Supporting the First Stryker Brigade in Iraq - Army Logistics ...

A gun truck is constructed by welding armor plates to the sides of a 5-ton
truck. A ring-mounted MK19 40-millimeter machinegun is emplaced in front,
and a .50-caliber machinegun is mounted in back.
would-be attackers. The size of the vehicles also offered
the crew a better field of view and permitted them to
move more freely in the truck beds. The added height
of the 5-ton vehicles also afforded better security for
crowd control and protection from looters and attackers
attempting to reach into vehicles or throw grenades into
the trucks. The larger gun trucks also were better able
to withstand IED attacks because they had a higher
ground clearance than the low-riding HMMWVs.
Since most of the gun trucks were constructed from
vehicles organic to the transportation companies, the
crews manning the gun trucks came from within those
companies. The crews were predominately motor
transport operators (military occupational specialty
88M), which made it easy to switch gun truck crews
and vehicle operators when necessary.
Disadvantages of External Security
Failing to include gun trucks on the tables of
organization and equipment (TOEs) of combat service
support units has significant drawbacks. Without
organic gun trucks, convoy security must be provided
by external units, or unit assets must be converted into
gun trucks, which decreases the unit’s lift capability.
Relying on external units for security could cause
combat forces to be diverted to missions other than
attacking the enemy.
Convoy battle drills must be well rehearsed so each
soldier understands the actions he must take on enemy
contact. External security assets do not habitually
train with the convoys they are protecting. The resulting
lack of cohesiveness creates a dangerous combat
environment. To be effective in suppressing an
enemy threat and preventing fratricide, soldiers must
be so well rehearsed that they know automatically
how they and their fellow soldiers will react.
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An alternative to
providing organic force
protection assets to
logistics units would
be to establish secure
lines of communication
(LOCs) between joint
operating areas (JOAs).
Because the current and
potential battlefields
are noncontiguous, austere,
and extremely
large, this would be an
enormous task. Securing
the LOCs would
require a dedicated
force of a size that
would be impractical.
The Army has a commitment to its soldiers to provide
them the best protection and equipment available.
While small arms protective inserts (SAPIs) and uparmored
HMMWVs are critical for combat units, gun
trucks are essential for convoys.
The enemy continues to develop TTPs for waging
attacks that threaten the full spectrum of Army operations.
Convoys are faced with evolving threats every
day. Make no mistake about it: most convoy operations
are combat operations, especially those that
traverse nonsecure LOCs between JOAs. Logistics
units are part of the greater Army, and they are integral
to the success of maneuver force operations. Failure of
any part of the Army jeopardizes the outcome of the
whole operation.
Tolerating inadequately mitigated risks while
protecting logistics convoys is a dangerous course of
action. Adding organic gun trucks to the TOEs of
logistics units would enable combat logisticians to provide
an uninterrupted flow of crucial supplies to combat
arms forces and help ensure continued success on
the battlefield. ALOG
CAPTAIN DANIEL T. ROSSI IS A COMBAT DEVELOPER IN
THE DIRECTORATE OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS FOR
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AT THE ARMY COMBINED
ARMS SUPPORT COMMAND AT FORT LEE, VIRGINIA. HE
PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN THE 548TH CORPS SUPPORT
BATTALION, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION (LIGHT
INFANTRY), WHICH PROVIDED SUPPORT TO THE 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) DURING ITS DEPLOY-
MENT TO IRAQ. HE HAS A B.S. DEGREE IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE FROM THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT AND IS A GRADUATE OF THE
ORDNANCE OFFICER BASIC COURSE, THE COMBINED
LOGISTICS CAPTAINS CAREER COURSE, AND THE COM-
BINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL.
JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2005