Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

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202 BIBLIOGRAPHY [12] M. Abadi and A.D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. Information and Computation, pages 148(1):1–70, January 1999. [13] M. Abadi and Ph. Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption). J. Cryptology, 15(2):103– 127, 2002. [14] R. M. Amadio and W. Charatonik. On name generation and set-based analysis in the dolev-yao model. In L. Brim, P. Jancar, M. Kretínsk´y, and A. Kucera, editors, CONCUR, volume 2421 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 499–514. Springer, 2002. [15] R. M. Amadio and D. Lugiez. On the reachability problem in cryptographic protocols. In C. Palamidessi, editor, CONCUR, volume 1877 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 380–394. Springer, 2000. [16] R. M. Amadio, D. Lugiez, and V. Vanackère. On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions. Theor. Comput. Sci., 290(1):695– 740, 2003. [17] A. Armando, D. A. Basin, M. Bouallagui, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, S. Mödersheim, M. Rusinowitch, M. Turuani, L. Viganò, and L. Vigneron. The aviss security protocol analysis tool. In E. Brinksma and K. Guldstrand Larsen, editors, CAV, volume 2404 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 349–353. Springer, 2002. [18] G. Ateniese and B. de Medeiros. A provably secure nyberg-rueppel signature variant with applications. Technical Report, In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/93, 2004. [19] AVISPA Tool Set. http://www.avispa-project.org/. [20] F. Baader. The theory of idempotent semigroups is of unification type zero. J. Autom. Reasoning, 2(3):283–286, 1986. [21] F. Baader and T. Nipkow. Term Rewriting and All That. Cambridge University Press, 1998. [22] F. Baader and W. Snyder. Unification theory. In J. A. Robinson and A. Voronkov editors, Handbook of Automated Reasoning, Elsevier and MIT Press, pages 445–532. 2001. [23] L. Bachmair. Canonical equational proofs. Progress in Theoretical Computer Science, Birkhauser, 1991. [24] L. Bachmair and H. Ganzinger. On restrictions of ordered paramodulation with simplification. In M. E. Stickel, editor, CADE, volume 449 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 427–441. Springer, 1990.
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Logical Analysis and Verification o
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Abstract This thesis is developed i
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x CONTENTS 2.1.7 Unification . . .
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xii CONTENTS 5.8 Decidability of re
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20 CHAPTER 2. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS USI
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58 CHAPTER 3. PROTOCOLS WITH VULNER
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100 CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOLS WITH VULNE
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112 CHAPTER 5. SATURATED DEDUCTION
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148 CHAPTER 6. ON THE GROUND ENTAIL
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150 CHAPTER 6. ON THE GROUND ENTAIL
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Page 216 and 217: 204 BIBLIOGRAPHY [36] M. Bellare, A
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