şi 

datorită interesului nostru faŃă de perioada enunŃată, prin intermediul acestui studiu ne 

propunem să prezentăm modul în care comunitatea baptistă din România a răspuns 

presiunilor şi persecuŃiilor care se exercitau asupra ei de către statul comunist. 

Avem în vedere mijloacele prin careaceasta a reacŃionatla acŃiunile oficialităŃilorcare 

îmbinau presiunile, hărŃuielile administrative, reglementările juridice, represiunea, dar şi 

oferirea de aparente avantaje.Răspunsurile au fost nuanŃate, unele fiind de supunere faŃă 

de autoritatea politică (rezistenŃă pasivă), altele au fost încercări de eludare a 

constrângerilor, prin opoziŃie mai mult sau mai puŃin deschisă (de exemplu, pastori care 

continuă să oficieze botezul deşi comuniştii interziceau botezarea celor care nu proveneau 

din familii baptiste), sau prin interpretarea în interes propriu a unor regulamente 

(schimbarea numelui şcolii duminicale în ora biblică, ori fixarea nunŃilor duminică după 

amiaza pentru a putea aduna totuşi comunitatea în momentul tradiŃional în condiŃiile în 

care slujbele religioase trebuiau Ńinute doar dimineaŃa). 

În urma consultării unor lucrări memorialistice, a realizării unor interviuri, precum şi a 

documentelor disponibile la Arhivele NaŃionale Istorice Centrale, Arhiva Secretariatului 

de Stat pentru Culte, Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii 

realizăm un demers prin intermediul căruia dorim să deschidem o cale către o mai buna 

cunoaştere a rolului pe care comunitatea baptistă l-a avut în acŃiunile de rezistenŃă şi 

opoziŃie faŃă de regimul comunist, dar şi să oferim tinerilor care nu au trăit perioada 

neagră a comunismului mărturii despre ce a însemnat aceasta. 

Instaurarea regimului comunist în România a produs schimbări majore la nivelul 

societăŃii, determinând şi noi moduri de relaŃionare între Stat şi Biserică. FaŃă de 

intruziunile statului şi acŃiunile de secularizare 2 , care avea printre obiectivele sale 

înregimentarea societăŃii, promovarea ateismului şi marginalizarea religiosului într-un 

1 Institutul Teologic Baptist Bucureşti, România. 

2Dic ionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române (DEX) define te verbul a seculariza cu referire la ,,a 

scoate din proprietatea sau componen a bisericii bunuri, domenii de activitate sau valori 

culturale, trecându-le în proprietatea statului”, DEX online,http://dexonline.ro/, termenul 

seculariza, (03.03.2011). 

745

spaŃiu privat, Bisericile Creştine Baptiste din România 3 au iniŃiat o serie de acŃiuni de 

protest, rezistenŃă şi contestare a ideologiei şi practicilor regimului comunist. 

Legat de reglementarea serviciilor religioase 4 din anul 1954, în anul 1962 regimul 

comunist va impune o altă reglementare care viza arondarea bisericilor, în fapt închiderea 

unor unităŃi de cult, iniŃiativă legislativă care a determinat opoziŃia pastorilor baptişti 

înainte şi după transpunerea acesteia în practică prin intermediul ameninŃărilor la care au 

fost supuşi reprezentanŃii cultului baptist. Ordinarea de diaconi ca modalitate de suplinire 

a lipsei pastorilor şi contestarea în instanŃă a unor decizii arbitrare ale autorităŃilor 

reprezintă alte modalităŃi prin intermediul cărora putem vorbi de o rezistenŃă 

anticomunistă în plan religios. Prin prezentarea unor acŃiuni de rezistenŃă şi protest ale 

bisericilor baptiste în cadrul acestei lucrări, dorim să contribuim la o mai bună înŃelegere 

a regimului comunist din România precum şi a modului în care Biserica ca parte 

componentă a societăŃii a răspuns la acŃiunile regimului de comunizare a sufletelor 

oamenilor. 

Iosif łon consideră că ,,formele de rezistenŃă, de la simpla pasivitate până la 

manifestările deschise de dezacord şi de respingere, au fost razele de lumină în acel 

groaznic întuneric.” 5 În opinia profesorului Daniel Mariş 6 , „credinŃa creştină a rămas ca o 

ultimă resursă spirituală cu ajutorul căreia era posibilă rezistenŃa în faŃa capitulării morale 

pentru aceia care trăiau în România sub cel mai represiv regim comunist.” 7 

Referindu-se la problematica rezistenŃei în faza târzie a comunismului românesc 8 , 

pastorul Vasile Taloş menŃionează că în cadrul Cultului baptist s-au conturat trei poziŃii 

referitoare la relaŃia cu statul şi modul de luptă pentru realizarea unor schimbări: 

1. ,,PoziŃia militantă (Radicală), promovată de Pavel Nicolescu prin iniŃierea ALRC 

(Comitetul de Apărare a LibertăŃii Religioase şi de ConştiinŃă) care şi-a propus 

demascarea prin orice mijloace (inclusiv Europa Liberă) a abuzurilor autorităŃilor 

comuniste […]: 

2. PoziŃia RezistenŃei Active, reprezentată de pastorii şi liderii care au continuat să 

lupte prin mijloacele oferite de ConstituŃie şi legi care au refuzat să se supună autorităŃile 

comuniste în probleme de credinŃă şi de practică religioasă; 

3. PoziŃia Dialogului cu Statul, care îşi propunea să obŃină drepturi în folosul 

bisericilor şi al credincioşilor pe calea negocierii între liderii religioşi devotaŃi 

Evangheliei şi reprezentanŃii progresişti ai comunismului cu faŃă umană.” 9 

3 R.P.R. respectiv R.S.R. 

4 Reglementarea serviciilor religioase prevedea că bisericile evanghelice nu mai aveau dreptul să 

aibă servicii religioase decât duminica diminea a i sâmbătă seara. În mod excep ional se 

admitea un serviciu religios duminică seara ptr cina Domnului, binecuvântări de copii i alte 

evenimente similare. 

5 Iosif on, Confruntări, Ed. a 3-a, Editura Cartea Cre tină, Oradea, 2009, p.7. 

6 Profesor i rector al Institutului Teologic Baptist din Bucure ti. 

7 Daniel Mari , „Change to a post-communist society in Romania, the effects upon Evangelical 

Christian communities” în Daniel Marius Mari , Theological reflections upon the practice of 

faith: Extended essays in applied theology, Editura Universitară, Bucure ti, 2009, p. 41. 

8 După anul 1977. 

746

Fără să minimalizăm rolul acŃiunilor de rezistenŃă religioasă ale liderilor sau 

comunităŃilor religioase trebuie să menŃionăm că în unele cazuri libertatea şi succesul pe 

care Biserica le obŃinea erau aparente pentru că, în fond, statul permitea anumite 

momente de relaxare ca acestea să fie folosite ca o supapă de refulare. Pe de altă parte, 

trebuie luate în calcul şi presiunile externe la care era supus statul comunist din partea 

unor organisme internaŃionale care militau pentru existenŃa unei libertăŃi religioase, 

precum şi de către mass-media internaŃională ca urmare a mărturiilor prezentate şi a 

mesajelor unor lideri religioşi 10 care au fost nevoiŃi sau determinaŃi de către autorităŃi să 

părăsească Ńara. 

RezistenŃa rămâne astfel un fenomen demn de admirat pentru cei care şi-au pus în joc 

propria libertate pentru a salva sau obŃine libertatea altora. 

Un prim aspect asupra căruia ne vom opri prezintă atitudinea pastorilor baptişti şi 

opoziŃia acestora faŃă de reglementarea serviciilor religioase. 

Pastorii baptişti se opun reglementării serviciilor religioase 

Prin acŃiunile statului care vizau diferite reglementări în viaŃa cultului baptist, printre 

care şi reglementarea serviciilor religioase a fost afectat şi personalul de cult, căruia i s-a 

redus în acest mod activitatea, motiv pentru care acesta va iniŃia diverse forme de protest. 

În acest caz măsurile de autoapărare au pornit de la conducerea Bisericilor Creştine 

Baptiste după cum relevă o notă informativă din 23 august 1953, unde se menŃionează că 

baptiştii nu au dat o circulară prin care să reducă serviciile religioase duminica, 

,,motivând că credincioşii care aparŃin cultului lor nu lucrează duminica.” 11 

Extrem de interesant este şi un document din 26 mai 1954 denumit RezoluŃie cu 

privire la reglementarea serviciilor divine duminica în Cultul Creştin Baptist din R.P.R. 12 

care vine cu o viziune proprie de rezolvare a problemei reglementării serviciilor divine în 

cultul baptist. Pe lângă opoziŃia oficială a cultului, o serie de pastori şi lideri baptişti s-au 

opus la rândul lor noilor reglementări impuse de către Ministerul Cultelor 13 . 

9 

Vasile Alexandru Talo , ,,Biserica i Securitatea - Mărturisiri-partea a doua -” în Revista 

Romanian Tribune, Edi ia 159 (anul 7 Nr.3) – Vineri, 8 februarie 2008. Articol disponibil online 

la adresa http://www.romaniantribune.net/a861_Biserica_si_Securitatea_-_Marturisiri_- 

_partea_a_doua_-_dezvaluiri_ale_pastorului_Vasile_Alexandru_Talos.aspx, (09.04.20101). 

10 

Dintre liderii religioşi amintim: Richard Wurmbrand, Iosif łon, Pavel Nicolescu, Aurel 

Popescu. 

11 

ASSC, fond Direc ia Studii, 1952, dosar 93, f. 11. 

12 

Ibidem,1954, dosar 125, ff. 7-9. 

13 

Mai ales la începutul impunerii acestei reglementări, nu au vrut să o aplice, motiv pentru care 

statul a trecut la represiune. „După ce impunerea reglementării a avut reu ită, la un anumit timp, 

împuternici ii raionali i cei regionali care aveau listele negre ale opozan ilor, mai ales ale 

celor care, fără frică, atât pastori cât i membri, i-au arătat împotrivirea fa ă de reglementare, 

au început pedepsirea lor. Pastorii au fost destitui i sau aveau salariile reduse din ordinul 

împuternici ilor. Pentru o anumită perioadă, un număr mare de pastori au fost destitui i [..]. Iar 

anumitor pastori care nu fuseseră destitui i, salariile lor erau reduse destul de sim itor, după 

indica iile subiective ale împuternici ilor Ministerului Cultelor”, Alexa Popovici, Istoria 

bapti tilor din România:1856-1989, Ed. A 2 – a, rev., Editura Universită ii Emanuel din 

Oradea, Editura Făclia, Oradea, 2007, p. 750. 

747

Un prim exemplu este acela al pastorului Ioan Rusu, secretar general al Cultului 

baptist, despre care suntem informaŃi că s-a deplasat la Arad ,,chiar când şefii penticostali 

au fost chemaŃi pentru reglementarea noului program. La Arad, Ioan Rusu a întâlnit pe 

Ilie Lipovan, prezbiterul penticostal al Regiunii Hunedoara, pe care l-a îndemnat să nu 

introducă noul program căci «Ministerul va trebui să cedeze»” 14 . 

Ilie Mârza, ,,preşedintele baptiştilor din regiune 15 , l-a chemat în ziua de 25 iunie 1954 

pe A. Z. 7-a 16 Aurel Pălăşan din Deva, pe care de asemenea l-a îndemnat să nu introducă 

noul program. Pastorul Pălăşan Aurel a refuzat propunerile lui Mârza, spunând că el face 

programul cerut de conducerea cultului său. Încercând în ziua de 26 iunie 1954 o ultimă 

tratare în privinŃa noului program, Ilie Mârza a refuzat categoric din nou” 17 să se 

conformeze reglementărilor impuse de Ministerul Cultelor. Ca urmare a atitudinii sale se 

propune să i se retragă recunoaşterea calităŃii de membru în comitetul Uniunii Baptiste, 

precum şi calitatea de pastor în cadrul cultului baptist 18 . 

Ioan łopa 19 , pastor al Bisericii Creştine Baptiste ,,Nădejdea” din Bucureşti,s-a opus 

la rândul lui ,,reglementării orelor de rugăciune”, fapt pentru care în anul 1955 i-a fost 

retrasă recunoaşterea din funcŃia de păstor 20 . Pastorul łopa s-a aflat permanent în atenŃia 

autorităŃilor dovadă fiind şi faptul că în anul 1958 acesta este menŃionat în cadrul unui 

document, alături de alŃi deservenŃi ai cultelor neoprotestante din Capitală cu serviciu la 

Stat 21 . 

Pentru nerespectarea reglementări serviciilor religioase şi pentru răspândirea de 

publicaŃii religioase, pastorul Cure Simiona fost închis cinci ani 22 . 

Un alt pastor care s-a opus reglementării serviciilor religioase a fost Mihai Huşanu 

care activa în cadrul ComunităŃii Baptiste Cluj. Conform documentelor cercetate în anul 

14 

ASSC, fond Direc ia de Studii, 1954, dosar 125, f. 12. 

15 

Este vorba de Regiunea Hunedoara. 

16 

Adventist de Ziua a 7-a. 

17 

ASSC, Fond DirecŃia de Studii, 1954, dosar 125, f. 12. 

18 

Ibidem. 

19 

,,D[om]nul opa de la bis. Giule ti. Arată că în trecut bisericile au fost sigilate i după 23 

august ele au fost deschise de ru i i pe străzi se predica Biblia, iar azi că este libertate li se 

pune lacătul că nu sunt de acord [..] să le pună lan urile de mâini” opa, pastor la Biserica 

baptistă din cartierul bucure tean Giule ti, face referire la reglementarea serviciilor religioase, 

care reprezintă pentru Biserică ceea ce reprezintă lan urile de la mâini pentru un condamnat. 

ASSC, fond Direc ia de Studii, 1954, dosar 125, f.118. 

20 


21 

Acesta era pastor în str. I.C. Frimu i lucra la Spitalul Nou Berceni, ASSC, fond Direc ia de 

Studii, 1958, dosar 122, f. 18. Procentul cel mai însemnat dintre pastorii aveau serviciu i la Stat 

apar inea conform documentului cultului baptist, Ibidem, ff. 18-19. 

22 

Simion Cure, născut la 17 ianuarie 1914 în Ilia, Hunedoara,a fost arestat la 17 august 1958 şi 

condamnat la 7 ani închisoare. A executat pedeapsa în închisorile Timişoara, Arad, Aiud, Ostrov, 

Giurgeni, Periprava. A fost eliberat la 1 august 1964. Daniel Mitrofan, Pigmei şi uriaşi, Editura 

Cristianus, Oradea, 2007, p. 68; fişă matricolă penală din Arhiva AdministraŃiei NaŃionale a 

Penitenciarelor. 

748

1961 ,,i-a fost ridicat carnetul de păstor deoarece nu a acceptat introducerea arondărilor 

(asta însemnând practic desfiinŃarea unor biserici).” 23 

2.. Realizarea unor servicii religioase separate precum binecuvântări de copii 

mici, ziua mamei, ziua recoltei 

Binecuvântările copiilor mici, ziua mamei, ziua recoltei au reprezentat ocazii 

festive şi tot atâtea prilejuri pentru bisericile baptiste de a avea serviciu religios de regulă 

duminica după amiaza când acest lucru nu era permis. S-a optat pentru astfel de servicii 

deoarece reglementarea menŃiona faptul că ,,se puteau Ńine servicii după masa numai în 

cazurile actelor de cult şi binecuvântărilor copiilor mici. Ca urmare a acestui fapt în 

bisericile mai mari, unde erau copii mai mulŃi, la serviciile divine de binecuvântare 

biserica se aduna şi duminica după masă, la orele alese de familia care aducea copilul la 

binecuvântare. În acest mod s-a creat oportunitatea de a avea servicii divine şi după 

amiaza şi erau foarte puŃine duminicile când nu aveau loc astfel de servicii religioase fără 

ca reglementareasă fi avut vreun efect de uzurpare 24 . 

O altă modalitate de răspuns a bisericilor baptiste şi a personalului de cult faŃă de 

impunerea reglementării serviciilor religioase a fost mutarea nunŃilor în ziua de 

duminică după masa sau duminică seara. ,,Potrivit unui vechi obicei, exista regula ca 

nunŃile să se Ńină în zilele de peste săptămână şi nu duminica, iar majoritatea bisericilor 

baptiste Ńineau căsătoriile religioase la biserici sâmbăta, şi puŃine din ele Ńineau joia, 

pentru ca duminica să fie dedicată numai serviciilor divine. Dar după impunerea 

reglementării şi pentru că era posibil să se Ńină servicii divine la biserică duminică după 

masa, nunŃile au fost mutate duminica, potrivit reglementării. Este cunoscut faptul că în 

bisericile baptiste din Vechiul Regat şi înainte de reglementare nunŃile se Ńineau tot 

duminica după amiază. După impunerea reglementării însă, toate bisericile din toate 

provinciile Ńării au schimbat ziua nunŃilor religioase pentru a fi Ńinute duminica.” 25 

Ziua mamei şi ziua recoltei au fost folosite tot în acelaşi scop, acela de a avea servicii 

religioase când altfel acestea nu se puteau desfăşura. 

3. Ordinarea de diaconi în bisericile baptiste modalitate de suplinire a dreptului 

de a ordina pastori 

Ordinarea de diaconi în biserici era o modalitate de răspuns din partea bisericilor 

baptiste şi a pastorilor faŃă de reglementarea serviciilor religioase, arondarea bisericilor şi 

destituirile personalului de cult 26 . ,,Bisericile aflaseră că pentru ordinarea de diaconi nu se 

cerea o aprobare în prealabil, şi cum nu se putea conta pe venirea la timp a pastorilor 

pentru a servi cina Domnului 27 , au hotărât şi au procedat la ordinarea a câte unul sau chiar 

doi diaconi pe care i-au ales. La ordinare nu s-a făcut nici o publicitate, nici anunŃuri cu 

23 

*** ,,Comunitatea Bisericilor Cre tine Baptiste Cluj” în Cre tinul azi, Revista Bisericilor 

Cre tine Baptiste din România, Nr.4/2009, p.15. 

24 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria bapti 

25 

Ibidem. 

26 


tilor din România 1856-1989, p. 759. 

27 

Echivalentul împărtă aniei din bisericile ortodoxe. 

749

un oarecare timp înainte, ci pastorul a oficiat actul de ordinare cu câte un bătrân ordinat, 

venit ca într-o vizită pe acolo.” 28 Datorită aprobării unui număr mic de pastori, a 

volumului mare de muncă pe care aceştia îl aveau de îndeplinit 29 , a îngrădirii activităŃilor 

bisericeşti, diaconul a ajuns ,,un fel de pastor ajutor, sau înlocuitor de păstor.” 30 ,,La 

începutul aplicării reglementării 31 şi reducerii numărului de pastori, o parte din pastori au 

rămas fără de posturi, astfel încât era natural ca, în cea mai mare parte, aceştia să devină 

diaconi aleşi, care de fapt îndeplineau toate lucrările din biserici. Şi nu mai era necesar ca 

aceştia să fie ordinaŃi. Mai târziu, când din cauza deceselor numărul pastorilor s-a tot 

micşorat, iar la studiile de la Seminarul Teologic Baptist din Bucureşti au fost admişi 

doar patru tineri, sistemul diaconilor trebuia aplicat de biserici” 32 . 

Un caz la care ne referim este cel al pastorului bisericii baptiste din Ploieşti, Leric 

Ioan, căruia Ministerul Cultelor îi retrage recunoaşterea ca pastor iar Uniunea Baptistă 

înaintează Ministerului un memoriu prin care solicită revenirea asupra deciziei 33 . Între 

timp acesta a primit salariu din fondurile proprii ale bisericii în anul 1953 şi în anul 1954 

prin încadrarea sa ca prezbiter 34 fără a avea aprobarea Ministerului Cultelor 35 . 

4. Contestarea în instanŃă a unor decizii arbitrare 

Un caz interesant este cel al pastorului Herlo Teodor din Petroşani care, în baza 

noilor prevederi 36 ale Codului Penal al R.P:R., a fost condamnat în anul 1961 de către 

Tribunalul Popular al oraşului Petroşani, ,,la 1 an închisoare corecŃională şi 1 an de 

interdicŃie corecŃională constând în cele prev. - de art. 58 pct. 2 şi 3 cod penal.” 37 Ca 

răspuns la condamnarea sa, Herlo Teodor face recurs la Tribunalul regional Deva, ,,care 

cu decizia penală 2.169/1961 din 13 oct.1961” l-a achitat de orice penalitate şi a trecut 

cheltuielile penale în sarcina statului 38 . 

Memoriile 

Memoriile au fost utilizate ca formă de protest faŃă de intruziunile statului în viaŃa 

internă a bisericilor, fiind adresate atât instituŃiilor cultului baptist la nivel central sau 

local, cât şi autorităŃilor locale sau centrale. Protestul trebuie înŃeles în acest caz şi ca o 

modalitate de a atrage atenŃia asupra unor nereguli sau a cere revenirea asupra unor 

decizii luate de către împuterniciŃi sau Departamentul Cultelor. Au fost adresate memorii 

28 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria bapti tilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

29 

Pastorii din mediul rural aveau uneori i câte 5 sau 6 biserici la care trebuiau să slujească. 

30 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria bapti tilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

31 

Referire la reglementarea serviciilor religioase în Cultul baptist din anul 1954. 

32 

Alexa Popovici, Istoria bapti 

33 

Ibidem, dosar 133. 

34 

Diacon 

tilor din România 1856-1989, p.754. 

35 

ASSC, fond Direc ia de Studii, 1954, dosar 133, ff. 1-2. 

36 

Pastorul Herlo Teodor a fost acuzat de faptul că a continuat să îndeplinească func ia de pastor 

după ce i-a fost retrasă recunoa terea de către Departamentul Cultelor. 

37 



750

către Uniunea Creştină Baptistă, Ministerului Cultelor/Departamentul Cultelor, precum şi 

către alte instituŃii ale statului. 

Memoriul Bisericii Creştine Baptiste din Buteni 

Memoriul a fost redactat în luna februarie 1953 de către pastorul şi membrii bisericii 

menŃionate prin care se plângeau de faptul că Balaban Ioan care deŃinea funcŃia de 

director al căminului cultural din Buteni, raionul GurahonŃ a luat decizia de a unifica 

forŃat fanfara bisericii cu cea existentă în sat 39 fapt care ducea inevitabil la desfiinŃarea 

celei dintâi 40 . În cadrul memoriului se menŃionează faptul că acŃiunea tovarăşului Baban 

Ioan a fost una deliberată, afirmaŃie argumentată atât prin acŃiunile şi atitudinea acestuia 

faŃă de biserica baptistă din Buteni în perioada lui Antonescu cât şi prin faptul că decizia 

de unificare a fost luată ca urmare a faptului că baptiştii nu au participat cu fanfara lor la 

o serbare în cadrul lunii prieteniei româno-sovietice 41 . Neparticiparea baptiştilor la 

acŃiunea menŃionată s-a datorat faptului că aceştia au fost anunŃaŃi de către directorul 

căminului cultural doar cu o zi înainte, ceea ce i-a pus în imposibilitatea de a putea cânta. 

Prin intermediul memoriului amintit, biserica baptistă prezintă motive întemeiate 

pentru care „muzica baptistă nu poate fuziona cu alte muzici” 42 . Dintre motivele 

credincioşilor baptişti menŃionăm: muzicanŃii din comună „au diferite apucături care fac 

imposibilă o sudare a elementelor muzicii. Aceste apucături: înjurături, scandal, beŃie etc. 

sunt folosite pentru a ofensa pe credincioşii baptişti. Astfel, în nenumărate rânduri 

fumătorii suflau fumul de Ńigară în faŃa unui credincios baptist pentru a-l provoca la 

scandal sau a-şi bate joc de el. S-au petrecut cazuri în care muzicienii s-au îmbătat şi în 

stare de ebrietetate au folosit un limbaj nu numai necuviincios ci direct ofensator” 43 . 

ConsecinŃa directă a acestui memoriu a fost aceea că, reprezentanŃii Ministerului 

Cultelor au cercetat la faŃa locului cele relatate şi în urma consultării cu organele locale 

au ajuns la concluzia că decizia directorului căminului cultural de a unifica mai mult 

forŃat cele două fanfare a fost una greşită 44 . Astfel, prin intermediul acestui memoriu şi al 

angajamentului bisericii de a lua parte la activităŃile culturale organizate în cadrul 

comunei sau al raionului respectiv, credincioşii au anulat o decizie considerată chiar şi de 

autorităŃile politice locale ca fiind una greşită. 

Memoriul pastorului Gavril Dunca 

Probleme cu autorităŃile erau şi la nivel individual după cum relevă memoriul 

pastorului Gavril Dunca. Acesta se plânge conducerii comunităŃii Timişoara de faptul că 

a fost reŃinut de miliŃie fără temei, precum şi de faptul că împuternicitul de culte Borca a 

39 Memoriul are următoarea formulă: „tov. Balaban Ioan,directorul caminului cultural din 

localitate a preconizat i ini iat ca din muzica bisericii baptiste i din cea a bisericii ortodoxe 

să se facă o fanfară a căminului cultural.” Ibidem, 1953, dosar, 139, f. 13. 

40 Ibidem, ff. 13-14. 

41 

Idem, 1953, dosar 139, f. 13. 

42 


43 

Ibidem. 

44 


751

avut o atitudine necorespunzătoare trecând la ameninŃări faŃă de pastor şi retrăgându-i a 

doua zi dreptul de a Ńine servicii religioase. 

Memoriul Bisericii baptiste din satul Fizeş 

MemoriulBisericii Creştine Baptiste din raionul ReşiŃa, regiunea Timişoara, a fost 

redactat cu scopul de a infirma acuzaŃiile împuternicitului de culte referitoare la faptul că 

pastorul care răspunde de biserica lor primeşte bani necuveniŃi pentru activitatea sa 45 . 

Probleme care urmează a fi discutate cu Tov. Ministru de către conducerea 

baptistă 

În anul 1955 conducerea baptistă urma să solicite ministrului cultelor rezolvarea mai 

multor probleme care Ńineau de relaŃia Biserică – Stat. Referitor la acest aspect un 

document extrem de interesant intitulat Probleme care urmează a fi discutate cu Tov. 

Ministru de către conducerea baptistă 46 dezvăluie intenŃiile Ministerului şi modul cum 

acesta urma să răspundă solicitărilor venite din partea Bisericii. Printre cele 7 puncte care 

urmau a fi discutate se afla şi solicitarea de a se reveni în cazurile pastorilor cărora li s-a 

retras recunoaşterea, punct în dreptul căruia găsim menŃionate următoarele: 

,,ÎmputerniciŃii nu ne-au semnalat că persoanele respective ar fi înŃeles să aibă o conduită 

corespunzătoare. - Nu putem fi de acord deci să se revină asupra hotărârii luate. – Sfidând 

hotărârea Ministerului, Ioan Isac a dispus plata salariului şi persoanelor cărora li se 

retrăsese recunoaşterea – .” 47 Într-un document anterior, Ministerul Cultelor făcea 

următoarea menŃiune: ,,Este de semnalat că pentru toŃi pastorii cărora li s-a retras 

recunoaşterea, deşi unii din ei elemente net duşmănoase, conducerea cultului a cerut să se 

revină, intervenind în repetate rânduri.” 48 

Realizarea de botezuri fără acordul autorităŃilor. 

Înainte de a prezenta câteva din caracteristicile botezului nou testamental considerăm 

necesar a prezenta faptul că botezul era un act de cult care se realiza cu acordul statului. 

Acesta era în conformitate cu mărturisirea de credinŃă, statutul cultului baptist din 1950, 

Legea pentru regimul general al cultelor religioase din 1948, precum şi cu alte acte 

normative prin intermediul cărora se menŃiona dreptul cetăŃenilor de a crede în ceva sau 

în nimic. 

Un alt aspect important care trebuie precizat este acela că practica botezului în ascuns 

pentru persoanele care nu primeau acordul autorităŃilor nu era ceva caracteristic în 

perioada comunistă doar pentru bisericilebaptiste. În fapt, botezul în ascuns reprezenta o 

modalitate de răspuns faŃă de restrângerea vieŃii religioase şi interdicŃiile privitoare la 

pregătirea personalului de cult, la rechiziŃionarea locaşurilor de cult, bătăi, arestări şi alte 

forme de represiune. Vorbim astfel de menŃinerea religiozităŃi ca formă a culturii 

45 

ASSC, fond Direc ia de Studii, 1954, dosar 140, ff. 1-11. 

46 

ASSC, fond Direc 

47 

Ibidem. 

ia de Studii, 1955, dosar 146, ff. 1-3. 

48 


752

cotidiene care s-a realizat atât prin trăirile personale intime cât şi prin manifestări precum 

botezul 49 , cununiile precum şi înmormântările cu ritualuri religioase 50 . 

Pentru a înŃelege de ce s-a recurs la botezuri fără acordul autorităŃilor considerăm 

necesar a prezenta câteva caracteristici ale botezului în doctrina baptistă. Astfel, spre 

deosebire de Biserica Ortodoxă unde botezul este o taină şi se administrează copiilor 

mici, în cadrul bisericilorbaptiste, botezul este un act de cult cu valoare simbolică, ce 

reprezintă moartea omului vechi şi aducerea la viaŃă a omului nou 51 , motiv pentru care 

acesta se administrează persoanelor mature capabile să înŃeleagă semnificaŃia sa. 

De regulă cei care doresc să se boteze anunŃă pastorul care, la rândul său informează 

şi convoacă comitetul bisericii, organ cu rol administrativ şi decizional, iar împreună 

examinează din punct de vedere doctrinar şi motivaŃional candidatul şi îşi dau sau nu 

acordul pentru botez. Botezul care se face prin liber consimŃământ reprezintă mărturia 

publică a unui cuget curat şi totodată modalitatea administrativă prin care o persoană 

poate deveni membră în cadrul unei bisericii baptiste 52 . Dată fiind importanŃa botezului, 

autorităŃile comuniste au dorit să-l controleze.Într-o primă fază împuterniciŃii de culte 

solicitau pastorilor să-i anunŃe data şi locul unde urma să se desfăşoare botezul, motivând 

că erau interesaŃi să participe la acesta când, de fapt, doreau împiedicarea desfăşurării 

acestuia. În zonele rurale, unde se obişnuia ca botezurile să se Ńină la râu cu alai mare 53 , 

condiŃia impusă de autorităŃii era tocmai aceea de a nu transforma botezul într-un 

eveniment sărbătoresc la care să participe un număr mare de oameni. Cu toate acestea, 

profitând de destinderea politică dintre anii 1955-1956 54 , s-au oficiat multe botezuri la 

râu 55 şi cu alai mare. 

Pe de altă parte, împuterniciŃii de culte nu se limitau doar la transmiterea unor ordine 

pastorilor baptişti ci se implicau încă din anii '50 în limitarea şi împiedicarea 

manifestărilor la care am făcut referire anterior. Exemplificator pentru modul de acŃiune 

al împuterniciŃilor este modul cum s-a desfăşurat un botez din comuna Agrij, raionul 

Zalău, din anul 1956, oficiat de către pastorul Ioan Bunaciu care relatează următoarele: 

49 Paul Caravia, „Studiu introductiv” în Paul Caravia (coord.), Biserica întemni ată. România 

între 1944-1989, Institutul Na ional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucure ti, 1999, p. 8. 

50 Înmormântările constituiau un prilej de manifestare publică a credin ei i proclamare a 

valorilor cre tine atât de către preo i cât i de către pastori. 

51 „Prin botez mărturisim că am fost îngropa i împreună cu Hristos i că am ie it la o via ă 

nouă pentru Hristos i Dumnezeu. Deci este semn al mărturisirii legământului în fa a celor 

nevăzu i.” Interviu cu Victor Lazăr în Denisa Bodeanu, NeoprotestanŃii din Transilvania în 

timpul regimului comunist. Studiu de caz: baptiştii din judeŃul Cluj – Mărturii şi documente -, 

Editura Argonaut, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 210. 

52 O altă modalitate prin care o persoană poate deveni membră a Bisericii Baptiste este transferul 

de la o altă biserică evanghelică. Dar i în acest caz trebuie făcută dovada botezului liber 

consim it. 

53 Un eveniment sărbătoresc la care participă un număr mare de persoane. 

54 Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan ii din Transilvania, p. 38. 

55 ,,Vara anului 1956 a fost o vară a libertă ilor religioase, din 1946 nu am mai avut o asemenea 

destindere, peste tot s-au inut botezuri în aer liber, evanghelizări etc.”, Ioan Bunaciu, Bisericile 

Cre tine Baptiste din România, p. 54. 

753

,,Am sosit sâmbătă seara în sat – relatează pastorul Bunaciu – şi de îndată a 

venit la casa unde stătea secretarul Sfatului Popular care m-a legitimat. I-am 

arătat legitimaŃia din partea ComunităŃii prin care eram împuternicit să oficiez 

botezul. Apoi m-a întrebat: Câtă lume vine mâine la botez? I-am răspuns: Nu 

ştiu, eu nu am invitat pe nimeni. Duminică dimineaŃa am Ńinut serviciul divin în 

biserică; pe la orele 13.00, am plecat în convoi spre râu cu candidaŃii îmbrăcaŃi 

în haine albe. Şi, tocmai când am ajuns la apă, se terminase slujba la biserica 

ortodoxă şi oamenii ieşind de la biserică, fugeau la râu ca să ajungă la botez. La 

biserica ortodoxă participase multă lume, pentru că era slujbă lungă, anume, ca 

enoriaşii lor să nu vină la botezul nostru dar, până la urmă, lucrurile s-au 

petrecut în favoarea noastră” 56 . 

După RevoluŃia maghiară din 1956, regimul comunist a introdus treptat o serie de 

prevederi care urmăreau un control mai strict al botezurilor cu scopul limitării acestora. O 

primă măsură a fost aceea de a interzice bisericilor evanghelice desfăşurarea de botezuri 

la râu impunându-le astfel să-şi construiască baptistiere. Cum nu toate bisericile aveau 

aşa ceva trebuiau să-şi construiască dacă primeau autorizaŃie sau să meargă în altă 

biserică. Pentru a reduce la minim numărul de botezuri în anul 1960 Departamentul 

Cultelor a hotărât, prevalându-se de o prevedere din Lega Cultelor din anul 1948, că 

declaraŃia schimbării cultului religios ,,trebuie făcută oficiului de stare civilă a primăriilor 

şi, pentru că din 1949 primăriile nu mai făceau asemenea acte ni s-a interzis să mai 

botezăm candidaŃi de la alte culte, deoarece nu se pot îndeplini condiŃiile legii cultelor, cu 

privire la trecerea de cult.” 57 RestricŃiile au fost împinse mai departe astfel că, - îşi 

aminteşte pastorul Bunaciu -, ,,pentru ca să poŃi oficia un botez în cadrul serviciului divin, 

trebuia să-l anunŃi pe împuternicitul teritorial, să-i prezinŃi lista cu candidaŃi la botez şi să 

dovedeşti cu registrul de membri că părinŃii lor sunt credincioşi baptişti.” 58 Prin urmare, 

pastorul avea obligaŃia să prezinte împuternicitului de culte lista cu candidaŃii la botez, iar 

în urma examinării erau tăiaŃi de pe listă cei care figurau ca membrii de partid, precum şi 

intelectualii, împuternicitul sau reprezentantul SecurităŃii îşi dădea acordul doar pentru 

persoanele care nu prezentau un interes 59 pentru stat. 

Cele menŃionate anterior ne sunt confirmate şi de pastorul baptist Ioan Mânzat care 

menŃionează faptul că personalul de cult avea voie să boteze numai candidaŃii care 

56 Ibidem, pp.51-52. 

57 Ibidem, p.55. 

58 Ibidem. 

59 ,,Dacă aveau pe cineva în vizor care reprezenta un interes pentru ei, o persoană pe care ar fi vrut 

să o coopteze, să facă ceva cu ea sau pur i simplu să te icaneze puteau să- i taie persoane de 

pe lista candida ilor pentru botez” Interviu cu Avram Faur în Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan ii 

din Transilvania în timpul regimului comunist, p. 39. Men ionăm faptul că pe lângă aspectul 

operativ amintit de către Avram Faur, pentru Securitate tinerii reprezentau o categorie de cetă eni 

care trebuia dirijată către alte valori decât cele religioase. Pe lângă tineri i copii, permanent în 

vizorul Securită ii s-au aflat intelectualii. Ca urmare, tinerii i intelectualii reprezentau categorii 

sensibile cărora de multe ori li s-a interzis dreptul de a trece la protestantism. 

754

proveneau din familii de baptişti 60 cu scopul de a opri înmulŃirea acestora. Pastorul Ioan 

Mânzat confirmă prezenŃa tabelului cu candidaŃii la botez, precum şi obligativitatea 

prezentării acestuia spre aprobare împuternicitului de culte. ,,Trebuia să mă duc cu tabelul 

la inspector înainte de botez ca el să scrie «aprobat» sau «respins». Şi ştergea de pe listă 

pe cei care .. noi mai făceam şi câte o chestie aşa na! Dacă i-o fost bunicii pocăiŃi baptişti 

puneam că o fost bunicii. Ş-atunci mai scăpa câte unul ..” 61 . 

În contextul acestor limitări şi impuneri, pastorii baptişti alături de personalul 

celorlalte culte evanghelice (penticostal, creştin după Evanghelie, adventist), au căutat 

soluŃii şi metode care să le permită oficierea acestor acte de cult şi împlinirea menirii lor 

precum şi ,,aspiraŃiilor religioase ale credincioşilor.” 62 

Pentru a înŃelege cum se desfăşura un botez nou testamentar în anul 1948, când încă 

mai exista o aparenŃă de liberate religioasă, considerăm oportună prezentarea botezului 

pastorului Huşanu Mihai 63 de la Cluj. Acesta relatează următoarele: ,,în 1948, în 15 

august m-am botezat în credinŃa baptistă […] cu mama. Botezul a fost făcut în râul 

Suceava, de către un pastor care avea dreptul să oficieze acest act, Silvestru Ungureanu. 

Deci la 16 ani am cunoscut credinŃa, la 17 ani m-am botezat.” 64 Cum o asemenea 

manifestare nu mai era permisă începând cu a doua parte a anilor '50, Mihai Huşanu, 

devenit între timp pastor, a început să oficieze botezuri în mod clandestin. 

,,Dumnezeu mi-a dat curajul ş-am botezat noaptea în biserică. Pregăteam 

apa pentru botez în biserică pentru a doua zi. Cu o zi, două înainte, îmi luam 

cheile frumos de la îngrijitor, şi-i spuneam lui Georgescu Ioan: 

Ascultă, la ora 1 noaptea, prin gardul acesta, uite aicea, îi aşezată 

scândura numai de formă. Dai la o parte scândura din gard şi vii frumos 

prin spatele bisericii … […] Îi ziceam: Nu vii cu nimeni, vii cu Dumnezeu, 

atât. Eu îi dădeam cămaşă de botez albă, intram cu el în apă, în baptistier şi 

îl întrebam: Georgescu Ioan, crezi în Domnul Hristos? Da, cred. Pe baza 

60 

O mărturie în acest sens este adusă i de către Nicu Zaharia secretar al Bisericii Cre tine 

Baptiste „Sfânta Treime” din Târgu Lăpu . Acesta s-a născut în anul 1947 în localitatea Rohia, 

raionul Târgu Lăpu într-o familie mixtă unde mama era de confesiune baptistă iar tatăl baptist 

fapt care l-a făcut să alterneze pe perioada copilăriei între Biserica Baptistă i cea ortodoxă. După 

ce a terminat coala în Rohia s-a mutat la Baia Mare unde prin intermediul familiei la care locuia 

în gazdă a cunoscut mai bine Cuvântul Domnului. „În 1969 – mărturise te Nicu Zaharia - m-am 

hotărât să-mi predau via a în bra ul Domnului i împreună cu Pocol tefan, [ i] Pop Augustin 

am fost gata de botez. În Biserica din Baia Mare nu puteam să fim boteza i pentru că nu 

proveneam din familii baptiste.Ne-am deplasat la Jibou i am fost boteza i pe ascuns de fratele 

Talo ” Alexa, tatăl pastorului Vasile Alexandru Talo . Vasile Bel, Lupta credin ei, Editura 

Astra-Dej, Dej, 2010, pp. 49-50. Sublinierea din text ne apar ine (M. S.). 

61 

Interviu cu Ioan Mânzat în Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan 

62 

Ibidem, p.40. 

ii din Transilvania, pp. 233-234. 

63 

Mihai Hu anu ,,s-a născut la 5 septembrie 1931 în satul Unce ti, jude ul Suceava. Este de 

na ionalitate română, a absolvit Seminarul Teologic Baptist din Bucure ti. A fost pastor baptist” 

la Biserica Cluj Mănă tur din Cluj-Napoca i pre edinte al cultului baptist între anii 1980-1984. 

Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan 

64 


ii din Transilvania, p.177. 

755

credinŃei tale, te botez în numele Tatălui, al Fiului şi al Duhului Sfânt. Amin. 

Se îmbrăca şi pleca. [… ] Aşa am făcut eu botezurile. AlŃii făceau la râuri. 

Am făcut şi eu un botez în râul Someş. Cineva a spus: Eu cred în Domnul 

Hristos ... Persoană sus-pusă. Mă botezi? Da. Când? În data de cutare vino 

… Cum am fixat acuma am mers la capătul Someşului […] Am intrat în 

Someş … L-am botezat în ziua mare şi-o plecat.” 65 

O altă mărturie ne este oferită de Dragomir Bojan 66 care, întrebat fiind dacă îşi 

aminteşte momentul botezului, relatează următoarele: 

,,Botezul meu a fost în nişte condiŃii destul de ciudate. Probabil ştiŃi că în 

1954 … pentru prima dată Departamentul Cultelor 67 a luat nişte măsuri, nişte 

reglementări 68 cu privire la bisericile evanghelice. Ş-atunci, în anul acela, a 

luat hotărârea ca orice botez să fie controlat. Trebuia să faci parte din 

Biserica Baptistă, dacă nu pastorul nu te putea boteza. Ş-atuncea pe mine mo 

botezat 69 noaptea într-un râu. O fost numa' câŃiva martori pentru că în 

biserică, în mod oficial aşa cum se petrece astăzi botezul, nu mă putea 

boteza.” 70 

Botezul pe care îl administra personalul duhovnicesc era un act de cult reglementat 

prin statut. Prin îngrădirea lui se realiza o intruziune în viaŃa internă a cultului şi o 

încălcare a statutului acestuia precum şi a dreptului persoanei de a-şi alege credinŃa. 

AcŃiuni similare cu cele ale pastorilor baptişti ca modalitate de rezistenŃă se regăsesc şi în 

viaŃa altor culte, inclusiv al celui ortodox. 

AcŃiunile de contestare şi răspuns ale bisericilor baptiste faŃă de presiunea 

autorităŃilor, la care ne-am referit anterior, reprezintă manifestări cunoscute de către 

autorităŃi. Cazuri similare se întâlnesc şi la Biserica Ortodoxă precum şi la celelalte culte 

evanghelice, iar autorităŃile reacŃionau de obicei prin atenŃionarea celor ce depăşeau ceea 

ce era îngăduit. SituaŃia se va schimba pe parcursul anilor '70 când formele de opoziŃie 

deschisă faŃă de încălcarea libertăŃii religioase sunt mult mai ample şi mai profunde 

trecând dincolo de o contestare discretă a regimului. 

Forme specifice ale opoziŃiei faŃă de regimul comunist după 1965 (anii '70 - '80) 

În cea de a doua parte a istoriei recente, denumită şi faza târzie a comunismului 

românesc, respectiv anii '70 - '80 ai secolului XX, „acŃiunile de opoziŃie faŃă de regim au 

îmbrăcat câteva forme distincte. Pe lângă mişcarea de disidenŃă culturală, reprezentată în 

primul rând de Paul Goma şi de adepŃii săi, au avut loc tot mai multe tulburări 

65 Interviu cu Mihai Hu anu în ibidem, p. 40. 

66 Dragomir Bojan s-a născut la 29 octombrie 1941 în Cluj-Napoca. Este de na ionalitate română 

i a absolvit Facultatea de Filologie la Cluj. A fost profesor de limba română. În anul 2006 era 

pensionar. Ibidem, p. 95. 

67 Departamentul Cultelor este înfiin at în anul 1957. Până la momentul men ionat vorbim de 

Ministerul Cultelor. 

68 Dragomir Bojan se referă la Reglementarea serviciilor religioase duminicale în Cultul Creştin 

Baptist. 

69 La momentul botezului, Dragomir Bojan era proaspăt absolvent de filologie, deci un intelectual. 

70 Interviu cu Dragomir Bojan în Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan ii din Transilvania, p. 96. 

756

muncitoreşti (Valea Jiului, S.L.O.M.R., Braşov), însă au crescut mult în amploare şi 

reacŃiile religioase faŃă de aplicarea forŃată a materialismului ateist. În cadrul acesteia din 

urmă, un rol important l-au jucat reprezentanŃii cultelor neoprotestante, care pe toată 

perioada existenŃei regimului comunist au avut de întâmpinat mari neajunsuri, interdicŃii 

şi persecuŃii din partea acestuia. A apărut în consecinŃă, în mod firesc, o acŃiune de 

opoziŃie din partea acestora, în special din partea baptiştilor, grupul religios cel mai 

important din rândurile lor. În primăvara anului 1978 aceştia pregăteau lansarea 

Comitetului Român pentru Apărarea LibertăŃii Religioase şi de ConştiinŃă (A.L.R.C.), cea 

mai organizată formă de opoziŃie religioasă la care s-a ajuns. Acum ea este considerată de 

mulŃi chiar fiind singura formă de contestare formulată pe baze ideologice faŃă de regimul 

comunist din România” 71 . 

AcŃiunile pastorului Iosif łon 

Iosif łon s-a născut la 30 septembrie 1934 în comuna GârboviŃa, judeŃul Arad. Între 

1951-1955, studiază la Facultatea de limbă şi literatură română din Cluj, urmând apoi 

cursurile Seminarului Teologic Baptist din Bucureşti (1955-1957). RenunŃă temporar la 

studiile de teologie şi în perioada 1958-1968 lucrează ca profesor de limba română. Va 

urma teologia la Oxford University din Anglia între anii 1969-1972, iar după terminare se 

întoarce în Ńară şi va preda la Seminarul Teologic Baptist din Bucureşti 72 (1973-1974). 

Începând cu anul 1974 se angajează în lucrarea pastorală la Biserica Baptistă din Ploieşti 

(1974-1977) iar apoi la Biserica Baptistă Nr. 2 din Oradea (1977-1981) unde va rămâne 

până la emigrarea sa împreună cu familia în Statele Unite ale Americii, continuând să 

slujească comunitatea evanghelică din România prin intermediul Radio Europa Liberă şi 

Radio BBC. 

Între ani 1973-1981 a fost arestat de mai multe ori aflându-se în conflict cu autorităŃile 

datorită acŃiunilor sale. 

În anii '70 Iosif łon a scris Cine îşi va pierde viaŃa (1973) şi Manifestul 

Creştin(1974), publicate în broşuri separate în Occident şi introduse clandestin în 

România 73 . 

Cine îşi va pierde viaŃa (1973) 

Scopul acestei lucrări a fost acela de a aduce în atenŃia românilor şi a comunităŃii 

internaŃionale problemele cu care se confruntau bisericile 74 din România la momentul 

71 Mircea Rusnac, „ContribuŃii bănăŃene la mişcarea de opoziŃie religioasă anticomunistă 

A.L.R.C. (1978)”, http://istoriabanatului.wordpress.com/2010/04/01/mircea-rusnac-contributiibanatene-la-miscarea-de-opozitie-religioasa-anticomunista-a-l-r-c-1978/ 

(3 mai 2011). A se vedea 

i Marius Silve an „A murit Aurel Popescu”, http://istorieevanghelica.ro/2010/10/20/a-muritaurel-popescu/ 

(3 mai 2011), Marius Silve an, „ALRC”, 

http://istorieevanghelica.ro/2010/02/10/alrc/ (3 mai 2011). 

72 Iosif on scrie că a fost chemat să predea la Seminarul Teologic în anul 1973 de către Nicolae 

Covaci, pre edintele cultului baptist. Iosif on, Confruntări, Ed. a 3-a, Editura Cartea Cre tină, 

Oradea, 2009, p. 13. 

73 Ibidem, p. 11. 

74 Ne referim în principal la bisericile evanghelice cunoscute sub denumirea de neoprotestante. 

757

espectiv. În acest sens Iosif łon scrie următoarele: „când am primit inspiraŃia de a o scrie 

am primit şi mesajul că «aceasta va rupe plasa».” 75 

Prin intermediul acestei lucrări Iosif łon a dorit să prezinte doctrina baptistă a bisericii 

şi să arate că reglementările şi restricŃiile introduse de către autorităŃi încalcă doctrina 

baptistă iar în virtutea acestui fapt Bisericile Baptiste au dreptul şi sunt chemate să le 

respingă 76 .După ce prezintă detaliat reglementările Statului care au afectat viaŃa 

bisericilor baptiste, Iosif łon consideră necesar să realizeze şi o sinteză a lucrurilor care iau 

fost răpite Bisericii de către autorităŃile comuniste 77 până la momentul respectiv 78 : 

1. „Biserica nu-şi mai poate alege păstorul si păstorul nu mai este angajatul ei ci al 

unei organizaŃii centralizate; 

2. Biserica nu mai poate alege pe cine vrea în comitetul ei de conducere; 

3. Diaconii ei nu-i mai pot îndeplini actele ei vitale de cult; 

4. Biserica nu mai poate boteza deschis, pe faŃă, aşa cum îi dictează Domnul ei, pe 

toŃi aceia care îl acceptă pe Isus Hristos ca Domn si Mântuitor personal; 

5. Biserica nu mai poate da cuvânt oricărui musafir pe care şi-l doreşte la amvon, şi 

nici chiar oricărui membru al ei, ci numai celor care sunt acceptabili unor 

persoane externe ei; 

6. Biserica nu mai poate face tot ce doreşte ea cu banii ei; 

7. Biserica ajunge până acolo încât cineva din afară îi dictează pe cine să primească 

în sânul ei ca membru.” 79 

În finalul lucrării menŃionate sunt prezentate şi unele revendicări pe care bisericilor 

baptiste le doreau a fi rezolvate de către autorităŃi 80 : 

1. „Încetarea presiunilor privitoare la numărul serviciilor religioase în bisericile 

noastre; 

2. RenunŃarea la măsurile impuse prin «arondare» şi redeschiderea tuturor bisericilor 

baptiste care se mai află închise şide formarea bisericilor noi, oriunde se află 

numărul statutar (deci, legal) de credincioşi baptişti care cer acest lucru; 

3. DesfiinŃarea carnetelor de pastor şi a cerinŃelor recunoaşterii pastorilor de către 

Departamentul Cultelor, aşa încât fiecare biserică să fie liberă să-şi aleagă orice 

păstor îşi doreşte ea; 

4. RenunŃarea la cerinŃa ca inspectorii de culte să aprobe o listă de membri din care 

biserica să-şi aleagă comitetul, precum şi la cerinŃa recunoaşterii de către 

inspectorii de culte a conducătorilor aleşi ai bisericii; 

75 Iosif on, Confruntări, p. 25. Referire la plasa care înconjura bisericile, o formă plastică de 

prezentare a ac iunilor statului care aveau ca scop limitarea vie ii religioase. Ibidem, pp. 15, 

16-27. 

76 Ibidem, p. 15. 

77 Ibidem, p. 74. 

78 Cu precădere în perioada 1955-1973. 

79 Iosif on, Confruntări, p. 75. 

80 Ibidem, p. 76. 

758

5. Oprirea oricăror imixtiuni a inspectorilor cultelor în problema botezurilor şi a 

celorlalte acte de cult (Cina Domnului, predicarea Evangheliei etc.) din viaŃa 

bisericii; 

6. Oprirea oricărui amestec în afacerile financiare ale bisericilor, cu excepŃia unui 

control referitor la corectitudinea operaŃiilor financiare.” 81 

Iosif łon scrie că lucrarea sa, Cine îşi va pierde viaŃa, precum şi Memoriul celor 

50 pe care îl prezentăm mai jos au fost folosite de către Departamentul de Stat al 

Statelor Unite ale Americii pentru a face presiuni asupra lui Ceauşescu ca acesta să 

acorde libertate religioasă creştinilor evanghelici dacă dorea ca România să 

primească clauza naŃiunii cele mai favorizate care îi permitea să aibă relaŃii 

comerciale privilegiate cu Statele Unite ale Americii 82 . 

Manifestul creştin (1974) 

Manifestul Creştin este o lucrare care militează pentru o înŃelegere între 

creştinism şi comunism dovadă şi titlul iniŃial Locul creştinului în socialism 83 . 

Premisa de bază de la care autorul a pornit în redactarea acestei lucrări a fost „că 

socialismul ca sistem este bun; singura problemă ar fi că oamenii corupŃi au făcut din 

el un sistem corupt şi astfel singura modalitate pentru a-l face să funcŃioneze ar fi 

transformarea oamenilor prin puterea lui Isus Hristos.” 84 

Între timp autorul şi-a schimbat opinia considerând faptul că socialismul ca 

sistem este rău şi că fenomenele care apar în cadrul acestuia nu sunt „produsul unor 

lideri depravaŃi din Ńările socialiste. Ele sunt produsul firesc al unui sistem care 

pretinde planificare centrală, aplicare centrală a planului, control central asupra 

tuturor şi transformarea acelora care execută în roboŃi care fac totul conform 

planului.” 85 Deşi opiniile autorului s-au schimbat 86 acesta consideră că încă mai 

există un motiv pentru care eseul Manifestul Creştinmerită citit. Motivul rezidă în 

faptul că „el face o analiză a eşecului comunismului în a produce omul nou pe care 

trebuia să-l producă şi pentru că prezintă mesajul creştin că numai Isus Hristos este 

în stare să schimbe şi să restaureze complet omul.” 87 

Pentru noi cei care trăim astăzi în libertate este mai greu să înŃelegem impactul pe 

care această lucrare l-a avut la momentul respectiv însă prin faptul că un exemplar a 

fost trimis şi conducătorului Ńării, Nicolae Ceauşescu, putem considera această 

81 Ibidem. 

82 Ibidem, pp. 22-26. 

83 Ibidem, p. 85. 

84 Ibidem, p. 86. 

85 Ibidem, p. 87. 

86 Relevant în acest sens este i faptul că în anul 1985, Manifestul Cre tin a fost republicată de 

Editura „Marshall Pickering” din Anglia cu titlul Marxism: The Faded Dream (Marxismul: visul 

spulberat). Ibidem, p. 82. 

87 Ibidem. 

759

acŃiune ca una de răspuns faŃă de constrângerile care acŃionau asupra Bisericilor şi 

credincioşilor din România. 

Scopul principal al Manifestului Creştin fost acela de a demonstra despre creştini 

evanghelici „nu numai că nu sunt dăunători socialismului ci, dimpotrivă, îi sunt 

necesari, îi pot aduce o contribuŃie care se va putea dovedi vitală societăŃii socialiste. 

Socialismul – continuă autorul - nu pierde nimic dacă face această încercare: să le 

dea deplină libertate credincioşilor evanghelici, să le dea drept de cetate (în locul 

statutului de «toleraŃi» pe care li-l dă în prezent), să le dea posibilitatea să arate ce 

pot aduce ei ca şi creştini societăŃii socialiste.” 88 De asemenea autorul milita pentru 

revoluŃie însă nu o revoluŃie a maselor ci una a inimii realizată de către Isus Hristos 

deoarece acesta va face „cea mai profundă mai necesară şi mai sănătoasă revoluŃie în 

această societate”, motiv pentru care societatea socialistă are nevoie de revoluŃia 

cristică. 89 

Datorită faptului că lucrarea de faŃă se ocupă cu precădere de perioada 1948-1965 

nu vom intra în detalii privind consecinŃele acŃiunilor iniŃiate de către Iosif łon, a 

modului în care acesta a reuşit să-şi difuzeze lucrările în străinătate precum şi a altor 

aspecte care Ńin de lucrarea sa în România şi din 1981 în Occident. 

Memoriul celor 50 (1973) 

Numele acestui document vine de la faptul că a fost semnat de 50 de pastori baptişti la 

iniŃiativa lui Vasile Taloş, pastor al Bisericii Baptiste „Sfânta Treime” din Bucureşti 90 . 

Prin intermediul acestui memoriu care a fost înaintat şi preşedintelui Ńării, Nicolae 

Ceauşescu, se formulau trei revendicări majore pentru bisericile baptiste. 

1. „Dreptul Bisericii de a hotărî în problemele ei esenŃiale: alegerea păstorului, alegerea 

comitetului, numirea persoanelor pentru fiecare Serviciu Divin în parte, primirea sau 

excluderea de membri, gospodărirea bunurilor sale băneşti şi materiale. După Statutul 

nostru şi Mărturisirea noastră de credinŃă, Biserica locală este singura care hotărăşte în 

problemele ei interne. […] 91 . 

2. Dreptul de a boteza pe toŃi aceia care din proprie convingere şi la cererea lor expresă 

doresc să devină membri ai Bisericii. Botezul adulŃilor este cea mai caracteristică 

practică a noastră. Numele nostru vine de la grecescul «baptizo» - «a boteza». În 

această privinŃă, însă, întâmpinăm cele mai multe greutăŃi. Contrar prevederilor 

ConstituŃiei, inspectorii de culte împiedică botezul celor care îmbrăŃişează crezul 

nostru venind de la un alt cult. S-a creat astfel situaŃia că în bisericile noastre există 

multe persoane care de ani de zile frecventează serviciile noastre, împărtăşesc aceeaşi 

88 


89 

Ibidem. 

90 

Cunoscută i ca Biserica baptistă din Mihai Bravu deoarece aceasta se afla pe strada cu acela i 

nume. 

91 

Istoria Memoriului celor 50: documente, relatări, amintiri, date biografice ale pastorilor 

semnatari ai memoriului din 1973/ documente adunate i păstrate de Iosif Sărac, Editura Ramira, 

Arad, 2010, p. 12. 

760

credinŃă cu noi, stăruiesc de noi să-i botezăm, iar noi suntem obligaŃi să-i refuzăm fără 

a putea justifica acest refuz 92 . 

3. Dreptul credincioşilor de a se aduna în case de rugăciune amenajate în acest scop, ori 

de câte ori doresc, pentru a se închina lui Dumnezeu, precum şi dreptul de a 

achiziŃiona, construi şi repara case de rugăciune.” 93 

ConsecinŃa acestui memoriu precum şi a altor acŃiuni 94 de rezistenŃă, a fost acela că 

bisericile şi-au recăpătat o serie de drepturi pierdute cu referire directă la faptul că 

bisericilor baptiste li s-a permis să boteze şi persoane care nu aveau părinŃi sau rude 

apropiate membre în cultul baptist 95 . 

Scrisoarea lui Marcoi Ştefan din Arad către M.A.N. (1978) 

În anul 1978 cetăŃeanul Marcoi Ştefan din Arad a adresat o scrisoare către Marea 

Adunare NaŃională înregistrată sub numărul 232 din 17 aprilie 1978 96 . În cadrul acestei 

scrisori este reliefată diferenŃa dintre discursul oficial aşa cum apare în documentele 

Partidului comunist sau în discursurile preşedintelui Ńării, Nicolae Ceauşescu şi realitatea 

vieŃii religioase exemplificată prin cazuri de încălcare a libertăŃii religioase în cadrul 

Cultului Creştin Baptist. 

Deşi nu sunt prezentate decât trei cazuri, scrisoarea denotă cunoaşterea documentelor 

oficiale ale Partidului Comunist. Remarcăm de asemenea accentul pus de autor pe 

legislaŃie precum şi ideea că aceasta este bună însă este aplicată defectuos de către 

autorităŃile locale. 

Cele trei cazuri pe care această scrisoare le aduce în atenŃia autorităŃilor sunt: 

1. Cazul bisericii baptiste din comuna Tomeşti judeŃul Timiş pe care autorul a vizitat-o în 

luna aprilie 1977 era persecutată de către primarul comunei care îi amenda pe 

credincioşi. Deşi au făcut contestaŃie la Lugoj, credincioşii baptişti din comuna 

respectivă au continuat să plătească amenzi, continuând să fie şicanaŃi şi prin faptul că 

primarul „intră în biserică în timpul serviciului religios şi introduce groază în 

credincioşii simpli din acea comună.” 97 

2. Al doilea caz se referă la situaŃia întâlnită în satul Cloşcani comuna Padeş, judeŃul 

Gorj. „Aici la fel responsabilul bisericii de credincioşi baptişti este persecutat mereu 

de către primarul comunei cu ameninŃări să închidă biserica că altfel îl amendează, îl 

92 Ibidem, p.13. 

93 Ibidem, pp. 12-14. 

94 Unul din documentele consultate în Arhiva Departamentului Cultelor (A.S.S.C.) se referă la 

demersurile ini iate de Uniunea Baptistă în anii '70 cu scopul permiterii bisericilor baptiste de a 

avea servicii religioase atât duminica seara cât i în cursul săptămânii. Dolean ele Uniunii s-au 

lovit de refuzul categoric al Departamentului Cultelor exprimat prin intermediul împuternicitului 

principal. 

95 Vezi i Iosif on, Confruntări, pp. 22-26. 

96 Adresa Secretariatului General al Marii Adunări Na ionale către Departamentul Cultelor 

Secretariat în ASSC, Dosar Departamentul Cultelor, note privind episcopii, nepaginat. 

97 „Către Marea Adunare Na ională a Republicii Socialiste România”, p. 1, în ASSC, dosar 

Departamentul Cultelor, note privind episcopii, nepaginat. 

761

dă în judecată, că are să îl lege şi aşa să îl bată şi a mai pus şi aceia să plece cu 

serviciul de pe raza comunei lui că aşa a primit ordin.” 98 

3. Al treilea caz la care face referire scrisoarea este cel întâlnit în oraşul Motru, „unde 

credincioşii sunt opriŃi de a se aduna într-o casă ce le-a pus la dispoziŃie un alt 

credincios imobilul său proprietate personală şi mai mult decât atât Sfatul Popular l-a 

dat în judecată să îi ia casa de la acest cetăŃean şi să îl amendeze cu numele de 

Ploscaru. În opinia lui Marcoi Ştefan, persecuŃia îndreptată împotriva lui Ploscaru şi a 

celor 50 de credincioşi din Motru se datora neaplicării întocmai de către autorităŃile 

locale a directivelor„date de către Partidul nostru Comunist.” 99 

După ce a prezentat aceste cazuri, Marcoi Ştefan prezintă diferenŃa dintre legislaŃie şi 

modul cum aceasta este aplicată în România atrăgând în acest mod atenŃia autorităŃilor 

asupra faptului că Bisericile Baptiste au dreptul la o libertate legitimă, la o libertate 

exprimată şi garantată de către ConstituŃie ca lege fundamentală. 

A.L.R.C. (1978) 

Comitetul Creştin de Apărare a LibertăŃii religioase şi de ConştiinŃă (A.L.R.C.) a fost 

o mişcare de protest interconfesională iniŃiată de către pastorul baptist Pavel Nicolescu în 

toamna anului 1977 ca „o organizaŃie de protest neoficială.” 100 Acesta era format, din nouă 

persoane 101 , adică Pavel Nicolescu (Bucureşti), Dimitrie Ianculovici (Timişoara), Ioan 

Moldovan (Timişoara), Petru CocîrŃeu (Caransebeş), Ioan Brisc (Timişoara), Emerich 

Iuhasz (Timişoara), Nicolaie Traian Bogdan (Timişoara), Nicolae Rădoi (Caransebeş), 

Ludovic Osvath (Zalău), iar ca purtători de cuvânt îi avea pe Pavel Niculescu şi Dimitrie 

Ianculovici. 102 Interesant este că toŃi semnatarii iniŃiali ai declaraŃiei, precum şi alŃii de 

după ei, au fost forŃaŃi să emigreze în Statele Unite, după maltratări şi condamnări date de 

autorităŃile comuniste. 

Comitetul Român pentru Apărarea LibertăŃii Religioase şi de ConştiinŃă milita pentru 

respectarea drepturilor religioase garantate cetăŃenilor de către ConstituŃia RSR (1965) 

precum şi de alte legi în vigoare la momentul respectiv printre care şi Legea pentru 

Regimul General al Cultelor Religioase. 

Scopul declarat al A.L.R.C. era:„1. Afirmarea valorilor morale şi spirituale ale religiei 

creştine, 2. Apărarea libertăŃii religioase şi de conştiinŃă, 3. Apărarea şi ajutorarea 

tuturor celor persecutaŃi din cauza convingerilor religioase, 4. Promovarea legăturilor 

interconfesionale între creştinii din Romania şi cei din străinătate, 5. Informarea opiniei 


99 Ibidem. 

100 Alexa Popovici, op.cit., p.824. 

101 „ALRC, declara ii i reac ii”,http://dezvaluiri.wordpress.com/alrc-dcaratii-si-reactii/, 

(24.09.2011). http://carteapasi.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/cultul-crestin-baptist-in-comunismcap-2.pdf, 

pp. 137-138, (24.09.2011). 

102 Ibidem. Din punct de vedere confesional Pavel Nicolescu, Aurel Popescu, Nicolae Rădoi, 

Dimitrie Ianculovici erau de la bapti ti., Silviu Cioată de la creştini după Evanghelie şi Constantin 

Caraman de la penticostali. 

762

publice din Ńară şi străinătate în privinŃa persecuŃiei religioase din România, 6. 

Analizarea fenomenului religios în contextul societăŃii socialiste.” 103 

Din perspectiva diferenŃei dintre realitate şi discurs legislativ, documentul ALRC-ului 

prezintă situaŃia reală a respectării libertăŃii religioase în România la sfârşitul anilor 70 ai 

secolului XX. Când ne referim la situaŃia drepturilor religioase trebuie să luăm în 

considerare şi obligaŃiile pe care România şi le-a asumat prin semnarea în 1975 a Actului 

final al ConferinŃei pentru Securitate şi Cooperare internaŃională de la Helsinki (CSCE). 

Printre cele zece principii cunoscute sub numele de Decalogul de la Helsinki remarcăm la 

punctul 7 următoarele: „respectarea dreptului omului şi a libertăŃilor fundamentale, 

inclusiv a libertăŃii de gândire, conştiinŃă, religie sau de convingere.” 104 Aşadar România 

s-a angajat în mod explicit să respecte aceste drepturi pe care în fapt a continuat să le 

încalce. 

Comitetul Român pentru Apărarea LibertăŃii Individuale şi de ConştiinŃă era o 

organizaŃie de apărare a libertăŃii de credinŃă, cele mai multe iniŃiative şi memorii avândule 

Pavel Nicolescu. Acesta a trimis memorii la Consiliul de Stat, Ministerul JustiŃiei, 

Departamentul Cultelor, Uniunea Baptistă, Comisia ONU pentru Drepturile Omului, 

Radio Europa Liberă, ş.a. 105 

Pavel Nicolescu a fost obligat să emigreze în SUA însă acest fapt nu l-a împiedicat să 

transmită în numele ALRC, al cărui preşedinte era, informaŃii despre persecuŃiile 

religioase din România către Radio Europa Liberă contribuind în acest fel la cunoaşterea 

adevărului şi demascarea propagandei antireligioase. 

Memoriul pastorului Dugulescu (1981) 

Memoriile au reprezentat o altă formă de protest şi rezistenŃă în perioada de după 

1965. Acestea au fost adresate de către lideri români sau instituŃii din străinătate 

organelor de stat şi de partid, precum şi preşedintelui R.S.R., Nicolae Ceauşescu. 

În 1981 pastorul Petre Dugulescu a iniŃiat un memoriu (semnat de mai mulŃi pastori) 

care a dus la demiterea directorului din departamentul Cultelor„rămas din garda stalinista 

şi care timp de câteva decenii terorizase bisericile neoprotestante” 106 . 

Memoriul celor 66 de pastori baptişti (1982) 

Tot Petru Dugulescu este cel care a redactat ,,Memoriul celor 66 de pastori 

baptişti.” 107 Adresat în august 1982 lui Nicolae Ceauşescu via Congresul SUA, Vocea 

103 „ALRC declara ii i reac ii”, http://dezvaluiri.wordpress.com/alrc-dcaratii-sireactii/,(24.09.2011).http://carteapasi.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/cultul-crestin-baptist-incomunism-cap-2.pdf, 

pp. 137-138, (24.09.2011). 

104 Patricia Gonzales Aldea, Helsinki 1975. Începutul sfâr itului: Degradarea regimului din 

România i singularitatea lui în Blocul de Est: (1975-1990), trad.: Alexandra Reocov, Curtea 

Veche Publishing, Bucure ti, 2008, p. 32. 

105 Alexa Popovici, Istoria baptiştilor, p. 824. 

106 Vasile Alexandru Talo , „Biserica i Securitatea - Mărturisiri - partea a doua–” în loc. cit. 

107 Petru Dugulescu, Democra ie i persecu ie, Editura Multimedia Interna ional, Arad, 2007, 

pp. 304-306. 

763

Americii, Europa Liberă şi Ambasada SUA la Bucureşti, memoriul avea şapte puncte prin 

intermediul cărora erau semnalate problemele cu care se confruntau baptiştii din România 

datorită atitudinii şi acŃiunilor autorităŃilor. Cele şapte puncte făceau referire la probleme 

legate de personalul de cult, finanŃele bisericilor, educaŃia personalului de cult, a tinerilor 

şi copiilor, dreptul de a tipări Biblii şi literatură creştină, discriminările la care erau supuşi 

credincioşii la locurile de muncă iar copiii în cadrul şcolilor şi universităŃilor. O ultimă 

problemă abordată făcea referire la dreptul de a deschide noi biserici, precum şi la 

aprobarea de autorizaŃii pentru construcŃii noi sau reparaŃii 108 . 

Memoriul pastorului Vasile Taloş către preşedintele R.S.R. Nicolae Ceauşescu 

(1989) 

Un alt memoriu de protest adresat preşedintelui Ńării a fost scris de către pastorul 

Vasile Taloş în data de 11 decembrie 1989. Memoriul a fost votat de către Congresul 

Cultului Creştin Baptist din România în ziua de 12 decembrie 1989 şi depus la Consiliul 

de stat al R.S. România pe data de 13 decembrie 1989 109 . 

Prin intermediul memoriilor, baptiştii atrăgeau atenŃia autorităŃilor române asupra 

discriminărilor la care erau supuşi şi cereau recunoaşterea unor drepturi legale prevăzute 

în legislaŃia referitoare la culte. În plan extern baptiştii doreau să prezinte lumii libere 

realitatea persecuŃiilor la care erau supuşi credincioşii baptişti şi totodată diferenŃa dintre 

discursul oficial şi situaŃia concretă din Ńară. 

Anii ’80 sunt şi cei în care statul acordă dreptul baptiştilor să tipărească un număr 

limitat de Biblii în Ńară 110 . Astfel, deşi statul controla strict acest domeniu, credincioşii au 

reuşit să transmită valorile lor tinerei generaŃii, împreună cu un ghid de conduită morală 

chiar dacă de multe ori şi-au riscat viaŃa. 

CONCLUZII 

108 Ibidem, p. 305. 

109 Preambulul memoriului aducea la cuno tin a pre edintelui ării, Nicolae Ceau escu, ,,faptul 

că prin repetate încălcări ale prevederilor constitu ionale săvâr ite de anumite organe ale 

administra iei de stat, unele biserici baptiste şi anumi i credincio i bapti ti sunt văduvi i de 

garan ii practice în exercitarea cultului religios şi a libertă ii de con tiin ă.” Imixtiunile în 

via a cultului baptist semnalate de către acest memoriu au fost următoarele: 1.Nu to i 

credincio ii se bucură de dreptul de închinare, 2. Îngrădirea dreptului bisericilor de a- i alege 

i angaja personal duhovnicesc, 3.Imixtiunea Departamentului Cultelor în alegerea organelor de 

conducere ale Cultului, 4.Restric ii în privin a loca urilor de cult, 5.Limitări în ceea ce 

prive te dreptul de a tipări i procura literatură religioasă, 6. icanări ale credincio ilor 

bapti ti la locurile de muncă. Vasile Alexandru Talo , ,,Bapti tii i Ceau escu”, 

http://vasilealexandrutalos.wordpress.com/2008/01/17/baptistii-si-ceausescu/ (08.04.2010). 

Memoriul complet în Daniel Mitrofan, Pigmei i uria i. File din istoria persecutării 

bapti tilor, pp. 89-92. 

110 Acest lucru s-a realizat între anii 1984-1988, când pre edinte al Cultului era pastorul Hu anu 

Mihai iar secretar general pastorul Vasile Talpo , Denisa Bodeanu, Neoprotestan ii din 

Transilvania, p. 192. 

764

Analiza raporturilor dintre Stat şi Biserică constituie un demers necesar, însă cu multe 

faŃete care trebuiesc analizate. Prin intermediul studiului nostruam evidenŃiat doar 

modalităŃile şi mijloacele, folosite de către aceasta pentru a ieşi din strânsoarea 

ideologică. 

Prin intermediul memoriilor, a botezurilor, a continuării realizării de servicii religioase 

chiar şi atunci când acestea nu erau permise ca urmare a reglementării acestora, precum şi 

a celorlalte forme de protest şi ,,activităŃi bisericeşti făcute în ascuns” 111 , baptiştii 

atrăgeau atenŃia autorităŃilor române asupra discriminărilor la care erau supuşi şi cereau 

recunoaşterea unor drepturi legale prevăzute în legislaŃia referitoare la culte. 

Manifestările religioase se desfăşurau astfel într-un cadru limitat, în care, deşi 

constituŃiile garantau libertatea religioasă, statul ducea o politică militant ateistă 112 care 

avea ca obiectiv reducerea rolului religiei în spaŃiul public 113 . În fapt, era o aplicare a 

principiilor lui Lenin care milita ca religia să devină o chestiune privată şi nu una 

publică 114 . Aceste modalităŃi de contestare şi răspuns dovedesc faptul că în perioada 

comunistă nu s-a reuşit o subordonare a Bisericilor Creştine Baptiste faŃă de Stat. 

111 Alexa Popovici, Istoria bapti tilor din România 1856-1989, p. 753. 

112 „Comunismul afirmă că nu există Dumnezeu, şi nici Hristos”, Richard WurmbrandThe 

Wurmbrand Letters, Cross Publications, INC Pamona, California, 1967, p. 23. 

113 Via a religioasă din România, Edi ia a II-a, p. 11. 

114 Pentru mai multe detalii despre politica ateistă a regimului comunist a se vedea capitolul 1 din 

cadrul prezentei lucrări, unde analizăm în cadrul unui subcapitol propaganda ateistă i modul cum 

aceasta se desfă ura prin intermediul Societă ii pentru Răspândirea tiin ei i Culturii. 

765

BISERICA GRECO-CATOLICĂ DIN 

ROMÂNIA – DIFERITE FORME DE 

REZISTENłĂ ANTICOMUNISTĂ 

Sergiu STOICA 1 

Biserica Greco-catolică cu 1,5 milioane de credincioşi, a fost condamnată de 

comunism în decembrie 1948, deoarece episcopii şi preoŃii ei, nu au fost de acord cu 

noile schimbări ale regimului comunist. Refuzul semnării declaraŃiei a făcut ca ierarhii 

Bisericii Greco-Catolice şi preoŃii ei să fie arestaŃi. Această Biserica a funcŃionat în 

continuare în clandestinitate. În anul 1948 Biserica Greco-Catolică din Banat conform 

Anuarului Pontifical avea: 208 preoŃi. Din cei 208 preoŃi ai Episcopiei Greco-Catolice de 

Lugoj am identificat 39 de preoŃi care s-au opus trecerii la Biserica Ortodoxă. Aceste 

personalităŃi ale Bisericii Greco-Catolice în perioada 1948 – 1964 au avut un destin tragic 

şi o formă de rezistenŃă anticomunistă remarcabilă, au trecut prin 26 de locuri de detenŃie 

precum şi pe la Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră, Balta Brăilei şi Minele de plumb din 

Nordul łării. Majoritatea au început itinerariul în închisorile comuniste de la 

Penitenciarul Timişoara (22 de preoŃi). Alte locuri de deten ie au fost Penitenciarul 

Sighet, Gherla, Aiud, Oradea şi altele. Din anul 1964 au ajuns în domiciliu obligatoriu. 

Pe lângă aceşti preoŃi ai Bisericii Greco-Catolice, care au fost în închisorile comuniste, 

există un număr însemnat de preoŃi (57 preoŃi) care în perioada 1948 – 1989, s-a opus 

regimului comunist în diferite forme: au stat ascunşi, s-au angajat la diferite uzine, 

spitale, CAP, astfel au refuzat să accepte planurile regimului comunist, fiind o formă de 

rezistenŃă anticomunistă. O altă formă de rezistenŃă anticomunistă au făcut 32 de preoŃi 

care au fost pensionaŃi obligatoriu în toamna anului 1948. 

Lagărele de muncă, ca loc de detenŃie pentru preoŃii Bisericii Greco-Catolice, sunt 

puŃin cunoscute. Majoritatea studiilor referitoare la acest subiect au trat doar închisorile 

Sighet, Gherla, Aiud şi diferite Mănăstiri Ortodoxe în care ierarhi şi preoŃi greco-catolici 

erau în domiciliu obligatoriu. 

Prin lagărele de muncă, regimul comunist, a urmărit izolarea persoanelor care se 

opuneau regimului şi societăŃii comuniste. „Avantajele” lagărelor erau diverse: 

pedepsirea, reeducarea exterminarea persoanelor ce opuneau rezistenŃă, terorizarea 

populaŃiei, dar şi obŃinerea unei forŃe de muncă gratuite 2 . 

1 Institutul de Istorie „George BariŃiu” al Academiei Române, Cluj-Napoca, România. 

2 Dennis Deletant, România sub regimul comunist, Bucureşti, Edit. FundaŃia Academia Civică, 

2010, pag. 113. 

766

În România au funcŃionat în perioada 1945 – 1964 următoarele tipuri de lagăre: 

Lagărele de Internare, acestea au funcŃionat în perioada 1945 – 1947, în care exista „o 

libertate” şi munca nu era obligatorie; UnităŃile şi coloniile de muncă – acestea au fost 

înfiinŃare prin decretul 6 din anul 1950, iar prin HCM nr. 1554 din anul 1952 au fost 

transformate în colonii de muncă. Scopul acestora a fost izolarea, reeducarea şi 

exploatarea prin muncă. În aceste unităŃi regimul de detenŃie a fost unul de o duritate 

extremă. Muncile deŃinuŃilor au fost dificile (în mină, construcŃii de diguri, în deltă 

recoltatul stufului şi papurii), în timp ce alimentaŃia era insuficientă. Din această categorie 

fac parte: Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră, Minele din Nordul Ńării 3 şi Balta Brăilei. O altă 

categorie a acestor lagăre au fost Centrele de triere 4 în care deŃinuŃii urmau să fie trimişi 

la diferite lagăre din Ńară 5 , indiferent de zona geografică, se trimiteau deŃinuŃi în lagăre 

unde era nevoie de muncă fizică, fără a conta vârsta, sau specializarea deŃinuŃilor. 

În aceste lagăre, mai ales pe şantierele de la canal şi cele din Balta Brăilei, conducerea 

MAI a hotărât aducerea următoarelor categorii de deŃinuŃi: „... condamnaŃii pentru port 

ilegal de armă şi pentru trecerea frauduloasă a frontierei, cu pedepse de până la 12 ani, 

condamnaŃii cu pedepse de până la 10 ani pentru infracŃiuni politice cu uneltiri împotriva 

ordinii sociale, anume: răspândirea de zvonuri sau informaŃii false privitoare la situaŃia 

economică a Ńării, nemulŃumiri ale populaŃiei (art. 198 CP), instigarea locuitorilor de a se 

ridica contra ordinii constituŃionale şi sociale şi uneltire contra ordinii sociale (art. 207- 

209 CP), încercarea de a provoca răzvrătire (art. 210 CP), omisiunea denunŃării 

infracŃiunilor contra liniştii publice (art. 337 CP), strângerea, fabricarea, transportarea sau 

păstrarea în mod clandestin de arme, muniŃii de orice fel, maşini infernale în scop de a le 

întrebuinŃa el însuşi sau a le da făcătorilor de rele (art. 335-336 CP), răspândirea de 

publicaŃii interzise (art. 325 CP)” 6 . 

3 A se vedea Ştefan Bellu, Triunghiul morŃii Baia Sprie – Nistru – Cavnic 1950 – 1955, Târgu 

Lăpuş, Edit. Galaxia Gutenberg, 2009 şi Valeriu Achim, Aurel Ciolte, Triunghiul morŃii Baia 

Sprie, Cavnic, Nistru, 1950 – 1954, Baia Mare, Edit. Gutinul SRL, 2007. 

4 PreoŃii Greco-Catolici din Bant în Centre de Triere: C.T. Bucureşti şi C.T. Văcăreşti: Albu Vasile 

[Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Crişan Alexandru [Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Paveloniu Valer [Orăştie, 

Hunedoara]. 

5 Dic Ńi onarul penitenciarelor din România comunistă (1945-1967), pag. 58 

6 Marius Oprea, Banalitatea Răului. O istorie a securităŃii în documente. 1949-1989, Iaşi, Edit. 

Polirom, 2002, pp 105 – 106. 

767

768

PreoŃi ai Episcopiei de Lugoj în închisorile comuniste 

Denumirea închisorii lagărului Preotul 

Aiud Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Crişan Ioan 

Arad 

[Dragşina, Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Răsădeanu 

Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş], 

Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj]. 

Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Delya Grigore [Folia, Timiş], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Socol Ioan 

Borzeşti 

[Chizdia, Timiş], Toma Ioan (credincios greco-catolic) 

[Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Deheleanu Florea[Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga Axente 

[ParŃa, Timiş], Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], 

Patachi Enea [Petroman, Timiş]. 

Botoşani 

Balta Brăilei 

Delya Grigore [Folia, Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, 

Timiş]. 

Lagăre de muncă: Giurgeni Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Toma Ioan 


Ostrov Bele Ioan [Caransebeş]. 

Periprava Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Craşovan 

Ioan [Timişoara], Pecican Petru [Arad], Toma Ioan 


Salcia Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan Alexandru [Geoagiu 

Hunedoara], Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din 

Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Canalul Dunăre – Marea Neagră 

Lagăre de Capul Puni Emil [Deva], Puşcaşiu Virgil [Timişoara]. 

muncă: 

Midia 

Cernavodă Puni Emil [Deva]. 

Galeş Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Voştinaru 

769

Teodor[Lugoj]. 

Poarta Puni Emil [Deva], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj], Deheleanu 

Albă 

Florea [Clopodia, Timiş]. 

Valea Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Patachi Enea 

Neagră 

[Petroman, Timiş], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj]. 

Caransebeş Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], 

Silvăşan Trandafir [Ghelari, Hunedoara]. 

Cluj-Napoca Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Borda Vasile 

[Timişoara], Crişan Ioan [Dragşina, Timiş], Ghelner 

Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Ep. Ioan 


Codlea Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara]. 

C.T. Bucureşti Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Crişan 

Alexandru [Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Paveloniu Valer 

[Orăştie, Hunedoara]. 

C.T. Văcăreşti Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Crişan 

Alexandru [Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Paveloniu Valer 

[Orăştie, Hunedoara]ZasloŃi Corneliu [Lugoj]. 

Dej Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Ep. Ioan 


Deva Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Puni Emil 

[Deva], 

FormaŃiunea 0616 K 24 Ganga Axente [ParŃa, Timiş]. 

GalaŃi Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, Caraş- 

Severin], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş]. 

Gherla Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Bele Ioan 

[Caransebeş], Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, 

Hunedoara], Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Craşovan Ioan 

[Timişoara], Crişan Ioan [Dragşina, Timiş], Deheleanu 

Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Delya Grigore [Folia, 

Timiş], Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, 

Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan 

[Lugoj]. 

Jilava Ar Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Berinde 

Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Borda Vasile 


Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga Axente [ParŃa, 

Timiş], Pecican Petru [Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan 

[Lugoj], Puni Emil [Deva], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, 

Timiş], Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic din 

Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

Lugoj Ep. Ioan Bălan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], 

Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ep. Ioan 

Ploscaru [Lugoj], Sălăgean Dumitru [Lugoj], Tiut 

Vasile [Lugoj], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj]. 

M.A.I. Bucureşti Ep. Ioan Bălan [Lugoj], Berinde Daniel Ştefan 

[Petroşani, Hunedoara], Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj], 

770

Puşcaşiu Virgil [Timişoara]. 

Malmaison Ep. Ioan Ploscaru [Lugoj]. 

Oneşti Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Ganga Axente 

[ParŃa, Timiş], Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], 

Patachi Enea [Petroman, Timiş], Puşcaşiu Virgil 

[Timişoara]. 

Oradea Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], 

Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Delya 

Grigore [Folia, Timiş], Ghelner Traian [fiu de pr. Gr. 

Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, 

Timiş], Socol Ioan [Chizdia, Timiş]. 

Piteşti Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, Hunedoara], Ep. 

Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Satu Mare Suciu Petru [Hunedoara]. 

Sibiu Dumitru Neda [Nevrincea, Timiş]. 

Sighet Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Berinde Daniel Ştefan 

[Petroşani, Hunedoara], Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], 

Deliman Ioan [Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj], RaŃiu 

Iuliu [Timişoara], Sălăgean Dumitru [Lugoj], Tiut 

Vasile [Lugoj], Vezoc Iosif, [Lugoj]. 

Timişoara Albu Vasile [Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan 

[Caransebeş], Berinde Daniel Ştefan [Petroşani, 

Hunedoara], Borda Vasile [Timişoara], Craşovan Ioan 


Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Delya Grigore [Folia, 

Timiş], Ganga Axente [ParŃa, Timiş], Ghelner Traian 

[fiu de pr. Gr. Cat. din Păru, Timiş], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan 

[Lugoj], Patachi Enea [Petroman, Timiş], Puşcaşiu 

Virgil [Timişoara], RaŃiu Iuliu [Timişoara], Răsădeanu 

Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Sălăgean Dumitru [Lugoj], 

Vezoc Iosif [Lugoj], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj], Tiut 

Vasile [Lugoj], Toma Ioan [credincios greco-catolic 

din Vermeş, Caraş-Severin], ZasloŃi Corneliu [Lugoj]. 

Uranus Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Mănăstiri 

Dragoslavele Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Căldăruşani Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Brînzeu Nicolae 

[Lugoj], Deliman Ioan [Arad]RaŃiu Iuliu 

[Timişoara], Vezoc Iosif, [Lugoj]. 

Ciorogârla Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj]. 

Curtea de Argeş Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj] 

NeamŃ Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], Deliman Ioan 

[Arad]RaŃiu Iuliu [Timişoara], Vezoc Iosif, 

[Lugoj],Teglasiu Ladislau [Timişoara]. 

771

Domiciliu Obligatoriu Ep. Bălan Ioan [Lugoj], Brînzeu Nicolae [Lugoj], 

Răsădeanu Dimitrie [Icloda, Timiş], Pecican Petru 

[Arad], Ep. Ploscaru Ioan [Lugoj]. 

PreoŃi în lagărele de muncă comuniste 

În aceste lagăre de muncă au ajuns şi preoŃi greco-catolici din Banat, în diferite 

perioade de timp. La lagărele de muncă din Balta Brăilei au fost şase preoŃi: Armean 

Nicolae [Pricaz, Hunedoara], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Craşovan 

Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan Alexandru [Geoagiu, Hunedoara], Pecican Petru [Arad] şi Toma 

Ioan (credincios greco-catolic din Vermeş, Caraş-Severin). La Canalul Dunăre-Marea 

Neagră, în diferite colonii de muncă au fost şapte preoŃi ai Banatului: Albu Vasile 

[Lugoj], Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Deheleanu Florea [Clopodia, Timiş], Nistor Alexandru 

[Ostrov, Hunedoara], Puni Emil [Deva], Patachi Enea [Petroman, Timiş], Voştinaru 

Teodor [Lugoj] 7 . Pe lângă aceşti preoŃi greco-catolici din Banat au mai fost şi alŃi preoŃi 

greco-catolici din alte zone geografice ale Ńării 8 . 

Coloniile de muncă din Balta Brăilei 

Scopul acestor colonii de muncă, din Balta Brăilei, era pentru agricultură, în special 

construcŃii de diguri din pământ pentru desecarea terenurilor inundabile şi pentru 

recoltarea stufului şi a papurii. Coloniile din Balta Brăilei au fost: Băndoiu, Berteşti, C.A. 

Rosetti, Chilia Veche, Chitirica, Ciobanu, Cojocaru, Culmea, Dăeni, Demonstene-bac, 

Florica, Girondine-bac, Giurgeni, Gârliciu, Grădina, Grindu-Letea, Hârşova, LuminiŃa, 

Măcin, Maraşu, Ostrov, Paradina, Periprava, Piatra-FrecăŃei, Salcia, Saivane, Seimeni, 

Sfistoca, Stână, Stoeneşti, Strachina, Strâmba, Tătaru, Vlădeni 9 . 

În Coloniile de muncă din Balta Brăilei au fost şi preoŃi greco-catolici mai ales la: 

Giurgeni, Periprava şi Salcia. DeŃinuŃii din colonia Giurgeni 10 erau folosiŃi la munci 

agricole, îndiguiri, construcŃia podului de peste Dunăre de la Giurgeni, dar şi la recoltarea 

stufului. DeŃinuŃii politici de aici aveau un regim de muncă forŃată, ei fiind păziŃi de câini, 

7 Vezi Tabel: PreoŃi ai Episcopiei de Lugoj în închisorile comuniste. 

8 Cf. Biserica Întemnițată România 1944 - 1989, Institutul Național pentru Studiul 

Totalitarismului, Colecția Dicționare, Bucurețti, 1998, în lagărele de muncă din Balta Brăilei 

şi Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră, au fost preoŃii greco-catolici: Ambrozie Gheorghe, BacoŃiu 

Augustin [Cluj], Bălan Gavril [Maramureş], Cherteş Ioan [Cluj], Chindriş Ion [Maramureş], 

Cosmivici Horea [Tureatca], Crăciun Ion [Turda], Fanea Victor [Satu-Mare], Gligor Vasile 

[BistriŃa-Năsăud], Istrate Petru [Cluj], Marcu Gheorghe [Satu Mare], Mare Vasile [Buceşti], 

Miclea Teodor [Satu Mare], Mureşan Gheorghe [Cluj], Onofrei Pompei [Sibiu], Păcurar Remus 

[Maramureş], Radu Ioan [Alba], RaŃă Ion (Tarciziu) [Maramureş], RaŃiu Ioan [Maramureş], 

Tătaru Augustin [BistriŃa], Tomoioagă Vasile [Maramureş]. 

9 Ioan Bălan, Regimul ConcentraŃionar din România 1945 – 1964, Bucureşti, Edit. FundaŃia 

Academia Civică, Biblioteca Sighet 12, 2000, pag. 104. 

10 PreoŃi Greco-Catolici din Banat la Lagărul de muncă Giurgeni: Armean Nicolae [Pricaz, 

Hunedoara], Toma Ioan (credincios greco-catolic) [Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

772

dresaŃi special să îi atace dacă se prăbuşeau la pământ sau dacă încercau să se odihnească, 

mâncarea şi apa în această colonie erau foarte proaste, „setea era chinuitoare” deŃinuŃii au 

băut apă din Dunăre sau din bălŃile de pe teren. Persoanele decedate, din acest lagăr, erau 

zidite în diguri, sau erau lăsate pradă şobolanilor 11 . În lagărul de la Giurgeni o activitate 

foarte grea a fost munca la orezărie. Această muncă începea la ora 6 şi se termina la ora 

18, în tot acest timp deŃinuŃii erau obligaŃi să stea tot timpul în apă 12 . DeŃinuŃii erau bătuŃi 

dacă „înecau orezul”, comandatul acestei colonii în perioada 1960 – 1962 Alexandru 

Dumitru IoaniŃescu afirma că: „puşcăriaşii înecau orezul intenŃionat, aşa că mai primeau 

o altoială” 13 . 

Lagărul de muncă Periprava, tot din Balta Brăilei, deŃinuŃii politici au muncit vara la 

creşterea animalelor şi în agricultură, iar iarna la recoltarea stufului. Numărul deŃinuŃilor, 

de aici, variază de la an la an în funcŃie de transferurile făcute de la o colonie la alta. În 

anul 1957 erau 2.400 de deŃinuŃi, în 1959 erau 1800, în 1962 numărul deŃinuŃilor era de 

3.255 14 , preoŃii greco-catolici din Episcopia Lugojeană ce au fost în această colonie de 

muncă sunt: Bălan Ştefan [Lugoj], Bele Ioan [Caransebeş], Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], 

Pecican Petru [Arad], Toma Ioan (credincios greco-catolic) [Vermeş, Caraş-Severin] 15 . 

În această colonie deŃinuŃii sufereau de frig, foame, bătăi zilnice, dar şi de norme de 

muncă imposibil de realizat. Conform mărturiilor la Periprava mureau în fiecare noapte 

doi sau trei deŃinuŃi, care erau îngropaŃi în gropi comune 16 . 

Un alt lagăr de muncă, tot din Balta Brăilei, în care au fost preoŃi greco-catolici din 

Banat 17 a fost Salcia. Scopul acestui lagăr de muncă a fost de a ridica un dig pentru 

protejarea BălŃi Brăilei de inundaŃiile Dunării. Aici deŃinuŃii munceau la creşterea 

animalelor, în agricultură, la recoltarea stufului şi a papurii, dar cea mai istovitoare muncă 

era construirea digului, normele pe zi au fost de 3 m³ pe zi pentru un deŃinut, iar munca 

pentru cărarea pământului se făcea cu roaba, târnăcopul şi cazmaua 18 . 

Aici normele erau imposibil de realizat, neîndeplinirea lor era pedepsită prin bătaie. La 

sfârşitul zilei, deŃinuŃii care nu au realizat norma se aşezau la uşa comandatului în 

aşteptarea bătăilor. Cu aceste excese de violenŃă administraŃia a ajuns să pedepsească cu 

izolarea la carceră chiar şi morŃii. „DeŃinutul Cozma după ce a murit s-a constatat că nu 

11 Cicerone IoniŃoiu, Morminte fără cruce. ContribuŃii la cronica rezistenŃei româneşti împotriva 

dictaturii, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/morminte3/ (30 ianuarie 

2012). 

12 Ibidem. 

13 TorŃionar şi deŃinut: mărturii în oglinda din lagărul comunist, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/dezbateri/tortionar-si-detinut-marturii-in-oglinda-dinlagarul-comunist-157241-main_pic1.html, 

(28 ianuarie 2012). 

14 Dic Ńi onarul penitenciarelor din România comunistă (1945-1967), pag. 140. 

15 Vezi tabel: PreoŃi ai Episcopiei de Lugoj în închisorile comuniste. 

16 Octavian Onea, Închisoare fără condamnare: caruselul puşcăriilor Convorbiri cu prof. Ion 

Mihăescu, în Memoria revista gândirii arestate, nr. 3-4, 2010, pag. 174. 

17 PreoŃi Greco-Catolici din Banat: Craşovan Ioan [Timişoara], Crişan Alexandru [Geoagiu 

Hunedoara], Toma Ioan (credincios greco-catolic) [Vermeş, Caraş-Severin]. 

18 DicŃionarul penitenciarelor din România comunistă (1945-1967), pag. 142. 

773

făcuse carceră în timpul vieŃii, astfel a fost introdus la carceră, DimineaŃa s-a constatat 

când a fost scos de la carceră că şobolanii îi mâncaseră urechile, nasul şi organul 

genital” 19 . 

La Salcia, la sfârşitul anului 1959, au murit doi deŃinuŃi pe zi majoritatea bărbaŃi cu 

vârsta de aproximativ 50 de ani, consideraŃi sănătoşi şi apŃi de muncă de comisiile 

Ministerul de Interne. Aceste decese au avut loc datorită muncii neîntrerupte, hranei 

precare, lipsa oricărei îngrijiri medicale, violenŃele aplicate deŃinuŃilor. Sicriele 

decedaŃilor erau confecŃionate din scândurile cutiilor de marmeladă, iar în dreptul 

pieptului a fost lăsată o gaură prin care un „reprezentant” al administraŃiei înfigea un 

piron pentru a se convinge că decedatul nu a „simulat” 20 . Mormintele celor decedaŃi aici 

sunt necunoscute. 

Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră 

Începerea lucrărilor pe teren la canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră s-au produs în 15 iulie 

1949. Acest canal acoperea un traseu cu o lungime între 65 – 70 de kilometri: Valea 

Carasu, Cernavodă, Poarta Albă, dealul Nazarcea, Capul Midia ajungând în Marea 

Neagră. Pe acest traseu au fost amplasate lagăre de muncă: Capul Midia, Columbia 

(Cernavodă), Galeş (Coasta Galeş), Kilometrul 5, Kilometrul 31, Noua culme (Culme 9), 

Peninsula (Valea Neagră), Poarta Albă, Saligny, Taşaul; şi lagăre auxiliare: Basarabi, 

Castelu, Medgidia, Năvodari, şi Seimeni 21 . 

ConstrucŃia acestui canal a fost pentru Statul comunist prilejul de a lichida elitele Ńării, 

Ana Pauker afirmase: „Canalul se construieşte fără burghezie şi împotriva ei” 22 . La 

început construcŃia Canalului s-a făcut cu mijloace rudimentare. În lagăre, munca consta 

în lucrări de excavaŃii (cu lopata), transportul pământului (cu roaba), sfărâmarea pietrei 

(cu barosul), construirea căilor ferate, barăci (pentru deŃinuŃi), clădiri (pentru 

administraŃie), utilajele mecanice destinate Canalului au fost foarte puŃine 23 . 

La Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră au fost PreoŃi Greco-Catolici 24 în detenŃie la lagărul 

Peninsula, sau Valea Neagră cum mai este denumit. Penitenciarul Peninsula s-a înfiinŃat 

în anul 1949 pentru lucrările de la Canal. Anul 1954 a adus desființarea penitenciarului, 

19Alexandru Mihalcea, Piteşti şi Salcia, două feŃe ale răului, în Memoria revista gândirii arestate, 

nr. 3-4, 2008, pag. 71. 

20 Ibidem. 

21 Comisia PrezidenŃială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, Raport final, 2006, p. 

256, accesibil online la adresa 

http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf, (19 ianuarie 2012). 

22 Această afirmaŃie a apărut şi în ziarul oficial al canalului: Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră, 

organ de presă al comitetului de partid şi al DirecŃiei Generale a Canalului, primul număr, 3 

septembrie 1949. 

23 Adrian Oprescu, Vărul Alexandru şi alte povestiri adevărate, Bucureşti, Edit. Humanitas, 

ColecŃia Memorii Jurnale, 2008, pag 215. 

24 PreoŃi Greco-Catolici din Banat: Nistor Alexandru [Ostrov, Hunedoara], Patachi Enea 

[Petroman, Timiş], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj]. 

774

dar a fost reînființat în anul 1955. Clădirile acestui lagăr la început erau construite din 

scânduri şi stuf, ulterior înlocuite de construcŃii din cărămidă efectuate de deŃinuŃi 25 . 

Programul în Valea Neagră sau Peninsula începea la ora 3.30 dimineaŃa cu apelul, 

mâncarea de dimineaŃă, şi mersul la muncă. În acest lagăr deŃinuŃii dormeau uneori chiar 

sub cerul liber. DeŃinuŃii, majoritatea deŃinuŃi politici, cei de drept comun erau foarte 

puŃini, au lucrat la construirea şi întreŃinerea căii ferate, construcŃia unei şosele între 

Valea Neagră şi Peninsula, construirea a trei garaje auto, construirea fabricii de cărămidă 

din Mamaia Sat şi din anul 1950 deŃinuŃii au spart piatră pentru construcŃia stadionului 

din ConstanŃa şi prestarea de munci agricole 26 . 

Aici s-a produs un crud experiment – „reeducarea”. Reeducarea deŃinuŃilor a început 

la Suceava, a continuat la Piteşti 27 , apoi în diferite penitenciare din Ńară la Gherla, Aiud 

dar şi la Peninsula 28 . Aici reeducarea deŃinuŃilor nu a funcŃionat, deŃinuŃii veniŃi de la 

Piteşti nu au avut condiŃii de izolare totală, deŃinuŃii peste zi mergeau la muncă, aveau 

contacte cu alŃi colegi îi avertizau, studenŃii s-au ocupat de reeducare în barăcile 13 şi 14. 

Bătăile din aceste barăci erau acoperite cu sunetele unor instrumente muzicale, în urma 

torturilor muribunzii erau stivuiŃi ca lemnele în pădure, victimele erau obligate să 

vorbească cu morŃii, să mănânce fecale, să se bată, să cânte în timpul torturii. Una din 

multele metode de tortură de la reeducarea din lagărul Peninsula era „broasca”. Întors de 

la muncă, deŃinutul era obligat să Ńopăie în poziŃia pe vine, cu mâinile în şolduri cu un alt 

deŃinut Ńinut în spate 29 . 

În acest lagăr de exterminare pe lângă muncile grele efectuate manual, cazarea şi 

hrana deŃinuŃilor tot timpul insuficientă, s-a mai adăugat torturile reeducării. În acest lagăr 

numai în luna ianuarie 1953 au decedat 46 de deŃinuŃi, aceştia erau transportaŃi noaptea în 

cimitirul comunei , unde gropile erau săpate de preoŃii deŃinuŃi. 

Un alt lagăr de la Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră în care au fost preoŃi Greco-Catolici 

din Banat a fost Poarta Alba 30 . Poarta Alba ca întindere şi efectiv, aici erau întemniŃaŃi 

atât deŃinuŃi politici cât şi deŃinuŃi de drept comun, era cea mai mare colonie de muncă de 

la Canal. Aceasta s-a înfiinŃat în iulie 1949 cu denumirea Colonia de muncă nr. 2 Poarta 

25 Marinel Marin Stănescu, Genocid în lagărele primului Canal Dunăre-Marea Neagră, în 

Memoria revista gândirii arestate, nr. 1-2, 2009, pag. 51. 

26 DicŃionarul penitenciarelor din România comunistă (1945-1967), pag. 234. 

27 A se vedea: Nicolae Călinescu, Sisteme şi procese de brainwashing în România comunistă, 

Iaşi, Edit. Gama, 1998, idem Virgil Iernuca, Fenomenul Piteşti, Bucureşti, Edit. Humanitas, 

1990. 

28 Alin Mureşan, Piteşti Cronica unei sinucideri asistate, Iaşi, Edit. Polirom, ediŃia a II-a, 

Institutul de Investigarea Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, 2010, pag. 

127. 




30 PreoŃi Greco-Catolici din Banat: Puni Emil [Deva], Voştinaru Teodor [Lugoj], Deheleanu 

Florea [Clopodia, Timiş]. 

775

Albă. În această colonie de muncă erau conform Raportului Final 12.000 deŃinuŃi în anul 

1952 31 . 

Ca şi în alte colonii de muncă şi la Poarta Alba programul începea la ora 3.30, urmat 

de spălare, aliniere apel şi masa. În timpul marşului spre locul de muncă deŃinuŃii erau 

obligaŃi să cânte pentru o mai rapidă „reeducare”, de fapt cântecele erau lozinci despre 

Canal 32 . 

Munca pe zi la Poarta Albă era de 2,1 m³ pentru o persoană norma zilnică. Dar a fost 

ridicată datorită întrecerilor socialiste la 3,63 m³ pe persoană norma zilnică. Normele 

acestea erau foarte mari, deŃinuŃii nu reuşeau să le îndeplinească decât foarte rar. Datorită 

regimului şi datorită acestor norme la Poarta Albă au avut loc sinucideri, în multe cazuri 

prin spânzurare, dar şi cazuri în care deŃinuŃii alergau spre sârma ghimpată pentru a 

evada, dar ştiau că vor fi împuşcaŃi. MorŃii din această colonie erau depuşi în lăzi de 

lemn, dezbrăcaŃi, uneori chiar şi doi decedaŃi într-o ladă. Cei decedaŃi erau îngropaŃi doar 

noaptea. Unul dinte sergenŃii coloniei, „verifica” personal decesul înfigând o Ńeapă în 

pieptul cadavrului, astfel s-a asigurat că nimeni nu i s-a substituit decesului cu scopul de a 

evada, acest procedeu s-a petrecut şi în lagărul Salcia 33 . 

Poarta Albă a rămas unul din numeroasele locuri ale regimului comunist înfiinŃat 

împotriva cetățenilor pentru a extermina orice rezistenŃă. 

Lucrările de la Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră s-au sistat, aşa cum au început, prin 

sugestia sovietică, resursele financiare costisitoare, alocate Canalului, urmau să fie cedate 

agriculturii, industriei alimentare textile de încălŃăminte şi locale 34 . 

Detaliu. PreoŃi în Lagăre de muncă 

Emil Puni - Vicar General al Episcopiei Greco-catolice de Lugoj şi fost provincial 

iezuit 

“ Nu trebuie să avem teamă de nimeni, doar de Domnul” 35 

Emil Puni – personalitate marcantă a Bisericii Greco-Catolice din Banat şi tot odată 

personalitate a SocietăŃii lui Isus (Ordinul Iezuit) din România, s-a născut în 23 august 

1916, în Comuna Herghelia, lângă Târgu Mureş 36 . A intrat în noviciatul IezuiŃilor în 1936 




32 Andrei Ciurunga, Poemele cumplitului Canal (1950 – 1964). Literatura de după sârma 

ghimpată, în Memoria, nr. 17, 1999, pp. 34 – 56. 

33 Constantin Cesianu, Salvat din Infern, (traducere din limba franceză Maria Alexe), Bucureşti, 

Edit. Humanitas, 1992, pag. 217. 

34 Stelian Tănase, Elite şi societate Guvernarea Gheorghiu Dej 1948 – 1965. Bucureşti, Edit. 

Humanitas, 2006, pag. 110. 

35 Maximă a Preotului Emil Puni. 

36 Fişa Matricolă Penală, Puni Emil, Penitenciarul Deva, nr. dosarului personal 520, 11 Iulie 1954, 

accesibil online la adresa: http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro; 

http://86.125.17.36/Fise%20matricole%20penale%20- 

776

la Toteşti (Hunedoara), unde era mănăstire a acestui ordin şi loc de pelerinaj pentru 

credincioşi Greco-Catolici din Episcopia de Lugoj 37 . 

La Toteşti, Emil Puni a stat timp de 2 ani, după care, între anii 1938 – 1945 a plecat în 

Olanda, unde a petrecut 7 ani studiind teologia şi filozofia. În această perioadă a studiilor 

a fost hirotonit preot celibatar, în anul 1943. După terminarea studiilor olandeze a fost un 

an în Belgia (1946), pentru formarea spirituală. A început activitatea pastorală la Roma 

de unde în anul 1947 se va întoarce în România 38 . 

Întors în România, deja comunistă, Preotul Emil Puni s-a ocupat de predarea religiei la 

un liceu Greco-Catolic din Bucureşti. Aici a stat la comunitatea iezuiŃilor din Bucureşti. 

Biserica Greco Catolică din România a fost desfiinŃată în decembrie 1948, dar Preotul 

Emil Puni a refuzat să îşi încheie activitatea pastorală şi a continuat-o în clandestinitate, 

până în momentul când a fost arestat. În fişa matricolă penală nu se specifică motivul 

reŃinerii, nu este judecat şi nu are nici o sentinŃă judecătorească de condamnare. Este 

internat de D.G.S.S. Hunedoara la data de 2 octombrie 1951 cu ordinul nr. 

8/419383/1951 39 . 

Următoarea fişă matricolă penală nr. 8332, a Preotului Emil Puni este făcută la Capul 

Midia în 27 decembrie 1954. În această fişă este scrisă şi durata internării de 24 de luni la 

care s-a mai adăugat 12 luni. De la Capul Midia a mai fost la Cernavodă, Poartă Albă – 

Canalul Dunăre Marea Neagră 40 . 

A fost eliberat din închisorile şi lagărele comuniste în 27 decembrie 1954. O vreme a 

stat la Deva şi a prestat diferite munci pentru a se putea întreŃine, lucrând într-o echipă de 

topografi, brancardier într-o ambulanŃă a spitalului din Deva şi telefonist la acelaşi spital. 

În toată această perioadă şi-a continuat activitatea spirituală, în secret a celebrat Sfânta 

Liturghie şi a desfăşurat activităŃi pastorale pentru a menŃine vie credinŃa credincioşilor 

greco-catolici şi nu numai. În anul 1958 va fi numit Vice-provincial al iezuiŃilor, care 

trăiau în clandestinitate, iar din anul 1967 va fi numit Provincialul SocietăŃii lui Isus 

pentru România până în anul 1995 41 . 

%20detinuti%20politici/P/P%2015.%20Predaes%20-%20Puznava/Puni%20Emil/index.php (05 

ianuarie 2012). 

37 Sionul Românesc, Anul XXIV, 10 August 1935 Nr. 15, pp. 64 – 69. 

38 Olivo Bosa SJ, Întoarcere la Casa Tatălui Preotului Iezuit Emil Puni, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.bru.ro/lugoj/intoarcerea-la-casa-tatalui-a-preotului-iezuit-emil-puni/ (05 ianuarie 

2012). 

39 Fişa Matricolă Penală, Puni Emil, nr. matricol 2212, Penitenciarul Jilava, 8 octombrie 1951, 

accesibil online la adresa: http://86.125.17.36/Fise%20matricole%20penale%20- 

%20detinuti%20politici/P/P%2015. %20Predaes %20-%20Puznava/Puni%20Emil/index.php, 

(05 ianuarie 2012). 

40 Fişa Matricolă Penală, Puni Emil, nr. matricol 8332, Unitatea Capul Midia, 27 decembrie 1954, 


%20detinuti%20politici/P /P%2015.%20Predaes%20-%20Puznava/Puni%20Emil/index.php, (05 


41 Olivo Bosa SJ, Întoarcere la Casa Tatălui Preotului Iezuit Emil Puni, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.bru.ro/lugoj/intoarcerea-la-casa-tatalui-a-preotului-iezuit-emil-puni/ (05 ianuarie 

2012). 

777

Este remarcabil curajul şi devotamentul lui Emil Puni faŃă de Preotul iezuit Ioan 

Lazăr. Acest preot a mers la Domnul în 25 mai 1989, iar în testamentul său îşi exprima 

dorinŃa ca înmormântarea lui să nu fie celebrată de preoŃi necatolici. AutorităŃile 

comuniste (cu rezistentă) au acceptat să fie înmormântat numai de un preot romanocatolic. 

Emil Puni a protestat vehement, spunând că voinŃa familiei este să fie 

înmormântat de un preot greco-catolic. Imediat l-a anuŃat pe Episcopul Alexandru Todea, 

care a venit la înmormântare cu mulŃi preoŃi, la care s-au adăugat şi mulŃi preoŃi din zonă. 

Ceremonialul înmormântării a fost condus de Episcopul Alexandru Todea. Astfel, Preotul 

Ioan Lazăr a fost dus pe ultimul său drum de preoŃi greco-catolici, datorită perseverenŃei 

şi curajul Preotului Iezuit Puni 42 . 

După evenimentele din 1989 din România, Biserica Română Unită a fost repusă în 

drepturi. Emil Puni a fost numit Vicar Episcopal al Episcopiei de Lugoj 43 . S-a ocupat de 

revigorarea Ordinului Iezuit din România, a fondat AsociaŃia medicilor catolici din 

România, a condus pentru o perioadă scurtă Seminarul Greco-Catolic din Blaj. Tot în 

această perioadă a iniŃiat construcŃia unei Biserici Greco-Catolice în Deva. 

Preotul Emil Puni a fost o personalitate foarte complexă: îndrumător spiritual şi 

duhovnic, scriitor, traducător. La toate acestea se adaugă construirea bisericii grecocatolice 

din Deva, care a fost sfin ită pe 28 septembrie 2002, Din anul 2002, în fiecare 

an, parohia din Deva îşi sărbătoreşte hramul: Imaculata ConcepŃie 44 . 

La venerabila vârstă de 92 de ani Preotul Iezuit Emil Puni, Vicar General Emerit al 

Episcopiei Greco-catolice de Lugoj, a mers la Domnul în 5 martie 2008, în urma unui 

infarct cardiac 45 . 

Itinerariul Preotului Emil Puni în temniŃele şi lagărele comuniste 46 : 

42 *** În amintirea Pr. Ioan Lazăr, iezuit şi preot greco-catolic: la 20 de ani de la moarte, 

accesibil online la adresa: http://www.bru.ro/maramures/in-amintirea-pr-ioan-lazar/, (05 ianuarie 

2012). 

43 Arh. Ep. Greco-Catolice de Lugoj, Fond Ioan Ploscaru, Episcopia Română Unită – Lugoj, nr. 

339.a/1990, Episcopul Ioan Ploscaru trimite o scrisoare Prea Cuvioşiei Sale Emil Puni: „Fiind 

Dieceza Română Unită de Lugoj foarte extinsă, pentru a nu mă deplasa pe distanŃe mari, am 

convenit verbal cu Preacuvioşia Ta să fi vicar general al acestei Episcopii în special pentru judeŃul 

Hunedoara, în care am avut patru protopopiate. În consecinŃă, prin prezenta Te numesc şi în scris 

Vicar General al Diecezei de Lugoj pentru a rezolva, ca un adevărat ordinariu toate problemele ce 

privesc această Dieceză. Prezenta scrisoare Ńi-am eliberat-o pentru a-Ńi servi la necesitate. 

Implorând binecuvântarea lui Dumnezeu pentru tot ce vei întreprinde, rămân al Precuvioşiei Tale 

în Hristos frate”. Lugoj, 5 iulie 1990. 

44 S-a obişnuit şi convenit de către Preotul Emil Puni SJ – ca la sărbătoarea de hram să predice un 

preot străin (din altă localitate), iar sărbătoarea să se Ńină în ziua de duminică, indiferent de ziua în 

care ar cădea această sărbătoare. 

45 Arhiva Episcopiei Greco-Catolice Lugoj, Act de deces, Preot Emil Puni. 

46 Fişa Matricolă Penală, Puni Emil, nr. matricol 8332, Unitatea Capul Midia, 27 decembrie 1954, 


%20detinuti%20politici/P/P%2015.%20Predaes%20-%20Puznava/Puni%20Emil/index.php, (05 


778

• Este internat de D.G.S.S. Hunedoara la data de 2 octombrie 1951 cu ordinul nr. 

8/419383/1951. 

• Penitenciarul Deva: 2 octombrie 1951 – 8 octombrie 1951. 

• Penitenciarul Jilava: 8 octombrie 1951 – 20 iunie 1953. 

• Lagărul Capul Midia: 20 iunie 1953 – 26 septembrie 1953. 

• Lagărul Cernavodă 3: 26 septembrie 1953 – 18 iunie 1954. 

• Lagărul Poartă Albă: 18 iunie 1954 – 12 octombrie 1954. 

• Penitenciarul Deva: 12 octombrie 1954 – 27 decembrie 1954. 

• Eliberat: 27 decembrie 1954, nr. ordinului 23162 din 1954. 

Preotul Teodor Vostinaru – Canonic 

Preotul Teodor Voştinaru s-a născut la Minişul de Sus, judeŃul Arad, pe data de 10 

septembrie 1910, părinŃii au fost Teodor şi Elisabeta. Teodor Voştinaru a fost preot la 

Lugoj. 

Clasele primare le-a urmat la Şcoala Confesională greco-catolică din Şiria. Unchiul 

său, Protopopul Aradului, Gheorghe Voştinar Bulzan, a remarcat calităŃile intelectuale ale 

nepotului şi la preluat sub oblăduirea sa. Teodor Voştinaru a fost trimis împreună cu 

Silviu Voştinar (fiul Protopopului), la Liceul – Samuil Vulcan din Beiuş. Protopopul 

Aradului, Gheorghe Voştinar Bulzan, îl pregăteşte pentru învăŃământul universitar 

deoarece a vrut să-l aibă ca urmaş, mai ales că fiul său Silviu a decedat 47 . 

Teodor Voştinaru a urmat cursurile Institutului „De Propaganda Fidae”, de la Roma, 

unde a obŃinut licenŃa în teologie în anul 1934. Reîntors acasă a devenit protopop în Arad. 

CâŃiva ani mai târziu, în aul 1941, obŃine titlul de doctor în drept canonic tot la Roma 48 . 

Conform fişei matricole Penale nr. 3394 49 este înmatriculat la data de 12 februarie 

1950, în penitenciarul Aiud; a fost ridicat de Securitate 50 în anul 1949. Teodor Voştinaru 

este judecat de Tribunalul Militar Bucureşti şi a primit o condamnare de 10 ani de 

temniŃă. 

Preotul Teodor Voştinaru a trecut prin următoarele locuri de detenŃie: Timişoara, 

Aiud; Lagărele: Poarta Albă, Valea Neagră, Galeş. A fost eliberat în 19 februarie 1953 cu 

ordinul nr. 19100 din 1953. 

După eliberare, reîntorcându-se în viaŃa civilă, cu sănătatea zdruncinată, a fost nevoit 

să se pensioneze pe motiv de boală. Deşi oarecum liber, a avut în continuare de suferit, 

deoarece era îndeaproape supravegheat de organele de represiune. Ca pensionar, a cules 

date istorice legate de cetatea Şiriei, despre locuitori, ocupaŃii şi tradiŃiile acestei 

localităŃi, pe care a reuşit să le adune în manuscrisul „Monografia comunei Şiria”, lucrare 

47 Pavel Orb, Protopop canonic, dr. Teodor Voştinar (1909-1982), accesibil online la adresa: 

http://actualitateasiriana.ro/protopop-canonic-dr-teodor-vostinar1909-1982/ (21 mai 2011). 

48 Ibidem. 

49 Fişa Matricolă Penală, Voştinaru Teodor, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/V/V%2004.%20Vlaisan%20- 

%20Vutulescu/Vostinariu%20Teodor%20T/index.php, (27 decembrie 2011). 

50 Fişa Matricolă Penală a lui Voştinaru Teodor nu oferă mai multe detalii. 

779

care a văzut lumina tiparului, după moartea sa, ea fiind lansată de către fratele sau Ing. 

George Voştinaru în anul 1996. 

Prin intermediul cărŃii, autorul se adresează tinerilor localnici: „să-şi pironească 

privirea asupra comunei natale a cărui trecut este bogat în oameni vrednici şi fapte 

mari…o mai bună cunoaştere şi preŃuire a trecutului Şiriei îmi vor fi destulă răsplată” 51 . 

Canonicul Teodor Voştinaru a încet din viaŃă în anul 1982, în etate de 82 de ani. 

Osemintele sale se află în cimitirul din Timişoara. 

Itinerarul preotului Teodor Voştinaru în închisorile comuniste 52 : 

• Arestat în anul 1949. 

• Penitenciarul Lugoj: 1949. 

• Penitenciarul Timişoara: 1949. 

• Penitenciarul Aiud: 12 februarie 1950. 

• Lagărul de muncă Poarta Albă: 1952. 

• Lagărul de muncă Valea Neagră: 1952. 

• Lagărul de muncă Galeş: 1952 – 1953. 

• Penitenciarul Timişoara: 1953. 

• Eliberat: în 19 februarie 1953, ordinul nr. 19100 din 1953 53 . 

Lucrare publicată a Canonicului Teodor Voştinaru: Monografia Comunei Şiria, Arad, 

Editura FundaŃia Culturală „Ioan Slavici”, 1996, coautor Voştinaru George. 

Preotul Albu Vasile 

Preotul Vasile Albu s-a născut în comuna Firiza de Sus, judeŃul Satu Mare, la data de 

18 ianuarie 1907, din părinŃii Rozalia şi Vasile. După hirotonire a primit parohia Fârliug 

din judeŃul Caras-Severin 54 . 

Din Fişa matricolă penală 55 nr. 4538, scrisă la Unitatea C. T. 56 Văcăreşti, aflăm că a 

fost reŃinut la data de 21 decembrie 1950 de către DirecŃia Regională de Securitate 

Timişoara, pentru durata de 24 de luni, cu începere din 1 martie 1951 până la 1 martie 

1953. Următoarea fişă matricolă penală completată în Lagărul Galeş, observăm că în 27 

martie 1953 este transferat la acest lagăr, cu toate că în prima fişă matricolă penală, scria 

51 

Cf. Teodor Voştinaru, (autor secundar Voştinaru George), Monografia Comunei Şiria, Arad, 

Editura FundaŃia Culturală „Ioan Slavici”, 1996, 

52 

Fişa Matricolă Penală, Voştinaru Teodor, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/V/V%2004.%20Vlaisan%20- 

%20Vutulescu/Vostinariu%20Teodor%20T/index.php, (27 decembrie 2011). 

53 

Fişa matricolă Penală a Preotului Teodor Voştinaru nu oferă date concludente asupra datelor de 

transfer dintr-un penitenciar în altul. 

54 

Sionul Românesc, anul XVII, Lugoj, 15 decembrie 1930, nr. 23 – 24, pag. 96. 

55 

Fişa matricolă penală Albu Vasile a fost întocmită de Elev Iliescu Marin. 

56 Centru de triere. 

780

ca în martie 1953 îi expiră pedeapsa. Preotul Vasile Albu a fost transferat la acest lagăr 

prin ordinul Ministerului SecurităŃii Statului nr. 023132 / 29 februarie 1953. În Lagărul 

Galeş a stat 5 luni până la data de 28 august 1953, dată la care a fost transferat la 

C.T.B. 57 , prin hotărârea judecătorească nr. 206628 din 1953, apoi se pare eliberat 58 . 

Itinerarul preotului Vasile Albu în închisorile comuniste 59 : 

• Arestat 21 decembrie 1950 la Timişoara 

• C.T. Văcăreşti 

• Lagărul Galeş: 27 martie 1953 – 14 august 1953 

• C.T. Bucureşti: 14 august 1953 – 28 august 1953 

• Eliberat prin ordinul DLCN 60 nr. 0219659 din 1953. 

Preotul Ştefan Bălan 

Preotul Ştefan Bălan s-a născut în Teiuş judeŃul Alba, la data de 22 octombrie 1907, 

din părinŃii Traian şi Valeria, studiile le-a făcut la Blaj 61 . La data reŃinerii era preot 

celibatar în Lugoj, cu studii de teologie la Strasbourg, fără avere şi apolitic. Ştefan Bălan 

a fost reŃinut prin ordinul 218 din 21 decembrie 1950. Conform fişei matricole penale nr. 

4539 62 îl găsim la Centrul de Triere Văcăreşti, iar apoi la Lagărul Galeş. Este reŃinut de 

Ministerul SecurităŃii Statului Timişoara timp de 24 de luni cu începerea pedepsei din 1 

martie 1951 până la 1 martie 1953. După expirarea perioadei de detenŃie în 1 martie 1953 

estre transferat, la data de 27 martie 1953, la Lagărul Galeş. A fost eliberat de Ministerul 

SecurităŃii Statului de la Lagărul Galeş prin ordinul nr. 0612059/53 conform hotărârii 

judecătoreşti nr. 206629/1953, la data de 14 septembrie 1953, de la lagărul Galeş a fost 

transferat la Centrul de Triere Bucureşti în 28 august 1953, apoi eliberat 63 . 

Itinerarul preotului Ştefan Bălan în închisorile comuniste 64 : 

• Arestat prin ordinul nr. 218/950, în 21 decembrie 1950. 

• Penitenciarul Timişoara: 21 decembrie 1950. 

• C. T. Văcăreşti. 

57 Centrul de Triere Bucureşti. 

58 Fisă matricolă penală, Albu Vasile, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/A/A%2001.%20Ababei%20- 

%20Alexoaie/Albu%20Vasile%20V/index.php, (6 ianuarie 2012). 

59 Ibidem. 

60 D.L.C.M. – DirecŃia Lagăre şi Colonii de Muncă 

61 Cornel Sigmirean, Intelectualitatea ecleziastică PreoŃii Blajului (1806 – 1948), Târgu-Mureş, 

Edit. UnivrsităŃii Petru Maior, 2007, p. 263. 

62 Fişă matricolă penală, Ştefan Bălan, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/B/B%2002.%20Balan%20- 

%20Barbot/Balan%20Stefan%20T/index.php, (5 ianuarie 2012). 

63 Ibidem. 

64 Ibidem. 

781

• Lagărul Periprava: 27 martie 1953. 

• Lagărul Galeş: 27 martie 1953 – 28 august 1953. 

• C. T. Bucureşti: 28 august 1953. 

• Eliberat: 28 august 1953 65 . 

Preotul Petru Pecican 

Preotului Petru Pecican, protopop onorific al Bisericii Greco-Catolice, la 29 iunie 

2007 i s-a conferit de către Episcopul Alexandru Mesian, de Lugoj, prin ordinul Papei 

Benedict al XVI-lea, distincŃia de Prelat de Onoare al SanctităŃii Sale, ca încununare a 

vieŃii spirituale în slujba lui Cristos şi a Bisericii Sale 66 . 

S-a născut în comuna Sâmbăteni, judeŃul Arad, la data de 2 martie 1921, din părinŃii 

Lazăr şi Elena. Şcoala primară a făcut-o în oraşul Arad, iar studiile medii, la Gimnaziul 

Iosif Vulcan şi la Liceul comercial. Serviciul militar îl face în perioada 1942-1945. În 

anul 1946, după absolvirea Academiei Teologice ortodoxe arădene, în perspectiva licenŃei 

şi a doctoratului, a frecventat cursurile FacultăŃii de Teologie ortodoxă de la Bucureşti. În 

octombrie 1947 s-a înscris la Facultatea de Litere şi Filozofie din Bucureşti, se reîntoarce 

la Arad, unde funcŃionează ca profesor de limba română la Liceul Moise Nicoară şi la 

Şcoala generală nr. 15 67 . 

La 3 iunie 1953, în Arad, a fost arestat de pe stradă şi transportat la securitatea din 

Bucureşti, cu acuzaŃia: Crimă de uneltire împotriva ordinii sociale. Urmează o captivitate 

de 11 ani, temniŃă grea, apoi munca forŃată, prin penitenciarele Jilava, Gherla, Aiud, şi 

prin lagărele de muncă de la Noua Culme şi Periprava. A avut două condamnări: una de 

şase ani (1953-1959), şi a doua, de încă 5 ani (1959-1964), în continuarea celei dintâi, 

pentru activitate catolică, în temniŃă, în timpul executării primei sentinŃe 68 . 

În iulie 1953 l-a cunoscut în secŃia a III-a a Penitenciarului Jilava (supranumit 

„Reduit 69 ”), pe Monseniorul Vladimir I. Ghika (1873-1954). Abia sosit de la Jilava, 

împreună cu alŃi încarceraŃi, a avut ocazia să-l cunoască personal pe Horia Cosmovici 70 – 

ilustru fiu spiritual al lui Vladimir Ghica, avocat, fost ministru subsecretar de stat al 

generalului Antonescu. A urmat penitenciarele din Gherla şi Aiud unde la cunoscut mult 

mai bine pe Horia Cosmovici. 

65 

Fişa matricolă Penală, Ştefan Bălan, nu oferă date concludente despre detenŃia preotului Ştefan 

Bălan. 

66 

Lucaci Ciprian Pecican, In memoriam Pr. Prot. On. Petru Pecican, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.bru.ro/lugoj/in-memoriam-pr-petru-pecican/, (17 iulie 2012). 

67 

Cf. Petru Pecican, Homo Homini Christus, Arad, Edit. Mirador, 1996. 

68 

Ibidem. 

69 

Reduită – Nume derivat al redutei, în Petru Pecican, Homo Homini Christus, p. 11. 

70 

Horia Cosmovici – s-a născut la 4 aprilie 1909. După studiile de Drept din Bucureşti, ia parte la 

campania electorală din anul 1937 pentru partidul Totul pentru łară. Luptă împotriva dictaturii lui 

Carol al II-lea. În anul 1940 îl găsim Subsecretar de Stat la PreşedinŃia Consiliului de Miniştri, 

pentru o perioadă scurtă de timp. La data de 8 februarie 1943 trece la Biserica Catolică, în capela 

privată a lui Vladimir Ghika. A stat la închisoare timp de 17 ani, până în anul 1964 când este 

eliberat de la Lagărul de Muncă Periprava. În 13 mai 1969 este hirotonit preot greco-catolic de 

Episcopul Iuliu HirŃea. Cf. Petru Pecican, Homo Homini Christus, pp. 55-56. 

782

În iunie 1959 a fost transferat la Noua Culme – un lagăr de muncă forŃată din zona 

Canalului Dunăre-Marea Neagră – unde, sub o colină din apropierea unei cariere de 

piatră, a rostit în genunchi, preotului greco-catolic Ioan Vladovici 71 , convertirea la 

catolicism 72 . 

Anul 1964, în luna mai, a fost eliberat după 11 ani de detenŃie. În anul 1967 s-a 

căsătorit şi a avut doi copii: Maria-Rozalia şi Petru-Gabriel. Duminica din 12 decembrie 

1977 a fost hirotonit în clandestinitate 73 de Episcopul Iuliu HirŃea 74 . 

După repunerea în drepturi a Bisericii Greco-Catolice Petru Pecican a avut o activitate 

remarcabilă: în 1993 a publicat lucrarea: „Lourdes – oază a păcii lăuntrice”. Primeşte 

mult aşteptatul Nihil-Obstat pronunŃat de Arhiepiscopia Romano-Catolică a 

Bucureştiului, spre recunoaşterea Ordinului Rozei al cărui obiectiv era – şi continuă să fie 

– „încreştinarea lumii politice”; A fost numit superior al Ordinului Rozei şi a contribuit la 

publicarea lucrării: „Manualul omului politic creştin” (Catehismul primar al Ordinului), 

prin prezentarea lui publică în anul 1995, la Bucureşti. 

Fişele Matricole Penale indică mandatul de arestare nr. 4228/1953 pentru: crimă de 

uneltire împotriva ordinii sociale 75 . Este judecat în anul 1954 şi condamnat pentru acesta 

la 6 ani de temniŃă grea. Data începerii pedepsei 3 iunie 1953, iar expirarea 1 iunie 1959, 

apoi pedeapsa s-a prelungit cu încă 60 de luni până în 1 iunie 1964 76 . 

În lagărul Periprava Preotului Petru Pecican i se întocmeşte o nouă fişă matricolă 

penală având categoria: C.R. 77 . În această fişă este acuzat că a fost legionar. Datorită 

acestui fapt conform ordinului Ministerul Afacerilor Interne i se prelungeşte pedeapsa cu 

60 de luni din 1 iunie 1959 până în 1 iunie 1964 78 . 

Itinerarul preotului Petru Pecican în închisorile comuniste 79 : 

• Arestat în anul 1953, mandat de arestare nr. 4228/1953. 

• Lagărul de muncă Periprava 1953 – 18 aprilie 1955. 

71 

Ioan Vladovici – preot greco-catolic din Sibiu, accesibil online la adresa:. 

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/biserici/preoti_greco_catolici_6 

/preoti_greco_catolici_6.pdf, (16 iulie 2012). 

72 

Petru Pecican, Homo Homini Christus, p. 92. 

73 


74 

Iuliu HirŃea Episcop al Episcopiei Greco-Catolice Oradea – 28 iulie 1949 – 28 iulie 1978. 

75 

Art. 209 Cod Penal, vezi în: Enciclopedia Regimului Comunist, Represiunea, Vol. A-E, ColecŃia 

Enciclopedii, Coordonator Octavian Roske, Bucureşti, Edit. Institutul NaŃional pentru Studiul 

Totalitarismului, 2011, pag. 334. 

76 

Fisă matricolă penală, Petru Pecican, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/P/P%2005.%20Pavelca%20-%20Petcut/Pecican%20Petru/index.php, 


77 

ContrarevoluŃionar. 

(4 

78 

Fisă matricolă penală, Petru Pecican, accesibil online la adresa: 


%20detinuti%20politici/P/P%2005.%20Pavelca%20-%20Petcut/Pecican%20Petru/index.php, 


79 

Ibidem. 

(4 

783

• Penitenciarul Gherla:18 aprilie 1955 – 25 iulie 1955. 

• Penitenciarul Aiud: 25 iulie 1955 – 14 iunie 1959. 

• Penitenciarul Jilava: 14 iunie 1959. 

• Lagăre de muncă Periprava, Noua Culme, 1959 – 1964. 

• Eliberat: 6 mai 1964 conform adeverinŃei 502/1964 a Ministerului Afacerilor 

Interne, cu Domiciliu Obligatoriu 80 . 

Bibliografie 

Surse Inedite 

1. Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii (ACNSAS). 

2. Arhiva Episcopiei Greco-Catolice de Lugoj. 

Surse Edite 

1. ***Biserica Întemnițată România 1944-1989, Institutul Național pentru Studiul 

Totalitarismului, Colecția Dicționare, Bucurețti, 1998. 

2. *** Enciclopedia Regimului Comunist, Represiunea, Vol. A-E, ColecŃia Enciclopedii, 

Coordonator Octavian Roske, Bucureşti, Edit. Institutul NaŃional pentru Studiul 

Totalitarismului, 2011. 

3. Achim Valeriu, Ciolte Aurel, Triunghiul morŃii Baia Sprie, Cavnic, Nistru, 1950 – 

1954, Baia Mare, Edit. Gutinul SRL, 2007. 

4. Bălan Ioan, Regimul ConcentraŃionar din România 1945 – 1964, Bucureşti, Edit. 

FundaŃia Academia Civică, Biblioteca Sighet, 2000. 

5. Bellu Ştefan, Triunghiul morŃii Baia Sprie – Nistru – Cavnic 1950 – 1955, Târgu 

Lăpuş, Edit. Galaxia Gutenberg, 2009. 

6. Călinescu Nicolae, Sisteme şi procese de brainwashing în România comunistă, Iaşi, 

Edit. Gama, 1998. 

7. Cesianu Constantin, Salvat din Infern, (traducere din limba franceză Maria Alexe), 

Bucureşti, Edit. Humanitas, 1992. 

8. Deletant Dennis, România sub regimul comunist, Bucureşti, Edit. FundaŃia Academia 

Civică, 2010. 

9. Iernuca Virgil, Fenomenul Piteşti, Bucureşti, Edit. Humanitas, 1990. 

10. Mureşan Alin, Piteşti Cronica unei sinucideri asistate, Iaşi, Edit. Polirom, ediŃia a IIa, 

Institutul de Investigarea Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, 

2010. 

11. Oprea Marius, Banalitatea Răului. O istorie a securităŃii în documente. 1949-1989, 

Iaşi, Edit. Polirom, 2002. 

12. Oprescu Adrian, Vărul Alexandru şi alte povestiri adevărate, Bucureşti, Edit. 

Humanitas, ColecŃia Memorii Jurnale, 2008. 

13. Pecican Petru, Homo Homini Christus, Arad, Edit. Mirador, 1996. 

80 Fisa matricolă penală, Petru Pecican, nu oferă date concrete asupra datelor de transfer dintr-un 

penitenciar în altul. 

784

14. Sigmirean Cornel, Intelectualitatea ecleziastică PreoŃii Blajului (1806 – 1948), Târgu- 

Mureş, Edit. UnivrsităŃii Petru Maior, 2007. 

15. Tănase Stelian, Elite şi societate Guvernarea Gheorghiu Dej 1948 – 1965. Bucureşti, 

Edit. Humanitas, 2006. 

Reviste 

1. Memoria revista gândirii arestate 

2. Sionul Românesc 

Surse online 

1. www.crimelecomunismului.ro 

2. Cicerone IoniŃoiu, Morminte fără cruce. ContribuŃii la cronica rezistenŃei româneşti 

împotriva dictaturii, accesibil online la adresa: 

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/morminte3/ 

3. TorŃionar şi deŃinut: mărturii în oglinda din lagărul comunist, accesibil online la 

adresa: http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/dezbateri/tortionar-si-detinut-marturiiin-oglinda-din-lagarul-comunist-157241-main_pic1.html, 

4. Raport final, 2006, accesibil online la adresa 

http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf, 

Olivo Bosa SJ, Întoarcere la Casa Tatălui Preotului Iezuit Emil Puni, accesibil online 

la adresa: http://www.bru.ro/lugoj/intoarcerea-la-casa-tatalui-a-preotului-iezuit-emilpuni/ 

785

DESCHIDEREA ECONOMICĂ A ROMÂNIEI 

SPRE OCCIDENT ŞI CRIZA DATORIEI 

EXTERNE DIN ANII ‘80 

Liviu łĂRANU 1 

La 7 decembrie 1972, Nicolae Ceauşescu semna Decretele nr. 493 şi 494 pentru 

aderarea României la Acordul privind FMI şi BIRD. În expunerea de motive a ambelor 

decrete se arăta că aderarea României la cele două instituŃii specializate ale ONU în plan 

financiar internaŃional era în acord cu „politica de largă colaborare internaŃională pe toate 

planurile” şi că „România doreşte să-şi aducă contribuŃia la dezvoltarea şi promovarea 

comerŃului şi cooperării economico-financiare între state şi la perfecŃionarea sistemului 

monetar internaŃional”. 

Zece ani mai târziu, în 1982, România încheia, de urgenŃă, un acord „stand by” cu 

FMI pentru a-şi salva credibilitatea în faŃa băncilor occidentale creditoare, care-i tăiaseră 

toate liniile de finanŃare încă din 1981. Din acest moment deschiderea României către 

Occident începea să fie problematică. 

La 40 de ani de la aderarea României la FMI şi la 30 de la criza din anii 1981 şi 1982, 

cercetarea acestor momente de istorie nu doar economică, ci şi politică, rămâne doar la 

stadiu incipient. Cum au decurs negocierile cu FMI şi ce au acceptat liderii de Bucureşti 

este puŃin cunoscut astăzi, ca şi implicaŃiile pe termen lung asupra economiei şi societăŃii 

româneşti ale acelui acord din 1982. 

Pentru întreaga perioadă comunistă din România, din punct de vedere economic, 

intervalul 1976-1989 delimitează declinul şi criza profundă în care intră nu doar 

economia ci întreg sistemul social şi politic al Ńării. Premisele acestui impas au fost 

identificate de istorici, politologi, sociologi ş.a. în sistemul de comandă centralizat din 

economie şi creşterea extensivă din domeniul industrial, neglijând eficienŃa, 

profitabilitatea şi calitatea. Cu certitudine, cauzele sunt însă mult mai numeroase, între 

acestea numărându-se, chiar şi în acele vremuri, dificila situaŃie financiară a Ńării. 

După cum se ştie comerŃul exterior al unei Ńări este un indicator important asupra 

sănătăŃii economiei acelui stat iar echilibrul extern reprezintă o componentă importantă a 

echilibrului economic general. łările din blocul comunist, departe de a sfida această 

regulă, au încercat în funcŃie de contextul general să obŃină tocmai un asemenea gen de 

echilibru. 

1 Consiliul NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii, Bucureşti, Romania. 

786

România sub regimul comunist avea relaŃii comerciale cu peste 100 de Ńări, ele 

desfăşurându-se în condiŃiile în care statul avea monopol asupra comerŃului exterior, 

realizat doar prin întreprinderile sale. De asemenea, statul avea dreptul exclusiv de a 

deŃine, a cumpăra şi vinde valuta străină şi aurul, precum şi de a stabili cursul valutar. 

În privinŃa balanŃei de plăŃi externe a României comuniste, realizarea echilibrului 

extern a fost destul de greu de realizat şi atunci când s-a făcut a fost cu mari sacrificii. 

Pentru orice Ńară dar mai ales pentru o Ńară în curs de dezvoltare aşa cum era România 

comunistă, industrializarea şi modernizarea economiei nu se puteau face decât prin mari 

importuri de maşini, utilaje, echipamente şi tehnologie modernă, cât şi importuri de 

materii prime. Datorită acestui fapt echilibrul extern a rămas un deziderat. 

În linii mari, se pot decupa trei perioade în evoluŃia balanŃei de plăŃi: 

a. 1950-1970 când apelul la resursele externe a fost de proporŃii reduse, datorită 

contextului politic internaŃional; 

b. Perioada 1971-1981 caracterizată prin folosirea intensă a creditelor externe şi apariŃia 

crizei datoriei externe; 

c. Perioada 1982-1989 marcată de restabilirea echilibrului extern prin lichidarea datoriei 

externe. 

Primele două decenii ale regimului comunist au fost marcate de relaŃii economice 

preponderent cu Ńările socialiste. Acordurile comerciale anuale aveau în vedere, în 

principal, o balanŃă comercială echilibrată, iar acolo unde apăreau solduri negative se 

conveneau, pentru anul următor, livrări majorate de produse pentru a compensa deficitul. 

Apelul la credite externe a fost foarte restrâns. 

SituaŃia s-a schimbat începând cu anul 1963 când autorităŃile de la Bucureşti au 

conştientizat că modelul polonez de a contracta credite pe termen lung în Occident pentru 

modernizarea industriei proprii reprezenta varianta optimă de a menŃine ritmul creşterii 

industriale şi al investiŃiilor în această ramură fundamentală a economiei socialiste. 

Prim-secretarul P.M.R., Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej exprima destul de realist, în decembrie 

1963, noua situaŃie a României şi nevoia de schimbare în strategia de dezvoltare: „Pentru 

a menŃine ritmul în care mergem noi şi a nu apela numai la venitul naŃional va fi nevoie 

să apelăm la credite”. EsenŃial pentru România acelor vremuri era să utilizeze conjunctura 

favorabilă existentă în relaŃia cu Ńările occidentale: „că Ńările capitaliste dezvoltate sunt 

dispuse să ne dea credite şi sigur, nu ne pun condiŃii politice [subl. ns., L.T.]”. 

„Dacă vrem să menŃinem un ritm ridicat de creştere a forŃelor de producŃie, să apelăm 

şi la credite pe termen lung. Neapărat trebuie făcut aceasta” indica Gheorghiu-Dej în 

Biroul Politic. El era convins că „bănci mari capitaliste manifestă tendinŃe de a lua 

legătura cu noi. Ori noi avem nevoie de capital bancar [subl.ns., L.T.]”. 

Succesorul lui Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Nicolae Ceauşescu, nu a făcut decât să continue şi 

să amplifice această strategie economică. În anii ‘70 apelul la resursele financiare ale 

băncilor occidentale a luat proporŃii majore. Impactul asupra echilibrului extern al Ńării pe 

termen mediu şi lung a fost însă unul nefericit. În contextul economic internaŃional al 

vremii marcat de două crize ale petrolului, contul curent al României s-a deteriorat 

puternic, îndeosebi din anul 1978 (-759 mil. dolari) ajungând în anul 1980 la un deficit de 

2.420 mil. dolari. Deşi atât importul cât şi exportul au înregistrat creşteri consistente între 

787

anii 1976-1980, diferenŃele dintre import şi export au devenit tot mai mari în defavoarea 

celui din urmă. Conducerea de la Bucureşti a procedat la importuri mari de maşini, utilaje 

şi echipamente moderne, de fabricaŃie occidentală, susŃinute cu credite externe, de la 

BIRD sau de la alte bănci din Vest. Ca urmare, datoria externă a crescut vertiginos. 

Cea mai mare parte a creditelor pentru dezvoltare au fost contractate pe termen mediu 

şi lung, însă o parte din aceste credite contractate în anii 1976-1978 au devenit scadente 

în anii 1980-1981. Datorită sumelor mari care trebuiau plătite creditorilor occidentali, 

fără a se mai putea face faŃă cu încasările curente din exporturile româneşti, statul român 

a ajuns, în primăvara anului 1981, la arierate (întârzieri la plată) care totalizau 1.143 mil. 

dolari SUA. 

Pe lângă aceste întârzieri la plata creditelor, „factura petrolieră” care trebuia achitată 

de România pentru ŃiŃeiul importat la un preŃ mărit de criza petrolului din 1979 şi 

contractarea de credite pe termen scurt (care au crescut ca pondere de la 4% la 22% în 

1980), toate au contribuit la ceea ce economiştii au numit „criza datoriei externe”. 

Factorul declanşator a Ńinut tot de contextul extern: Polonia, un stat important al blocului 

socialist, a intrat, în 1980, în încetare de plăŃi. Rezultatul nu s-a lăsat prea mult aşteptat: 

băncile occidentale au devenit foarte prudente în relaŃia cu Ńările din CAER, tăindu-le, 

practic, accesul la finanŃare. 

Deşi conducerea „superioară” a României a fost sfătuită să înceapă discuŃii cu toŃi 

creditorii occidentali pentru reeşalonarea datoriei externe, tocmai pentru a preîntâmpina o 

previzibilă încetare de plăŃi, Nicolae Ceauşescu a refuzat sau a amânat orice dialog pe 

această temă. Inevitabilul s-a produs în toamna anului 1981, iar statul român a fost nevoit 

să pornească negocieri cu FMI şi cu băncile occidentale creditoare. 

Trebuie spus că cei care răspundeau de finanŃele Ńării nu aveau experienŃa unor astfel 

de negocieri, fiind pentru prima dată când România cerea o reeşalonare a datoriilor. 

Exista însă un mare avantaj, singular în cadrul blocului comunist, acela că România era 

membru cu drepturi depline la FMI, Banca Mondială, Banca InternaŃională de 

ReconstrucŃie şi Dezvoltare. România era singura Ńară din Est care avea această calitate şi 

un capital social depus la FMI de 500 de milioane de dolari. 

PoziŃia României în cadrul FMI nu era neglijabilă. La finele lui 1981, FMI avea 145 

de Ńări membre, iar sumele depuse în acel moment în cadrul Fondului atingeau 60.000 de 

milioane de DST-uri (drepturi speciale de tragere) ceea ce era echivalent cu cca. 600 

miliarde $. Voturile fiecărei Ńări erau direct proporŃionale cu procentajul rezultat din 

capitalul social depus la totalul capitalului FMI. Pentru exemplificare, în 1982, SUA 

aveau 19,64%, Anglia 6,80%, FranŃa 4,51%, RF Germania 5,08%, Japonia 3,92%, 

Canada 3,20%, Italia 2,94%, RP Chineză 2,84%, Suedia 1,09%, Iugoslavia 0,68%, 

România 0,61%. Astfel, Ńara noastră, după capitalul depus, se situa pe locul 31, după noi, 

cu capitaluri mai mici, fiind un număr de 114 Ńări printre care: Coreea de Sud, Emiratele 

Arabe, Grecia, Israel, Portugalia, Turcia ş.a. 

FuncŃionarea FMI era asigurată de un Consiliu al reprezentanŃilor Ńărilor membre, un 

Consiliu de administraŃie format din 22 de membri şi un director general. Cu sediul la 

Washington, FMI era condus în fapt de Consiliul de administraŃie în care cinci Ńări aveau 

câte un reprezentant permanent: SUA, Anglia, Germania, FranŃa şi Japonia. CeilalŃi 16 

reprezentanŃi erau aleşi pe câte doi ani, fiecare reprezentând un număr de Ńări. 

788

În 1982, director general al FMI, era Jacques de Larosiere, de origine franceză. A fost 

cel care a întins o mână prietenoasă reprezentantului României în acel moment dificil, 

Petre Gigea. Acesta a deŃinut şi poziŃia de ministru al FinanŃelor din februarie 1981 până 

în august 1986. 

Politica şi statutul FMI permiteau acordarea de împrumuturi Ńărilor membre, la cerere, 

atunci când se aflau într-o situaŃie financiară grea. Baza unui astfel de împrumut era un 

program stabilit de comun acord, confirmat de o scrisoare de intenŃie a guvernului 

respectiv, concretizat într-un aranjament „stand-by”. Avantajul acestor împrumuturi era, 

în primul rând, dobânda mai mică decât cea care se plătea pe pieŃele financiare 

internaŃionale şi comisionul unic de 0,5%. Cuantumul creditului era stabilit întotdeauna în 

DST-uri, convertite, de obicei, în dolari. În 1982, un DST era echivalent cu 1,16 dolari 

SUA. De regulă, împrumutul se acordă în rate, la termene stabilite anterior, în funcŃie însă 

de îndeplinirea anumitor măsuri convenite în acordul „stand-by”, verificate riguros de 

FMI la faŃa locului. 

Măsurile cerute de FMI Ńărilor care solicită ajutor financiar au fost şi sunt deseori 

foarte dure, pornind de la regulile economiei de piaŃă: liberalizarea preŃurilor, eliminarea 

oricăror subvenŃii de către stat, restrângerea cheltuielilor statului cu administraŃia, 

educaŃia, sănătatea etc. Statistic, aplicarea acestor măsuri de către statele care au semnat 

acorduri cu FMI a condus în 98% din cazuri la proteste violente ale populaŃiei şi 

manifestări de stradă. După opinia mai multor economişti români şi străini, FMI, prin 

aceste cerinŃe, contribuie la dezetatizarea economiei, promovând extinderea economiei 

libere de tip american la nivel mondial. 

România, de la începutul anilor ’80, a fost printre puŃinele Ńări unde aceste 

demonstraŃii nu au avut loc datorită regimului foarte strict de supraveghere a populaŃiei şi 

acŃiunilor de prevenire desfăşurate de Securitate. Aflată la al doilea acord de împrumut cu 

FMI (din cele trei câte au existat în perioada 1975-1989), România a îndeplinit aproape în 

totalitate măsurile convenite, primind în total un credit de 1,5 miliarde de dolari, acordat 

în trei tranşe semestriale. Etapele pentru obŃinerea împrumutului, după cum scrie în 

amintirile sale Petre Gigea, au fost cele care se aplică şi în prezent: semnarea de către 

guvernul român a unei scrisori de intenŃie, elaborarea apoi a unui memorandum 

economic, un plan de măsuri, iar la final acordul de împrumut „stand-by”. Toate aceste 

documente au fost negociate şi elaborate împreună de către reprezentanŃi ai guvernului 

român şi o echipă a FMI prezentă la Bucureşti. În urma negocierilor „grele şi dure” în 

descrierea lui Petre Gigea, negociatorul şef, din partea României, s-a ajuns la concluzia că 

nu trebuia aplicată o terapie de şoc, ci una graduală prin majorarea preŃurilor şi tarifelor 

pentru populaŃie, precum şi prin reducerea cheltuielilor bugetare din administraŃie, 

educaŃie, sănătate, cultură etc. Concret, măsurile convenite în acel „program de ajustare” 

vizau creşterea preŃurilor interne la combustibili (gaze, cărbune, benzină, motorină), 

energie electrică, reducerea subvenŃiilor în industrie şi agricultură, (de pildă, în industria 

textilă erau reduse subvenŃiile pentru uniformele şcolare şi îmbrăcămintea pentru copii), 

reducerea importurilor, îndeosebi a celor petroliere, creşterea dobânzilor bancare, 

devalorizarea leului prin modificarea raportului leu-dolar, reducerea deficitului balanŃei 

comerciale şi, în final, reglementarea plăŃilor la arierate către băncile occidentale. 

Împrumutul de 1,5 miliarde dolari pe care l-a obŃinut România, la o dobândă de 3,5% 

789

anual (dobânda pe pieŃele financiare era peste 7%), alături de acordul semnat cu FMI era 

o garanŃie pentru întreaga comunitate internaŃională, fie că era vorba de bancheri sau 

guverne occidentale, că statul român îşi va respecta obligaŃiile financiare 2 . 

Prin intermediul Clubului de la Paris al łărilor Creditoare (instituŃie creată în 1956 şi 

care cuprindea 19 state dezvoltate) şi cu ajutorul FranŃei, România a reuşit să 

dezamorseze criza datoriei externe. Au fost purtate lungi discuŃii cu FMI, Clubul de la 

Paris, Clubul de la Londra, reprezentând marile bănci comerciale, cu câteva guverne care 

au garantat credite pentru România. DiscuŃiile au avut ca rezultat unele reeşalonări. Dar 

guvernul de la Bucureşti a fost somat să plătească urgent toate datoriile pe termen scurt 

(până la un an). FMI a oferit, în schimb, câteva facilităŃi de finanŃare cât şi sprijin în 

restructurarea creditelor externe. La masa negocierilor au fost reeşalonate credite 

scadente în anul 1982 (2,7 miliarde dolari) şi 1983 (770 milioane dolari). 

Programul de „ajustare structurală” convenit cu FMI a fost implementat de 

autorităŃile de la Bucureşti cu succes, balanŃa de plăŃi devenind excedentară încă din 

anul 1982. Deşi se avea în vedere o reeşalonare a plăŃilor şi pe anul 1984, aceasta nu a 

mai fost necesară, situaŃia contului curent permiŃând plata la timp a tuturor scadenŃelor 

externe. 

Din nefericire, somaŃia de a plăti urgent toate datoriile pe termen scurt (percepută la 

vârful nomenclaturii drept amestec în treburile interne) l-a enervat pe Nicolae Ceauşescu 

care a hotărât ca România să achite integral datoria externă. Rezultatul a fost pozitiv din 

punct de vedere al scăderii datoriei externe şi al credibilităŃii României pe pieŃele 

financiare, dar pentru economia românească această decizie a fost o lovitură de 

graŃie. Importul de materii prime şi îndeosebi, cel de tehnologii moderne a fost redus 

drastic ceea ce a condus la scăderea calităŃii produselor industriale dar şi la o funcŃionare 

defectuoasă a majorităŃii întreprinderilor româneşti. La acestea se adaugă scăderea 

abruptă a nivelului de trai al populaŃiei, multe din bunurile de consum care ar fi trebuit să 

se găsească pe piaŃa internă fiind exportate. 

Pentru a scurta perioada plăŃii datoriei externe, Nicolae Ceauşescu a decis să fie 

vândută pe piaŃa occidentală o cantitate de 80 de tone de aur din tezaurul BNR. Această 

cantitate urma să fie răscumpărată după ce datoria externă ar fi fost lichidată. În prima 

parte a anului 1987 aurul era vândut şi erau încasaŃi deja peste un miliard de dolari SUA, 

sumă care imediat a fost utilizată la plata creditelor externe, la care se plăteau dobânzi 

între 7-11%. 

Deşi în anii următori rezerva valutară ar fi putut asigura răscumpărarea aurului vândut, 

până în decembrie 1989, doar 21 tone din aurul vândut a fost răscumpărat. 

Gheorghe Stroe, fost director al Băncii Române de ComerŃ Exterior şi vicepreşedinte 

al CSP în momentul respectiv, cataloga gestul de a vinde aurul din tezaurul Ńării drept o 

„eroare”, acest gen de măsuri fiind aplicate doar în caz de calamităŃi sau războaie. 

Această greşeală a fost dublată, în opinia aceluiaşi economist, de cea de-a doua decizie 

prin care, aurul vândut a fost răscumpărat doar parŃial. 

2 Dumitru Constantin, Cum şi ce a negociat România cu FMI în anii ’80, în „Cotidianul”, 

26 mai 1980. 

790

În anii 1987-1988 au fost plătite în contul datoriei externe sume exorbitante: 356 mil. 

dolari în anul 1987, 4.252 mil. dolari în 1988 şi 1.790 mil. dolari în 1989. 

La 31 martie 1989 s-a încheiat rambursarea datoriei externe. La finele anului 1989, în 

conturile bancare ale României existau disponibilităŃi de 1,8 miliarde dolari SUA iar de la 

câteva Ńări în curs de dezvoltare, erau de încasat creanŃe de 2,9 miliarde dolari SUA. În 

decembrie 1989, România, practic, nu mai avea datorie externă. 

Ne-a folosit acest lucru? Din nefericire, nu. 

Plata anticipată a întregii datorii externe a fost una dintre cele mai neinspirate decizii 

economice dinainte de decembrie ’89. A fost, după opinia unui avizat, Adrian Vasilescu, 

o încălcare a regulilor bancare drastic sancŃionată de reprezentanŃii pieŃei financiare 

internaŃionale. 

Pentru o perioada de 15 ani, România a fost scoasă din circuitul mondial al capitalului. 

ConsecinŃele acestei carantine financiare s-au resimŃit vreme îndelungată iar economia 

României a devenit şi mai închisă decât fusese până atunci. După „euforia debitorului” 

din anii ‘70, a urmat disperarea plăŃii anticipate a tuturor datoriilor externe prin mijloace, 

de asemenea, disperate, incluzând până şi vânzări masive de produse alimentare şi de aur. 

Urmarea a fost vlăguirea economiei dar şi a populaŃiei. 

Şi ce-a urmat, nu a fost deloc încurajator. Rezerva adunată în 1989, de 1,8 miliarde de 

dolari, a fost epuizată în numai câteva luni din 1990, când s-a produs o nouă inversare în 

balanŃa comercială a României: au scăzut exporturile şi au crescut masiv importurile. Şi 

iarăşi, cămara valutară a rămas aproape goală. În vara anului 1992, România a ajuns din 

nou în pragul încetării de plăŃi. 

791

ACTIVITĂłI DE OPOZIłIE ALE 

MIŞCĂRII LEGIONARE ÎN PERIOADA 

NOIEMBRIE 1947 – MAI 1948 

Ilarion łIU 1 

După încheierea celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial, liderii Mişcării legionare din Ńară 

au decis să înceteze orice formă de opoziŃie împotriva guvernului comunist condus de 

către dr. Petru Groza. Garda de Fier se afla sub incidenŃa ConvenŃiei de ArmistiŃiu din 

septembrie 1944, care la punctul 15 prevedea interzicea tuturor organizaŃiilor de factură 

„nazistă“. Neutralitatea Mişcării legionare s-a consfinŃit printr-un acord de principiu 

dintre liderii organizaŃiei şi Ministerul de Interne condus de Teohari Georgescu. Acest 

„pact de neutralitate“ a intrat în vigoare la 15 decembrie 1945. După alegerile falsificate 

din 1946 însă, liderii Mişcării legionare şi-au reconsiderat poziŃia faŃă de regim. Aşadar, 

începând cu a doua jumătate a anului 1947 şi-au pus tot mai serios problema 

reorganizării. 

Abandonarea „pactului de neutralitate“ de către legionary 

După alegerile din noiembrie 1946, autorităŃile comuniste au iniŃiat măsuri vizibile de 

intimidare a opoziŃiei. Astfel, prin Ordinul nr. 50.000 din 12 februarie 1947 al 

Ministerului de Interne, SiguranŃa, PoliŃia şi Jandarmeria erau autorizate să-i aresteze pe 

cetăŃenii care s-ar fi manifestat ca „instigatori“ 2 . În instrucŃiunile anexe erau prevăzuŃi şi 

legionarii, fapt care atestă că regimul nu mai considera valabil „pactul de neutralitate“, 

adoptat în decembrie 1945. Arestări pentru „manifestări antidemocratice“ se mai 

operaseră şi în 1946, însă erau mai degrabă măsuri de intimidare, fără ca cei reŃinuŃi să 

primească pedepse privative de libertate. 

Începând din primăvara anului 1947, guvernul comunist a sporit sancŃiunile faŃă de 

adversarii politici care se manifestau contra sa, ori a colaborării cu Uniunea Sovietică. În 

aprilie 1947, Nicolae Orezeanu, mare proprietar de pământ din com. RacoviŃa (jud. 

Vâlcea), a fost arestat pentru „propagandă şi instigare împotriva regimului democrat“ 

deoarece îi îndemnase pe locuitorii localităŃii să se înarmeze, pentru a doborî „cu forŃe 

proprii“ Guvernul. Orezeanu se afla pe lista legionarilor a căror statut fusese stabilit de 

„pactul de neagresiune“, întrucât fusese victimă a „trierii“ (a fost internat în lagărul de la 

1 Universitatea Creştină „Dimitrie Cantemir“ din Bucureşti, România. 

2 Arhivele NaŃionale ale României – DirecŃia Arhive NaŃionale Istorice Centrale (în continuare 

DANIC), Fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, dos. nr. 27/1947, f. 280. 

792

Caracal, în 1945). În urma anchetei, jandarmii au mai descoperit că Nicolae Orezeanu 

declarase că va lua înapoi pământul Ńăranilor împroprietăriŃi pe moşia sa pentru că urma 

să înceapă în curând un nou război, în urma căruia comuniştii vor fi înlăturaŃi de la 

putere. Despre Guvernul Groza, marele proprietar declarase că era „pleava societăŃii“, 

fiind alcătuit din „bandiŃi şi tâlhari“. După ce a fost reŃinut o perioadă la Chestura de 

PoliŃie Râmnicu Vâlcea, Orezeanu a fost trimis în arest preventiv într-un penitenciar (cel 

mai probabil la Piteşti), unde aştepta judecarea procesului său 3 . Aceiaşi soartă a avut-o şi 

Ştefan Ciobanu, din com. Dracea (jud. Argeş), care a fost arestat în aprilie 1947 pentru 

critici la adresa Guvernului şi declaraŃii de admiraŃie pentru Mişcarea legionară. Ciobanu, 

membru al PNL-Tătărescu în momentul arestării, fusese înainte de război şef de plasă 

legionară. În baza Ordinului nr. 50.000/1947 a fost trimis în arest preventiv la 

penitenciarul Piteşti 4 . 

Arestările din primăvara anului 1947 nu au mai avut rol de intimidare a adversarilor 

politici. Ordinul de „ridicare a instigatorilor“ s-a aplicat tot timpul anului, regimul 

urmărind să-i neutralizeze pe adversarii care se manifestau făŃiş cu ostilitate. În noiembrie 

1947 a fost arestat „reacŃionarul de provenienŃă legionară“ Ştefan Ionescu, şeful 

abatorului din com. Burdujeni (jud. Suceava). Acesta declarase că Guvernul Groza era 

format din „hoŃi care vor duce Ńara de râpă“. Despre Stalin a afirmat că era „un bandit 

care fură tot din Ńară pentru a hrăni armata lui flămândă“. Mai mult, Ionescu le-a 

recomandat locuitorilor din zonă să nu respecte ConvenŃia de ArmistiŃiu şi Tratatul de 

Pace, „instigându-i la revoltă şi rebeliune faŃă de actualul regim“. Ca urmare a atitudinii 

sale, a fost trimis în arest la penitenciarul Gherla 5 . 

Arestările nu s-au redus doar la unii lideri locali ai Mişcării legionare. AutorităŃile au 

început în 1947 ofensiva împotriva extremiştilor de dreapta cu potenŃial terorist, mai ales 

din rândul celor paraşutaŃi din Germania, în 1944. Astfel, la 3 august 1947 a fost arestat 

Filon Verca, şeful unei echipe paraşutate în Banat, care după „pactul de neutralitate“ îşi 

legalizase statutul şi activa ca profesor la Liceul „Traian Doda“ din Caransebeş. 

Împrejurările arestării lui Verca sunt speciale. În 1945, când s-a legalizat împreună cu 

grupul său, a refuzat să predea şi armamentul. Numai că unul dintre camarazi, Nicolae 

Târziu, s-a prezentat la poliŃie şi a dezvăluit strategia. AutorităŃile nu au luat nici o 

măsură atunci, în 1945, aşteptând momentul oportun pentru a trece la arestări în cazul 

armamentului nepredat. OperaŃiunea s-a consumat în august 1947, când Filon Verca a 

ajuns în ancheta SiguranŃei din Timişoara. A reuşit însă să evadeze, fiind condamnat, în 

lipsă, la 20 de ani de închisoare 6 . 

Când nu au avut la dosar „probleme subversive“ în cazul legionarilor întorşi din 

Germania după război, autorităŃile au apelat la strategia rejudecării unor procese mai 

vechi. Astfel, Constantin Coniac, muncitor la Bocşa Română (jud. Timiş-Torontal), a fost 

arestat în octombrie 1947 şi deferit CurŃii MarŃiale Bucureşti pentru a executa o pedeapsă 

3 Ibidem, f. 501. 


5 Ibidem, f. 223-226. 

6 Verca, Filon, ParaşutaŃi în România vândută: mişcarea de rezistenŃă: 1944-1948, Timişoara, 

Editura Gordian, 1993, p. 214. 

793

de 15 ani muncă silnică, dată în lipsă, pentru participare la evenimentele din 21-23 

ianuarie 1941. Coniac avea acte în regulă, primite după întoarcerea în Ńară (septembrie 

1945), când s-a prezentat la poliŃie însoŃit chiar de Vică Negulescu. Însă, acum, în 1947, 

autorităŃile au decis să repună în discuŃie pedeapsa neexecutată. Probabil reprezentanŃii 

locali ai Ministerului de Interne au interpretat ca activitate legionară acŃiunea lui Coniac 

de a înfiinŃa o cantină pentru muncitorii de la şantierul Bocşa Română. Pentru cercetări a 

fost trimis la Bucureşti, însoŃit de un jandarm. S-a întâlnit cu Decebal-Corneliu Andrei 

într-un tramvai care circula de la Gara de Nord la Închisoarea CurŃii MarŃiale. Andrei i-a 

transmis necazul prin care trecea Conic lui Vică Negulescu. Intervenind la Ministerul de 

Interne, Negulescu a obŃinut eliberarea camaradului său, după o lună de arest. După 

ieşirea din închisoare, Constantin Coniac s-a întâlnit cu Negulescu, care i-a transmis că 

autorităŃile emiseseră mandate de arestare pentru toŃi legionarii cu procese mai vechi. Nu 

aveau nimic de făcut, trebuind să-şi pregătească apărarea 7 . 

Negocieri în „Comandamentul pe Ńară“ privind reorganizarea Mişcării legionare 

Atitudinea autorităŃilor de după alegerile din 1946 i-a determinat pe unii legionari să 

facă presiuni asupra „Comandamentului pe Ńară“. Legionarii care se simŃeau vizaŃi de 

campania guvernului de „ridicare a instigatorilor“ au lansat afişe pe străzile Capitalei şi 

ale principalelor oraşe ale Ńării, în care chemau „la acŃiune“ împotriva comuniştilor. Spre 

exemplu, în mai 1947, în zona DorobanŃi din Bucureşti poliŃiştii au găsit lipit pe vitrina 

unui magazin următorul afiş: „Ceasul vostru sună, jidani împuŃiŃi / Moartea vi se apropie, 

tâlhari şi bandiŃi / Care-n Ńara noastră, jale aŃi adus / Va veni iar timpul, să staŃi în cui puşi 

/ De la faşă, la barbă albă / Cu noi este Dumnezeu, chiar şi Fiul Său / Doamne ajută-ne 

mai iute, să scăpăm de iudei“ (semnat: „Un Român“) 8 . Afişele şi manifestele au continuat 

să apară în vara anului 1947. Astfel, în dimineaŃa zilei de 8 august 1947 au fost aruncate 

dintr-un tren în zona Dorneşti–RădăuŃi manifeste în limba română şi ucraineană, cu 

următorul conŃinut: „FraŃi Români, în curând soseşte ziua eliberării, răzbate la uşă, 

comuniştii vor fi distruşi de pe tot globul, fiŃi uniŃi şi înarmaŃi-vă, Armata Roşie trebuie 

atacată, intelectuali din toate ramurile care sunteŃi epuraŃi în curând veŃi fi scoşi din 

serviciu, faceŃi legătura cu fraŃii banderişti din munŃi, care vă vor ajuta la salvarea 

voastră, porniŃi la luptă, faceŃi distrugeri la poduri, fabrici etc. Trăiască România liberă, 

naŃională şi independentă“ 9 . 

Responsabilii „Comandamentului pe Ńară“ al Mişcării legionare, şi în primul rând 

Nicolae Petraşcu şi Vică Negulescu, nu puteau omite aceste semnale din partea 

camarazilor. După intrarea în vigoare a „pactului de neutralitate“, tocmai acesta era 

scopul menŃinerii „Comandamentului pe Ńară“, să împiedice alunecarea cuiburilor active 

spre extremism. Cele două manifeste prezentate mai sus sunt semnificative pentru a 

constata creşterea tensiunii interne în organizaŃie. În primul rând, mesajul antisemit 

7 

Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii (în continuare ACNSAS), 

Fond Penal, dos. nr. 431, f. 490-501. 

8 

Ibidem, Fond Documentar, dos. nr. 11572, f. 24. 

9 

DANIC, Fond DirecŃia Generală a PoliŃiei, dos. nr. 45/1947, f. 84. 

794

fusese interzis cu desăvârşire după încheierea războiului, în condiŃiile în care Mişcarea 

legionară – atât din exil, cât şi din Ńară – anunŃase că renunŃă la tezele discriminatorii pe 

criterii etnice din perioada interbelică. În al doilea rând, apelul la sprijinirea partizanilor 

bucovineni ridica de asemenea probleme pentru „Comandamentul pe Ńară“, întrucât 

Nicolae Petraşcu anunŃase că nu susŃine nici o mişcare de rezistenŃă. În consecinŃă, 

Petraşcu, Negulescu şi ceilalŃi lideri din Ńară erau nevoiŃi să ia o decizie, întrucât pierdeau 

Mişcarea legionară din mână. EvidenŃele Ministerului de Interne susŃineau că în Ńară 

existau aproximativ 48.000 de legionari, dintre care 12.400 avuseseră „grade şi funcŃii“ în 

organizaŃie 10 . BineînŃeles că nu toŃi erau activi, însă majoritatea erau conştienŃi că, dacă 

regimul va porni o campanie de reprimare a organizaŃiei, vor fi anchetaŃi toŃi indivizii 

despre care se ştia că avuseseră legături vreodată cu Garda de Fier. Exista precedentul 

„trierilor“ din 1944-1945. În 1947, cele mai puternice nuclee erau în centrele studenŃeşti. 

Spre exemplu, în Bucureşti activau în jur de 1.000 studenŃi legionari 11 . 

Chiar dacă erau conştienŃi că trebuia să facă ceva, Nicolae Petraşcu şi Vică Negulescu 

nu ştiau de unde să înceapă, deoarece erau fideli „pactului de neutralitate“. Mai ales 

Petraşcu, retras la Sibiu la familie, dorea pace cu comuniştii, în speranŃa că legionarii vor 

fi lăsaŃi în pace. Primele acŃiuni, destul de firave, au fost iniŃiate la începutul anului 1947, 

când cei doi au decis refacerea legăturilor între legionari. Pentru a nu compromite 

acŃiunea, s-a decis ca unităŃile legionare să aibă şefi noi. În principiu, aceştia erau numiŃi 

de Petraşcu, însă i-a lăsat şi pe Vică Negulescu şi Nistor Chioreanu să ia decizii. Oricum, 

orice numire trebuia ulterior confirmată de Petraşcu 12 . Cea mai însemnată acŃiune a fost 

schimbarea conducerii organizaŃiei legionare a Capitalei, la 1 martie 1947. 

Însă, în cele din urmă, imboldul decisiv pentru iniŃierea reorganizării Mişcării legionare 

a venit tot din străinătate, de la Horia Sima. Acesta l-a trimis în Ńară pe Eugen 

Teodorescu, ca să vadă care era situaŃia reală a organizaŃiei. Sima avea informaŃii destul 

de aproximative despre ceea ce se întâmpla cu subordonaŃii săi din România. Cea mai 

sigură sursă fusese Ovidiu Găină, fugit peste graniŃă în 1946 13 . Dar acesta nu cunoştea 

detalii foarte exacte despre „pactul de neutralitate“ întrucât nu fusese de acord cu 

strategia lui Petraşcu şi, în consecinŃă, nu participase la negocierile cu Ministerul de 

Interne, de la sfârşitul anului 1945. 

Sosirea lui Teodorescu în Ńară nu se lega numai de dispoziŃiile primite de la Horia Sima, 

ci şi de iniŃierea unui contact dintre Mişcarea legionară din exil şi serviciile secrete 

americane. Ce se întâmplase? Pe Eugen Teodorescu, împreună cu un grup de aproximativ 

40 de camarazi, sfârşitul războiului l-a prins în zona de ocupaŃie americană a Austriei, 

undeva între Linz şi Salzburg. Prin intermediul inginerului Caraion, care a întemeiat un 

„Comitet naŃional“ al românilor din Salzburg, a reuşit să-şi facă acte de şedere în Austria, 

pe motiv că fusese internat în lagărele naziste în timpul războiului. Cu timpul însă, 

activitatea sa legionară a fost deconspirată de serviciile secrete ale SUA. Americanii 

10 

Ibidem, Fond Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Român – SecŃia Administrativ Politică, 

dos. nr. 4/1952, f. 13. 

11 

ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, dos. nr. 181086, vol. 2, f. 136-139. 

12 

Ibidem, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 34-37. 

13 

ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, dos. nr. 181086, vol. 2, f. 213-220. 

795

pregăteau deja racolarea foştilor colaboratori ai Germaniei din estul Europei, care 

activaseră într-o formă sau altă împotriva Uniunii Sovietice, la sfârşitul războiului. După 

ce strângeau informaŃii îi arestau pe potenŃialii colaboratori, sub diverse pretexte. Aşa s-a 

întâmplat şi cu Eugen Teodorescu, care a fost arestat la sfârşitul lunii martie 1946, 

împreună cu avocatul I.V. Emilian. PoliŃia militară americană l-a dus la sediul CIC 14 din 

Linz, unde l-a interogat căp. Lainet, şeful serviciului de contrasabotaj. Ancheta a urmărit 

trecutul lui Teodorescu în Mişcarea legionară, întrebările fiindu-i puse după un 

chestionar. A fost pus în libertate, însă era chemat din când în când pentru alte întrebări 

legate de activitatea Mişcării legionare înainte de război: raŃiunea existenŃei unui „Corp 

Muncitoresc Legionar“ (relaŃia cu ideologia de stânga), punctul de vedere al Mişcării 

asupra capitalismului şi economiei în general etc. Anchetatorii au fost interesaŃi în ce 

zone ale Europei Occidentale se aflau legionarii, dar şi de activitatea celor din Ńară. După 

câteva runde de cercetări, lui Teodorescu i s-a făcut propunerea să lucreze pentru CIC. 

Luat prin surprindere, a dorit să ceară mai întâi acordul lui Vasile Iaşinschi (internat în 

lagăr la Salzburg la acea dată), întrucât se considera încă legionar, şi-i trebuia acceptul 

unui superior ierarhic pentru o astfel de acŃiune. Căp. Lainet i-a răspuns cu răceală după 

formularea acestor argumente, drept urmare Teodorescu a acceptat colaborarea, de teamă 

să nu fie arestat. Pentru început, americanii doreau să le dea date despre românii din Linz, 

iar mai apoi să plece într-o misiune în România, pentru a studia în ce măsură se putea 

organiza un serviciu de informaŃii, bazat pe organizaŃia legionară. 

Din Linz, Eugen Teodorescu s-a deplasat la Salzburg, unde s-a întâlnit cu Vasile Mailat. 

Acesta fusese şi el anchetat de CIC, care-i propusese, de asemenea, să lucreze pentru 

americani. Cei doi au căzut de comun acord să accepte misiunea de a pleca în Ńară, mai 

ales că ştiau de dorinŃa lui Sima de a trimite pe cineva în România, pentru a afla situaŃia 

reală a Mişcării. Sarcina dată de americani putea fi îmbinată cu dispoziŃia lui Horia Sima. 

Au decis să trimită un curier în Italia, la „Comandant“, pentru a primi acceptul misiunii. 

După cinci săptămâni, din Italia a sosit în Austria Ovidiu Găină, însoŃit de Mircea 

Dimitriu. Conform dispoziŃiilor lui Sima, Găină ar fi trebuit să plece în Ńară, şi nu 

Teodorescu. Ovidiu Găină era familiarizat cu noile realităŃii ale României post-belice, 

având în vedere că activase din 1944 până în 1946 în Ńară. Însă Teodorescu a argumentat 

că-i era foarte greu să-l introducă în reŃeaua CIC-ului, deoarece căp. Lainet cu el 

discutase despre o eventuală misiune în România. În urma unor discuŃii au stabilit că va 

pleca totuşi Teodorescu. Acesta s-a prezentat la căp. Lainet, căruia i-a comunicat că 

acceptă misiunea de a pleca în Ńară, împreună cu alŃi doi legionari. Dar plecarea a fost 

amânată, deoarece căp. Lainet a fost schimbat din funcŃie. Noul şef al şeful serviciului de 

contrasabotaj al CIC-ului din Linz, mr. Insen, a dat prioritate propriei reŃele de români 

pregătiŃi să plece în misiune în Ńară. Astfel, o echipă condusă de slt. Maghirescu 

(nelegionar), a fost condusă de soldaŃii americani până la Arad, însă s-a întors după o 

lună, fără rezultate. 

În acest timp, în primăvara anului 1947, Eugen Teodorescu s-a întâlnit din nou cu 

Vasile Mailat, la Salzburg. Cu această ocazie, Mailat i-a înmânat lui Teodorescu un bilet 

14 Counterintelligence Corps – serviciul secret al Armatei Statelor Unite ale Americii în timpul 

celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial. 

796

de la Horia Sima, care-l însărcina să plece în Ńară, pentru a vedea care era situaŃia reală a 

legionarilor. Trebuia să comunice „Comandamentului“ să pună accent pe reorganizare şi 

era interzisă orice iniŃiativă cu caracter politic – nimeni nu mai avea voie să angajeze 

Mişcarea legionară politic prin decizie personală. 

Întâlnirea cu Mailat nu i-a adus lui Eugen Teodorescu doar instrucŃiuni de la Horia 

Sima, ci şi un nou contact cu serviciile speciale americane. Vasile Mailat fusese abordat 

de un anume Malner, austriac de origine, ieşit de curând din lagărul de la Glasenbach. 

Legătura dintre Mailat şi Malner fusese intermediată de Alexandru Randa, internat şi el la 

Glosenbach. Malner i-a spus că lucra pentru serviciile americane din Frankfurt, având 

nevoie să-i recomande un legionar cu care să colaboreze. Dacă-i găsea, un ofiŃer american 

de informaŃii urma să sosească la Salzburg pentru această misiune. Având în vedere că 

CIC-ul din Linz abandonase colaborarea cu el, Teodorescu a acceptat noul contact, mai 

ales că acum avea o misiune oficială din partea lui Horia Sima. Prin Mailat, Eugen 

Teodorescu a primit de la Malner 50 de dolari, 1.000 de şilingi austrieci şi documentele 

necesare care-i facilitau trecerea ilegală în România. 

Plecarea spre România s-a produs la jumătatea lunii mai 1947, Teodorescu fiind însoŃit 

de Dragoş Hoinic. Prin Traian Puiu, cumnatul lui Hoinic, cei doi l-au contactat la Viena 

pe Gheorghe (GhiŃă) Stoia, care se ocupa cu comerŃul ilegal între Austria şi Ungaria. 

După două săptămâni, Stoia le-a facilitat trecerea clandestină în Ungaria. Au luat trenul 

până la Budapesta, apoi la Beckesksaba, unde au contactat rudele legionarului Petre 

Lipovan. Un văr al acestuia i-a transportat cu motocicleta până într-un sat de graniŃă, 

trecând frontiera în România, pe la Salonta. Au mers pe jos până la Arad, de unde au luat 

trenul spre Bucureşti. Teodorescu şi Hoinic s-au întâlnit întâmplător în Gara de Nord cu 

NiŃă Ghimbăşanu, care i-a condus la Vică Negulescu. Văzându-i, Negulescu a vrut să se 

ducă cu ei la Ministerul de Interne, pentru a-şi legaliza situaŃia. Teodorescu i-a spus însă 

că dorea să se întoarcă în Austria, intenŃionând să vorbească întâi de toate cu Nicolae 

Petraşcu. 

Întâlnirea s-a realizat peste o săptămână, undeva în perioada iunie-iulie 1947, pe 

marginea lacului Tei din Capitală. Petraşcu i-a prezentat lui Teodorescu situaŃia 

legionarilor din Ńară, căutând să justifice circulara din august 1945 şi „pactul de 

neutralitate“. Nicolae Petraşcu a insistat ca Horia Sima să fie informat că a căutat să-l 

contacteze pentru a primi „dezlegare“, ba chiar să plece din Ńară, însă nu a reuşit. La 

finalul discuŃiei, Eugen Teodorescu i-a comunicat lui Petraşcu şi a doua componentă a 

misiunii sale, respectiv constituirea unui serviciu de informaŃii pro-american, cu ajutorul 

Mişcării legionare. După câteva săptămâni, în iulie 1947, Teodorescu şi Hoinic s-au 

întors în Austria 15 . 

Întrucât noile instrucŃiuni de la Horia Sima aveau implicaŃii foarte serioase asupra 

raportului dintre Mişcarea legionară şi autorităŃi, nucleul de conducere al 

„Comandamentului pe Ńară“ s-a reunit pentru discuŃii. Întâlnirea a avut loc la începutul 

lunii august 1947, sub pretextul unei excursii în MunŃii Făgăraş, la Lacul Bâlea. Nistor 

Chioreanu s-a deplasat însoŃit de Aurel Călin, care l-a şi informat despre întrevedere, iar 

Nicolae Petraşcu a venit în echipă cu Vică Negulescu. Petraşcu le-a relatat pe larg 

15 ACNSAS, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574. 

797

discuŃia avută cu Teodorescu. În primul rând, legionarii din exil ar fi avut informaŃii că, în 

1948, în România erau programate noi alegeri, sub supraveghere internaŃională, pentru a 

evita scandalul măsluirii scrutinului din 1946. Mişcarea legionară ar fi fost autorizată să 

depună liste în noua conjunctură. Tocmai de aceea, Horia Sima a dat dispoziŃii 

„Comandamentului pe Ńară“ să iniŃieze reorganizarea Mişcării legionare, pe judeŃe, pentru 

ca, atunci când va începe campania electorală, să fie pregătită de acŃiune. InstrucŃiunile 

lui Sima, aduse prin Teodorescu, recomandau o reorganizare prudentă – să se 

construiască numai scheletul (şefi de judeŃe, eventual şefi de plasă), din oameni de 

încredere, care să fie puşi pe liste la alegeri. 

Petraşcu nu era încântat de dispoziŃiile primite, susŃinând că cei din exil nu „vedeau 

optim“ realităŃile din Ńară. În primul rând, el nu dorea ca Mişcarea să-i provoace pe 

comunişti (omitea totuşi că, după alegeri, autorităŃile luaseră o mulŃime de măsuri contra 

membrilor organizaŃiei). În cele din urmă, la presiunea celorlalŃi participanŃi la discuŃie, 

Petraşcu a acceptat să înceapă reorganizarea, dar le-a recomandat colaboratorilor să fie 

foarte prudenŃi cu alegerea oamenilor 16 . 

Însă Petraşcu nu a fost convins în sinea lui despre necesitatea şi, mai ales, eficacitatea 

reorganizării. Tocmai de aceea a căutat un contact paralel cu Horia Sima, fiind 

neîncrezător în planurile lui Teodorescu de a întemeia un serviciu de informaŃii proamerican, 

pe structura Mişcării legionare. În septembrie 1947, soŃia lui Decebal-Corneliu 

Andrei, italiancă de origine, a decis să se repatrieze, având în vedere situaŃia tot mai 

tensionată din România. La plecare, Vică Negulescu i-a înmânat o scrisoare adresată lui 

Horia Sima, în care făcea o „dare de seamă“ asupra situaŃiei politice din Ńară şi a 

legionarilor. SoŃia lui Andrei trebuia să-i contacteze pe legionarii din Italia, care să 

transmită lui Sima scrisoarea 17 . Nu se ştie dacă informaŃiile au ajuns la Horia Sima. 

Cea mai puternică organizaŃie regrupată în 1947 a fost cea a Capitalei. Reactivarea 

cuiburilor începuse anterior sosirii lui Eugen Teodorescu în Ńară, odată cu trecerea 

conducerii de la Nelu Rusu la Mircea Nicolau, în martie 1947. 

Cine era Mircea Nicolau? În perioada guvernării naŃional-legionare a deŃinut funcŃia de 

inspector de poliŃie la Craiova, fiind arestat pentru „rebeliune“, deşi nu se afla în oraş în 

21-23 ianuarie 1941. A fost condamnat la 15 ani de închisoare, ispăşind pedeapsa la 

Aiud, Craiova, Văcăreşti şi Jilava. După adoptarea „pactului de neutralitate“ a fost graŃiat, 

în 1946, ca urmare a unui recurs la Curtea de JustiŃie şi CasaŃie Militară. După eliberare 

şi-a continuat studiile, absolvind Facultatea de Filozofie, în 1946. Între timp a reluat 

legăturile cu Mişcarea legionară, vizitându-l în mai multe rânduri pe Vică Negulescu. 

IniŃial, acesta nu i-a trasat nici o sarcină, discutând probleme de ordin general, dar şi 

despre situaŃia Mişcării, după negocierea „pactului de neutralitate“ 18 . La 1 martie 1947 

însă, Mircea Nicolau a primit de la Negulescu însărcinarea să conducă organizaŃia 

Bucureşti. Nelu Rusu, care avusese această responsabilitate până atunci, era cunoscut de 

autorităŃi pentru activitatea legionară, dar se arătase şi destul de inactiv în ultima 

perioadă. 

16 Chioreanu, Nistor, op. cit., p. 155-161. 

17 ACNSAS, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 34-37. 

18 Ibidem, f. 50-62. 

798

Predarea comenzii s-a realizat în prezenŃa lui Nicolae Petraşcu şi Mircea Nicolau. 

OrganizaŃia Bucureşti avea următoarea structură în martie 1947. Şeful „Corpului 

Muncitoresc Legionar“ era ing. Semergiu, care lucra la Ministerul Lucrărilor Publice. 

Nelu Rusu i-a făcut cunoştinŃă în cursul lunii martie cu Nicolau, în parcul Cişmigiu. 

„Corpul RăsleŃi“ era condus de Emil Bulhac, funcŃionar CFR. Legătura cu Mircea 

Nicolau s-a realizat în interiorului Palatului CFR, la jumătatea lunii martie. Şef al 

„Corpului StudenŃesc Legionar“ era Petre Sultana, însă în ultima perioadă se manifestase 

destul de nesigur. Se pare că Sultana nu a fost înştiinŃat că la conducerea Capitalei venise 

Nicolau. La şefia „Corpului Fetelor“ era Titi GâŃă, care urma să ia legătura cu Mircea 

Nicolau prin Vică Negulescu. În Capitală nu exista o organizaŃie FdC, şef pe Ńară fiind 

Costache Oprişan, care lucra direct cu „Comandamentul pe Ńară“. Grupa „organizaŃiilor 

Suburbane“ ale Capitalei era condusă de Dumitru (Mitică) Staicovici. Acesta era în 

legătură directă cu Nicolau, întrucât se cunoşteau de la închisoarea Aiud. OrganizaŃia 

Capitalei era construită extrem de conspirativ, şeful acesteia nefiind cunoscut decât de 

şefii Corpurilor din subordine, sau cel mult de înlocuitorii acestora 19 . 

Cel mai puternic Corp din Capitală era cel al „RăsleŃilor“, condus de Emil Bulhac. 

Conform instrucŃiunilor privind activitatea în ilegalitate era organizat pe cuiburi, compuse 

din 3-4 membri. Conform regulilor conspirativităŃii, Nicolau nu-i cunoştea pe membrii 

cuiburilor, fiind în legătură directă doar cu Bulhac. Doar când trebuiau trasate sarcini 

speciale Mircea Nicolau se întâlnea cu membrii cuiburilor. 

Spre deosebire de Emil Bulhac, ing. Semergiu nu a reuşit să-i organizeze pe muncitori 

într-o structură compactă. În general, cuiburile „Corpului Muncitoresc Legionar“ erau 

compuse din muncitori care nu lucrau împreună, ci la întreprinderi diferite. Era riscant să 

constituie cuiburi în fabrici, unde supravegherea sindicatelor comuniste era riguroasă, iar 

activitatea legionară putea fi deconspirată. În general, la nivelul Capitalei, activau 

muncitori de la: STB, Malaxa, Vulcan, Arsenalul Armatei, ospătari, Gaz şi Electricitate, 

CFR, dar şi de la alte unităŃi din sectoarele Roşu şi Albastru. Nicolau nu cunoştea numele 

şefilor de unităŃi CML, şi nu a avut niciodată legături cu ei. DispoziŃiile şi fondurile erau 

trasate/vărsate prin ing. Semergiu 20 . 

A doua organizaŃie ca importanŃă la nivel naŃional, după cea a Capitalei, erau „FrăŃiile 

de Cruce“. Acestea au început să-şi reia activitatea, în conformitate cu noile dispoziŃii ale 

„Comandamentului pe Ńară“, după începerea cursurilor liceelor, în octombrie. Elevii 

legionari se întâlneau în general în locurile publice, cum ar fi parcurile sau pădurile de la 

periferiile oraşelor. Uneori adunările se Ńineau şi la domiciliile particulare ale 

membrilor 21 . Ca de obicei, FdC-iştii se ocupau mai ales cu activitatea de curierat. O 

radicalizare a activităŃii FdC-iştilor s-a înregistrat în primăvara anului 1948, când 

măsurile autorităŃilor faŃă de Mişcarea legionară s-au înăsprit 22 . 

Reorganizarea Corpurilor legionare din anul 1947 a avut drept scop respectarea 

dispoziŃiilor lui Horia Sima de reactivare a organizaŃiei, în vederea participării la 

19 Ibidem, f. 162-163. 

20 Ibidem, f. 50-62. 

21 DANIC, Fond MI–Diverse, dos. nr. 2/1947, f. 14. 

22 Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 6/1932, f. 52. 

799

prezumtivele alegeri libere, în 1948. Însă semnalele din România nu duceau la o astfel de 

perspectivă, dimpotrivă. OpoziŃia fusese scoasă în afara legii, iar principalii lideri ai săi, 

în frunte cu Iuliu Maniu, erau după gratii la sfârşitul anului 1947. Aşadar, reorganizarea 

Mişcării legionare trebuia redirecŃionată, în eventualitatea unei confruntări directe cu 

regimul. Nu de şefi ai judeŃelor care să fie pe liste era nevoie, ci de conducători ai 

cuiburilor radicale, care să organizeze rezistenŃa împotriva măsurilor guvernamentale, 

când va fi nevoie. Era Mişcarea legionară capabilă să realizeze aşa ceva, după doi ani de 

inactivitate şi control din partea Ministerului de Interne, ca urmare a „pactului de 

neutralitate“? 

După a doua venire în Ńară a lui Eugen Teodorescu, în noiembrie 1947, 

„Comandamentul pe Ńară“ a decis ca, în paralel cu activitatea informativă, să iniŃieze şi o 

„activitate subversivă“. Era clar pentru toată lumea că odată cu organizarea serviciului de 

informaŃii pro-american se încheia politica de neutralitate, iar dacă autorităŃile 

descopereau una dintre activităŃi – de „spionaj“ sau „subversivă“ – începeau arestările. 

Responsabilitatea mobilizării cuiburilor cu potenŃial de „luptă“ i-a revenit lui Nistor 

Chioreanu, care mai avusese această responsabilitate şi în 1944-1945, după paraşutarea 

echipelor din Germania. Chioreanu a dat dispoziŃii ca legionarii implicaŃi în această 

activitate să fie organizaŃi în echipe de 3-4 persoane, care să fie pregătite pentru a intra în 

acŃiune oricând le va cere. Însă, ca şi în 1944-1945, legionarii din cuiburile pregătite 

pentru rezistenŃă nu aveau armament, fiindu-le recomandat să se descurce cum pot 23 . În 

1947, Decebal-Corneliu Andrei a aflat că exista un depozit de armament şi muniŃii 

necunoscut de autorităŃi undeva lângă Ploieşti. Vică Negulescu l-a trimis să verifice, însă 

nu a descoperit nimic. De asemenea, şefii din „Comandamentul pe Ńară“ au fost înştiinŃaŃi 

de Şerban Secu că ar exista unul sau două aparate de telegrafie fără fir ascunse într-o 

localitate din Transilvania. De asemenea, după căutări, nu s-a descoperit nimic. 

„Comandamentul“ nu mai avea nici resurse pentru a falsifica documente de identitate, 

acŃiune vitală pentru o activitate ilegală. Întrebat de Gabriel Bălănescu despre această 

problemă, Vică Negulescu l-a sfătuit să se descurce cum poate 24 . SituaŃia era mai critică 

decât în primăvara anului 1945, când, la sosirea lui Petraşcu în Bucureşti, Nelu Rusu 

(prin organizaŃia „Femeilor“) reuşise să falsifice documente pentru câŃiva camarazi care 

trăiau clandestin. 

În ciuda acestor dificultăŃi, totuşi Nistor Chioreanu a decis să continue planificarea 

„acŃiunii subversive“. În Ardeal l-a numit responsabil pe Şerban Secu, în Banat pe Puiu 

Florescu, iar în Oltenia şi Muntenia pe Ion JurubiŃă. Pentru Moldova, Chioreanu nu avea 

nici un om de încredere, trasându-i lui Vică Negulescu această responsabilitate. 

Negulescu l-a numit responsabil cu Moldova pe Gabriel Bălănescu. De organizarea 

subversivă în centrele universitare urma să se ocupe Gheorghe Brahonschi, ca şi în anii 

precedenŃi. De asemenea, problema elevilor din FdC era în atribuŃiile lui Constantin 

Oprişan, pe care însuşi Chioreanu îl învestise la comanda acestui Corp 25 . Pentru siguranŃa 

comunicării, a fost utilizat un cod secret. Acesta fusese creat de un legionar înainte de 

23 ACNSAS, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 335, vol. 1, f. 536. 

24 Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 431, f. 23-25 

25 Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 335, f. 536. 

800

ăzboi, fiind perfecŃionat în 1947, prin eliminarea unor dificultăŃi de decriptare a 

informaŃiilor 26 . 

AcŃiunea „Comandamentului pe Ńară“ de mobilizare a cuiburilor cu potenŃial de „luptă“ 

nu a dat randamentul scontat. În primul rând, majoritatea legionarilor nu erau dispuşi să 

se implice într-o acŃiune atât de periculoasă, care i-ar fi adus în faŃa unui tribunal militar, 

pentru „subminarea statului“. Doar cei cunoscuŃi de autorităŃi pentru activităŃile lor 

extremiste, care puteau fi arestaŃi în orice moment, s-au implicat cu precădere, întrucât nu 

aveau ce pierde. În al doilea rând, exista şi o problemă serioasă a finanŃării rezistenŃei. 

Când a venit în Ńară în vara anului 1947, Eugen Teodorescu avea în buzunar câŃiva dolari 

şi şilingi austrieci. Americanii care-l trimiseseră în România nu erau dispuşi să finanŃeze 

o acŃiune de rezistenŃă, nici să trimită armament. De asemenea, Horia Sima nu avea nici o 

posibilitate să trimită bani în Ńară, locuind ilegal în Italia şi arătându-se foarte rar la faŃă. 

OrganizaŃiile legionare care aveau activitate, mai ales cea a Capitalei, strângeau cotizaŃii 

cu prioritate pentru ajutorarea camarazilor din închisori, şi a familiilor acestora. Abia în 

februarie 1948 Nicolae Petraşcu a dispus o „bătălie“ pentru strângerea de fonduri, în 

scopul finanŃării activităŃii clandestine. Nu au fost colectaŃi decât 300.000 lei, acŃiunea 

fiind făcută la repezeală 27 . 

Unele Corpuri au reuşit să se gospodărească independent şi să tipărească manifeste, prin 

care-i chemau pe legionari la opoziŃie faŃă de regim. Astfel, în preajma Anului Nou 1948, 

„FrăŃiile de Cruce“ au lansat manifestul „Dragi camarazi“, în care se făcea apel la 

mobilizare: „În ciuda duşmanilor care doresc să ne vadă dezbinaŃi şi slabi, întâmpinăm 

noul an 1948 cu credinŃă în drumul nostru legionar, şi ascultăm porunca Comandantului 

nostru Horia Sima. Nu încetaŃi camarazi nici o clipă lupta pe care o duceŃi în primul rând 

cu voi înşivă, pentru a putea deveni ostaşii credincioşi şi puternici pe care neamul îi 

aşteaptă. Pe umerii fiecăruia vor apăsa în curând răspunderi grele. PregătiŃi-vă! Nu 

entuziasm trecător şi fără valoare, ci înŃelegere totală a misiunii noastre în faŃa lui 

Dumnezeu şi a Ńării. De un lucru, îndeosebi, trebuie să vă ocupaŃi cu perseverenŃă în tot 

decursul activităŃii: de problema recrutărilor. PăstraŃi continuitatea. ArătaŃi-vă tăria 

voastră şi pregătiŃi necontenit elementele cele mai bune. La MulŃi Ani! Trăiască Legiunea 

şi Căpitanul“ (semnat: Ajutorul şefului FdC, Vasile Văleanu) 28 . 

Însă mobilizarea clamată de manifestele Corpurilor legionare nu a avut efect de masă. 

Singurul moment important când s-a observat activitatea antiguvernamentală a opoziŃiei 

ilegale au fost alegerile pentru Marea Adunare NaŃională din 28 martie 1948 (scrutinul a 

avut totuşi loc, însă fără observatori internaŃionali şi fără alte partide în afara celor 

tolerate de comunişti pe liste!). Cu acest prilej, legionarii, în cooperare cu naŃional- 

Ńărăniştii, au dus o campanie de denigrare a regimului, prin diverse activităŃi de hărŃuire. 

Astfel, au fost rupte afişele Frontului DemocraŃiei Populare, s-au tipărit şi răspândit 

manifeste antiguvernamentale, s-au scris lozinci împotriva comuniştilor pe garduri şi pe 

ziduri etc. Unii „reacŃionari“ i-au sfătuit pe cetăŃeni să nu-şi ridice cărŃile de alegător, să 

se abŃină de la vot, sau să anuleze buletinul prin aplicarea greşită a ştampilei. Cele mai 

26 DANIC, Fond MI–Diverse, dos. nr. 5/1948, f. 1-5. 

27 ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, dos. nr. 151086, vol. 2, f. 50. 

28 DANIC, Fond MI–Diverse, dos. nr. 6/1932, f. 65. 

801

intense activităŃi de acest fel s-au înregistrat în judeŃele Arad, Prahova, Tecuci, 

Hunedoara şi în Bucureşti 29 . În oraşul OlteniŃa au fost lipite într-o seara portrete ale lui 

Mihai I, Horia Sima şi Corneliu Codreanu 30 . 

Serviciul de informaŃii pro-american al Mişcării legionare 

Atât datorită lipsei de entuziasm pentru „acŃiuni subversive“, cât şi datorită lipsei 

fondurilor, acŃiunea de organizare a unei opoziŃii „în teren“ faŃă de regimul comunist, în 

toamna 1947 – primăvara 1948, a eşuat. „Comandamentul pe Ńară“ al Mişcării legionare 

şi-a concentrat atenŃia şi asupra altei activităŃi în această perioadă, respectiv crearea unui 

serviciu de informaŃii pentru americani. 

După plecarea din Ńară, în iulie 1947, Eugen Teodorescu s-a întors în Austria, pentru a 

raporta misiunea sa din România. La Salzburg s-a întâlnit cu Vasile Mailat, cu Malner şi 

cu un anume Auner (austriac ieşit din lagărul de la Glasenbach, care lucra pentru 

americani, ca şi Malner). Cu Mailat a discutat despre situaŃia Mişcării legionare din Ńară, 

pentru ca informaŃiile să-i fie transmise mai departe lui Horia Sima. DiscuŃia cu Malner şi 

Auner s-a referit la posibilităŃile de întemeiere a unui serviciu de informaŃii pro-american, 

în rândul legionarilor. Celor doi le-a transmis că pusese bazele unui mic „sâmbure de 

reŃea informativă în România, care a şi început să lucreze“ 31 . În realitate, nu realizase 

acest lucru, ci avea la dispoziŃie doar o „dare de seamă“ întocmită de Vică Negulescu 32 . 

Apoi, Malner şi Auner i-au cerut câteva note informative despre situaŃia din România: 

starea de spirit, economatele, legea colectărilor produselor agricole, situaŃia industriei, 

memoriul lui Gheorghe Tătărescu, eventualele grupe de rezistenŃă, arestarea lui Iuliu 

Maniu, situaŃia regelui Mihai I, statutul diferiŃilor oameni politici, starea de spirit în 

rândul ofiŃerilor etc. Teodorescu a fost rugat să întocmească un buget, pe „cap de om“ 

încadrat în reŃeaua sa informativă. Urma să primească 1.000 de dolari lunar, socotiŃi în lei 

la cursul oficial, pentru o reŃea de zece oameni. Notele întocmite de Eugen Teodorescu 

trebuiau să fie semnate „617“, iar cele scrise de colaboratorii săi din Ńară cu cifrele 

următoare lui 617. Malner dorea ca Teodorescu să plece imediat în România, şi să 

organizeze două trimiteri de material pe lună. Eugen Teodorescu a obiectat însă, 

susŃinând că timpul era prea scurt, şi că va trimite un material pe lună. Pe lângă 

organizarea serviciului şi strângerea de material, mai trebuia să aranjeze şi o legătură de 

telegrafie fără fir (a fost instruit să utilizeze acest mijloc de comunicaŃii). După o 

săptămână de la sosirea la Salzburg, lui Teodorescu i-a fost prezentat un anume Terner, 

ofiŃer american de informaŃii, care umbla în civil. Acesta a studiat notele pe care le 

redactase, fiind încântat de informaŃiile pe care le putea obŃine prin reŃeaua legionară. 

La începutul lunii septembrie, Eugen Teodorescu a avut o întâlnire importantă şi pe 

linie legionară, cu Traian Borobaru (colaborator apropiat al lui Horia Sima), care sosise la 

Salzburg. Întrevederea dintre cei doi a fost organizată de Vasile Mailat. Teodorescu i-a 

29 

CNSAS, Fond Informativ, dos. nr. 10312, f. 143-146. 

30 

Ibidem, f. 10-11. 

31 

Ibidem, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574. 

32 

Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 19-20. 

802

prezentat lui Borobaru situaŃia Mişcării legionare din Ńară, precum şi legăturile sale cu 

filiera Terner–Malner–Auner, pe care trebuia să i-o comunice lui Horia Sima. La finalul 

discuŃiei, Borobaru i-a comunicat lui Teodorescu că se va ocupa singur de serviciul de 

informaŃii, fără să-l implice pe Nicolae Petraşcu. Acesta din urmă trebuia să se îngrijească 

în continuare de Mişcarea legionară, cele două activităŃi – de reorganizare şi informativă 

– fiind independente. Eugen Teodorescu trebuia să rămână în Ńară maxim şase luni, după 

care se întorcea în Austria. Dacă Petraşcu trebuia să vină în străinătate urma să i se 

comunice prin curieri. După această discuŃie, Borobaru s-a dus în Bavaria, întorcându-se 

la începutul lunii octombrie. Între timp, Teodorescu a aflat de la Mailat că şi Borobaru 

avusese discuŃii şi Malner şi Auner. Nu este clar în ce măsură Horia Sima era implicat în 

această activitate de informaŃii, însă este cert că Traian Borobaru lucra cu americanii. 

InformaŃiile din Ńară trebuiau să-i fie trimise lui Vasile Mailat, care le trimitea mai 

departe. Serviciul informativ în care era implicată Mişcarea legionară era legat de alte 

centre superioare americane, trecând peste Salzburg. 

Plecarea lui Eugen Teodorescu spre Ńară a fost programată la sfârşitul lunii octombrie 

1947. A primit de la Auner 1.000 de dolari, plus cerneală simpatică, pentru a fi utilizată în 

scrierea notelor informative. Ca şi în vară, a plecat din Salzburg cu Dragoş Hoinic, căruia 

i-a dat 450 de dolari. Apoi cei doi s-au deplasat la Viena, pentru a-l contacta pe GhiŃă 

Stoia, în vederea facilitării trecerii ilegale a frontierei austriaco-ungare. Însă pe drum 

Hoinic s-a îmbolnăvit, Stoia înlocuindu-l în misiunea spre România. Au trecut graniŃa 

dintre Austria şi Ungaria la jumătatea lunii noiembrie, ajungând la Bucureşti pe aceiaşi 

rută ca şi în iunie. 

A doua zi după sosirea în Capitală l-au contactat pe Vică Negulescu, pe care 

Teodorescu l-a informat despre dispoziŃiile lui Borobaru: „Comandamentul din Ńară“ să se 

ocupe cu reorganizarea, iar cei veniŃi din Austria cu serviciul de informaŃii. Pentru 

această din urmă misiune a cerut un om de legătură, iar Negulescu l-a recomandat pe 

Decebal-Corneliu Andrei (prieten cu Costache Oprişan, şeful FdC şi cu multe contacte în 

Mişcarea legionară). Teodorescu şi Andrei s-au întâlnit după câteva zile, stabilind un plan 

referitor la cum trebuia să se lucreze, şi cum să se raporteze materialul: informaŃii 

militare, politice, economice, sociale, despre oamenii politici importanŃi, despre 

activitatea Guvernului şi a opoziŃiei, starea de spirit în rândul militarilor etc. Trebuia să se 

organizeze o reŃea pe orizontală – pe toată Ńară, şi una pe verticală – pe domenii de 

activitate. Fiecare şef de reŃea trebuia să Ńină legătura cu Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, care 

apoi comunica cu Teodorescu 33 . 

După sosirea lui Teodorescu în Bucureşti, Vică Negulescu i-a chemat pe Nicolae 

Petraşcu şi Nistor Chioreanu de la Sibiu, pentru consfătuiri. Întâlnirea a avut loc în casa 

lui Nelu Rusu. DiscuŃiile au avut loc în contradictoriu, întrucât Teodorescu nu a putut 

dovedi că avea ordin de la Horia Sima pentru organizarea serviciului de spionaj. Spre 

deosebire de prima sosire, din vară, Teodorescu nu avea într-adevăr nici un semnal de la 

Sima, ci doar de la Traian Borobaru (secretarul său), care lucra cu americanii în 

Germania. Însă, în 1947, nici Borobaru nu avea contacte regulate cu Sima, care trăia în 

Italia, ascunzându-şi identitatea. În consecinŃă, datorită situaŃiei încurcate, Teodorescu a 

33 Ibidem, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 335, vol. 1, f. 567-574. 

803

fost sfătuit să lucreze cât mai discret, şi să nu implice prea mult Mişcarea legionară în 

activitatea de informaŃii 34 . 

După întâlnire, Petraşcu şi Chioreanu au plecat la Sibiu, iar Eugen Teodorescu a rămas 

în legătură cu Vică Negulescu, din partea „Comandamentului pe Ńară“. Nu avea întâlniri 

frecvente nici nu acesta, pentru conspirativitate. Era în dialog permanent însă cu Decebal- 

Corneliu Andrei, care până la jumătatea lunii decembrie a reuşit, de unul singur, să 

strângă câteva note informative, după modelul cerut de Teodorescu la sosirea în Ńară. 

Acestea au fost transcrise cu cerneală simpatică şi trimise prin GhiŃă Stoia în Austria. 

Stoia a trecut graniŃa ilegal, pe ruta pe care sosise în Ńară, fiind ajutat de Aurel Călin 35 . A 

ajuns cu bine la Viena, trimiŃând informaŃiile la Salzburg, la Vasile Mailat, prin Gogu 

Gheorghiu 36 . 

Pe de altă parte, suspiciunea membrilor „Comandamentului pe Ńară“ faŃă de acŃiunea lui 

Teodorescu era maximă. Astfel, după plecarea lui GhiŃă Stoia spre Austria, Vică 

Negulescu i-a dat dispoziŃie lui Decebal-Corneliu Andrei să plece în Occident, ca să-l 

contacteze pe Horia Sima. A reuşit să treacă graniŃa româno-maghiară, însă s-a întors din 

drum, din lipsă de bani pentru a continua călătoria 37 . 

Întors la Bucureşti, Decebal-Corneliu Andrei a continuat activitatea de strângere a 

informaŃiilor. La începutul lunii februarie 1948, din Austria a sosit în România Dragoş 

Hoinic, trecând frontiera clandestin, pe la Beba-Veche. Acesta primise instrucŃiuni pentru 

Teodorescu de la Gogu Gheorghiu, iar cerneală simpatică, sub formă de pastile, de la 

Vasile Mailat 38 . Hoinic s-a întâlnit cu Vică Negulescu şi Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, în 

casa acestuia din urmă. S-a iscat un scandal deoarece Eugen Teodorescu şi GhiŃă Stoia nu 

reuşiseră să utilizeze corespunzător cerneala simpatică în decembrie 1947, iar notele 

informative ajunse la Salzburg nu au putut fi citite. Acum, în februarie 1948, apăruseră 

din nou probleme cu cerneala simpatică, deoarece au greşit formula de dizolvare şi a 

devenit inutilizabilă 39 . În cele din urmă, Dragoş Hoinic a scris notele informative cu 

cerneală obişnuită, riscând să fie arestat pentru spionaj, în cazul în care era percheziŃionat. 

Decebal-Corneliu Andrei i-a furnizat date despre situaŃia producŃiei petrolifere, rapoartele 

politice în general, şi câteva informaŃii militare 40 . A plecat la sfârşitul lunii februarie, prin 

punctul de frontieră Pilu (jud. Arad), servindu-i drept călăuză şi profesorului Dragoş 

Protopopescu. Înainte de a pleca, s-a întâlnit cu Nicolae Petraşcu, care i-a dat dispoziŃie 

să-l întâlnească personal pe Horia Sima, sau cel puŃin pe Traian Borobaru, cărora să le 

transmită situaŃia reală din Ńară, şi să primească instrucŃiuni pentru viitor. Ajuns la 

Salzburg i-a transmis notele informative lui Vasile Mailat, care i-a făcut legătura cu 

Borobaru. La discuŃia cu Traian Borobaru a participat şi Mircea Dimitriu 41 . 

34 Ibidem, f. 504-505. 

35 Ibidem, f. 567-574. 

36 Ibidem, loc. cit., vol. 2, f. 212-213. 

37 Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 19-20. 


39 Ibidem, loc. cit., dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 32. 


41 Ibidem, f. 212-213. 

804

După plecarea lui Dragoş Hoinic în Austria, Eugen Teodorescu a solicitat o nouă 

întrevedere cu Nicolae Petraşcu. Întâlnirea a fost organizată de Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, 

locul ales fiind Parcul Domeniilor din Bucureşti. Teodorescu era nemulŃumit că nu 

primea sprijin din partea lui Petraşcu. După această discuŃie, Eugen Teodorescu a primit 

un prim ajutor important din partea „Comandamentului pe Ńară“, prin implicarea 

organizaŃiei Capitalei în acŃiunea de strângere de informaŃii. Astfel, Decebal-Corneliu 

Andrei a intrat în legătură cu Mircea Nicolau, care l-a desemnat pe Luca Dumitrescu să 

colaboreze la operaŃiune. Andrei şi Dumitrescu au pus la punct o reŃea de strângere a 

informaŃiilor, după modelul adus de Eugen Teodorescu în decembrie 1947. Aşadar, în 

cadrul „Corpului RăsleŃi“ al Capitalei au fost constituite cinci echipe informative, cu 

numere de la 14 la 18. Fiecare echipă era constituită din cinci oameni, incluzându-l pe 

şeful acesteia. Echipa nr. 14 era condusă de C. Diaconescu (recrutat de Mircea Nicolau), 

Echipa nr. 15 era condusă de Cristian Petrescu (recrutat de Luca Dumitrescu), Echipa nr. 

16 era condusă de Puiu Anastasescu (recrutat de Luca Dumitrescu), Echipa nr. 17 era 

condusă de Gheorghe Gall (recrutat de Luca Dumitrescu), iar Echipa nr. 18 era condusă 

de Nonu Sassu (recrutat de Mircea Nicolau). Echipa nr. 14 şi-a început activitatea în 

prima parte a lunii martie, Echipele nr. 15 şi nr. 16 s-au constituit în ultima parte a lunii 

martie, iar Echipele nr. 17 şi nr. 18 s-au constituit în aprilie. Organizarea acestora s-a 

făcut destul de anevoios şi au avut acŃiune regulată doar în luna aprilie 1947. Cu ocazia 

sărbătorilor de Paşte s-au descompletat, nereuşind să se reorganizeze ulterior. 

Conform instrucŃiunilor lui Decebal-Corneliu Andrei, Luca Dumitrescu trebuia să ia 

contact personal cu fiecare şef de echipă pentru a culege informaŃiile. La rândul lui, şeful 

de echipă era în contact direct cu ceilalŃi patru membri ai săi. Purta cu ei conversaŃii orale, 

iar mai apoi redacta nota informativă, către Luca Dumitrescu. Acesta făcea o sinteză a 

datelor pe care le primea, prezenta apoi lui Decebal-Corneliu Andrei (îl întâlnea la 7-10 

zile). Un raport informativ al lui Luca Dumitrescu trebuia să aibă şapte puncte: 1. ştiri în 

legătură cu activitatea guvernului; 2. activitatea PCR; 3. partidele istorice şi opoziŃia în 

general; 4. ştiri în legătură cu Mişcarea legionară (din interiorul organizaŃiei şi atitudinea 

guvernului faŃă de Mişcarea legionară); 5. ştiri din tabăra dizidenŃilor Mişcării legionare; 

6. ştiri despre mişcările de rezistenŃă; 7. diverse 42 . 

De multe ori, informaŃiile primite de la membrii echipelor informative erau speculative 

şi culese de la persoane care nu aveau neapărat legături în cercurile puterii, sau ale 

armatei 43 . Informările produse de echipele lui Luca Dumitrescu erau de genul: „Mişcări 

de trupe în Muntenia. (17 aprilie). Prin Braşov a trecut un tren cu 10 vagoane cu militari 

români (circa 50 de oameni în vagon). Trenul trecea spre Predeal. A fost observat un 

sublocotenent. Restul era alcătuit în majoritate din gradaŃi. Se crede că erau de la o şcoală 

de cadre“ 44 . 

Informările strânse de Decebal-Corneliu Andrei prin intermediul „Corpului RăsleŃi“ din 

Bucureşti nu au reuşit să ajungă în Austria, la serviciile speciale americane. La sfârşitul 

lunii aprilie 1948, Dragoş Hoinic a plecat din Linz spre România, având asupra sa 620 de 


43 Ibidem, f. 216-228. 

44 Ibidem, f. 606-608. 

805

dolari, trimişi de Vasile Mailat, prin intermediul lui Gogu Gheorghiu. Primise, de 

asemenea, informaŃii verbale şi scrise, cerneală simpatică, precum şi diverse adrese 

destinate lui Eugen Teodorescu şi Nicolae Petraşcu. Acestea nu au ajuns la destinatari 

întrucât Hoinic a fost arestat la puŃin timp după trecerea ilegală în România 45 . Toată 

reŃeaua de informaŃii a căzut în săptămânile următoare. Nu doar datorită arestării lui 

Hoinic, ci şi imprudenŃelor comise de Eugen Teodorescu. Acesta nu a respectat regulile 

conspirativităŃii, iar în scurt timp după a doua sosire în România autorităŃile au aflat atât 

despre prezenŃa lui în Ńară, dar şi despre serviciul de informaŃii în favoarea americanilor 46 . 

Luându-i-se urma, Ministerul de Interne a descoperit şi reŃeaua lui Luca Dumitrescu. 

Procesul 

Procesul de „spionaj“ a avut loc în anul 1949, şef de „lot“ fiind desemnat de către 

autorităŃi Vică Negulescu. El a fost făcut responsabil de crearea în cadrul organizaŃiei 

Bucureşti a Mişcării legionare a unui resort de spionaj, care-i furniza informaŃii lui Eugen 

Teodorescu. 

În actul de acuzare, Vică Negulescu era învinovăŃit că: „a iniŃiat şi constituit împreună 

cu Nicolae Petraşcu şi Mircea Nicolau o organizaŃie subversivă de tip fascist, politică şi 

paramilitară constituită din elemente ale fostei Mişcări legionare, cu scopul pregătirii unei 

acŃiuni de răsturnare a regimului democratic; a organizat o reŃea de spionaj cu 

încuviinŃarea lui Nicolae Petraşcu, cu elemente luate din grupul subordonat lui Mircea 

Nicolau, care culegea informaŃii cu caracter politic, economic, militar şi social, pe care le 

transmitea serviciului de spionaj american, prin intermediul lui Horia Sima şi cu 

concursul lui Eugen Teodorescu“. Pe lângă reorganizarea Capitalei, începând cu martie 

1947, Mircea Nicolau mai era acuzat şi de implicare în construirea unei reŃele de spionaj 

în favoarea americanilor. Ultimul punct în actul de acuzare în cazul lui Nicolau se refera 

la activitatea sa de după arestările din mai 1948, când l-a ajutat pe Nistor Chioreanu să 

refacă „Comandamentul“. Un alt membru al „lotului“ a fost Luca Dumitrescu, legionarul 

care s-a ocupat de organizarea reŃelei de informaŃii subordonată lui Decebal-Corneliu 

Andrei. Deşi nu a fost implicat în această activitate, în „lot“ a fost inclus şi Nelu Rusu, 

care condusese organizaŃia Capitalei înainte de Mircea Nicolau. Era acuzat că a menŃinut 

legăturile cu Vică Negulescu după martie 1947, căruia i-a furnizat „informaŃii diverse“ 

(de fapt, cei doi se înştiinŃau reciproc despre intenŃiile regimului faŃă de legionari). Fără 

vreo legătură cu „reŃeaua de spionaj“ a lui Luca Dumitrescu, procesul l-a avut inculpat şi 

pe Constantin Conic. În iulie 1948, acesta urma să fie trimis în străinătate de Nistor 

Chioreanu, pentru a prezenta situaŃia din Ńară liderilor din exil. În total, în „lot“ au fost 

incluse 20 de persoane, majoritatea implicate în „afacerea“ reŃelei de informaŃii 

organizată de Luca Dumitrescu la nivelul Capitalei 47 . 

SentinŃa s-a emis la 10 februarie 1949, principalii inculpaŃi primind următoarele 

pedepse: Vică Negulescu (în vârstă de 44 de ani) – muncă silnică pe viaŃă, 10 ani 


46 Ibidem, Fond Informativ, dos. nr. 233979, vol. 3, f. 165. 

47 Ibidem, Fond Penal, dos. nr. 431, vol. 1, f. 2-17. 

806

degradare civică şi confiscarea averii pentru înaltă trădare; Mircea Nicolau (în vârstă de 

35 de ani) – muncă silnică pe viaŃă, 10 ani degradare civică şi confiscarea averii pentru 

înaltă trădare; Nelu Rusu (în vârstă de 38 de ani) – 25 de ani muncă silnică, 10 ani 

degradare civică şi confiscarea averii pentru înaltă trădare; Constantin Coniac (37 de ani) 

– 25 ani muncă silnică şi 5 ani degradare civică pentru organizare şi participare la 

organizaŃii de tip fascist 48 . La 21 ianuarie 1950 Curtea Militară de CasaŃie şi JustiŃie a 

respins recursurile formulate de condamnaŃi 49 . 

Bibliografie 

Documente inedite 

1. Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii, Fond Penal: dos. 

nr. 335, dos. nr. 431. 

2. Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii, Fond Documentar: 

dos. nr. 11572. 

3. Arhiva Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii, Fond Informativ: 

dos. nr. 10312, dos. nr. 151086, dos. nr. 181086. 

4. Arhivele NaŃionale ale României – DirecŃia Arhive NaŃionale Istorice Centrale, Fond 

Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei: dos. nr. 27/1947. 


Ministerul de Interne – Diverse: dos. nr. 6/1932, dos. nr. 2/1947, dos. nr. 5/1948. 


DirecŃia Generală a PoliŃiei: dos. nr. 45/1947. 


Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Român – SecŃia Administrativ Politică: dos. 

nr. 4/1952. 

Memorii 

1. Chioreanu, Nistor, Morminte vii, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1992, 384 p. 

2. Verca, Filon, ParaşutaŃi în România vândută: mişcarea de rezistenŃă: 1944-1948, 

Timişoara, Editura Gordian, 1993, 593 p. 

48 Ibidem, loc. cit., vol. 2, f. 136-151. 

49 Ibidem, f. 383-387. 

807

MILITARII DIN EXILUL ROMÂNESC 

POSTBELIC ŞI CONDAMNAREA 

COMUNISMULUI 

Mihaela TOADER 1 

La sfârşitul război mondial un număr restrâns de militari români fie aflaŃi la post în 

Ńările vest europene, unde îndeplineau diferite misiuni diplomatice, fie trimişi la studii în 

Germania sau cei făcuŃi prizonieri cu ocazia desfăşurării operaŃiunilor militare pe frontul de 

vest la care se adaugă, mai târziu cei îndepărtaŃi în mod abuziv din armată pe criterii politice, 

au ales calea exilului. MulŃi dintre aceştia au luat atitudine privind condamnarea 

comunismului. 

Aşa cum rezultă din documentele parcurse, majoritatea militarilor români au plecat din 

Ńară în perioada anilor 1941-1950 2 . EvoluŃia organizării reprezentanŃilor militarilor în exil s-a 

dezvoltat în raport sau în funcŃie de evenimentele internaŃionale cât şi din perspectiva 

acŃiunilor sovieticilor din Ńară. 

Pe de altă parte se crează o ca urmare a Războiului Rece o imagine a unui continent 

european divizat între o Europă de Vest afectată de americanizare şi o Europă Răsăriteană 

sovietizată. Geografic şi simbolic, „dezbaterea din Occident legată de prezenŃa americană în 

Europa identifică aproape întotdeauna Vechiul Continent cu partea sa vestică. De obicei, 

cealaltă parte a Europei e menŃionată marginal, sau e pur şi simplu ignorată. Atunci când e 

luată în discuŃie, prezenŃa americană în Europa Răsăriteană e prezentată arareori ca o temă 

autonomă, fiind de obicei folosită în contexte în care se dezbate eficienŃa diolomaŃiei 

culturale americane în timpul Războiului Rece. Cu alte cuvinte, despre ce fel de prezenŃă 

1 

Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, Bucureşti, 

Romania. 

2 

Se poate vorbi de două perioade în care militarii români au plecat din Ńară: 1. între anii 1941-1945, se 

încadrează cei proveniŃi dintre legionarii persecutaŃi în timpul regimului instaurat de regimul Ion 

Antonescu, ofiŃerii şi subofiŃerii din Divizia „General Platon Chirnoagă” şi militarii aflaŃi la studii în 

Germania; 2. 1946-1950, mai cu seamă după abdicarea regelui Mihai, se includ militarii nemulŃumiŃi 

de situaŃia creată în armată în urma epurărilor masive pe criterii politice şi a derulării acŃiunii de 

„democratizare” a organismului militar. Dintre aceştia o parte au ajuns în Occident, trecând prin 

Ungaria şi Austria, alŃii prin Iugoslavia, iar alŃii în special aviatori, prin Turcia; Vezi ACNSAS, fond 

SIE, dosar nr. 184; Ion Calafeteanu, Exilul Românesc. Erodarea SperanŃei. Documente (1951-1975) 

Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2003, Ion Calafeteanu, Politică şi exil 1946-1950 Din istoria 

exilului românesc, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2000; 

808

americană se poate vorbi într-o regiune ocupată de Armata Roşie şi căzută în sfera de 

influenŃă a Uniunii Sovietice? Diviziunile politice, ideologice, economice şi culturale dintre 

Vest şi Est au fost majore şi au avut un impact important asupra evoluŃiilor de pe Continent” 3 . 

Militarii care au ales calea de a rămâne în Occident au încercat, prin diferite mijloace să 

fie purtătorii de cuvânt a românilor care au rămas în Ńară sub înfluenŃa unui regim care se 

îndrepta către un totalitarism comunist. „FuncŃia de reprezentare s-a materializat în raport cu 

Occidentul în ansamblu, cu autorităŃile statelor gazdă şi cu opinia publică din lumea liberă” 4 . 

Însă funcŃia de reprezentare a fost direct legată de funcŃia de informare care s-a desfăşurat pe 

două direcŃii. Pe de o parte, „exilul românesc a căutat să informeze şi mai ales să 

sensibilizeze în legătură cu situaŃia din Ńară. Dar, pe lângă informarea puterilor occidentale cu 

privire la natura, practicile şi consecinŃele regimului comunist din România, exilul a avut şi 

rolul de a informa opinia publică din Ńară” 5 . Pe de altă parte, „o funcŃie de o importanŃă 

deosebită a exilului a fost aceea de păstrare a tradiŃiei democratice, concomitent cu 

delegitimarea regimului comunist. Exilul românesc a întreŃinut ideea unei românii alternative, 

democratice şi a reprezentat conştiinŃa vie a naŃiunii” 6 . În acest context exilul reprezentat prin 

militari a încercat prin generalul Nicolae Rădescu crearea Comitetului NaŃional Român care 

s-a dorit reprezentarea guvernului român din exil. 

O primă categorie a exilului postbelic a fost reprezentat pe lângă diplomaŃii de carieră 

militarii români care au deŃinut funcŃii militare diplomatice în străinătate şi care au refuzat să 

se întoarcă în Ńară. Printre aceştia s-au numărat: generalul Gheorghe Băgulescu şi generalul 

Ion Gheorghe. 

De asemenea una dintre personalităŃile diplomatice foarte active ale exilului a fost, fără 

îndoială, diplomatul Radu Scarlat Arion 7 , însărcinat cu afaceri al Ńării la Atena până 1947. 

Acesta a ordonat un raport de 72 de pagini asupra organizării armatelor din Ńările comuniste, 

cu referire specială la România. Raportul oferă informaŃii de ordin militar culese de autor de 

la refugiaŃi şi mai ales de la un ofiŃer român – nenumit – care ulterior s-a stabilit în Australia. 

Ele sunt dublate de ample comentarii politice asupra efectelor comunismului, în primul rând 

în România, şi apoi în Ńările vecine ori în îndepărtata Chină. 

„Planul de reorganizare a armatei române 8 , eşalonat pe trei ani, e în mare parte terminat, 

dată fiind graba cu care comuniştii pregătesc războiul. Se pare că serviciile de informaŃii ale 

3 Bogdan Barbu, Vin americanii! PrezenŃa simbolică a Statelor Unite în România Războiului Rece, 

Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006, pp. 17-19; 

4 Dumitru Dobre, Iulia Huiu, Mihaela Toader, Sursele SecurităŃii informează, Editura Humanitas, 

Bucureşti, 2008, p. 23. 

5 Ibidem. 

6 Ibidem. 

7 Vezi despre Constantin Arion, Radu Scarlat Arion, diplomat şi dizident, în „Revista istorică”, III, 

1992, nr. 7-8, p. 834-836; 

8 Vezi Ulrich Burger, Misiunea Ethridge în România, FundaŃia Academia Civică, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 

231-236; 

809

puterilor occidentale sunt sistematic înşelate de comunişti atunci când încearcă să afle stadiul 

de pregătire al armatelor comuniste. Se pare, de asemeni, că occidentalii nu cunosc faptul că 

serviciile de informaŃii ale armatelor comuniste au un compartiment special de 

„dezinformare”, compartiment însărcinat cu contraspionaj şi care s-a specializat în a face să 

ajungă la îndemâna birourilor de informaŃii ale adversarilor date false asupra armatelor 

comuniste, documente greşite sau trucate, ca şi hărŃi false. 

Raport asupra organizării actuale a forŃelor armate ale R.P.R. 

Conducătorii puterilor occidentale se înşeală dacă subestimează forŃa militară a Ńărilor 

satelite Uniunii Sovietice, inclusiv a Ńărilor foste inamice, ca România. În urma reoganizării 

forŃelor armate române după modelul sovietic, guvernul comunist de la Bucureşti ar putea 

mobiliza rapid, în caz de război, o armată cu efective egale, dacă nu chiar superioare, celor 

avute de armata regală română în timpul războiului împotriva Uniunii Sovietice. 

Conducătorii occidentali nu trebuie să-şi imagineze că guvernele comuniste, care nu 

respectă niciun angajament prevăzut în tratate şi convenŃii în domeniul politic, economic, 

cultural, etc., vor respecta tocmai angajamentele pe care şi le-au asumat în domeniul militare. 

După semnarea armistiŃiului de la 23 august 1944, armata română a suferit o epurare 

drastică, majoritatea ofiŃerilor şi subofiŃerilor activi şi de rezervă fiind scoşi din cadre. 

Aceştia au fost înlocuiŃi cu oferiŃi şi subofiŃeri provenind dintre soldaŃii aparŃinând diviziile 

comuniste Tudor Vladimirescu şi Horia, Cloşca şi Crişan, sosite din URSS. 

Comuniştii au mai păstrat câŃiva ofiŃeri de carieră ca să împiedice dezorganizarea 

completă a armatei, având în vedere incapacitatea totală a ofiŃerilor şi subofiŃerilor care 

proveneau din soldaŃi. Vechii ofiŃeri şi subofiŃeri care au fost menŃinuŃi au fost folosiŃi pentru 

instruirea noilor cadre ale armatei, recutate printre aderenŃii regimului. Originea socială e 

criteriul principal de recutare a viitorilor ofiŃeri şi subofiŃeri ai armatei comuniste. PromoŃiile 

de ofiŃeri şi subofiŃeri români ieşite în cursul anilor 1946, 1947, 1948 şi 1949 sunt în 

întregime formate din fii de muncitori ori de membrii ai partidului comunist”. 

Despre recutarea cadrelor în armată se regăseşte într-un amplu articol semnat de 

colonelul Dan Ivanovici 9 : „OfiŃerii se recutează în prezent atât în trupele M.F.A. cât şi în 

trupele M.A.I. din şcolile de ofiŃeri din U.R.S.S. Numai tinerii care s-au evidenŃiat prin 

activitate comunistă în organizaŃiile de tineret, acei cu origine socială sănătoasă, acei care nu 

au avut niciun fel de avere, atât ei cât şi părinŃii lor, etc, pot fi admişi în şcolile de ofiŃeri. 

Verificarea şi supravegherea acestora continuă în tot timpul celor doi ani de şcoală, mulŃi din 

ei fiind daŃi afară, cu câteva luni sau chiar câteva zile înainte de a deveni ofiŃeri. În afară de 

aceştia, mai pot fi primiŃi direct în şcolile de ofiŃeri, tineri din Uniunea Tinerilor Muncitori 

(U.T.M.) trimişi direct de organizaŃiile de partid, tineri evidenŃiaŃi prin activitatea şi 

devotamentul lor pentru cauza comunistă. Concomitent li se face o temeinică pregătire 

politică, predându-li-se: studiul marxist şi cunoaşterea URSS cu întreaga istorie a partidului 

9 Buletinul Militar nr. 5, 1953, Recutarea cadrelor în armata R.P.R., pp. 14-15; 

810

comunist bolşevic al URSS. În prezent, datorită faptului că majoritatea ofiŃerilor de carieră au 

fost îndepărataŃi, după ce au fost folosiŃi la reorganizarea armatei comuniste, ofiŃerii 

comunişti au fost întăriŃi la comenzile unităŃilor şi dublaŃi de comandanŃii politici. Acolo, 

unde se mai găsesc ofiŃeri de carieră înseamnă că prezenŃa lor mai este încă necesară; 

înlocuirea lor nu va întârzia însă. ToŃi aceşti ofiŃeri, care sunt consideraŃi duşmani ai 

poporului sunt dublaŃi sau secondaŃi, de aşa manieră, încât orice mişcare sau orice gest este 

supravegheat. Pretutindeni, în toate compartimentele militare, ofiŃerii politici, prin agenŃii lor 

acoperiŃi sau nu, zădărnicesc orice intenŃie de rezistenŃă”. 

În concluzie una din condiŃiile principale, care s-a constiut într-o primă etapă şi care care 

i-a determinat pe militarii români să urmeze calea exilului a fost tocmai reorganizarea 

armatei 10 . Aceasta a fost una dintre primele atitudini ale militarilor privind condamnarea 

comunismului şi a întregului sistem constituit în România. 

O primă organizaŃie politică a românilor aflaŃi în exil a fost reprezentată de Comitetul 

NaŃional Român de la New York 11 . „Necesitatea de a reprezenta întreaga Ńară (România) în 

faŃa imperialiştilor şi necesitatea de acŃiona unitar, a determinat unele grupuri politice să 

constitue un Comitet naŃional român al emigranŃilor din străinătate” 12 . Un rol important în 

cadrul acestui Comitet, care s-a dorit, de fapt, un guvern provizoriu a românilor din exil, a 

fost reprezentat de generalul Nicolae Rădescu. „Personajul principal în jurul căruia s-au 

adunat cu toŃii pentru constituirea acestui Comitet NaŃional Român a fost generalul Nicolea 

Rădescu, pe care l-au ales de la început ca preşedinte. Două împrejurări au determinat această 

alegere: a) Rădescu Nicolae a fost ultimul preşedinte al Consiliului de miniştri, recunoscut ca 

legal; b) Nicolae Rădescu a avut atitudinea net anticomunistă, manifestată vehement şi făŃiş 

în februarie 1945” 13 . Generalul Nicolae Rădescu 14 s-a dovedit o personalitate puternică în 

cadrul acestei organizaŃii care s-a născut ca un comitet ce dorea ca prin acŃiunile sale să 

contribuie la condamnarea comunismului. 

Printre acŃiunile de început ale generalui Nicolae Rădescu trebuie menŃionate încercările 

sale de unificare sau de grupare a militarilor din exil cum ar fi atragerea de partea sa pe 

generalul Platon Chirnoagă şi Puiu Petrescu, colonelul Ion Tomoroveanu, comandorii Mihail 

10 

Pentru reorganizarea armatei vezi Florin Şperlea, De la armata regală la armata populară. 

Sovietizarea armatei române (1948-1955), Editura Ziua, 2003; 

11 

Această organizaŃie a fost înfiinŃată în următoarele împrejurări: între anii 1945-1948 au fugit în 

străinătate unii fruntaşi reacŃionari, ca Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti, Constantin Vişoianu, Nicolae 

Rădescu, Augustin Popa, Virgil Veniamin, Mişu Fărcăşanu, Vintilă Brătianu, Zissu, Ieftimie Gherman 

şi alŃii. Vezi Caietele INMER,iunie 2005, Documente, p. 32; 

12 

Caietele INMER, iunie 2005, Documente, p. 32 

13 

Ibidem, p. 32; 

14 

Pentru Generalul Rădescu vezi „Exilul militar românesc. 1939-1972. ComandanŃi fără armată” 

EdiŃie îngrijită de Dumitru Dobre, Veronica Nanu, Mihaela Toader, Editura ProHistoria, Bucureşti 

2005 sau Dumitru Dobre, PersonalităŃi ale exilului militar românesc, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 

2008; 

811

Opran şi Mircea Pătru şi maiorii Bazil RaŃiu şi Bobi Chintescu. În acest sens, a creat sub 

directa coordonare a generalului Puiu Petrescu un Centru Informativ la Paris. 

Condamnarea comunismului de către militarii aflaŃi în exil se reflectă prin încercările de 

crearea unor organizaŃii care să grupeze în jurul lor militarii din exil şi nu numai. Dintre 

acestea amintim: AsociaŃia Foştilor CombatanŃi din FranŃa şi Uniunea CombatanŃilor 

Români. „Principalele activităŃi ale AsociaŃiei Foştilor CombatanŃi au constat în organizarea 

de simpozioane pe teme militare şi internaŃionale, participarea la serbări comemorative şi 

iniŃierea unor demersuri pe lângă Comandamentul Militar NATO” 15 . 

De asemenea în 1954 s-a încercat o revigorare a AsociaŃiei Foştilor CombatanŃi „cu 

scopul de a spori combativitatea acesteia. În acŃiune s-a implicat şi regele Mihai, care a 

reproşat conducerii Comitetului NaŃional Român că a contribuit la dezagregarea corpului 

ofiŃeresc, determinând, astfel, trecerea acestuia pe poziŃii antimonarhice. De revigorarea 

AsociaŃiei s-au preocupat şi americanii, care urmăreau înfiinŃarea de legiuni străine de 

voluntari sub drapelul SUA. Ca urmare, un număr restrâns de ofiŃeri români au semnat 

angajamente de înrolare în armata americană, dar în scurt timp, au renunŃat la ele de teama 

trimiterii pe frontul din Coreea” 16 

AflaŃi în exil militarii români au urmărit, în contexul perspectivelor politice Vest-Est, 

evenimentele care aveau loc în România, militând prin toate mijloacele pe care le aveau la 

dispoziŃie, pentru revenirea Ńării la democraŃie. În această privinŃă sunt relevante studiile şi 

articolele care se regăsesc în publicaŃia Buletinul militar, coordonată de colonelul Dan 

D.Ivanovici. Această revistă militară avea drept scop de a menŃine vie flacăra exilului, în 

special a celui militar. În cadrul acestei reviste se regăsesc studii care reflectă îndemnuri la 

mobilizarea „exilului românesc în faŃa revoluŃiilor din Est” 17 prin propunerea unor condiŃii: 

„1. constituirea, cât mai repede a unui Sfat NaŃional care să poată acŃiona în numele 

întregului exil, sfat ai cărui membri să fie aleşi de întregul exil; 2. formarea unui Comitet 

Militar care să se ocupe cu chestiunea participării românilor la lupta de eliberare; 3. crearea 

unui fond pentru transport, studii şi alte operaŃiuni. 

Un articol semnat de maiorul Dumbravă reflectă neîncrederea exilului în practica politicii 

sovietice cu privirea la retragerea trupelor sovietice din România: „...retragerea trupelor 

sovietice, ar urmări să micşoreze ura ce nutreşte, azi, poporul român contra Sovietelor, 

contra comunismului şi chiar contra Rusiilor. Realitatea este alta decât se crede. Dacă truple 

sovietice au părăsit România o altă armată sovietică invizibilă marelui public român, continuă 

să asigure guvernul comunist instaurat la Moscova” 18 . 

15 Exilul militar românesc. 1939-1972. ComandanŃi fără armată” EdiŃie îngrijită de Dumitru Dobre, 

Veronica Nanu, Mihaela Toader, Editura ProHistoria, Bucureşti 2005, p. 15; 

16 Ibidem, p.15; 

17 Buletinul Militar, an IV, nr. 10, octombrie 1956, pp. 14-15; 

18 Buletinul Militar, an VI, nr. 7-8, iulie-august 1958, pp.11-13; 

812

Vorbind despre „...înfruntarea dintre cele două lumi”, colonelul Dan. D.Ivanovici 

prezintă într-un amplu studiu Ńelurile vizate de Rusia comunistă la întrunirea de la Geneva 11 

mai 1959. Unele dintre aceste Ńeluri ar fi: „1.a. o slăbire a tensiunii actuale dintre Est şi Vest 

şi b. Recunoaşterea statu quo-ului din Estul Europei; 2.a.scoaterea AliaŃilor din Berlin şi b. 

recunoaşterea Germaniei de Răsărit”. 19 . Colonelul Dan Ivanovici a încercat şi o sinteză a 

acestor Ńeluri sovietice: „...să vedem în ce măsură sunt ele acute şi urgente pentru Rusia 

comunistă. Am spus că Sovietele urmăresc o slăbire a tensiunii produsă de războiul rece care 

ar duce la o serioasă diminuare a cheltuielilor de înarmare, fonduri pe care ele le-ar folosi 

pentru finanŃarea planului de 7 ani care, după propaganda ce i s-a făcut, constitue o condiŃie 

de viaŃă a regimului şi una de menŃinere la putere a lui Hruşciov. Economiştii vestici susŃin 

că numai prin slăbirea acestei tensiuni Kremlinul ar avea parte de recunoaşterea din partea 

Vestului a statu quo-ului din Estul Europei, adică recunoaşterea de către lumea liberă a 

dominaŃiei popoarelor subjugate de către Soviete, recunoaşterea sclaviei instituită. Această 

problemă cred că este cea mai sensibilă pentru siguranŃa imperiului comunist, căci aceste 

popoare constitue duşmanul cel mai periculos al lumii comuniste. Revoltele şi mişcările din 

diferitele Ńări robite, ca şi revoluŃia din Ungaria din 1956, menŃin Sovietele într-o continuă 

gardă; teama de o revoluŃie generală nefiind înlăturată cu tot aparatul lor poliŃienesc” 20 . 

O rubrică prezentă de fiecare dată în paginile Buletinului Militar a fost InformaŃii 

militare. Din lumea robita sau din Lumea liberă. Articolele priveau ştiri de actualitate despre 

situaŃia internaŃională din lume cât şi despre România. 

În acest scop au iniŃiat acŃiuni de spionaj şi sabotaj, au pregătit agenŃi pentru a fi infiltraŃi 

cu diferite misiuni în Ńară, sau au avut relaŃii cu serviciile secrete occidentale, fie s-au 

exprimat în presa scrisă sau vorbită din Ńările din Occident. 

În anul 1951 a fost înfiinŃată AsociaŃia Românilor Liberi din Germania avându-l ca 

preşedinte de onoare pe generalul Ioan Gheorghe. AsociaŃia a întreprins, în general, acŃiuni 

de atragere a refugiaŃilor români şi în special Volksdeutshe-lor care pun problema repatrierii. 

Puneau accentul răsturnarea guvernului de la Bucureşti şi apoi întoarcerea în Ńară. „De 

exemplu, cu ocazia zilei de 23 august 1955, generalul Ion Gheorghe împreună cu AsociaŃia 

românilor din sudul Germaniei a organizat o slujbă religioasă şi cu ocazia cuvântărilor s-a 

protestat împotriva acŃiunii care au dus la eliberarea Ńării. AcŃiunile cu caracter duşmănos şi 

calomnios la adresa Ńării noastre ale AsociaŃiei Românilor Liberi sunt încurajate şi de Free 

Europe, în special prin publicitatea largă care o face prin presă şi radio acestor acŃiuni” 21 . 

La 8 iulie 1954 s-a creat la München un Centru de coordonare românească în exil. Acesta 

reunea AsociaŃia românilor din Austria, condusă de I.V.Emilian, Clubul românesc din 

München, consus de Vasile Dumitrescu şi AsociaŃia Germanilor din România condusă de 

H.Scheiner. „În procesul verbal de constituire, au arătat că avându-se în vedere că unitatea 

19 

Buletinul Militar, an VI, nr. 3, martie 1959, pp. 1-4; 

20 

Ibidem; 

21 

ACNSAS, fond SIE, dosar nr. 184, ff. 72-73; 

813

exilului nu a fost dusă până la capăt până în prezent, semnatarii doresc să acŃioneze pe teren 

naŃional, pentru a ajunge cât mai repede la unitatea dorită[...]. În încheierea procesului verbal 

semnatarii accentuează că vor să colaboreze cu oricine doreşte să contribuie cu fapta lor la 

eliberarea Ńării sau toŃi acei care vor să participe la acŃiuni prin care să facă cunoscute în 

lumea întreagă virtuŃile şi lupta poporului român şi care să câştige noi prieteni pentru 

România” 22 . 

O altă organizaŃie care s-a dorit remarcată prin acŃiunile sale a fost Uniunea 

CombatanŃilor Români care a fost înfiinŃată în secret la 10 octombrie 1954 la München. 

Scopul acestei uniuni ar fi fost „unirea tuturor acelora care vor să lupte pentru eliberarea Ńării 

şi să găseacă căile şi mijloacele de a face ceva pozitiv, activitate împotriva regimului 

comunist” 23 

Pe de altă parte, Securitatea din România intuind pericolul a dirijat importante efective de 

ofiŃeri şi agenŃi informatori pentru a-i determina pe cei mai activi dintre militari să renunŃe la 

atacurile lor împotriva regimului comunist din Ńară. În acest sens vom reda câteva exemple 

din paginele unor dosare parcurse: 

„Din materialele primite de la U.M. 0123/I rezultă că Gheorghe Ion are legături cu 

Renke, şeful DirecŃiei Politice din Ministerul Afacerilor Externe din Bonn care este în 

legătură cu serviciul de spionaj pe care aceasta o desfăşoară împotriva Ńării noastre. 

În anul 1954 Iakob Kolb fost colaborator al serviciului de spionaj vest-german din 

Berlin-Departamnetul Blank, care a trecut în R.D.G.a declarat că Gheorghe Ion a intrat în 

repetate rânduri în legătură cu serviciul de spionaj vest-german din München şi a dat chiar 

material preŃios. 

El a susŃinut faŃă de spionajul vest-german că dispune în România de mai mulŃi agenŃi. 

Spionul Gheorghiu Gheorghe paraşutat în R.P.R. în 1954 a declarat că în timp e se 

fala în străinătate a aflat că Gheorghe Ion este colaborator la postul de radio „Europa Liberă” 

şi are legături cu srviciul de spionaj american. Acesta a mai declarat că în discuŃiile purtate cu 

fugarii Dimitriu Mircea şi Mailat Vasile (ambii spioni) aceştia au afirmat că Gheorghe Ion 

are legături cu serviciul de spionaj american pentru Europa cu sediul la Frankfurt/Main. Tot 

Gheorghe Gheorghiu a declarat că unul dintre colaboratorii pe linie de spionaj ai lui 

Gheorghe Ion, este fugarul român Isbăşescu Traian. 

Din materialele primite de la U.M.0123/I cât şi din declaraŃiile fostului colonel 

Baiulescu Sterian, repatriat în Ńară în 1956 rezultă că un alt colaborator apropiat al lui 

Gheorghe Ion este fugarul Amzăr Dumitru din Wiesaden R.F.G. semnalat că se ocupă cu 

interogarea persoanelor fugite din R.P.R. în R.F.G. şi colaborează cu serviciul de spionaj 

american. 

Gheorghe Ion are un fiu anume, Gheorghe Ion Nicolae, născut în 1919, de profesie 

inginer, domiciliat tot în oraşul München. Repatriatul Băiulescu Sterian în anul 1957, a 

22 Ibidem, pp. 76-77; 

23 Ibidem, pp. 82-83; 

814

declarat că fiul lui Gheroghe Ion a lucrat o perioadă ca funcŃionar într-un lagăr american din 

R.F.G.iar ulterior a fost angajat la postul de radio american „Europa Liberă”. Din datele ce le 

posedă U.M. 0123/ I rezultă că Gheroghe Ion junior ar fi agent al serviciului de spionaj vestgerman. 

În cursul anului 1959, o sursă a DirecŃiei a II-a a semnalat că un grup de elemente din 

R.F.G. ar fi fost pregătite de serviciul de spionaj vest german pentru a fi trimise cu misiuni în 

R.P.R.. Din acest grup ar face parte şi Gheorghe Ion junior[...]. 

În ceea ce priveşte fostele legături din trecut ale lui Gheorghe Ion în special din perioada 

cât a lucrat în Marele Stat Major şi la LegaŃia română din Berlin, în majoritate au fost 

identificate şi încadrate informativ pentru a le stabili activitatea prezentă. 

Nu au fost obŃinute materiale din care să rezulte că fugarul ar fi în legătură cu vreun 

element din aceste categorii” 24 . 

Material primit de la rezistenŃa FrankfurtMain prin curierul din 16 mai 1962; o scrisoarea 

nr.65/E. „Din 8 aprilie 1962 privind constituirea OSAR pe teritoriul R.F.Germană.Din 

discuŃiile purtate până acum şi din informaŃiile culese cu privire la OSRA au rezultat 

următoarele: Problema înfiinŃării OSAR s-a discutat pentru prima oară în luna decembrie 

1961 în rândul conducătorilor organizaŃiilor de fugari români din Paris în s-a pus problema 

înfiinŃării unui comandament general care să conducă şi să coordoneze activitatea întregii 

emigraŃii pe linia Oscar. La acesta s-a pus un accent deosebit pentru atragerea fugarilor 

români din R.F.G. 

În acest scop fugarul Ion Emilian a primit sarcina de a publica elemente din rândul 

fugarilor şi a V.D. cu menŃiunea ca din rândul acestora din urmă să se înceapă cu cei care au 

făcut parte din cadrele armatei române sau germane. 

În urma acestor sarcini Ion Emilian contactează fugarii români şi V.D. cărora le spune 

despre înfiinŃarea, organizarea OSAR şi lupta pe care o desfăşoară aceasta pentru eliberarea 

Ńării. 

Din afirmaŃiile sale rezultă că până acum nu a reuşit în R.F.G. să înroleze decât 7 membri 

motivând aceasta prin faptul că este foarte greu deoarece organizarea are un caracter foarte 

secret privinc componenŃa şi membrii săi. 

Ion Emilian de câte ori discută cu cei pe care intenŃionează să-i atragă în OSAR le atrage 

atenŃia asupra păstrării secretului discuŃiilor şi intenŃiile OSAR. Problemele şi rezultatele 

obŃinute în organizarea OSAR în R.F.G. Ion Emilian le aduce la cunoştinŃa lui Ion Gheorghe 

cu care se consultă asupra acestor probleme. 

Ideea constituirii OSAR a fost inspirată din activitatea OAS din FranŃa şi se intenŃionează 

ca principiile OSAR să fie identificate cu cele ale OAS adaptate însă la specificul activităŃii 

organizaŃiilor de fugari români din străinătate. 

Scopul organizării OSAR este de a înrola în aceasta pe toŃi fugarii români indiferent de 

apartenenŃa lor politică şi de a-i atrage în lupta lor duşmănoasă împotriva Ńării. Tot ca scop s- 

24 ACNSAS, fond SIE, dosar nr. 163189/4, pp. 23-34; 

815

a propus ca prin OSAR să strângă legăturile cu toate organizaŃiile reacŃionare din Occident şi 

în special cu restul organizaŃiilor de fugari din Ńările socialiste care se găsesc în Occident. Ion 

Emilian afirmă că OSAR se bucură de sprijunul moral şi material a unor cercuri înalte din 

R.F.G., FranŃa şi S.U.A. Despre Ion Emilian deŃinem informaŃii de la mai multe surse că 

lucrează efectiv cu Gehlen de la care primeşte salariu lunar, cât şi cu serviciul de informaŃii 

francez” 25 . 

În concluzie, majoritatea manifestărilor militarilor români au avut ca iniŃiativa pe de o 

parte de a atrage opinia publică din străinătate asupra regimului comunist din Ńară în vederea 

primirii unui sprijin din partea autorităŃilor occidentale fie încercarea de a găsi soluŃii 

favorabile pentru românii din Ńară. 

25 Ibidem, pp. 43-45; 

816

„COMPLOTUL” DIN BATALIONUL 27 

VÂNĂTORI DE MUNTE. TENTATIVĂ DE 

REZISTENłĂ ANTICOMUNISTĂ SAU 

ÎNSCENARE JUDICIARĂ? 

Constantin VASILESCU 1 

11 mai 1952. PuŃin după miezul nopŃii, pe coridoarele întunecoase şi pline de igrasie ale 

penitenciarului Jilava răsună paşi. FlancaŃi de câte doi gardieni, maiorii Ion Dumitrache şi 

Nicolae Mihăilescu parcurg ultimul drum. La capătul acestuia se află „satrapul” Jilavei, 

comandantul Nicolae Moromete 2 , însoŃit de către delegatul autorităŃilor administrative ale 

Ministerului Afacerilor Interne (M.A.I.), căpitan Nicolae Andronache, medicul 

penitenciarului Jilava, doctor Avram Calihman şi locotenentul M.A.I. Constantin 

Petrache. SculaŃi cu noaptea-n cap, alături aşteaptă plictisiŃi locotenentul major magistrat 

Ovidiu Secui, procuror militar pe lângă Parchetul Militar Bucureşti, grefierul şef T. 

Petrescu JoiŃeanu şi oamenii din grupa de execuŃie. 

Ce va fi fost în sufletele celor sortiŃi morŃii este greu de bănuit, însă perspectiva oficială 

este redată într-un proces-verbal arid: „Executarea sentinŃei de mai sus fiind fixată pentru 

ziua de 11 mai 1952 orele 0.45, înainte de executarea sentinŃei au fost aduşi condamnaŃii 

susnumiŃi, însoŃiŃi fiecare de câte doi gardieni şi toŃi însoŃiŃi şi de comandantul 

penitenciarului Jilava, înaintea locului de execuŃie, unde au fost identificaŃi. Aici, după ce 

s-a primit raportul comandantului grupei de execuŃie, s-a dispus să se citească de către 

Grefierul Tribunalului Militar Bucureşti dispozitivul sentinŃei de condamnare la moarte şi 

li s-a adus la cunoştinŃă condamnaŃilor că hotărârea rămânând definitivă a sosit timpul 

să-şi ispăşească pedeapsa [sublinierea noastră]. După aceasta condamnaŃii au fost 

conduşi în locul de execuŃie, legaŃi la ochi şi aşezaŃi cu spatele spre grupa de execuŃie. 

După îndeplinirea acestor formalităŃi, Procurorul Militar a ordonat comandantului grupei 

de execuŃie pregătirea execuŃiei. Comandantul grupei de execuŃie a deschis focul şi astfel 

condamnaŃii au fost executaŃi prin împuşcare, pe rând şi separat. După ce condamnaŃii au 

fost executaŃi, medicul Penitenciarului Jilava, Dr. Calihman Avram, a verificat şi 

constatat moartea lor. După constatarea morŃii condamnaŃilor […], la o oră după execuŃie, 

1 

Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, Bucureşti, 

Romania. 

2 

Nicolae Moromete, născut la 3 mai 1912 în Valea Ungureni, Argeş. Comandant al penitenciarului 

Jilava (mai 1949 - iunie 1952). Între 1952-1958 a fost comandant al penitenciarelor Caransebeş şi 

GalaŃi, al formaŃiunii Chilia Veche, precum şi locŃiitor de comandant pentru pază şi regim la Văcăreşti. 

Andrei Muraru (coord.), DicŃionarul penitenciarelor din România comunistă (1945-1967), Editura 

Polirom, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 362-363. 

817

cadavrele condamnaŃilor la moarte Dumitrache N. Ion şi Mihăilescu Gh. Nicolae au fost 

date în primire Comandantului Penitenciarului Jilava, Căpitan Moromete Nicolae, spre 

cele legale, care să dispună înmormântarea lor” 3 . 

CondamnaŃi pentru presupuse legături cu partizanii locotenent-colonelului Gheorghe 

Arsenescu, maiorii Ion Dumitrache si Nicolae Mihăilescu făceau parte dintr-un lot de 

şapte militari, alături de căpitanul Ioan Radu, locotenenŃii majori Constantin Mihăescu şi 

Gheorghe Malaşincu, precum şi plutonierii Constantin Costraş şi Atanasie Firică. 

În ceea ce ne priveşte, interesul asupra subiectului ne-a fost stârnit în urma parcurgerii 

unui articol de specialitate 4 . În acest caz ne-a surprins contrastul dintre lipsa unor 

elemente esenŃiale şi absenŃa oricărei rezerve asupra cursului evenimentelor. Involuntar, 

în lipsa unei cercetări temeinice, dar în prezenŃa bunelor intenŃii, asemenea demersuri 

obŃin efectul contrar, sfârşind prin a îmbrăŃişa versiunea SecurităŃii. În cele ce urmează 

am încercat să desluşim ce se află în spatele acestui episod macabru, sursele care au stat 

la baza cercetării fiind reprezentate, în cea mai mare parte, de documente aflate în 

custodia Consiliului NaŃional pentru Studierea Arhivelor SecurităŃii (C.N.S.A.S.) 5 . Lipsa 

mărturiilor celor implicaŃi în mod direct în ceea ce a fost identificat de Securitate drept 

„complotul din cadrul Batalionului 27 Vânători de Munte Câmpulung-Muscel” a 

reprezentat un handicap serios 6 , însă coroborarea declaraŃiilor, elementele atipice 

evidenŃiate de studierea atentă a acestora, precum şi buna cunoaştere a temei mai largi în 

care se încadrează acest caz ne-au facilitat cercetarea. Concomitent, ne-am străduit să 

suplinim această deficienŃă şi printr-o interpretare critică a surselor documentare, dar şi 

prin oferirea variantelor alternative în situaŃiile mai puŃin clare. 

Preliminariile unei înscenări judiciare 

Debutul anului 1948 a plasat România sub auspiciile sumbre ale unui regim comunist 

aflat în plenitudinea forŃelor sale. România a cunoscut din acest moment fenomenul 

constituirii grupurilor armate al căror scop era împotrivirea la comunizare, dar şi 

salvgardarea intereselor personale în faŃa abuzurilor regimului. În acest context mai larg 

se plasează şi iniŃiativele locotenent-colonelului Gheorghe Arsenescu care a întemeiat pe 

versantul sudic al munŃilor Făgăraş nuclee de partizani care au dăinuit până în 1958. 

Astăzi se discută tot mai frecvent în ce măsură aceste grupuri de partizani, în general, şi 

3 A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 403, vol. 2, f. 145. 

4 Zicu Ionescu, Cadre militare în grupările de rezistenŃă armată anticomunistă în munŃii Argeşului 

şi Muscelului, în Ilie Popa (coord.), Experimentul Piteşti – Reeducarea prin tortură. Grupuri 

înarmate de luptă împotriva bolşevizării României, Editura Matrix Rom, Piteşti, 2004, pp. 224- 

230. 

5 Dosarul penal al „organizaŃiei” cuprinde nu mai puŃin de 11 volume. 

6 În realizarea acestui studiu am beneficiat, totuşi, de mărturia foarte preŃioasă a Mariei Nicola, 

soŃia unuia dintre militarii condamnaŃi în loturile „Arsenescu”, la rândul său înarcerată din motive 

politice. 

818

grupul „Arsenescu”, în special, au reprezentat o ameninŃare reală pentru regim. Din 

această zonă polemică s-a dezvoltat şi acest studiu. 

Apărută în februarie 1948, în rândul unor indivizi cu vederi politice naŃional-liberale, 

ideea coagulării unui grup de rezistenŃă în munŃii Muscelului s-a dezvoltat rapid în 

săptămânile următoare ca urmare a spectaculoaselor evoluŃii socio-politice interne, dar şi 

sub spectrul unei posibile modificări a contextului internaŃional. În aceste condiŃii s-a 

distins clar personalitatea militarului Gheorghe Arsenescu care a influenŃat în mod 

decisiv cursul evenimentelor. Reuşind să cantoneze în zona muntoasă un nucleu de 

partizani, Arsenescu a întreŃinut în acelaşi timp ample legături cu numeroase persoane 

aflate „în legalitate”. Notorietatea, cariera militară, dar şi aura legendară pe care şi-a 

format-o în mentalul colectiv în urma câtorva acŃiuni spectaculoase prin care a reuşit să 

evite capturarea, l-au transformat pe Gheorghe Arsenescu într-unul dintre cei mai vânaŃi 

oameni din România. Pe acest context s-a grefat iminenŃa „conspiraŃiei”, acutizată 

permanent de neputinŃa organelor represive de a-l anihila. 

În cele ce urmează vom efectua o scurtă trecere în revistă a faptelor, evidenŃiind 

premisele „complotului militar”. După o bună bucată de vreme petrecută în munte cu 

partizanii săi, în toamna lui 1948 Gheorghe Arsenescu se reîntoarce la Câmpulung unde 

se ascunde, alături de Alexandru Alexandrescu 7 , într-un adăpost dinainte pregătit 8 . În 

aceeaşi perioadă ia legătura cu plutonierul Pavel Nicola, unul dintre foştii săi subalterni în 

cadrul Regimentului 30 DorobanŃi, unitate restructurată şi transformată la aceea dată în 

Regimentul 4 Vânători de Munte 9 . Cunoscând că Nicola a rămas în cadrele active ale 

armatei, dar şi în virtutea unor relaŃii personale anterioare 10 , Arsenescu i-a solicitat 

7 

Alexandru Alexandrescu, născut la 5 decembrie 1929 în Rucăr, Argeş. Partizan în grupul 

„Arsenescu”. A fost arestat la 25 martie 1949 şi condamnat la 10 ani temniŃă grea. Rejudecat 

ulterior, a fost condamnat la 15 ani de închisoare. A fost închis la Jilava, Târgu Ocna, Caransebeş, 

Gherla, Piteşti, GalaŃi, Salcia, Ostrov. A fost eliberat la 20 martie 1964. InformaŃii din fişa 

matricolă penală din Arhiva AdmnistraŃiei NaŃionale a Penitenciarelor (în continuare A.A.N.P.). 

8 

„Dat fiind faptul că fusesem sesizat de medicul veterinar Grigoriu Mircea, când m-am reîntors 

din Muntele Roşu, să plec imediat de la domiciliu că mă arestează organele de stat, de aci înainte 

m-am ascuns împreună cu Alexandrescu Alexandru într-un bordei de sub casa sorei mele, anume 

Cojocaru Elena din Câmpulung-Muscel. Acest bordei era o construcŃie în beton cu destinaŃie, 

atunci când s-a construit casa, să fie hazna, dar, cum în acelaşi timp s-a făcut canalizarea străzii, 

acea încăpere de la subsol nu a fost folosită ca hazna. Încă din vara anului 1948 amenajasem 

împreună cu Alexandru Alexandrescu această încăpere, blocând chepengul dinspre curtea casei şi 

construind o intrare secretă din altă parte. Astfel, în exterior, la capătul casei, am construit o sobă, 

la sobă am construit o firidă cu un chepeng, pe unde se putea pătrunde în acel adăpost. Pe capacul 

chepengului erau puse nişte paie şi dormea acolo un câine al meu. În interiorul adăpostului am 

montat un post fix, un altul pliant şi o masă tot la fel, am instalat un godin mic, am tras lumină 

electrică în acel adăpost unde am instalat şi un aparat de radio.” A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Informativ, 

dosar nr. 675, vol. 15, f. 74. 

9 

În componenŃa Regimentului 4 Vânători de Munte Câmpulung-Muscel intrau Batalioanele 21 şi 

27. 

10 

Înrudit prin alianŃă cu soŃia lui Pavel Nicola, Gheorghe Arsenescu reuşise în 1945 să obŃină 

transferul plutonierului de la o unitate din Moldova, la unitatea militară din Câmpulung-Muscel. 

Mai mult, în perioada 1948-1949 Pavel şi Maria Nicola locuiau în Câmpulung, într-o încăpere 

819

acestuia să-i obŃină câteva efecte specifice inventarului militar care-i erau necesare 

activităŃii în munte. SimŃindu-se îndatorat, la solicitările repetate ale locotenentcolonelului, 

în perioada următoare Nicola a luat legătura cu câŃiva subofiŃeri de la Centrul 

Militar Teritorial Muscel şi din cadrul Batalionului 27 Vânători de Munte: plutonierii 

Petre Bunel, Dumitru Vasile şi Florian Voicescu. Astfel, între 1948-1949, Gheorghe 

Arsenescu a obŃinut de la aceştia o foaie de cort, o raniŃă, o pereche de bocanci, un pistol 

şi câteva cartuşe 11 . 

La sfârşitul lui 1948, independent de cele relatate mai sus, Gheorghe Arsenescu se 

întâlneşte cu maiorul Ion Dumitrache, comandantul Batalionului 27 Vânători de Munte 

Câmpulung-Muscel. Unul dintre personajele cheie în acest moment a fost un alt „om al 

armelor”, plutonierul major în rezervă Grigore Miron 12 , care a intermediat întrevederea 

celor doi ofiŃeri. Angajat de către Arsenescu la ferma sa, după îndepărtarea din cadrele 

active ale armatei, Miron a fost folosit şi ca om de legătură cu diverse elemente implicate 

în activitatea grupului 13 . Astfel, conform lui Gheorghe Arsenescu, cei doi s-au întâlnit în 

două rânduri, în perioada octombrie-noiembrie 1948, iar „discuŃiile purtate între 

subsemnatul şi Dumitrache Ion au constat în expunerea pe scurt a situaŃiei în care se 

găsea atunci el [...] şi propunerea acestuia de a-l primi în banda formată de 

subsemnatul” 14 . 

Plecat la Bucureşti în iarna dintre anii 1948-1949, Arsenescu s-a reîntors la munte în 

primăvara lui 1949, însă de data aceasta în zona localităŃii Nucşoara, din cauza arestărilor 

masive operate în rândul celor care au constituit primul său nucleu de partizani în aria 

localităŃilor Dragoslavele-Stoeneşti-CetăŃeni. Alături de fraŃii Toma şi Petre ArnăuŃoiu a 

petrecut o perioadă foarte tumultoasă în regiune, punând bazele unui nou grup de 

partizani – „Haiducii Muscelului” – şi având confruntări cu trupele de Securitate. În acest 

interval, conform declaraŃiilor sale, singurul cadru militar activ din Câmpulung cu care a 

avut contact direct a fost Pavel Nicola, pe care l-a întâlnit în mai multe rânduri, inclusiv la 

Nucşoara, în iunie 1949. Cu toate acestea, pentru a menŃine coeziunea şi spiritul combativ 

în sânul partizanilor, locotenent-colonelul a folosit şi metode mai puŃin ortodoxe, 

supralicitând în faŃa lor mijloacele pe care le-ar fi avut la dispoziŃie 15 . Se pare că unul 

închiriată de la sora locotenet-colonelului Arsenescu. Interviu cu Maria Nicola, realizat la 19 

februarie 2011, arhiva personală a autorului. 

11 A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 50, vol. 9 A, ff. 345-347, 349. 

12 Grigore Miron, născut la 16 august 1901 în Scopoşeni, Iaşi. A fost arestat la 14 septembrie 1951 

şi condamnat la 25 de ani muncă silnică. A fost închis la Piteşti, Jilava, Aiud, Gherla, Oradea, Dej. 

A fost eliberat la 23 iunie 1964. InformaŃii din fişele matricole penale din A.A.N.P. 

13 Este demn de precizat că, deşi a fost arestat în 1951, procesele verbale de interogatoriu ale lui 

Grigore Miron nu conŃin nicio referire la contactele dintre Arsenescu şi Dumitrache. Idem, vol. 7, 

passim. 

14 A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Informativ, dosar nr. 675, vol. 15, f. 89. DivergenŃa între variantele celor doi 

este generată de faptul că, deşi admit contactul, fiecare îi atribuie celuilalt iniŃiativa întâlnirii şi a 

propunerii de incadrare în organizaŃia de rezistenŃă. 

15 De altfel, aceasta a fost o metodă uzuală pe care Gheorghe Arsenescu a folosit-o şi în timpul 

constituirii primului său grup de partizani, în Muntele Roşu. Interviu cu Constantin Catrinu, 

realizat la 29 octombrie 2011, arhiva personală a autorului. 

820

dintre atuurile folosite a fost şi acela al „legăturilor puternice” în interiorul Batalionului 

27 Vânători de Munte, deşi nu există nicio dovadă că discuŃiile purtate cu maiorul Ion 

Dumitrache s-au concretizat în vreun fel. Astfel, întâlnirea de la Nucşoara cu plutonierul 

Nicola a fost prezentată partizanilor, de către Arsenescu, ca o dovadă a legăturilor sale 

strânse cu unitatea militară din Câmpulung. În acest sens, înainte de a-l afişa celorlalŃi, 

locotenent-colonelul a discutat separat cu Nicola şi, conform celor declarate de Petre 

ArnăuŃoiu, după introducere plutonierul le-a spus celor de faŃă că „a lucrat la ordine de 

chemare în unitate, deci se pregătesc concentrări de trupe şi va isbucni războiul. Despre 

acŃiuni comune ale armatei cu banda, în momentul declanşării războiului, plutonierul Paul 

a spus că s-a aranjat ca maiorul Dumitrache din Godeni-Muscel să întreprindă cu 

batalionul din Regimentul 2 [sic!] Vânători Muscel, batalion pe care-l comanda, o 

incursiune în zona munŃilor Făgăraş, cu care ocazie îi va preda comanda numitului 

Arsenescu Gheorghe” 16 . În continuare ArnăuŃoiu mai precizează că Arsenescu i-a dat lui 

Pavel Nicola „câte un exemplar din documentele bandei pentru ca să fie incluşi pe ştate 

de plată şi în efectivele militare. Nu am înŃeles bine ce a urmărit prin aceasta. Mai 

degrabă cred că Arsenescu Gheorghe i-a dat lui Paul acele documente pentru a fi date 

cuiva din rudele sale spre a le păstra. Amănunte privitor la modul cum va opera numitul 

Paul să ne dea armament şi echipament nu am discutat, s-ar putea să fi vorbit despre 

aceasta numai cu Arsenescu” 17 . După cum vom vedea, astfel de practici de influenŃare a 

partizanilor vor avea rezultate neaşteptate. 

În toamna lui 1949, fără să fi întreprins vreo acŃiune cu susŃinerea militarilor din 

Câmpulung, retras din grupul de la Nucşoara în urma unei ambuscade, Gheorghe 

Arsenescu a fost adăpostit o vreme, de către plutonierul Nicola, într-un loc izolat. Eşuarea 

capturării sale de către Securitate în acest punct a condus la un nou val de arestări în 

lunile noiembrie-decembrie 1949, printre cei ridicaŃi aflându-se şi subofiŃerii Pavel 

Nicola, Dumitru Vasile, Petre Bunel şi Florian Voicescu. Momentul arestării lui Nicola - 

15 noiembrie 1949 - este, în opinia noastră, punctul de plecare pentru dezvoltarea 

ulterioară a teoriei „complotului militar”, deşi nici acesta, nici ceilalŃi trei subofiŃeri 

amintiŃi nu au fost incluşi ulterior în lotul militarilor din Batalionul 27 Vânători de 

Munte. AnchetaŃi la Piteşti până la 28 mai 1950, au fost incluşi în cel de-al doilea lot al 

partizanilor lui Gheorghe Arsenescu, judecat în decembrie 1950 18 . Documentele anchetei 

16 

A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 50, vol. 44, f. 84. 

17 

Ibidem. 

18 

SentinŃa din 20 decembrie 1950 a consemnat următoarele condamnări: Popescu Constantin – 25 

de ani muncă silnică; Chircă Gheorghe – 5 ani muncă silnică; Ciolan Nicolae – 20 de ani muncă 

silnică; Luca ŞuŃu – 7 ani muncă silnică; Chircă Eugen – 8 ani muncă silnică; Nicola Pavel, Bunel 

Petre, Voicescu Florian, Chrică Aurel, Marinescu Iosif, Marinescu Ioan, Georgescu Constantin, 

Marinescu Virgil – 10 ani închisoare corecŃională; Vasile Dumitru, Milea Nicolae, Aurica Costea 

– 8 ani închisoare corecŃională; Damian Vasile, Drăgoi Cornel – 7 ani închisoare corecŃională; 

ArnăuŃoiu Victoria, Sorescu Ioan, ArnăuŃoiu LaurenŃia – 6 ani închisoare corecŃională; Chircă 

Elena, Pâslaru Margareta, Marinescu Elisabeta, Stăncescu Gheorghe, Iosif NiŃu, Krasinski Maria, 

Preda Ioan, Drăgoi Ioan – 5 ani închisoare corecŃională; Chircă D. Gheorghe, Luca Petrică, 

Samoilă Constantin, Marinescu Alexandru – 4 ani închisoare corecŃională; Nicola Maria, Cojocaru 

821

nu au stabilit nicio conexiune cu o posibilă organizaŃie anticomunistă condusă de către 

maiorul Ion Dumitrache 19 . 

Arestările şi ancheta 

Conform datelor prezentate până acum există certitudinea unor legături separate între 

Gheorghe Arsenescu şi două cadre militare active din Câmpulung-Muscel – Pavel Nicola 

şi Ion Dumitrache - însă nu există nicio dovadă care să ateste prezenŃa unui grup compact 

anticomunist în cadrul Batalionului 27 Vânători de Munte sau a unui plan concret de 

acŃiune. În lipsa mărturiilor directe ale celor implicaŃi am fost nevoiŃi să avansăm o 

ipoteză de lucru validă bazându-ne exclusiv pe interpretarea documentelor, demers care sa 

dovedit destul anevoios. DificultăŃile principale au constat în desluşirea criteriilor în 

virtutea cărora s-au operat arestările în acest lot şi în descoperirea unui fir logic în 

succesiunea acestora, deoarece înainte de reŃinerea lui Ioan Radu, Atanasie Firică, 

Constantin Mihăescu, Constantin Costraş şi Gheorghe Malaşincu nu am reuşit să găsim 

vreo declaraŃie în care numele acestora să fi fost menŃionat de către cei deja arestaŃi 

pentru legături cu grupul „Arsenescu”. În această situaŃie am pornit cu raŃionamentul de 

la identificarea unei note a DirecŃiei Regionale a SecurităŃii Piteşti către DirecŃia Generală 

a SecurităŃii Poporului, din 8 decembrie 1949, cu următorul conŃinut: „[...] Totodată 

semnalăm spre ştiinŃa dumneavoastră pentru a aduce la cunoştinŃa MAN pe Maiorul 

Mihăilescu Nicolae, ajutorul comandantului Batalionului 27 V.M. din Câmpulung- 

Muscel, prevăzut în declaraŃia plutonierului Pavel Nicola ca unul ce s-a manifestat încă în 

toamna anului 1948 faŃă de acesta cu idei antidemocrate ceea ce l-a determinat pe Nicola 

să-l pună în cunoştinŃă cu situaŃia lui Gheorghe Arsenescu, fapt care l-a bucurat pe 

maiorul Mihăilescu sperând că în curând situaŃia politică internă şi externă se va schimba 

în urma unui război inevitabil între anglo-americani şi U.R.S.S.” 20 . Invocarea unei 

asemenea declaraŃii, probabil rezultată în urma condiŃiilor extreme de anchetă şi 

interpretată într-o cheie specifică organelor de cercetare, ne îndreptăŃeşte să formulăm 

singura ipoteză de lucru valabilă: apariŃia unor cadre militare în rândurile celor arestaŃi 

pentru legături cu partizanii lui Gheorghe Arsenescu a trezit în sânul forurilor superioare 

de conducere suspiciunea reală faŃă de eventualitatea unui complot generalizat în cadrul 

garnizoanei Câmpulung-Muscel, oferind motivaŃia arestărilor ulterioare. 

Elena – 2 ani închisoare corecŃională; Iacobescu Nicolae – 5 ani închisoare corecŃională. Idem, 

dosar nr. 261, vol. 10, ff. 191-193. 

19 În procesul verbal întocmit la încheierea cercetărilor, la 28 mai 1950, nu există nicio menŃiune 

referitoare la cei care ulterior vor constitui „organizaŃia din Batalionul 27 Vânători de Munte”, atât 

Nicola, cât şi Bunel, Voicescu şi Vasile fiind condamnaŃi pentru legăturile personale pe care le-ar 

fi întreŃinut cu Arsenescu. Ibidem, ff. 6-20. 

20 Idem, dosar nr. 50, vol. 13, f. 235. MenŃionăm că nu am identificat la dosar declaraŃia acordată 

de către Nicola în noiembrie-decembrie 1949 şi invocată de nota D.R.S.P. Deşi se pare că a fost 

primul menŃionat într-un document înainte de începutul arestărilor, maiorul Mihăilescu a fost 

ultimul ridicat dintre cei şapte, la exact un an de la data acestei note! 

822

Ipoteza este confirmată şi de faptul că reŃinerea celor patru subofiŃeri - Pavel Nicola, 

Petre Bunel, Florian Voicescu şi Dumitru Vasile - a alarmat Serviciul de InformaŃii al 

Armatei (S.I.A.) dar şi DirecŃia Superioară Politică a Armatei (D.S.P.A.) care în virtutea 

unui ordin al ministrului adjunct al Apărării NaŃionale a instituit o comisie mixtă de 

anchetă 21 . Pentru a nu creea panică în rândul celor vizaŃi, întrucât „din indicaŃiunile 

primite şi din conŃinutul materialului adunat a reieşit în mod clar existenŃa unui aspect 

subversiv contrarevoluŃionar […] comisiunea şi-a desfăşurat activitatea sub aspectul 

cunoaşterii cadrelor şi a muncii din unitate, procedând la adunarea materialului 

documentar” 22 . 

La adăpostul acestei activităŃi de rutină rezultatul anchetei întreprinse în cadrul 

regimentului a fost transpus într-un raport 23 al D.S.P.A., în care se preciza existenŃa 

„indiciilor cu caracter contrarevoluŃionar” în cazul căpitanilor Ion Ştefănescu şi Vasile 

Pârlea din Batalionul 21 Vânători de Munte, a căpitanului Ioan Radu, locotenenŃilor 

majori Constantin Mihăescu şi Gheorghe Malaşincu, maiorului Nicolae Mihăilescu şi 

plutonierilor Constantin Costraş şi Atanasie Firică din Batalionul 27 Vânători de Munte 24 . 

21 Compusă dintr-un delegat D.C.A., căpitan Roşu Gheorghe, un delegat D.S.P.A., locotenent 

Alexoaia Ion şi un delegat S.I.A., locotenent major Tatus Grigore, „pe baza investigaŃiilor făcute la 

Rgt. 4 V.M. şi unităŃile din garnizoana Câmpulung-Muscel şi referinŃele obŃinute de la judeŃeana 

de P.M.R. Muscel, Securitate şi MiliŃie, a trecut la cercetarea situaŃiei din Rgt. 4. V.M. şi Btl. 21 şi 

27 V.M.” Idem, dosar nr. 403, vol. 8, f. 157. 

22 Ibidem. 

23 Semnificativ pentru logica evenimentelor este şi acest pasaj din debutul raportului care vine să 

întărească ipoteza de lucru de la care am pornit: „łinând seamă că în regiunea C-Lung şi Nordul 

Jud. Muscel operează banda fostului Lt. Col. Arsenescu, care a avut legături strânse cu o parte de 

cadre din garnizoană [Pavel Nicola, Dumitru Vasile, Petre Bunel şi Florian Voicescu – n.n.], 

precum şi de faptul că în jud. Muscel şi în special în garnizoana C.Lung se află o serie de elemente 

duşmănoase regimului nostru (ofiŃeri deblocaŃi, chiaburi, foşti moşieri etc.), cercetările au fost 

îndreptate în primul rând asupra legăturilor militarilor activi cu banda şi deasemeni cu cercurile 

reacŃionare din localitate”. Ibidem. 

24 „Indiciile contrarevoluŃionare” consemnate în raport constau din originea socială „nesănătoasă” 

a celor „vizaŃi, atitudini neconforme cu linia politică oficială, „culpa” participării la bătăliile de pe 

frontul din Răsărit, anumite abateri de la disciplina militară, presupuse contacte cu „persoane 

suspectate de activitate contrarevoluŃionară” sau sustragerea de efecte militare în folosul lui 

Gheorghe Arsenescu. Iată câteva exemple: căpitanul Ştefănescu Ioan „întrebuinŃează în mod ilegal 

caii unităŃii [sic!], a luat cu de la sine putere lemne din unitate, fără nicio formă legală [...], din 

investigaŃiuni rezultă că în războiul criminal împotriva Uniunii Sovietice a luat parte la acŃiuni 

contra partizanilor şi a făcut parte dintr-un detaşament de la Sărata”; căpitanul Radu Ioan „fiu de 

chiabur [...], duce o acŃiune defetistă ascunsă în unitate, împreună cu alte elemente duşmănoase, 

făcând parte dintr-un cerc de ofiŃeri ce în mod ostentativ se intitulează între ei cu sau 

, înlocuind expresia de […], „în ziua de 8 Februarie 1950 [...] s-a exprimat că 

este urmărit de organele informative şi că nu-i este frică”; locotenentul major Mihăescu Constantin 

„primind, ca element de încredere, diverse sarcini de informare, le-a divulgat atunci când a fost 

vorba de Cpt. Radu Ioan, sau a căutat să le desmintă, după ce la început le-a afirmat în scris”; 

maior Mihăilescu Nicolae „din investigaŃii, la arestarea Plot. Nicola Pavel a manifestat în continuu 

îngrijorare şi teamă faŃă de organele politice şi informative”; căpitanul Pârlea Vasile „prin lipsa de 

823

Deşi conspirată, comisia a trezit suspiciunile şi neliniştea ofiŃerilor şi subofiŃerilor, din 

cauza interogatoriilor defăşurate în garnizoană de către cadre ale S.I.A., cu privire la 

activitatea lui Gheorghe Arsenescu 25 şi nu numai. Firesc, Arsenescu reprezenta unul 

dintre subiectele de discuŃie ale militarilor din garnizoana Câmpulung-Muscel, dar în 

lumina evenimentelor cea mai mică delaŃiune în acest sens căpăta grave conotaŃii 26 . 

Pe cale de consecinŃă, au fost arestaŃi căpitanul Ioan Radu şi plutonierul Atanasie Firică 

la 27/28 martie 1950, locotenentul-major Constantin Mihăescu la 28 martie 1950, 

plutonierul Constantin Costraş la 29 martie 1950 şi locotenentul-major Gheorghe 

Malaşincu la 29/30 martie 1950 27 . În urma verificărilor efectuate în regiment au mai fost 

ridicaŃi căpitanii Ion Ştefănescu şi Gheorghe Milea, însă la o dată încă nesigură 28 . Deşi a 

fost primul menŃionat de către Pavel Nicola, în decembrie 1949, maiorul Mihăilescu, aflat 

în acel moment la un curs de perfecŃionare la Craiova 29 , nu a fost ridicat alături de ceilalŃi. 

La scurt timp după efectuarea arestărilor, „DirecŃia Politică a Regiunii a II-a Militare” a 

trimis o comisie de anchetă „pentru a cerceta şi întocmi acte de trimitere în judecată celor 

găsiŃi vinovaŃi în neregulile semnalate la Bat. 21 V. Munte din Rgt. 4 V. Munte”. Fără 

control a permis ca magaziile companiilor să fie lăsate în mod exclusiv pe mâna magazionierilor 

[…] fără nicio formă legală, fapt care a înlesnit sustragerile de echipament care putea fi uşor 

predat bandiŃilor în timpul transportului cu căruŃele spre munŃi unde se găseau subunităŃile în 

aplicaŃii”; locotenentul major Malaşincu Gheorghe „a adus în repetate rânduri injurii la adresa 

P.M.R., Guvernului şi Conducerii Armatei”; plutonier Costraş Constantin „într-o discuŃiune cu un 

subofiŃer în luna decembrie 1949 […] a schiŃat un plan de atac al cazărmii, spunând că dacă ar 

avea cine să organizeze atacul, ar scoate întâi din luptă pe ofiŃerul de zi, apoi cu oamenii de 

încredere ce-i are în cazarmă, cu două puşti mitraliere, ar aduna şi dezarma întreg regimentul”. 

Ibidem, ff. 157-167. 

25 În autobiografia întocmită în arest, căpitanul Ioan Radu amintea: „La Câmpulung am fost 

interogat la servicul de informaŃii dacă cunosc sau am ceva cunoştinŃă de un oarecare Arsenescu”. 

Idem, vol. 5, f. 13 verso. 

26 De altfel, se pare că referinŃele nefavorabile acordate de unii dintre colegii de regiment au 

contribuit la identificarea „vinovaŃilor”. Într-o declaraŃie amplă din 29 martie 1950, locotenentul 

Radu Susai afirma: „Tov. Cpt. Radu Ioan este un element duşmănos. […] Este prieten cu tov. 

Locot. major Mihăescu Constantin […] care este de origine socială chiabur. […] Tov. Locot. 

major Malaşincu Gheorghe […] este un element duşmănos care de la introducerea cuvântului de 

nu l-a pronunŃat, continuând a vorbi cu [!]”. Idem, vol. 8, ff. 98-100. 

27 În cee ce-i priveşte pe Ioan Radu, Atanasie Firică şi Gheorghe Malaşincu, datele arestării care 

figurează în fişele matricole penale sunt devansate cu o zi faŃă de cele consemnate în dosarul 

penal. Idem, vol. 1, ff. I, 2; Fişele matricole penale din A.A.N.P. 

28 Conform fişelor matricole penale Ştefănescu şi Milea ar fi fost arestaŃi la 14 octombrie 1950, 

pentru „complicitate la deŃinere ilegală de armă” şi „abuz de putere”, respectiv „divulgare de 

secrete militare”, şi în final condamnaŃi la 5 luni, respectiv 4 luni închisoare corecŃională. De fapt, 

conform raportului DirecŃiei Politice a Regiunii a II-a Militare, la 26 aprilie 1950 Ştefănescu era 

deja arestat. A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 403, vol. 8, f. 144. Un indiciu suplimentar că cei 

doi au fost ridicaŃi mult mai devreme, este declaraŃia căpitanului Ioan Radu, din februarie 1951, 

care afirmă că a fost „depus la Văcăreşti împreună cu Cpt. Ştefănescu Ion, Cpt. Milea Gheorghe” 

şi ceilalŃi. Idem, vol. 5, f. 187. 

29 Idem, vol. 4, f. 16 verso. 

824

vreo dovadă a unei colaborări între militari şi partizani, în baza unei note cu lipsurile de 

efecte din gestiunea batalionului 30 , această nouă comisie a recomandat trimiterea în 

judecată a mai multor cadre: „łinând seama de constatările de mai sus, cât şi de faptul că 

o serie de cadre, dintre care Lt. Mihăescu C-tin, Plot. Vasile Dumitru din Bat. 27 V.M. şi 

Cpt. Ştefănescu Ioan din Bat. 21 V.M., azi arestaŃi, şi alte cadre care au avut legături cu 

reacŃiunea, tragem concluzia că lipsurile de echipament, armament şi materiale de la 

Batalionul 21 V.M. este [sic!] o sustragere organizată de elemente criminale şi 

duşmănoase regimului nostru de DemocraŃie Populară, ceea ce a făcut ca aceste materiale 

să ajungă în mâinile duşmanului, în munŃi/Banda lui Arsenescu. Această acŃiune 

criminală a mai fost favorizată de totala lipsă de control şi vigilenŃă constatată la o serie 

de cadre din Batalionul 21 V. Munte. Vom urmări şi raporta cum decurge judecarea celor 

menŃionaŃi în cuprinsul raportului” 31 . Din datele pe care le deŃinem până în prezent, cu 

excepŃia căpitanului Ştefănescu, în privinŃa Batalionului 21 nu rezultă că demersul de 

trimitere în judecată ar fi fost finalizat în cazul celorlalŃi militari menŃionaŃi în 

document 32 . 

Ulterior, cazul a prilejuit şi implicarea personală a temutului subdirector al D.G.S.P., 

Alexandru Nicolschi alias Boris Grunberg. Indirect, acest fapt a fost provocat şi de către 

exagerările lui Gheorghe Arsenescu în faŃa oamenilor săi, consecinŃa neaşteptată fiind 

intoxicarea involuntară a SecurităŃii 33 . Nu excludem varianta ca derularea ulterioară a 

evenimentelor să fi fost dirijată de către Nicolschi însuşi. 

30 Întocmită la 1 aprilie 1950, după registrul de gestiune de la 4 ianuarie, această notă consemna 

lipsa a sute de efecte militare, precum: bocanci, mantale, pantaloni, vestoane, băşti, foi de cort, 

gamele, cearceafuri [sic!], cuŃite, castroane, genŃi, mănuşi, ochelari de ski etc. Idem, vol. 8, f. 138. 

31 Ibidem, f. 144. 

32 Este vorba despre următorii ofiŃeri şi subofiŃeri ai Batalionului 21: maiori Sfiriac Simion şi 

Vasilescu D, căpitani Drâmbăreanu Ariton, NemŃeanu Silviu şi Pârlea Vasile, plutonieri Ursu 

Gheorghe, Iosub Constantin, Stroileasa Florea, Şuteu Vasile, Goşnea Constantin şi locotenent 

colonel Diaconescu Alexandru, comandantul batalionului. Ibidem, ff. 143-144. 

33 Induşi în eroare de către Arsenescu, unii dintre cei arestaŃi au menŃionat ulterior că locotenentcolonelul 

ar fi avut contacte cu ofiŃeri din unităŃile militare din Câmpulung, conducându-l spre 

piste false pe căpitanul Cârnu, temutul anchetator al loturilor de partizani din Muscel. Faptul a 

stârnit mânia acestuia, care s-a manifestat în faŃa unor cadre ale S.I.A. Ca urmare, în decembrie 

1950, Nicolschi i-a solicitat căpitanului Cârnu un raport în legătură cu aceste afirmaŃii: „Prin luna 

August sau Septembrie 1950, ducându-mă la Unitatea de Vânători din Garnizoana Câmpulung- 

Muscel [...] am găsit în Birou pe Tov. Lt. Col. AMBROZIE MUNTEANU tot de la S.I.A. [...] 

Printre altele, deschizând discuŃia despre banditul ARSENESCU, am spus (repet cuvintele): 

, dându-i exemple cum că în 1949, venind cu 

unul din fraŃii bandiŃilor, anume AUREL CHIRCA, la Bughea într-un grajd şi acolo a avut 

întâlnire cu o fină a sa, aceasta fiind cu fratele ei, discutând cu aceştia separat de AUREL 

CHIRCA, deşi acesta văzuse persoanele. După ce a plecat [sic!] cele două persoane ARSENESCU 

se urcă în pod la AUREL CHIRCA, spunându-i că a luat legătura cu doi ofiŃeri. Deasemenea l-a 

învăŃat pe AUREL CHIRCA să spună şi celorlalŃi bandiŃi, în munte, că a luat legătura cu doi 

ofiŃeri din Câmpulung, fapt ce a şi făcut AUREL CHIRCA. Prin acest fel, am vrut să-i arăt 

Tovarăşului Lt. Colonel felul cum banditul ARSENESCU îi minŃea pe ceilalŃi bandiŃi”. Idem, 

dosar nr. 50, vol. 15, ff. 318-319. 

825

Anticipând, înainte de a ne apleca asupra cercetărilor, este necesar să semnalăm şi 

prima breşă în eşafodajul penal al SecurităŃii: veridicitatea îndoielnică a unora dintre 

informaŃiile oferite de procesele verbale de anchetă ale subofiŃerilor arestaŃi în noiembriedecembrie 

1949 şi implicaŃi în cel de-al doilea lot al partizanilor grupului „Arsenescu”. 

Atât Bunel, cât şi Voicescu şi Vasile au declarat în cursul cercetărilor că au fost conştienŃi 

tot timpul că sunt parte a unei conspiraŃii şi că şi-au asumat acest risc în mod benevol. În 

ceea ce ne priveşte, considerăm acest fapt ca fiind neadevărat, din mai multe motive. 

Primul este acela că Nicola ar fi riscat inutil oferind mai multe detalii decât ar fi fost 

necesare celor trei subofiŃeri. De altfel, obligarea de către anchetatori a asumării unei 

conştientizări totale a „complotului” reprezintă o constantă în aproape toate cazurile celor 

cercetaŃi în loturile „Arsenescu” 34 . Un al doilea motiv se întemeiază pe depoziŃiile din 

instanŃă ale celor patru care aduc rectificări esenŃiale declaraŃiilor din anchetă 35 . În fine, 

un ultim argument este reprezentat de utilizarea torturii ca instrument de persuasiune 36 . 

Avem astfel de-a face cu un perfid mecanism al mistificării care accentuează caracterul 

deja difuz al conexiunilor dintre partizani şi militarii din garnizoana Câmpulung-Muscel. 

34 Cu toate acestea „urzeala” anchetei este străvezie. Pavel Nicola, deşi este silit să admită faptul 

că furnizorii săi erau în cunoştinŃă de cauză în privinŃa partizanilor, în acelaşi timp afirmă foarte 

clar faptul că Arsenescu a plătit obiectele primite: „L-am rugat pe Voicescu Florian să-mi dea ceva 

armament spunându-i că-mi trebuie pentru un colonel Arsenescu care şi-a format o organizaŃie 

teroristă în munŃi şi are drept scop dărâmarea regimului actual. Auzind acestea lui Voicescu i-a 

părut bine de acest lucru, promiŃându-mi că-mi va da un pistol mitralieră contra cost [!]. A doua zi 

m-am dus la el acasă şi mi-a dat un pistol mitraleiră OriŃa sau sovietic, cu un încărcător şi cartuşe, 

în schimbul căruia i-am dat 3000 lei, bani primiŃi de la Arsenescu”. Idem, dosar nr. 261, vol. 10, f. 

18. 

35 Nu foarte diferite ca formă de cele din anchetă, declaraŃiile din instanŃă sunt radical diferite ca 

fond. Pavel Nicola: „Recunosc fapta ce mi se impută şi declaraŃiile de la anchetă cu următoarele 

adăugiri: [...] Bunel nu a ştiut nimic pentru cine îi cer bocancii, foaia de cort şi o raniŃă. Mie mi-a 

lăsat un pistol cu 5 cartuşe, Voicescu, drept amanet pentru nişte bani fără a ştii ce voi face cu el. 

Vasile Dumitru mi-a dat nişte bocanci fără să ştie pentru ce. Nu am discutat nimic cu aceşti 

subofiŃeri despre Arsenescu. [...] Recunosc că am ştiut de activitatea lui Arsenescu. Pentru bocanci 

am dat o chitanŃă”. Petre Bunel: „Am dat lui Nicola o raniŃă şi o foaie de cort primind pentru ele o 

purcică de 6 săptămâni [!] fără a-mi spune pentru ce le cere. Recunosc declaraŃia de la cercetări cu 

precizările făcute azi”. Florian Voicescu: „Recunosc că am dat lui Nicola pentru 3000 de lei un 

pistol cu cartuşe ce erau ale mele, fără a-mi spune pentru ce. Recunosc declaraŃia de la cercetări cu 

precizările de azi. Pe Arsenescu nici nu-l cunosc, nu ştiu nimic de el.” Dumitru Vasile: „Recunosc 

că am dat o pereche de bocanci contra chitanŃă lui Nicola şi altceva nu ştiu nimic de banda lui. 

Recunosc declaraŃia cu precizările de azi”. Idem, dosar nr. 50, vol. 9 A, ff. 345-347, 349. 

36 Într-o cerere de revizuire întocmită în 1956, Petre Bunel specifica: „[...] în urma unor torturi şi 

schingiuiri groaznice, fiind forŃat a scrie tot ceea ce au dorit domnii ofiŃeri anchetatori, recte d-l 

căpitan Cârnu şi un domn locotenent de la Câmpulung care în primele zile de la arestare la 

Securitatea din Câmpulung introducându-mă la anchetă m-a lovit peste faŃă, în partea stângă, 

scoŃându-mi dantura pusă pe care o am lipsă şi acum. IntenŃionam ca la proces să pot declara 

adevărul, adică declaraŃia a fost dată forŃat, dar procesul a fost numai formal pentru că în 3 ore am 

fost judecate 36 de persoane implicate în organizaŃie. Nu am avut drept nici la ultimul cuvânt”. 

Idem, vol. 10, f. 254. 

826

Parcurgerea proceselor verbale de interogatoriu ale celor implicaŃi în „complotul din 

batalionul 27 Vânători de Munte” a constituit o adevărată incursiune în universul represiv 

al sistemului judiciar comunist. Deşi în marea majoritate a cazurilor astfel de documente 

nu transmit intensitatea ororilor şi a colapsului interior al celor anchetaŃi, decât cel mult 

specialiştilor avizaŃi şi doar printre rânduri, în cazul de faŃă contactul cu barbaria a fost pe 

cât de frust şi direct, pe atât de neaşteptat. 

După arestările de la sfârşitul lunii martie 1950, Radu, Firică, Mihăescu, Costraş şi 

Malaşincu au fost transportaŃi la Bucureşti în vederea cercetărilor 37 . Conform datării 

documentelor am identificat mai multe faze în desfăşurarea anchetei. Astfel, o primă fază 

s-a desfăşurat în intervalul aprilie-mai 1950, la puŃin timp după arestare, şi a debutat cu 

declaraŃii autobiografice amănunŃite. Încă de la început misiunea anchetatorilor a fost să-i 

determine să recunoască legăturile pe care le-ar fi întreŃinut cu grupul de partizani condus 

de Gheorghe Arsenescu. Deşi intenŃia n-a fost străină de cei arestaŃi, bănuiala înfiripânduse 

în mintea lor odată cu apariŃia în unitate a comisiei de cercetare, uluiala acestora a fost 

sinceră în faŃa variantei „complotului” 38 . Unul din mijloacele folosite de anchetatori 

pentru a-şi atinge obiectivele a fost şi crearea unei stări de adversitate între cei cercetaŃi, 

37 Nu cunoaştem cu exactitate locaŃiile în care militarii au fost anchetaŃi, însă pe baza declaraŃiilor 

am putut identifica faptul că în cursul cercetărilor aceştia s-au aflat inclusiv la Uranus şi Văcăreşti. 

38 Ioan Radu: Pe acest om [Arsenescu – n.n.] nu l-am cunoscut şi nu l-am văzut niciodată. […] La 

Câmpulung în afară de viaŃa de cazarmă nu am avut relaŃii de familie cu nimeni, în afară de 

familia căpitanului Predescu Ioan şi Lt. major Mihăescu C-tin […] Într-o seară cred prin Februarie 

cam după ora 20 a venit la mine Plut. Firică şi Costraş. Plut. Costraş îi cerusem nişte beŃe de schi 

ce erau ale mele. Mi le-a adus şi Costraş [...] mi-a spus că a venit să-mi spună că e ceva grav: 

Ştiind că nu am nimic, nu am dat nici o importanŃă”. A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 

403, vol. 5, ff. 13 verso-14. “În legătură cu acuzaŃia adusă în cazul Arsenescu, nu ştiu cine este, nu 

l-am cunoscut şi nu l-am văzut niciodată. Nu am vorbit despre el cu Locot. Maj. Mihăescu 

Constantin şi nici cu altcineva. Cu Locot. Maj. Malaşincu Gh. nu am vorbit decât puŃin şi arareori, 

iar în acest an nu cred să fi vorbit cu el de două ori câte un minut. Nu am avut cu el legături de nici 

un fel decât ca vechi ofiŃeri în aceeaşi unitate”. Ibidem, f. 17 verso. 

827

fapt îndeplinit doar superficial în prima fază a anchetei 39 . De asemenea, deşi încă nu 

reiese explicit din declaraŃii, presiunea psihică şi fizică a fost folosită încă de acum 40 . 

O nouă etapă a cercetărilor a debutat la 31 august 1950, odată cu arestarea maiorului 

Ion Dumitrache. Probabil intuind pericolul care se profila în urma faptului că se întâlnise 

cu Arsenescu care acum acŃiona deschis la Nucşoara, la 5 iunie 1949 Dumitrache a 

solicitat şi a obŃinut de la comandantul Diviziei a 2-a Munte transferul la comanda 

Batalionului 25 Vânători de Munte Predeal, căutând să se îndepărteze de epicentrul 

„complotului” 41 . Ulterior, la 6 februarie 1950, a fost mutat la Bucureşti, în cadrul Marelui 

Stat Major. Arestarea celor cinci militari nu l-a lăsat indiferent, iar interesul său a fost 

depistat de Securitate, care l-a considerat suspect 42 . Cum era şi firesc, la primele cercetări 

Dumitrache a refuzat să admită existenŃa „organizaŃiei”. 

39 Din acest punct de vedere unul dintre procedeele alese a fost sublinierea antagonismului ofiŃersubofiŃer. 

Plutonierul Atanasie Firică: „Raportez că pentru faptele Tov. Cpt. Radu Ion, Tov. Cpt. 

BănăŃeanu, Tov. Lt. maj Malaşincu şi Plot. Costraş nu aş dori şi nu aş vrea să-mi putrezească 

oasele şi să-mi petrec viaŃa în închisori la etatea de 25 de ani, abia acum când ni s-au deschis şi 

nouă frunŃile şi drumurile mai ales la subofiŃeri. [...] Dacă aceşti tovarăşi ofiŃeri care au trăit 

domneşte şi şi-au petrecut viaŃa cum au poftit şi cu ziua de astăzi la fel şi nu pot să se alipească de 

clasa muncitoare, ei să stea în închisoare, nu eu. Idem, vol. 7, ff. 168-169. De asemenea, s-a 

încercat formarea percepŃiei conform căreia culpabilizarea unuia, uşurează situaŃia celuilalt. 

Constantin Mihăescu: „În regimentul nostru cât am fost în Câmpulung consideram ca suspect pe 

Lt. Malaşincu. Acest element după atitudinile sale, după manifestările sale consider că era suspect. 

Adeseori îşi manifesta dorinŃa de a ieşi din armată, motivând că este bolnav şi că numai în civilie 

se poate vindeca. Am arătat Bir. Informativ acest caz şi am demascat pe acest element”. Idem, vol 

6, f 73. 

40 Indiciile în această direcŃie sunt multiple. Spre exemplu menŃionăm declaraŃiile cu caracter 

autobiografic oferite de către capitanul Ioan Radu. Detaliate, de teama omiterii vreunui amănunt 

care ar fi putut fi ulterior descoperit şi imputat de anchetatori, acestea sunt încărcate cu numeroase 

paranteze autocritice secundare în raport cu miza reală a cercetării: „Venirea lui Antonescu la 

putere mai ales în situaŃia grea de atunci şi reprimarea repede şi hotărâtă a rebeliunii m-a făcut să 

cred că e bine venită o conducere militară […] Deci am avut în Antonescu la început încredere şi 

vedeam sub conducerea lui o îndreptare a lucrurilor. […] Victoriile rapide şi categorice asupra 

Poloniei şi FranŃei, […] m-au făcut să cred că ei vor câştiga războiul. […] FaŃă de aparatul politic 

nu mi-am schimbat atitudinea de rezervă ce păstrasem. […] Eu, personal, acasă nu mi-am 

controlat că pe lada de campanie era o ştampilă foarte vizibilă cu insigna regală [!]. […] La Aiud 

am făcut greşeli de erori [sic!] politice mai multe, fie prin anturajul persoanelor cunoscute, fie prin 

inactivitate în unitate. […] Tot aici când Tito şi banda lui au lunecat pe panta cu totul eronată a 

politicii anti-muncitoreşti am crezut că Tito e încă comunist. […] La Câmpulung-Muscel […] am 

dus conştiincios munca în conducerea instrucŃiei, păstrând însă aceeaşi pasivitate faŃă de aparatul 

politic […], nu am depus toată seriozitatea cu care trebuia tratată problema, dând astfel naştere la 

discuŃiuni cu locŃiitorul politic. […] Idem, vol. 5, ff. 6-14. 

41 În faŃa anchetatorilor Dumitrache şi-a justificat transferul destul de neconvingător: „Am cerut 

mutarea din cauză că nu puteam să-mi fac serviciul cum trebuie, având prea multe cunoştinŃe şi 

anturaje cu un pahar de vin mai mult, care mă sustrăgeau de la adevărata mea chemare”. 

A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 403, vol. 3, f. 16. 

42 Dumitrache s-a întâlnit cu soŃia căpitanului Ioan Radu căreia i-a promis că se va interesa de 

soarta celor închişi. La rândul ei, aceasta a trimis o scrisoare soŃiei plutonierului Firică spunându-i 

828

Însă ultima fază importantă în desfăşurarea anchetei, probabil şi cea mai violentă, a 

debutat în toamna lui 1950. Din acest moment presiunile s-au intensificat, iar accentul a 

căzut exclusiv pe legăturile cu Gheorghe Arsenescu. Marcată de un moment al negării 

totale, urmat de concesii în favoarea anchetatorilor, iar apoi de prăbuşirea totală, această 

etapă s-a concretizat prin acceptarea deplină a versiunii SecurităŃii. Probabil exasperaŃi de 

rezistenŃa militarilor, la 12 octombrie 1950 responsabilii anchetei au decis reinterogarea 

plutonierilor Pavel Nicola şi Dumitru Vasile asupra legăturilor pe care le-ar fi avut cu 

maiorul Mihăilescu, căpitanul Radu şi locotenentul major Mihăescu 43 . AflaŃi în 

penitenciarul Jilava, în aşteptarea procesului, cei doi subofiŃeri au reintrat în malaxorul 

anchetei. Sarabanda declaraŃiilor lui Dumitru Vasile oferă o perspectivă halucinantă prin 

oscilaŃiile afirmaŃiilor sale: dacă la început acesta neagă categoric orice intenŃie de a-i fi 

furnizat materiale locotenent-colonelului Arsenescu precum şi legăturile militarilor din 

unitate cu acesta 44 , începând cu finalul lunii decembrie este silit să admită toate 

acuzaŃiile 45 . Indiciile falsităŃii informaŃilor oferite din acest moment, ale violenŃei extreme 

a anchetatorilor, dar şi ale devastării psihice şi fizice a celui anchetat se disting într-o 

declaraŃie contradictorie de la o frază la alta: „Am mers ca să-i spun asemenea lucruri 

[maiorului Mihăilescu – n.n.] fără ca să-mi dau seama ce fac. Nu m-a determinat nimic, iam 

spus sub formă de discuŃii şi totodată am crezut că dânsul va lua vreo măsură contra 

lui Necula. La Securitate am semnat declaraŃia scrisă şi redactată de către Dl. Cpt. Cârnu, 

deşi în declaraŃii erau trecute chestiuni de care eu nu aveam cunoştinŃă. […] La justiŃie 

că „cineva” va încerca să afle amănunte despre soŃul ei. În urma interceptării misivei, soŃia 

căpitanului Ioan Radu a fost adusă la sediul SecurităŃii din Câmpulung şi silită să precizeze 

identitatea persoanei în cauză: maior Ion Dumitrache. Ibidem, f. 27. 

43 Decizia de reanchetare era motivată astfel: „Vă facem cunoscut că în momentul când plutonierul 

Nicola Pavel a fost arestat, maiorul Mihăilescu a înştiinŃat pe căpitanul Radu despre această 

arestare, iar, printre altele, maior Mihăilescu i-a afirmat căpitanului Radu: , manifestându-se foarte 

preocupat”. Idem, dosar nr. 50, vol. 13, f. 461. 

44 „După ce am fost arestat […] am aflat că aceşti bocanci au fost daŃi colonelului Arsenescu de 

către plutonierul Nicola Pavel, care a declarat la cercetări că bocancii au fost primiŃi de la mine, la 

fel a mai declarat că a mai primit de la mine un cojoc de sentinelă, o pereche pantaloni, o căciulă şi 

o cutie cu unsoare de bocanci, lucruri ce nu sunt adevărate, căci eu nu i-am dat lui decât o pereche 

de bocanci cu chitanŃă pentru uzul lui propriu. Acest fapt l-a recunoscut şi în faŃa instanŃei pe ziua 

de 11 decembrie când am fost judecaŃi. Cât priveşte despre activitatea dusă cu Arsenescu, eu 

personal nu am dus nici un fel de activitate şi nici nu cunosc dacă vreun ofiŃer sau subofiŃer din 

Bat. 27 V. Munte au dus vreo activitate cu Arsenescu sau au avut întâlniri cu el, decât pe plot. 

Necula Pavel îl cunosc că a avut activitate cu colonelul Arsenescu şi întâlniri. Aceasta am aflat în 

timpul cercetărilor la Piteşti”. Idem, dosar nr. 403, vol. 8, f. 15. 

45 “Prin jumătatea lunii iunie 1949 a venit la mine Plot. Necula Pavel şi mi-a cerut o pereche de 

bocanci pentru colonelul Arsenescu şi eu i-am dat spunându-mi că colonelul Arsenescu este fugit 

în munŃi şi acolo are 30-40 de partizani şi că la schimbarea regimului colonelul Arsenescu va fi cel 

puŃin ministru de război. [sic!] […] Despre întâlnirea Plot. Necula Pavel cu colonelul Arsenescu 

am spus şi D-lui maior Mihăilescu Nicolae care în acel timp se afla în cazarmă. […] Atunci Dl. 

maior m-a întrebat ce fel de om este colonelul Arsenescu. Eu am răspuns că este un om dur şi 

hotărât [!]. Ibidem, ff. 16-17. 

829

am minŃit faŃă de declaraŃia semnată că am dat bocanci lui Necula pentru uzul lui propriu. 

Aici la fel am spus în prima declaraŃie că bocancii i-am dat pentru uzul lui propriu şi 

aceasta am făcut-o fără ca să-mi dau seama că din nou comit o altă greşeală prin aceea că 

mint aşa cum am făcut cu semnarea declaraŃiei de la Securitate [!]” 46 . SituaŃia este 

similară şi în cazul lui Pavel Nicola care neagă orice legătură cu Mihăescu, Radu şi 

Mihăilescu, dar mai târziu, în aceeaşi zi, admite că în iulie 1949 i-ar fi vorbit lui 

Mihăilescu despre legăturile sale cu Gheorghe Arsenescu 47 . 

Concomitent, anchetatorii îşi înteŃesc presiunile asupra lui Radu, Mihăescu, 

Dumitrache, Costraş, Malaşincu şi Firică, imputându-le organizarea unui grup de 

rezistenŃă anticomunistă în unitate, precum şi subordonarea acestuia liderului partizanilor, 

Gheorghe Arsenescu 48 . Epuizarea provocată de „practicile specifice” de anchetă, produce 

şi prima breşă în declaraŃii, la aproape şapte luni de la arestare. Primul care cedează este 

căpitanul Ioan Radu, care la 25 octombrie 1950 admite versiunea „complotului”, impusă 

de către organele de cercetare 49 . Aproximativ trei săptămâni mai târziu, la 15 noiembrie, 

46 Ibidem, ff. 38-39. InadvertenŃele şi contradicŃiile din această declaraŃie sunt flagrante, 

subofiŃerul admiŃând pe rând validitatea şi invaliditatea celor afirmate la cercetări sau în instanŃă. 

47 Ibidem, ff. 50-52. 

48 Cu toate acestea, militarii încă rezistă. Ioan Radu: „Nu am avut niciodată discuŃii contra 

regimului. Nu am avut nici un grup format ci eram numai prieten cu maiorul Mihăilescu N., cpt. 

BănăŃeanu, lt. major Mihăescu şi lt. major Malaşincu. Nu ne-am întâlnit toŃi niciodată pentru a 

discuta ceva dinainte stabilit”. Idem, vol. 5, f. 47. Sub presiune, ofiŃerul face chiar o concesie 

anchetatorilor admiŃând predispoziŃia sa pentru afilierea la o organizaŃie anticomunistă, probabil în 

speranŃa că aceştia se vor mulŃumi cu o astfel de vină, ipotetică şi diminuată: „Dacă aş fi cunoscut 

vreo organizaŃie subversivă înainte de 1949 m-aş fi putut chiar înscrie, însă cum nu am găsit nu mam 

înscris şi nici nu am cunoscut vreun membru al vreunei organizaŃii subversive înainte sau după 

data de mai sus”. Ibidem, f. 60. 

49 “În primăvara anului 1949 prin luna martie a venit la mine la birou Maiorul Mihăilescu Nicolae 

şi mi-a spus să mergem să ne plimbăm prin spatele cazărmii. […] Maiorul Mihăilescu era foarte 

atent şi mi-a spus: . […] am intrat într-o pădurice. Acolo, într-o groapă jos stătea un individ la 

vederea căruia Mihăilescu s-a culcat şi s-a apropiat încet; eu l-am urmat. A dat mâna cu noi, nu a 

spus nimic, făcându-ne semn să stăm cât mai jos, după care a spus: . Ne-a întins mâna […] 

. […] În drum am întrebat pe Mihăilescu cum e cu această întâlnire. Iar dânsul a 

răspuns: Am înŃeles că Nicola a jucat un rol intermediar sau 

poate era chiar pe acolo”. Ibidem, f. 62. “În luna iulie 1949 către sfârşit sfârşit când ne găseam în 

comuna Dragoslavele, Maiorul Mihăilescu N. mi-a spus că are din nou comunicări, în sensul de 

continuarea menŃinerii legăturii cu Arsenescu. Eu să caut să menŃin apropiat pe Lt. Maj. Mihăescu 

C-tin fără a-i spune însă concret ceva despre Arsenescu şi să caut în mod subtil a creea o atmosferă 

favorabilă în jurul lui Arsenescu, motiv pentru care eu am vorbit într-o situaŃie tactică despre 

Arsenescu soldaŃilor lui Mihăescu […] În luna octombrie când am venit din manevră Plut. Nicola 

Pavel a fost arestat şi atunci mi-a spus Maiorul Mihăilescu […]:

probabil scăpat o perioadă din menghina interogatoriilor şi având procese de conştiinŃă, 

căpitanul Radu găseşte puterea să înfrunte o dată în plus teroarea anchetatorilor: „Fiind 

îndelungat cercetat am spus sau am recunoscut tot ceea ce am zis sau am făcut. La unele 

acuzaŃii le-am dat interpretări exagerate în defavoarea mea numai pentru a arăta 

sinceritate. Am ezitat sau am recunoscut mai târziu unele lucruri de care nu mi-am adus 

aminte şi cărora atunci când s-au petrecut nu le-am dat nici o importanŃă. În chestiunea 

Arsenescu adevărul este că nu ştiu nimic mai mult decât am declarat până în prezent. Pe 

lângă că eu nu l-am cunoscut nu ştiu şi nu cunosc pe nimeni care să-l fi cunoscut sau să fi 

avut legături cu el. DeclaraŃia dată la 25 oct. 1950 prin care arăt că l-am cunoscut 

împreună cu maiorul Mihăilescu şi plut. Nicola nu este adevărată. Am dat-o însă 

imaginându-mi modul cel mai plauzibil şi mai complex de împrejurări ce ar fi părut 

verosimil. Toate acestea au reieşit din modul cum domnul anchetator îmi prezenta situaŃia 

şi îmi arăta că dânsul cunoaşte împrejurările. Am dat această declaraŃie fiind extrem de 

zdruncinat moralmente şi fiziceşte. Credeam că declarând că am cunoscut pe Arsenescu 

mi se va da o sentinŃă oricât de gravă, însă cu gândul că se vor termina cercetările. Pe 

Arsenescu nu l-am cunoscut... orice aş spune în această chestiune ar fi o invenŃie, ar fi 

ceva născocit în mintea mea deoarece în realitate nu a fost nimic. Îmi dau seama de 

alternativa în care sunt pus. Există convingerea organelor de cercetare că am avut legături 

sau că ştiu multe lucruri în această chestiune. Subsemnatul nu ştiu absolut nimic mai mult 

decât cele declarate, situaŃie în care ştiu că niciodată nu voi scăpa de aici sau termina, însă 

am spus tot ce ştiu. Ştiu că nu numai eu voi suferi până îmi voi da sfârşitul dar consecinŃe 

vor suferi soŃia, fraŃii şi tot neamul meu, dar mai mult decât adevărul nu am ce spune. Am 

minŃit o dată cu gândul că voi fi condamnat şi că aş putea pune capăt cercetărilor dar nici 

cu minciuna n-am putut termina în vreun mod oarecare. Neavând posibilităŃi de a 

demonstra că am spus tot adevărul că mai mult nu ştiu nimic în această chestiune voi 

suferi până îmi voi da viaŃa într-o chestiune de care îmi este ruşine pentru mine şi pentru 

tot neamul meu, dar dacă nu am făcut nimic şi nu ştiu nimic nu mai am ce declara. Dacă 

se va descoperi că am avut vreo legătură cu Arsenescu sau că am ştiut ceva mai mult 

decât am declarat până astăzi doresc şi rog a mi se aplica cele mai crunte măsuri şi a mi 

se da moartea cea mai neomenească şi cea mai crudă mie iar familiei pedepsele cele mai 

aspre” 50 . 

Urmarea breşei create a fost sporirea presiunilor asupra celor care încă refuzau să 

admită „complotul”. În acelaşi timp, la 7 decembrie 1950, a fost arestat şi maiorul 

Nicolae Mihăilescu, lăsat în libertate până atunci din raŃiuni care încă ne scapă 51 . 

Interogatoriul a debutat în forŃă două zile mai târziu cu întrebări despre legăturile cu 

Nicola, singura „culpă” majoră admisă iniŃial fiind „greşeala că nu l-am demascat pe Plut. 

vara încuiat în cabinetul comandantului. Să vezi acum câŃi o mai băga la apă că locuia în casele lui 

Arsenescu şi avea legături cu el> […]”. Ibidem, f. 77. 

50 Ibidem, f. 87-88. 

51 Înapoiat de la un exerciŃiu de tragere, Mihăilescu a fost arestat la orele 18.15, din cabinetul 

comandantului, şi transportat la Bucureşti cu un automobil. Idem, vol. 4, f. 315. 

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Nicola Pavel atunci când fără să-l întreb eu mi-a vorbit despre Arsenescu, lăsând impresia 

că îl simpatizez” 52 . 

Un moment important în evoluŃia cercetărilor s-a consumat când maiorul Dumitrache a 

admis contactul cu Gheorghe Arsenescu, din toamna lui 1948 53 . Foarte posibil, acest fapt 

a motivat suplimentar anchetatorii, accentuând suspiciunea şi hotărârea de a demasca 

„complotul”. Debutul noului an, 1951, a adus cu sine şi cedarea aproape integrală 54 . Deşi 

fracturată de momente de revoltă interioară, concretizate în afirmaŃii opuse versiunii 

anchetatorilor, teoria „complotului” este prezentă în majoritatea declaraŃiilor începând cu 

data de 26 ianuarie 1951, semn al atingerii limitei de rezistenŃă sub presiunea violenŃei 

extreme 55 . Astfel, până în martie anchetatorii au smuls suficiente documente 

compromiŃătoare, apropiind finalul anchetei. 

Din decembrie 1950, utilizând mijloace ingenioase şi profitând de neglijenŃa organelor 

de pază, deŃinuŃii au reuşit să comunice în arestul de la Uranus. De asemenea, în mai 

1951, după smulgerea declaraŃiilor compromiŃătoare, au fost transferaŃi la Jilava unde, 

intenŃionat sau dintr-o eroare administrativă, Dumitrache şi Mihăilescu au fost încarceraŃi 

în celula nr. 24, prilej cu care au putut discuta întreaga situaŃie. Concomitent, maiorii au 

putut comunica şi cu ceilalŃi cinci militari, în timpul ieşirilor la aer. Fiind interogaŃi şi în 

legătură cu aceste contacte, ulterior au fost acuzaŃi că s-ar fi pus de acord în vederea 

negării învinuirilor în faŃa instanŃei 56 . 

În mod oficial, cercetările s-au definitivat la 20 iunie 1951. Procesul verbal de încheiere 

sintetizează exclusiv sarabanda declaraŃiilor care admit existenŃa „complotului”. Pe scurt, 

conform acestui document, maiorul Dumitrache ar fi luat legătura cu Gheorghe 

Arsenescu care l-a însărcinat cu „munca de cunoaştere a elementelor” favorabile din 

unitate. Mai departe Dumitrache l-a racolat pe căpitanul Radu Ioan, alături de care i-a 

racolat ulterior pe Mihăescu, Costraş, Firică şi Mihăilescu. Împreună cu aceştia, prin 

intermediul lui Miron Grigore, ar fi participat la o a doua întâlnire cu Arsenescu „pe un 

teren viran de lângă Şcoala Normală din Câmpulung Muscel”, unde au discutat despre 

„planul ce urma să-l pună în aplicare în momentul când izbucnea războiul, plan care avea 

ca obiective ocuparea instituŃiilor publice din oraş [!] de către maiorul Dumitrache cu 

52 Ibidem, f. 42. 

53 Idem, vol. 3, f. 46. 

54 Exasperat de insistenŃa anchetatorilor, maiorul Dumitrache încă declară la 11 ian 1951: „Nu mai 

am nimic de spus în problema Arsenescu. În cazul în care se va dovedi că am mai avut vreo 

întâlnire sau vreo legătură cu Arsenescu, cer să mi se aplice legea 16.” Ibidem, filă nenumerotată. 

SituaŃia limită este relevată şi de faptul că tot în această zi, 11 ianuarie, Dumitrache acordă nu mai 

puŃin de nouă declaraŃii cu un fond identic, singurele variabile fiind elementele de formă. 

55 La 26 ianuarie 1951 căpitanul Ioan Radu oferă o declaraŃie în care admite existenŃa unei 

veritabile organizaŃii în cadrul unităŃii, cu funcŃii şi misiuni specifice pentru fiecare dintre cei şapte 

militari anchetaŃi. Idem, vol. 5, ff. 97-98. O lună mai târziu, pe parcursul unei singure zile - 23 

februarie, plutonierul Costraş semnează nu mai puŃin de trei declaraŃii succesive, negând şi 

admiŃând, pe rând, existenŃa organizaŃiei. Idem, vol. 7, ff. 113-115. 

56 DiscuŃiile cu Dumitrache au fost relatate de către Mihăilescu cu o acribie care denotă spaima 

produsă de anchetă, în acest scop fiind readus în faŃa organelor de cercetare în iunie 1951. Idem, 

vol. 2, f. 5; vol. 4, ff. 222-223, 312-320. 

832

oamenii lui şi să asigure păstrarea lor şi a ordinii până la sosirea bandei lui Arsenescu”. În 

acest sens maiorul Dumitrache ar fi stabilit misiuni precise pentru fiecare dintre ei. 

InadvertenŃele abundă chiar şi în acest document-sinteză, unde misiunile atribuite 

fiecăruia variază de la un anchetat la altul 57 . În fapt, cele şase file ale procesului verbal 

conturează imaginea îndoielnică a unui complot generalizat, la adăpostul căruia cei şapte 

militari ar fi desfăşurat activităŃi „contrarevoluŃionare”: şedinŃe conspirative, furnizarea 

de efecte militare către partizanii lui Gheorghe Arsenescu, întocmirea unor planuri 

concrete de acŃiune, racolarea de noi membri etc. 

Putred, eşafodajul avea să se clatine la proces. 

Procesul 

Nerăbdarea de a încheia acest caz, după mai bine de un an de la debutul anchetei, s-a 

vădit din plin. În iulie 1951, la o lună după încheierea oficială a cercetărilor, la SecŃia I-a 

a Tribunalului Militar Bucureşti s-a desfăşurat procesul celor şapte militari acuzaŃi de a se 

fi constituit într-o „organizaŃia contrarevoluŃionară” 58 . Cu toate pregătirile anterioare, 

atmosfera din instanŃă a fost bulversată de atitudinea acuzaŃilor. EliberaŃi de presiunile 

anchetei şi depăşind, pentru moment, traumele suferite, cei şapte au oferit o probă de tărie 

de caracter, declaraŃiile lor venind să contrazică versiunea „complotului”, prezentă în 

actul de acuzare. Astăzi studierea acestor afirmaŃii contribuie la restabilirea adevărului 

istoric: 

„Cele ce declar astăzi sunt adevărul, nu i-am dat nici un răspuns lui Arsenescu; nu am 

acceptat şi din teamă nu am denunŃat [întâlnirea cu Arsenescu – n.n.]. La cercetări am fost 

pus într-o situaŃie grea încât am fost nevoit să brodez cele ce am arătat în acele declaraŃii 

însă nu este adevărat cele ce am scris. Tot ce am scris de la 1 februarie înainte nu mai 

corespunde adevărului. […] Nu i-am vorbit nimănui niciodată despre Arsenescu şi 

niciunuia dintre subalternii mei. […] Sarcinile date lui Mihăescu sunt imaginare. […] Din 

toamna lui 1948 nu l-am mai văzut pe Arsenescu – nu este adevărat că m-am întâlnit cu 

57 În vreme ce conform concluziilor extrase din ancheta lui Dumitrache, Mihăescu „avea ca 

misiune asigurarea legăturilor unităŃii pe timpul acŃiunii” şi „tăierea şi instalarea unor linii 

telefonice noi”, conform celor declarate de Mihăilescu anchetatorul a consemnat că Mihăescu 

„trebuia să ocupe depozitul de muniŃie la momentul oportun” şi „să recruteze noi membri dintre 

elementele corespunzătoare acŃiunii lor”. Aceeaşi situaŃie persistă şi în cazul lui Costraş, care 

conform lui Dumitrache, „trebuie să asigure paza depozitului de muniŃiuni” şi „să asigure 

aprovizionarea cu muniŃiuni în timpul operaŃiunii”, iar conform lui Mihăilescu acesta „trebuia să 

transporte materiale lui Arsenescu în colaborare cu Vasile Dumitru şi Nicola Pavel [!]”. Idem, vol. 

1, ff. 2-5. 

58 Completul de judecată a fost alcătuit în următoarea formulă: maior de justiŃie Finichi Paul 

(preşedinte), căpitan Radu Haralambie, locotenent major de justiŃie Stoica Ion, locotenent Naghy 

Alexandru, locotenent Popa Constantin (membri). Alături de aceştia, procurorul militar, căpitan de 

justiŃie Tronici Alexandru, şi grefierul de şedinŃă, grefier şef T. Petrescu-JoiŃeanu. Idem, vol. 2, f. 

65. 

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el. […] La cercetări am fost nevoit să declar cele ce am declarat acolo” 59 (Ion 

Dumitrache). 

„Eu nu l-am cunoscut pe Arsenescu. […] La cercetări am dat acea declaraŃie într-un 

moment de surescitare cu nervii zdruncinaŃi, dar nu corespunde adevărului. Nu m-am 

întâlnit cu fostul colonel Arsenescu, nu l-am cunoscut şi nu am dorit să-l cunosc. […] Nu 

am făcut parte din nici o organizaŃie subversivă şi nu am luat parte la nici o şedinŃă 

conspirativă. […] Am scris la cercetările preliminare pentru că situaŃia mea în acel 

moment era dezastruoasă încât am brodat acele chestiuni să termin mai repede. […] N-am 

denunŃat pe cei care mi-au vorbit despre Arsenescu datorită educaŃiei mele din trecut. […] 

Nu s-a făcut niciun fel de plan de a scoate alimente sau efecte din unitate. […] Neg orice 

legătură cu vreo organizaŃie subversivă şi neg orice întâlnire cu Arsenescu sau vreo 

sarcină avută în legătură cu acŃiunea lui Arsenescu. Nu mi-am putut explica motivul ce la 

determinat pe Nicola să mi se adreseze mie – probabil că a avut încredere în mine şi nu 

l-am denunŃat datorită vechii mentalităŃi burgheze” 60 (Nicolae Mihăilescu). 

„Am scris acele ce sunt în declaraŃiile de la dosar într-un moment de depresiune morală, 

dar nu corespund adevărului. Nu recunosc să fi avut o sarcină de la Dumitrache în acea 

organizaŃie subversivă. Nu am făcut propuneri nimănui să intre în organizaŃie. Nu mi-a 

propus niciun plan de acŃiune. Nu cunosc să se fi trimis efecte lui Arsenescu în munŃi. Nu 

am luat parte la nicio şedinŃă conspirativă a acelui grup contrarevoluŃionar. Am scris la 

cercetări fiindcă mi s-a pus în faŃă declaraŃia lt. major Mihăescu în care se spuneau aceste 

lucruri. […] Nu am avut şi nu am primit sarcină să dau hărŃi pentru Arsenescu […]” 61 

(Ioan Radu). 

„La cercetări am fost nevoit să arăt cele ce am declarat. Nu ştiu nimic de organizaŃia lui 

Arsenescu. Despre Arsenescu am auzit la închisoarea Văcăreşti cât a fost arestat Nicola şi 

ceilalŃi. […] Ultima dată, la Jilava, când ne-am văzut la aer, eram toŃi de faŃă şi toŃi am 

discutat referitor la acea organizaŃie că am spus acestea datorită condiŃiunilor create la 

anchetă – altceva nu am discutat. Nu am auzit despre atitudinea ce urmează să o ia la 

proces” 62 (Constantin Mihăescu). 

„Am scris la cercetări pentru că nu am mai putut rezista şi faŃă de declaraŃiile date de 

maior Mihăilescu care a spus că a recunoscut acelea că nu a mai putut rezista, că a ştiut 

de plut. Nicola că este în legătură cu Arsenescu; acestea le spunea la închisoarea Jilava. 

Am auzit şi eu că Nicola şi Vasile ar fi recunoscut că au dat muniŃiuni şi efecte din 

cazarmă lui Arsenescu, însă eu nu ştiu şi nu am trimis nimic, nici alimente. La 

închisoarea Văcăreşti am auzit că aceştia au făcut declaraŃia de recunoaştere, înainte nu 

am ştiut nimic. […] La închisoarea Jilava ne-am văzut când şedeam la aer, dar nu ne-am 

înŃeles să negăm. Eu declar numai cele ce corespund adevărului” 63 (Constantin Costraş). 

59 Ibidem, ff. 34-36. 

60 Ibidem, ff. 37-41. 

61 Ibidem, ff. 42-44. 

62 Ibidem, f. 45. 

63 Ibidem, ff. 46-47. 

834

„Nu a existat nici o organizaŃie subversivă şi nu am luat parte la nici o şedinŃă 

conspirativă. Am fost forŃat să declar cele ce am scris la cercetările preliminare. […] Nu 

l-am cunoscut pe Arsenescu şi nu cunosc activitatea lui” 64 (Atanasie Firică). 

„Nu cunosc nici o organizaŃie subversivă şi nu mi-a propus nimeni să intru într-o 

organizaŃie contrarevoluŃionară. […] La cercetări am fost pus în grea situaŃie, la 

închisoare, să declar cele ce am declarat. […] La închisoare ne-am întrebat fiecare ce am 

declarat. Eu nu am spus minciuni, dar ceilalŃi au arătat numai minciuni, fiind forŃaŃi să 

arate ceva” 65 (Gheorghe Malaşincu). 

ReacŃia procurorului militar în faŃa acestor declaraŃii a fost că „faptele adevărate sunt 

cele arătate de către acuzaŃi la primele cercetări, iar în instanŃă acuzaŃii au negat, după ce 

s-au pus de acord la închisoarea Jilava, crezând că prin aceasta îşi uşurează situaŃia şi 

scapă de sancŃiuni” 66 . Mai mult, invocând drept circumstanŃă agravantă calitatea de 

militari a inculpaŃilor, a solicitat pedeapsa capitală pentru Ion Dumitrache, Nicolae 

Mihăilescu, Ioan Radu şi Constantin Mihăescu, iar pentru ceilalŃi pedeapsa maximă 

prevăzută de articolul 209 partea a III-a Cod Penal 67 . „Apărarea” a fost asigurată de către 

avocaŃi din oficiu, dar pledoariile acestora au fost departe de a susŃine interesele celor din 

boxă 68 . Ultimul cuvânt oferit acuzaŃilor nu a modificat un verdict dinainte stabilit 69 . Deşi 

negarea în bloc a declaraŃiilor din anchetă ar fi trebuit să conducă la reluarea cercetărilor, 

instanŃa a ignorat evidenŃa. Astfel, la 6 august 1951, prin sentinŃa nr. 1164, din vina de a 

se fi „constituit şi participat la organizaŃiuni de tip fascist, politice şi paramilitare”, cu 

activităŃi specifice în această speŃă, cei şapte au fost condamnaŃi după cum urmează: Ion 

Dumitrache şi Nicolae Mihăilescu la moarte, Ioan Radu la 25 de ani muncă silnică, 

Constantin Mihăescu şi Gheorghe Malaşincu la 20 de ani muncă silnică, Constantin 

64 Ibidem, f. 48. 

65 Ibidem, f. 49-50. 

66 Ibidem, f. 66 verso. 

67 La articolul 209, partea a III-a, Codul Penal în vigoare la acea dată prevedea: „Se pedepsesc cu 

muncă silnică de la 15 la 25 de ani şi degradare civică de la 5 la 10 ani, cei care iniŃiază, 

organizează, activează sau participă la organizaŃiuni de tip fascist, politice, militare sau 

paramilitare”. Codul Penal al Republicii Populare Române adnotat, Editura de Stat, 1948, p. 269. 

68 Redăm, spre exemplificare, rezumatul pledoariei avocatului David Zaitman „în favoarea” 

maiorului Dumitrache: „[…] în faza trecerii de la capitalism la socialism, lupta de clasă se ascute 

[…] şi […] duşmanul de clasă caută să se servească de elementele slabe care cad victimă 

elementelor exploatatoare […] Astfel fostul maior Dumitrache, deşi fiu al clasei muncitoare, dar 

rătăcit, lipsit de educaŃie şi de nivel politico-ideologic a putut fi convins de duşmanul poporului 

muncitor. El a greşit, la cercetări a recunoscut [sic!], iar în faŃa instanŃei a căutat să nege 

[…]”.A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 403, vol. 2, f. 66 verso. 

69 Ultima reacŃie în faŃa instanŃei apare ca o încununare a dramatismului, o ultimă încercare de a 

evita fatalitatea, reliefând teama şi zbuciumul sufletesc al acuzaŃilor: „Dumitrache Ion arată că 

dezbrăcat de orice haină are conştiinŃa împăcată că a spus adevărul în instanŃă […] Se gândeşte la 

cele două fetiŃe ale sale, la mama lui care nu ştie carte şi la tatăl său, lăutarul din Godeni […]. 

Mihăilescu Nicolae susŃine că a declarat adevărul în instanŃă, că nu a denunŃat datorită educaŃiei 

sale burgheze din liceul militar Mânăstirea Dealului-Târgovişte, unde […] profesorii îi puneau să 

se închine la mormântul lui Mihai Viteazul foarte des, dar niciodată nu i-au dus să viziteze vreo 

fabrică unde lucrează muncitorii”. Ibidem, f. 67 verso. 

835

Costraş şi Atanasie Firică la 18 ani muncă silnică 70 . Deşi în motivele de recurs avocaŃii au 

indicat numeroase vicii de procedură precum şi netemeinicia sentinŃei, recursurile, 

precum şi cererile de graŃiere înaintate ulterior de către Dumitrache şi Mihăilescu, au fost 

respinse, pecetluindu-se astfel soarta celor şapte militari. 

OrganizaŃie anticomunistă sau înscenare judiciară? 

Datele pe care le deŃinem până în prezent ne permit să oferim un răspuns clar la 

întrebarea care, de fapt, stă la baza acestui demers de cercetare. Parcurgerea dosarului 

penal, studierea atentă a declaraŃiilor precum şi coroborarea surselor ne-au condus la o 

singură concluzie: ne aflăm în faŃa uneia dintre înscenările judiciare din perioada 

comunistă. 

SituaŃia este clarificată în bună măsură de către însuşi Gheorghe Arsenescu, la 

aproximativ un deceniu de la arestarea celor şapte militari. Conform declaraŃiei sale, cu 

prilejul primei întâlniri pe care a avut-o cu maiorul Dumitrache în toamna târzie a lui 

1948, acesta i-ar fi relatat că se aşteaptă să fie îndepărtat din cadrul armatei şi împreună 

cu locotenentul Ion Ştefănescu, „plănuiseră ca într-o atare situaŃie să se refugieze 

amândoi în zona păduroasă dintre Godeni şi Berevoieşti, dar [...] aflând de la Miron 

Grigore [...] că v-aŃi refugiat în munte [...] vă rog să primiŃi propunerea de a mă primi 

alături de dvs.” 71 . Mai departe Arsenescu afirmă că Dumitrache „s-a oferit că-mi poate da 

câteva rânduri de efecte militare pentru echiparea câtorva din băieŃii cu care sunt 

împreună” 72 . Zece zile mai târziu cei doi s-au întâlnit din nou: „Ca şi anterior i-am 

precizat lui Dumitrache Ion că pentru iarna 1948-1949 plec la Bucureşti [...], iar în 

primăvară, în raport cu cele ce voi stabili la Bucureşti, respectiv în situaŃia că voi reveni 

în munŃi, voi lua legătura cu el [...]. Aceasta a fost ultima întâlnire, nu ne-am mai fixat 

alta [...]. De la acea dată însă nu m-am mai întâlnit cu Dumitrache Ion. [...] Cum însă în 

1949, dat fiind împrejurările noi ivite a trebuit să-mi stabilesc alt loc de refugiu şi 

activitate şi cum Miron Grigore nu m-a urmat în timpul stabilit [...], nemaiavând deci 

după 1 martie 1949 nici un fel de legătură cu Miron Grigore, s-au întrerupt complet şi 

legăturile cu Dumitrache Ion despre care nu am mai aflat nimic din nici o sursă” 73 . 

Atât la proces cât şi în anchetă, în declaraŃiile în care a respins versiunea SecurităŃii, 

Dumitrache a negat o a doua întâlnire cu Arsenescu 74 . O posibilă explicaŃie ar fi aceea că 

maiorul nu a dorit să furnizeze anchetatorilor elemente acuzatoare suplimentare, Ńinând 

cont şi de faptul că legăturile dintre cei doi nu s-au concretizat. Însă o dovadă certă a 

70 

Condamnările au fost însoŃite de confiscarea averii şi degradarea militară. Ibidem, f. 77. 

71 

A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Informativ, dosar nr. 675, vol. 15, f. 89. 

72 


73 


74 

În iunie 1951, cu câteva zile înainte de încheierea oficială a cercetărilor, maiorul Dumitrache 

declara: „Aceasta a fost singura mea întâlnire cu Arsenescu. De atunci n-am mai avut nimic comun 

cu el sau cu altcineva care să servească cauza lui”. A.C.N.S.A.S., fond Penal, dosar nr. 403, vol. 3, 

f. 188. 

836

înscenării este faptul că Arsenescu nu aminteşte niciunde numele celorlalŃi militari 

anchetaŃi alături de Dumitrache, în condiŃiile în care procesul verbal de încheiere a 

cercetărilor şi sentinŃa menŃionează întâlniri conspirative şi atribuŃii specifice pentru 

fiecare. Întâlnirile dintre Gheorghe Arsenescu, Nicolae Mihăilescu, Ion Dumitrache şi 

ceilalŃi, consemnate în declaraŃii, reprezintă exclusiv plăsmuiri ale SecurităŃii 75 . 

Un argument în plus în favoarea inexistenŃei organizaŃiei este şi faptul că cinci dintre 

cei şapte militari (Costraş, Firică, Malaşincu, Mihăescu şi Mihăilescu) erau originari din 

alte zone ale Ńării, sosind în Câmpulung-Muscel cu prilejul reorganizării unităŃii, timp 

insuficient pentru iniŃierea şi consolidarea relaŃiilor cu Gheorghe Arsenescu, care la acea 

dată se afla deja îndepărtat din armată. 

Dar poate cea mai consistentă dovadă în tentativa de a expune înscenarea ne-a fost 

furnizată de identificarea declaraŃiilor referitoare la contactele dintre cei şapte militari în 

cursul cercetărilor. MinuŃiozitatea cu care au fost întocmite ne-a îngăduit pătrunderea 

tenebrelor anchetei, probând faptul că declaraŃiile care susŃin versiunea complotului au 

fost smulse de la cei în cauză prin intermediul ameninŃărilor sistematice (inclusiv cu 

moartea), şantajului şi torturii extreme care i-a adus în pragul epuizării fizice şi psihice, în 

anumite cazuri chiar la graniŃa nebuniei. O premeditare inteligentă sau poate chiar groaza 

prelungirii indefinite a cercetărilor i-a determinat ca atunci când au fost chestionaŃi să 

aştearnă în scris inclusiv situaŃiile limită în care s-au aflat: 

„Între 24-26 ianuarie 1951 pe când mă aflam la beci şi Cpt. Radu Ion în camera vecină 

beciului, am vorbit cu el prin uşă. [...] M-a mai întrebat [...] dacă soŃia i-a fost arestată 

deoarece i s-a spus la anchetă că a fost arestată. [...] Între 10-25 ianuarie 1951 am scris un 

bileŃel lt. major Mihăescu prin care îi spuneam că sunt bătut şi Ńinut în beci să spun ce 

legături am avut cu Arsenescu. Îl întrebam dacă el ştie şi l-am rugat să-mi pună răspunsul 

la closet [...]. Îmi spunea în el că şi el e bătut, dar nu ştie ce să spună. [...] Biletul i l-am 

aruncat pe vizetă, pentru că era în camera de lângă closet şi îl văzusem odată prin geam” 76 

(Ion Dumitrache). 

„În ziua de 17 mai 1951 a fost adus la Jilava, în celula no. 24, unde mă aflam eu, 

Dumitrache Ioan, cu care am stat împreună până la 30 mai 1951. În acest timp am 

discutat următoarele: [...] a reuşit să ia legătura prin uşă cu Radu Ion şi Mihăescu 

Constantin [...] şi să-i întrebe ce au declarat ei, că pe el îl bate de îl omoară şi nu ştie ce să 

spună. Aceştia i-au răspuns că nu au declarat nimic. Până la urmă a trebuit să accepte 

formula unei organizaŃii în legătură cu Arsenescu [...] Mi-a mai spus cum a declarat că 

am fost recrutaŃi de el. [...] Mi-a mai spus cum într-o noapte a fost luat într-o maşină şi 

75 Într-una din declaraŃii maiorul Mihăilescu este forŃat să admită o întâlnire cu Arsenescu la scurt 

timp după arestarea lui Pavel Nicola, din 15 noiembrie 1949: „Am plecat cu Maiorul Dumitrache 

şi l-am întâlnit pe Arsenescu [...]. Şi-a exprimat îngrijorarea de arestarea lui Cojocaru şi Nicola 

indicând mai multă prudenŃă”. Idem, vol. 4, f. 122. Falsitatea unei asemenea afirmaŃii este uşor de 

demonstrat, deoarece în intervalul 6 octombrie 1949 – 1 martie 1950 Gheorghe Arsenescu s-a aflat 

ascuns în gospodăriile lui Ion Aldea şi Nicolae Bivol, pierzând complet contactul cu partizanii. 

Mai mult, abia scăpat dintr-o împresurare a SecurităŃii, la 5 octombrie 1949, Arsenescu era rănit la 

picior nefiind într-o condiŃie optimă pentru deplasare. Idem, dosar nr. 219, vol. 1, ff. 246-252. 

76 Idem, dosar nr. 403, vol. 3, f. 190. 

837

dus înspre Jilava [...] şi întrebat sub ameninŃarea cu împuşcarea dacă s-a întâlnit cu mine, 

cu Arsenescu. A răspuns că nu. S-a întâlnit numai singur. [...] În ceea ce mă priveşte pe 

mine eu i-am comunicat conŃinutul declaraŃiilor pe care le-am dat. [...] I-am mai 

comunicat cum după aceea am negat tot ce declarasem, că am fost lăsat o lună fără să fiu 

cercetat, pentru ca după aceea susŃinând în continuare că nu este nimic adevărat, în ziua 

de 24 ianuarie 1951 să fiu bătut [...]. Dumitrache Ioan mi-a spus aici că şi-a închipuit, 

pentru că i s-a spus imediat după aceea că eu am botezat vâna de bou: . Aici în beci a trebuit să recunosc încă o şedinŃă Ńinută în acelaşi loc [...] şi o altă 

întâlnire cu Arsenescu. [...] În urma acestor discuŃii, care au avut loc, disperat, am ajuns la 

concluzia că există contraziceri în declaraŃiile pe care le-am dat, iar eu mi-am mărturisit 

speranŃa şi încrederea pe care o am în organele anchetatoare de a verifica în amănunt [...] 

pentru ca adevărul să iasă la lumină […] În continuare a fost de părere ca în cazul când nu 

s-a făcut încheierea cercetărilor şi vom fi confruntaŃi să susŃinem că această organizaŃie 

nu a existat, iar dacă vom fi din nou ameninŃaŃi şi bătuŃi să susŃinem fiecare declaraŃiile pe 

care le-am dat” 77 (Nicolae Mihăilescu). 

„În ziua de 13 decembrie 1950 mă găseam cu încă trei reŃinuŃi pentru cercetări […] în 

camera de lângă beci. La un moment dat cineva din beci a deschis uşa şi s-a ridicat până 

sus pe trepte bătând uşor în uşa care despărŃea camera noastră de beci. […] Mi-a spus 

maiorul Dumitrache că a fost arestat la 1 septembrie seara de acasă, din Bucureşti şi că 

până atunci stătuse la Uranus. Mi-a mai spus că la anchetă este interogat asupra chestiunii 

Arsenescu dar că până atunci el nu a spus nimic. […] L-am întrebat apoi ce crede? Cum 

se va sfârşi această chestiune? La care mi-a răspuns să am speranŃă că se va sfârşi bine. 

Nu avem nimic de spus. […] Mi-a spus apoi că şi el a fost şantajat la cercetări 

propunându-i-se să fie lăsat liber pentru a merge la Câmpulung unde de la soŃia mea să 

afle legăturile mele cu Arsenescu. […] A doua oară am vorbit cu maiorul Dumitrache 

Ioan în ziua de 24 ianuarie 1951 când subsemnatul eram singur în camera de lângă beci. 

Nu am vorbit prea mult fiindcă eu eram în lanŃuri în mijlocul camerei […]. Se plângea că 

îi este frig în beci fiindcă este îmbrăcat în haine subŃiri, de vară, aşa cum îl arestase. Al 

doilea cu care am luat legătura a fost Locot. Major Malaşincu Gheorghe. […] Mi-a spus 

că e de două săptămâni în anchetă, dar că până acum el nu a declarat nimic. Eu i-am spus 

că am declarat tot ce ştiam şi chiar au fost lucruri pe care le-am exagerat numai pentru a 

termina ancheta. […] I-am mai spus că nu e bine să declare mai mult decât a făcut sau 

lucruri imaginare fiindcă dă naştere la confuzii. El mi-a spus că declară şi ce nu a făcut, 

numai să scape de cercetări. Mi-a spus că a fost plecat în spital unde a stat aproape două 

luni, că este încă bolnav mai rău ca oricând şi ar vrea să termine mai repede, dar el ştie 

prea puŃin de organizaŃie. […] În seara zilei de 18 februarie 1951 a fost adus altcineva în 

beci [Constantin Costraş – n.n.] […]. L-am întrebat ce a declarat până acum iar el mi-a 

spus că mai mult nimic, deoarece i se cer lucruri pe care nu le cunoaşte în legătură cu 

Arsenescu. […] Subsemnatul i-am spus că mie mi s-au cerut lucruri pe care nu le cunosc 

şi că pentru a termina cercetarea aş declara orice, am ajuns până acolo să afirm că am tras 

camionul la uşa magaziei de îmbrăcăminte şi l-am încărcat cu efecte pentru Arsenescu. 

[…] Luni 18 februarie a fost adus din nou Locot. Maj. Malaşincu Gheorghe în beci. […] 

77 Idem, vol. 4, ff. 312-320. 

838

Mi-a mai spus că e bolnav din ce în ce mai rău cu stomacul şi acum se simte rău şi cu 

plămânii şi nu ştie dacă mai scapă de aici. […] În acest moment am fost observat de 

planton care a intrat în cameră şi l-a surprins şi pe el ieşit din beci şi urcat pe scări” 78 

(Ioan Radu). 

„Sâmbătă când am fost dus la beci am auzit câteva glasuri din camera vecină stabilind 

după aceea că unul este al cpt. Radu Ion. L-am întrebat ce face şi mi-a răspuns că stă de 

câteva săptămâni prin faptul că a recunoscut nişte lucruri neadevărate şi nu ştie cum să le 

susŃină. L-am întrebat apoi ce organizaŃie a existat în bat. 27 V. Munte – sunt adevărate 

cele ce declară maiorul Mihăilescu? Mi-a răspuns că nu cunoaşte nimic despre 

organizaŃia subversivă din Câmpulung şi că dânsul a declarat multe lucruri neadevărate 

numai pentru a scăpa de presiunea cercetărilor. I-am spus că nu cunosc nimic despre 

organizaŃie şi atunci dacă aceasta a existat la Câmpulung cum de nu ştiu nimic. Aş 

recunoaşte lucruri pe care nu le-am făcut, dar nu pot să le susŃin prin amănunte. […] Luni 

19 febr. seara am fost dus din nou la beci. […] I-am spus că am declarat lucruri 

neadevărate numai pentru a scăpa de beci şi de gimnastica ce o făceam. I-am spus că 

fiecare a declarat mult şi neadevărat numai pentru a scăpa de moment. […] Sunt adus din 

nou la beci pentru că nu declar că am făcut parte din organizaŃie” 79 (Gheorghe 

Malaşincu). 

„În ziua de 10.XI.950 când m-am dus în cameră de la cercetări am găsit pe Tov. Cpt. 

Radu Ioan după cum eram foarte bolnav d-lui m-a întrebat . Eu am răspuns 

şi l-am întrebat ” 80 (Constantin Costraş). 

IncoerenŃa anchetei, neconcordanŃele dintre declaraŃii, sarabanda recunoaşterilor şi 

retractărilor, neconfirmarea existenŃei complotului prin interogatoriile partizanilor 

grupului „Arsenescu”, specificarea clară a utilizării torturii ca mijloc de constrângere 

reprezintă tot atâtea probe de necontestat în demantelarea acestei înscenări judiciare. Deşi 

a pornit de la câteva elemente concrete - arestarea plutonierilor Nicola, Bunel, Voicescu 

şi Vasile, menŃionarea, sub tortură, a altor militari cu atitudini nu tocmai conforme cu 

ideologia comunistă - ancheta a avansat în direcŃia unei teorii a conspiraŃiei nesustenabile. 

Teama de „reacŃiune” şi de Gheorghe Arsenescu însuşi, suspiciunea, lipsa prezumŃiei de 

nevinovăŃie şi nu în ultimul rând reflexele criminale ale regimului comunist au capacitat 

instituŃiile statului la instrumentarea acestei înscenări judiciare. Au plătit cu viaŃa Ion 

Dumitrache şi Nicolae Mihăilescu. 

78 Idem, vol. 5, ff. 181-186. 

79 Idem, vol. 7, ff. 44-46. 

80 Ibidem, f. 72. 

839

CAMPANIA DE ÎNCHIDERE A 

MĂNĂSTIRILOR DIN MOLDOVA SOVIETICĂ 

(1944–1962) 

Ion XENOFONTOV 1 

Dimensiunile problemei. Potrivit istoricului englez Timothy Ware „specific 

ortodoxiei este tradiționalismul, acel aer arhaic, hotărârea ei de a rămâne credincioasă 

trecutului în sensul unei continuități cu biserica străveche” 1 . Această pietate colectivă față 

de tradițiile spirituale a fost considerată de propaganda bolșevică drept opiu al societății – 

religia și biserica fiind incluse în categoria inamicului intern și extern ai Uniunii 

Sovietice. La 20 ianuarie 1918 în URSS a fost declarată separarea Bisericii de Stat și 

drept urmare s-au intensificat acțiunile politico-ideologice, economice ale autoritățile 

sovietice, care au tins să lichideze în totalitate dimensiunea spirituală a cetățenilor 

sovietici. Articolul 124 din Constituția sovietică (1936) garanta dualismul religios-politic 

„libertatea conștiinței și exercitarea cultelor religioase și în același timp libertatea 

propagandei antireligioase” 2 . În urma „campaniilor active în favoarea ateismului” în anii 

1960, în Uniunea Sovietică numărul lăcașelor de cult s-a redus de la 20 de mii la 7 mii, 

iar a mănăstirilor de la 87 la 17 și a seminarelor de la 8 la 3 3 . În percepția regimului 

comunist, obștile monahale constituiau focare de spiritualitate și de rezistență a limbii și a 

conștiinței naționale românești împotriva politicii de deznaționalizare și rusificare 4 . În 

acest context, mănăstirile din Basarabia anexată de URSS au fost supuse unei ample 

campanii de intimidare, deznaționalizare, de distrugere a obștii monahale etc. Din 

perspectiva liderilor comuniști „orice refacere completă a societății impunea eradicarea 

religiei și distrugerea bisericilor” 5 . Biserica dispunea de bogate resurse economice, avea 

un puternic prestigiu social și era, evident, un concurent important al statului sovietic, 

aceasta dorind să schimbe credința religioasă în una de partid. Era bine cunoscut 

sloganul comunist al perioadei respective: „Pentru a fi un bun comunist, trebuie să fii un 

bun ateist”. Liderul Uniunii Sovietice, Nikita Hrușciov, a declarat că poporul sovietic va 

intra în comunism „fără popi și bețivani”. Iar pentru a realiza acest obiectiv se organizau 

întruniri regizate ale „poporului truditor” la care se declara lichidarea lăcașelor sfinte 6 . 

Instituțiile de cult, clerul, simbolurile creștine au fost profanate și marginalizate. Practica 

de aici a fost ulterior aplicată de autoritățile sovietice în RSS Moldovenească. 

1 Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice al Academiei de ŞtiinŃe a Moldovei, Republica Moldova. 

840

Repere istoriografice. Considerate ac iuni de consolidare ideologică a statului 

sovietic, închiderea lăca urilor monahale s-a înscris în ampla campanie a ateismului 

militant, iar istoricii sovietici le-au considerat, în unison cu propaganda comunistă, fie 

ac iuni utile ale statului sovietic, fie, în cel mai bun caz, le-au neglijat sau plasat în 

categoria subiectelor tabuizate. De exemplu, în una din căr ile comuniste de propagandă 

antireligioasă se specifica: „Oamenii care nu cred în Dumnezeu au posibilitatea 

neîngrădită de a fi atei, de-a traduce în via ă dreptul lor la libertatea con tiin ei, de-a 

desfă ura propaganda ateistă” 7 . Biblia constituia o raritate bibliografică. Nu era permisă 

elaborarea i editarea literaturii religioase, cu excep ia calendarelor de profil. Abia în 

1961 a fost editat noul Aghiazmătar 8 . La sfâr itul anilor 1980, A.I. Babii a publicat o 

lucrare în care anun a triumfalist despre apusul bisericii ortodoxe în republică 9 . După 

decăderea comunismului, în contextul reevaluării faptelor i evenimentelor istorice, în 

istoriografia din Republica Moldova s-a aten ionat asupra subiectelor referitoare la 

via a spirituală în general i cea a vie ii monahale în mod special. De men ionat că 

cercetarea fenomenului vie ii religioase în general i asupra celor vizând via a 

monahală, în mod special, a suscitat interesul nu doar a istoricilor, ci i a publici tilor, 

scriitorilor, teologilor etc. Scriitorul i publicistul Nicolae Dabija a editat articole 

referitoare la soarta lăca urilor sfinte din Basarabia ocupată de sovietici 10 . Vladimir 

Be leagă a studiat situa ia bisericilor i mănăstirilor în cadrul regimului totalitar 

comunist 11 . Despre „rebeliunea de la Răciula” V. Be leagă scrie că a fost o „luptă dârză, 

pe via ă i pe moarte, contra regimului comunist de ocupa ie i a căpătat o clară 

semnifica ie de protest a fiin ei noastre române ti supusă unei aprigi dezna ionalizări 

i asimilări” 12 . Istoricul Ion urcanu a analizat implicarea agen ilor de securitate în 

închiderea lăca elor sfinte 13 . El conchide că, de exemplu, „aspectul cel mai degradant în 

acea diversiune politico-ideologică a fost colaborarea unei păr i a clerului, mai ales a 

administra iei ecleziastice, cu conducerea de stat comunistă i cu organele de represiune 

ale acestuia în lupta împotriva credin ei i pentru închiderea lăca urilor în care se 

oficiau ritualurile de cult” 14 . Cercetătoarea Veronica Dudnic a analizat prin prisma istoriei 

orale a analizat formele de rezisten ă ale popula iei împotriva autorită ilor care tindeau 

să închidă lăca urile sfinte 15 . Istoricul Ludmila Tihonov a realizat o retrospectivă istorică 

a politicii statului sovietic fa ă de cultele din RSS Moldovenească (1944–1965) 16 . 

Doctorul în istorie Elena i canu a studiat distrugerea Bisericii din RSS Moldovenească, 

ca formă de interven ie în via a privată 17 . Teologul Veaceslav Ciorbă a cercetat i a 

analizat mănăstirile în perioada regimul totalitar comunist (1944–1989) 18 . O contribu ie 

substan ială în abordarea subiectului în cauză o aduce membrul corespondent al 

Academiei de tiin e a Moldovei, Valeriu Pasat. V. Pasat a pus în circuit tiin ific o 

serie de documente istorice inedite din arhivele din Republica Moldova (inclusiv din 

Arhiva Securită ii), Ucraina, Rusia, România 19 . 

Repere istorice. Din 1420, de la atestarea primii institu ii monahale din regiune 

(Vărzăre ti, Nisporeni) până în 1940 pe teritoriul Basarabiei au fost înfiin ate 48 de 

mănăstiri 20 . Numărul mare de mănăstiri amplasate pe un teritoriu extins se explică prin 

sentimentul i pietatea religioasă al locuitorilor din regiune i prin sprijinul privilegiile 

acordate de puterea laică sfintelor lăca e. În perioada interbelică, în spa iul actual al 

841

Republicii Moldova s-a constituit un dualism în privin a politicii i vie ii religioase. 

După 1918, în Basarabia revenită în spa iul românesc de s-a produs o revigorare a vie ii 

spirituale. Astfel, anul 1925 în provincia românească 1104 preo i slujeau în 1090 de 

biserici i capele; activau 20 de mănăstiri i 9 sihăstrii cu 2414 vie uitori 21 ; s-a ridicat 

nivelul învă ământului teologic (în 1926 la Chi inău a fost deschisă Facultatea de 

Teologie a Universită ii din Ia i). În 1940, complexele monahale de ineau 1 624 ha de 

pământ, în medie câte 61,6 ha de fiecare 22 . Alt traseu l-a parcurs însă popula ia 

Republicii Autonome Sovietice Socialiste Moldovene ti (RASSM), unitate teritorială 

creată în 1924. În 1917, în regiune func ionau 1017 biserici i case de rugăciuni, 13 

mănăstiri i schituri în care efectuau serviciul divin 890 de preo i i 384 de călugări 23 . 

Până în 1941, în acest spa iu au fost demolate i închise aproape toate bisericile, fiind 

lăsată să func ioneze doar una, cea a cimitirului nr. 2 din Odesa 24 . 

La 28 iunie 1940, când URSS a anexat Basarabia, în regiune func ionau 1090 de 

biserici i 28 de mănăstiri ortodoxe 25 . Drept urmare a interven iei sovietice s-a 

intensificat propaganda anticre tină, bisericile au fost transformate în dormitoare pentru 

trupele sovietice, magazii, săli de spectacole sau închise. Pentru a demonstra rolul nefast 

al religiei asupra „construc iei socialismului” a fost înfiin at a a-numitul Muzeu 

Atireligios de la Chi inău, amplasat în fosta capelă a Liceului de Fete Regina Maria 26 . 

Crucile de pe lăca urile sfinte era distruse i înlocuite cu drapele ro ii. Un asemenea 

drapel a fost arborat i la statuia lui tefan cel Mare, în mâna în care domnul ării 

Moldovei inea crucea 27 . Preo ii erau umili i prin faptul că erau îmbrăca i în haine de 

mireni, tun i scurt i bărbieri i. Au fost deporta i în Siberia i asasina i 52 de 

preo i i 45 de cântăre i biserice ti 28 . Au fost organizate deta amente de agitatori 

antireligioase (безбожники), care organizau diverse ac iuni de propagandă 

antireligioasă în comunită i 29 . Asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe au fost efectuate presiuni 

economice, având, dincolo de aparen e un singur scop: lichidarea lăca elor de cult. De 

exemplu, dacă un kilowat de curent electric costa pentru particulari 13 copeici, biserica 

era taxată cu cinci ruble 30 . În 1940, mănăstirea Saharna, de exemplu este transformată 

în… sediul administraŃiei colhozului 31 , fiind deposedată abuziv de o bună parte din 

terenurile agricole stăpânite 32 . În octombrie 1940, pădurile mănăstirilor au fost 

na ionalizate 33 . Mănăstirea Frumoasa a fost transformată în casă de odihnă 34 , Suruceni 

i Hârjauca – în spitale 35 , Hârbovă , Căpriana – în orfelinat 36 . La retragerea sovieticilor 

în 1941, mănăstirile au fost jefuite i profanate. Renumita icoană făcătoare de minuni de 

la mănăstirea Hârbovă Icoana Maicii Domnului a fost arsă în Catedrala Chi inăului 37 . 

În 1944, după retragerea autorită ilor române ti din Basarabia s-au refugiat i o 

parte din membrii ob tii monahale, preo i, diaconi, cântăre i, în mod special persoane 

având studii superioare i de inând înalte func ii ierarhice. În jude ul Băl i, cel mai 

populat, în anul 1946, sovieticii au întocmit o listă pentru repatrierea a 218 preo i, 8 

diaconi i 66 de dascăli refugia i peste Prut 38 . 

Politica sovietică în domeniul religiei promovată în RSSM, inclusiv în sistemul 

monastic. În timpul ac iunilor militare din anul 1944, sovieticii au devastat i jefuit 

842

mănăstirile basarabene. De exemplu, la mănăstirea Noul Neam sovieticii au sustras 

„pentru necesită ile frontului”, covoarele din cele două biserici, o cruce mare de aur, 120 

mii lei, scaune, mese, paturi, canapele, două camioane, două tractoare, patru tone de orz 

i grâu 39 . După ofensiva jandarmilor români asupra partizanilor i para uti tilor 

sovietici de la mănăstirile Căpriana i Condri a, unii dintre para uti ti „au înnoptat la 

Mănăstirea Hâncu” 40 , iar din averea mănăstirească nu a rămas nimic 41 . În vara anului 

1944, mănăstirea de monahii Co ălăuca, a fost deposedată de 376 de copaci seminceri, 

tăia i de militarii sovietici 42 . În august 1944, în RSS Moldovenească func ionau 25 de 

mănăstiri 43 . 

După reinstalarea sovieticilor în regiune a fost desfiin ată administra ia bisericii 

române ti. Mitropolia Basarabiei a fost înlocuită cu Episcopia Chi inăului i Moldovei, 

supusă administrativ Sinodului de la Moscova. Ca i în perioada aristă această 

structură a fost păstorită doar de arhierei ru i i ucraineni: episcopul Ieronim Zaharov 

(1944–1947); episcopul Benedict Poleakov (1947–1948); arhiepiscopul Nektarie 

Grigoriev (1948–1968). Ace tia erau monitoriza i de împuternicitul Consiliului pentru 

treburile bisericii ortodoxe ruse de pe lângă Consiliul de Miniştri al Uniunii Sovietice, un 

organ represiv al vie ii spirituale, instituit la 7 octombrie 1943 prin hotărârea CCP al 

URSS. eful Consiliului pentru treburile bisericii ortodoxe ruse unionale era G.G. 

Karpov, ef de sec ie al NKGB al URSS. Pentru RSS Moldovenească împuternicit a 

fost numit P.G. Romenski, care activa pe lângă conducerea Comisariatului Poporului, 

transformat ulterior în Consiliul de Mini tri al RSS Moldovenească. După instalarea în 

func ie, P.G. Romenski a ini iat o serie de ac iuni pentru închiderea lăca elor sfinte. 

Aceea i politică a promovat-o i următorul împuternicit, A.I. Oleinik, care punea accent 

pe conlucrarea cu conducerea eparhială pentru a lichida mai u or lăca urile sfinte. A.I. 

Oleinik afirma următoarele: „Aten ia noastră era concentrată în direc ia elaborării 

ac iunilor pentru ca închiderea mănăstirilor, încetarea slujbelor religioase în biserici, 

lichidarea comunită ii religioase să fie efectuată cu mâinile conducerii eparhiale. 

Practica a demonstrat că o astfel de atitudine fa ă de ob inerea celor dorite are rezultate 

pozitive” 44 . Anumi i slujitori ai bisericii, dând dovadă de exces de zel, îl felicita regulat 

prin telegrame pe împuternicitul Consiliului 45 . În activitatea sa împuternicitul a fost 

sprijinit de o re ea de agen i infiltra i în structurile administrative ale Bisericii 

Ortodoxe. Capul bisericii din Moldova, arhiepiscopul Nektarie avea numele conspirativ 

„Kazan ev”, iar asistentul acestuia era „Iuriev”, i el agent KGB 46 . În contextul în care 

se lua decizia de a fi închisă o mănăstire, arhiepiscopul Nektarie îi îndepărta din 

complexul monahal pe cei mai activi călugări pentru a evita astfel posibilitatea unei 

rezisten e din interior, creând astfel impresia că are loc o ac iune spontană, ini iată de 

chiar ob tea monahală 47 . Potrivit unei note informative a Comitetului Securită ii de Stat 

al RSS Moldovene ti din 8 ianuarie 1960, re eaua de agen ii ai bisericii ortodoxe era 

constituită din 16 persoane, inclusiv cu func ii administrative în mănăstiri, cu nume 

conspirative „Înăl atul”, „Albu”, „Nikitin”, „Florea”, „Grigoriev”, „Scurtu” etc. 48 . 

Predicile preo ilor erau supravegheate, la fel i coresponden a lor privată 49 . Erau strict 

interzise efectuarea serviciilor divine de către preo ii, călugării neînregistra i, oficierea 

procesiunilor cu crucea la ini iativa acestora 50 . 

843

Slujitorii religiei, inclu i în categoria „du manilor poporului” au avut de suferit în 

urma deportărilor din 1949. Dacă la 20 iunie 1949, în Biserica Ortodoxă activau 430 de 

clerici i 356 de dascăli, la 1 ianuarie 1950 au rămas 353 de clerici i 321 de dascăli 51 . 

În lipsa unei coli teologice în RSSM, dosarele pentru studii se depuneau la 

Seminarul Teologic din Odesa. De exemplu, în anii 1955–1956 au depus dosarele, 

respectiv 8 i 43 de persoane. Cei neînmatricula i erau strict supraveghea i i 

prelucra i ideologic de organiza iile de partid i cele comsomoliste 52 . 

La 16 octombrie 1958, a fost luată decizia de a lichida complet sistemul monastic din 

RSS Moldovenească 53 . În anii 1960, în RSS Moldovenească a fost interzisă tragerea 

clopotelor, au fost scoase din localită i peste 30 000 de răstigniri i cruci, erau interzise 

pelerinajele la mănăstiri i locuri sfinte 54 . La 1 ianuarie 1962, 98 de biserici au fost 

transformate în cluburi, săli de sport, biblioteci; 67 au fost demolate. Peste un an, în 

Eparhia Chi inăului i a Moldovei func ionau doar 256 de biserici i o singură 

mănăstire 55 . 

Factorul politic, sprijinit de cel al structurilor securită ii, a izbutit în scurt timp să 

marginalizeze i să supună controlului structurile institu ionale ale Bisericii Ortodoxe 

din RSSM. Mai mult, ierarhii Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova sovietică au fost 

transforma i în parte în instrumente utile de compromitere i de închidere a lăca elor 

monahale. 

Situa ia generală a mănăstirilor i a ob tii monahale din RSS Moldovenească după 

cel De-al Doilea Război Mondial. După cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial numărul 

lăca elor monahale s-a redus substan ial. În 1945, în noua republică sovietică erau 

înregistrate 25 de mănăstiri i schituri (16 – de monahi i 9 – de monahii) 56 . În 1948, 

func ionau doar 22 de mănăstiri: în anul 1949 –20, iar în 1956 – 15, dintre care 7 de 

călugări i 8 de călugări e 57 . Toate mănăstirile aveau nevoie de repara ii capitale, 

deoarece nu au fost între inute pe parcursul mai multor ani i suferiseră în urma 

conflagra iei mondiale. Chiar i a ezămintele monahale cu o situa ie economică bună 

nu aveau posibilită i să efectueze repara ii de amploare, dat fiind faptul că în condi iile 

războiului materialele i utilajele de construc ii erau deficitare 58 . 

Drept urmare a presiunilor violente din partea autorită ilor centrale i locale i 

numărul vie uitorilor din lăca e monahale s-a redus substan ial. Dacă în 1947, numărul 

monahilor i monahiilor constituia 1642; în 1950 – 1746; în 1952 – 1569; atunci în 1956 

mai existau 311 călugări i 1059 de călugări e. Numărul maicilor era de trei ori mai 

mare, decât cel al monahiilor. i încă un aspect: majoritatea vie uitorilor erau în etate. 

Astfel, în anul 1952, 51 de persoane aveau până la 18 ani, 526 – de la 19 până la 40 de 

ani, 399 – de la 41 până la 55 de ani, 593 erau trecu i de 55 de ani. Drept urmare a 

politicii sovietice de intimidare a modului de via ă religios treptat s-a redus i numărul 

vie uitorilor monahali nou-venit. Astfel, în prima jumătate a anului 1957, în mănăstiri au 

intrat doar 14 persoane, inclusiv 9 tineri (4 tineri i 5 fete) cu vârsta cuprinsă între 18 i 

26 de ani 59 . Sub aspect etnic majoritatea erau moldoveni, mai pu ini ru i, ucraineni, 

844

ulgari, găgăuzi. Majoritatea vie uitorilor din comunită ile monahale proveneau din 

ărani. În anul 1948, doar un singur monah avea studii superioare laice, unul – teologice 

medii; 7 – medii laice; 1400 – studii primare, iar 233 erau analfabete 60 . Potrivit 

împuternicitului sovietic P.G. Romenski: „Persoanele care se călugăresc în ultimii ani, 

sunt în exclusivitate ărani i ărănci din păr ile locului, moldovenii provenind în 

majoritatea lor din familii de nevoia i, înapoiate cultural i religios până la fanatism. 

Printre ele se numără nu numai bătrâni i oameni de vârstă medie, ci i tineri i copii, 

care se duc la mănăstire sub influen a părin ilor sau, de multe ori, la îndemnul rudelor 

apropiate (fra i, surori etc.), care s-au făcut călugări i călugări e mai înainte” 61 . După 

scriitorul Vladimir Be leagă tendin ele de completare a comunită ilor monahale erau 

generate nu doar de sentimentul religios, ci i de precaritatea condi iilor economice „ i 

chiar de mizeria din structurile de jos ale societă ii. Tineri, oameni vârstnici, dar i 

elemente persecutate politic de autorită ile sovietice vedeau în mănăstiri un fel de liman 

salvator” 62 . 

La 23 ianuarie 1959, Biroul CC al PCM printr-o hotărâre a decis: „Consiliul de 

Mini tri al RSS Moldovene ti va propune Consiliului de Mini tri al URSS reducerea 

numărului de mănăstiri din RSS Moldovenească i închiderea ulterioară a tuturor 

mănăstirilor (s.n.)” 63 . Ca urmare, la 5 iunie 1959, Consiliul de Mini tri al RSSM a luat 

decizia de a se „închide treptat nouă mănăstiri de pe teritoriul republicii, pe parcursul 

anilor 1959–1960” 64 . În lumina indica iilor stabilite de autorită ile sovietice centrale, 

doar în anii 1959–1960 au fost închise nouă mănăstiri i 173 de biserici. În anul 1960, în 

RSSM func ionau doar cinci mănăstiri: 3 de călugări (Hârbovă , Căpriana i 

Chi cani) i 2 de călugări e (Călără euca i Japca). În 1961 au fost desfiin ate 

mănăstirile Hârbovă i Călără euca, cu un număr total de 179 de persoane, iar în 1962 

Căpriana i Chi cani, cu un număr total de 171 de persoane. Lichidarea complexului 

monahal Hârbovă , la 10 mai 1961, a fost motivată ca fiind executată „în conformitate 

cu necesită ile de reducere a numărului de mănăstiri în republică” 65 , fiind transformată 

în orfelinat. Anumite lăca uri monahale au devenit cămine sociale (Hâncu), spitale 

pentru copii cu handicap (Saharna), spitale (Cu ălăuca, Noul Neam , Căpriana), coli 

pentru copii cu handicap (Călără euca), cluburi (Tabăra), aziluri de aliena i mintal 

(Curchi) etc. 

Singura mănăstire neînchisă a fost cea de la Japca, luată ulterior în administrarea 

directă a Patriarhiei Moscovei. 

Forme i mecanisme de lichidare a mănăstirilor i de intimidare a comunită ilor 

monahale. În urma creării mecanismelor opresive de lichidare a vie ii religioase în RSS 

Moldovenească s-au dat indica ii categorice privind compromiterea i ulterior 

lichidarea a ezămintelor monahale. În acest scop, autorită ile sovietice au aplicat mai 

multe metode radicale i tertipuri: de la înlăturarea fizică i intimidări psihologice până 

la marginalizarea economică i socială a comunită ilor monahale. 

845

În profilul comunismului de război s-a aplicat formula Cine nu-i cu noi, este 

împotriva noastră. Utilizându-se respectivul principiu s-a ini iat o amplă campanie de 

„lichidare” a elementelor declarate de autorită ile de ocupa ie sovietice drept 

antisovietice, inclusiv din rândurile comunită ilor monahale. Astfel, într-un document 

din iunie 1946 printre elementele antisovietice din timpului celui de-al Doilea Război 

Mondial erau men iona i călugării, califica i drept „colaboratori ai regimului de 

ocupa ie”, fiind învinui i că, chipurile, denun au grupurile de a a-zi i partizani 

sovietici, precum i de alte acte „antisovietice”. Ca urmare au fost aresta i 28 de 

vie uitori ai mănăstirilor 66 . 

În mecanismul complex de lichidare a lăca elor monahale au fost antrena i masiv 

i permanent colaboratorii organele securită ii de stat (NKVD). Astfel, în opera ia de 

închidere a mănăstirii Hârbovă „un mare rol a revenit agenturii i persoanelor de 

încredere, care ocupau posturi de conducere în administra iile eparhiale, în mănăstiri sau 

locuiau în satele din vecinătatea lor” 67 . Pentru închiderea discretă a mănăstirii evitându-se 

manifestările de protest public securitatea sovietică a studiat situa ia la zi a mănăstirii, a 

monahilor, localită ilor învecinate. Pentru a pregăti terenul lichidării complexului mai 

întâi s-a răspândit zvonul despre închiderea mănăstirii: „La indica iile noastre agentura 

i persoanele de încredere dintre călugări i credincio i răspândeau mai întâi zvonul 

despre o eventuală închidere a mănăstirii. Zvonul era sus inut i de agentul nostru… 

care era stare ul mănăstirii. În urma acestui fapt, printre călugări apărea un grup care 

cerea împăr irea avutului mănăstiresc. Folosindu-se de aceste împrejurări, agen ii 

no tri…, au convins cam 52 de persoane din 94 de monahi, să părăsească mănăstirea… 

Agentul…, la indica ia noastră, nu s-a împotrivit plecării călugărilor, dimpotrivă, i-a 

asigurat cu tot necesarul – produse alimentare, haine i bani. După ce călugării au părăsit 

mănăstirea, agentul…, în persoana stare ului mănăstirii Chi cani, fără să-l pună la 

curent pe episcop, a plecat, la indica ia noastră, la mănăstirea Hârbovă i a organizat 

transportarea călugărilor care i-au exprimat dorin a să plece la mănăstirea Chi cani. 

În momentul în care la mănăstire mai rămăseseră doar câ iva călugări, agentul… s-a 

adresat oficial împuternicitului pentru Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă cu rugămintea de a lua sub 

pază avutul mănăstirii i, totodată, l-a rugat pe stare ul mănăstirii vecine să vină după 

călugării răma i. Agentul nostru…, care ocupa un post de conducere în eparhie, a 

contribuit activ la închiderea mănăstirii. La indica ia lui, în timpul pregătirii de închidere 

a mănăstirii, au fost transferate în alte lăca e persoanele capabile să exercite o influen ă 

negativă asupra închiderii mănăstirii” 68 . 

În ampla campanie de lichidare a complexelor monahale, făcând exces de zel, s-au 

încadrat i activi tii comuni ti de rând. Elocvent în acest sens este cazul de la 

mănăstirea Suruceni, din 10 iulie 1955. În această zi „la mănăstire au apărut directorul 

fabricii de vin din Ialoveni A. Gh. Karataev, membru de partid, pre edintele colhozului 

Voro ilov din Chiperceni, Vidi , membru de partid, împreună cu încă trei bărba i i 

două femei, în stare de ebrietate. Ei au început a se purta ca ni te huligani, fugărind 

călugării, strigând la ace tia că de ce mai trăiesc la mănăstire i nu se împră tie de 

acolo. S-a eviden iat prin purtarea sa mai ales Vidi , care alerga cu cu itul în mână. El 

846

a vrut să taie barba unui călugăr bătrân, iar pe stare ul mănăstirii Gargalâc a încercat să-l 

lovească cu cu itul, chiar în biserică, unde a dat buzna în timpul slujbei. Călugării au 

venit în ajutor stare ului, luându-i lui Vidi cu itul i dându-l afară din biserică. Slujba 

s-a întrerupt, credincio ii s-au împră tiat. După aceasta Vidi i ceilal i scandalagii 

be i n-au încetat ac iunile lor huliganice, au continuat să alerge prin curtea mănăstirii 

strigând: «măcar un călugăr să omor»” 69 . În alterca ii violente a fost implicată i o 

monahie de la mănăstirea Tabăra. Au fost i situa ii tragice, cum ar fi cazul de la 

mănăstirea Hirova, unde la 31 martie 1949, la ora 02.00, a fost împu cată monahia 

Col a Fevronia 70 . 

Mănăstirile, considerate temple ale purificării divine, au fost supuse la diverse 

ac iuni de intimidare psihologică i de compromitere a modului de via ă monahal. 

Astfel, pentru a justifica închiderea mănăstirea Căpriana, Ministerul Sănătă ii al RSSM a 

fost „obligat să organizeze până la 5 octombrie 1949 un control medical al personalului 

monahal i să constate că mănăstirea era un focar de boli venerice” 71 sau se intentau 

„dosare penale privind actele de viol i alte acte de violen ă săvâr ite asupra femeilor 

de către călugări” 72 . Oficial au fost „înregistrate” 15 cazuri de boli venerice, iar printre cei 

contamina i figura i fostul stare 73 . La 5 octombrie 1949, procuratura din Călăra i a 

intentat un caz de violare a unei femei de către călugării de la mănăstire. 74 Acelea i 

„argumente” au fost invocate i în cazul monahiilor de la mănăstirea Tabăra. Despre 

ob tea monahală de aici se spunea că formau „o casă a celui mai de ăn at desfrâu i o 

pepinieră a unor boli contagioase. Via a desfrânată pe care o duc călugări ele din 

această mănăstire, be iile i via a sexuală dezorganizată au ca rezultat faptul că printre 

vie uitoarele mănăstirii se înregistrează bolnave de sifilis i de alte boli socialmente 

periculoase. Mai mult, invocând ca motiv falsa lor «castitate», modul de via ă evlavios, 

iar în realitate, de teama de a le fi demascate viciile în fa a poporului, călugări ele 

contaminate caută i- i ascundă pe toate căile boala i se eschivează de la tratament, 

ceea ce contribuie la o i mai largă răspândire de boli venerice atât în mediu lor, cât i 

în rândurile popula iei cu care vin în contact” 75 . Despre călugării de la mănăstirea Curchi 

se afirma că „se in de be ii i duc o via ă desfrânată, însu i stare ul mănăstirii, 

Veniamin Batâr, convie uie te cu monahia Dionisa Cempoc de la mănăstirea Hirova. În 

chilii e murdărie, călugării în i i umblă murdari” 76 . Împuternicitul Romenski, 

concluziona, în 1956, că toate mănăstirile reprezintă fără nicio excep ie centre de 

comportament amoral i dezmă sexual 77 . 

O altă formă de constrângere a a ezămintelor monahale a fost cea economică. 

Conform unei clasificări a autorită ilor sovietice, mănăstirile din republică erau de trei 

categorii: mănăstirii cu poten ial economic înalt, mediu i precar. Se considera că 

mănăstirile de categoria a treia nu aveau perspective de existen ă, de aceea urmau să fie 

lichidate sau comasate 78 . Prima mănăstire desfiin ată pe acest motiv a fost cea de maici 

la Frumoasa (6 iunie 1946). Drept argument de închidere a mănăstirii Vărzăre ti, în anul 

1949, s-a invocat faptul că „din punct de vedere material, mănăstirea este insuficient 

asigurată i nu dispune de condi iile necesare pentru a exista în continuare” 79 . Acelea i 

„argumente” erau invocate i în cazul mănăstirii ipova (Horodi te) 80 . 

847

Spre deosebire de gospodăriile colective, complexurilor monahale nu li se acordau 

scutiri. Mănăstirile au fost supuse la impozite i alte livrări obligatorii de produse 

animaliere. Din cauza recoltei proaste, în anul 1947, 12 mănăstiri din cele 22 nu au 

îndeplinit planul la livrările de cereale. 

În anul 1952, impozitele i dările mănăstirilor către stat s-au dublat fa ă de anul 

1950. Prin ruinarea economică se miza astfel pe lichidarea „decentă” a lăca elor 

monahale. Restric iile economice ale mănăstirilor s-au intensificat la sfâr itul anilor 

1950. Impozitele noi constituiau acum trei sferturi sau mai mult din volumul total al 

produc iei ob inute 81 . Grigore Căpă ină, egumenul mănăstirii Suruceni, a raportat că 

din cauza impozitului mare – 5000 litri de lapte – a vândut două bovine 82 . 

În procesul de colectivizare s-a mizat i pe na ionalizarea averilor mănăstire ti. 

La 3 aprilie 1946, mănăstirile aveau în proprietate 1317 ha de pământ, inclusiv 791 ha de 

pământ arabil, 117 ha de livezi i 109 ha de vie 83 . Peste doi ani, la 16 martie 1948, 

mănăstirile aveau în proprietate doar 1030 ha, inclusiv 506 ha de pământ arabil, 81 ha de 

livezi i 67 ha de vie. În medie o mănăstire de inea 46,5 ha de pământ 84 . Noile 

gospodării colective acaparau i ele, cu for a, terenurile i construc iile lăca elor 

monahale. Mănăstirile au fost impuse la impozite exorbitante. În contextul colectivizării 

se efectuau diverse încercări de deposedare a lăca ului de pământ, iar membrii ob tii 

monahale erau impu i să lucreze în gospodăriile colective, având o remunerare modică 85 . 

Astfel, la sfâr itul anului 1944, egumenul mănăstirii Noul Neam din Chi cani, 

Axentie Munteanu, a depus o plângere privind ocuparea pământului i acapararea averii 

mănăstire ti de către sovhozul nou-înfiin at din localitate 86 . În 1946, mănăstirea Hâncu 

a fost deposedată de roadă de autorită ile locale: „ i a dat Dumnezeu roadă deplină în 

livezile cu fructe, se putea lua 150 000 (una sută cincizeci mii) rub., dar sovietul sătesc 

Ciuciuleni – a în elat pe egumenul Pavel Friptu i a pus mâna pe toată această roadă... a 

luat de la mănăstire toată recolta de struguri i pe cea din livezile de fructe” 87 . 

În a doua jumătate a anilor 1940, potrivit estimărilor autorităŃilor sovietice, 

mănăstirea Saharna era inclusă în categoria locaşurilor dezvoltate sub aspect 

socioeconomic 88 . Statul sovietic a continuat însă deposedarea de proprietă i a locaşului, 

una dintre primele acŃiuni fiind sechestrarea morii 89 . Apoi locaşul monahal a fost impus la 

impozite exorbitante. În 1946, comunitatea monahală a solicitat micşorarea impozitelor, 

cererea fiind însă respinsă categoric de împuternicitul sovietic care aprecia impozitarea 

drept „corectă” 90 . 

O parte din mănăstirile de maici (Tabăra, Hirova, Vărzăre ti, Răciula, Frumoasa) au 

fost obligate să furnizeze produse industriale pentru o remunerarea modestă 91 . 

Colhozul „Calea spre comunism” a acaparat de la mănăstirea Vărzăre ti terenurile 

de stuf 92 . Mănăstirea Pripiceni a fost lipsită de moară, la Tabăra au fost ocupate o parte 

din chiliile mănăstire ti, provocând dezordine pe teritoriul lăca ului. Erau cerute 

impozite suplimentare, iar sătenii trimi i să se alimenteze la trapeza mănăstirii. 

Mănăstirea Hârbovă nu a fost plătită pentru 140 kg de miere de albine livrate statului 

848

prin contractare. Prioritar se acaparau viile i livezile de la care se ob ineau recolte 

bogate de fructe i struguri 93 . 

Presiuni din partea organiza iilor de stat au fost efectuate i la mănăstirea Japca. În 

1948, stare a mănăstirii Japca, egumena Pahomeea, a depus o reclama ie împotriva 

directorului Combinatului Industrial din raionul Vertujeni, care dorea să înstrăineze din 

averea mănăstiri 3 ha de pământ în scopul extragerii hidroxidului de calciu (varul stins). 

Peti ia a fost înaintată pre edintelui Comitetului Executivului al raionului Vertujeni 

pentru a lua măsurile de rigoare 94 . La 19 aprilie 1955, administra ia colhozului din satul 

Japca s-a adresat instan elor superioare cu rugămintea de a transfera la balan a 

gospodăriei colective o construc ie mănăstirească pentru adăpostirea animalelor 95 . La 21 

mai 1959, stare a Serafima l-a informat pe arhiepiscopul Chi inăului i Moldovei 

Nektarii despre faptul că mănăstirea Japca n-a fost recompensată pentru munca prestată în 

colhozul „Moldova” 96 . În septembrie 1959, drept urmare a ac iunilor de intimidare, 

mănăstirea Japca a fost deposedată de aproape întreaga mo ie, rămânând doar cu 6 ha de 

pământ 97 . Călugări ele au fost for ate să meargă i să lucreze în colhoz. Rămânând fără 

gospodărie, acestea men ineau i între ineau doar grădina i via din jurul mănăstirii. 

La 26 noiembrie 1958, a fost adoptată o hotărâre a Consiliului de Mini tri al RSS 

Moldovenească „Cu privire la impozitarea veniturilor mănăstirilor”, conform căreia 

impozitul pentru un ar de pământ arabil în raioanele Otaci, Rezina, Flore ti constituia 16 

ruble, pentru Răciula – 20 ruble; impozitul se majora în direc ia raioanelor de sud, 

ajungând la 50 ruble pentru un ar în raionul Bender 98 . La 23 ianuarie 1959, Biroul CC al 

PCM a propus reducerea la minimum a suprafe elor loturilor de pământ ale mănăstirilor 

active, prin stabilirea unei norme de 0,1 ha pentru un călugăr. Urmau să fie confiscate 

terenurile care aveau cele mai mari venituri (livezi, vii etc.). Pe viitor mănăstirile urmau 

să achite arenda către stat pentru toate clădirile de locuit, construc iile auxiliare 

gospodăre ti i altele aflate în folosin a lor 99 . 

S-au aplicat i ac iuni moderate, „mai umane” de lichidare a mănăstirilor. La 31 

mai 1947, în conformitate cu Hotărârea Consiliului de Mini tri al RSS Moldovene ti 

„Despre activită ile de protec ie i restaurare a monumentelor de arhitectură din RSS 

Moldovenească”, o parte din complexurile mănăstire ti au fost luat sub ocrotirea 

statului 100 , ac iune, care, de fapt, nu erau altceva decât o formă de ingerin ă în treburile 

interne ale sfintelor lăca e de către autorită ile sovietice. Astfel, în 1952, potrivit 

declara iei împuternicitului, cauza închiderii mănăstirea de călugări din Hârjauca era 

descre terea numărului de monahi i necesitatea ocrotirii clădirii ca monument de 

arhitectură 101 . 

Cazul mănăstirii Japca. Mănăstirea Japca cu hramul Înăl area Domnului este situată 

în apropierea satului Japca, raionul Floreşti, pe o înălŃime stâncoasă a malului drept al 

fluviului Nistru. Este unicul aşezământ monastic din spaŃiul pruto-nistrean care 

funcŃionează neîntrerupt de la înfiinŃare – din a doua jumătate a sec. XVII. Până în 1916, 

mănăstirea a fost locuită de monahi, iar din acel an şi până în prezent – de călugăriŃe 

849

efugiate din Polonia, unele fiind rude cu familia imperială a Romanovilor. La începutul 

anilor 1960, au fost închise toate mănăstirile cu excep ia celei de la Japca. Presiunea 

asupra lăca ului sfânt de la Japca s-a intensificat atât din partea autorită ilor religioase, 

cât i a celor laice. Potrivit ordinului nr. 3 din 19 noiembrie 1962, emis de arhiepiscopul 

Nektarie, ieromonahilor de la mănăstirea Japca li s-a interzis efectuarea serviciilor divine 

(taine i ierurgii) în afara mănăstirii 102 . La 28 martie 1963, A. Oleinik, plenipoten iarul 

Consiliului în Problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe din RSS Moldovenească, a întocmit un 

plan-calendaristic de desfiin are a mănăstirii Japca. Pentru realizarea acestei ac iuni au 

fost implica i: A. Oleinik, Comitetul Executiv Raional Flore ti, Sec ia Raională de 

Men inere a Ordinii Publice, Procuratura i Consiliul Securită ii de Stat. Până la 

sfâr itul lunii aprilie 1963, A. Oleinik urma să analizeze resursele umane ale mănăstirii 

(să efectueze recensământul maicilor, să analizeze starea de spirit din comunitate etc.) i 

materiale, după care să elaboreze proiectul de desfiin are a mănăstirii. A. Oleinik a 

solicitat sprijinul Comitetului Executiv Raional Flore ti pentru elaborarea procedurii de 

lichidare a mănăstirii, pregătirea documentelor privind darea în arendă a clădirilor ei, 

repartizarea călugări elor i transferarea acestora la un azil de bătrâni. Comitetul 

Executiv Raional Flore ti, Sec ia Raională de Men inere a Ordinii Publice urma să 

analizeze starea de spirit din satele învecinate cu mănăstirea Japca, pentru a preîntâmpina 

eventualele ac iuni de protest din partea credincio ilor. Arhiepiscopul Nektarie urma să 

fie pregătit minu ios pentru lichidarea mănăstirii. S-a decis constituirea unui grup de 

activi ti „de încredere” i „bine instrui i”. În perioada de lichidare a mănăstirii, ace tia 

trebuia să efectueze patrularea continuă pe căile de deplasare a oamenilor spre lăca ul 

sfânt. În momentul lichidării mănăstirii, urma să fie neutralizat sunetul clopotului. 

Călugări elor li se punea la dispozi ie transport pentru a părăsi mănăstirea. Se interzicea 

categoric transportarea călugări elor în zilele de sărbătoare, de sâmbătă i duminică. 

Până la 15 aprilie 1963, Comitetul Executiv Raional urma să înainteze propuneri concrete 

Consiliului de Mini tri referitoare la locurile de repartizare a călugări elor i la 

folosirea încăperilor eliberate, iar o comisie să inventarieze bunurile lăca ului monahal 

eliberat. Complexul monastic urma să fie lichidat definitiv la 1 iulie 1963 103 . Potrivit unui 

martor al timpului: „Am fost chemat la Comitetul Raional de Partid i silit să mă ocup de 

recensământul maicilor aflate la mănăstire. Pentru a închide mănăstirea, trebuiau 

repartizate maicile pe la rude, iar cele care nu mai aveau pe nimeni din apropia i în 

via ă urmau să fie trimise la azilul de bătrâni din Chi inău” 104 . În aceste condi ii, 

egumena Serafima s-a adresat Patriarhiei i Consiliului în Problemele Bisericii Ortodoxe 

Ruse de pe lângă Consiliul de Mini tri al URSS privind necesitatea activită ii 

Mănăstirii Japca sau permisiunea ca unele călugări e să se refugieze în una din 

mănăstirile ortodoxe din Republica Populară Polonă 105 . Gra ie insisten ei stare ei 

Serafima, rusoaică de na ionalitate, participantă la cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial în 

cadrul armatei sovietice i care avea un prestigiu social în fa a autorită ilor sovietice, 

mănăstirea n-a fost lichidată 106 .Totodată, apriori, considerăm că autorită ile sovietice nu 

doreau totu i să facă publică închiderea abuzivă a tuturor mănăstirilor. Se urmărea 

afi area unei imagini „democratice” a statului sovietic, adică „una vorbe ti i alta faci”. 

Prin „autolichidarea” lăca elor monahale s-ar fi demonstrat mai lesne „colapsul” 

850

institu iilor religioase. Totodată, mănăstirea Japca, aflată la Nistru, în proximitatea fostei 

RASSM i cu o ob te monahală vorbitoare de limbă rusă era mai bine acceptată de 

autorită ile sovietice, decât alte lăca uri monahale în care se slujea în limba română. 

În pofida faptului că mănăstirea n-a fost închisă, în scopul de a perturba totu i 

oficierea serviciului divin, în lăca ul monahal militan ii ideologiei sovietice desfă urau 

diverse ac iuni provocatoare. Conform unor mărturii ale timpului în noaptea de Sfintele 

Pa ti, din anul 1966 sau 1967, mai mul i activi ti de partid i comsomoli ti din 

oră elul Camenca i localită ile proxime au organizat ac iuni violente la mănăstirea 

Japca. Astfel, în timpul oficierii serviciului divin, pe la orele 23:00, atunci când biserica 

era arhiplină, inclusiv cu copii, grupări de activi ti de partid i comsomoli ti au început 

să scandeze lozinci antireligioase, să lovească zgomotos în u ă i să arunce în geamurile 

bisericii pietre i bucă i de fier. Monahiile de-abia au izbutit să-i adăpostească în chilii 

mai întâi de toate pe copiii în stare de oc. Pornirile agresive ale provocatorilor au fost 

anihilate de tinerii din Sănătăuca i Japca, care au venit în ajutor credincio ilor. 

Călugări ele le-au acordat ajutor medical răni ilor, unii cu leziuni corporale provocate 

de cu ite. În acea noapte oficierea divină a Sfântului Pa ti a fost oprită i doar spre 

diminea ă au fost sfin ite alimentele. „Când s-a luminat de zi s-a desprins o imagine 

infernală: pretutindeni se vedeau urme de ciocniri acerbe, sânge, cioburi de sticlă, în 

cimitirul mănăstirii crucile erau profanate” 107 . 

După 1981, ingerinŃa în afacerile mănăstirii a fost temperată, iar Patriarhia Rusă a 

luat-o sub jurisdicŃia sa directă. Mai mult, în 1983, la insistenŃa arhiepiscopului Ionatan, 

s-a obŃinut permisiunea ca în mănăstire să fie acceptate trei ascultătoare noi, iar în 1985 

încă una. Toate acestea au avut loc în contextul în care autorităŃile interziceau categoric 

includerea altor persoane în obştea monahală: se miza pe autolichidare. Sfântul locaş 

reprezenta o oază de spiritualitate creştină într-o regiune în care domina ideologia 

marxist-leninistă şi propaganda militantă a ateismului. 

Ac iuni de rezisten ă împotriva închiderii mănăstirilor. Cazul mănăstirii Răciula. În 

fiecare mănăstire existau călugări care se opuneau cu vehemen ii închiderii sfintelor 

lăca e. Politica statului sovietic de a lichida prin forme violente lăca urile monahale au 

generat diverse ac iuni de protest ale credincio ilor. Într-o scrisoare adresată eparhiei de 

la Moscova se men iona: „Prea Înaltului patriarh al Moscovei i a toată Rusia Alexei. 

Pre Înal i… A i lăsat turma lui Hristos i o răpesc lupii cei mari. i nu purta i griji de 

ea. Nădejde nu-i nimic în dumneavoastră… Sunte i patriarhi numai de formă… Va zice 

Mântuitorul: voi, slugi rele i lene e… Ce puteri are bietul norod, dacă voi nu da i nici 

un sprijin. Cât norod pătima , neavând nici un sprijin de la voi… În satul Iurceni i 

Bol un raionul Nisporeni s-a făcut închiderea sfintelor două biserici prin un preot de la 

sfânta mănăstire Hârbovă . La Bol un au luat sfântul antimis i l-au dus la Episcop” 108 . 

Unul dintre cele mai răsunătoare cazuri de refractare a fost cel de la mănăstirea Răciula, 

„fenomen de-a dreptul unic pe parcursul ultimelor decenii” 109 . Aici sovieticii au 

întâmpinat rezisten a fizică a credincio ilor care în perioada 23 iunie – 2 iulie 1959, au 

stat continuu de gardă în jurul mănăstirii pentru a nu lichida complexul monastic 110 . 

851

Pentru o stopa tensiunile din localitate s-a apelat la armată. Potrivit unor martori: „Au 

participat mul i din sat la apărarea, a venit un deta ament de mili ieni. Pe un sătean lau 

împu cat în fa a bisericii, iar pe tata, Ilarion Mocreac, l-au rănit la picior. Au fost 

arestate 6-7 persoane, pe tata după ce l-au arestat l-au adus de la Chi inău i l-au judecat 

peste 6 luni. I-au dat 15 ani. Ne-a spus că a fost bătut până la judecată pentru că opunea 

rezisten ă; el vroia să explice că puterea sovietică nu făcea corect că închide bisericile. 

Tata a scris câteva scrisori i la ONU. I-a venit răspuns, dar eful închisorii nu i l-a 

arătat spunând că nu are rost să scrie. A stat la închisoare 15 ani” 111 . Sentin a altor 

participan i la evenimente a fost următoarea: Vasile Poiană – 8 ani, Diomid Mladan – 6 

ani, Vasile Pricinoc – 10 ani, Dionisie Dani ă – 6 ani, Simion Mocan – 15 ani, Mihail 

Tcaci – 4 ani, Roman Benderschi – 4 ani, S. Istrati – 3 ani, Dionisie Olari – 3 ani, David 

Simion – 2 ani 112 . Împuternicitul A. Oleinik considera că tensiunile la mănăstire au 

survenit din cauza unor erori de tactică i de strategie: „Atât noi, cât i organele locale 

de partid, nu am luat în calcul particularită ile mănăstirii i ale bisericii din cadrul ei. 

De asemenea, nu s-a inut cont de faptul că satul Răciula este populat de 800 de 

persoane adulte, iar în mănăstire se nevoiesc 236 de maici; că biserica este frecventată de 

o bună parte din locuitorii satelor Frumoasa, Vărzăre ti i alte localită i din vecinătate. 

De asemenea, nu s-a inut cont nici de faptul că însă i biserica se află în centrul satului, 

fiind înconjurată de 85 de case ale localnicilor” 113 . 

Considera ii finale. Drept urmare a politicii sovietice de marginalizare i de 

presiune ideologică, economică etc. asupra vie ii religioase, în general, i a vie ii 

monahale, în special, în Basarabia au fost lichidate lăca urile i ob tile monahale, cu 

excep ia mănăstirii Japca. Mecanismul acerb de lichidare a a ezămintelor monahale s-a 

înscris în strategia autorită ilor sovietice de lichidare a oricăror forme de manifestare i 

rezisten ă spirituală. Însă aceste ac iuni radicale ale statului sovietic au dat însă gre . 

Nu este întâmplător faptul că descompunerea URSS a fost legată direct de ampla mi care 

religioasă urmată de redeschiderea tuturor mănăstirilor desfiin ate de Kremlin. 

NOTE: 

1 

Ware Timothy, Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe, București. Ed. Aldo Press, 1993, p. 196. 

2 

Konstituția SSSR, Moskva, 1943. 

3 

Soulet, Jean-François: Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele noastre, 

IaȘi. Polirom, 1998, p. 243. 

4 

Tihonov Ludmila, Politica statului sovietic față de cultele din RSS Moldovenească (1944– 

1965), ChiȘinău. Prut InternaȘional, 2004, p. 214. 

5 

Soulet, Jean-François: op. cit., p. 44. 

6 

FuȘtei, Nicolae, Centrul de cultură ți spiritualitate – Sfântul Dumitru din Chiținău. Studiu 

istoric ți documentar, ChiȘinău, „Elena-V.I”, 2010, p. 39. 

7 

Călăuza ateistului, BucureȘti. Editura Politică, 1962, p. 515. 

852

8 Veronica Dudnic, Lăsați clopotele să bată?! Biserica Ortodoxă din Basarabia de la Stalin la 

Hruțciov. In: Anuarul de Istorie Orală, Cluj-Napoca, nr. IV, pp. 60-61. 

9 Babii, A. I., Pravoslavie v Moldavii: istoria i sovremennosti, KiȘinev, 1988, pp. 76–84 (Babii, 

A.I.: Ortodoxismul în Moldova: istorie ți contemporaneitate, ChiȘinău, 1988, pp. 76-84). 

10 Dabija Nicolae: Biserici deportate, în Literatura ți arta, 2003, 13 iunie, p. 1. 

11 BeȘleagă Vladimir,Bisericile ți mănăstirile sub regimul totalitar communist în RSSM (1950– 

1960). In: Destin românesc, 1996, nr. 1, pp. 121-136; Idem, Răciula, 1959. In: Destin românesc, 

2000, nr. 1, pp. 102-114; Idem, Cruci răsturnate de regim. Mănăstirea Răciula. 1959, ChiȘinău. 

Prut InternaȘional, 2006. 

12 Idem, Cruci răsturnate de regim…, p. 99. 

13 Șurcanu Ion, Cum au fost închise bisericile ți mănăstirile din Basarabia. In: Cugetul, 2000, nr. 

1 (5), pp. 51-55; Idem, Scurt istoric al închiderii mănăstirii Noul Neamț de către sovietici. In: 

Cugetul, 2002, nr. 4, pp. 93-95. 

14 Idem, Bessarabiana. Teritoriul dintre Prut ți Nistru în câteva ipostaze istorice ți reflecții 

istoriografice, ChiȘinău. Editura Cartididact, 2012, p. 216. 

15 Dudnic Veronic, op. cit., pp. 51-67. 

16 Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit. 

17 ȘiȘcanu Elena, Imixtiunea statului totalitar de tip sovietic în viața privată. In: Stat ți viață 

privată în regimurile comuniste. Lucrări prezentate la Simpozionul Internațional „Stat ți viață 

privată în regimurile omuniste”, Făgăraț – Sâmbăta de Sus, 3-5 iulie 2008. IaȘi. Polirom, 2009, 

pp. 415-417. 

18 Ciorbă Veaceslav, Biserica Ortodoxă din Basarabia şi Transnistria (1940–2010), Chişinău. 

Pontos, 2011, p. 213-242. 

19 Православие в Молдавии: власть, церковь, верующие. 1940–1991: Собрание документов: в 

4 т. (Ortodoxia din Moldova: puterea, biserica, credincioții. 1940–1991: Culegere de 

documente: în 4 vol.) / Отв. ред. и авт. предисл. В. Пасат, T. 1-4, Москва, РОССПЭН, 2009– 

2012. 

20 Aici includem Și lăcaȘurile monahale desfiinȘate pe parcursul istoriei: mănăstirea Sf. Nicolae 

(Soroca), schitul Soroca, schitul CereȘnovăȘ, schitul ClimăuȘi, schitul Cinicea, schitul Curătura, 

schitul Lămanova, schitul Poiana, schitul RaȘcov, schitul Verejeni, schitul Zăluceni, schitul 

GătiȘca, schitul Hârtop, schitul MaȘcăuȘi, schitul Mana, schitul PeciȘte/Fântâna Doamnei, 

schitul PeȘtera, schitul PăpăuȘi, schitul Răzina, schitul RâȘcov, schitul Trebujeni, schitul 

Uricova, schitul Sârcova, schitul Pojăreni etc. 

21 Ciobanu Ștefan, Basarabia. Populația. Istoria. Cultura, ChiȘinău, 1992, p. 84. 

22 Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul. Documentarul deportărilor de pe teritoriul RSS Moldovenețti, 1940– 

1959, ROSSPEN 2006, p. 371. 

23 Nistor Ion, Istoria românilor din Transnistria, BucureȘti. Editura Eminescu, 1995, p. 79. 

24 Chirtoagă Ion, JarcuȘchi Ion, Negru Elena Ș.a., O istorie a regiunii transnistriene din cele mai 

vechi timpuri până în prezent. Compendiu. ChiȘinău. Civitas, 2007, p. 322. 

25 Șăranu Mariana, Unele aspect ale politicii religoase din Basarabia în timpul primului an de 

ocupație sovietică. In: Destin românesc. Revistă de istorie Și cultură. Serie nou, 2008, anul III, 

nr. 4, p. 10. 

26 Ibidem, p. 14. 

27 GuȘuleac Alexandru,Profanarea sau distrugerea patrimoniului bisericesc sub prima ocupație 

sovietică (1940–1941). In: Buletin țtiințific. Revistă de Etnografie, țtiințele Naturii ți 

Muzeologie. Serie nouă, Volul 13 (26), ChiȘinău, 2010, p. 230. 

28 Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., p. 33. 

853

29 Православие в Молдавии. Власть, церковь, верующие. 1940-1991. В 4-х томах. Отв. 

редактор, составитель и автор предисловия В. Пасат. 1940-1953. Том 1. Москва, РОССПЭН, 

2009, p. 101-103, doc. 6; p. 106–107, doc. 9. 

30 Negru Leontin, Primele victime românețti ale bolțevismului. Basarabia sub ocupația 

armatei roții în 1940–1941. In Formele de represiune în regimurile comuniste. Lucrări 

prezentate la simpozionul internațional „Forme de represiune în regimurile comuniste” 

Făgăraț – Sâmbăta de sus, 12-14 iulie 2007, IaȘi, Polirom 2008, pp. 384-385. 

31 GuŃuleac Alexandru, op. cit., p. 232; Ciorbă, Veaceslav, op. cit., p. 105. 

32 Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova (ANRM). F. 1135, inv. 20, d. 212, f. 2-9; Православие 

в Молдавии…, Том 1. p. 98-99, doc. 2. 

33 Ibidem, p. 98, doc. 2. 

34 Ibidem, p. 99, doc. 3. 

35 Ibidem, p. 100-101, doc. 5. 

36 Ibidem, p. 103-104, doc. 7. 

37 Ieraclie, Mănăstirea Hârbovăț. In: Luminătorul, nr. 9-10, ChiȘinău, 1941, p. 583. 

38 Cemârtan Romeo, Situația ți evoluția vieții bisericețti în perioada 1945–1962. In Destin 

românesc. Revistă de istorie Și cultură. Serie nou, 2010, anul V, nr. 3-4, p. 119. 

39 Ciorbă Veaceslav, op. cit., p. 214. 

40 Agachi Alexei, Istoria mănăstirii Hâncu (1677–2010), Chişinău. Pontos, 2010, p. 159. 

41 BeȘleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim..., p. 58. 

42 Ibidem, p. 45. 

43 ANRM. Fond 3046, inv. 1, dosar 6, f. 22. 

44 Nicolae FuȘtei, Centrul de cultură ți spiritualitate – Sfântul Dumitru din Chiținău. Studiu 

istoric ți documentar, ChiȘinău, „Elena-V.I”, 2010, p. 41. 

45 Ibidem, p. 37. 

46 Șurcanu Ion, Bessarabiana…, p. 211. 

47 Pasat V.I.,Trudnîe stranițî istorii Moldovî: 1940–1950-e gg, Moskva, 1994, pp. 652-665. 

48 BeȘleagăVladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim..., doc. nr. 8, p. 313. 

49 Pasat Valeriu, Calvarul…, p. 356. 

50 Ibidem, p. 371. 

51 Cemârtan Romeo, op. cit., p. 123. 

52 Ibidem, p. 124. 

53 Șurcanu Ion, Bessarabiana…, p. 211. 

54 MoȘin Octavian, Biserica ți cultele în RSSM. In Republica Moldova. EdiŃie enciclopedică. Ed. 

a 2-a. ChiȘinău, Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice (Tipogr. „Bons Offices” SRL), 2011, p. 698. 

55 FuȘtei, Nicolae: op. cit., p. 44. 

56 Православие в Молдавии…, T. 1, p. 165, doc. 28; Ciorbă, Veaceslav, op. cit., p. 213. 

57 Cemârtan, Romeo: op. cit., p. 125. 

58 Православие в Молдавии…, Том 1. p. 361, doc. 79. 

59 Pasat Valeriu, Трудные страницы истории Молдовы. 1940–1950 gg. (File tragice din istoria 

Moldovei. 1940–1950), Moskva. „Terra”, 1994, p. 646–648. 


61 Ibidem, p. 372-373. 

62 BeȘleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate..., p. 63. 

63 Ibidem, doc. nr. 2, p. 306 

64 Ibidem, doc. nr. 4, p. 308. 


854



68 Ibidem, p. 376-377. 


70 Agachi Alexei, op. cit., p. 165. 

71 Arhiva istorică. In Cugetul, ChiȘinău, nr. 1, 2000, p. 52. 

72 Ibidem 

73 Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., p. 58. 

74 Ibidem, p. 58. 

75 BeȘleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim…, p. 64. 

76 Ibidem, p. 69. 

77 Tihonov Ludmila, op. cit., 2004, p. 60. 

78 ANRM. F. 3061, inv. 1, dos. 12, f. 17. 


80 Ibidem, p. 63. 

81 Pasat, Valeriu: Calvarul…, p. 377-378. 


83 Православие в Молдавии…, T. 1, p. 240, doc. 51. 

84 Ibidem, p. 356, doc. 80. 

85 Ibidem, p. 409, doc. 94. 


87 Ibidem, p. 59. 

88 Arhiva Organizațiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova (AOSPRM). F. 51, inv. 9, d. 44, f. 

135. 

89 Agachi Alexei, op, cit., p. 165. 

90 Ibidem, p. 179. 

91 ANRM. F. 3041, inv. 1, dos. 6, f. 4-7. 

92 Православие в Молдавии...,T. 1, p. 496, doc. 120. 

93 Alexei Agachi, op. cit., p. 165. 

94 Православие в Молдавии…, T. 1, p. 397, doc. 90. 

95 Православие в Молдавии: власть, церковь, верующие. 1940–1991: Собрание документов: 

в 4 т. (Ortodoxia din Moldova: puterea, biserica, credincioții. 1940–1991: Culegere de 

documente: în 4 vol.), T. 2 (1953–1960) / Отв. ред. и авт. предисл. В. Пасат, Москва, 

РОССПЭН, 2010, p. 292, doc. 57; p. 480, PlanȘa 14. 

96 Ibidem, p. 649, doc. 225. 

97 AOSPRM. F. 51, inv. 19, d. 82, f. 258. 


99 Ibidem, doc. nr. 2, p. 306 

100 ANRM. F. 2848, inv. 22, d. 40, f. 142. 



103 AOSPRM. F. 51, inv. 23, d. 101, f. 86-87. 

104 Sârbu Antonia,Japca, în Mănăstiri basarabene: Culeg./ alc.: Sârbu Antonina şi Ladaniuc 

Victor; Red. şi resp. de ed.: łopa T. şi Trofailă V., ChiȘinău, Universul, 1995, p. 168. 

105 Православие в Молдавии: власть, церковь, верующие. 1940–1991: Собрание документов: 

в 4 т. / Отв. ред. и авт. предисл. В. Пасат, T. 3, Москва. РОССПЭН, 2011, p. 273, doc. 107 

855

106 

Михалаш, В.: История Кишиневской-Молдавской епархии с 1945 по 1995 г. Диссертация 

на соискание ученой степени кандидата богословия (Istoria Eparhiei ChiȘinăului Și Moldovei 

din 1945 până în 1995. Teză de doctor în teologie), Сергиев Посад. Троце-Сергиева Лавра, 

1997, p. 60; Sârbu, Antonia: Japca. In: Mănăstiri basarabene…, p. 169; Tihonov, Ludmila: op. 

cit., p. 6. 

107 

Мельник С. М., Древняя обитель над Днестром (Из истории Свято-Возненского 

Жапского женского монастыря) (Ațezare veche de la Nistru (din istoria mănăstirii de monahii 

Înălțarea Domnului din Japaca). In: Покровские чтения. Сборник науч. докл. Книга 11, 

Тираспол, 2010, p. 28 (Ațezare veche de la Nistru (din istoria mănăstirii de monahii Înălțarea 

Domnului din Japaca) 

108 

BeȘleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim…, p. 88. 

109 


110 

Vrednic Nina, Nouă zile ce au zguduit Răciula. In: Moldova socialistă, 22 iunie, 1990, p. 4. 

111 

Mărturia lui Ilarion Mocreac, fiul, preluată din studiul Dudnic, Veronica: op. cit., pp. 62-63. 

112 

BeȘleagă Vladimir, Cruci răsturnate de regim…, p. 100. 

113 

ANRM. F. 3046, inv. 1, dos. 91, f. 14-15. 

856

CREAłIA LITERARĂ CA FORMĂ DE 

REZISTENłĂ ÎN ROMÂNIA COMUNISTĂ. 

CAZURI SEMNALATE DE CENZURĂ 

Ion ZAINEA, Carmen UNGUR-BREHOI 1 

Titlul studiului nostru poate părea, pentru unii, pretenŃios, pentru alŃii, probabil nu. 

Depinde de care parte te situezi în legătură cu posibile răspunsuri la întrebarea: A fost 

creaŃia literară o formă de rezistenŃă în România lui Ceauşescu? Vom încerca, în cele ce 

urmează, un răspuns din perspectiva instituŃiei de cenzură: DirecŃia Generală pentru Presă 

şi Tipărituri/Comitetul pentru Presă şi Tipărituri 2 . 

În România comunistă, cenzura a avut un temei ideologic, scopul său fiind, în ultimă 

instanŃă, producerea unei literaturi în concordanŃă cu exigenŃele ideologice şi cu voinŃa 

partidului comunist. Vorbind despre misiunea scriitorilor şi a celorlalŃi oameni de artă, în 

expunerea la Consfătuirea de lucru cu activul de partid din domeniul ideologiei şi al 

activităŃii politice şi cultural-educative, din iulie 1971, Nicolae Ceauşescu preciza: 

„ConcepŃia ideologică trebuie să fie una singură: ideologia şi concepŃia revoluŃionară a 

clasei muncitoare... În acest sens suntem pentru cea mai largă libertate de creaŃie, pentru 

cea mai largă exprimare a imaginaŃiei, dar în spiritul concepŃiei noastre despre lume şi 

viaŃă” 3 . 

Prin urmare, scriitorii trebuiau să accepte, ori să înveŃe să accepte condiŃiile şi 

îndrumările sugerate de conducerea superioară de partid şi de către Nicolae Ceauşescu în 

mod direct. Pentru a fi publicaŃi aveau două opŃiuni: fie abordau acele subiecte şi 

modalităŃi ce erau pe placul partidului şi, se înŃelege, al cenzorilor, fie evitau sau 

estompau subiectele controversate sau neagreate, în caz contrar trebuind să se „lupte”, să 

negocieze, să se târguiască cu cenzorii 4 , aceasta în cazul cel mai fericit. 

Unii i-au împărŃit pe scriitori în „roşii” şi „albi”, cei dintâi, „roşii”, fiind scriitorii 

devotaŃi regimului, iar „albii” cei care îi rezistau. Este vorba de „o rezistenŃă în forme 

specifice, literare, nu de dizidenŃă”- precizează Nicolae Manolescu - categoria 

dizidenŃilor neintrând în discuŃie, unii aflându-se sub interdicŃie, iar alŃii în exil 5 . 

Dincolo de ce se spune şi uneori se scrie, este de reŃinut şi ce spune instituŃia de 

cenzură, ce scriu cenzorii, care le este optica, care le sunt opiniile. Am ales pentru 

1 Universitatea din Oradea, România. 

2 InstituŃie înfiinŃată în 1949, funcŃionând pe lângă Consiliul de Miniştri, şi desfiinŃată în 1977 

3 N. Ceauşescu, Expunere la Consfătuirea de lucru cu activul de partid din domeniul ideologiei şi 

al activităŃii politice şi cultural-educative, din iulie 1971, Ed.Politica, Bucuresti, 1971, p. 12 

4 Liviu Nistor, „Cenzură şi ideologie sub comunism”, în vol. Cenzura în România (Ilie Rad 

coordonator), Cluj-Napoca: Tribuna, 2012, p. 245 

5 Nicolae Manolescu, „Albii şi roşii”, în România literară, 1995, nr. 29, p. 2 

857

exeplificare/ca studiu de caz, Referatul întocmit de către DirecŃia Instructaj-Control 6 , la 

30 XI 1967, în care se face o analiză a publicaŃiilor din provincie în perioada noiembrie 

1966-noiembrie 1967. Din primele rânduri, aflam că numărul publicaŃiilor cu profil 

politic, social, ştiinŃific, cultural şi literar ce apăreau în provincie era în continuă creştere, 

răspunzând tot mai mult sarcinii (s.n.-I.Z.) de „a informa şi îndruma” masele de cititori. 

Mai erau menŃionate, ca elemente pozitive, sporirea diversităŃii tematice, dar şi o 

îmbunătăŃire calitativă a materialelor publicate, fapt datorat în principal redacŃiilor, care 

se străduiau să răspundă exigenŃelor crescânde ale cititorilor, atât în privinŃa conŃinutului 

de idei, cât şi a Ńinutei intelectuale. 

Cu toate acestea, se menŃionează în continuare, numeroase (s.n.-I.Z.) materiale 

cuprinse în paginile publicaŃiilor amintite, „dezbat încă în mod greşit, tendenŃios uneori” 

problemele abordate, apariŃia acestora fiind considerată inoportună. Multe materiale erau 

„negativiste, denigratoare”, întrucât propunându-şi să dezbată o „presupusă îngrădire” în 

dezvoltarea normală a valorilor de la noi, prezentau „o imagine deformată a realităŃilor 

noastre”, ridicând particularul la rangul de general. Altele tratau „într-un mod 

necorespunzător” ( a se înŃelege altfel decât linia oficială) originea limbii şi poporului 

român, ori momente din istoria acestuia. Frecvente erau, de asemenea, articolele de 

„polemică neprincipială”, tonul folosit dând, pe alocuri, o tentă de răfuială personală, 

faptul lezând sobrietatea şi prestigiul revistelor în care apăreau. În fine, articolele 

referitoare la evenimentele internaŃionale, se aprecia că recurg la „o problematică sau o 

manieră de tratare”, care puteau afecta neplăcut relaŃiile Ńării noastre cu alte state 7 . 

Pe scurt, DIC aprecia că materialele care făceau conŃinutul muncii de cenzură erau 

multe la număr, pe care le grupează în câteva categorii: erau, mai întâi, cele care 

„dezbăteau în mod greşit, uneori tendenŃios” problemele abordate, apoi cele socotite 

„negativiste, denigratoare”, cele care tratau în mod „greşit” probleme de istorie ori 

aspecte din viaŃa internaŃională. Materialele care ridicau astfel de probleme, sau altele 

asemănătoare, se spune mai departe în referat, au fost „în marea lor majoritate sesizate”, 

fiind necesar „fie să se renunŃe complet la publicarea lor, fie să se efectueze modificări 

parŃiale, ori de structură”. În toate cazurile, ni se spune, înainte de a fi discutate şi 

rezolvate cu redacŃiile, „observaŃiile au fost aduse la cunoştinŃa comitetelor regionale ale 

PCR, spre informare”. Articolele cu probleme a căror rezolvare interesa în primul rând 

forurile de îndrumare, au fost semnalate organelor locale de partid, acestea hotărând 

„dacă pot apare în forma iniŃială sau cu modificări” 8 . 

După cum observăm, această parte a referatului ne dezvăluie, pe de o parte, soarta 

materialelor zise „greşite” (n-au apărut sau au fost modificate), iar pe de alta aspecte 

legate de munca de control şi de procedură/subordonare. Deducem că cei care efectuau 

controlul/lectură aveau experienŃa necesară, din moment ce au „sesizat” (în sensul că leau 

depistat) majoritatea materialelor, ceea ce, pe de altă parte, ne duce cu gândul că erau, 

prin urmare, şi „scăpări”. Cât priveşte chestiunile de procedură/subordonare, aflăm că 

6 DirecŃie în cadrul DGPT, al cărei director era Ghircoiaş Victor 

7 Arhivele NaŃionale-Serviciul JudeŃean Bihor (în continuare AN-SJ BH), fond DirecŃia Generală 

pentru Presă şi Tipărituri-Unitatea Oradea (în continuare DGPT-UO), dos. 9/1967, f. 1 

8 Ibidem, f. 2 

858

observaŃiile erau, mai întâi, aduse la cunoştinŃa comitetelor regionale de partid, pentru 

informare, iar apoi discutate şi rezolvate cu editurile; că cele care interesau organele 

superioare de partid erau semnalate organelor locale ale PCR, care hotărau dacă acestea 

pot apare în forma iniŃială sau cu modificări. 

După această parte, să-i spunem generală, referatul se ocupă de cazuri concrete, 

pentru fiecare categorie de probleme semnalate. Din acestea, vom prezenta şi noi cazurile 

mai semnificative. Prima categorie, prima şi pentru că erau multe, dar şi ca gravitate, este 

cea a materialelor care prezentau „o imagine denaturată” a realităŃilor de la noi. În 

legătură cu acestea, se aprecia că „pornind de la unele neajunsuri în diverse sectoare de 

activitate”, de la „anumite manifestări singulare”, unii autori „le amplifică, le dă o notă 

criticistă generalizantă, denigratoare”, punând relaŃiile neprincipiale, practicile negative 

pe seama relaŃiilor sociale care le-ar genera. Se recunoştea, prin urmare, existenŃa unor 

„minusuri” şi unor „manifestări”, chiar „singulare”, dar se considera că unii autori, rău 

intenŃionaŃi, le amplifică, le critică la modul general, le denigrează, ba mai rău, le pun pe 

seama relaŃiilor sociale (socialiste, deci). Un prim exemplu oferit era pamfletul Proiect de 

deratizare de Traian Coşovei 9 . În viziunea autorului, lumea noastră ar trebui „deratizată” 

de şobolani (şobolanii în pamflet fiind oamenii, buni sau răi, grupaŃi şi etichetaŃi după 

profesii, caractere, însuşiri). „Şobolani mici, şobolani mijlocii, şobolani mari, şobolani 

cocoŃaŃi..., şobolani cu nepoŃi şi nepoate..., şobolani cu gură mare, ... şobolani jucându-se 

într-un angrenaj cu milioane de roŃi..., şobolani-le-vine-rândul-la-toŃi” 10 . 

Extinderea criticii de la cazul particular, izolat, la cel general, mergându-se până la 

denigrare era considerată evidentă şi în pamfletul Zoodidactica de George Mihăescu 11 . 

Satirizând calea abuzivă în obŃinerea certificatelor de studii de către unii cu funcŃii înalte, 

neavizaŃi la cultură, depăşiŃi de evenimente şi constrânşi de cerinŃele vieŃii cotidiene, 

autorul transpune fabulistic opinia sa în soarta unui măgar de rând. Acesta, în trecut, o 

dusese prost, slujind pe la stăpâni, nemâncat şi bătut, iar azi ajunge o personalitate. În loc 

să se bucure că este „mai mare peste o ogradă şi mănâncă singur din ieslea cea mare”, nu 

are tihnă deoarece pensionarii ogrăzii clevetesc „că-i un măgar prost şi că treburile, din 

acest motiv, merg anapoda...”. soluŃia o găseşte prin dobândirea cu orice preŃ, numai prin 

muncă nu, a unei dovezi de studii. Aşa că, „prin anume măgării”, el obŃine prima diplomă 

de şcoală „când mai avea câŃiva dinŃi în gură”. „Bătu cu copita în masa unui director de 

liceu”, de la care luă o diplomă de maturitate, apoi se înscrise la facultate (fără frecvenŃă). 

Când tocmai urma să-şi ia licenŃa, „a fost luat de urechi şi dus nu se ştie unde” 12 . 

Articolul Marginalii la o uvertură de Romulus Zaharia 13 , a fost sesizat pentru că 

prezenta prea realist, iar nu cum dorea regimul, situaŃia medicilor, aspecte asemănătoare, 

dar legate de cadrele didactice, intenŃionând să abordeze şi Szilagyi Istvan în articolul 

Problemele pedagogilor de la sate 14 . Astfel de aprecieri „s-au mai încercat” şi în 

9 ce urma să apară în revista Tomis (ConstanŃa), nr. 4, aprilie 1967 

10 AN-SJBH, fond DGPT-UO, dos. 9/1967, f. 2 

11 ce urma să apară în nr. 10/octombrie 1967 al aceleiaşi reviste Tomis 


13 din Tribuna (Cluj), nr. 48/1.XII.1966 

14 din revista Utunk (Cluj), nr. 10, 1967 

859

materiale privitoare la alte sectoare de activitate, ca de exemplu Oceanologia în 

actualitate 15 (în care se critica lipsa de contribuŃie a Ńării noastre în domeniul cercetărilor 

oceanologice, subliniindu-se faptul că trăgea o serie de foloase din cercetările şi 

descoperirile altora), Repertoriul cinematografic faŃă în faŃă cu publicul 16 (anchetă 

realizată de St. Oprea în legătură cu producŃia cinematografică românească, din care se 

degaja ideea că în afară de filmul „Dacii”, restul sunt toate la periferia cinematografiei 

mondiale contemporane). Aprecieri denigratoare la adresa activităŃii editoriale de la noi 

conŃinea interviul luat de Petru Sfetcu prozatorului Ion Lăncrănjan 17 . După părerea 

autorului, soarta cărŃilor în general nu era determinată de valoarea lor, ci de poziŃia pe 

care o deŃinea autorul respectiv, de situaŃia acestuia. „Dacă autorul lor – se spunea printre 

altele – e şef pe undeva, sau urmează să fie şef sau subşef, dacă are relaŃii înalte cu 

anumite cercuri literare, estetizante şi supercompetente, care dau tonul la o inexistentă dar 

foarte activă „bursă literară”, atunci câştigarea certificatului de autenticitate şi perenitate 

pentru personajele diverselor „opere” literare, fie ele prost scrise, sărace sau de-a dreptul 

scabroase este asigurată cu brio şi pentru veşnicie”. În ce priveşte fenomenul literar de la 

noi din Ńară, intervievatul afirma că „analiza acestuia este atât de strâmb făcută, încât ar fi 

vai şi-amar de scriitorul care şi-ar orienta activitatea după această analiză” 18 . 

O a doua categorie cuprinde acele scrieri literare, proză şi poezie, care dezbăteau 

probleme ale creaŃiei artistice şi din care se degaja „sentimentul lipsei de perspectivă, a 

imposibilităŃii de afirmare a valorilor, insinuînd cauze de ordin social” 19 . Parte dintre 

aceste materiale, fie prin intermediul simbolului, fie în mod direct, „se ridică vehement 

împotriva presupusei îngrădiri a libertăŃii”. Se nominaliza, pentru început, schiŃa Numai 

cu dreapta (stilul perfid) de Romulus Vulcănescu 20 . Folosind o formă alegorică, se 

considera că autorul protesta împotriva aşa-zisei obligativităŃi pentru poeŃi de a scrie 

versuri la comandă, lipsite de conŃinut şi adevăr. În schiŃă, toŃi poeŃii sunt convocaŃi la 

„marele negustor de produse artistice” care, în schimbul asigurării condiŃiilor materiale de 

existenŃă le pretinde să scrie versuri într-un anumit fel. Deşi promite în mod demagogic 

că sunt liberi în a scrie ce şi cum vor, „marele negustor” impune, totuşi, anumite canoane, 

„înserate în agendă, alfabetic”, precizând că există o singură cenzură, o singură instanŃă: 

„eu” şi o singură penalizare „interdicŃia pe viaŃă a condeiului”. Când, după scurt timp, 

unii poeŃi încearcă să scrie despre adevăr li se pune braŃul drept în ghips. Încercarea de 

revoltă se dovedeşte tardivă pentru că la unii ghipsul a căzut cu mână cu tot, iar altora 

mâna le-a rămas anchilozată definitiv. 

Împotriva îndrumării artei şi literaturii se ridica şi N. Manolescu în articolul 

Contemporaneitate şi univers artistic 21 , în care scria printre altele: „Orice amestec în 

„treburile interne” ale literaturii este dezastruos; literatura trebuie lăsată să se dezvolte 

15 

Tomis, nr. 1/1967 

16 

Cronica (Iaşi), nr. 39/30.II.1967 

17 

din rubrica „CreaŃie şi actualitate” a revistei Tribuna, nr. 23/8.VI.1967 

18 

AN-SJBH, fond DGPT-UO, dos. 9/1967, f. 4-5 

19 

Ibidem, f. 6 

20 

din Iaşul literar, nr. 9/1967 

21 

din revista Cronica (Iaşi), nr. 2, 14.I.1967 

860

singură, pentru că – de ce se înŃelege aşa greu acest lucru? – literatura o fac scriitorii, nu 

„teoreticienii”. SchiŃa Coridorul de Dumitru łepeneag 22 , a fost sesizată pe motiv că 

autorul „încerca să demonstreze că omul zilelor noastre parcurge un drum jalonat de 

anumite reguli impuse, fiind obligat să se abată pe un „coridor” lipsit de orice 

perspectivă, plin de obstacole şi de trupurile însîngerate ale celor sacrificaŃi” 23 . Într-un 

coridor lung, plin de mobile îngrămădite unele peste altele, eroul scrierii se zbate disperat 

să ajungă la lumină, la fereastră. Eforturile lui sunt însă zadarnice, pentru că la fiecare pas 

se izbeşte de mobile cu diferite destinaŃii şi de un jilŃ masiv şi înalt, de neclintit. 

Disperarea sa este amplificată prin groaza ce i-o provoacă mirosul de „carte stîlcită, 

hăcuită de satîre”. În mijlocul acestei atmosfere apăsătoare, el îşi aminteşte cu nostalgie 

de vremea copilăriei când, pe acelaşi coridor, avea posibilitatea să privească pe o 

fereastră la un cal alb, la păsări cu penaj multicolor, la iarba verde, totul scăldat într-o 

lumină vie, strălucitoare, în timp ce acum, prins în hăŃişul de mobilier, nu poate nici cel 

puŃin ajunge la ochiul de fereastră nesimŃindu-se suficient de înalt şi voinic ca să poată 

sfărâma obstacolele din cale. 

Probleme pentru cenzură au ridicat au ridicat şi unele materiale pe teme privind 

origine limbii şi poporului român, hotarele mai vechi sau mai noi ale Ńării. Multe 

conŃineau referiri frecvente la teritorii care nu mai aparŃineau României, şi arătau că 

tradiŃia economică şi culturală a locuitorilor de aici atestă originea lor comună cu românii. 

Era menŃionat studiul Ruinele romane de la Komarovo de N. Gostar 24 , în care autorul 

combătea opiniile cercetătorului sovietic M.I. Smişko, conform cărora toate urmele 

materiale descoperite la Komarovo, regiunea CernăuŃi, ar fi de sorginte autohtonă, 

susŃinând că, dimpotrivă, studierea atentă a urmelor respective atestă originea lor romană. 

Istoricul ieşean făcea precizarea că acolo a fost un castru roman întemeiat cu scopul de a 

apăra frontierele Daciei traiane şi că abia în sec. III-IV apar urmele localnicilor, 

suprapunându-se acestora. 

O altă categorie de materiale sesizate de cenzură se referea la cele care puneau în 

discuŃie diverse probleme litigioase din viaŃa internaŃională, folosind, cel mai adesea, 

simbolul sau modul alegoric de exprimare. Folosind ca element de comparaŃie cartoful, 

satira cu acelaşi titlu de Valeriu Sîrbu 25 „condamna, pe un ton persiflant, împărŃirea 

arbitrară a statelor de către forŃe străine lor”. Indignarea poetului, spuneau cenzorii, se 

îndrepta împotriva amestecului marilor puteri în viaŃa internă a altor Ńări, amestec care, 

mergând până la împărŃirea administrativă a acestora şi chiar la influenŃarea ideilor şi 

concepŃiilor poporului, duce la ură şi duşmănie între fraŃi 26 . Asta spun cenzorii. Autorul o 

spune altfel. El recurge la povestea unui grădinar care, plictisit de atâtea flori, s-a hotărât 

să facă un lucru nemaipomenit. A luat un cartof şi l-a împărŃit, cu o cretă, în două, rostind 

un discurs hărăzit drept constituŃie, prin care hotărăşte că „deşi componente ale întregului, 

cele două părŃi nu se vor mai numi la fel” şi interzice „ seva şi hrana, ideile chiar să 

22 din revista Orizont, (Timişoara), nr. 7, 1967 


24 din Analele UniversităŃii „Al. I. Cuza” Iaşi, History series, 1967 

25 From the magazine Tribuna (Cluj), no. 27, 6.VII.1967 


861

circule dintr-o parte în alta”. Neputând prevede ce se va întâmpla în viitor cu cartoful, 

autorul exclamă ironic în final: „ Eu înŃeleg ca mai marii şefi de state/să împartă aceeaşi 

Ńară-n două/E just şi e normal/Dar un simplu grădinar să facă o asemenea bazaconie cu un 

cartof?/E prea de tot”. 

La aceeaşi categorie, a mai fost sesizată sceneta Lupoaica mea de Marin Sorescu 27 , 

care, spun cenzorii, „sugerează ideea că lupta pentru putere constituie un fenomen 

inevitabil societăŃii omeneşti, că în lupta dusă pentru acapararea de noi bogăŃii şi teritorii 

masele acŃionează ca nişte instrumente oarbe, fără a reacŃiona la crimele ce se săvîrşesc şi 

că dezvoltarea societăŃii e însoŃită de războaie iminente”. În plus, lucrarea, se menŃiona, 

„satirizează şi ideea tratativelor la „masa rotundă” pentru dezarmare parŃială sau totală, 

acestea (tratativele) fiind folosite cu scopul de a masca goana după perfecŃionarea 

armamentului” 28 . 

Sesizată a fost povestirea Pseudo tauro manie de Marin Porumbescu 29 , o fantezie 

burlescă, ce parodia un imaginar spectacol de lupte cu tauri oferit de o trupă străină pe 

arena Circului nostru de stat. Prezentând pe principalii eroi ai acestei coride, autorul, 

printre alte detalii, arată că taurul Spuryus, venind de peste graniŃă şi trecând prin 

Moldova, pe tot itinerariul parcurs în Ńara noastră a lăsat urme adânci. „Cu botul veşnic 

roşu, are ochii ficşi, injectaŃi în sînge…, copite grele cu ştanŃe de dimensiuni suprarealiste 

şi nişte coarne ce îngrozesc, impunînd respect şi teamă”. În mod surprinzător taurul 

Spuryus reacŃionează numai la culoarea galbenă. Matadorul, pe nume Escondido Sacha 

Sehohr Ubu, supranumit Ledykiler, venind de undeva de departe din răsărit, înalt, uscăŃiv, 

agil şi cu mers de felină, poartă o tunică galbenă, foloseşte o ruletă galbenă, este salutat 

cu batiste galbene. Există şi un toreador mai mic, cu un rol mai modest în această luptă, 

care poartă de asemenea o ruletă „galben murdar”, iar în înfruntarea cu taurul urmăreşte 

doar să-l aŃâŃe, să-l obosească. Autorul redă în continuare cu lux de amănunte, apriga 

confruntare dintre taur şi matador. La un moment dat, micul matador îi vâră taurului în 

nări o crucetă, iar din nările lui Spuryus începe să curgă grâul „ca prin silozul ConstanŃa”. 

În final, privind în interiorul boxei în care s-au retras răniŃii, autorul constată că atât taurul 

cât şi matadorul sunt nişte farseori machiaŃi, deghizaŃi, că întregul spectacol (lupta) a fost 

o farsă. 

O parte din vină pentru existenŃa multor materiale cu probleme la această categorie se 

considera că ar aparŃine redacŃiilor revistelor din provincie, care introduc în pagini 

materiale a căror publicare nu era oportună în conjunctura dată. Erau oferite ca exemplu 

mai multe materiale, între care Reflexe de Augustin Buzura 30 , în care acesta făcea câteva 

consideraŃii pe marginea operei satirice a lui A. Avercenko, ale cărui schiŃe erau populate 

„de idioŃi de toate nuanŃele şi gradele”, subliniind valoarea deosebită a schiŃelor cu 

caracter social, arătând că „într-o perioadă ca aceea în care a trăit autorul, în care 

autorităŃile se omoară să facă restricŃii, să impună felul lor de a gîndi, literatura satirică 

este singura care poate să oglindească fidel vremea şi care, paradoxal, primeşte drept de 

27 din Cronica, nr. 21, 26.V.1967 

28 AN-SJBH, fond DGPT-UO, dos. 9/1967, f. 12-13 

29 ce urma să apară în revista Ateneu (Bacău), nr. 10/1967 

30 din Tribuna (Cluj), nr. 43, 26.X.1967 

862

apariŃie tocmai de la cei vizaŃi, pentru că prostia merge cu îngîmfarea cu gesturi largi, cu 

paradă… Cehov, ca şi Avercenko au scăpat de toate cenzurile posibile tocmai pentru că 

au ştiut să profite de aceste calităŃi reale ale idioŃilor” 31 . 

Nepotrivite erau considerate şi alte materiale, precum însemnările lui V. Rebreanu, 

La mormîntul lui S. Esenin, în care se aduceau reproşuri indirecte autorităŃilor sovietice, 

la fel apariŃia articolului Mărăşti, Oituz, Mărăşeşti, de C. Ştefanache 32 , ce conŃinea 

expresii dure la adresa armatei germane, chiar în timpul vizitei lui Willy Brandt în Ńara 

noastră, ori povestirea Refugiul de Leonida NeamŃu 33 , în care se descrie cu lux de 

amănunte groaza şi panica de care a fost cuprinsă populaŃia română la intrarea trupelor 

sovietice în Ńară, în anul 1944, chiar în preajma aniversării „eliberării patriei”. 

Un capitol aparte în referat îl formau materialele (articole şi studii) referitoare la 

momente din istoria Ńării şi a mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti, pe care le tratau „în mod 

unilateral, inoportun sau neveridic”. Se nominaliza studiul Istoriografia română despre 

participarea României la primul război mondial, de C. C. Giurescu 34 , în legătură cu care 

se menŃiona că: încercând să clarifice caracterul participării României la primul acest 

conflict şi prezentând lucrări pe această temă, apărute înainte şi după 23 august 1944, 

autorul prezenta aprecieri care subliniau că din punct de vedere al Ńării noastre acesta a 

fost un război just, legitim, determinat de realizarea „României întregite”; insista pe rolul 

pozitiv al regelui şi primului-ministru I. C. Brătianu, ca şi pe sprijinul promis de Rusia 

pentru recucerirea Transilvaniei şi dorinŃa de a hotărî asupra Bucovinei pe baza 

principiului naŃionalităŃilor. Cu privire la istoriografia de după al doilea război mondial, 

până la finele anului 1963, Giurescu arăta că apare un punct de vedere deosebit – susŃinut 

de V. Liveanu, G. Tudoran şi alŃii – conform căruia participarea României la război a 

avut un caracter imperialist, pe care autorul îl combate cu tărie, arătând că aprecierea 

justă a caracterului primului război mondial, în ce priveşte participarea României, a 

început să se facă în istoriografia noastră abia „în ultimii ani” şi în special după 

DeclaraŃia C. C. al P. C. R. din aprilie 1964, citând în acest sens articole ale sale şi unul 

aparŃinând acad. C. Daicoviciu 35 . 

Era, de asemenea, menŃionat articolul Moarte frumoasă de Balogh Edgar 36 , ce 

rememora evenimentele petrecute la Cluj în toamna anului 1944. Mare parte din lucrare 

se ocupa de redarea unor aspecte ale mişcării de rezistenŃă antifascistă din Cluj, condusă 

de „un grup de comunişti unguri, români (puŃini la număr) şi evrei de curînd eliberaŃi din 

închisoare”. Se scria, de asemenea, despre plecarea unei delegaŃii de pace la Moscova, 

din care făceau parte şi comunişti, cu scopul de a obŃine înglobarea Transilvaniei la 

Ungaria. Se vorbea, pe de o parte, de un anume Hegedus, venit la Cluj de la Budapesta, în 

numele Partidului RevoluŃionar Comunist Ungar, pentru a trata problema proclamării 


32 din Cronica (Iaşi), nr. 31, 7.VIII.1967 

33 din Tribuna (Cluj), nr. 33, 17.VIII.1967 

34 urma să apară în revista Argeş, nr. 7, iulie 1967 

35 AN-SJBH, fond DGPT-UO, dos. 9/1967, f. 17-18 

36 din revista Igaz Szö (Tg. Mureş), nr. 6, iunie 1967 

863

„Republicii Sovietice de la Tisa”, idee ce consta de fapt în proclamarea unei „republici 

sovietice” încă înainte de venirea trupelor române în Ardeal. Nu putea să apară. 

Aspecte asemănătoare privind modul în care acţiona cenzura asupra aparițiilor 

literare din ziarele vremii, se desprind şi din notele Direcției Tipărirea Presei Centrale 37 . 

Redăm doar câteva aspecte. Poemul Requiem autor Ana Blandiana, trimis spre publicare 

ziarului “Contemporanul”, este oprit de la apariție. Direcţia punctează doar, fără multe 

explicații, în 23 noiembrie 1966, că “la sesizarea noastră, s-a indicat să se scoată poezia 

Requiem dintr-un grupaj de poezii semnate de Ana Blandiana, ce urma să apară”. Poezia 

se folosea mult de alegorii și făcea referire la plecare, la moarte, dar și la libertate, 

naivitate, uitare. Poeziei Steaua noastră, din ziarul „Muncitorul sanitar”, i se aplică doar 

modificări, deoarece “autorul (neprecizat) afirma în imagini simbolurile cuprinse în 

stemă: soarele, pădurile de brazi, sondele, snopii, steaua. Nu se vorbea nimic de tricolor”. 

Drept urmare, la sesizarea cenzorilor, poezia “s-a modificat”. La finele anului 1966, în 

“Viața Studențească” urma să apară cronica intitulată 30 Decembrie ’47 – sfîrșit de an și 

început de veac. Atenția cenzorului se oprește asupra a două aspecte din citatul reprodus 

în subsol 38 , cu care nu este de acord și pe care le și subliniază pentru a fi mai ușor apoi 

redacției să le modifice: “S-a atras atenția redacției asupra următoarelor erori istorice și 

politice: a) că nu este aproape, ci un sfert de veac împlinit de la primul eveniment 

enumerat; b) că insurecția armată nu este, după cum apare în enumerarea subliniată, 

efectul celor două evenimente anterioare, ci cauza lor, că în consecință trebuie amplasată 

înaintea acestora”. Odată depistate gravele greșeli, autorul textului s-a conformat 

corecturilor, iar “redacția a modificat în consecință”. 

Concluzii 

Constatăm, prin urmare, că se scria, şi încă mult ne spun cenzorii, altfel decât cereau 

indicaţiile/directivele/linia oficială; că scriitorii, artiştii, mai cu seamă cei formaţi în 

perioada interbelică, se dovedeau greu adaptabili la noua politică culturală, ei fiind 

clienţii cenzurii; că scrierile pe care cenzura le numea „cu probleme” le-a păstrat, într-o 

formă sau alta, de unde le putem astăzi recupera; că acestea nu pun în discuţie regimul 

comunist, în ansamblu, dar elemente, aspecte ale sale, precum îngrădirea libertăţii, 

sistemul de valori, aspecte din viaţa socială, tipuri şi caractere, perioade precum cea a 

dogmatismului, modelul sovietic implementat în România, sunt aspru criticate, denigrate. 

Mai mult, o spune cenzura, critica era extinsă de la cazul particular la general, deci la 

sistem, la relaţiile sociale care le generau; se făceau eforturi de recuperare a adevărului 

referitor la istorie, mai veche sau mai nouă, a românilor, la locul şi rolul mişcării 

comuniste. 

37 Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale, fond. Comitetul pentru Presă şi Tipărituri (1944-1977),, 

dos. 27/1967, f. 2-4. Nota este redactată la data de 18.1.1967, de directorul unităţii, Rosenzweig 

Moise 

38 “Memoria noastră înregistrează de aproape un sfert de veac pe pelicula ei sensibilă momentele 

cele mai sguduitoare, mai capitale pentru viaţa unei naţiuni: intrarea României în cel de-al doilea 

război mondial, întoarcerea armelor împotriva armatelor hitleriste, eliberarea şi insurecţia armată, 

primul guvern democrat, reforma agrară, reforma electorală, proclamarea Republicii, actul 

naţionalizării, şi toate cele care au urmat ducînd spre înflorirea ei actuală”. 

864

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