Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

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204 BIBLIOGRAPHY [36] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, and S. Micali. Public-key encryption in a multiuser setting: Security proofs and improvements. In EUROCRYPT, pages 259–274, 2000. [37] M. Bellare and Ph. Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribution. In D. R. Stinson, editor, CRYPTO, volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 232–249. Springer, 1993. [38] M. Bellare and Ph. Rogaway. The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based game-playing proofs. In S. Vaudenay, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 4004 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 409–426. Springer, 2006. [39] J. Cohen Benaloh and D. Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 544–553, 1994. [40] V. Bernat and H. Comon-Lundh. Normal proofs in intruder theories. In M. Okada and I. Satoh editors, ASIAN, volume 4435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 151–166, Springer, 2006. [41] K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, and A. D. Gordon. A semantics for web services authentication. In N. D. Jones and X. Leroy, editors, POPL, pages 198–209. ACM, 2004. [42] E. Biham and R. Chen. Near-collisions of sha-0. In M. K. Franklin, editor, CRYPTO, volume 3152 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 290–305. Springer, 2004. [43] S. Blake-Wilson, D. Johnson, and A. Menezes. Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. In M. Darnell, editor, IMA Int. Conf., volume 1355 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 30–45. Springer, 1997. [44] S. Blake-Wilson and A. Menezes. Authenticated diffie-hellman key agreement protocols. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, pages 339–361, 1998. [45] S. Blake-Wilson and A. Menezes. Unknown key-share attacks on the station-to-station (sts) protocol. In H. Imai and Y. Zheng, editors, Public Key Cryptography, volume 1560 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 154–170. Springer, 1999. [46] B. Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. In CSFW’01: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 82–96. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2001. [47] B. Blanchet. From secrecy to authenticity in security protocols. In M. V. Hermenegildo and G. Puebla, editors, SAS, volume 2477 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 342–359. Springer, 2002.
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Logical Analysis and Verification o
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Abstract This thesis is developed i
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x CONTENTS 2.1.7 Unification . . .
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xii CONTENTS 5.8 Decidability of re
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Figure 1.
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4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Secrecy T
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20 CHAPTER 2. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS USI
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58 CHAPTER 3. PROTOCOLS WITH VULNER
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100 CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOLS WITH VULNE
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112 CHAPTER 5. SATURATED DEDUCTION
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148 CHAPTER 6. ON THE GROUND ENTAIL
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