deur: nico patrick swartz

In die siel moet tussen laer vermoëns (soos waarneming, verbeelding en herinnering) 52 en
die hoër vermoë (naamlik die redenerende denke) onderskei word. 53 Die laere vermoëns,
is gedrenk in die materie en afhanklik van liggaamlike organe vir hul uitoefening, terwyl
die rede, die intellek, op geen wyse beperk is nie. 54 By laer vermoë van waarneming het
ons byvoorbeeld steeds te doen met iets wat stoflik en sigbaar waargeneem word.
Wanneer die intellek egter hieroor begin nadink, word die stoflike en die individuele
getransendeer. 55
Hieruit volg dat die rede nie slegs onstoflik is nie, maar ook enkelvoudig is. Dit bly
onveranderd afgesien van liggaamlike veranderinge wat mag plaasvind. Omdat dit
enkelvoudig is, is dit onverganklik; want slegs iets wat saamgestel is, kan tot ontbinding
oorgaan. 56 Terwyl die laer sielsvermoëns derhalwe saam met die liggaam sterwe, is die
denkende rede onsterflik en onverwoesbaar. 57 Thomas Aquinas omskryf die “ denkende
siel “ die redelike vorm van die menslike natuur, altyd as “goddelik“; die liggaamlike
materie noem hy egter nooit goddelik nie. Die siel word opgevat as ‘n abstrakte deel van
52
Summa Theologica I-II, Q. XV, A. IV, obj. 1. “ …that consent to pleasure belongs to the lower reason.”
53
Summa Theologica I-II, Q. XV, A. I, obj. 1. “ …that consent belongs to the higher reason.”
54
Summa Theologica I, Q. LXXIX, A. IX, O.t.c.: die hoëre en laere rede word onderskei deur hul
funksies.
55
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chapt. LXXXII
“ But in the souls of dumb animals we find no activity higher than the activities of the sentient part. That
animals neither understand nor reason is apparent from this, that all animals of the same species behave
alike, as being moved by nature, and not acting on any principle of art. But if the soul of a dumb animal
remains after the body is gone, it will be a form seperated from matter. Therefore the soul of a dumb
animal will have understanding, which is impossible. “
( Joseph Rickaby S.J.: Of God and His creatures. An anntated translation. Svmma contra gentiles of St.
Thomas Aquinas. The Carrol Press Westminster, Maryland, 1950, P. 159. )
56
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chap. LXXXII
“ Every part seperated from its whole, is imperfect. But the soul, being the form ( Chap. XLVII ), ia a
part of the human species. Therefore, existing by itself, apart from the body, it is imperfect. “
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chapter, LXXXII
Joseph Rickaby, S.J., Of God and His creatures, p. 161
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chap. LXXXIX
“ Therefore the sentient soul of man, as of other animals, comes to be by the active power that is in the
male semen. But the sentient and the intelligent soul in man is one in substance ( Chap. LVIII ).
As Aristotle teaches, in point of time the foetus is an animal before it is a man. The sentient soul,
whereby the human foetus was an animal, does not last, but its place is taken by a soul that is at once
sentient and intelligent. “
57
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chap. LXXIX
“ Every intelligent subsisting being is imperishable ( Chap. LV ). But the human soul is an intelligent
subsisting being. Nothing is destroyed by that which makes its perfection. For the soul is perfected by
knowledge and virtue; now in knowledge there is greater perfection.
Intelligible being is more permanent than sensible being. Therefore the human soul, of which the potential
intellect is a part, is indestructible. “
Joseph Rickaby S.J., Of God and His creatures, p. 152-153
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