Pacifica Military History Free Sample Chapters.pmd

Free Sample Chapters 77
January 1943 at Milne Bay, the morale of the pilots was low due to the
few recent occasions on which they had seen combat. The P-39 had
proved ineffective against the faster and more maneuverable enemy fighters.
Its range and altitude limitations were also major draw-backs. Additionally,
an epidemic of malaria and dengue fever had rendered many
of the pilots and ground-crew personnel hors de combat. It was time for
a change.
In late January, the unit was withdrawn from New Guinea and moved
to Mareeba, Australia. Rest and rehabilitation to recover from malaria
and dengue was the primary reason for the move, but more important
was the news that our P-39 and P-400 aircraft were to be replaced by
highly regarded Lockheed P-38 Lightning twin-engine fighters mounted
with four .50-caliber machine guns and a 20mm cannon. Morale soared.
The move was completed in early February.
In early April 1943, the Headhunters brought their new P-38s back
to Port Moresby. Our camp was Kila Airdrome, more commonly known
as 3-Mile Strip. In the following %Vi months, the squadron proved itself
an outstanding combat unit. The P-38 was superior in most aspects to
the Japanese Zero fighter aircraft we were facing. By the middle of
December, we had contributed a total of 136 confirmed kills to the war
effort. All but 7 of these had fallen to P-38 guns.
I had joined the Headhunters at Milne Bay in late November 1942.
A year later, I was credited with 5 aerial victories, all in the P-38. Morale
of both pilots and ground-crew personnel was at an all-time high. We
welcomed the increasing opportunities to bring the war to the enemy
with our long-legged fighter.
On December 12, 1943, the 80th Fighter Squadron completed a
permanent move from Kila to the multibase airdrome complex recently
constructed at Dobodura, on the east coast of New Guinea. During
October and November 1943, our air strikes against forward Japanese
air and sea strongpoints on New Britain and along the more northern
shore of eastern New Guinea had critically interfered with the enemy’s
ability to pose a major threat to our air installations. We had seized
control of the New Britain and southern New Guinea airspace and
shipping lanes necessary for our logistical support. General Mac Arthur’s