Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and ... - BITS

Chapter VIII
f. The J-4 should consider assigning a
minimum of two individuals for preparation
of the daily logistics status report for the
supported combatant commander. These
individuals build confidence and become the
JTF experts for logistics status and issues.
g. Figure VIII-2 illustrates an optional LRC
which can serve as the JTF J-4 “Operations
Center,” for all logistics functions, boards,
offices, and centers, and can provide to the
JTF logistics oversight, coordination, and
control of logistics functions.
4. Logistics Considerations
a. Logistics As A Factor In Determining
Objectives. Strategically, logistics
capabilities may limit the deployment,
concentration, and employment options
available to the NCA, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, or combatant commanders.
Operationally, theater logistics constraints
may dictate the rate of strategic buildup or
theater onward movement, overall size of the
combat force, the depth of any attack, or the
speed of advance. Logistics almost always
will affect a theater campaign and exert
varying constraints on JTF operations.
b. Coordinate Logistics Planning With
Operational Planning. Operations and
logistics are inseparable. J-4 must coordinate
closely with current operations, future
operations, and future plans to be effective.
c. Forward Impetus. A system of
continuous replenishment that requires either
automatic “push” or requisitioning “pull”
capability. JTF requirements should be
reviewed periodically and refined if required.
Service component commanders can help
determine the best method of continuous
replenishment. A system to capture cost
associated with providing support to
multinational forces must be established and
the legal authority for the provision of support
identified.
VIII-4
d. Balance Between Combat Forces
And Logistics Forces. The aim of any
military organization is to produce the
greatest possible combat power with the
resources available. Commanders must
determine the proper balance based on
differences between various logistics and
operation concepts. The balance at the
beginning of hostilities is especially
important. Fully trained and equipped
combat support elements must be available
and deployed early enough and in adequate
numbers to render immediate sustained
support to combat troops. A combat force
without logistic support is immobile and
powerless.
e. Logistics Command and Control.
Unity of command requires coordination not
only between Services, but among
government departments and agencies,
NGOs, PVOs, and multinational forces.
f. Apportionment and Allocation.
Apportionment is distribution for planning of
limited resources, whereas allocation is
distribution of limited resources among
competing requirements. Failure to maintain
a system of apportionment and allocation can
cause inflation of priorities, ultimate
breakdown of the priority system, and loss of
control over the logistics system.
g. Accommodation for Requirements.
JTF J-4 organization should be set up to meet
all the JTF requirements. An effective J-4
organization will be able to meet the JTF
logistics needs without a reorganization
should a change in the JTF missions and
responsibilities occur.
h. Logistics Discipline. True economy
of supply requires the careful planning and
buildup of levels to provide those resources
required. Excess stock or unwise use of
priorities decreases flexibility and drains
transportation, facilities, and logistics
resources from other operational priorities.
Joint Pub 5-00.2