30.01.2013 Views

Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

3.3. THE MODEL 67<br />

• InA = � x A 1 , x A 2<br />

• OutA = � y A 1 , y A 2<br />

• SA =<br />

�<br />

x A 1<br />

� ,<br />

� ,<br />

?<br />

= ∅, x A 2<br />

?<br />

= enc p (x, P kA), y A 1<br />

?<br />

= enc p (〈A, NA〉, P kB), y A 2<br />

The role B is represented by the following symbolic derivation:<br />

(VB, SB, KB, InB, OutB) with:<br />

• VB = � xB 01, xB 02, xB 03, xB 04, xB 05, xB 06, xB 1 , yB 1<br />

xB 04 < xB 05 < xB 06 < xB 1 < yB 1<br />

• KB = � A, B, NB, KB, K −1<br />

B<br />

• InB = � xB �<br />

1 ,<br />

• OutA = � yB �<br />

1 ,<br />

• SB =<br />

�<br />

x B 1<br />

?<br />

= enc p (y, P kB), y A 1<br />

�<br />

, KA ,<br />

Composition <strong>of</strong> symbolic derivations<br />

�<br />

?<br />

= ∅<br />

� , ordered as follows: x B 01 < x B 02 < x B 03 <<br />

?<br />

= encp (NB, P kπ1(decp (xB 1 ,P k−1<br />

B )))<br />

�<br />

Given two I-symbolic derivations, we show next how to compose them [72].<br />

Definition 41 Let I = 〈F, LI, H〉 be an intruder deduction system, <strong>and</strong> let C1 =<br />

(V1, S1, K1, In1, Out1) <strong>and</strong> C2 = (V2, S2, K2, In2, Out2) be two I-symbolic derivations<br />

with two disjoint sets <strong>of</strong> variables <strong>and</strong> index sets (Ind1,

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!