Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

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50 CHAPTER 2. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS USING CONSTRAINT SOLVING And the role receiver (or B) is given by a tuple constructed by the follow: • KB = {B, S, A, NB, KBS}, • and the set of rules is: B1 : v4 ⇒ encs (NB, π1(decs ? (v4, KBS))); v4 = encs (〈X3, Y3〉, KBS) B2 : ? v5 ⇒ ∅; v5 = encs (NB − 1, π1(decs (v4, KBS))) Before describing the execution of a protocol, we need to describe the execution of a role. In the high level specification of a protocol, a role represents an abstract participant in the protocol, while a concrete participant of the protocol, denoted an agent (or instance of role), is as represented below: Definition 31 (Instance of role) An instance of role R is obtained from the role R by instantiating its parameters, that is its initial knowledge, KR, and its fresh values. If R is a role, and σ is a substitution instantiating the parameters of R, Rσ is an instance of that role. Let an instance of role defined by ({vi ⇒ Si; Ui} i∈I , K), by definition of role (Definition 30), and by definition of instance of role (Definition 31), it is easy to see that V ar(Si) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi} for i ∈ {1, . . . , ♮I}. An agent, also called a concrete participant in the protocol, should play a role in that protocol. To this end, he should instantiate that role. An agent could instantiate many roles, or instantiate the same role many time. Definition 32 (Instance of protocol) An instance of a protocol P is defined by a union of instances of P roles and by a set of ground terms representing the initial knowledge of the intruder I. We denote an instance of the protocol P as follows: ({vi ⇒ Si; Ui}i∈I,
2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 51 Example 11 We consider again the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol. We consider three agents Alice, Bob, and s such that Alice instantiates once the sender role (or role A), Bob instantiates once the receiver role (or role B), and s instantiates once the server role (or role S). This instance of Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol is given by ({r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6},
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Logical Analysis and Verification o
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Abstract This thesis is developed i
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112 CHAPTER 5. SATURATED DEDUCTION
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148 CHAPTER 6. ON THE GROUND ENTAIL
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178 CHAPTER 7. VOTER VERIFIABILITY
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198 CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND PERSP
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200 CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND PERSP
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202 BIBLIOGRAPHY [12] M. Abadi and
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204 BIBLIOGRAPHY [36] M. Bellare, A
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208 BIBLIOGRAPHY [83] H. Comon-Lund
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214 BIBLIOGRAPHY [160] J. C. Mitche
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216 BIBLIOGRAPHY [187] H. Seidl and
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