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xxvi among the national leaders. This chapter deals with the magnificent victory of the All- India Muslim League in the elections of 1946. It also reveals how the British and Unionists utilized government machinery and funds for the Akali and Unionist candidates which eventually dragged the Punjab to a political split. The fourth chapter deals with as to how the democratic ethics were violated when with only a few seats, a Unionist leader became Premier of the Punjab. This chapter also projects that the refusal of the Sikh and Hindu Punjabis to side with the League in the Assembly paved the way for the Governor’s Rule and then the territorial split. It also undertakes the study of the partitioning experience. The fifth chapter is the conclusion which presents a gist of the important events and direction or line taken in the study in the perspective of the primary sources. It also reveals that the Punjabi leadership remained under the central commands therefore they were unable to cope with the situation. It also has revisited the years of 1940 to 1947 and dilated upon the hectic politics of both the communities. The Punjab remained victim of barbarity not only during the migration but also after the Partition of 1947. The Punjabi families unlike other provinces were not allowed to meet their relatives across the borders. The study concludes that it happened due to the Muslim-Sikh conflict. Although the League leadership could not make place in the Akali circles as the Congress did, however it exposes the Sikh leadership crisis which could not bargain properly with the political stakeholders. Their violence-ridden strategy to counter the Pakistan scheme, sub-national status, erratic attitude, endeavour to capture the Punjab by force, disunity and allegiance to the Congress created hurdles in reaching a better option. The best option would have been accession to Pakistan or a separate Sikh state, with the consent of the League and
xxvii Congress, which could award them concessions to continue their business oriented activities in any part of Pakistan and India and free movement to their religious places. The UN could be the guaranteeing authority along with the Britishers and the agreement concluded by the stakeholders. Loss of all such religious, political, agricultural, financial and social benefits proved an unbearable blow to the Sikhs who turned more violent and avenged it by killing the innocent Muslims during the migrations.
Page 5 and 6: To Abdullah Sandhu, My Sweet Son v
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT In the Name of Alla
Page 9 and 10: I cannot forget the help accorded t
Page 11 and 12: PREFACE The Muslims entered the Sub
Page 13 and 14: were made by the League leadership
Page 15 and 16: established themselves in the rural
Page 17 and 18: movement, a researcher has to deal
Page 19 and 20: titled Pakistan Resolution Revisite
Page 21 and 22: through the streets of the Punjabi
Page 23 and 24: xxiii and secondary documents in th
Page 25: of the Subcontinent. The major poli
Page 29 and 30: INTRODUCTION MUSLIM-SIKH RELATIONS
Page 31 and 32: interest in the Islamic heritage mo
Page 33 and 34: upon their own kinspersons. Chandu
Page 35 and 36: Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618-1707) decid
Page 37 and 38: period was hard for Sikhs. Mir Mann
Page 39 and 40: intolerance and repression; the Sik
Page 41 and 42: soon succeeded in winning over the
Page 43 and 44: However, the British adopted secula
Page 45 and 46: constitutional packages. The method
Page 47 and 48: gave nothing to them. They had alre
Page 49 and 50: movement made them over-confident a
Page 51 and 52: government and was scared of the pa
Page 53 and 54: worked to occupy the Punjab by forc
Page 55 and 56: 24 Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of Wo
Page 57 and 58: 77 Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi
Page 59 and 60: After the advent of the Shiromani A
Page 61 and 62: of life. The government analysed th
Page 63 and 64: Sikh army were now jobless and the
Page 65 and 66: the society under the British gover
Page 67 and 68: divide and rule 39 rather their sys
Page 69 and 70: against this adjustment till last m
Page 71 and 72: injustice to the Muslim community i
Page 73 and 74: improving day by day but Gandhi wit
Page 75 and 76: According to M. J. Akbar, the Mahan
Page 77 and 78:
Babbar Akalis in November 1922, Ins
Page 79 and 80:
interests would not be damaged and
Page 81 and 82:
government’s support made the lif
Page 83 and 84:
the Hindus could kill him so he mus
Page 85 and 86:
Sardar Buta Singh, the Deputy Presi
Page 87 and 88:
admitted his communal role when he
Page 89 and 90:
Indian independence although this w
Page 91 and 92:
itterness pervasive throughout the
Page 93 and 94:
Fazl-i-Husain with an invitation to
Page 95 and 96:
them in making an assertive place i
Page 97 and 98:
to Sikandar’s war efforts which s
Page 99 and 100:
Decaying Unionist Party The Muslims
Page 101 and 102:
Punjab as a solution to the on-goin
Page 103 and 104:
confidence by standing with them in
Page 105 and 106:
During the British period, the Sikh
Page 107 and 108:
in the central Assembly, Jinnah and
Page 109 and 110:
manual class or kami who worked as
Page 111 and 112:
ceremonies, and other social activi
Page 113 and 114:
were not with the Civil Disobedienc
Page 115 and 116:
Committee consisted of the district
Page 117 and 118:
Communitarian Dominance The communi
Page 119 and 120:
and the Governor-General in April 1
Page 121 and 122:
Muslims agreed to the Sikhs opening
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and ‘Hindu water’ and ‘Hindu
Page 125 and 126:
Muslims. In case of refusal they pl
Page 127 and 128:
Chapter One Notes 1 The Gurdwara Mo
Page 129 and 130:
54 Khushwant Singh, A History of th
Page 131 and 132:
110 Fazl-i-Husain seems very carefu
Page 133 and 134:
173 Mushirul Hasan, ed., India’s
Page 135 and 136:
and Debt, 2 nd ed. London: Oxford U
Page 137 and 138:
CHAPTER TWO THE LAHORE RESOLUTION--
Page 139 and 140:
defence unit.” 4 The Sikhs and Ma
Page 141 and 142:
Hindu support. If the Congress was
Page 143 and 144:
against the Muslims. 19 Sikhs were
Page 145 and 146:
look into the sharply changing situ
Page 147 and 148:
clear that the Congress wished no u
Page 149 and 150:
the British in the war could result
Page 151 and 152:
Gujarwal (district Ludhiana) on 15
Page 153 and 154:
Narang, Raja Narendra Nath and Bhai
Page 155 and 156:
Sikh inclusion in the expanded Vice
Page 157 and 158:
Sikhs. 97 They shouted against the
Page 159 and 160:
masses. The Akali Dal was a well en
Page 161 and 162:
with yellow coloured uniform, calle
Page 163 and 164:
against all promises. They kept on
Page 165 and 166:
Muslim Preparations 137 The word
Page 167 and 168:
when a rumour pervaded that the Mus
Page 169 and 170:
serious state of the “rearmament.
Page 171 and 172:
in the province therefore the Sikh
Page 173 and 174:
Demand for Sikh State 145 The senti
Page 175 and 176:
Working Committee meeting of the Ce
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149 On the other hand, the Sikhs co
Page 179 and 180:
his anti-Pakistan statements were n
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scheme as and how they could afford
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Rajagopalachari on 23 August 1940.
Page 185 and 186:
anti-Muslim activities. In 1941, Sa
Page 187 and 188:
had admitted that within two years,
Page 189 and 190:
transfer of power in general and de
Page 191 and 192:
They contended that the Sikh popula
Page 193 and 194:
provision that provinces could opt
Page 195 and 196:
criticized the pro-Pakistani Madras
Page 197 and 198:
possibilities. He further observed
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position in an uncertain future.”
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173 Nevertheless, Baldev Singh thou
Page 203 and 204:
Jinnah. Master Tara Singh explained
Page 205 and 206:
ealities had left the only option f
Page 207 and 208:
had been assured in the Lahore Reso
Page 209 and 210:
Chand Narang rejected it. Master Ta
Page 211 and 212:
in India. Being scattered “they h
Page 213 and 214:
therefore they retaliated with ange
Page 215 and 216:
Chapter Two 187 1 Khushwant Singh,
Page 217 and 218:
66 CMG, 18 April 1940. 67 S. Qalb-i
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191 161 Anup Chand Kapur, The Punja
Page 221 and 222:
193 237 Letter from Secretary of St
Page 223 and 224:
CHAPTER THREE PUNJAB: TOWARDS POLIT
Page 225 and 226:
197 The latter seemed unable to tac
Page 227 and 228:
199 Nasar Ullah Khan of Jahanian, Z
Page 229 and 230:
201 communities to an agreed agenda
Page 231 and 232:
203 backed by any major party or gr
Page 233 and 234:
205 addressing the Anti-Pakistan Co
Page 235 and 236:
207 Gandhi showed his willingness t
Page 237 and 238:
209 economically and politically fo
Page 239 and 240:
211 their nationalistic character.
Page 241 and 242:
213 League paper, The Eastern Times
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Singh consented to resist any possi
Page 245 and 246:
217 unpopular ‘Azad Punjab scheme
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219 People who were following a pol
Page 249 and 250:
221 Ishar Singh Majhail said that A
Page 251 and 252:
223 The Sikhs should have understoo
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225 India with their rights and pri
Page 255 and 256:
227 Punjab League had been arrangin
Page 257 and 258:
229 proposal while the Premier was
Page 259 and 260:
231 favour of his standpoint agains
Page 261 and 262:
233 Jinnah’s insistence on the no
Page 263 and 264:
235 entertained. 149 The League rep
Page 265 and 266:
237 The economic depression increas
Page 267 and 268:
239 the point that the Sikhs were e
Page 269 and 270:
Why should the Sikhs send their pet
Page 271 and 272:
243 writes that the League had conf
Page 273 and 274:
245 related to the anti-Pakistan an
Page 275 and 276:
247 The meeting between Jinnah and
Page 277 and 278:
249 particularly the Sikhs adopted
Page 279 and 280:
251 of the Punjab by force. Master
Page 281 and 282:
253 This political strategy reflect
Page 283 and 284:
255 Eastern Times pointed out that
Page 285 and 286:
257 widespread bloodshed, because,
Page 287 and 288:
259 that all this was possible only
Page 289 and 290:
261 that he already had expressed t
Page 291 and 292:
263 methods were being used against
Page 293 and 294:
265 platforms to convey that the su
Page 295 and 296:
267 Congress tickets but with the c
Page 297 and 298:
269 Khan issued a statement that th
Page 299 and 300:
271 and Amritsar who furthered the
Page 301 and 302:
273 representative of the Indian Mu
Page 303 and 304:
275 formula was an acceptance of th
Page 305 and 306:
277 course of the politics became t
Page 307 and 308:
36 Mitra, The Indian Annual Registe
Page 309 and 310:
281 125 FR, March 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
Page 311 and 312:
211 FR, January1944, L/PJ/5/247. 21
Page 313 and 314:
285 305 Nazar Tiwana, Interview wit
Page 315 and 316:
287 developments and the reactions
Page 317 and 318:
289 to look for the Congress suppor
Page 319 and 320:
291 step for the Akalis because thi
Page 321 and 322:
It was a trump card in propaganda f
Page 323 and 324:
295 inclusion of their representati
Page 325 and 326:
297 delegation was provided every t
Page 327 and 328:
help her to attain that freedom as
Page 329 and 330:
301 acceptable because the Muslims
Page 331 and 332:
303 which relieved them from the Mu
Page 333 and 334:
305 recommendations. He questioned
Page 335 and 336:
307 empowered to launch protests in
Page 337 and 338:
309 misinterpreting by the Sikhs co
Page 339 and 340:
311 Conference and was still persis
Page 341 and 342:
Leadership Crisis 313 The Sikh lead
Page 343 and 344:
315 Mission Proposals keeping the I
Page 345 and 346:
317 two vetoes certainly would neve
Page 347 and 348:
defending the weak. He appealed to
Page 349 and 350:
Makhi Dhand land to the Sindhi and
Page 351 and 352:
323 In December 1946, Hazara distri
Page 353 and 354:
325 On 6 October 1946, the League j
Page 355 and 356:
327 topple the coalition government
Page 357 and 358:
329 provincial ministry. The resolu
Page 359 and 360:
331 authority in the province. Anot
Page 361 and 362:
333 clearly said, if majority of th
Page 363 and 364:
335 which they suggested to divide
Page 365 and 366:
337 did not desire to experience an
Page 367 and 368:
339 Hall continued igniting the Sik
Page 369 and 370:
341 drive to bring the minorities t
Page 371 and 372:
343 Interestingly, none of these pr
Page 373 and 374:
345 fight the Muslims. The Akal Sai
Page 375 and 376:
347 The Sikhs pinned many hopes upo
Page 377 and 378:
349 Tiwana analysed that Sikh migra
Page 379 and 380:
351 strategy and said that they wou
Page 381 and 382:
353 danger until a final solution s
Page 383 and 384:
355 new legislature and separate el
Page 385 and 386:
357 as a political tactic. This was
Page 387 and 388:
359 India therefore he stressed tha
Page 389 and 390:
361 offered him a Sikh state and a
Page 391 and 392:
363 The British officials wanted to
Page 393 and 394:
365 but the Sikhs had their sacred
Page 395 and 396:
367 wrote that the dividing line of
Page 397 and 398:
369 Singh that the two Assemblies w
Page 399 and 400:
371 Radcliffe mainly depended on th
Page 401 and 402:
373 boundaries against Pakistan. 34
Page 403 and 404:
375 accepted by the two major parti
Page 405 and 406:
377 after the partition. If the Sik
Page 407 and 408:
379 Finally the bare violation of t
Page 409 and 410:
Chapter Four Notes 1 Letter from Kh
Page 411 and 412:
76 Note by Major Short on 5 June 19
Page 413 and 414:
152 FR, January, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
Page 415 and 416:
236 Khushwant Singh, A History of t
Page 417 and 418:
311 Viceroy’s reply to Nehru in M
Page 419 and 420:
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION The Muslim-
Page 421 and 422:
393 tries to divide the strength of
Page 423 and 424:
395 effective role in the provincia
Page 425 and 426:
397 Therefore, considering it their
Page 427 and 428:
399 society. Nevertheless, their le
Page 429 and 430:
401 principles, a political party s
Page 431 and 432:
403 behind the other classes but al
Page 433 and 434:
Punjab under Central Command 405 Th
Page 435 and 436:
407 leaders even in the Governor’
Page 437 and 438:
409 role in the progress of the Sik
Page 439 and 440:
411 succeed in its tricky politics
Page 441 and 442:
Sikhs and Jinnah 413 The Sikhs main
Page 443 and 444:
415 On 11 August 1947, Jinnah annou
Page 445 and 446:
417 The Sikh massacre took place in
Page 447 and 448:
419 government and its representati
Page 449 and 450:
421 erasing the bitterness inflicte
Page 451 and 452:
423 No decision could serve the Sik
Page 453 and 454:
425 Guards but at the same time the
Page 455 and 456:
427 According to Professor Khizar V
Page 457 and 458:
Chapter Five Notes 429 1 Despite a
Page 459 and 460:
431 57 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Sin
Page 461 and 462:
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURC
Page 463 and 464:
Private Office Papers L/PO/6/106B(i
Page 465 and 466:
Mitra, H. N., ed. The Indian Annual
Page 467 and 468:
Covey, Stephen R. Principle-Centere
Page 469 and 470:
Kapur, Anup Chand. The Punjab Crisi
Page 471 and 472:
Narang, Sir Gokul Chand. Transforma
Page 473 and 474:
Singh, Gurmit. Failures of Akali Le
Page 475 and 476:
Zaman, Prof. Waheed-uz-. Quaid-i-Az
Page 477 and 478:
Ahmad, Waheed. “Source Material f
Page 479 and 480:
“Speech by Sirdar Kapur Singh in
Page 481 and 482:
Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. “Muslim-S
Page 483 and 484:
434 that government was so constitu
Page 485 and 486:
APPENDIX-2 436 Letter of the Muslim
Page 487 and 488:
1. Prime Minister to Government Pun
Page 489 and 490:
APPENDIX-4 Extracts 440 Harbans Sin
Page 491 and 492:
442 about our duty in the critical
Page 493 and 494:
444 etc. etc. Again Sir Chhotu tele
Page 495 and 496:
446 the people to vote for the Unio
Page 497 and 498:
448 against him as far as Ludhiana
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450 would be branded as the enemy o
Page 501 and 502:
452 Chandra said that this sort of
Page 503 and 504:
APPENDIX-7 Letter from Pethick Lawr
Page 505 and 506:
456 sides would be anxious to get t
Page 507 and 508:
Top Secret C.D.I. (1) APPENDIX-9 45
Page 509 and 510:
460 Moslems, though not taking up a
Page 511 and 512:
462 (ii) Has no ports of importance
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464 (c) Tribal control Five battali
Page 515 and 516:
466 (c) There is sufficient suitabl
Page 517 and 518:
APPENDIX-10 468 Master Tara Singh
Page 519 and 520:
470 years that they intended to pro
Page 521 and 522:
APPENDIX-12 [Pamphlet Publicised by
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