Supporting the First Stryker Brigade in Iraq - Army Logistics ...

DODAAC Management
During the time I was in the Iraqi theater, there was
little, if any, DODAAC management. Arriving containers
were loaded with items for multiple DODAACs,
and many of the tri-wall boxes had items for multiple
customers. This placed a tremendous burden on the
small and understrength supply units that operated the
various supply support activities (SSAs) and the TDC at
Camp Doha. Every container and many of the tri-wall
boxes had to be opened and sorted before their contents
could be forwarded to the requisitioning units. After a
while, the frustration that resulted from the inability to
keep pace with the volume caused them to ignore the
ultimate customer and simply add the items to their customers’
authorized stockage lists (ASLs) to meet myriad
dues-out. Supply personnel assumed that items had
been in transit so long that the original requester had
satisfied the requirement in some other way.
Management of DODAACs must be put at the top of
any list of corrective actions to be taken as a result of lessons
learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Only through
good management can throughput to customers be maximized
and the weighty burden on support units in the
theater, and ultimately the customers, be relieved. We
must reexamine how DODAACs are managed. The automated
processes for handling DODAACs at the AMC
Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) at Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama, must be changed to enable on-the-fly,
quick-response changes in “ship-to” addresses. As late as
October 2003, the DODAAC file at LOGSA had home or
mobilization station locations listed as the ship-to
addresses for many units that were in theater.
Installations and theater commands can and should
maintain control of the “bill-to” address, but the ship-to
address is the ultimate responsibility of the unit commanders.
A Web-based system (easily changed to a
batch mode system if there is no Internet connectivity)
that allows the commander to quickly change
the ship-to address for his unit is critical to good
throughput management. A unit’s DODAAC should
be as permanent as its unit identification code or
derivative unit identification code.
In-Transit Visibility
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, containers arrived
in theater with radio frequency identification (RFID)
tags carefully mounted and full of data on what was
inside the containers. However, no one was at the port
to forward the containers to their correct destinations
when they came off the commercial vessel, so all that
labeling work was a wasted effort.
This issue isn’t new; it is simply a continuing saga of
a new idea with no sponsor. Adding technology without
first implementing the right organizational and doctrinal
changes only means that we know more quickly
that we’re in trouble—and we have no way to fix it.
The Army has failed to institutionalize RFID technolo-
gies even though we have had those technologies for
over 15 years. The Logistics Transformation Task
Force, commissioned in May 2002 by Army Chief of
Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and headed by Major
General N. Ross Thompson III, commander of the
Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, recognized
this shortcoming and recommended that
responsibility for standardizing RFID technologies be
given to the movement control community. To date,
nothing has happened to resolve this ownership issue.
The Army is planning the future logistics organizations
that will deliver support to the warfighter during the
first 30 days. Now is the time to embed the right structure
in the resulting organizations to support in-transit
visibility and provide the technology our units need to
obtain information on the sustainment flow. When we are
preparing for operations, distribution teams must deploy
to critical distribution centers and ground, air, and sea
ports to install readers in sufficient quantities and locations
so logisticians can “see” in-transit assets that have
RFID tags or barcode labels attached.
Joint policies, procedures, and regulations must be
changed to require the correct labeling of all Department
of Defense assets to support RFID tracking. Thus,
when units and supplies move through the logistics
nodes, the data will feed to the Global Transportation
Network (GTN) database, where they can be accessed
by those who need unit and asset visibility, regardless of
their location. Once the data are in the GTN database,
linking them to trains, trucks, planes, or ships is a datalinking
process rather than a major input operation.
Our current systems already have pieces of this solution,
but there still is no established method to ensure
that data are updated at critical points while supplies are
in transit. Doctrine that assigns responsibility for developing
such a method to movement control elements
would correct this deficiency.
A final thought: Soldiers often have simple solutions
to some of these seemingly overwhelming challenges.
We must harvest their ideas before they become stale.
Progress in technology is often measured in micro steps
forward, not in blinding leaps. Therefore, we must garner
these advances, apply them where needed, and
institutionalize the changes. It matters little who gets
the credit—the bottom line is doing the best that we can
for our soldiers. ALOG
COLONEL GLENN W. WALKER, ARNG AGR, SERVES
AS THE G–4 FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA. HE HAS MASTER’S DEGREES IN
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FROM MORAVIAN COLLEGE
IN PENNSYLVANIA AND IN NATIONAL RESOURCES STRATE-
GIES FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY. HE IS
A GRADUATE OF THE QUARTERMASTER OFFICER BASIC
AND ADVANCED COURSES, THE ARMY COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, AND THE INDUSTRIAL
COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS 35