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06 TODAY’S ZAMAN MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009 INTERVIEW
Georgýan expert says Caucasus
Platform should ýnclude US, EU
‘From the Georgian perspective, the main thing is security from Russia, and it can only come from the US, NATO and the EU, which
have some weight with Russia. Any moves to weaken NATO or EU influence in the region are considered bad for Georgia’
Ghia Nodia, a professor and advocate of democratization
in the Caucasus, has said the Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform, created by Turkey following
the brief war between Georgia and Russia, should
include Western institutions to be successful.
“From the Georgian perspective, the main thing is
security from Russia, and it can only come from the US,
NATO and the EU, which have some weight with
Russia. Any moves to weaken NATO or EU influence in
the region is considered bad for Georgia,” he said,
speaking with Monday Talk for Today's Zaman.
He added that Georgian experts think the Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform is too general.
“We have had lots of initiatives for the South
Caucasus dialogue, but we know that it never works
because Armenians and Azeris start to quarrel over
Karabakh, and Georgians just listen. Dialogue should
be about achieving results, not just talking.”
Under Turkey's initiative, the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform will have its fourth meeting in
September with technical experts from Russia, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish officials have maintained
that the platform will facilitate the resolution of frozen
conflicts in the region, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The
initiative was welcomed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Russia. Georgia later participated, even though it had initial
reservations about being at the same table as Russia.
The Georgian offensive into South Ossetia and
Abkhazia escalated into a five-day war in August of
last year with Russia emerging the victor. The question
of which side started the war has always been hotly
debated. The Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili,
had claimed that Russian tanks advanced into South
Ossetia on the evening of Aug. 7. While some experts
say Russia's invasion of Georgia had been planned in
advance, others say the Russian army did not enter
South Ossetia until Aug. 8. In the meantime, Russia
has repeatedly accused Washington of fueling the conflict
with its military support for Georgia.
For Monday Talk, Professor Nodia elaborates on the topic.
Monday Talk spoke with the professor when he came to Ýstanbul
to participate in the Turkey-Georgia Relations
Workshop organized by the Foundation for Political,
Economic and Social Research (SETA) from July 22 to 24.
What is the political situation in Georgia one
year after the war?
We have had internal political tensions which have
not been directly linked to the war. First of all there is a
general legitimacy problem within the political institutions.
The opposition did not accept the results of the presidential
and parliamentary elections in 2008, so a part of the
opposition does not recognize Saakashvili as the legitimate
president. Some of the opposition refused to enter the parliament.
Those problems were there before the war.
What has the war changed in Georgia?
The war had an impact in two ways. One thing was
that immediately after the war it was considered unpatriotic
to be active against the government because Russia obviously
wanted to replace Saakashvili. Oppositional activities
were suspended. But on the other hand, Saakashvili
has lost some support from the West because of the war,
and that has given the opposition an argument to force
Saakashvili to resign, so the opposition resumed demonstrations
in March demanding his resignation.
Do you think it will happen?
No. The assumption was that Saakashvili would respond
in a violent manner and his support from the West
would erode further. But Saakashvili responded in a calm
and moderate way, so the West did not support the opposition
and eventually the opposition lost the support of the
public. They are divided and there are more than 10 parties
forming the opposition. As a result, they stopped protests.
How do you think the Europeans view Saakashvili
in relation to the war?
He was criticized by the West a lot. He was more
criticized in Western Europe, where he is seen as too
pro-American. Western Europeans were also annoyed
by the American pressure to support Georgia's accession.
For many Western European leaders the war was
a good pretext to say that Saakashvili is hot headed
and immature for NATO.
Does Saakashvili think that he made some mistakes?
I don't think he thinks he made grave mistakes.
Some Georgian moves were not good, but Georgia
was forced to do them. They did not have any other
options. Georgia did not like attacking South Ossetia,
but it was self-defense against Russia. That is how the
Georgian government sees it, but there was a miscalculation.
Before the war, there was some hope that
Russia would not enter the war so openly and directly
and occupy places outside South Ossetia. That was not
expected. We saw Russia's readiness to go to war with
Georgia. Russia asserted itself militarily.
PROFILE
Professor Ghia
Nodia, expert and
advocate of
democratization
in Caucasus
A professor of politics
and a director of the
International School
of Caucasus Studies
at Ilia Chavchavadze
State University in
Tbilisi, Ghia Nodia is
also a founder and
member of the board
of the Caucasus
Institute for Peace,
Democracy and
Development (CIPDD),
a Tbilisi-based independent
public policy
think tank. He has
published extensively
on regional security,
state-building and
democratization in the
Caucasus, as well as
on theories of nationalism
and democratic
transition in the post-
Cold War context. He
served as the
Georgian minister of
education and science
from February to
December 2008.
Is there a possibility for a similar conflict?
In this war Russia was successful in creating this
perception: Georgia started the war, Russia intervened
later but overreacted. But if Russia attacks Georgia
again, it will be an open aggression against Georgia
without this kind of pretext. The presence of the
European observers in Georgia is important because
Russia cannot blame any provocations on Georgians.
How long are the European observers going to
be there?
I don't know about their mandate. Americans are expected
to join them, and even Turkish observers. Now
everybody understands that some threat -- it may not be at
a high level at the moment -- of Russian aggression is
there. The observers are very important so as not to allow
the Russians to invent some kind of pretext for invasion.
Does the Georgian political establishment still
favor Georgia's membership in NATO?
Yes, absolutely. The Saakashvili government never had
doubts about that. But some of the opposition has expressed
some doubt. For example, the Labor Party supports
Georgian neutrality, but it is a small party. Recently,
radical opposition parties came together and signed a
memorandum on their values. In the memorandum they
included their support for Georgia's NATO membership.
The parliamentary opposition also supports NATO membership.
So a large majority of the political establishment
continues to support Georgia's NATO membership. That's
the best available guarantee against Russian threat.
But at the same time isn't it a further aggravating
factor, considering Russia?
No, because even before Georgia's official application
to [join] NATO, we had bad relations with Russia. The
main thing is that Russia wants to dominate Georgia because
Georgia is the gateway to the Caucasus. Russia
would like Georgia only as its satellite state.
‘Turkey has strong image in Georgia’
In the last year Georgia has been nervous about
Turkey's moves and intentions. How much of this uneasiness
still continues today?
Since the independence of Georgia, relations with Turkey
have been excellent. Not only the Georgian political establishment
but the general public also considers Turkey an important
ally. We have a lot of joint projects, including the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey has a stable, strong image in Georgia.
Against that image, there was some disappointment during the
war. The Georgian public expected Turkey's support, but
although Turkey did not do anything particularly anti-
Georgian, it was not clearly supportive of Georgia, either.
And the decision to suspend the passage of the American
ships through the Bosporus and Turkish Prime Minister
[Recep Tayyip] Erdoðan's visit to Moscow created some
uneasiness. But Georgia recognizes that all countries
have their own interests. Georgians did not expect that
the whole world would become the enemy of Russia because
of the Georgian-Russian conflict.
How does Georgia approach the Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform set up after the war?
Georgian experts do not attach great importance to
the platform because it is too general and there is no
specific substance attached to it so far. Initially, there
were some suspicions that the platform implied some
kind of exclusion of NATO and the European Union
from the region. The Georgian public does not know
much about it, but the Georgian experts and the political
community want to know what it really means.
The Turkish side apparently is of the idea that the
conflict needs to be addressed regionally first and that
building trust at the regional level is a must. Does the
Georgian side think it is absolutely necessary to include
the US and/or the EU to do that?
In practice, yes, because dialogue is a nice word and
everybody is for it. But we need to now what it means
specifically. We have had lots of initiatives for the South
Caucasus dialogue, but we know that it never works because
Armenians and Azeris start to quarrel over Karabakh
and Georgians just listen. Dialogue should be about
achieving results, not just talking. From the Georgian perspective,
the main thing is security from Russia and it can
only come from the US, NATO and the EU, which have
some weight with Russia. Any moves to weaken NATO or
EU influence in the region are considered bad for Georgia.
What does Georgia really expect from Turkey, then?
Georgia expects a lot from Turkey. We have a lot of energy
and other projects.
I mean in political terms…
Turkey is a NATO member.
Any intermediary roles?
An intermediary role between Russia and Georgia
would not be of any interest.
Why not?
It would not be practical because Russia would not
accept it. Russia would not see Turkey as a great
enough power. In addition, a Turkey less oriented toward
the West would be in Russian interests. When it
comes to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one could think
of an intermediary role for Turkey, but then Georgia
would be concerned about the Russian involvement,
and in that case Turkey's intermediary role would have
to go through Russia. Then Turkey would be concerned
about not annoying Russia because anything
you do with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is de
facto Russian territory, would be a challenge to Russia.
So Georgia does not expect Turkey to take that role.
What about Abkhaz and Circassian diasporas
in Turkey?
Georgia is interested in having better relations
with them. In that sense, Turkey can play a role, and
that would be very welcomed.
Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement and
Georgia's reaction
“Officially, Georgia will never object to Turkish-Armenian relations
in any way. But this is my expert opinion: Georgia has a monopoly
over transit routes from Azerbaijan to Turkey. If Armenian-Turkish
relations improve, Georgia would lose that monopoly; economically,
that is not so desirable. However, there are already pipelines
built and agreements signed, so I don't expect a dramatic change
in that regard. But there will be some negative impacts on
the economy considering that the transit routes of trucks
currently pass through Georgia,” Professor Ghia Nodia said.
“There are also fears that the Armenian diaspora groups
living in Georgia will become extremely nationalistic, similar to
the Dashnaks [the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF]
because Armenia will be less dependent on Georgia.”
“On the other hand, there are also pluses in the sense that
the Armenian dependence on Russia will reduce. Now Armenia
has no other strategic partner but Russia. It has an overdependence
on Russia militarily. Armenia has this mentality of
being squeezed between enemies. If Armenia does not see
Turkey as an enemy, that will be a big change in the
Armenian psyche. Then tensions will diminish as
Russia will have less leverage in the region,” he said.
“The visit of Saakashvili to Yerevan was quite notable. He
was lavishly received, and Russia considers that a kind of offense.
Russia is quite displeased with this demonstration of
friendship by Armenia so personally to Saakashvili.”
‘Turkey's EU accession would
encourage Georgians'
“We have EU aspirations, but we also know there is enlargement
fatigue. We also see how Turkey is treated by the
EU, so we do not have illusions about it. [If the EU treated
Turkey better] it would not only encourage Georgia, but it
would also be a strategic change. It would make Georgia's
aspirations much more realistic. Georgia has a strong interest
in Turkey's accession to the EU. … President
Saakashvili said several times that Atatürk is an inspiration
for him in relation to modernization and leadership. It is
good for Georgia to have democratic countries around us.
Turkey is the only democratic country around us right now.”
P H O T O S T O D A Y ’ S Z A M A N , T U R G U T E N G Ý N
19
CM Y K