El Futuro de la cooperación Unión European - OTAN

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El futuro de la cooperación UE - OTAN different path of adaptation. Of course, it’s not only a NATO-EU problem, but the problem of national adaptation processes and the differences in the security perceptions of the member states, primarily of the United States and some European allies. The good news is that if you read the major strategic documents of the NATO strategic concept and the European Security Strategy, you will fi nd many commonalities, especially in the fi eld of the description of the security environment. You will fi nd the same problems and even the same expressions. The bad news is that the conclusions drawn from this description are different. For example, the conclusion of the United States is, on the basis of threats and challenges, that the world is a very dangerous place. On the other hand, if you read the EU Security Strategy, your conclusion is that the world is a very complicated place. And of course the 2 sides of the Atlantic draw different conclusions regarding policies, regarding the capabilities required and regarding the use of these capabilities: when and under what circumstances these capabilities should be used. The next problem is the different cultures on the two sides of the Atlantic, and again, these are quite obvious. We attach different meaning to terms like preventive engagement or preventive strike and also a different interpretation of what an effective multilateralism would mean. 20 I would mention as the last one, maybe the most important problem, and that is the different ambitions within NATO and within the EU regarding the respective roles of the two organizations and also the different ambitions regarding EU- NATO cooperation. Because we have these dilemmas in both organizations, in NATO for example, there are ongoing discussions about to what extent NATO should perform some civilian tasks, but of course, there is no consensus within the Alliance about the development of civilian capabilities but as the operational experience at Afghanistan and Kosovo show, there is an ever increasing need for interaction with civilian actors and that calls for a Comprehensive Approach. But there is no consensus in developing civilian capabilities. Of course, in the EU there are similar discussions, maybe sometimes behind the scenes, about the potential role of the EU in collective defense. The Reform Treaty of the EU for the time being, of course, excludes that option but I’m pretty sure there will be such discussion in the future as well. Also in NATO we have ongoing discussions about emerging threats, such as cyber attacks or energy security, for example, and we are still struggling with these issues, how to deal with them and of course, until there is no consensus within the NATO, its quite diffi cult to engage in serious cooperation or even dialogue with the EU.
The other problem is that there are rather different approaches to the scope of NATO-EU cooperation. There is a very ambitious approach which would like to see synergies and strategic partnership as in many areas as possible. There is a more restrictive approach whose primary objective is to de-confl ict the cooperation between the two organizations. Now I would like to turn to the possible complementarities. Again another ongoing debate is if we should devise a division of labor between the two organizations. My answer is that devising such a formal division of labor is very diffi cult, if not impossible. The only thing we can say with certainty is that NATO doesn’t have a monopoly anymore, although it used to have it during the cold war times and even at the beginning of the nineties. But NATO doesn’t have that monopoly anymore and it has to learn that there is another kid in the block, the EU, which is developing and ever stronger ESDP and NATO has to live with that. Certainly we can’t devise a division of labor in geographical scope, since both organizations are present in Europe, in the Balkans primarily, but also in Afghanistan and in Africa, something that would be inconceivable fi ve years ago. It is also diffi cult to devise a division of labor in terms of functional areas, because both are engaged in military crisis management. Of course the EU is much more qualifi ed to do the civilian part of the job and that is the reality which won’t probably change in the future and we Panel I: “Relaciones UE-OTAN: competición, complementariedad y sinergias” should take that into consideration. In terms of capabilities, the picture is not that black and white, because at the institutional level, again it’s a reality that the NATO continues to be the corner stone of collective defense for its member states. So of the two organizations only NATO is responsible for collective defense. The other matter of fact is that the EU has much more comprehensive tools of crisis management, especially in the civilian fi eld. But on the basis of this we can’t draw the conclusion that NATO should be responsible for the high intensive operations and the EU for civilian operations. This is all the more true with respect to national capabilities because I think it would be absolutely unacceptable within an alliance that for example, United States and some other allies develop high intensity capabilities and the European allies prepare themselves for low intensity operations. From the political point of view, is completely unacceptable. Turning to the future, I think that the area which will really force our cooperation 21
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El Futuro de la cooperación Unión European - OTAN

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