Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

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18 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1.5.3 Chapter 7: Analysis of electronic voting protocols: “voter verifiability” property In Chapter 7, we study a specific class of cryptographic protocols: the “electronic-voting” protocols for which we analyse the “voter verifiability property”. The voter verifiability property includes the the individual verifiability and universal verifiability properties. Intuitively, the individual verifiability property mans that a voter can check whether her ballot was included in the tally, and the universal verifiability property means that anybody can check the correctness of the published outcome. We formally define these two properties, and that using the applied pi calculus [11] which is well-suited for modelling security protocols and in particular electronic voting protocols [97, 25]. We apply our definition to some well-known e-voting protocols such as the protocol due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [115] and Lee et al. [141], and show that both protocols are voter verifiable according to our definition.
Chapter 2 Constraint systems to analyse cryptographic protocols The security of a cryptographic protocol is assessed with respect to the environment in which the protocol is executed. Dolev and Yao [107] have described the environment by the deductions an intruder attacking a protocol is able to perform. They considered that the intruder has a complete control over the communication medium (network), he listen to the communication and can obtain any message passing through the network, he can intercept, block, and/or redirect all messages sent by honest agents. He also can masquerade his identity and take part in the protocol under the identity of an honest agent. His control of the network is modelled by assuming that all messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the intruder and that all messages received by the honest agents are always sent by the intruder. Besides the control of the network, the intruder has some specific rules to deduce new messages [73, 72, 156]. Many procedures have been proposed to decide security problems of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model with respect to a finite number of sessions [16, 53, 178]. Among the different approaches, there is the symbolic approaches [156, 75, 29, 87] on which, as mentionned in the introduction of this document, we work. In these approaches, cryptographic primitives are represented by function symbols, messages are represented by terms in a signature (a set of function symbols representing the cryptographic primitives), and intruder capacities are represented by deduction rules on sets of messages representing his knowledge. These deduction rules allow the intruder to derive new messages from a given (finite) set of messages representing his knowledge. Cryptographic primitives may have algebraic properties, such as the associativity for the concate- 19
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178 CHAPTER 7. VOTER VERIFIABILITY
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202 BIBLIOGRAPHY [12] M. Abadi and
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208 BIBLIOGRAPHY [83] H. Comon-Lund
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210 BIBLIOGRAPHY [108] B. Donovan,
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214 BIBLIOGRAPHY [160] J. C. Mitche
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216 BIBLIOGRAPHY [187] H. Seidl and
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Logical Analysis and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols - Loria

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