Michael Eisenstadt David Pollock How the United States Benefits ...

13. National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce, “2011
Trade Data: Preliminary Information,” February 15,
2012, http://www.nusacc.org/2011prelim.
14. Pollock, Slippery Polls, pp. xiii–xiv and passim.
15. Mark Landler and Steven Lee Meyers, “With $30
Billion Arms Deal, U.S. Bolsters Saudi Ties,” New
York Times, December 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billionarms-deal-united-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.
html; Will Lester, “U.S. Seals Deal on $3.48 Billion
Sale of Missiles, Technology to UAE, a Close Ally in
Mideast,” Associated Press, December 30, 2011, http://
www.boston.com/business/articles/2011/12/30/us_
seals_348b_missiles_technology_sale_to_uae/; Robert
Burns, “U.S. Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with
Saudis,” Associated Press, May 19, 2011, http://articles.
boston.com/2011-05-19/news/29561404_1_saudi-arabia-saudis-fear-security-force.
16. Pollock, Slippery Polls, passim, and Pollock et al.,
Actions, Not Just Attitudes, passim.
17. Pollock et al., Actions, Not Just Attitudes, passim.
18. Pollock, Slippery Polls, pp. xiiii–xiv and passim.
19. Pollock, Slippery Polls, passim.
20. See, for instance, “On Anniversary of bin Laden’s
Death, Little Backing of al-Qaeda” (Pew Global
Attitudes Project, April 30, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/04/30/on-anniversary-of-bin-ladensdeath-little-backing-of-al-qaeda/;
“Osama bin Laden
Largely Discredited among Muslim Publics in Recent
Years” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, May 2, 2011),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1977/poll-osama-binladen-death-confidence-muslim-publics-al-qaedafavorability.
21. Pollock, Slippery Polls, passim.
22. James R. Clapper (director of national intelligence),
“Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community for the Senate Select Committee on
How the United States Benefits from Its Alliance with Israel
Intelligence,” January 31, 2012, http://www.fas.org/irp/
congress/2012_hr/013112clapper.pdf.
23. Shlomo Shpiro, “Israeli Intelligence and al-Qaeda,”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence
25, no. 2 (2012), pp. 242–243, 249, 255; Lake,
“Israel, Gulf States”; Guzansky, “Tacit Allies.”
24. Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, Congressional
Research Service Report RL33222 (March
12, 2012), p. 24, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
RL33222.pdf.
25. Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle
East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, Congressional
Research Service Report RL32260 ( July 17, 2009),
p. 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB954.pdf.
26. Ironically, some critics assert that Israel does not contribute
to U.S. power-projection capabilities in the
region. In fact, it is Israel’s military capabilities that
obviate the need for U.S. power projection in the
Levant, while the weakness of U.S. allies in the Gulf
creates the need for U.S. power projection there. Thousands
of U.S. lives would have been spared and trillions
of dollars saved if America’s Arab Gulf allies had been
able to deter or defend themselves against wouldbe
regional hegemons. For one critic’s view, see, for
instance, Chas Freeman, “Israel Is Useless to U.S. Power
Projection,” Mondoweiss, April 30, 2010, http://mondoweiss.net/2010/04/freeman-israel-is-useless-to-uspower-projection.html.
For one attempt to estimate the
amount spent by the United States to secure Persian
Gulf oil, see Roger J. Stern, “United States Cost of Military
Force Projection in the Persian Gulf, 1975–2007,”
Energy Policy 38, no. 6 ( June 2010), pp. 2816–2825,
http://www.princeton.edu/oeme/articles/US-miiltarycost-of-Persian-Gulf-force-projection.pdf.
27. ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2012,
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/english/press_
release.php.
28. Michael Singh, “What Has Really Changed in the
Middle East?” ForeignPolicy.com, September 22, 2011,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/22/
what_has_really_changed_in_the_middle_east.
The WashingTon insTiTuTe for near easT Policy 9