Michael Eisenstadt David Pollock How the United States Benefits ...

ASSET TEST
Buy 4 More Iron Dome Interceptors,” Reuters, May
26, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/
idINIndia-57287720110526. See also Yaakov Katz,
“U.S. May Buy Iron Dome to Defend ME Bases,”
Jerusalem Post, January 4, 2012, http://www.jpost.
com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=247684; Barbara
Opall-Rome, “Israel Accelerates Iron Dome Purchases,”
Defense News, August 29, 2011, p. 28; “Raytheon-Rafael
Get Boost for Iron Dome,” United
Press International, August 23, 2011, http://www.upi.
com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/08/23/
Raytheon-Rafael-get-boost-for-Iron-Dome/
UPI-18551314128093/.
34. Barbara Opall-Rome, “U.S.-Israel to Develop David’s
Sling Missile Defense,” Defense News, August 7, 2008,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3664531;
Noam Eshel, “David’s Sling Short-Range Missile
Defense Systems Enter a New Stage,” AviationWeek.
com, September 28, 2010, http://www.aviationweek.
com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blo
g&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest
&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog:2
7ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:48ffc19f-
060b-4f8b-bdd1-78ee6d0a6981.
35. Yuval Azulay, “Defense Officials View Solid Laser as
Future of Anti-Missile Technology,” Haaretz, March
24, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/news/defenseofficials-view-laser-as-future-of-anti-missile-technology-1.242193;
Paul McLeary, “U.S. Army Pushing
Laser-Based Defenses,” Defense News, May 13,
2012, http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=2012305130001; Grace Jean, “New ONR
Program Aims to Develop Solid-State Laser Weapons
for Ships,” Office of Naval Research, May 8, 2012,
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=67041.
36. Yaakov Katz, “Israel-U.S. Anti-Missile Drill Back on
Track,” Jerusalem Post, April 4, 2012, http://www.jpost.
com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=264712.
37. Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt, and Andrew Bacevich,
Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, 1998).
38. For more on the U.S. influence on the Israeli military,
see Col. Dr. Meir Finkel and Dr. Eitan Shamir, “From
Whom Should the IDF Learn?” Maarachot, no. 433
(October 2010), pp. 32–33; Dima Adamsky, The Culture
of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors
on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S.,
and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2010), pp. 101–104; and Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of
Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), pp. 250–331.
39. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The
Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), pp. 183, 358; J.
Paul de B. Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages: Government
Responses to Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
2002), pp. 116, 141–142, 144.
40. Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans, p. 39; Bernard C.
Nalty, Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the
United States Air Force, Vol. II, 1950–1997 (Washington,
D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program,
1997), p. 401; David Patrick Houghton, U.S. Foreign
Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press: 2001), p. 111. For the impact
of the Entebbe operation on planning for the Tehran
hostage rescue operation, see pp. 17–18, 81–87, 115–116,
120–121, 144–145, 147, 159, 164.
41. Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force:
The Army’s Elite Counterterrorism Unit (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), p. 171; Richard Marcinko,
The Real Team: Rogue Warrior (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1999), p. 265.
42. For more on CTTSO, see http://www.cttso.gov/.
43. Saul Bronfeld, “Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact
of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army,” Journal of
Military History 71 (April 2007), pp. 465–498. See also
George F. Hoffmann and Donn A. Starry, Camp Colt to
Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 365–
367, 393, 408–409, 438–439, 445–447, 548–550, 554–555,
559; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of
American Airpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2000), pp. 55–56, 69–70, 74, 82.
44. Lambeth, Moscow’s Lessons, p. 12; Lambeth, The Transformation,
pp. 91–96, 101, 112, 175.
45. Israeli efforts to fuse intelligence and greatly enhance
interagency cooperation had their analogue in the formation
of U.S. high-value target teams, which were key
to defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq and the success of the
surge. Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret
Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational
Innovation (Institute for National Strategic Studies,
Strategic Perspectives no. 4, March 2011), http://www.
ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/Strat%20Persp%204%20
Lamb-Munsing.pdf. For a study of successful tactics
and techniques used by U.S. forces in Iraq during
the surge, some of which seem to reflect Israeli experience,
see David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and
Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City (RAND
Occasional Paper, OP-335, 2011), http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/
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