1293S

To
Abdullah Sandhu,
My Sweet Son
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ------------------------------------vii
ABREVIATIONS ----------------------------------------------x
PREFACE ------------------------------------------------------xi
INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------------1
CHAPTER ONE ----------------------------------------30
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL PUNJAB
CHAPTER TWO ----------------------------------------109
THE LAHORE RESOLUTION--A PERMANENT CLEAVAGE
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SIKHS
CHAPTER THREE -----------------------------------------195
PUNJAB: TOWARDS POLITICAL SPLIT
CHAPTER FOUR -----------------------------------------286
PUNJAB: TOWARDS GEOGRAPHICAL SPLIT
CHAPTER FIVE -----------------------------------------391
CONCLUSION
APPENDICES -----------------------------------------433
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----------------------------------------474
vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Dr. Sikandar Hayat once advised me that ‘finished thesis is the best thesis,’
despite this very apt advice it took a long time to bring the thesis at this stage. I thank
him for his guidance and cooperation. I am indebted to thank Dr. Wiqar Ali Shah and
Dr. Razia Sultana who always remained helpful during the period of my research.
Heartiest gratitude is reserved for Dr. Javed Haider Syed, my supervisor, who proved
a source of inspiration during this tough period and continued enlightening me about
the subject. His in-depth analysis and input on the historical events pertaining to the
Punjab steered me to the right direction.
I discovered new avenues of knowledge regarding research and the colonial
Punjab under the supervision of Ian Talbot, an authority on the Colonial Punjab. The
stay at the University of Southampton broadened my horizon about the colonial
history. The Pakistani scholars who have visited the University of Southampton still
talk of the generosity, competence and kindheartedness of Professor Ian Talbot. I will
always cherish my association with Ian Talbot. I feel at a loss for words to thank him.
He infused a new spirit into my work by reviewing my thesis.
During the SAARC Writers’ Conference held at Delhi in 2004, I met the Sikh
scholars and listened to their views on the subject. I pay special gratitude to Ajeet
Cour, Dr. Amrik Singh, Dr. Prithipal Singh Kapur, Balbir Madhopuri, Roop Singh,
Dr. Harminder Singh, Parmajit Singh Sarna (Delhi), Daljit Singh Bagga (Jallandhar)
and others for their love and kindness.
vii

Special thanks are due to the Higher Education Commission which provided
me an opportunity to benefit from the UK-based scholars and primary sources. I thank
Jahanzeb Khan, Hasan Raza, Sajid and Behram Khan who always entertained me
whenever I approached them.
I am thankful to Francis Robinson who shared some important issues relating
to Ranjit Singh and the Pakistani politics. Special thanks are due to Dr. Pippa Virdee
and Ilyas Chatha whose company proved a source of encouragement for me. They
always consoled me whenever I felt homesickness during my stay at UK.
I thank Amarjit Singh Chandan, Dr. Pritam Singh, Dr. Virinder Singh Kalra,
Dr. Meena Dhanda, Dr. Shindar Thandi, Dr. Pradeep Rai, Dr. Jasdev Rai, Parminder
Chadha, Gurharpal Singh, Mushtaq Singh Mushtaq, Dr. Khizer Humyun Ansari, Dr.
Jane, Dr. Dane and Anne, Chaudhri Amjad (basically from Bhimbar), Shoaib Khan,
Mir Iftekhar and his family, Shaista, Qaim Husain Jafri, Herta Grazne and Zulekha
who helped me a lot during this period.
I am indebted to Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Dr. Massarrat Abid, Dr. M. Iqbal
Chawala, Shahid Rashid, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, Ahmad Saeed (Lahore), Prof.
Masood Akhtar Zahid (NIPS) and Dr. Tahir Kamran who were always available to me
whenever I asked for their help. I pay special gratitude to my teachers particularly to
Prof. Syed Muhammad Mushabbar, Syed Azhar Ali Kazmi and Dr. Rasul Bakhsh
Rais who have always been a source of inspiration for me.
Robin Jaffrey presented to me his published work on the Punjab Boundary
Force and encouraged me to write on the Punjab. Hew McLeod, an expert on
Sikhism, shared his precious opinion through e-mails. He has left us for his eternal
abode (May his soul rest in peace).
viii

I cannot forget the help accorded to me by Muhammad Maqsood Ahmad,
Deputy Secretary, Abdul Razzaq, Section Officer and Naveed Allauddin, Additional
Secretary, Finance, Punjab Government, for crossing the Secretariat hurdles. I am also
grateful to Lt. General Mohsin Kamal, Military Secretary, GHQ who always
encouraged me to work hard.
I thank Salimullah Khan, NDC, Muhammad Ramzan, NAP, Ch. Hanif, Chief
Librarian, the Punjab University Library, Ch. Ghulam Muhammad, Punjab Public
Library, Abbas Chughtai and M. Arfeen of the Punjab Archives, Muhammad Naeem,
GC University Library and Ch. Idrees Mann of Govt. College Sheikhupura Library
who provided every possible help during the research. I am also thankful to Dr. Chris
Woolgar and Ms. Sarah of the Hartley Archives, University of Southampton and
officials of the British Library, National Archives, London, History Seminar Library,
QAU, and NIHCR Library for their cooperation. My indebtedness is also due to
Rizwan Kokab (Punjab University), Abdul Qayoom, NIP, Altaf Bajwa, Ch. Zahid and
Qaim Shah, Department of History, QAU. I am thankful to Col (R) M. Javed Iqbal for
reviewing the draft of my thesis and sharing valuable feedback. His association has
always inspired me in positive directions of life. His friendship is more precious than
blood relations.
Lastly, I thank my wife Amna Mahmood who had to bear with me during the
tedious period of my research and single handedly looked after the children during my
stay at UK. I am also thankful to my children, Abdullah Sandhu, Aalijah Husain
Sandhu, Hijab-i-Zahra Sandhu and Ali Changezi Sandhu who were patient and were
loving despite my commitment to work.
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu
ix

AIML All-India Muslim League
ABBREVIATIONS
AFM Archives of Freedom Movement
API Allied Press of India
ASI Assistant Sub-Inspector
CAD Central Akali Dal
CMG The Civil and Military Gazette
CVS Chief of the Viceroy of India’s Staff
DC Deputy Commissioner
DSP Deputy Superintendent of Police
FR Governor’s Fortnightly Reports
INA Indian National Army
JPSV Joint Private Secretary to Viceroy of India
KB Khan Bahadur
MSF Muslim Students’ Federation
NAP National Archives of Pakistan
NDC National Documentation Centre
NWFP North-West Frontier Province
PML Punjab Muslim League
PSV Personal Secretary to the Viceroy of India
PSV Principal Secretary to the Viceroy of India
PSV Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India
PUP Punjab Unionist Party
QAP Quaid-i-Azam Papers
QAU Quaid-i-Azam University
RTC Round Table Conference
SAD Shiromani Akali Dal
SDO Sub-Divisional Officer
SDPO Sub-Divisional Police Officer
SGPC Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee
SHO Station House Officer
SP Superintendent of Police
X

PREFACE
The Muslims entered the Subcontinent as conquerors and soon with the
teachings of egalitarianism, justice and love secured huge conversions from the local
communities. After gaining imperial foothold, the Muslim rulers and their co-
religionists could not demonstrate the pure Islamic character which created a vacuum
for new religious cults. Jagjit Singh writes, “A great conscious and sustained effort
was needed to go against and overcome the hardened traditional trends and rigidity.” 1
Dissatisfied with the extremist religious trends, the newly emerged religious tradition,
Nanakism, secured profound strength in the 16 th century. The Muslims and Sikhs had
been enjoying a mutual understanding and the mechanism adopted by them was the
principle of ‘live and let live’ or social inter-dependence at the bottom level. They had
been together in the annual fairs, fields, streets, playgrounds, institutions, and public
places but despite this social interaction, both of them retained distinctive line
between them on the basis of religion. The political polarization was mainly because
of the growing political awareness and politicising the institutions in the country.
They had always been conscious of their political rights and it was mainly
concentrated in the urban areas. The strained Muslim-Sikh relations because of the
religious enmity were further damaged by the Muslim League’s portioning scheme in
March 1940 which ultimately reached the point of geographical vivisection of the
region.
Various dimensions in the form of queries during the research have been taken
up including, what was the nature of the Muslim-Sikh relations particularly under the
British raj? What were the roots of the Muslim-Sikh animosity? Did this animosity

disturb the Muslims and Sikhs in the rural Punjab which is said to have been a
peaceful place throughout the history? What were the factors which helped the Sikh,
Muslim and Hindu landlords to join hands and make coalition government in the
British Punjab? Was there entire communal harmony on all the religious and political
issues during the Unionist era? What were the Sikh grievances and how they were
being perceived and treated by the government and other political actors? What was
the real situation regarding the Unionists being perceived as cross-communal leaders?
They had the decision-making power and could play a decisive role in eliminating the
communal tension which was also their claim and responsibility. Therefore, the nature
of working relationship of the Sikh, Hindu and Muslim members within the
government is worth probing in. The Sikhs were always opposed to the All-India
Muslim League without any bitter experience from it. The League leadership had
never been unsympathetic to the Sikh interests even then the Sikhs perceived M. A.
Jinnah as an anti-Sikh leader. Therefore, the role of Jinnah regarding the Sikh
question requires clarification. The study focuses on the point that the Pakistan
scheme of the League worsened the Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab
therefore an endeavour has been made to take all the facets into account which might
have influenced the state of the Muslim-Sikh relationship in the British Punjab.
The Punjab politics of 1940s was stormy and demanding which required
mature and sagacious leadership. The question arises as to what options the Akali
leaders chalked out as political alternatives for their community. The Sikh tilt towards
the Indian National Congress and hatred towards the League is also an important
aspect of the study. Why did the Sikhs remain with the Congress and other Hindu
parties despite numerous complaints against them and the insulting attitude of the
Hindus towards the Sikhs and their Gurus? This also ramified such as to what efforts
xii

were made by the League leadership to win over the Sikhs. Could the partition of the
Punjab be averted if the Sikhs had joined hands with the League despite the Hindus
being in majority in the eastern districts of the Punjab? A significant aspect of the
study was the role of the British administration in the tussle between the League and
the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Sikh representative party. The British effort to bring the
stakeholders to venues such as Round Table Conference, Cripps Mission, Cabinet
Mission, etc. was appreciable but the Indian political parties could not benefit from
such opportunities.
The role of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Lord Mountbatten and Sir
Cyril Radcliffe needed a special consideration in deciding the destiny of the Punjab
boundaries. The partition, migration and killing of late 1940s had far reaching effects.
On the other hand, the communal understanding in the rural areas was based on the
cultural bindings and economic interdependence. These two communities had
harmony as well as diversity in their relationship which made the study interesting.
The Muslim-Sikh relations is a vast subject to study as it addresses the
sociological, religious, political, cultural, historical, agricultural, economic and so
many other aspects and every aspect needs a comprehensive study. Besides, three
major communities namely Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, were living in the Punjab and
numerous dissident groups existed within these communities. The spirit of the
research was confined to the Akali and League politics which remained the main
political protagonists in the Punjab. The Unionists remained a major focus due to their
ruling status and interaction with all the stakeholders. Therefore, the area of research
demanded me to tackle the hypothesis confining the research to the limited political
domain and character. Nevertheless, all other Muslim groups have been discussed
according to their relevance to the area of research. ‘The Lahore Resolution’
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presented by the League and the reaction from the Sikhs generated a debate mainly on
the nature of the ‘political relationship’ between the two communities in the British
Punjab. This study took up as how the politics of the League and the Akali Dal
influenced the conventional political trends of the Punjab.
‘Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab’ proved a neglected subject in the
domain of academic research. The Sikhs and Muslims had been vying for mastery
over the Punjab. The Muslims being an outright majority claimed to regain this region
on the basis of the democratic principles while the Sikhs having negligible numerical
strength continued their struggle to recapture the Punjab on the basis of their historical
claim and violence as their strategy. Therefore, the political, cultural, religious and all
other questions seem overwhelmingly relevant. This was the time when all the non-
League actors including the British were declaring the Pakistan scheme as absurd and
non-viable. The Punjab was a major deciding factor in the Muslim struggle for
Pakistan. The members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly particularly after 3 rd June
Plan stamped on the validity of Pakistan.
The Punjab had been divided into rural and urban areas but the historians
treated the urban Punjab as the real Punjab although a tremendous majority of the
people was residing in the villages. Some important material such as Wisdom and
Waste in the Punjab Village (1934) and The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt
(1928) by Malcolm Lyall Darling, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan (1959) by Zekiye
Egler and Across India (1895) by Oliver Optic, presented a divergent picture of the
urban Punjab to the rural areas. Such valuable works were available and distinguished
true village life from the urban setup. Although the rural Punjab constituted more than
90 per cent of the population but it had no leadership to represent it. Therefore, the
rural people were overwhelmed by the educated, rich and political tycoons who had
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established themselves in the rural and urban areas simultaneously. The rural Punjab
being the feeding-base remained confined to the daily pursuits. Bread, cloth and
shelter (Roti, Kapra aur Makan) had never been a problem for the Punjabis. They did
not require involving in the immoral or illegal activities like weapon-production,
smuggling and political intrigues for their livelihood. In the past, the urban politicians
had never approached the villagers to educate them about the politics. Being
uneducated, they remained unaware of the published and communication sources
which kept them immune to communalism, a dominant feature in the cities. An
outstanding mark of the rural Punjab was a peaceful atmosphere in which all the
religious communities could survive on the principle of interdependence and
respecting ‘otherness of the others’ which was taught mainly by the culture, the holy
saints and the economic pursuits. The rural Punjab has retained this tradition even
now and during this worst period of terrorism, majority of the rural areas are living a
peaceful life.
The urban society of the Punjab was polluted with communalism. The
communities were competing to secure more and more political, economic and
official concessions. Being well-informed about the rural and urban norms, the
landlords or feudality possessed and demonstrated both approaches towards the
political developments in the province. Therefore, history of the British Punjab was a
panorama of the Muslim-Sikh politics, sometimes Unionists versus Akalis and then
Sikhs versus Muslim League. The notable point is that every sphere of the Muslim-
Sikh question was treated as conflicting and contradictory despite the British desire to
keep the political atmosphere of the Punjab peaceful.
Abundant work was produced on the Punjab but the subject ‘Muslim-Sikh
relationship’ during the British period particularly from 1940 to 1947 remained
xv

unaddressed. The East Punjab is said to have worked a lot on the Punjab and Sikhs
but these scholars remained confined to the period from 1849 to 1939. The period
from passing of the Lahore Resolution of 1940 to 1947 has remained absolutely
ignored. The Indian and other foreign researchers jumped from the 1930s to the last
phase of the British rule and preferred to work on the migrations and killing of 1947.
The Sikh apathy on the study of the Sikh-Muslim relationship can be traced to some
very important and holy places of the Sikhs such as Nankana Sahib, Punja Sahib,
Sacha Saoda, Smadh of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and remains of Guru Arjun Dev being
in Pakistan. Due to this fact, they avoid projecting the subject of Muslim-Sikh
relations because both the religious communities have bitter past and it can drag them
to an ill-will for each other. For this reason, Sikhs did not write freely on this topic.
Many Sikh writers have used ‘Mughal’ atrocities rather than ‘Muslim’ carnage in
their writings.
Review of the Literature
Mahabharta and other Hindi literature preserved the history of this region as
the land of five rivers. It was during the reign of Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar
when, for the first time, this chunk of land with its larger size was called ‘Punjab.’
Therefore, ancient history of the Punjab has been an interesting area of study on
which many eminent historians have produced very useful work like Joseph Davey
Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (1849), W. H. McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh
Community (1976), and Fauja Singh, The History of the Punjab (1972). All the writers
throw light on the Punjab of the ancient and pre-British times. Bakhshish Singh
Nijjar’s three volumes, Punjab under Sultanates, Punjab under Mughals and Punjab
under the British are also a valuable work. During the research on the freedom
xvi

movement, a researcher has to deal with the Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and British point of
view therefore study of all these communities is related to the Punjab history.
xvii
Explaining the details of the Sikh religion and establishing its diversity,
Baldev Raj Nayar distorted Islam. He asserted that according to the beliefs of other
religions, a religion is a relationship between a person and God whereas Sikhism deals
with entire human life. 2 It must be clarified here that Islam is a religion which deals
with the personal, local, national and international aspects of human life.
Apparently, non-Muslim and nationalist Muslim writers have been severely
prejudiced towards the demand and struggle for Pakistan therefore they did not take
enthusiastically the domain of the ‘Muslim-Sikh relations’ for research. Khushwant
Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Sir Gokul Chand Narang, Transformation of Sikhism,
A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom and other works of the nationalist Indian writers can
be quoted as example whose main target is the Muslim League and Pakistan scheme.
Despite this anti-Muslim League attitude, none has produced a special work on the
Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab. Ram Gopal has asserted that his book
titled Indian Muslims: A Political History 1858-1947 is “the first complete account of
Muslim politics up to the Partition of India” whereas not even a page has been
assigned to the Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab. The work of Ram
Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle is a good presentation of the Sikh or Hindu point
of view which mainly focuses on the Sikh contribution to the history particularly the
struggle for independence but amazingly lacks any discussion on the Muslim-Sikh
interaction in the British Punjab. S. Gurbachan Singh Talib in his book, Muslim
League Attack on the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947 has presented the killing
of the Hindus and Sikhs with a biased approach on the communal clashes. However,
he did not give an account of the Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab. It

xviii
contains the stereotyped stories of misery during the partition phase with no evidence
to prove who the culprit was and how this situation emerged.
The sources lead us to the conclusion that the rhetoric and tirades of the Akali
leadership spread insecurity not only among the Sikhs but also the Muslims who
seemed worried about the protection of their families. The League leadership was
working in the constitutional ways while the Sikhs were proposing to resort to
violence and killing. As evidence, I quote Robin Jeffrey who exposes the assassins of
the Killing of 1947: “A minister of the Punjab government admitted in 1979 that he
killed a Muslim during the partition riots.” 3 Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis:
An Analytical Study gives an outlook of the Punjab politics of the 20 th century but
includes no study of the Muslim-Sikh relations. His work becomes ambiguous when
some portion of his work touches plagiarism. An indented quotation on page 37 is
different than what Khushwant Singh has quoted on page 221. 4 Some other
plagiarized lines can also be presented as evidence in this book. Particularly if a
reader reviews pages 35-37 of Anup Chand Kapur’s book and compares them with
the pages 220-222 of Khushwant’s book, the reality will surface out clearly.
In Pakistan, S. M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan,
comprehensively discusses the Muslim majority in each province, even then the
writer concentrates on the Muslim organizations rather than the organizations of all
the communities living in the Punjab and their implications on the Muslim-Sikh
relations. Dr. Sarfraz Khawaja, Sikhs of the Punjab, briefly covers the period 1900 to
1925 but gives sketchy picture of the Muslim-Sikh relations while Sarfraz Hussain
Mirza’s The Sikh Question surveys the Sikh history and focuses on the post-partition
developments in the Sikh struggle. Most of the historians have hardly touched the
Muslim-Sikh relations as a separate unit or chapter in their books. Even the book

titled Pakistan Resolution Revisited (published in 1990) on the occasion of the
Golden Jubilee of the Pakistan Resolution, in which the eminent scholars of Pakistan
contributed, contained no article on the Muslim-Sikh relations. Hasan Masud and
Farooq Ahmad Dar’s M.Phil. theses (Department of History, QAU, Islamabad) are a
useful addition to the material on the Punjab because they have depicted the
communal trends and the political conditions of the Punjab but once again the work
addresses the Hindu-Muslim tussle rather than the Muslim-Sikh relations. Many
authors have compiled correspondence relating to the Sikh question as Latif Ahmad
Sherwani included eight letters in his book, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940-
1947. Imran Ali, Punjab Politics in the Decade before Partition gave no importance
to the subject of the Muslim-Sikh relationship. Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in
the Punjab, 1921-1947, presents a well-worked and comprehensive study on the
Punjab politics. The author has supported the historical events and directions with
authentic sources particularly the India Office Record. Although it undertakes the
study of the Sikh politics as well but does not deal with the Muslim-Sikh relations as
a separate chapter in the book. Dr. Mohammad Jahangir Tamimi has produced two
books, Bharat Mein Sikh Qaumi Tehreek (1992) and Sikh-Muslim Ta’aloqat: Aik
Tehqiqi Jaiza (2007) in which he defends the Mughal emperors on the issue of the
Gurus’ murder. He undertakes the study of the Muslim-Sikh relations under the
British rule up to 1947. This book deals partly with the period from 1940 to 1947. His
study from 1940 to 1947 is not authentic because it carries wrong data. For example,
his assertion that the Indian National Congress forced the Sikhs to demand Azad
Punjab, Sikhistan or Khalistan 5 cannot be accepted as he has cited no evidence to
prove it. It also contradicts his stand on page 179 and his conclusion in his other book
that Khalsa Raj had become a religio-political tradition of the Sikhs. 6 In his book
xix

Sikh-Muslim Ta’aloqat (p. 176), he cites the year ‘1946’ as the year of the arrival of
the Cripps Mission and repeats the same mistake in the next pages. His claim on the
same page that Cripps had assured the Sikhs that the British were ready to award
them the area from Jamna to Chenab is not acceptable as no authentic source testifies
it. Other incorrect points are that Master Tara Singh was not a headmaster of
‘primary’ school (p. 178), 7 in 1945 Sir Sikandar Hayat was not the Punjab Premier (p.
184 and 254), Khizr Tiwana was in the office while Sir Sikandar passed away in
1942.
The Indian Punjab is said to have put in a lot of effort to produce research on
the Punjab and its inhabitants but Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab, J. S. Grewal,
The Sikhs of the Punjab, Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, Sangat Singh, The
Sikhs in History, Verinder Grover, The History of Punjab: Yesterday and Today, K.
C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of
Freedom Struggle in Punjab, Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith,
A. S. Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej: The Akali Politics, Nina Puri, Political Elite and
Society in the Punjab, Satya M. Rai, Punjab Heroic Tradition, 1900-1947, Darbara
Singh, The Punjab Tragedy, Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership and History
of Sikh Struggles (1946-1966), Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement and many
others discuss mostly the Sikh politics in the British Punjab and failures of the Akali
leadership without going into details of the League’s standpoint on different issues.
All such writings lack special focus on the Muslim-Sikh relations during the period
from 1940 to 1947.
Other than Indian scholars, the foreign authors contributed a lot to the material
on the Punjab history and politics under the British rule. Ian Talbot is an eminent
name among such writers. He not only utilized the primary sources but traveled
xx

through the streets of the Punjabi villages of the Indian Punjab and penned down the
delightful days of the combined society of the pre-partition Punjab and the painful
experiences of the migration of 1947. He interviewed many including Nazr Tiwana
son of Khizr Hayat Tiwana and Sardar Swaran Singh. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal
Singh, Region and Partition compiled articles of various scholars covering the
partition of the Punjab and Bengal and its impacts but offered no chapter on the
Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, Khizr
Tiwana, Divided Cities, Freedom’s Cry and other valuables work on the British
Punjab mainly deal with the British rule and response of the Punjab communities
along with its impact on the stakeholders. He also extensively utilized the cultural
aspect in his writings. He has deeply observed the society, culture, religion, economy,
social classification and politics of the British Punjab and explored every aspect and
ups and downs of the combined society. His focus on the crowd studies is a valuable
contribution to the existing literature on the Punjab. Andrew J. Major, Return to
Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the mid-Nineteenth Century and
Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century compiled
articles written by the eminent authors. Indu Banga took up the Sikh politics from
1940 to 1947 in an article (pp. 233-255). The editors of this book made a solid effort
in beautifying it with diverse subjects relating to the Punjab politics but produced
nothing noteworthy regarding the Muslim-Sikh relations. David Gilmartin, an
authority on the Punjab, mainly focuses in the book Empire and Islam, on the role of
the pirs, buried and alive in the crucial phase of the Punjab history. He tells as how
the message of Pakistan permeated the masses or other than the political elites of the
Punjab and how religion was used in the politics. Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh
Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia has a solid firm grip on the Punjab
xxi

politics. Tai Yong Tan addresses the Muslim-Sikh politics but not as a separate study.
Leonard Mosley gives only one page on this topic in his book, The Last Days of the
xxii
British Raj. David Page, Prelude to Partition, elaborates the political fragmentation in
the Subcontinent but has not taken up the issue of the Muslim-Sikh relations.
The historians preferred working on the Muslim-Hindu relations and ignored
the Muslim-Sikh relations. The British Punjab was a decisive factor in the Pakistan
movement and the partition of India therefore the study of its inhabitants was very
important but this domain has never been taken up by the researchers to explore.
ORGANISATION
Methodology and Sources
Partly descriptive and analytical approaches have been used in the research.
Nevertheless, it was tried to question or challenge the existing direction taken by the
writers and wherever the arguments and sources helped. On different occasions,
theories such as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s inter-dependence theory, 8
coalition government theory by Harold Laski and Maurice Duverger, 9 the Time-lag
theory discussed by Aparna Basu, 10 principle-centered leadership by Stephen R.
Covey, 11 hostage interpretation by Dr. Rasul Bukhsh Rais and others are applied
during the research. The study has rejected the concept of ‘Divide and Rule’ in the
case of the British Punjab with the argument that sane rulers wish peace in the under-
ruled society because the good situation of law and order can better serve the imperial
purposes while violence breeds more violence and brings disaster to all the
stakeholders.
Sources play a key role in research and defend a researcher. An attempt was
made to explore maximum sources available in Pakistan, India and the UK. Primary

xxiii
and secondary documents in the British Library and National Archives, London, and
Hartley Archives, University of Southampton, UK have extensively been consulted.
Mountbatten Papers and Papers of Col. Nawab Khizr Hayat Tiwana at the Hartley
Archives were of great importance. In Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Archives of
Freedom Movement, Shamsul Hasan Collection, Newspapers, Police Reports,
personal collections lying in the National Archives of Pakistan, National
Documentation Centre and other libraries proved a valuable and authentic source of
information.
It is woefully expressed that the writings on the Muslim-Sikh relations in India
mostly present the Sikh and Hindu point of view while in Pakistan this valuable
aspect of study has not been taken up by researchers. Subaltern study has become
popular in the history writing therefore during data collection, a special attention was
given to the oral history accounts. The interviews with the Sikhs and Muslims from a
common man to MLA, who had been a participant of the politics of the 1940s,
provided sufficient information relating to the (voiceless) people. Comrade Bishan
Singh, Sardar Ajmer Singh Kundal, Mushtaq Singh Mushtaq, Nervair Singh, Balwant
Kaur, Ch. Khadim Husain Chahal, Ch. Akbar Ali Chahal, Rehmat Bibi, Khurshid
Bibi, Ch. Ahmad Ali Bhullar and Baba Jeona provided very useful information.
The study is divided into five chapters along with an Introduction. The thesis
starts with ‘Introduction’ which usually unfolds the direction or framework covering
the main argument and outcome of the research but this part of study has been treated
differently. The Muslim-Sikh interaction goes back to the emergence of Sikhism in
the 15 th century and it seems relative to give an account of the early period of the
Muslim-Sikh relationship to understand the religions, culture and the fabrication of
the political histories of the Punjabi communities. The emergence of Sikhism and the

xxiv
Mughal response to it cannot be ignored because the early relations impacted the
political ties in the British Punjab. Therefore, it seems essential to understand the
roots of the Muslim-Sikh relationship, good or bad. During the Muslim rule in the
Subcontinent, the Muslim-Sikh relations passed through numerous ups and downs
that infused antagonistic sentiments into the Sikh minds and literature. Such a
religious heritage played an important role in the relationship between the two
communities. Therefore, considering it inevitable, the introduction narrates as to how
Sikhism emerged in the Punjab and what were the important events which proved
turning points in the Muslim-Sikh relations. The last part of the Introduction touches
divergent aspects of the Punjab society, culture and politics which might have
connection with the Punjab politics. Relativity in things convinced me to do so to
build my own understanding and take a separate direction or perspective of the
historical events.
The first chapter discusses different angles of the Unionist, Muslim League,
Congress, British and Sikh politics in the Punjab. The rural Punjab, blessed with the
saintly heritage of the Sufis and elements of the cultural binding has also been taken
into account. It presents a different shape of things vis-à-vis the political happenings
such as the constitutional reforms, Round Table Conference, Shahidganj Mosque
issue, elections and the results and Jinnah-Sikander Pact. It also expresses as to how
the elections of 1936-37 proved a good omen for the Muslim League leadership and
pernicious to the anti-League forces. The study derives the conclusion that the term
‘Divide and Rule’ was used as a fashion otherwise no such official British policy
existed in the Punjab. It was natural that the British occupation had to face two types
of reaction from the locals, unconstitutional or constitutional, to push the British out

of the Subcontinent. The major political parties adopted the last option which was to
accept the British writ in all the affairs.
xxv
Second chapter highlights the political environment which pushed the League
to pass the Lahore Resolution in 1940 and its effects relating particularly to the
Muslims and Sikhs. It also gives a picture of the Punjab where a big hue and cry was
raised against it and threats to resist the Pakistan scheme. The Sikhs also cried against
the Achari formula which displayed that the Congress leadership had planted a group
to induce the League to abandon their struggle for Pakistan till the departure of the
British from India. The Cripps Mission is of course of unique importance which
accelerated the pace of the Muslim and Sikh movements. The demand for Pakistan
and the Sikh state was about to be accepted officially but the Sikh leadership seemed
disunited on any common point. The Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact has been discussed
which highlights different turns in the Sikh politics.
Third chapter deals with the Muslim-Sikh politics from 1943 to the elections
of 1946. The popularity of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah forced the Congress
to come to terms with the League. The parleys on the Achari formula and Jinnah-
Gandhi Talks took place but all this increased apprehensions of the Sikhs. The Sikh
politics had been based on the traditional heritage with a weak consideration of
ground realities. The Sikhs merely focused on their military strength rather than
concluding negotiations with the stakeholders to reach some reasonable alternatives.
They demanded Azad Punjab or Khalistan but faced severe criticism by their own
community along with the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha. The British continually
provided several occasions to the local leaders to arrive at any agreed demand but
they could not show any harmony. The Simla Conference arranged by the Viceroy
Lord Wavell was very significant for the Sikhs because Master Tara Singh got a place

xxvi
among the national leaders. This chapter deals with the magnificent victory of the All-
India Muslim League in the elections of 1946. It also reveals how the British and
Unionists utilized government machinery and funds for the Akali and Unionist
candidates which eventually dragged the Punjab to a political split.
The fourth chapter deals with as to how the democratic ethics were violated
when with only a few seats, a Unionist leader became Premier of the Punjab. This
chapter also projects that the refusal of the Sikh and Hindu Punjabis to side with the
League in the Assembly paved the way for the Governor’s Rule and then the
territorial split. It also undertakes the study of the partitioning experience.
The fifth chapter is the conclusion which presents a gist of the important
events and direction or line taken in the study in the perspective of the primary
sources. It also reveals that the Punjabi leadership remained under the central
commands therefore they were unable to cope with the situation. It also has revisited
the years of 1940 to 1947 and dilated upon the hectic politics of both the
communities.
The Punjab remained victim of barbarity not only during the migration but
also after the Partition of 1947. The Punjabi families unlike other provinces were not
allowed to meet their relatives across the borders. The study concludes that it
happened due to the Muslim-Sikh conflict. Although the League leadership could not
make place in the Akali circles as the Congress did, however it exposes the Sikh
leadership crisis which could not bargain properly with the political stakeholders.
Their violence-ridden strategy to counter the Pakistan scheme, sub-national status,
erratic attitude, endeavour to capture the Punjab by force, disunity and allegiance to
the Congress created hurdles in reaching a better option. The best option would have
been accession to Pakistan or a separate Sikh state, with the consent of the League and

xxvii
Congress, which could award them concessions to continue their business oriented
activities in any part of Pakistan and India and free movement to their religious
places. The UN could be the guaranteeing authority along with the Britishers and the
agreement concluded by the stakeholders. Loss of all such religious, political,
agricultural, financial and social benefits proved an unbearable blow to the Sikhs who
turned more violent and avenged it by killing the innocent Muslims during the
migrations.

Notes
1 Jagjit Singh, The Sikh Revolution: A Perspective View (New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc.,
1982), 87.
2 Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), 68.
3 Robin Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India? 2 nd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
xxviii
1994), 25.
4 See Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II (Princeton: Oxford University Press,
1966), 221 and Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis: An Analytical Study (New Delhi: S. Chand &
Co., 1985), 37.
5 Dr. Mohammad Jahangir Tamimi, Sikh-Muslim Ta’aloqat: Aik Tehqiqi Jaiza (Urdu) (Lahore:
CSAS, Punjab University, 2007), 172.
6 Mohammad Jahangir Tamimi, Bharat Mein Sikh Qaumi Tehreek (Urdu) (Lahore: CSAS,
Punjab University, 1992), 56-58.
7 Master Tara Singh S/o Patwari Kanshi Ram graduated from Khalsa College, Amritsar. He
was appointed Headmaster of Khalsa High School, Lyallpur in 1914. See IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet
Mission: Sikhs.
8 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown
and Co., 1977).
9 Harold Laski in Lawrence C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton,
New York: Princeton University Press, 1976).
10 Aparna Basu, “Growth of Education and Muslim Separatism, 1919-1939,” in B. R. Nanda,
ed., Essays in Modern Indian History (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1980).
11 Stephen R. Covey, Principle-Centered Leadership (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

INTRODUCTION
MUSLIM-SIKH RELATIONS IN RETROSPECT
It is hard luck of the Punjab that it remained under the foreign rule for
centuries which resulted in a sense of psychological, intellectual, political, economic
and social deprivation in the region. The colonialism is mainly attributed to the British
but historically it goes back to the Persian and Central Asian imperialism. Andrew J.
Major writes that twelve non-Punjabi dynasties ruled over the Punjab from 11 th
century to the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839). 1 Islam secured huge
conversions from Hindus and Sikhs which made Islam a dominant religion in the
north-west region of the Subcontinent along with the non-Indian Muslims from
Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan. On the ground of the Muslim majority of this region, a
separate homeland was demanded later in the mid-twentieth century. The Punjab was
the province which was to provide the most forceful support to this demand otherwise
the dream of Pakistan could never be materialized. On the other hand, the Punjab was
everything to the Sikhs. It was a birthplace of their Gurus 2 and religiously historical
place where their religious heroes lived, smiled, passed through ordeal, ruled and had
smadhs. 3 The roots of the Muslim-Sikh antagonism were the assassination of the
Gurus, further atrocities by Banda Singh Bahadur Bairagi and Mir Mannu, and the
Muslim invasions by Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali, his son Timur Shah and
grandson Shah Zaman in which the Muslim support was unleashed in favour of the
Muslim invaders. 4

The Islamic principles of egalitarianism impressed upon the Hindu folk which
gave birth to the counter-reformations. The Bhakti movement was outstanding among
such classical Hindu campaigns for reformation. Guru Nanak Dev (1469-1539)
conceived mainly from Islam and Hinduism and paved the way for a new religious
tradition. Oneness of God and rejection of the idol-worship, sati, discrimination, class
system, caste system, drinking, smoking and pardah for women were the core
teachings of Nanakism. He necessitated the importance of love, peace and cordial
relations among all factions of society. In the childhood, he explained that alif 5
denotes singleness of God and unity of humankind. 6 The “Sikhism recognizes no
caste and strictly enjoins upon those who profess it to treat all human beings as
equal.” 7 Sikh as defined by an Indian writer Gupta is one who worships one God,
takes guidance from the Granth Sahib, refutes the caste 8 prejudices, takes baptism by
dagger immersed in water, adopts Singh (lion) with name, abstains from tobacco,
wears turban, and always has 5 Ks. 9
The beginning of the Muslim-Sikh relations goes back to the co-relations of
the Muslims and Hindus living in the same place, Talwandi 10 wherein Guru Nanak
Dev was born in 1469. Both the communities were enjoying cordial relations as
brothers under the cultural bonds. Guru Nanak always preferred the association of
faqirs (saints). His disciple Mardana was the first Muslim who became Sikh of Guru
Nanak Dev 11 and later others like Allahyar of Delhi and Ibrahim of Chhatteana are
quoted to have converted to Sikhism. 12
Guru Nanak Dev received early education from Syed Hasan at Nankana and
learnt Persian and other knowledge which definitely impressed upon his mental
fabrication as enunciated by many in the West Punjab. 13 He served for a short period
in langarkhana (almshouse) under Daulat Khan Lodhi, governor of Sultanpur. His
2

interest in the Islamic heritage moved him to the Muslim religious places in India,
Iran, Iraq, Makkah and Medina. He started preaching his beliefs publicly at Multan
and was arrested during the reign of Ibrahim Lodhi. The Guru was released by Zahir-
ud-Din Muhammad Babur after the victory against Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat (1526). 14
It is conspicuously mentioned that Guru Nanak Dev along with other faqirs
underwent corporal sufferings at the hands of Muslims when Mir Mughal, Babur’s
commander, occupied Saidpur (Aimanabad) in 1520. Babur sacked Saidpur, “put all
of its inhabitants to the sword, and ravaged the surrounding countryside.” 15 The
worthwhile aspect of this incident is that Guru Nanak never asked his followers to
take revenge from the Muslims of such persecutions. This is the real message of
Nanakism that tormentors ought to be forgiven and love, tolerance, harmony and co-
existence be popularised. 16
Despite having two sons, Guru Nanak did not make the Gurgaddi 17 as
hereditary and appointed Angad Dev (Lehna) (1504-1552) as his successor who
invented Gurmukhi script mainly derived from the Sanskrit script. It preserved the
Sikh religious heritage and Sikh identity. Emperor Humayun (1508-1556), the second
Mughal emperor, saw Guru Angad during his retreat by Sher Shah Suri (1486-1545)
and his own brothers. The Guru predicted that he would gain victory in the near
future. The Muslim-Sikh relations at the very outset of Sikhism remained friendly.
The later Gurus added valuable beliefs to the religious tradition and transformed
Nanakism into Sikhism. All the ten Gurus, from Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh
belonged to the caste Khatri. The Hindu Jats embraced Sikhism during the gurgaddi
of Guru Arjun Dev (1563-1606). 18
As a whole, the Punjab had been a liberal and secular society as we find no
evidence of persecution and fight at the initial conversion from Hinduism to Islam and
3

then to Sikhism. 19 To Sibt-i-Hasan, the Indus Valley Civilization presents the signs of
co-existence and non-violence in the society. 20 Later on, the colonial rule of the
British created a sense of deprivation among the inhabitants but even then the Punjab
retained tradition of mutual harmony particularly in the rural society. Nevertheless, to
differ with others was a right which the founder of Sikhism availed himself fully.
Criticizing the Muslim rulers, Guru Nanak opined that they had discarded the real
path of Islam:
Nor can we consider Islam as a powerful force on the basis of its teachings, because
the propagators of the Prophet’s gospel had been busy in the merciless slaughter of
the ‘infidel’ sons of Allah…He [Guru Nanak] lamented the religious bigotry of the
Muslims and protested against the violence, cruelty and persecution by the Muslim
rulers…His heart was deeply touched by the utter helplessness of the masses of the
age on whom had fallen the unbearable and inhuman sufferings caused by
Brahmanical religio-social tyranny and Muslim bigotry and violent persecutions. 21
Being indigenous and moreover a religion under-persecution, it quickly permeated the
masses particularly of the Punjab. Moreover, the Punjabi Hindu families had a
common practice to declare one of their sons as Sikh. 22 Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad
Akbar (1542-1605) is said to have ruled over India with liberal and secular policy.
Therefore, the Muslim-Sikh relations remained amicable during his reign. Akbar
gifted land to Guru Ram Das (Jetha Bhai) (1534-1581) at Amritsar where Hazrat
Mian Mir, eminent Muslim Sufi, laid foundation of the famous Golden Temple. This
era illustrates the harmonious relations between the two communities as both had no
roots of conflict.
The relations between the two communities became antagonistic in 1605 when
prince Khusrau 23 rebelled against Nur-ud-Din Muhammad Jahangir (1569-1627).
Guru Arjun Dev (5 th Guru) supported rebellious Khusro. It was one of the most
important segments of the Indian history that Khusrau sought refuge under him and
the Guru had no fear of the formidable government of Delhi who had inflicted cruelty
4

upon their own kinspersons. Chandu Lal, Diwan of Lahore, embroidered the story and
the king arrested and killed Arjun Dev in 1606. 24 This was a government action which
drew hard-line between Muslims and Sikhs. The writers believe that the relations
between the two communities were absolutely good till this event because the Sikh
community being a nascent group did not partake in the national politics. It was a
courageous step of the Guru to adopt defiant character and plunge into the national
politics. Nevertheless, the Guru’s assassination proved undoubtedly a turning point in
the history of the Muslim-Sikh relations. To Gokul Chand Narang, the maltreatment
by the Muslim rulers enthused the Sikhs to acquire power. He writes, such
persecutions were inevitable from a despotic government that was forced to hinder
any dangerous organization 25 as a parallel force to the central authority. According to
Sagoo, Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi (1562-1624) provoked Emperor Jahangir against
Guru Arjun Dev when he stayed at Sirhind pursuing Khusrau. 26
Many writers tried to prove Emperor Jahangir’s innocence in this murder and
held Chandu Lal responsible for it 27 because, according to such writers, he was
working as a Hindu conspirator. Tamimi also proved that the Hindus consciously tried
to damage Islam and Sikhism and that Jahangir was innocent. 28 Jahangir removed
Chandu Lal from the office when he came to know about his action. 29 But all this
goes futile when Emperor Jahangir himself confesses in his autobiography that he
ordered to kill Guru Arjun Dev:
At Govindwal situated on the River Beas there lived a Hindu named Arjun in the garb of
saints and holy men… I ordered him to be arrested ….I confiscated all his property and
issued orders that he should be imprisoned, tortured and executed. 30
It is interesting that the pro-Jahangir writers could not impress upon the Sikhs who
still believe that Jahangir was responsible for the Guru’s murder. The standpoint of
such writers is repudiated by the treatment meted to Chandu Lal by Guru Hargobind
5

for the murder of Guru Arjun Dev. This incident should have worsened the Sikh-
Hindu relations but it did not affect them.
Dr. Pashaura Singh and few others declared it a political murder but up till
now, a big majority of the Sikhs believes that Jahangir was the real killer. 31 Whatever
the writers argue and quote in favour of the Mughal king, they cannot deny that a
religious personality was persecuted to death during the authoritarian rule of Emperor
Jahangir therefore responsibility goes to him. Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi, a hardliner
Muslim cleric, who thanked God on Emperor Akbar’s death since he was a liberal
ruler, expressed his pleasure on the murder of Guru Arjun by Emperor Jahangir. He
wrote to Shaikh Farid, the governor of the Punjab that the killing of the Kafir of
Goindwal was a big achievement “and is the cause of the great defeat of the accursed
people.” 32 The next Guru, Hargobind (1595-1644), tried to arm his followers and for
this purpose he started collecting tax from them. Soon he was arrested and put in jail
by Emperor Jahangir. However, he was released on the recommendation of Hazrat
Mian Mir and Wazir Khan. Jahangir and the Guru got along with each other after the
release. The Emperor along with other concessions handed over Chandu Lal to the
Guru who tortured him to death as a revenge for his father’s murder. 33 During the
reign of Shah Jahan, his son prince Dara Shikoh as a governor of the Punjab had
friendly relations with the Guru and gifted him land in Kiratpur but soon conflict
arose on a trivial cause which resulted in a direct conflict. Guru Har Rai (1631-1661),
a pacifist by nature became friendly with prince Dara Shikoh (1615-1659). The war of
succession among the sons of Shah Jahan (1592-1666) proved a setback as far as the
Muslim-Sikh relations were concerned. The Guru supported Dara in the war against
Aurangzeb Alamgir who after capturing Delhi became an adversary to the Sikhs. 34
6

Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618-1707) decided to take stern action against the new
religion. A group of the Kashmiri Brahmins led by Kirpa Ram Datt of Mattan came to
Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675) and sought his help against the forced conversions
to Islam by the royal authorities. The Guru stood against Aurangzeb’s policy. Soon he
had to turn up before the Delhi court where Aurangzeb asked for a miracle as
evidence of his religious standing. On his refusal, the king put him in the jail but he
was released for the miraculous show. He claimed that the holy words would protect
him from the blow of sword. The executioner struck and the neck was separated from
the body. The sad incident of Tegh Bahadur’s assassination increased hatred between
the Muslims and Sikhs. The body of Tegh Bahadur was insulted and thrown in the
street. 35
Aurangzeb Alamgir was held guilty in the murder of Guru Tegh Bahadur. His
governor buried two sons 36 of Guru Gobind Singh alive at Sirhind. The Guru
established Khalsa “for the accomplishment of his mission against the
Mahomedans.” 37 Many Muslim historians tried to convince Sikhs exonerating the
Mughal rulers from the murder of their Gurus but the classical sources are replete
with the anti-Muslim material which never convinced Sikhs to absolve the Muslim
kings. Few Sikh writers held the Hindus responsible for the Gurus’ murder
particularly the murder of Guru Arjun Dev. They are wise enough because if Jahangir
is accepted as killer, Guru Hargobind becomes the killer of Chandu Lal and a spiritual
personality is not supposed to be involved in such a crime. Anyway, the religious
fervor converted Sikhs to militancy.
The military status definitely meant a political zeal, which moved them to
become a nation. 38 To W. H. McLeod, “The military aspect had to be fused with the
religious, and this Guru Gobind Singh achieved by promulgating the Order of the
7

Khalsa on that fateful day in 1699. Thus were the sparrows transformed into
hawks.” 39 Gobind Singh, the last Guru, awarded five Ks to his followers which
infused a sense of confidence and prowess. Sword and pagg (turban) in particular
were the cultural objects and oftenly used by the distinguished personalities of the
martial castes or any prominent figure in the Punjab. Pagg was to be used by the head
of a family while sa’fa 40 could be used by all. Therefore, using pagg was a symbol of
honour and influential position in the Punjab society. So, wearing of a pagg was now
made necessary for all the Sikhs by the 10 th Guru which naturally created in them a
sense of respect and superiority. Having a dagger or sword was another feeling of
respect and martial tradition. 41
Banda Singh Bairagi (1670-1716) got engaged in crushing and killing the
Muslims mercilessly wherever he found them under the enthusiasm infused by the
Khalsa. He slaughtered thousands of Muslims, “burnt down scores of villages and for
a moment seemed to have shaken the very foundations of the Moghul Empire.” 42 To
Hari Ram Gupta, he massacred and punished the Muslims of Ghuram, Thaska,
Kunjpura, Shahabad, Mustafabad, Ambala, Kapuri, Chhat and Banur. After running
over Sirhind, he removed all the Muslim officers from the pargnahs and appointed his
own devotees. 43 Bhagat Singh writes that Banda Singh left immense influence on the
Sikh polity. The Sikh misals adopted the military organisation done by Banda Singh.
Many Hindus and Muslims also joined Banda Singh and enjoyed the fruits by
accepting Sikhism. 44 The writer does not take up the point of the forced conversions
during this drive rather euphemized with such wording that confirms that the Muslims
willingly accepted Sikhism.
Bahadur Shah I (ruling period 1707-12) and Farrukh Siyyar (ruling period
1713-19) took stern actions and tried to eliminate the Sikh menace. The later Mughal
8

period was hard for Sikhs. Mir Mannu, the governor of Punjab (1748-1753), took
drastic measures against them that caused heavy casualties but it could not knock
them down completely and they continued their violent activities. A verse became
very popular regarding Mir Mannu’s murderous actions against them and the Sikh
enthusiasm:
Mannu asadi datri aseen Mannu de soey
Jiyon jiyon Mannu vadhda aseen doon sawaey hoey 45
(Mannu is like a sickle for us but despite his killing, we grew more and more in
number).
These circumstances resulted in the Sikh attacks from the north and the Marathas
from south who inflicted a course of barbarity on the Muslims. 46 Ahmad Shah
Abdali’s ferocious onslaughts on the Punjab resulted in a massacre of many Sikhs and
the rest of them had to hide in the dense forests and mountains. These military
campaigns dented the political, economic and social life of the Punjab, which
popularised a verse throughout the region. This Punjabi couplet is famous among all
the Punjabis irrespective of religion, race and caste:
Khada peeta lahyey da
Rehnda Ahmad Shahyey da 47
(Except bread all grains belong to Ahmad Shah Abdali).
The February of 1762 was disastrous to the Sikhs who were brutally put to death at
Kup in the premises of Malerkotla by the Muslim invader. This combat cost the lives
of 15,000 Sikhs in a day, which is called in history Wadda Ghallughara, the great
killing. 48
Although, Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839) had many Muslims in his court
but the factual position is that the Muslims went at bottom when the Sikhs ascended
the political power. The Sikh regime proved an era of agony for them as their holy
places were ruined. During his rule, the marbles of the mosques were sent to Amritsar
9

to decorate the Golden Temple. The Muslims were degraded in the courts and their
religious values were ridiculed. They had been declined to the status of the oppressed
and third class citizens of the society and their holy places were converted into
stables, arsenals and brothels. They could not dare to register their protest against this
sacrilege. Sita Ram writes, “the Moti Masjid in the fort of Lahore….is built of white
marble and was used as a place for offering prayers by the Muhammadan
emperors…Ranjit Singh converted it into treasury room for containing cash.” 49
Likewise, Ranjit banned the cow slaughter throughout his kingdom. 50 Sikkha Shahi is
still prevalent among the Muslims attributing to the barbarity and lawlessness during
the Sikh rule. 51
Definitely the Sikhs were confident being the ruling community as compared
to the Muslims. Even the local officers never dared to challenge the Khalsa member.
The Sikh conquests pleased them. Cunningham further expresses the Sikh
psychological supremacy infused by Ranjit in different ways: “Runjeet Singh, in
writing or in talking of his government, always used the term “Khalsa.” On his seal he
wrote, as any Sikh usually writes, his name, with the prefix “Akal Suhaee.” 52 The
Sikhs revenged what they had suffered at the hands of the Muslims. For several
occasions, the Muslims ruined Amritsar and suburbs but the Sikh victory enabled
them to re-capture Amritsar, “they carried out bloody reprisals and washed the steps
of the sacred pool with blood of Mussalmans.” 53 To James Kellas, the nationalist
movements of the European countries produced germs of nationalism throughout the
world. He further talks of the two categories of the nationalism pervasive in the world,
the Inclusive Nationalism and the Exclusive Nationalism. The first category
represents the more liberal and democratic thought while the latter propagates
10

intolerance and repression; the Sikh nationalism is among such nationalisms in the
world. 54
According to Prithipal Singh Kapur, Ranjit selected the people according to
their inherent nature and loyalty as the “cultured intelligence” for the governmental
affairs. For example, he selected Jats for the positions of generals or military services
because he knew that they could plough and fight only while he preferred Muslims,
Brahmins, Rajputs, Khatris in council. 55 This policy testifies that the concept of
‘martial races’ existed already in the Punjab before the British advent and it was
further canalized by the British through the administrative and defence policies.
Many have projected that Ranjit was a secular leader but his derogatory
attitude towards the Muslim sacred places does not prove this claim. To J. S. Pakkar,
the Muslims were the privileged class in the society during the Mughal rule but they
“had been reduced to the level of common subjects under the Sikh rule.” 56 The writers
also present the Persian as his official language as evidence of his liberal propensity
but actually it also does not testify the secular character of Ranjit Singh. If the Persian
language remained the official language during his period, it does not show Ranjit’s
devotion to the Persian literature or Iranian people rather he had no substitute to the
Persian language at the very moment. The Punjabi language had never served as a
‘social capital’ even in the Punjab. To Tariq Rehman, language enjoys the status of
social capital that has intimate relationship with political power and social influence.
“It is created by power and it has the potential to make others powerful.” It is widely
“used in so many domains of power.” 57 The Persian language had a status of ‘social
capital’ so everyone could make place in the government as well as the society by its
learning.
11

The other measure appreciated by the writers is the appointment of the Muslim
ministers in his government. Actually, he appointed the Faqir brothers in his court not
under adherence to Islam rather their talent convinced Ranjit to have the most
competent people in his court as his strength. To Garrett, the Faqir brothers had a
sound knowledge of medicine and Arabic language. They knew the court decorum
and the skills how to deal with the courtiers as they “have devised a cypher which
they use in correspondence among themselves and this artifice, hitherto, I believe,
unknown in the East, gives them a reputation for great cleverness.” 58 The presence of
the Muslims in the government does not testify that Ranjit Singh was following the
secular lines in his policies. Can the historians consider Aurangzeb Alamgir a secular
king who too had non-Muslims of high ranks in his government? As a matter of fact,
Ranjit coming from a minority could not ignore the majority community, the Muslims
of the Punjab. Similarly, the Mughal rulers, representing the minority community,
could not work successfully without the support of the majority community (Hindu)
in the Subcontinent. However, there was a bright aspect of Ranjit’s character that
being a local particularly a rural Jat, he did not try to disturb the culture of mutual
understanding between the Muslims and the Sikhs in the society of the rural Punjab.
Furthermore, his anti-Muslim measures hardly upset the rural arrangements of peace
as many of them were least involved in the politics.
The Punjab went under weak Sikh rulers and ultimately was occupied by the
British. The Anglo-Sikh Wars (1846, 1848) shattered not only the Sikh dream of the
Khalsa rule but also caused a sharp decrease in their number. Many rejoined the
parent religion and others became victim of the immoral and illegal practices. 59 It is
noteworthy that the Sikhs fought their wars on their own and the Sikh defeat pleased
the majority of the Muslims. It was a major setback to the Sikh community but they
12

soon succeeded in winning over the Britishers who unleashed concessions to restore
their confidence and morale.
Impact of Culture and Syllabi
According to George Eaton, a person is infused with the existing prejudices
against certain group. If a child is asked why he hates a minority group living around
him, he repeats the reasons embeded by his domestic and external environment. He is
true in assuming the things in the conceived perspective. “The cultural norm is now
his norm; he is socialized.” 60 The Sikh children read chapters from the Hindu classical
literature in the syllabi. G. W. Leitner prepared a report on the indigenous education
of the Punjab in 1882 and shed light on the Hindu policy towards the sister
communities:
The educated Hindus, whose one great aim is the consolidation of all non-
Muhammadans of India into one nation, are endeavouring to substitute Nagri for
Gurmukhi, and some dialect of Hindi for the Bhasha or vernacular of the country. 61
So the Hindus made an utmost endeavour to infuse the Muslim hatred into the Sikh
and Hindu communities. 62 Young Jai Singh, a Sandhu Jat from Kanah (Lahore), went
to Amritsar to get baptism and the people were impressed by his beauty. They
inquired about his native village, he told ‘Kanah.’ The Sikhs appreciated his name as
it resembled Kanaihya, “Kanaihya is one of the names of the beautiful Lord
Krishan.” 63 In the folk song, a Sikh lady expresses her desire about to what type of
husband she seeks. She ostensibly idealizes the Hindu personality:
Ni keho jia ver loriey
Ram Chandra jia ver loriey 64
(Husband I would desire to have must be like Ram Chandra)
The Sikh classical literature was replete with the anti-Muslim sentiments which
infused hatred towards the Muslims. Even in the Satyarth Parkash and Mahan Kosh,
13

the writers abused the Muslim heroes and used abhorrent and vilifying language for
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon Him). The Muslims never protested because they
could not read Gurmukhi script which kept them ignorant about how their religious
heroes were being treated by the sister community. 65 All such facts guide what type of
literature the Sikh children were studying and what impact it had on the Muslim-Sikh
relations.
The Muslim-Sikh hostility is severer and more deep-rooted than the Muslim-
Hindu’s. The Hindus and Muslims owned religious ‘differences’ not ‘enmity’ because
the Muslim and Hindu religious personalities had experienced no direct clash having
no same era and area. Islam emerged in Arab while Hinduism was an indigenous
religion of the Subcontinent. Therefore, as compared to the Sikhs,’ the political
problems were more dominant rather than religious one in the perspective of the
Muslim-Hindu relations.
Sikh and Muslim-Pro-British Character
At the initial stage, the British got victory over the Indian peoples who lost their
social, political, religious, and economic status in their own society. The leaders of
this era sought the solution in getting the western education and loyalty towards the
new rulers. The Aligarh Movement of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) among the
Muslims and the Singh Sabha Movement among the Sikhs played very important role
in the communitarian awakening. Teja Singh justifies the pro-British character of the
Muslims and Sikhs:
It was in the interest of Sikhs and Mohammedans that before they could
consciously and usefully take part in the political life of India they should go
through a discipline of education and religious reforms. Both these communities
were backward…and they were quite justified in cooperating with the Government
in order to secure the much-needed help from them. 66
14

However, the British adopted secular approach towards the religious affairs of the
local communities. According to Dushka H. Saiyid, if the British supported any one
of the existing religions in the Punjab, it would have displeased the other religious
communities . 67
The Punjab, when the British annexed it in 1849 had already been divided into
urban and rural populations with a variety of religions. 68 The Muslims, Hindus and
Sikhs were scattered with a diverse proportion throughout the region. All of them had
been rulers of the Punjab. With the fluctuating proportion, the non-Muslims were
overwhelmingly concentrated in the eastern, Muslims in the western and a slight
balance in the central districts but overall, the Muslims were in a majority in these
areas. The urban life during the British period was a facilitated and well aware of the
historical realities, politics, business, education and other avenues of life. This
awareness proved fatal as far as the Muslim-Sikh relations are concerned under the
communitarian identity and was later transmuted into communalism. The political
leadership coming from the rural areas was capacious due to congenial traditions of
mutual harmony but remained confined to personal gains while the urban leadership
was more concerned with the majority-minority question. The communalism was a
spontaneous outcome of the political contest for power. Such contests grew in
significance as the British authorities steadily introduced the representative politics
from the 1860s onwards. The political demands most of the time were conflicting in
nature to each other. The new educational, political and constitutional reforms
engaged the locals in securing the maximum communitarian benefits.
The rural areas wherein a vast majority of the proportion resided retained
partly the character of a liberal society. The role of saints and cultural bonds in this
regard seems a potent factor in the peaceful arrangements nevertheless, the religious
15

identity maintained distance between the Muslims and Sikhs. They did not inter-dine
and inert-marry. Azan, 69 cow-killing, Halal-Jhatka meat, routes of the religious
processions, music before mosques and other issues were constantly disturbing the
harmony of the Punjab. The rural areas were immune to the seeds of the urban
communalism to a great extent but it proved infectious enough and permeated the
villages through the political conferences and meetings arranged by the political
parties.
A British civil servant, Charles E. Trevelyan, in 1883 worked out two possible
political models which could bring a political change in the Subcontinent. According
to the first, the Indians might adopt violent and rebellious strategy to achieve
independence while to the second, the locals could launch a constitutional struggle
within the limits set by the ruling authority which would ultimately force the British
to leave the country. 70 The paradigm can be viewed as the aftermath of the War of
Independence of 1857 that had divided the locals into the defiant and constitutionalist
groups. The constitutionalists accepted the British rule and started struggling for
freedom living within the administrative or constitutional framework given by the
ruling British while the defiant group started rebellious and illegal activities to push
the imperialists out of the country. The Kuka Movement 71 and the Babbar Akalis 72
adopted the defiant character and their leaders and workers were either killed
ruthlessly or banished. On the other hand, the Congress, the League and the
Shiromani Akali Dal 73 were the parties which accepted the British writ in the
Subcontinent and started struggle for the independence through the political means.
The mechanism adopted by the leadership was to have negotiations and protests to
achieve certain political rights. They continued it by presenting memoranda to the
British authorities or delegations deployed by them to get their assent about the
16

constitutional packages. The method vividly adopted by the British was to secure
agreement from all the communities, the direct stakeholders, on some specific
constitutional reforms. Consequently, the Congress and the League leaders negotiated
with the British, signed and concluded agreements for several times and some time
adopted ‘going public policy’ to press on their standpoints. Therefore, the anti-British
verbosity was used as a fashion in the early 20 th century otherwise the political doings
do not ratify their assertion to be the anti-British to the entirety.
The Punjab Unionist Party 74 possessed entirely a different status as compared
to the other political parties. It was performing purely a loyalist character and was
being supported by the British through the Governor. The party being in a facilitating
position attracted the Punjabi Sikh, Hindu and Muslim leaders towards the
government. They wholeheartedly sided with the Muslim Unionists and in return, the
government showered every kind of support to them through proper or improper way.
They were being projected as cross-communal or secular party but as a matter of fact
none of them considered the leader of the rival community as a secular leader. Even
till now, no Sikh or Hindu has claimed that Sir Fazl-i-Husain or Sir Sikandar Hayat
Khan was their hero. On the other hand, till now, no Muslim faction has accepted Sir
Sunder Singh Majithia or Ch. Chhotu Ram as their heroes. Throughout the political
history, the Muslim leaders remained purely the Muslim leaders, the Sikhs as the Sikh
leaders and Hindus as the Hindu leaders. On the educational policy, the Punchayat
Act, Municipal Committee Act, Gurdwara Act and other occasions, the Muslim and
Sikh leaders remained rivals within and outside the Punjab assembly. The Sikh
leadership frequently protested against the biased policies of the Muslim Unionists
and even demanded the Governor to relieve the Muslim minister, Sir Fazl-i-Husain
from the office. Most of the Muslim writers agreed that Sir Fazl-i-Husain had worked
17

a lot for the Muslims which confirm the standpoint of the Sikhs that the Muslim
ministers were working for their own community and not for the Sikhs. Master Tara
Singh 75 projects Sir Sikandar as the cruel ruler in his book and writes that Sir
Sikandar tried to eliminate the Akalis from the scene. 76 In 1925, Kapur Singh writes,
Sir Fazl-i-Husain published a book for the specific Muslims with the request not to
disclose about its text particularly to any Sikh or Hindu because there were
humiliating points about the Sikhs. 77
The Unionist government was a class rule under the patronage of the British
Governor. They had negligible contribution to the educational and economic
conditions of the rural areas and the middle and lower classes of the Muslims. The
elevating segments for the rural poor classes such as the agrarian and educational
reforms and the military services were purely the British initiatives. The land reforms
and Panchayat Act were to protect the landed aristocracy. The British awarded lands
to the eminent Punjabi families and created a new semi-official class of zaildars and
nambardars with some administrative and judicial powers, which pleased the
common people, as their own people had been honoured, but gradually they tried to
establish their personal rule over the masses. The Unionist Party disappointed their
co-regionists to the extent that they soon lost their grip over the masses in their own
spheres of influence. The League plunged into the regional politics which made the
Unionist Party gradually ineffective in the Punjab while the Muslim masses sided
wholeheartedly with the League. So unpopular the Unionist Muslims had become
among the masses that in the Lahore session on 22 March, they raised anti-Sikandar
slogans when Shahnawaz Mamdot praised Premier Sir Sikandar Hayat. 78 The idealism
of Pakistan scheme eliminated threats and horrors of the feudality from the common
folk. In fact, the Muslims of the Punjab had experienced the Unionist leadership who
18

gave nothing to them. They had already been deprived of many of the due rights
under the feudal masters. They, despite having political influence, demonstrated
nothing to root out the miseries of their co-religionists. Time had exposed the
Unionist leadership to the Punjabi Muslims and now they wanted to experience the
League. The only two forces, which sustained the Unionist status as non-communal
were the administrative machinery and the press. The political activism in the Indian
affairs increased the importance of the commoners whether they were a voter or not
they played a crucial role during the period of 1940s.
British Policy in Punjab
The communal identity was already there before the advent of the British who
needed a peaceful Punjab to achieve their objectives. Observing the societal norms of
the Punjab they conferred some of the judicial and administrative powers upon the
prominent families appointing them numbardars and zaildars. All of such families
played very loyal role throughout the British period. The local ‘bureaucracy’
consisted of numberdars and zaildars numbered only 80,000. 79 It is very strange that
the British who wanted to educate the other nations by introducing democratic,
educational and administrative institutions themselves undertook to violate the spirit
of such reforms. They established bad precedents in the Punjab as they deployed the
military officers for the civilian jobs. The ICS officers were appointed as judges in the
Chief Court (High Court) while the judicial, financial and administrative powers were
merged with the single office of Deputy Commissioner under the Divisional
Commissioner who was unable to do his duties properly due to the poor
communication and transportation. 80
19

The issue of separate electorate remained central to all the stakeholders in the
Subcontinent. The experience of joint electorate proved unjust regarding the Muslims
who were mostly poor and illiterate. 81 The results of the elections for the Councils of
1909 and 1912 were very discouraging from the Muslim point of view. In 1909, the
Muslims got only three seats. Khawaja Ahad Shah won by drawing lots while
Khawaja Yousuf Shah and Seth Adamji Mamoonji secured their seats only by a
margin of one vote. Most importantly, Mian Mhammad Shafi and Sir Fazl-i-Husain
contested the election from the University seat but were defeated by Shadi Lal. 82
The politics during the post-Gurdwara Reform Movement 83 moved around the
Shiromani Akali Dal. 84 The party emerged and secured its deep and strong footing in
the Sikh minds because it was backed by the holy Sikh shrines. 85 The religio-political
status of the party severely hit the traditional feudal Sikh leadership and obtained
complete hold on the Sikh political affairs. The Akali policy remained very confused
pertaining to the political affairs; they were nationalists in the case of Hindus while
staunch communalists in the case of the Muslims in general and the AIML in
particular. The Sikhs posed to be anti-imperialists while remained integral part of the
British army and administration. They demanded separate electorates but also
consented to surrender it. They talked of joint electorates but when the Muslim
Unionists agreed to it, they slipped away and refused to surrender the right. They
posed to be integrationists but demanded partition of the Punjab in the early 1930s.
They projected themselves sincere advocates of the Sikh interests but remained keen
in the Gurdwara funds and money from the Hindus. They raised demand for Azad
Punjab, separate Sikh state Khalistan but at the same time they never thought to sever
their relations with the Nationalist Congress. Their success in the Gurdwara
20

movement made them over-confident and they started boasting to end the British rule
as they had done, according to them the downfall of the Muslim empire in India.
Concluding, the Shiromani Akali Dal was given full confidence by the Sikh
masses but the leadership after the Gurdwara Movement could not chalk out any
constructive programme to struggle for. The post-1920s Sikh politics demanded the
same spirit and character which they could neither sense nor demonstrate. Pakistan
movement and the Congress influence created crisis in the Sikh polities which could
not be settled although they had a sincere support of the British behind them.
The Sikhs never enjoyed unity and always underwent dissension within the
community and party as well. Dissension is an inherent right of any person but when
it is productive and beneficial for the community concerned. Disagreement for
personal pursuits always blots the struggle and communitarian integrity. Giani Kartar
Singh disagreed with others and sought cooperation with the AIML but he was
opposed to the unbelievable extent by the Akalis. On every important occasion, the
Sikh leaders remained divided with contradictory opinion. Sardar Hukam Singh was
of the view that the Sikhs could not set any goal to achieve as in the Simla Conference
Master Tara Singh rejected the idea of Sikh State. In the negotiations with the Cabinet
Delegation, every Sikh leader had individual standpoint, different to the other’s which
shows that the Sikh leadership had no political ideal to achieve. Gurmit Singh
suggests that the Azad Punjab was the best solution to the Sikhs while Hukam Singh
repudiates such solution with the argument that the expulsion of the Muslim and
Hindu communities from the areas was not possible. 86 Actually, the sane line was that
the Akali leadership should have been clear that they could achieve nothing until an
approval of the Congress and the League but they secured goodwill from none of
them. They dialogued with the stakeholders as a party but the dream of the restoration
21

or recapture of the Punjab remained in their sub-conscious which had perhaps blocked
them to exert for other options.
The Round Table Conference 87 generated another furious wave against the
Muslims. The Sikhs demanded partition of the Punjab. Master Tara Singh appointed
Gandhi as Sikh representative who was to advocate the Sikh demands including the
re-demarcation of the Punjab territories. The noteworthy aspect of this incident is that
Gandhi supported the partition of the Punjab as he accepted the Sikh demands to
present in the Conference. It also shows that Master Tara Singh from the very start
preferred the submissive and subordinate role to the Hindu leadership. It had impact
on the Sikhs from top to bottom that was obvious in the political on-goings during the
freedom movement.
The League represented the Indian Muslims at the centre while the Unionist
Party had coalition ministry in the Punjab backed strongly by the British Governor.
The British support or sympathy sometimes the writers attribute to the Divide and
Rule policy but as a matter of fact, no document has yet been presented to prove that
the British had some official policy in this respect. The Balance and Rule policy can
be justified but the Divide and Rule policy has no place in the Indian affairs. Jinnah at
initial phase struggled for the Indian independence but the discriminatory attitude of
the Congress towards the Muslims made him conscious and consequently he decided
to work for the Muslims only. He was anti-imperialism but demanded a separate
Muslim homeland as a solution to the communal problem. The rude Congress
behaviour after wining the elections of 1936-37 further alarmed the Muslim
leadership that the Congress aimed at the establishment of the Hindu Raj which meant
the enslavement of the Muslims under the democratic system. They decided to fight
for an independent Muslim state. The Punjab had been under the coalition
22

government and was scared of the parties working at the national level. The
Government of India Act 1935 made first general elections possible in the Punjab in
1936-37 with a comparatively reasonable size of the voting right which shook the writ
of the Unionists because the AIML decided to plunge into the regional politics for the
first time since its inception in 1906. Though the League got no success in the
elections as expected but soon it started denting the status of the regional parties.
Sunder Singh Majithia (the Khalsa National Party) and few Hindu members were with
the Muslim Unionists but after the Gurdwara Reform Movement, the Shiromani Akali
Dal occupied whole of the Sikh politics. Although the Sikhs had always been critical
to the Muslim ministers throughout the life of the Punjab Legislative Council but the
Akali fanaticism paved the way to the anti-Muslim politics in the region through
violent strategy. 88 Their main target was the League which was the sole advocate of
the rights of the Indian Muslims.
The Sikhs mostly sided with the Hindus due to the similarity in their religions
and the past anti-Muslim passions of animosity. Their customs and traditions were the
same.
Basically the Gurus’ teachings were Vedantic. Therefore there was not the same
kind of breach from Hinduism, as in the cases of Jainism or Buddhism. Sikhism
accepted the Hindu code of conduct, its theory of the origin of the world, the
purpose of life, the purpose of religion, samsara the theory of birth, death and
rebirth were taken in entirety from Hinduism. Consequently, the problem of
separate identity for the Sikhs was more complicated that with the other two breakaway
groups. 89
The partition scheme of the Muslims and the furious Sikh reaction worsened the
nature of the Muslim-Sikh relations in the Punjab.
On 23 March 1940, the AIML passed the Lahore Resolution with the demand
of separate Muslim states comprising of north-western and eastern Muslim majority
areas as the best solution of the on-going constitutional and communal problem in
23

India. The Sikhs opposed the division of India urging on the same grounds taken up
by the Congress. The Akali Dal-Congress cooperation increased due to this identical
goal. 90 Nevertheless, the possibility of the partition infuriated the Sikhs who declared
that their community would resist the Pakistan scheme with all means because by
conceding the partition plan, they would lose the fertile land of the Punjab and their
holy places. The economic and religious setbacks caused communal frenzy between
the Muslims and the Sikhs in the British Punjab. They were nowhere majority except
Tehsil Tarn Taran of the central Punjab. 91 Therefore, the Pakistan scheme accelerated
the declining relations between the Muslims and Sikhs. The decisive results of the
elections of 1946 brought split. The Unionist Party, the so-called cross-communal
party could bag only 3 Sikh, 3 Hindu and 1 Christian seats. 92 Both the Akali and
League parties surrendered themselves at the mercy of the central commands. It was a
popular way of the politics during the British period that all-Indian leadership of the
League and Congress seldom interfered with the regional politics but the regional
leadership styled to have all-Indian party at the back to strengthen the image. 93
The rural areas maintained the spirit of the harmony and brotherhood. Both the
communities were making the fullest use of the cultural bonds and economic inter-
dependence. In the area of religion, they adopted the co-existence policy over-riding
the historical antagonism under the common Punjabi societal norms. They kept
themselves mainly away from the extremist religious propagation by the fanatics. The
illiteracy among the Punjabi people was also a plus point that kept them ignorant from
the communal activities published in the newspapers or pamphlets. The demands
placed before the British delegations such as the Cripps Mission and Cabinet
Delegation by the communities were contradictory in nature. The Sikhs lacked
competent leadership who voiced for the Azad Punjab and Khalistan but secretly
24

worked to occupy the Punjab by force. For the reason, they smuggled weapons from
the NWFP and trained the people to fight against the Muslims. The political
conferences and arm smuggling by the Sikhs polluted the peaceful society of the rural
Punjab which was caught gradually by the communal disease. Nevertheless, the field
surveys show that in the Punjab, the migration of 1947 is commonly called lut mar
(looting and plundering). And it is very interesting that this lut mar was planned
overwhelmingly by the lower castes of the western Punjab. The death toll might have
doubled if the martial castes had been behind the Sikh massacre. Unlike this, the
Muslims in the areas of the eastern Punjab were attacked purely on the religious and
political grounds or under the rumours. Many of the martial castes are reported to
have involved in the killing but not in looting and plundering. The role of religion
seems prevalent in the political domain throughout the history. Once an anti-
community verdict was publicized, it was impossible to reverse the situation.
25

Notes
1
Andrew J. Major, Return to Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the mid-
Nineteenth Century (Karachi: Oxford University Press 1996), 1.
2
The Sikh religious personalities whom their followers call ‘prophets.’
3
Grave wherein the Sikhs bury remains of a dead.
4
A History of the Freedom Movement, 1707-1831, vol. 1 (Karachi: The Board of Editors,
1957), 153.
5
First letter of the Punjabi and Urdu alphabets.
6
Sayed Muhammad Latif, History of the Punjab (Lahore: People’s Publishing House, 1889),
241, 245.
7Kirpal
Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, revised by Sri Ram Sharma (Patiala: Punjabi
University, 1972), 16; also see Harish K. Puri, “The Scheduled Castes in the Sikh Community-A
Historical Perspective,” Economic & Political Weekly (June 2003), 2-3.
8
For details about the origin of the caste system see, AL Basham, The Wonder that was India
(Fontana: Sidgwick and Jackson: 1971), 148-152.
9
Hari Ram Gupta, Later Mughal History of the Punjab, 1707-1793 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1976), 40.
10
Talwandi is the old name of Nankana Sahib in the West Punjab that is now an independent
district.
11John
Clark Archer, The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus, Moslems, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas:
A Case Study in Comparative Religion (London: Princeton University Press, 1946), 177; also see HS
Bhatia, Rare Documents on Sikh and their Rule in the Punjab (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications,
1981), 14.
12
Harbans Singh, ed., The Encyclopedia of Sikhism, vol. 1 (Patiala: Punjabi University Patiala,
2002), 35-36, 83.
13
Guru Nanak Dev is much respected by the Shia community of Muslims due to his regard for
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and His descendants particularly Hazrat Imam Husain who was
mercilessly massacred in 61 AH at Karbala (Iraq). The people in the West Punjab quote his verse for
Imam Husain which he recited on 10 th Moharram, the day of martyrdom of the Imam. He said:
Guru Husain sab jagat ka, esa hor na ko
Esi marni marr gia, jo suney so ro
(Hussain is the guru of whole of the world, none resembles him
He died in such a way that every listener of his martyrdom starts weeping)
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Guru Nanak Dev and Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Punjab,” paper presented
on 30 December 2008 at International Conference on History, Politics and Society: The Punjab, at
Punjab University, Lahore.
14
Sayed Latif, History of the Punjab, 245.
15
Hew McLeod, Guru Nanak and Sikh Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 8.
16
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Militarization of the Sikh Religion against the Indian Muslims and
its Implications,” Pakistan Vision 6 (July 2005): 79.
17
Seat or office of Guru
18
Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, Syed Farooq Hasnat and Sohail Mahmood, The Sikh Question
(Lahore: Centre for South Asian Studies, Punjab University, 1985), 11. Life period of Guru Arjan Dev
was 1563-1606.
19
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Pre-Partition Punjab,” paper
delivered at WUN South Asian Virtual Seminar Series, University of Southampton, UK, 6 May 2008;
visit website, http://www.uwex.edu/ics/stream/session.cfm?eid= 11900&sid=16502.
20
Sibt-i-Hasan, Pakistan mein Tehzeeb ka Irteqa, (Urdu) (Karachi: Maktaba-i-Danyal, 1999),
69.
21
Fauja Singh, ed, History of the Punjab: Muslim Period, vol. III (Patiala: Department of
Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, 1972), 312-313.
22
R. C. Majumdar, An Advanced History of India (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1960), 499.
23
Khusrau was a son of Emperor Jahangir. Majumdar spells as Khusrav. An Advanced History
of India, 464.
26

24
Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (London: Lindsay Drummond Limited, 1934),
319-320; see also, Sayed Latif, History of the Punjab, 254.
25 th
Sir Gokul Chand Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 5 ed. (New Delhi: Kalyani
Publishers, 1989), 46.
26
Harbans Kaur Sagoo, Banda Singh Bahadur and Sikh Sovereignty (New Delhi: Deep &
Deep Publications, 2001), 22.
27 Professor Kartar Singh, Sikh Itehas (n.p., n.d.), 404-405.
28 Mohammad Jahangir Tamimi, Bharat Mein Sikh Qaumi Tehreek (Lahore: CSAS, Punjab
University, 1992), 5-8.
29 Dr. Mohammad Jahangir Tamimi, Sikh-Muslim Ta’aloqat: Aik Tehqiqi Jaiza (Lahore:
CSAS, Punjab University, 2007), 10.
30 Salim Wahid Salim, trans., Toozuk-i-Jehangeeree (Urdu) (Lahore: Majlis-i-
Taraqi-i-Adab, 1960), 99; see also, Gokal Chand Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 47-48.
31 A project was conducted at St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, and University of
British Columbia, B.C. The project dealt with the history of 500 years of Sikhism with a view to have
an objective research by using the Social Sciences method. Although, the Sikhs reacted furiously to the
project, however Dr. Pashaura Singh continued research under Dr. H. McLeod. He concluded that
“Hair, turban and sword entered Sikhism through the Jat influence. Jats did not enter Sikhism empty
handed.…. Guru Arjan was murdered and not martyred in 1604.” The University authorities relieved
Dr. Hew McLeod from the programme on the protests by the Sikh community of Canada.
http//www.sikhspectrum.com /092002/Toronto.htm,16/7/03.
32 Dr. Trilochan Singh, “Political Relations between Aurangzeb and the Sikh Gurus,” Punjab
History Conference (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1968): 100-101.
33 Many Sikh writers put responsibility of Arjun’s murder on Chandu Lal because by this, the
killing of Chandu Lal by Guru Hargobind can be justified.
34 Sayed Latif, History of the Punjab, 253-270; see details about the Gurus in Max Arthur
McAuliffe, The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1909).
35 Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1985), 79-87.
36 Zorawar Singh 9 year and Fateh Singh 6 year old.
37 D. Petrie, “Secret C.I.D. Memorandum on Recent Development in Sikh Politics, 1911,” in
The Punjab: Past and Present IV, part II (October 1970): 304-6.
38 D. Petrie, “Secret C.I.D. Memorandum,” 304-6.
39 Hew McLeod, Evolution of the Sikh Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 4.
40 A small unsewn cloth put around the head. It protected the head from sun and a blow of
Dang (stick) during a fight but pagg was used by specific persons of certain families. Safa was a thing
of common use while pagg was used by distinguished people.
41 Having a weapon like axe, spear or sword was a sign of bravery and the bold persons of any
caste could possess them which was to testify that in time of fight he would serve his community. In
the Punjabi culture, bravery was appreciated by many even in a personal fight or enmity.
42 G. C. Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 49-50.
43 Hari Ram Gupta, Later Mughal History of the Punjab, 1707-1793 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1976), 46-47.
44 Bhagat Singh, A History of the Sikh Misals (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1993), 421, 425.
45 Harpreet Kaur, “Muin-ul-Mulk (Mir Mannu) and the Sikhs (April 1748-November 1753),”
The Punjab: Past and Present XX (April 1986): 103.
46 Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Lahore: People’s Publishing
House, 1980), 142-43.
47 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 2 nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996), 106.
48 Ibid., 105.
49
Sita Ram Kohli, comp., Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records, vol. II (Lahore: Government
Printing Press, 1927), 156n.
50
Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab (Chandigarh:
Government of Punjab, 2004), 42.
51
Sikhashahi, the Sikh Rule, is a synonym for the misgovernment and oppression. Ian
Stephens, Pakistan (London: Earnest Benn Limited, 1963.), 133.
27

52 Joseph Davey Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, reprint 2002 (New Delhi: Rupa Paperback,
1849), 171-72.
53 H. L. O. Garrett, The Punjab, A Hundred Years Ago, rep. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1997), 28.
54
James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan Education
Ltd., 1991), 74.
55
Prithipal Singh Kapur and Dharam Singh, eds., Maharaja Ranjit Singh (Patiala: Punjabi
University, 2001), 259.
56 J. S. Pakkar, Muslim Politics in the Punjab (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1985),
343.
57 Dr. Tariq Rehman, “The Lingo Power,” Dawn (Karachi) 21 March 2004.
58 Garrett, The Punjab, A Hundred Years Ago, 50.
59 D. Patrie, “Secret C.I.D. Memorandum on Recent Development in Sikh Politics,” in The
Punjab: Past and Present IV, part II (October 1970): 304-6.
60 George Eaton and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of
Prejudice and Discrimination, 4 th ed. (New York and London: Harper & Row publishers, 1972), 139,
162.
61 G. W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab Since Annexation and in 1882
(Calcutta: The Superintendent of Government Printing, 1882), 33-36.
62 The Sikh students were taught the maxims of Guru Angad, Japji, a chapter of the Bhagwat,
Hanuman natak, etc. Ibid.
63 Dr. Bhagat Singh, “The Kanaihya Misal: Its Rise and Fall,” The Punjab: Past and Present
XX (April 1986): 105.
64 Nahar Singh and R. S. Gill, “Folk Songs of Punjab,” Journal of Punjab Studies 11 (Fall
2004): 187.
65 Abul Aman Amritsari, Sikh-Muslim Tareekh: Haqeeqat Kay Ainey Mein (Urdu) (Lahore:
Idara-i-Saqafat-i-Islamia, 1958), d.
66 Teja Singh, Essays in Sikhism (Lahore: Sikh University Press, 1944), 129.
67 Dushka Haider Saiyid, Muslim Women of the British Punjab, From Seclusion to Politics
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 26-27.
68 For detail on urban rural life, see Oliver Optic, Across India (Boston: Lee and Shepard
Publishers, 1895).
69 Call for prayer
70 S. R. Mahrotra, “The Early Indian National Congress, 1885-1918: Ideals, Objectives and
Organization,” in BR Nanda, ed., Essays in Modern Indian History (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1980), 4. 71It was a puritan Sikh movement. Initially, Balak Singh (1799-1861) of Rawalpindi district
started the Kuka movement nearly in 1855. Baba Ram Singh, carpenter by caste, became successor
after the death of Balak Singh in 1863. Ram Singh experienced non-cooperation, boycott and swadeshi
methods of protests for the first time in India. The Kuka movement launched anti-butchers activities
which caused Muslim-Sikh tension. The followers of the movement are also known as Namdhari
Sikhs.
72 The Babbar Akali movement during the 1920s was an anti-British drive, launched mainly by
the Sikhs under Kishan Singh Gargajj (1886-1926) who intended to drive the British out of India and to
take revenge for the Sikh killing during the Gurdwara movement He was hanged on 27 February 1926.
73 Founded on 14 December 1920 but with the name of Gurdwara Sewak Dal. It was named
Akali Dal on 23 January 1921 but on 29 March 1922, it was renamed as Shiromani Akali Dal. Dr.
Harjinder Singh Dilgeer, http://www.dilgeer.com/sadal.htm, 31-12-2003.
74 The Punjab Unionist Party was founded in 1923 to secure the interests of the agricultural
class of the Punjab under the cloak of the British administrative machinery. Mian Fazl-i-Husain and
Ch. Chhotu Ram, the Congress leaders, were the founding leaders. It was also called Ittehad Party and
Zamindara League Party or Zamindara League. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, The
Punjab Unionist Party 1923-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1999), 106n.
75 Master Tara Singh, the most prominent Akali leader during the freedom struggle, belonged
to a village of the Rawalpindi district. He was a school headmaster but later on joined the Punjab
politics as an Akali leader.
76 Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945),
133.
28

77
Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee, 1993), 88.
78
Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Chand Yadein Chand Ta’surat (Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1992), 195-96.
79
Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 11, 1940 (Lahore: Superintendent, Government
Printing, Punjab, 1941), 395.
80
Nina Puri, Political Elite and Society in the Punjab ( New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1985), 3.
81Population
in 1911
Total 19,974,956
Muslims 10,955,721
Hindus 6,722,455
Sikhs 2,093,804
Population in 1941
Total 28,418,820
Muslims 16,217,242
Hindus 7,550,372
Sikhs 3,757,401
Others 89,805.
The literate people in 1901 were only 857,000 of which 193,000 or 35% were Muslims. “Most of them
could only recite the Holy Quran.” Khalid Shamsul Hasan, The Punjab Muslim League and the
Unionists (Karachi: Ushba Publishing International, 2005), 1-2.
82
Ibid., 4.
83 nd th
It is also called Akali Movement. During the 2 decade of the 20 century, the Sikhs
struggled to capture the Gurdwaras along with their property from the Mahants, the corrupt and the
pro-government religious Hindu priests in the Sikh Gurdwaras. It ended successfully and the Akali
Sikhs entered the Sikh politics as an effective force.
84
Sanskrit word ‘Kal’ means ‘time and ‘A’ stands for ‘without.’ So Akal means ‘timelessness’
or ‘immortality.’ Guru Gobind Singh “transformed an essentially pacifist religious sect into a militant
community.” K. C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974),
17.
85
Ibid., 9.
86
Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha institute of religious studies, 1981),
40-41.
87
The Round Table Conferences (1930-32) were an opportunity provided by the British to the
Indian leaders to reach an agreed constitutional package.
88
Akhtar Sandhu, “Militarization of the Sikh Religion,” 77.
89
Khushwant Singh and Bipan Chandra, Many Faces of Communalism (Chandigarh: Centre
for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1985), 4.
90
Devinder Pal Sandhu, Sikhs in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1992), 70.
91
Hugh Tinker, Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997),
250.
92
FR, February 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
93
For example, the Muslims of the NWFP objected to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s association
with the non-Muslims and his regional role under the command of the Congress. He presented two
arguments based on religion and region. One was that the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) had also
concluded agreement with the Jews and Christians and secondly they needed some all-Indian party
which could defend their position at the national level better. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam,
and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 35.
29

CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL PUNJAB
The British took over the Punjab in 1849 and introduced several
administrative reforms. They had to manage the complex affairs of the province
which was historically under a constant stress of communalism. All the major
communities, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, possessed very strong feelings of identity and
confidence, having been rulers of the region at some point of time. The region was not
the property of any one community instead it belonged to all who had been its
inhabitants. The British were a new community who ascended the Punjab throne. The
new masters desired to have Punjab a united and peaceful land for the sake of their
own benefits, therefore, the policy ‘divide and rule’ had no place in the possible
manoeuvrings. They selected a few Punjabi families such as the Noons, Bedi,
Qureshi, Khattar and Tiwana who had rendered their support in the difficult time of
the 1857 uprising or even before and granted them several concessions like, honorary
titles, lands and administrative and judicial powers. All these people proved very
trustworthy political and administrative protagonists. After 1923 onwards, the
informal alliances between the Colonial rulers and the landowning elites were
institutionalised in the Punjab Unionist Party. This loyalist party proved a source of
strength to the British and in return they backed them in all spheres of life. All the
Punjabi communities particularly in the rural areas were living partly a peaceful life
under the principle of inter-dependence. But to live under a majority community had
been a nightmare for the minority.

After the advent of the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Sikh politics experienced a
major shift from feudal to mass leadership. The Akali leadership, somewhat
emotional due to religious fanaticism, lacked political exposure at the national level
therefore failed to suggest right direction to their community in the political crisis
which proved pernicious to their future course of action. By the end of 1930s, the
communal intentions either of the Unionist, Congress, League or Sikh political parties
had been exposed as communalist in entirety which paved the way for the separatist
tendencies. It is also true that though no serious clash occurred except the Shahidganj
Mosque issue (1935), the cordial relations between the Muslims and Sikhs could not
bring stability in the political domain. The Muslim leadership failed to assure the
Sikhs that their interests would be more secure by the political alignment to the
Muslims. The Sikhs had been critical of the Muslim Unionists throughout this period
due to their communal character and tilt towards the All-India Muslim League.
Interestingly, the League never opposed the Sikhs although it had been perceived and
projected as an enemy of the Sikh interests. The conflicting political and social issues
mostly remained unsolved and pestering, which ultimately collapsed the makeshift
arrangements of the communal harmony in the political arena. The sole Muslim
representative political party at the national level became gradually assertive in the
regional politics overriding the regional parties but this increased insecurity among
Sikhs. The traditional, moderate and feudal Sikh leadership started losing grip over
the masses and the SAD emerged as the sole Sikh party after the Gurdwara Reform
Movement 1 which soon occupied all corners of the Sikh society. In this chapter, I
have tried to trace the major dimensions of the Punjab politics and the impact of the
central politics on the regional course of political activities.
31

After annexation of the Punjab, the British introduced a number of
administrative reforms. In the reforms of the provincial boundaries, they in November
1901 created a new province NWFP by separating five districts, Peshawar, Hazara,
Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan from the Punjab. 2 The Punjab was further
reduced when in 1911 the British Government decided to shift the capital from
Calcutta to Delhi. Thus, the British Punjab at the time of the partition of Subcontinent
in 1947 consisted of five Divisions, Ambala, Jallandhar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and
Multan embracing 29 districts. 3 The main communities in the Punjab were Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs but the Muslims formed 57 per cent of the population. 4 The Punjab
was an important land for all the indigenous communities and the British as well who
developed the region as their breadbasket and sword arm of India. It was a motherland
to the Hindus who profited from the commercial and professional opportunities
arising from the colonial rule. They enjoyed special privilege being majority of India.
The Sikhs had been the ruling community of the region especially during 1770 to
1849. They had a spiritual adherence towards the land as it was the birthplace of their
Gurus. The British developed the largest canal system in the western part of the
Punjab which increased its importance.
The major portion of the Muslim population resided in the western Punjab
whose support always enhanced stature of their national leadership. They were
confident being at one time ruling community and now majority of the province. The
four religious communities namely Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Christian, had been
experiencing a complex nature of mutual interaction. Therefore, the Punjab had been
locus of communalism. In the Congress report of 1923, C. R. Das, Motilal Nehru,
Sarojini Naidu, Abul Kalam Azad, and Hakim Ajmal Khan expressed that the
situation of the Hindu-Muslim relationship in the Punjab was deplorable in all strata
32

of life. The government analysed that unity between the two communities seemed
impossible. The Congress and the government sought compatibility on the point that
the contributory factor was the shuddhi movement 5 behind the abominable state of the
communal affairs in the Punjab.
The Punjab was a hub of the political, religious and communal activities.
According to Ian Talbot, the activities of the Arya Smajist and Christian missionaries 6
reduced the number of the Sikhs during 1881 to 1891 and onward but the efforts of
the Singh Sabha movement 7 blocked the further conversions. Nina Puri is of the
opinion that during this era, thousands of Choorhas 8 embraced Sikhism. “In Ferozpur
alone, in 1881, 7,237 Choorhas converted to Sikhism and by 1891 their number
further increased to 64,333.” 9 According to D. Patrie’s Report, the annexation of the
Punjab brought the Sikh social supremacy to an end and cut its numbers as well
because due to the uncertainty about the future masters, the parents commonly
avoided to baptize their children as Sikhs. During the uprising of 1857, the Sikh
loyalty impressed upon the British who began to patronise them. 10 M. J. Akbar
concludes that during the period of 1881-1891, the Sikhs were reduced to a meagre
number. According to the different census reports, the Sikh population in percentage
remained as under:
Year Sikhs
1881 8.22
1891 8.08
1901 8.63
1911 12.11
1921 12.38
1931 14.29
1941 14.62
M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege within Challenges to a Nation’s Unity (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003),
142.
33

The Sikh educational system in the pre-British Punjab resembled that of the sister
communities of the region. All the communities arranged the primary education in
their respective holy places such as Gurdwara, Mosque and Dharamshala wherein the
religious education was the entire syllabus. The Muslim children got purely Islamic
education and the Hindu children received their own religious education. The Sikh
children used to read the maxims of their own religious heroes, teaching of the Gurus,
Japji, etc. in mixed Hindi and Gurmukhi. Apart from this, the Sikh children were
taught also the Hindu heroes and the holy stories of Hinduism. 11 This traditional
method and syllabus of the Sikh community helped them to be close to the Hindus
and get away from the Muslims. The infused Sikh religiosity in the minds of the
posterity maintained distance between Muslims and Sikhs. The Muslim children were
not taught about the Indian political history while the Sikh children studied Indian
politics relating to the relationship between the sacred Sikh personalities and the
Muslim rulers and commoners because their religion emerged in India during the
Muslim rule. Therefore, the study of the Indian politics was a part of the Sikh
religious history which infused a political understanding regarding the Indian politics.
Of course, this educational arrangement never helped in uprooting the traditional
bitterness between the two communities.
The Sikhs got relief and economic prosperity during the Sikh regime in the
Punjab and the real prosperity and identity as a religious community came with the
advent of the British in 1849 when they rendered patronage to the Sikhs whole-
heartedly under their military needs. But before it, immediately after the Anglo-Sikh
wars of 1846 and 1848, the Sikhs had lost their social, political, economic, and other
importance as the British did not absorb them immediately in the new trends of social
life. Consequently, they were out of the mainstream of life. The Sikh soldiers of the
34

Sikh army were now jobless and the British preferred Muslim recruitment in the army
and police. The Sikhs “often returned to crime to ward off starvation. There was an
explosion of armed robbery and cattle theft in the central districts of the manjha
[majha].” 12 John Clark goes into details:
Kalal caste of distillers joined and took the name of Ahluwalia…They rather prospered
under British regulation, and acquiring through wealth and political prestige social
standing of great eminence, despite their humble origin. There were indeed many dregs,
much sheer social sediment, in early Sikh society. Consider further…the sansis and other
kindred stocks in the neighbourhood of Amritsar and Lahore, especially…they hunted
and trapped animals and indulged in petty thieving. 13
Patrie’s report on the Sikhs further reveals another aspect of the British patronage of
the Sikhs that the British officers in the Sikh regiments had made routine to salute the
Granth Sahib and other scriptures just to honour the Sikhs:
Sikhs in the Indian Army have been studiously “nationalised” or encouraged to regard
themselves as a totally distinct and separate nation…. The reason of this policy is not far to
seek. With his relapse into Hinduism and re-adoption of its superstitions and vicious social
customs, it is notorious that the Sikh loses much of his martial instincts and greatly
deteriorates as a fighting machine. 14
To Ganda Singh, the Anglo-Sikh Wars generated animosity between the Sikhs and
British but the Sikhs secured the British sympathies by supporting them in the War of
1857 and became integral part of the British rule in India. Baba Khem Singh Bedi
who descended from Guru Nanak family supported the British in the war and got
several rewards such as cash, magistracy and 14,000 acres land. 15 The Sikhs had
feelings of brotherhood for England and were loyal to the Crown 16 although it was
very much surprising that eight years ago the Sikhs got humiliation in the battlefield
at the hands of the British but in 1857, they were sacrificing their lives for them. 17
But, to an eminent historian Payne, this was a stark reality that Sikhs would have
been merged into the Hindu community if they had not joined the British army. 18
On the other hand, the Muslims were held responsible for the war against the
British as Gurdial Singh writes that after 1857, 19 the Muslims were relegated to
35

ottom of the society; the British favoured the Hindus and suppressed the Muslims
because they had concluded that the ‘Mutiny’ was purely a Muslim drive. 20 This
perception caused severe pains to the Muslims whose wounds could only be healed
with some beneficial reforms. Gurdial Singh wrote, “Muslims were yet backward in
this communal wave but they were rising slowly.” 21
All the communities in the Punjab had their own anjumans or associations but
these could not meet the challenge of the new dimensions of the rapid progress under
the new political system of the new masters. The western education and the
publishing activity activated public opinion and spread the sense of identity. 22 Francis
Robinson adds that census created a sense of identity among the communities. 23 The
religious communities started organizing themselves for their political rights. The
Muslims and Sikhs founded the political parties on their own but the only party
founded by the British was the Indian National Congress. Allan Octavian Hume was
the man who worked day and night for the Congress’ sessions, having contacts with
committees and leaders, finances, preparation of reports, etc. This self-commitment
busied him throughout the year. It was only Hume who devoted himself to the
Congress and its activities until Gopal Krishna Gokhale undertook the duties in 1901.
Five British 24 had presided over the Congress sessions during 1885 to 1918. The
Congress intentionally selected the Britishers in order to prove their loyal and liberal
character. The minimum subscription was Rs. 25 and students were not allowed to
join this party. The Congress president was called ‘king of the Indians for three or
four days’ during the annual session. Delegations at the annual gathering were housed
according to their religions, status etc. 25
The Muslims adopted the mechanism set by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan which was
to be aloof from the Congress and focus on their education for a respectable place in
36

the society under the British government because the lack of western education had
put them behind the Hindus 26 and Sikhs in every walk of life. The Punjabi Muslims
strove hard to launch an educational campaign to have an effective share in
government services. The lack of higher education amongst the Muslims and resultant
deprivation from effective offices affected their position in the society. It also
motivated them to form their own organizations. They remained loyal to the British,
for their advancement like other parties were doing. The anti-imperialist parties like
the Kuka Movement, Ghadar Party, Babbar Akali, etc. had never been acceptable for
the rulers. The Congress, Khalsa National Party, 27 Shiromani Akali Dal and All-India
Muslim League had a constitutional character. In the democratic set-up, they had right
to protest to secure rights or to redress their grievances. They ideologically were
against the foreign rule but practically had accepted the constitutional and
administrative writ of the British in India. They may be called ‘anti-imperialism
loyalists.’ According to Dr. S. D. Gujrani, the character of the early Congress was a
“loyal and constitutionalist.” 28
The Congress leaders teased the Muslims by naming them flatterers and laid
blame on the government for having a soft corner for them. To J. S. Pakkar, this
propaganda and behaviour of the non-Muslim leadership moved the Muslims away
from the Congress and dragged them to separatism. 29 Ram Gopal wrote that the local
bodies which also worked as electoral colleges for the Council elections had restricted
franchise under the qualification of property and the Hindus economically were far
better than the Muslim. The Muslim leaders and the British concluded that the
political rapacity of the Hindus would not elect the other community to enjoy the
official powers. With this assumption, the Muslims demanded that “the
representatives of the Muslims should be chosen through a separate electorate.” 30
37

The imperialistic impact through the western education and the publishing
activities was a reality that brought revolutionary change in the Subcontinent. The
Indians joined the British efforts to anglicize the Indian society and organized
themselves under the nationalistic aspirations but the root of identity was ostensibly
religion. H. V. Hodson has observed, “The problem of India was essentially one of
imperialism, nationalism and internal disunity, not of race or colour.” 31 Padmasha
opines, there was no oneness in India so the “Indians had never been a nation, we
were divided by our religion, race, castes and languages.” 32 To Cotton, India was
undergoing many revolutionary changes rapidly particularly in the area of political
consciousness and all this was due to the spread of the western education. The
feelings of nationality overwhelmingly stimulated the locals to have their own
organizations. 33 Nehru remarked on the failure of the War of 1857 that the lack of
nationalistic sentiments among the Indians caused the setback in the battlefield
because “Nationalism of the modern type was yet to come.” 34 A. B. Rajput illustrates
that “Political consciousness began to grow among the people of India during the 19 th
century.” 35 Macaulay’s educational move in India was to produce “harmless petty
clerks” but “he was unconsciously putting a suppressed people on the road to
intellectual revolution which would ultimately challenge the British Imperialism on
the soil of India.” 36 Similarly, the western administrative and educational institutions
provided social mobilization and communal identity and led to a new communal
tension and animosity in the perspective of the historical Muslim-Sikh hostility. 37
Moreover, the power of the press with approximately 500 newspapers in various
vernacular languages gave a new sense of action to the locals in the political field. 38
Therefore, it is not fair to say that the British ruled over the country by the principle of
38

divide and rule 39 rather their system of education and other institutions convinced the
local leaders to start political activities in the country.
The principle of ‘divide and rule’ may be effective in a battlefield where
enemy needs to reduce the number of his opponents because this split or divide can
result in his victory. But when a conqueror becomes ruler of a country, he needs peace
and harmony in the area under his reign. Unrest, turmoil and clash cannot be
beneficial for the ruling machinery because by this they may lose their lives and
administrative grip over the state affairs. The British did not rule over the
Subcontinent under the ‘divide and rule’ policy, rather the political, educational and
administrative systems and democratic institutions unintentionally produced
nationalistic identity and induced the locals to obtain their rights more and more for
the uplift of their respective communities. The race or competition for achieving
rights was a natural outcome of the new system. As a matter of fact, the British had no
intention to divide the communities and to provoke them to fight and kill each other.
Pakkar has also the same opinion that ‘divide and rule’ had no place in the British
policies:
…the real reason was the dawn of a new spirit of communal consciousness among the
Punjab Muslims. Further, the separatist tendencies between the Hindus and Muslims of the
Punjab had their origin in a movement of religious as well as national revivalism which took
place during the second half of the nineteenth century...Gradually, the revivalist movements
took a religious as well as national form, and there arose a desire for communal
supremacy. 40
The political movement was based in the language and religion providing identity and
social mobilization. To Francis Robinson, “Politics is not just the process in which
nations are made, politics itself makes nations.” 41
The Muslim leaders always tried to work for unity among the communities
and their efforts concluded in rapprochement between the League and Congress as
both signed the Lucknow Pact in 1916. 42 This was a great achievement as the major
39

communities could prove a united front against the British. At the same time, it had
testified that the Sikhs being a Punjab-based community could not yet make a place in
the national politics and were confined to the regional politics. According to Ajit
Singh Sarhadi, no party tried to give due weightage to the Sikhs which they
deserved. 43 On the other hand, to Tuteja, the Sikhs being considered a branch of the
Hindus were ignored in the Lucknow understanding. 44
The Congress acknowledged the Muslims’ political claims for separate
representation conceding 48 per cent representation in the Punjab under the principle
of weightage. 45 To Satya Rai, the Congress lost its secular nationalist character by
conceding the separate religious identity and religious representation for the Muslims.
This pact alarmed the Sikhs 46 who could no longer be aloof from the politics at the
national level because the concluded decisions at Lucknow (1916) had affected their
status not only in the Punjab but also at the national level. Therefore, the Chief Khalsa
Dewan 47 repudiated the pact in December 1916 by sending the protest and demands to
the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. 48 According to the letter, the Dewan declared
that Sikhs would not submit to any constitutional package unless it guaranteed an
appropriate Sikh share in the provincial and national bodies. It also raised voice for
the Sikh services in the civil administration of India according to their past
importance and the present services to the British government. In August 1917, the
Sikh leaders aimed for one third representation in the Punjab. The Montagu-
Chelmsford Report of 1918 approved separate electorates for the Sikhs on the ground
of their services to the imperial army and their scattered position throughout the
province, which had blocked their proper representation. 49
The principle of weightage 50 gave more seats to the Muslims than their
numerical strength in different Muslim minority provinces. The Sikhs had been crying
40

against this adjustment till last moment while a major portion of the Muslims had also
been dissatisfied with these arrangements. The Muslim dissidents’ standpoint was that
by the principle of weightage, the Muslims had lost their strength to form
governments in the Muslim majority provinces. In November 1924, the League
proposed that modifications should be made in the Lucknow Pact so that the Muslim
majority should not “be reduced to a minority or even an equality.” 51 According to
Tuteja, the Muslims repeatedly accentuated that the Muslim majority in the Punjab
must be restored and “if weightage was to be given to the Sikhs, it should be only
from Hindu seats.” 52 Nevertheless, the new adjustment reduced the Muslim seats by
13 per cent in Bengal and 5 per cent in the Punjab but gave a big compensation in the
other provinces as follows:
Province Existing % Given %
Bombay 20 33
UP 4 30
Bihar 13 29
Madras 07 17
Source: Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Sube di Gatha, 31.
The Sikhs were given the following weightage:
Province Existing % Given %
Punjab 13 20
NWFP 10 25
Source: Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Sube di Gatha, 31.
Under these arrangements, the Muslims became dependent on the non-Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs, but on the other hand, the Sikhs deemed it an unrecoverable
injustice to their community. Therefore, the Sikh politics of the coming decades
revolved around this point. They demanded 33 per cent share in the Punjab
legislature, 33 per cent for the Hindus and the same percentage for the Muslims 53 so
41

that they could secure a balanced position in the provincial Council to meet the
Muslim domination. They also demanded the joint electorates for showing their
unremitting cooperation with the Congress.
The separate electorate, a problematic issue in the political history of India is
displayed as a British policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the case of the Muslims but not
the Sikhs. The Chief Khalsa Diwan cried for the right of separate electorate which had
already been given to the Muslims in the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. The
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab supported this Sikh demand strongly which was
ultimately included in the constitutional reforms of 1919 generally known as the
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms or Mont-Ford Reforms. Amazingly, no prominent
Congress or nationalist leader condemned the separate electorate for the Sikhs
considering it the policy of ‘divide and rule.’ The Sikhs were very happy on this
success and demanded more political concessions, which the Muslims were enjoying
as a minority in the other Indian provinces. 54 Notwithstanding, the Sikh demand for
33 per cent seats could relegate the Muslim political status in the Punjab to a minority.
Both the Hindus and Sikhs made 38 per cent of population but they were asking for
60 or 66 per cent seats in the Punjab. By accepting such a stand, the Hindu and Sikh
position in the provincial legislature would have tremendously increased which would
have denied the Muslim majority and their due share in the provincial legislature.
The issue of weightage was not a new phenomenon in the Lucknow Pact
rather it was a conflicting issue from the very outset of the British administrative
history in the Punjab. They had introduced institutions systematically in the province.
They tried to enforce feudalism and bureaucratic rule, which was suggested by the
British intelligentsia as the best system to be profited. But even then the Muslims
faced injustice in the new adjustments. In an editorial of the Paisa Akhbar, the
42

injustice to the Muslim community in the majority province was expressed with great
concern in 1913. The newspaper pointed out that the modern Punjab Council
consisted of nine governmental and fifteen non-governmental members besides
president, but there was no fair representation of the Muslims according to their
numerical strength. The paper wrote that all should see five Hindus, five Muslims,
three Sikhs and two Europeans in the Council which showed that the Hindus and
Sikhs made majority of the Council while both the communities were only 43 per cent
of the population. The Muslims were more than 55 per cent in the Punjab but the
‘followers of Islam’ had been given one-third share in the provincial Council. 55 The
Muslims also criticized the injustice towards them in the local arrangements. Chunian
was a town in Lahore district (now in district Kasur) where majority of the voters
were Muslims but there were eleven Hindus and one Muslim member in the Chunian
Municipality. The Municipality consisted of twelve members, eight elected and four
nominated. Three of these four seats were to be filled from the government servants
according to the official ranks and the government authorities were to nominate one
non-government member. During this time, Sub-Divisional Officer was Lala Labhu
Ram, Thanedar (commonly known as SHO) and doctor were also Hindus by religion
and due to the favourable conditions the Hindu candidates won seven out of eight
seats. 56 Therefore, the Municipality did not represent the majority community. So the
issue of the representation produced ill-will between the Muslims and non-Muslims.
This issue further complicated the Muslim-Sikh relations when Fazl-i-Husain
introduced the Municipal Amendment Act of 1923. Although the government had
already increased Municipalities, which increased the number in the newly created
Municipalities and the Muslim percentage went from 40 to 44% during 1917-20. The
Municipal Amendment Act of 1923, nevertheless, added more seats to the Muslims:
43

In forty-one municipalities where joint electorates had previously existed, the balance
of power remained unchanged in thirty-three cases, and the redrawing of electoral
boundaries benefited the non-Muslims in two cases and the Muslims in one case.
Where election was introduced for the first time, six municipalities were given non-
Muslim majorities and only two Muslim majorities. In the most important
municipalities, however, where communal electorates already existed, the Muslims did
derive the greatest benefit. In eighteen out of thirty-eight of these municipalities the
Muslims gained seats, whereas the non-Muslims gained only five; and in seven
municipalities, including Lahore and Ambala, the Muslims gained majorities or
equalities, whereas the non-Muslims gained majorities in only two. Where municipal
power was most substantial, therefore, the Muslims benefited most, and by 1930 their
share of the total number of municipal seats had risen from forty-four to forty-nine
percent. 57
The Hindus resented Fazl-i-Husain’s policies and even in 1923 before the passage of
the Municipal Amendment Act, they boycotted the Governor’s speech and after the
passage of the Act, they demanded the sack of Mian Fazl-i-Husain from his office for
his communal policies. 58 According to Amarjit Singh, the political atmosphere in
1924 was at the simmering point on the issue of separate electorates that was
furthered by the discriminatory policies of Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab especially in
the services, local bodies and educational institutions. 59 To Kirpal Singh, under
Dyarchy, 60 only one Sikh was to be appointed in the Governor’s Council of three
members from 1921 to 1926 but this number remained the same when the total
number increased to four during 1926 to 1937 and in the autonomous province with
six members the Sikh number was not revised. Therefore, under these arrangements,
the Sikh percentage was gradually reduced from 33 to 25 per cent in 1926 and then to
16 per cent in 1937. 61
The early 20 th century was turbulent as the repercussions of the World War I,
Rowlatt Act, 62 Jallianwala Bagh massacre, 63 Khilafat movement, 64 Akali Movement
and Babbar Akali activities put the Punjab into disorder. All of the three communities
were engaged in the protests. The Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus were struggling under
the leadership of Gandhi as a nationalist force and the communal harmony was
44

improving day by day but Gandhi without taking the leaders into confidence ended
the movement in 1922. To Yadav, Gandhi committed a blunder regarding the Punjab
situation in particular. 65 In the 1920s, the Akalis campaigned to take possession of the
Gurdwaras from the Mahants by force. The government declined their demands and
maintained the legal safeguards to the Mahants but later the government tried to
impose the legislation designed with the help of the Muslim legislators. The Sikhs
vehemently resisted considering it a manoeuvre against the Sikh religion. In 1923, the
government with the Muslim members’ support passed the Gurdwara Act but the
Akalis rejected it. The Unionist Muslims’ interference into the Sikh religious affairs
amplified the Sikh apprehensions towards the Muslims. 66 This interference convinced
the Sikh community to demand 30 per cent seats to end the Muslim statutory majority
in the province. 67 The Gurdwara Act passed by the Punjab government in 1925
induced the Akalis to trust the Unionists. This act was a message of confidence for the
Sikhs which also boosted up the leadership of Master Tara Singh. 68
The Muslims were fighting for the safeguard of the Ottoman Empire. The
Congress and the Sikhs were siding with the Indian Muslims in the religious
movement. In this scenario, the 2 nd decade of the 20 th century proved a turning point
in the Punjab as well as the Indian history. Apart from this, the division of Bengal and
then its revocation and the Congress’ agitation invigorated the spirit of nationalism in
the Indian communities. The Khilafat movement ended in an uproar but helped
organize the Muslims at the grassroots level. This was the political phase, which
confirmed the status of the communitarian identities. The other results like the
confidence in the Indian soldier, impact of the Russian Revolution, Britain’s weak
position in the War and declining economic prosperity of the local people during the
war, were the factors which infused feelings of communal nationalism in the
45

communities. 69 This situation also brought the Muslim, Sikh and Hindu communities
closer for the time being as all were agitating against the British. The Muslim Ulama
(religiously learned people) went beyond the limit of the theocratic position in the
communal harmony as Maulana Shaukat Ali said in a speech at Surat that Gandhi was
an Imam and came to guide the Muslims in place of Imam Mahdi. 70 .
Akali Sikhs
The Akalis 71 had an entirely different character in the historical accounts.
When the Sikhs established their so-called states confined to some petty areas in the
Punjab originally called Misals, 72 the Akali Sikhs remained out of these Misals’
authorities and retained their identity as “the uncompromising soldiers of Guru
Gobind Singh.” 73 At the zenith of the Sikh rule, they maintained their religious
identity by wearing blue dress and keeping arms with them. Their headquarters was
Amritsar but off and on they spread all over the Punjab as the terrorizing groups.
Ranjit Singh decided to benefit from their fanatical religiosity. He recruited 4,000 to
5,000 Akalis in his army and put them “preferably against his Mussalman enemies.” 74
He never challenged their position nevertheless, he killed about twenty Akalis in a
military campaign during the last days of his rule. 75 The Akalis had increased to lakhs
under the impact of the Gurdwara reform movement of 1920s. The passive political
and religious role of the traditional Sikh leadership provided an opportunity for the
Akalis to assume a dominant role in the 20 th century politics.
The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) became a nursing
base for providing leaders and active followers to the SAD that undertook the
evacuation of the Sikh Gurdwaras by force from the possession of the Mahants.
46

According to M. J. Akbar, the Mahants had turned the Sikh holy places into centres of
debauchery and immoral activities:
By the turn of the century, one of the places in the Punjab where you might fancy your
chances of buying pornographic literature, or bedding a prostitute, or perhaps
gambling, depending on the entrepreneurial abilities of the man in charge, was the Sikh
temple, the Gurdwara….And this astonishing decadence had touched even the holiest
of places, the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Innocent women coming to pray in the
temples were not safe; and the mahants, or priests, used to boast about this…Women
from the ‘best’ families got pregnant after a bout ‘worship.’ The mahant at Guru ka
Bagh, for instance, used to keep two mistresses, Isro and Jagdei, in addition to a regular
harem of prostitutes. Theft and drunkenness were clearly only minor crimes. 76
The Akalis decided to use force against these mahants. The SAD was a militant wing
of the SGPC, which had empowered them to use its platform and sources as they
desired. Emerson 77 wrote, “For years the central committee and most of the special
and local committees have been in the hands of the Akalis.” 78 The Akalis mostly
came from the humble social groups as Ganda Singh writes, “The Akali movement
was pre-eminently the movement of the masses, of the humble folk recruited from
amongst peasants, artisans, and labourers.” 79
The Gurdwara campaign was the only movement fought against the British laws
and won successfully by the Akalis. The Akali Jatha of 150 Sikh devotees marched
towards Nankana Sahib where the Gurdwara was under the possession of a wealthy
Mahant, Narain Das, whose men furiously retaliated and killed 130 Sikhs in an
encounter. 80 The Muslims were shocked by the poignant incident and Shaukat Ali and
Muhammad Ali visited the place to share grief and pains of the sister community. 81
But the Sikhs returned no love and continued their anti-Muslim exhortations. The
Babbar Sher published from Amritsar wrote in September 1923:
…. on the principle that the Muhammadans demand suzerainty of the Khalifa over the
Jaziratul-Arab as their holy places are situated there ‘the Sikhs claim the Punjab which
has been held in trust for Maharaja Dalip Singh.’ The trust has been violated.
“Moreover, the land of the five rivers is replete with Sikh Gurdwaras so that it itself is
practically a vast Sikh Gurdwara. So long as the Punjab does not come under the
political control of the Sikhs, neither the Sikh community can be relieved of the anxiety
about its religion nor can peace be maintained in the country. 82
47

By this, the Sikhs foretold about violence if an independent Sikh state was not
endorsed to them. At the Jaito 83 morcha, the Akalis adopted very violent reaction to
the police. The CID report of 15 September shed light on the incident that on 14
September, 100 Akalis with lathis and chavvis attacked Jaito. The groups were
resisted in which many officials were injured. The report by the SGPC stating that the
Akali movement was a non-violent struggle had been contradicted by what happened
at Jaito. 84 According to Ian Stephens, “Gandhian pacifism finds no place at all in
Sikhism as consolidated by their tenth and last guru, Gobind Singh.” 85
The Akalis were very impressed by the anti-British Babbar Akalis who stood
shoulder to shoulder with the Akali Dal in the morchas and never disowned their
appearances in such activities. As a matter of fact, the Akalis believed in the power
politics and violent actions to achieve their objectives as they declared that Swaraj
would not be achieved through requests rather ‘action’ or force was the only way to
snatch the political rule from the foreign rulers. 86 All these facts confirm that the
Akalis never gave up their traditional martial strategy to deal with the political
matters.
Bhagat Singh 87 became a revolutionary model for the Akalis and Babbar
Akalis who were quite inspired by him. The Akalis were proud to be anti-British and
took an active part on the side of the Congress as its militant offshoot. They posed to
be the cause of the decadence of the Mughal Empire and now they intended to be a
stunning blow to the British power. But the British too were responsible in
strengthening the Akali position by conceding their demands in the Gurdwara Act. 88
The Babbar Akalis too joined the Gurdwara movement but with ostensibly
violent strategy. After the government’s decision to take stern action against the
48

Babbar Akalis in November 1922, Inspector Ghazanfar Husain arrested a few leaders
in January 1923 89 and the Superintendent of Police CID Sheikh Abdul Aziz arrested
71 Babbar Akalis on 22 April 1923. 90 These incidents occurred at the time when the
Unionist Muslims were dominant in the Punjab government. The Muslim police
officers deployed by the government on the Jallianwala incident and against the
Babbar Akali activities might convince the Sikhs to perceive it as an anti-Sikh drive
by the Muslim community and increase the ill-will towards the Muslims.
The Hindus and Sikhs of the NWFP scared of the Muslim domination
(Muslim 93%) struggled for the re-amalgamation of the province with the Punjab.
The issue was discussed in the Punjab Legislative Council and divided the Council on
the communal lines. The Sikhs and Hindus opposed while the Muslims supported the
division of the Punjab. 91 In October 1922, Lala Lajpat Rai promised to work against
the division of the Punjab in Peshawar but to Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, the non-Muslims
abandoned this drive sensing that the re-amalgamation of the NWFP with the Punjab
would increase the Muslim proportion which could undermine the non-Muslims’
strength. 92
The all-India political developments always affected the regional politics. On
7 July 1925, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, challenged the Indian
politicians to frame an agreed constitution. He repeated the same in November 1927
when the Simon Commission was working on how the Indian constitutional problem
might be resolved. The Unionists asked for the communal electorates and greater
provincial autonomy. The Akali Dal and the Central Sikh League boycotted as the
Congress did while the Chief Khalsa Diwan laid stress on the Sikh reservations and
safeguards. 93 As far as the Sikh demands were concerned, despite good sentiments,
this Commission proposed nothing to eliminate the Sikh grievances particularly the
49

issue of the Sikh representation. 94 The Sikhs unanimously rejected the Simon
Commission Report in 1928 and the Akali newspaper wrote that Chhotu Ram had
signed the report to confirm the Muslim domination in the Punjab therefore the Sikh
organizations should not invite him to their functions. The newspaper further wrote
that the Punjabi Muslims’ demand for the separation of Sindh, which was not a
Punjab provincial matter indicated towards the Muslim communal vision. 95
Nehru Committee was the next forum to redress the communal issues. The
Central Sikh League, 96 the then Sikh representative political body formed in 1919,
nominated Baba Kharak Singh, Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh, Master Tara Singh,
Giani Sher Singh, Amar Singh Jhabal and Sardar Mangal Singh to protect the Sikh
rights in the Conference. The Sikh-Muslim differences could not be settled during the
first session of February and then in the session held in May 1928. The Conference
declared a Committee headed by Motilal Nehru to draw some principles for a new
scheme. Sardar Mangal Singh Gill 97 represented the Sikhs in the Committee which
was to cope with the communal representation of the Hindus and Muslims in India
and the Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab. The Committee announced its
recommendations known as the Nehru Committee Report on 19 May 1928 and put
before the All-Parties Conference in August 1928 at Lucknow for feedback by all the
relevant stakeholders. Practically there “were no provisions made specifically for the
Sikhs” 98 which infuriated them against the Congress. The Akali criticized the Nehru
Report by pointing out the Sikh-Hindu rifts and Muslim communal politics. The
Muslims too rejected the Nehru Report as it suggested the joint electorates for them.
Although the Sikhs protested against the Hindus but they were restive to restore the
status quo. The Akalis were not happy on the Sikh-Congress rift. The Editorial
published in the Akali appealed that Congress should declare at least that the Sikh
50

interests would not be damaged and surely this statement by the Congress would get
them closer to the Akalis. 99 The Sikhs could never think to sever their relations with
the Congress. Baba Kharak Singh, the president, declared boycott of the coming
session of the Congress at Lahore in 1929 but the prominent Sikh leaders opposed the
decision including Master Tara Singh who wished to work for the Sikh rights while
remaining within the Congress. The bizarre situation of the Sikh community may be
seen through the decision by the Congressite Sikhs mainly Gurdit Singh who
organized the Sikh National Party just “to prevent the Sikhs from boycotting the
Congress session of Lahore.” 100 To Prithipal Singh Kapur, after the publication of the
Nehru Report in 1928, Master Tara Singh decided to adopt new direction in the Sikh
politics however, he did not want to part with the Congress. 101 The Sikhs had
numerous complaints against the Hindus as the Arya Samajists had insulted the Sikh
Gurus in a book Satyarth Prakash by Swami Dayananda (1875). The author had
passed insulting remarks about Guru Nanak and the Granth, but even then the Sikhs
could never think to split with the Hindus. 102 The Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj
were the main Hindu organizations which initiated communal hatred against the
Muslims in the Punjab. 103 The Arya Smajists were so fundamentalist and extremist
that they did not spare even the Hindu faction, Sanatan Dharma. 104
The Congress passed a resolution on 31 December 1929 (on the bank of River
Ravi) at Lahore in which they assured the Sikhs that no communal settlement would
be conceded without their consent. According to the resolution, no solution of the
communal issue would be conceded if the Sikhs, Muslims and other minorities had
opposed. Gandhi stated later that the very resolution was passed only for the sake of
the Sikhs, “but was rationalized to placate all the communities.” 105 The Sikh folk
thought it their victory and in future they repeatedly quoted this pledge but as a matter
51

of fact the Lahore resolution or Lahore Pledge of 1929 was a severe blow to the Sikh
identity. Through this resolution, the Congress had neither addressed the core
problems of the Sikhs nor the other minorities. The language of the resolution did not
grant the Sikhs a separate and distinctive status. This was a part of the traditional
Hindu approach by which they believed Sikhism as a part of Hinduism. It did not
suggest having dialogue with the Sikhs as equal to the Hindus. Rather it conferred
some words of promise upon the people who were their subordinates and at their
disposal. This resolution was a stunning blow to the Sikh leaders who accepted their
subordinate character under the Congress. Unluckily, they could not understand the
Congress verbosity and soon resumed the pro-Congress role.
Unionists and Cross-Communal Status
The Unionist politics was a class politics and the leaders were working purely
to retain their concessions and social status. According to the British officials, the
Unionist leaders were rewarded heavily:
...the leading Unionists were rewarded with benefits-ranging from revenue grants, titles,
jobs in the local government to a seat in the Viceroy’s Council and the Secretary of
State’s Council. The Unionist ministers had also been obliging their supporters by
awarding them crown lands; Fazli started this tradition, which was continued by
Sikandar and Khizer. 106
The Unionists asserted to be a cross-communal party in the political arena but they
could not erase the label of communalists. The religious identity always maintained
its control on the political leadership as Tanwar describes that the basis of its support
was too fickle to maintain it for a long time and “even a far weaker tide than that was
created by the demand for Pakistan could have dislodged it.” 107 The relations between
the Sikhs and the Unionist Muslims remained continuously under stress. The
ambivalent character of the Unionist leaders of both the communities and the
52

government’s support made the life of that coalition possible. As a community, the
Sikhs never had trust in the Unionist Muslims therefore, according to Bajaj, direct
support to the Unionist Party among the Sikhs “was very thin.” 108
Analysing the Unionist Party, one can observe that no political party is
assessed merely on the basis of its manifesto and slogans rather on the basis of its
performance and impact of its policies. 109 The Unionist Party was supposed to work
for all the communities living in the Punjab which was also their political creed. They
tried their level best to pose to be secular and cross-communal 110 in the Punjab and in
the provincial Council. They under the coalition government ran the affairs
successfully to some extent but their performance and policies never stamped the
secular claim of the party leaders. As a matter of fact, the Muslim and Sikh members
had some religious predilections in their political agenda and programme to uplift
their own communities. Except few, the Sikhs and Hindus never liked domination of
the Muslim Unionists. Even Fazl-i-Husain who was considered a godfather of the
party was condemned on the anti-Sikh policies. Tuteja writes that the Unionists
claimed to be non-communal but their programme was entirely fraught with
communalism and they never seemed sympathetic to the Sikhs. 111 Waheed Ahmad
writes that Fazl-i-Husain performed more than any other Muslim for the Muslim
uplift 112 which confirms the communal role of the Unionist Muslims. In the year
1923, many Sikh parties wished Fazl-i-Husain down and exposed the real face of the
Muslim-Sikh Unionists’ mutual understanding when the Sikh and Hindu parties
presented a vote of censure against Fazl-i-Husain. 113 Fazl-i-Husain conspicuously
endeavored to improve the educational, economic and social condition of the Muslim
community. He established educational institutions including intermediate colleges in
Gujrat and Lyallpur, the dominantly Muslim areas. The Sikhs condemned him on his
53

communal policies. They once had appealed to Sir Edward Maclagan, the Governor,
to override the Education Minister’s measures but the objections by the non-Muslims
were entirely ignored. The authorities declared that the honourable Minister was
justified in his reforms:
For the moment, there is very justification for the attempt of a majority community,
backward in educational and political status, to raise itself to the level of its rivals. Real
harm will be done if that community passes from the constructive process of denying
equal opportunities to other members, or deliberately excluding them from the
administration. 114
Prithipal Singh Kapur writes that Fazl-i-Husain contributed in arousing the Punjabi
Muslim consciousness and the influence of the “so-called Unionist phenomenon” in
the political domain of the province. His effort should have addressed the Sikh
grievances particularly the fear of Muslim domination but contrarily his actions
weakened the Sikh position. The Municipal Amendment Act was passed in March
1923, which accelerated the pace of communal tension in the British Punjab. 115 Under
the Act, the Muslims got reasonable number of seats in the municipalities. Raja
Narendra Nath criticized the insufficient representation of the minorities suggested by
the Panchayat Act, Municipal Act and District Board Act. He alleged that the Muslim
Minister wanted to replace the competent Hindus by the incompetent Muslims in the
services. Fazl-i-Husain defended his policies by the standpoint that what the Muslims
got in the western the non-Muslims got the same position in the eastern part of the
Punjab. But the Sikhs apart from Sundar Singh Majithia who held a ministerial office
voted against Fazl-i-Husain. And even his Hindu Jat supporters showed reluctance to
support him in the tussle with the Hindus and Sikhs. 116 He himself noted twice in his
dairy during October 1930 that the “Hindus are creating a bias against me in
England.” On 3 November, he came to know through Abdul Hamid from Panipat that
54

the Hindus could kill him so he must be careful. 117 Fazl-i-Husain seemed collapsed
and dejected with such warnings. He wrote on 11 November:
Danger to me from the Hindu Mahasabhites in conjunction with the Violence Party has
increased. They have, I understand, decided to do away with me and so has been
ascertained they propose to accomplish this by the shooting method. I have always held
the view that precautions cannot protect one, though I am not for refusing to have them
taken. I do not pin much faith in them. I believe in “kismet” and so the matter ends. I do
hope they will not attempt it because if they do, Hindu/Muslim relations will be very
much estranged thereby. 118
According to J. S. Grewal, the Unionist Party asserted to represent the rural class
irrespective of the religious affiliation but the Unionist Muslims always gave
preference to the Muslim community. According to the Reform Enquiry Committee
report in 1924, Fazl-i-Husain, the Education Minister, ignored the minority interests
for the sake of the Muslims.’ The Unionists introduced separate electorates to the
local elections and the seats were reserved for the Muslims in the educational
institutions. “In 1932, they improved the proportion of Muslims in services from the
older ratio of 40, 40 and 20 for Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs respectively to 50, 30 and
20.” 119 Even then the claim to be a cross-communal party was being projected by the
Unionists but their policies and the Sikh reaction reflected their strong religious
affiliations. Therefore, the communal politics was a stark reality not only of the day
but also the history of the region. Overwhelmingly, the British benefits were a central
point to the Unionist Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus in the political and administrative
structure of the province. This stretched from the British Governor down to the ‘rural
bureaucracy’ 120 of zaildars and numbardars:
The hierarchy saw the common people obey the rural bureaucracy; the rural
bureaucracy to civil bureaucracy, the civil bureaucracy to Ministers or Assembly and
the provincial assembly to the Governor. All the segments of this order worked very
efficiently and loyally to maintain the hold on the public and private affairs of the
Punjabis. 121
55

Furthermore, the Unionist Muslims were encamped into Noon and Sir Sikandar
groups 122 which restrained their original role to play in the Punjab politics.
The Khalsa National Party had been with the Muslim Unionists in the
provincial affairs. As a ruling class, Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia remained with the
Muslim feudal. Sir Sikandar’s father had friendly relations with Dyal Singh Majithia
who chaired the first meeting of the Sikh Educational Conference. 123 But in the
communal sphere, he with the other Sikh groups remained always critical of the
Muslim Unionists. Their main objection was that the Muslim Ministers were working
purely for the Muslims. By this mindset, the Sikhs seemed alarmed by the reforms
introduced by the Muslim Ministers. On 7 November 1922, when the Akali Morcha
of Guru Ka Bagh was in progress and Fazl-i-Husain introduced the Gurdwara Bill to
relieve the tension going on between the Sikhs and the Government, his effort could
not produce the required ends because all was going on without the Sikh consent. Sir
Sundar Singh opposed the Gurdwara bill discussed by Fazl-i-Husain and other
members. 124 A Select Committee was formed consisting of the five Sikh MLCs but
four of them never joined the meetings while Bawa Hardit Singh Bedi too deserted
after attending a few meetings when his community motivated him to refuse as the
other members did. This situation made “quite clear that even the moderate section of
the Sikh member in the Legislative Council was against Fazli Hussein’s measure.” 125
Though the Khalsa National Party opposed the Muslim Unionists’ policies yet it could
not secure a soft corner among the Akalis because the feudal party was “a big
problem for the Akalis.” 126
When the electioneering campaign was in progress and Sir Sikandar was
making grounds for the party, a political incident took place, which exposed the Sikh-
Unionist Muslims’ relations. The election for the Punjab Council President in which
56

Sardar Buta Singh, the Deputy President of the Council, challenged the Unionist
nominee Sir Chhotu Ram who had been one of the top Unionists. Interestingly the
urban Hindu members stood against Chhotu Ram that made the position of Sardar
Buta Singh very strong in the contest. 127 But the result was very shocking for the Sikh
parties, as Chhotu Ram was declared successful with 56 votes while Sardar Buta
Singh could receive only 28 votes. The Sikh parties listened about the defeat very
uncomfortably and most of the Sikh members protested, walked out and left the
Chamber. 128 In 1937, the non-Muslim members of the Punjab Assembly tried to oust
Sir Sikandar from the Premiership through a no-confidence motion and for this
purpose they collected 16 lakh rupees under the leadership of Sardar Baldev Singh.
They planned replacing Sikandar with Nawab of Dera Ghazi Khan but not a single
Muslim member consented to be a part of the moneyed conspiracy. 129
The Akali Sikhs always remained alarmed of the communal character of the
Unionist Party dominated by the Muslims whose “primary interest was the Musalman
Jat; the Sikh Jat was of secondary importance.” 130 Although the Muslim Jats were not
a focus point of the Unionist Party but this statement reveals that the Unionist
government was working for the Muslims. It is worth mentioning that the rules and
regulations of the Unionist Party set their allies free to work on the communal line
according to the community stand if there was no agreement on any issue. 131 So, the
foundation of the party was very weak. Their leaders wanted to enjoy only in the
government-making activities and were least interested in improving the communal
relations between the Muslims and the non-Muslims.
Round Table Conferences
Gandhi started Civil Disobedience Movement on 6 March 1930 in which the
Akalis participated enthusiastically. To Master Tara Singh, the Sikhs considered it a
57

suicidal act to be aloof from the movement launched by the Congress at the national
level. He worked in the Punjab Congress Working Committee during this era when he
was arrested at Peshawar for helping the Pathan Satyagrahis. 132 The Round Table
Conference was another British effort to give an opportunity to the Indian leaders to
arrive at some agreed constitutional settlement. Sardar Sampuran Singh 133 and Sardar
Ujjal Singh 134 represented the Sikh community. Sardar Ujjal Singh presented the Sikh
memorandum in which he presented different options to solve the Sikh question. He
pleaded his case on the basis of Sikh ruling status, revenue the Sikhs had been paying
and services rendered to the British:
If the Muslims refuse to accept in this province, where they are in a slight majority in
population (56 per cent.), anything but their present demand of a reserved majority. We
ask for a territorial re-arrangement which would take from the Punjab the Rawal Pindi
and Multan divisions (excluding Lyallpur and Montgomery districts)…These
overwhelmingly Muslim districts, with a population of seven millions, can either form
a separate province, which will give the Muslims another majority province, or be
amalgamated with North-West Frontier. This re-arrangement would leave a Punjab of
about sixteen millions in which no single community would have an absolute majority
and each community would be obliged to conciliate the others. 135
Interestingly, Pandit Nanak Chand of the Punjab Hindu Mahasabha in the same
conference laid stress on the re-demarcation of the Punjab keeping the religious
affiliation in mind. He demanded an impartial boundary commission to draw a line
under the Indian federation. 136 After the Gandhi-Irwin pact on 5 March 1931, Gandhi
before leaving to join the RTC, talked to different leaders on the communal question.
The Sikh delegation under Master Tara Singh handed over the 17 Sikh points initiated
by the Central Sikh League 137 conceding him as the Sikh representative in the RTC.
These points mainly included redrawing “the boundaries of the Punjab to give larger
representation to the Hindus and Sikhs in addition to reservation of seats for the Sikhs
on the basis of joint electorates.” 138 The nationalist Sikhs like Sardul Singh Caveeshar
rejected 17 points considering them as the 14 points of Jinnah. Master Tara Singh
58

admitted his communal role when he replied to Gandhi that communalism could be
challenged with communalism. 139
The Indian debates and memoranda at the RTC could not settle the communal
issue therefore “the British government was requested to give its own verdict on the
communal question” 140 which announced the Communal Award in 1932. It awarded
19 per cent seats to the Sikhs in the Punjab but this too could not please the Akalis
and they opposed the League and the Unionists because both the parties, to them,
were working for the Muslim rights. The most interesting thing was the Sikh demand
of “territorial arrangements of Punjab at the 2 nd Round Table conference.” 141 In 1932,
according to Sardar Kapur Singh, the British Government offered the Sikhs some
attractive concessions “if they dissociate finally with the Congress movement.” 142 To
Sir Sikandar, in 1932, the Muslim, Hindu and 11 or 13 Sikh leaders had put their
signatures on an agreement for joint electorates but someone convinced the Sikhs not
to do so. 143
The Sikh seats according to the weightage were as under:
Province Total Seats Sikh Seats
Punjab 175 33 144
NWFP 50 3
Central Legislative Assembly 250 6
Council of States 150 4
Source: Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 232.
After the publication of the Communal Award, the Sikh leadership at Simla declared
that the Sikhs had lost their trust in the justice and fair-play of the British. Amazingly,
the pro-government and the sober-minded Sikh leaders like Sardar Majithia and
Sardar Jogindra Singh, the Punjab Minister, were also among the signatories of the
Sikh pledge against the package. Sardar Ujjal and Sardar Sampuran sent their
resignation to the Viceroy from the membership of the Consultative Committee as
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protest against the Muslim raj in the Punjab awarded by the Communal Award. They
declared, the coming constitutional structure would be more painful than the present.
The Sikh organizations had already launched a violent campaign against the Muslims
in the region but the Award sped up the antagonistic activities against them. 145 To A.
S. Narang, the Akalis snubbed the Communal Award and the Congress’ policy of
neutrality. They alleged that the Congress was neutral just for gaining the Muslim
support. They held all-parties Sikh Conference at Lahore on 28 July 1932 and rejected
the Award but their policy caused a split in its own party while “too few and divided
Sikhs could not do much, and the British Parliament approved the award by enacting
the Government of India Act of 1935.” 146
The RTC is a landmark in the Sikh history which exposed several weak
dimensions of the Sikh politics including leadership crisis, demand of the Punjab
partition and extraordinary allegiance to the Congress command. During these years,
the Hindu leadership kept on neglecting the Sikh interests. The decision to appoint
Gandhi as a Sikh representative was a submissive character or failure of the Sikh
leadership. The Sikh panth had given this right to its own leaders but they handed it
over to the Hindus for flattery otherwise Gandhi had never been an advocate of the
Sikh cause. On the other hand, by participating in the RTC, Master Tara Singh could
have an opportunity to get along with the leaders which could enhance his exposure
among the top Indian leadership but he did not avail this opportunity and remained
involved in the regional politics. The Government of India Act of 1935, according to
Jaspreet Walia, forced the Akalis to win over the Congress to gain an effective
political strength against the Muslim domination and the Khalsa National Party.
Furthermore, the Akalis were natural allies to the Congress when they pledged for the
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Indian independence although this was merely a lip service by the Congress
leadership. 147
Issue of Shahidganj Mosque 148
The Muslim-Sikh relations remained strained because of the fracas over the
Shahidganj issue. The Muslim religious parties and organizations started mass
campaign to gain control of the Mosque. The Shahidganj issue incessantly had been
the jerking blow to the Muslim-Sikh relations in the Punjab. The Gurdwara including
Mosque was under the Sikh control during the Sikh rule. After the British took power
from the Sikhs, the Muslims started a struggle to regain the control of the Mosque but
unluckily according to the British laws the Muslim case was not strong because it
lacked the required legal documentary proof and physical possession.
The religio-political leadership of the Muslims motivated the people to
sacrifice their lives for the sake of the sacredness of the Mosque, the daughter of
Ka’ba. To Janbaz Mirza, before this clash, when Mian Fazl-i-Husain was a Minister,
the Gurdwara Act was presented (1925) and the Sikhs needed the Muslim votes for its
passage. It was the right time to adopt the policy of ‘give and take’ to resolve the
Shahidganj issue but they did not show interest in it. 149
At the mid-night of 28-29 June 1935, a Sikh, Mela Singh, started demolishing
the Mosque but incidentally he fell and passed away. On listening this, the Muslims
rushed towards the Mosque but the DC prevented them from serious clash by assuring
the Muslims about the status quo of the building until the court decision. 150 Sir
Sikandar government never favoured the Muslim protesters and followed the legal
position of the Shahidganj directed by the Governor. 151 On 4 July 1935, the Muslim
leaders including Janbaz Mirza, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Syed Habib talked to
the Sikh leadership on the issue but Master Tara Singh said that the Muslim jathas
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were roaming in the streets and their newspapers were threatening the Sikhs.
Therefore, they could not talk to the Muslim leaders. Maulana Zafar put his cap in
Tara Singh’s feet as to impress him under the Punjabi tradition but Tara Singh rudely
rejected the Muslims’ request and threatened to occupy all the famous Mosques
claiming to be originally Hindu sacred places. He further prophesied that if there
would again be the Muslim rule in India they would occupy all the Hindu and Sikh
sacred places. At that moment, Janbaz Mirza reminded Master Tara Singh that the
Sikh Jathas and the Muslims were rushing towards the place and the Sikh leaders
should think about the dangerous situation; both the communities were to live
together in the same country; what would be the impact of that attitude on the rural
Sikhs and Muslims who were being dragged towards violence; and that the Sikh
leaders must adopt a positive behaviour towards the sacred places of the Muslims.
Master Tara Singh agreed to give the Mosque a sacred status under the Sikh
possession but Maulana Zafar Ali refused to concede this offer. 152 This is to note that
on the issue of Shahidganj, Master Tara Singh presented himself as a champion of the
Hindu rights. He asked the Hindus for full support on the Shahidganj issue. Although
they helped the Sikhs but this was insufficient to satisfy the Akali leader who had to
say, “the Congress would keep aloof even if Muslims attacked the Golden
Temple.” 153
The Unionist Muslims seemed under great stress and ultimately adopted the
official policy considering that the Muslim claim on the Mosque was not justified.
The British were facilitating the Sikhs who were busy in construction of the building
without passing through official process. Firoz Khan Noon wrote to Fazl-i-Husain on
8 August 1935 that the Sikhs had no approval of the Municipality for the construction
at the site of the Mosque therefore it was against the law. He also pointed towards the
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itterness pervasive throughout the Punjab. He further expressed that in “the central
Punjab districts where the Sikhs carry swords and Mussalmans do not, the Sikhs have
become very truculent.” 154 The Unionist government was fully aware of what was
happening on the Mosque issue but they remained submissive and did not let the bill
prepared by Malik Barkat Ali come to the provincial legislature. According to Sir
Sikandar, the pro-Muslim decision in the provincial Assembly could start a new war
on the worship places between the Muslim and the non-Muslim communities;
moreover, the Governor and the Governor-General were not likely to approve a
purely anti-Sikh bill even if the Muslim Unionists had passed it. By such legislation,
the Muslim minorities would have to face many problems in the other provinces. 155
On the request made by K. L. Gauba (member of Central Assembly from Punjab), the
Governor and Allama Mashraqi, 156 Jinnah arrived at Lahore to handle the sensitive
situation. People from all the communities welcomed Jinnah’s arrival and several
parties paid homage to Jinnah’s services. He had discussions with the leaders of both
the communities and Governor Emerson. He met the Sikh leaders and suggested to
them to conclude an amicable settlement acceptable for all those living in the Punjab.
He announced a joint committee 157 to solve the matter. 158 His visit affirmed his status
as a sole Muslim leader in the Subcontinent. This issue exposed the fragility of the
cross-communal coalition of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh representatives in the
Punjab. It also signified Jinnah’s firm belief in non-violence and its recognition from
Sikhs, Muslims, Unionists and the Governor.
The Akali politics as usual remained anti-Muslim. On the issue of Shahidganj,
the Akali Dal took oath from every Sikh candidate to take part in the protection of the
Gurdwara Shahidganj which all the Sikhs did including Sardar Majithia. 159 According
to the Governor, Baba Kharak Singh used fanatical and irresponsible language in the
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speeches just to be in the limelight and was basically responsible for the trouble and
excitement on the Shahidganj issue. 160
The Muslims were not prepared to surrender their claim over Shahidganj
Mosque. In the beginning of 1940, a Muslim student attacked three Sikhs in the
Gurdwara Shahidganj. In the police investigation he told the SSP, Gainsford that he
could not tolerate the Muslim sacred place under the Sikh possession. 161 The issue of
Shahidganj proved havoc for the Muslim-Sikh relations. It also exposed the Unionist
Muslims’ weak stand towards a purely religious issue. They just wanted to bury this
issue forever to save themselves from its repercussions. Otherwise, if new legislations
could be done to deal with the Akali movement then they could find a reasonable
solution for this problem also. The best solution evidently could be the restoration of
sacred status of the Mosque and Gurdwara to both the communities. But the Unionist
Muslims used the legal position as an excuse to avoid the nuisance of the Akalis.
Under these circumstances, the Unionist Muslims earned ill-will among the Muslims
which resulted in the decay of the party in the long run.
Punjab Politics and Elections of 1937
During the 1930s, the League is said to have been a weak party but actually, it
had successfully maintained its status among the Muslims. The League leadership was
confined to the centre and did not try to be effective in the masses because it never
launched any movement which required the support of masses. It had not yet adopted
a policy of direct interference into the regional politics instead it had given a free hand
to the regional parties supposing that their support was on its back. It was the period
when the prominent Muslim leaders preferred the regional Muslim parties as Sir Agha
Khan started supporting the Unionist Party financially. 162 In this situation, Jinnah
undertook to re-organize the League in early 1935 and for this purpose he approached
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Fazl-i-Husain with an invitation to preside over the Lucknow session of the League.
Fazl refused due to the fear that his tilt towards the League could oust the Muslims
from the Premiership of the Punjab. The party politics of the Unionists was also a
reason for his refusal. The groups of the Unionist Muslims within the party had their
own pursuits particularly the leadership of the party and the Premiership as no faction
was in favour of his return from the centre to the Punjab politics. 163 Under this
pressure, Fazl-i-Husain was not ready to invite new problems by joining hands with
the League. 164 Khalid Bin Sayeed wrote that “Jinnah did not make any headway in the
Punjab” 165 but the factual position was that he activated the party in the Punjab
politics with more vigour and enabled it to challenge the Unionist Muslims in the
coming elections and to create links with other Muslim parties.
The SAD launched its election manifesto with the promise that the party
would achieve Indian freedom and oppose the Communal Award. It also pledged to
counter the struggle on Shahidganj possession by the Muslims. Kirpan issue and Sikh
interests were given prominent place in the election manifesto. 166 The Sikhs and the
Congress made a few adjustments in the constituencies 167 which projected the
confused policy of the Akali leadership. The Congress got majority in eight out of
eleven provinces. The League won only two seats in the Punjab. Beside 16 seats of
independent candidates, the party position was as follows:
Party Seats
Ahrar 02
Muslim League 02
Shiromani Akali Dal 11
Khalsa National Party 13
Hindu Mahasabha 12
Punjab Unionist Party 98
Ittehad-i-Millat 02
Indian National Congress 18
Congress Nationalist Party 01
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Source: K. C. Yadav, “The Partition of India,” 133-34.
The election results expressed the popular trend of the Punjab politics. The Akalis
replaced the leadership of the landed aristocracy. The League as a democratic party
tried to have an alliance with other political groups as the Congress and Akali Dal had
done but could send only 10 candidates to contest elections. 168 This had prepared the
League leadership to face the weak performance in the coming elections. The League
leadership was satisfied with the results because the principal aim of the League was
to challenge the regional parties particularly the Unionist Party whose leadership had
clearly defied Jinnah. Although, the League did not get encouraging response in the
Punjab nevertheless, it did not replicate it in other provinces. The main reason of the
failure was a short time with Jinnah to reorganise the party after his return to India a
year before from UK.
Overall Results of the Elections of 1937
Province Actual Seats Cong. Won Percentage
Bengal 250 35 14
NWFP 50 19 38
Punjab 175 18 10
Sindh 60 8 13
UP 228 133 58
Source: Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, 108-9.
The Congress secured no effective position in the elections in the Punjab and lost the
claim to be a representative of all the Indian communities. In UP, the Muslim
Congressites were strong but “no Muslim was returned on the Congress ticket.” 169
According to Uma Kaura, “The only redeeming feature for the League was that the
performance of Congress in the Muslim majority areas was also not impressive.” 170
The Akali politics set the target to let down the other Sikh parties in the
elections. The SGPC provided workers, funds and religious support which helped
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them in making an assertive place in the provincial politics. They put huge amounts of
money in the elections which damaged their status among the administrative
authorities. This corruption in the Gurdwara funds was taken up in the Governor’s
letter to the Viceroy. 171 Emerson wrote that the “Akali successes would have been
fewer had they not used religious funds for the purpose of bribing the electorates.” 172
The major parties could not perform well in the Punjab but the real politics and show
of power started after these elections.
Popularity of the Muslim League
Apparently poor performance of the League in the Muslim majority provinces
did not damage its political character. It was a pre-election assessment that the League
would be unable to show revolutionary results because it could send less than a dozen
candidates in the elections. 173 Jinnah remained an effective voice at the national level
because he could counter the Congress leadership on equal terms. 174 He was also
well-connected with many of the prominent Muslim families throughout the
country. 175 Ahmad Yar Daultana (1896-1940) expressed deep regards for Jinnah 176 as
he wrote to Jinnah, “I have considered you my leader during the last 25 years and
have always been loyal to you.” 177 His key role to bring Sir Sikandar close to Jinnah
had positive impact on the Muslim politics in the Punjab because it resulted in the
Jinnah-Sikandar Pact in 1937. 178
The position of Jinnah was confirmed and he asserted himself in the Punjab
politics within a short span of time. He claimed that the League would be in a position
to challenge any party in the country in the near future. 179 His assertion came true as
the League gradually captured the masses who were the base for the politics whereas
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the Unionists could not do this despite being in power. According to the Pioneer,
Jinnah got deep footing “within about a year of his launching the programme.” 180
Jinnah-Sikandar Pact
By the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact at Lucknow on 15 October 1937, Sir Sikandar
promised that the Unionist Muslims in the Assembly would become the League
members. The interesting aspect of the pact is that as to why Sir Sikandar agreed to
follow Jinnah. The Muslim Mass Contact Movement of the Congress 181 actually
moved Sikandar to join the League camp because he had already been disturbed a lot
by the Sikhs and Hindus particularly belonging to the Congress. The Akalis rendered
wholehearted support to the Congress as Master Tara Singh seconded Nehru and
stated that “the Premier was a stooge for the British, and that he was consolidating the
Muslim position in the Punjab.” 182 The other factor of the Pact was the natural
sympathy of the Unionist Muslims towards the League which could be problematic in
the future for the Premier. Sikandar, well aware of the League’s status at all-India
level, knew that it was the only effective voice of the Indian Muslims. 183 Yadav
contended that Sikandar was dictated by the British to strengthen the League and its
leadership. 184 Yadav misperceived the situation due to the non-consultation of the
primary sources such as the Punjab Governor’s fortnightly reports which confirmed
that Sir Sikander’s decision to approach Jinnah was quite surprising for the British. 185
The factual position was that the Punjab Premier came to the conclusion under some
specific circumstances that he could hardly survive against the Congress and Akalis
without the League support. Sangat Singh is of the pinion that by this pact, “the
Unionists committed the same blunder that the Akalis had committed earlier by
making Akali legislators to accept Congress discipline.” 186 The Akali-Congress patch-
up moved Sir Sikandar to secure the League support. Qalb-i-Abid attributed the pact
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to Sikandar’s war efforts which sought League’s support in the ongoing war but this
tilt and League’s popularity badly disturbed the Sikhs. 187
The Jinnah-Sikandar Pact proved strength for the Unionist Muslims and the
League but on the other hand it increased bitterness between the Muslims and
Sikhs. 188 Sir Sikandar was less aware about the side-effects of this pact 189
nevertheless, the pact assured the coalition partners to maintain the existing
arrangements in the provincial Assembly. Emerson hailed the popularity of Sir
Sikandar among the Sikhs which did not let the coalition collapse. The Premier
enjoyed friendly relations with Raja Narendra Nath who had convinced Dr. Gokal
Chand Narang to cancel an anti-Unionist Muslim conference which was scheduled to
be held in Lahore. 190 However, the Akali Sikhs cried against the Jinnah-Sikander Pact
and perceived it an anti-nationalist conspiracy. The Akalis and Hindus held a meeting
at Rawalpindi in November 1938 under Baldev Singh in which the speakers
condemned the Unionists. They also motivated the Sikhs to join the Congress. 191
Sajjad Zaheer, an eminent Communist, commented that the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact was
“a short-sighted policy on the part of the League.” 192
In December 1937, the Governor of the Punjab wrote to the Viceroy that the
Unionist Ministers seemed least interested in holding public meetings while the
Communists and the Congress were increasing their influence among the masses.
According to the reports, the Premier seemed interested in the trivial administrative
issues in the province. 193 All these circumstances weakened the Unionists’ hold in the
province.
The League started gaining roots in the Muslim masses gradually but the
reactionary attitude of the Congress ministries popularized the League and increased
its importance among the Indian Muslims. Even before the Lahore Resolution was
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passed, a huge number of the Muslims had gathered under the League banner. In
January 1939, approximately 25,000 Muslims participated in the League meeting at
Patna. The journalists presented the League as the sole Muslim representative party.
Hasan Nizami, an editor of a magazine, Munadi, stated that the rulers and the
Congress must witness this popularity and accept the reality of the League’s stature.
He praised Jinnah for his sagacity in dealing with rival communities on the communal
issues. 194 However, the Congress showed no prudence and tried its level best to
defame the League without realizing that, this policy was pernicious to their political
agenda to establish a united India. The contemporary journalists criticized the
Congress behaviour but the Congress leadership was intoxicated with the idea of
Hindu chauvinism. The League’s participation in the regional politics “caused cracks
in the anti-League and pro-British fort in the Punjab.” 195
The biased performance of the Congress ministries put a stamp on the Two-
Nation theory and the Muslims were forced to believe what the League had been
propagating regarding the cruel mentality of the Hindu majority towards the Muslims.
The debate in the British Parliament on the point ‘either the Congress ministries’ anti-
Muslim drive should be probed or not’ was discouraged with the argument that it
would cause communal clashes in India. 196 Jinnah remarked on the Congress rule that
the Congress was behaving like a poor man winning a big sum of money in a lottery
and was intoxicated by the power. He also indicated that the Congress policy of
ignoring the League was not a sane behaviour. It would be the greatest blunder of the
Congress leadership if they thought that by sidelining the League any solution to the
constitutional problem was possible. To achieve the agreed settlement, the Congress
would have to learn “to respect the other parties.” 197
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Decaying Unionist Party
The Muslims were facing very hard time where they were at the disposal of
the non-Muslim countrymen. Their number was reduced through the false evidence in
the census. In January 1939, Hasan Nizami writing in an editorial about the coming
census said that the Congress believed that the League was an impractical
organization and it had joined hands with the British against it. He suggested to
Jinnah to work against the expected irregularities by the non-Muslim machinery in the
coming census. The non-Muslim officials deliberately wrote the Hindi language as the
mother tongue of the Muslims which decreased the number of the Muslim voters. He
quoted his example that he met the voting criteria but his name was not there in the
voters’ list. Therefore, he requested Jinnah that ninety million Muslims had been
registered by heart as the Leaguers therefore it was the duty of the League to launch a
Muslim census to collect the real figures of the Muslim population. 198
Famine in the Punjab during the World War I was proving much supportive to
the League and destructive to the Unionist government. The League started a
campaign to provide ‘aata’ (flour) and other necessities of life to the people of the
Punjab which helped to create a soft corner in the minds of the Punjabi Muslims for
the League. The people of Gurgaon, Rohtak and Hissar had suffered a lot due to the
famine and appealed to the Punjab government to facilitate them by providing silage
for the cattle and clothes and food for the affected by following the examples of the
past Muslim rule. The Punjab Premier had already issued many political statements,
which could not satisfy the needy 199 because nothing practical was done.
In the coming years, the shortage of the goods and commodities engulfed the
popularity of the Unionist government. People had the buying capacity but due to the
war and essentials of daily life were not available. The peasants grew food crops and
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secured high prices but had to use their money to take back their mortgaged lands.
Anyhow, the people could not obtain cloth, iron, cement, sugar and kerosene, which
increased the anti-Unionist government sentiments in the Punjab. The Unionist Party
functioned with the financial help of the agriculturist magnets but due to the
depression the party suffered from the “financial stringency.” Though the Sikh and
Hindu contractors were earning a lot under the government patronage but collectively
the party was badly affected by the decrease in funds. 200
Muslim Separatism and Sikhs
Religion awarded identity to the Punjabi communities and moved them to save
their political, economic, cultural, religious and social rights. Tuteja writes, “Religion
was made an agent to mobilise the community for political gains and politics to
consolidate religious bonds.” 201 The Muslims and Sikhs were separate communities as
they had been distinctive throughout the past history. The Muslims remained separate
from the rest of communities considering it the Islamic philosophy whereas the non-
Muslims joined hands together. Socially both the Muslims and Sikhs tried to be united
as friends without losing their separate identity.
The arrogant Hindu leadership was keen to rule over complete Subcontinent
whereas the Sikhs needed their own Punjab while the Muslims claimed for the
Muslim majority areas as a Muslim state. The politically well aware people sensed the
subtle situation of the communal gulf between the Muslim and non-Muslim
communities, which was ostensibly dragging the country towards separation. They
proposed to the responsible Hindu politicians to ponder over the situation and suggest
some remedy, well in time to avoid unrecoverable loss to the Indian integrity. Lala
Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) in November-December 1924 had suggested partition of the
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Punjab as a solution to the on-going communal problem. 202 All these political
developments convinced the Sikhs to be united for some independent political
direction. To Sangat Singh, the Hindu and the Muslim apathy towards the Sikh
interests motivated them to look “to the British for fulfilment of their aspirations.” 203
Kirpal Singh opines that Sardar Ujjal Singh laid stress on the re-distribution of
the Punjab boundaries in retaliation to the suggestion by the Chief Secretary Geoffrey
Corbett who in the 2 nd Round Table Conference suggested separation of the Ambala
Division minus Simla District from the Punjab and amalgamation into the United
Provinces. 204 Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, in his presidential address at Allahabad in 1930,
had indicated towards the Muslim destiny as a separate nation in the Muslim
dominant areas by separating Ambala Division from the Punjab. 205 This was resented
by the Sikh intelligentsia. To Uma Kaura, his solid perception to have a Muslim state
in the northwest of India created unrest in the Hindu Mahasabha circles. On the
provocation from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikh demand for re-distribution of the
areas of the Punjab complicated the political situation. Furthermore, they insisted on
the similar protection as given to the Muslim minority in the Hindu majority
provinces. 206 To Satya M. Rai, Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s scheme of a Muslim state
upset the Sikhs very much because it could result in the division of the Sikh
community. A delegation presented demands signed by 64 eminent Sikhs to the
Viceroy which included 30 per cent representation and partition of the Punjab in such
a way that Muslim majority areas should be merged into the NWFP. 207
In June 1931, the Manchester Guardian analyzed that the Indian Muslims’
insistence on the separation of Sindh from Bombay revealed the fact that they were
going towards the partition because they seemed not satisfied with the Hindu
treatment on the issue of the Muslim rights. Even the proposed federal system was
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fraught with horrors and fears for them and the major factor of that approach was the
Hindu majority, which could engulf them in the Indian federation. 208 The newspaper
rightly sensed the separatist tendency in Muslim community but the Hindus did not
realize the consequence of the problem and kept on infuriating the Sikhs against the
separation of Sindh from Bombay. 209
Sikhs and the Congress
As a sub-nation, Sikhs were under pressure of the Hindus in the Punjab. They
being minority were forced to seek the Hindu support in the council or legislature or
out of it. While having no voice at national level, they had to be dependent on the
Congress. Being a regional party, every Sikh organisation required the backing of
Congress. On the other hand, they were fighting with the League which had been
working at the national level with a big stature and representation in most of the
Indian provinces. The Hindu leadership kept a firm hold on the Sikhs by its all-India
character and the political support. For this very reason, the Sikhs always remained
with Congress, no matter their demands were ignored, their leadership and even
religion was humiliated by the Hindus and the Congress leadership. Master Tara
Singh in 1930 considered it a suicidal step if the Sikhs kept themselves aloof from the
Congress struggle. 210 The Intelligence Bureau report relates that the Congressmen had
“no sympathy with the Akalis, except as enemies of Government.” 211 Anyway, Master
Tara maintained the same perception throughout his career in the united India. Sikhs
from all the parties had the same attachment to the Congress as Master Tara had.
Master Tara as Akali leader and Sohan Singh Josh as communist leader enjoyed dual
membership i.e., of the Sikh party and the Congress. But it was not a one-sided
approach; the Congress or Hindu leadership had made efforts to achieve the Akali
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confidence by standing with them in the crisis-packed situation. The Congress
leadership including Khilafat leaders supported the Akalis’ action at Jaito. Nehru
visited the Sikh protesters and was arrested along with the other Congress leaders. 212
At Amritsar, the Hindu and Khilafat leaders held All-India Congress Working
Committee meeting but, due to the quorum issue they concentrated on the informal
conferences at Amritsar. However, the leaders concluded a resolution in a “closed
door” meeting to have a Special Committee consisting of Akalis with two
Congressmen. The committee was supposed to give advice to the Akalis in the on-
going Sikh agitation. Dr. Kitchlew and Jawaharlal Nehru were among the newly
formed committee. Punjab Provincial Congress and Khilafat Committee gave
financial help of Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively to the Akalis. Lala Lajpat Rai
played an important role despite his ill-health. According to the Intelligence Bureau
report in November 1923, the Committee also directed the Congressmen to “become
associate members of the Akali Dal.” 213 The participation and arrest of the top
Congress leadership for the Sikh cause was an encouraging step which pleased them
to the core. Central and the Punjab Congress leadership contributed a lot to impress
upon the Sikhs. The League most of the time remained away from the Sikh agitation
while the Khilafatists had no recognition other than a pro-Congress faction.
Therefore, the Congress leaders secured Sikh sympathy and carved an image in their
minds as the supporting community.
Nevertheless, Gandhi had his own vision and refused in 1924 to support the
Akalis at Jaito unless they persuaded that the movement would neither be anti-Hindus
nor aimed at “the establishment of Sikh Raj.” 214
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Muslim-Sikh Friendly Relations
Despite political rivalries, the united Punjab saw many bright aspects in the
Muslim-Sikh relations. Western historians opine that at first glance the Sikhs in their
daily life and religious beliefs are closer to the Muslims rather than Hindus. 215 Guru
Nanak Dev learnt Persian and acquired traditional Muslim education and furthermore
included 112 slokas and 4 lyrics of Baba Farid Ganj-i-Shakar in the Granth compiled
by the 5 th Guru, Arjun Dev in 1604 A.D. 216 Guru Granth contains numerous couplets
stamping the Islamic heritage as true and immortal. The Muslim rulers like Mughal
emperor Akbar donated land while Guru Gobind Singh enjoyed the Muslim support
from Pathans and Syeds of Sadhaura (district Ambala). 217
In the Punjab, Muslims and Sikhs had been converted from Hinduism to their
new religions but the nature of their relationship with each other did not change in
entirety. People from the same clan accepted the new religion, Islam or Sikhism,
whichever they liked. A family (on caste basis) would represent the two or more
religions, Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism simultaneously. Sikhs had a lot of respect for
the Muslim saints and the Muslims honoured Guru Nanak Dev. Sakhi Sarvar, a
Muslim saint, “is still of great interest and is worshiped by Muslims, Hindus, and
Sikhs alike.” 218 Emperor Bahadur Shah, son of Aurangzeb, honoured Guru Gobind at
Delhi and “conferred upon him a robe of honour.” 219 Durranis in the mid-eighteenth
century attacked India and took thousands of the Muslim and Hindu girls with them.
The Muslims and Hindus appealed to the Sikhs at Amritsar who rescued the girls. 220
The honour (izzat) of the sister communities’ female was considered common in the
Punjabi society and defended as such.
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During the British period, the Sikh community followed the example set by
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in the educational advancement. Sundar Singh Majithia and
other leaders of the Chief Khalsa Dewan attended the Karachi session of the Muslim
Educational Conference in 1907 and laid the foundation of the Sikh Educational
Conference on 9 January 1908 at Amritsar with Tarlochan Singh and Bhai Jodh Singh
Chairman and Secretary respectively. 221 The Sikh Educational Conference opened
hundreds of schools where the Muslims could study and also could serve as teachers.
The Sikh leadership of the Chief Khalsa Dewan was trying to create harmonious
relations between the two communities. 222
The Muslim press played its due role in awakening political consciousness
among the Sikhs as the Paisa Akhbar in 1914 motivated them to have their proper
representation in the Municipal Committee Amritsar. The daily pointed out that the
Sikhs never paid attention towards it and there was no Sikh among the 18 members of
the Municipal Committee. The paper deplored that the Sikhs presented themselves as
a separate community from the Hindus but their adherence to the Hindus was
unquestionable. The message given to them was that ‘the Sikhs must safeguard their
political rights.’ 223
Ghadar movement 224 was mainly initiated by the Sikhs but the Muslims took
part enthusiastically in the movement 225 and became victim of the British legal wrath.
The Muslims and Sikhs zealously participated in the Punjab agitations during the
1919s. In the case of the Lahore and Amritsar Conspiracies, both the communities
seemed working shoulder to shoulder. The accused were alleged that they had led the
Punjab disturbances, which culminated on 10 April to overawe the official authorities
against the newly enforced Rowlatt Acts. Fifteen leaders were tried by the
government and sentenced severely. In the Lahore case, five leaders were “sentenced
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to transportation for life with forfeiture of property” among them one was a Muslim,
Maulvi Allah Din, and one was a Sikh, Master Mota Singh. In the Amritsar
conspiracy case, Muhammad Bashir was given capital punishment. Among those
freed by the commission which consisted of two judges, Justice Leslie Jones and
Justice Broadway, were Badr-ul-Islam, Gurdial Singh, Ghulam Nabi, Muhammad
Ismail and Moti Ram Mehra. 226
Apart from the above-mentioned political activities, the spheres of social and
cultural life like Mushairas, games and festivals in the urban and rural areas were
going well. On 13 July 1919, a mushaira was arranged by the district administration
partly funded by Sardar Budh Singh in which the Muslim and Sikh poets
participated. 227 The communities behaved amicably in such circles but this was a
negligible proportion of the urban population.
Jinnah and Sikhs
The attitude of the League remained conducive towards the Sikh interests. The
League leadership tried to win the Sikh sincerity as a sister community and strove its
best to help them in their struggle for religious and political rights. The Muslims’
sympathy was with the Akalis when they were struggling to take their Gurdwaras
back from the Hindu Mahants. During the Jaito morcha, the Muslim leaders
condemned the firing against the Sikhs and “expressed their sympathies with the
Akalis.” 228 During the movement, Jinnah with Madan Mohan Malaviya endeavored to
eliminate the tension which emerged after the Jaito morcha. To Mohinder Singh,
Hailey was pushing the Akalis back by his clever moves like the Sudhar Committee,
which was a push to organise the moderates against the Akalis. Taking a plea that the
Sikh Gurdwaras were situated out of the Punjab therefore legislation might be moved
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in the central Assembly, Jinnah and Malaviya forced Hailey to abandon his policy to
corner the Akalis in the political sphere. 229 They also presented a motion for debate on
the issue but the Speaker rejected it. On 27 February 1924, Jinnah was prominent
among the 47 members who initiated an adjournment to talk about the Jaito firing but
the Speaker turned downed the motion. 230 He in April 1924 spoke to the annual
session of the League at Lahore that the Muslims were with the Sikhs in their
religious struggle. He warned the government for its intention to crush the Sikh
community. He demanded to come to terms with them for the sake of peace in the
region. 231 Many writers opine that the League displayed narrow-mindedness in the
case of the Unionists and Sikhs. But Khizar Tiwana admitted that Jinnah stayed at
Lahore in the spring of 1936 and kept on trying to convince Fazl-i-Husain to allow his
men to contest elections on the League tickets and that after winning the elections
they would make coalition government with the non-Muslim parties. 232 This shows
that Jinnah was flexible towards both and never opposed working relationship with
the Sikhs. He desired good relations with them in the political domain.
Rural Punjab—A Peaceful Society
The Muslim-Sikh relations in the rural areas of the Punjab were exemplary.
The communal virus had struck the urban classes but the majority of the Punjabis
living in the villages were immune to this disease. To Yadav, a small chunk of urban
population was leading the communal rights propaganda while majority of the people
were indifferent to it and living a peaceful life: “about 97% of the population was still
living in peace and harmony with their Hindu, Muslim and Sikh brethren in the
villages, in slums, and ‘unimportant’ localities in towns/cities.” 233 Both the
communities had same folk tales and attended the gatherings to enjoy the stories of
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Heer Ranjha, 234 Sassi Punnu, Sohni Mahinwal etc. According to Sardar Jagdish Singh,
all the communal problems were created by the political parties, otherwise the Sikhs,
Hindus and Muslims were not concerned with such things. They had very peaceful
life and lived like a family. 235 Sir Sikandar said that the rural Punjab had “preserved
the highest Punjab traditions of inter-communal harmony.” 236
Brotherhood of both the communities may be observed in the Punjabi villages,
which maintained peace. For example, both the Muslims and Sikhs were influential in
the areas of district Sheikhupura. To Professor Khizar Virk, his father loved Sardar
Labh Singh and the Muslims and Sikhs had been living as good friends. Even today in
the West Punjab, many Muslim families particularly the Jats still avoid eating beef. It
is an impact of the patched and mutually decided way of life prevalent in the rural
Punjab. The principle of ‘live and let live’ or co-existence between the Muslims and
Sikhs was the base of such an understanding. 237 Supporting the leaders on the basis of
caste was pervasive in the regional politics particularly in the rural areas. According
to the Paisa Akhbar, the Indian Jats in 1916 tried to organize their own association.
The leaders appealed to the Sikh, Muslim and Hindu Jats to join hands as they were
the bravest faction of the Indian society. 238
The responsible elements, which spread the feelings of communalism, may be
the Christian missionaries, western education, educated classes mostly in the urban
areas and the publishing activities in the region. The landed people had respect among
the villagers and enjoyed something like veto power in the day to day affairs.
Illiteracy among the villagers proved blessing for them. The religion was contained to
the sacred places only. 239 The Punjabi village was a place of merriments and peace. It
was traditionally composed of different classes 240 on the basis of land and profession
which had determined their status. Biggest land owner, farmers with small land,
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manual class or kami who worked as servants, 241 and Choorhras (mostly poor
Christians) were the components which made the rural society.
All the people were clear about their duties, rights and limitations.
Furthermore, the rural Punjab enjoyed customs and traditions which helped in
maintaining peace and respect for each other. Such traditions and other factors proved
supportive in creating harmony between the Muslims and the Sikhs. Saintly heritage,
exchange of turban (pagg), tradition of revenge which worked as deterrence, absence
of political, educational and publishing activities, conversion within caste, feudal
structure or Punchayat system, poverty and folklore were the prominent elements in
this regard.
The Muslim saints were esteemed by the Sikhs and Hindus as they demonstrated
practically a clear picture of agape. 242 The common folk believed their presence as a
blessing from God for them. People of all religions and from all strata of life thought
their words immersed in the will of God as V. S. Suri writes about Rai Indarjeet Singh
Bhandari who had been serving in the Lahore Darbar from 1809 to 1849. To the
writer, the issueless Rai Bhag Mal returned from Ghazni and approached Baba Farid
of Pakpattan to pray to God for endowing the former with a son. He prayed and Rai
Bhag was blessed with a son. “The name Bhandari was given to him by the saint.” 243
The saints never begged their disciples instead they were always at the giving end
which endeared them among all the communities irrespective of religion and caste.
The illiteracy kept the people away from the newspapers and books, which
could spread the awareness about the communal as well as political differences. The
folklore of the Punjab facilitated the Punjabis to have feelings of brotherhood. All of
them were fond of and owned mahya, tappa, bolian, folk songs, etc. The accounts
indicate that the Punjab had been a liberal and accommodating land as no fight or
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oycott had been recorded on the early conversions. Conversion within the caste
particularly the Jats and Rajputs proved a blessing and they continued the intimate
interaction as relatives irrespective of the religious affiliations. The tradition of
revenge was a last resort in the rural areas, which as a strategy of deterrence saved the
communities from violence. Whenever some bitter incident took place it was
immediately taken to the punchayat (village assembly composed of the prominent
men of all the communities regardless of religion), which solved the problem in no
time. Poverty was an outstanding feature of the Punjabi rural society. 244 The economic
problem was partly relieved by the recruitment in the British army which helped the
Punjabis to be prosperous. Sir Sikandar stated in 1940:
It is not perhaps generally realized that about Rs. four and half crores-a sum which is
equal to the total amount of land revenue of the province-is received annually by the
Punjab soldiers in the form of salaries and pensions and but for this it would be
impossible for thousands of families to make both ends meet. 245
As a matter of fact, the Punjabi families needed revolutionary economic activities to
pull them out of the depressing condition. According to the Intelligence report in May
1923, when the Sikhs were engaged in agitation, the Muslims were mainly concerned
with the army jobs. The report portrays their feelings that “in fact in the poorer
districts a hope is expressed that some new war might break out to provide for the
many unemployed.” 246 Therefore, poverty engaged the people in earning their
livelihood. The communities living from hand to mouth could not form organizations
or stage political activities, which could result in a rift between them.
Interdependence between the communities reduced the possibility of
communal clashes and this co-existence emerged on the basis of the “realization of
the otherness of others and their cultural and religious heritage.” 247 They were
together in the farming places, playgrounds, annual fairs, marriage parties, death
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ceremonies, and other social activities. The rural Punjab society was blessed with
many administrative and cultural blessings which had been in their experience for
centuries. It was not like the urban life full of hypocrisy where a political issue was to
be religionised and a religious issue was to be politicised. 248
Antagonistic Aspect
Religion can be separated from politics but not from the society concerned but
the Punjab politics was much influenced by religion. Therefore, the religious
affiliations played an overwhelming role in maintaining identity between the two
communities. The Hindu and Muslim heroes did not confront each other for having
lived in different periods and societies while the Sikh heroes being from the same land
and time clashed with the Muslim rulers. Therefore, the Muslim-Sikh enmity was
more deep-rooted than Hindus.’ Clash because of material things can be solved but
religious enmity can hardly be eradicated from the minds of the followers. Due to
religious hatred, the Muslim-Sikh relations could not be ideal which seemed engulfing
the mutual understanding at the end of the third decade of the 20 th century.
The source material related to Sikhism is replete with the Muslim brutalities.
Pictures of Muslim cruelty were displayed on the walls in the Golden Temple at
Amritsar. The bleeding Sikh children particularly the sahibzadey (sons) of Guru
Gobind Singh were shown pierced by spears by the Muslims. 249 The Kuka movement
under the leadership of Baba Ram Singh was the first political wave among the Sikhs
in the British Punjab but it adopted the militant character against the Sikh landlords
and then the Muslims, which provided an opportunity to the British to ruthlessly
suppress the movement. 250 They launched violent move against the butchers and
killed many of them in different areas of the Punjab. They raised the slogan:
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Marhi masiti dha ke kar dio madana 251
(Dismantle graves and Mosques to the ground).
The Paisa Akhbar recorded the gruesome situation of the Muslim teachers of High
School, Simla, in 1919 who were transferred one after the other from the school.
There were the Arya Kumar Sabha and Sanatan Kumar Sabha 252 in the school but
after the joining of the Headmaster Sohan Singh, the Simla Home Rule Party
established the Sikh Kumar Sabha. Ostensibly, the main object of the Sikh Sabha was
to impart ethical education but their whole concentration was to irritate the Muslim
teachers. 253
In the political domain, the Muslim-Sikh relations had never been ideal. A
minor anti-Sikh statement by the Muslim leadership could infuriate the Sikh
leadership while they could tolerate a lot of unreasonable maneuvers from the Hindus
particularly the Congress leaders. Mian Muhammad Shafi, an eminent Punjab League
leader, declared Sikhs as sub-section of Hinduism before the Indian Statutory
Commission 254 which irritated the Sikh community a lot. The word sub-nation was to
point out the scattered population of the Sikhs 255 but they considered it a humiliating
attack on their political existence. In fact, it was avoidance of the reality related to
their numerical and scattered position.
The Unionist Ministers introduced policies which were perceived against the
Sikh interests therefore the Sikhs protested furiously and condemned the Unionist
Muslims. The Sikhs demanded that they must be treated in the Punjab as the Muslims
were being treated in other Indian provinces. They were seeking all the things in the
perspective of the Muslims. When Lord Peel stated that Calcutta and Peshawar
disturbances were due to the Sikh violence, Sardar Ujjal Singh wrote that the Sikhs
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were not with the Civil Disobedience Movement and that the “Muslims are being
patted on that account.” 256
The Communal Award further created conflict between the Muslims and the
Sikhs because none of the communities had welcomed the Award. The Sikhs even
before the announcement started enrolling volunteers for protest assuming that it
would establish the Muslim raj in the Punjab which the Sikhs would never tolerate.
Sir Muhammad Iqbal said that the Hindu encouragement of the Sikhs justified the
Muslims’ struggle to end the Hindu domination in India. On the other hand, about
50,000 Muslims gathered in Amritsar after Friday prayers and vowed not to accept
any constitution, which “would deprive of their right to be a majority in the
Punjab.” 257
The Sikhs agitated both through press and the masses. According to Sangat
Singh, the Khalsa Darbar, representative body of all the groups, and the Akali Shahidi
Dal with 100,000 men could launch a protest which would have been a revolutionary
step but the Sikhs could achieve nothing due to the disunity within their
community. 258 Naranjan Dass Mohaya writes that the Punjab had been fortunate
regarding the communal peace, but soon after the Unionist ministry assumed office
the communal riots broke out in the region. Jhatka, halal, cow-killing, music before
Mosques and Muslim, Hindu and Sikh festivals were the main reasons behind these
riots. The riots started in the 1930s in Kot Bhai Than Singh (district Attock), Amritsar,
Panipat (District Karnal), district Gujrat, Multan, and Tallagang (Attock) which
disrupted the harmony between the two communities. 259 Furthermore, the
unreasonable and contradictory political demands were moving the religious elements
to widen the gap between the Muslims and Sikhs.
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Rawalpindi Region
The north Punjab proved very sensitive in the case of Muslim-Sikh relations.
Despite all the efforts of goodwill it remained tense and fragile and even a trivial
incident could produce havoc in the existing peace of the region. The social
interdependence played an effective role in maintaining the peace but traditionally the
Punjabis could fight on some trifling incident like child fight in street or annual fairs
etc. Gurdwara Dyal Sar near Rawalpindi was attacked by the Muslims in which the
Sikh families including the Granthi’s wife and children of twelve and sixteen years
were injured. The injured were sent to the Civil Hospital Rawalpindi. The brawl
started not due to some political or religious matter but the street fight of the children
proved to be a bone of contention. 260 It is evident that the rural harmony could prove
uncertain and a small incident could flare up the situation.
Mela (fair) is a Punjabi folk gathering in which all the communities were
supposed to participate; either it was in the memory of a Muslim or a Sikh saint but
the communalism severely affected it too. The annual fair of Baba Than Singh (Kot
Bhai Thansingh) at Fatehjang is worth discussing as the administrative authorities
reported satisfaction that the fair had passed smoothly without any tension as “No
Muslim parties were allowed to go to the mela.” 261 The problem arose once again in
November 1936 when tension between the Gurdwara Committee of Punja Sahib
(Attock) and trustees of the Dera Baba Than Singh and a zamindar Sardar
Mohammad Niwaz Khan of Kot Fateh Khan emerged. His men attacked the Sikhs
who were working on a wall. The police arrested twenty-four Sikhs and sixteen
Muslims in this case. The court found the Muslims guilty and fined them. 262
The issue of religious procession routes also put the Rawalpindi region into
communal disorder in the autumn of 1936. The three meetings of the Conciliation
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Committee consisted of the district administration, Muslims and Sikhs ended in
naught but both the communities seemed ready to change the routes of their religious
processions. 263 The Sikh leaders consented to drop the Jama Masjid as a route of the
Sikh procession and adopting all other routes even in the presence of the mosques in
the route. On the other hand, the Muslims promised not to take the route of the Raja
Bazar because of the Sikh Gurdwara. Later on, it was mutually decided in the
presence of the DC, Sir King, that the Sikhs would not adopt the route passing near
the mosque and the Muslims would not go to the Bazar Sarafan and the Guru Singh
Sabha side which was mostly populated by the Sikh community. The Muslims
allowed the Sikhs to have their shops of Jhatka meat. The Sikhs also agreed not to
play music in front of the mosques. 264 This mutual agreement of the Muslims and
Sikhs could dawn a new era of peace in the region but a faction of the Sikh extremists
sabotaged all the hopes of reconciliation and peace. They condemned the President of
the Singh Sabha and Khan Qurbanali Khan, Superintendent of the Police and
demanded replacing of the Muslim police officer with some European officer. The
Sikhs laid stress on the old route of the Sikh procession on 27 October and threatened
not to forego the Mosque Street from their route. Approximately, 15,000 Sikhs
gathered in the Guru Singh Sabha. They were condemning the President and
demanding from him either to resign or to lead the procession through the traditional
route. The district administration imposed section 144 and banned any kind of
gathering of more than 4 persons for seven days. But thousands of the Sikhs
converged in the Guru Singh Sabha from the adjacent areas and districts and attacked
the President’s house:
Unruly scenes were witnessed last night when Sikhs demonstrated in front of the
President of the Singh Sabha and others, who came to an agreement with the Muslims.
Stones were thrown, breaking glass panes of doors and windows. 265
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The police held 55 Sikhs who came out in the streets or roads. The Sikhs attacked the
Police who used lathi charge and some 50 Sikhs were sent to the Khalsa Hospital. 266
The nature of the Muslim-Sikh relations was uncertain in the Punjab as ever.
A Police report on the communal unrest said that, “it must be admitted that little
would be required to arouse communal feelings to a pitch, which would require the
intervention of strong police force.” 267 These events verified that the Muslims and
Sikhs of Rawalpindi area proved very emotional on the religious issues. The other
notable aspect is that the Muslims and Sikhs from adjacent rural areas always joined
the co-religionists whenever the tension arose.
Another issue, the Shahidganj Mosque, caused an unrecoverable setback to the
Muslim-Sikh relations. This issue always remained problematic till the partition. The
Muslims tried to nationalize this issue and announced the Shahidganj Conference at
Lahore in which the Indian Muslims would ponder over the on-going bitterness. 268
The Sikhs and Muslims had lost lives so the Shahidganj issue being the religious
matter had engaged the Muslim and Sikh masses in the furious communal skirmishes
from time to time. Even in 1940, a Muslim student from Lyallpur entered the
Gurdwara Shahidganj and attacked the Sikhs. During interrogation, he told that he
could not tolerate the Mosque under the Sikh control. 269 Furthermore, the clash
emerged between the Amritsar Muslims and Sikhs as a result of stabbing a Muslim
shopkeeper who died later. It was the start of Moharram and the non-Muslims
demanded change in the route which alarmed the administration to take serious action
against the trouble makers. 270 Sir Henry Craik 271 went on writing to the Viceroy that
“Moharram fortunately passed without any serious disturbance, though at several
places there were incidents, such as bricks being thrown at tazias, which might have
had disastrous consequences…..The communal situation is, however, still acute.” 272
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Communitarian Dominance
The communitarian dominance enormously affected the characteristics of the
minority in the Punjab under the specific religious values. 273 The western areas in the
Punjab were Muslim dominated while some areas were Sikh or non-Muslim
dominated particularly the eastern whereas the population in the central areas was
mixed with almost equal proportion. 274 There were such areas also where the
landlords were Sikhs with a small Muslim population, poor and dependent on the Sikh
Sardars while in some areas the non-Muslim population was under the Muslim
landlords. Such arrangements conspicuously bothered the minorities particularly the
Muslims because they were facing the Hindu and Sikh communities who had
religious as well as social compatibility to each other. 275 They had deep-rooted
affinity in their social life as they could inter-dine, inter-marry, etc. Although the
relationship between the Sardar and minority people varied from region to region but
the minorities were not free of the religious and social strains.
The disparity of the varied proportion of the population in the region affected
the minority life severely. Such impacts may be categorized into spontaneous and
forced impacts. Under the first category, the minority either Muslim or Sikh had
adopted the characteristics of the majority community while in the second category
the dominant community deliberately compelled the minority to live according to the
dominant societal norms. Even the majority community culture sometimes over-rode
the religion as perdah is not lawful in the Sikh religion but in the Muslim dominant
areas, the Sikh women observed perdah strictly. Similarly the Muslims in the non-
Muslim areas refrained from eating beef. The Muslims who were converted to Islam
from Sikhism and had Sikh relatives did not eat beef to please their relatives, as many
Jat Muslim families even today don’t use beef. 276 In the Muslim majority areas, the
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Sikh landlords occasionally allowed the Muslims to slaughter cows and many Sikhs
as well as Hindus regularly joined the Moharram processions along with the
Muslims. 277 While in the non-Muslim dominant areas, this was the occasion when the
communal tension was rife. The minority was supposed to listen to others and observe
the religious practices of the dominant community. That is why, the propensity of
conversion to Sikhism or Islam was more pervasive from the minority community but
it proved dangerous where the minority resisted the majority or countered the
religious effectiveness.
The second category caused irritation and created severe tension in the
communities. It emerged when the dominant community seemed not ready to honour
the sister community’s religious practices or sentiments. Many incidents may be
quoted as the Sikhs of Gurdaspur area did not allow the Muslims to say Azan. 278 The
Muslims of Raja Jang district Lahore (now in Kasur district) insisted on reciting Azan
in the mosque but the dominant Sikh community did not allow the poor Muslims even
to say their prayers. The Sikhs even attacked the police. In 1937, the Muslims staged a
mass protest but the Sikhs attacked the procession in which two Muslims were killed
and hundreds were injured. The government approved a police chauki (post) in 1939
at Raja Jang under the Lulliani Police Station with a punitive police tax on the Sikhs
whereas the Muslims were exempted from this tax. The Sikhs blocked the Muslims to
go to the fields for rearing their cattle and forcibly stopped the Muslim children and
women even to go to their fields for the call of nature. 279 The Sikhs approached the
SGPC, Amritsar and all other Sikh Assembly members who later forced the
government to impose tax on the poor Muslims. The SDO Balwant Singh Nalwa re-
prepared the tax proposal in such a manner that the Muslims were put under the
burden of the tax more than the Sikhs. The Muslims sent an appeal to the Governor
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and the Governor-General in April 1940 for restoring the exemption from the police
tax. 280 The Muslims of Raja Jang could not be given their religious as well as their
constitutional rights because they were poor and under dominance of the Sikhs.
Prakash Tandon depicts what happened under the Muslim majority:
The Hindus resented the Muslims slaughtering cows on their Bakri-Id, and the Muslims
objected to the noise and music of our festivals, and would not let Dusserah, Diwali and
Holi pass without trouble, sometimes leading to bloodshed. It reached such a pitch that
for some years we did not celebrate our festivals for fear of provoking bloody riots. Even
Ram Leela was dropped. 281
Therefore, to live as a minority under the rival religious community was an unpleasant
experience in the Punjabi society.
The Two-Nation theory became a stark reality as the Sikh heroes were the
Muslim enemies and the Muslim personalities were villains for Sikhs. The Sikhs
celebrated the birthdays and observed the death anniversaries of their martyrs. This
agonized the Muslims because some of the Sikh heroes had butchered the innocent
Muslims ruthlessly. In an important work, A Punjabi claimed that the Sikhs
deliberately celebrated those days to sustain the spirit of antagonism against the
Muslims. The writer raised questions as to what did they seek by celebrating the
Shahidganj Day? They did it just to promote the Muslim-Sikh bitterness; they
celebrated Banda Bahadur Day to increase the Muslim killing; they paid tribute to
Banda Bairagi to hurt the Muslim feelings. According to the writer, the politics was a
real factor behind such anti-Muslim activities. 282 So the leaders were using religion to
gain political ends but this approach was reviving religious hatred among the Sikhs
against the Muslims.
Conflicting Issues
The Muslim-Sikh relations were strained because of the conflicting stands
mainly relating to religion. The Muslim religious processions like Eid, Moharram and
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Sikh processions for their Gurus and the ‘martyrs’ were the main source of turmoil in
the Punjab. A clash was inevitable where the procession route touched the street
wherein some religious building of the rival community was situated.
Kine killing issue was one of the most dangerous issues. Basically the Hindus
worshiped cow while the Sikhs considered it a sacred animal. Both did not like the
kine-killing therefore, on this issue, the Sikhs and Hindus fought with the Muslims.
The Muslims slaughtered cow for eating, like the Christians, especially on the
religious occasions. Raja Ranjit Singh who generally avoided capital punishment 283
had banned the cow-killing 284 and “gave capital punishment to the offenders.” 285 The
Punjab Board of Administration permitted the use of beef as food in the Muslim areas
with some conditions but it could not finish the tension. In 1869, at Amritsar, Dewa
Singh collected a cow-bone and put it before the Granth in the Golden Temple, which
created a big protest against the Muslims. 286 During the 1870s, the Kuka movement
turned against the butchers and killed many in different areas of the Punjab like
Amritsar, Raikot and at other places of Ludhiana, Malerkotla etc. 287 and this issue
always remained unsettled between the two communities.
Jhatka 288 issue had been a troublesome aspect of the Muslim-Sikh relations
throughout the British Punjab. It aroused the Muslim-Sikh and Muslim-Hindu tension.
In the outset of the 20 th century, the Hindu and Sikh students used to eat halal 289 meat
in the boarding-houses without any hesitation and protest but under the guidance of
Sir Sundar Singh Majithia backed by the Hindus, the Sikhs demanded Jhatka meat for
them. They were united against the Muslims on the halal meat issue. The Arya
Samajists were provoking the Sikhs through press and lectures and proved that the
Sikhs were a part of Hinduism 290 and were a united force against the Muslims. During
the tension at district Rawalpindi in 1936, Jhatka meat was one of the issues; the
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Muslims agreed to the Sikhs opening the Jhatka meat shops in the market. 291
Although the emerging scuffle on the issue was dealt properly by the authorities but it
remained on the forefront in the Muslim-Sikh tension. Master Tara Singh on
September 1937 sent protests to Sir Sikandar Hayat against his speech on Jhatka
issue. He said that the Muslims after his speech were molesting the Sikhs as it caused
communal tension in the province particularly in Jandiala Sher Khan (District
Sheikhupura). The speech was a blatant evidence of the communal mentality of the
Punjab government. 292
The Muslims recite Azan loudly before all the five prayers to inform its
religious fellows to come to Mosque but it became a bone of contention between the
Sikhs and the Muslims mostly in the Sikh-Hindu dominant areas. Woefully
sometimes the administration too involved in repudiating the Muslim religious right.
The Paisa Akhbar wrote in an Editorial (1914) that in district Gurdaspur, the poor
(kami) Muslims were not allowed to recite Azan under the pressure of the Sikh zaildar
of the village Dallah. Even the Hindu Magistrate harassed these kami Muslims by
summoning them in his court. 293
Music was a part of the Sikh and Hindu religions while it is forbidden in
Islam. Though the Sikhs had a right to perform their religious duty but woefully they
performed it deliberately and more loudly before Mosques particularly at the time of
prayers or congregation. The Muslims never spared them and stopped them from
playing music, which caused clashes between the communities in which the Hindus
and Sikhs always joined hands with each other.
Religious conflict did not see boundaries and affected all its followers living
even beyond the Punjab boundaries. In Nagpur, a big crowd of the Muslims stopped
the Sikh procession with music near Lohar Mandi Mosque in the presence of the
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British Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who were
escorting the procession. The SGPC demanded the protection of the Sikhs. 294 In
Cawnpore on 11 February 1939, as reported by a Congress weekly, the Hindu-Muslim
riots erupted when a marriage party played music before a Mosque in the Thatheri
Bazaar. 295
Language became a source of the political identity along with the religion for
the communities. This grew disputes concerning the languages and their role in the
government. In particular, Hindus owned Hindi with Devnagri script, Muslims Urdu
with Persian styled script and Sikhs Punjabi with Gurmukhi script. But in the Punjab,
the Sikhs demanded the Gurmukhi script instead of the Persian script whereas most of
the Sikhs used the Persian script in the publishing activities. Such circumstances
emerged in which Gurmukhi became “the symbol of the separate identity of Sikhs” 296
and the Sikhs with the Hindu support kept on demanding the Gurmukhi or Punjabi
script in the educational institutions. In the Sikh Educational Conference at Lyallpur
(now Faisalabad, Pakistan) Sardar Jodh Singh emphasized that all of the Sikhs should
learn Gurmukhi. During the Conference, several resolutions were passed to introduce
Gurmukhi in the educational institutions. 297
The concept of halal-haram maintained distinction between the two
communities throughout the history. Sikhs did not like their utensils to be touched by
the Muslims because according to their religion it made them impure (Bhitt jana).
Comrade Bishan Singh narrates that at many times their Muslim class fellows in the
school intentionally touched their lunch just to eat a better food because the Muslim
students generally belonged to the poor families. 298 Most of the Hindus never ate from
the Muslim houses and all the communities experienced the sale of ‘Muslim water’
94

and ‘Hindu water’ and ‘Hindu bread’ etc. 299 Sukki Bhaji (dry food items) was a
popular mode to accept food at the marriage functions.
The proportion of the Sikhs in the government services always created a bitter
situation in the Punjab. The Muslims had been in the Premier office so all the
complaints and ills were diverted to this office. The government removed five
Professors of the Khalsa College Amritsar including a brother of Master Tara Singh
who threatened the Premier that the Sikhs would never submit to the Muslims’
political supremacy in the Punjab. “The Akalis are freedom-loving people and they
imbibe the traditions of their community and will not be seduced by ambitions or
threats.” 300 Sardar Mangal Singh through a letter to the Home Secretary, Government
of India, New Delhi, requested the government to increase the reserved seats for the
minorities in the competitive examination. He said that during 1936 only one Sikh
was successful in the ICS examination. The Muslims had eight seats therefore one
more seat be increased for the minority in the coming Delhi examination. 301 Both the
communities had been protesting against the injustice in the services throughout the
British rule. In 1937, Tara Singh commented on the Unity Committees:
…..all this is to consolidate the Muslim position and to establish Muslim domination in
the Punjab. You are cognisant of the fact that this move on your part will be opposed by
the better mind of the Punjab and consequently you propose to strike at the Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and the Shiromani Akali Dal…you may persecute
us, but you will never succeed in crushing the Sikh spirit and demoralising the Sikh
community. 302
The political atmosphere was alarming and dragging even the rural Punjab to a
dangerous point. The religious friction came up from time to time because the Punjab
was over-flooded by the political conferences and meetings particularly after the
Shahidganj Mosque issue. The Sikhs and Muslims from the rural areas attended these
protest gatherings which helped communalism permeate the rural stakeholders as
95

well. The peaceful rural Punjab had an ineffective influence on the urban and rural
political actors who had effective voice in the government affairs. Unluckily, the
leaders from the rural areas also became a part of the urban styled politics. The rural
harmony could not influence the urban minds mainly infected under the dominant role
of the communal urban atmosphere. The Sikh status as a sub-nation motivated them to
take refuge under the Hindu cloak. The Unionist Muslims had adopted the British
policy to govern with the help of the sister communities. Though they had some
religious predilections but they made their utmost endeavors to redress the Sikh
grievances. On the other hand, the Sikhs never remained gratified to the policies of
the Muslim Unionists throughout the history of the British Punjab. The Muslims,
whether Unionists or Leaguers could not maintain their due honour among the Sikh
groups. Despite sincere effort, they could never be stamped as cross communal by the
Sikhs. All the political, social and constitutional measures taken by the British
authorities proved futile in binding the Muslims and Sikhs into an ideal political
coalition. Even after experiencing the coalition ministries in the Punjab, Hindus
remained Hindus, Sikhs remained Sikhs and the Muslims remained Muslims by their
political affiliations. For example, a liberal Muslim politician like Raja Ghazanfar Ali
Khan defended the Muslim rights only throughout his political career. 303 The Muslim
Unionists had never been recognized as the heroes of the Sikhs or Hindus.
The communal character of the Unionist Muslims and the on-going communal
tension had already disturbed the Sikhs therefore even before the Lahore Session of
the League, the Akalis had started a campaign against the idea of Pakistan. A
delegation of sixty Akalis including Master Tara Singh, Sampuran Singh, and Pratap
Singh, decided to participate in the Ramgarh Session of the Congress just to
pressurise the Hindu leadership to relinquish the reconciliatory attitude towards the
96

Muslims. In case of refusal they planned to demand the same concessions conferred
upon the Muslims. 304 But the Congress promised nothing in this regard to the Sikhs.
The Congress was in a fix regarding the Punjab politics. They had no control over all
of the three major communities. Even the communities were further divided into more
groups within the groups. The Congress needed the Muslims to stabilize their claim to
be representative of all the communities living in India while to make the civil
disobedience successful they also needed the Sikh support. Therefore, many Congress
leaders spoke out the language the Sikhs liked.
The study concludes that the Muslim-Sikh relations were cordial in the
rural areas and tense in the political domain but the political activities and trivial
Muslim-Sikh conflict attracted the rural people’s attention as well. Until 1923, the
Sikhs had demanded their own state along with a threat of the physical violence if
their demand was not conceded. The Sikh reaction to the Allahabad address of Dr.
Muhammad Iqbal moved them to demand the re-demarcation of the Punjab during the
Round Table Conference. The Shahidganj Mosque issue caused unremitting chain of
Muslim-Sikh tensions. The failure on the part of the Unionist Muslim leadership was
that they could not erase fear of the Muslim raj from the Sikh minds. In all the
reforms, they expressed anxieties and reservations. They accused that the Muslim rule
had been established by the Unionist Muslims in the Punjab but no remedy could be
sought to redress the Sikh grievances. Until the elections of 1936-37, the League
neither had any direct clash nor mutual settlement on any issue with the Akali Dal
because it started regional politics before the first general elections in the Punjab. The
Jinnah-Sikandar Pact disturbed the Sikhs but not to the extent that the League-Akali
relations could not be handled. But no one cared to gauge the depth of the tension in
the Sikh minds against the League which had been sympathetic to the Sikhs. A void
97

existed between the Sikh and League leadership while the Congress’ top leadership
had constantly been in touch with the Sikh community.
The Muslims were being discriminated against in the society. Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru himself had admitted his non-accommodating attitude towards the
Muslims in a letter to Jinnah on 18 October 1939 that “he had neglected the solution
of the communal problem.” 305 But it was too late as the League had construed it that
they must have their own separate state wherein they could live a peaceful and
honourable life. This message they got from their own experiences and political
solutions presented by different personalities like Lala Lajpat Rai, Allama
Muhammad Iqbal, Ch. Rehmat Ali, Abdul Latif and the Sikh demand of re-
demarcation of the Punjab. The Pakistan Majlis or Majlis-i-Kabeer had issued the
map of Pakistan with the new boundaries of the Subcontinent even before the
Pakistan Resolution was presented. 306
98

Chapter One
Notes
1 The Gurdwara Movement of the early 1920s was successfully launched by the Sikhs to regain
their Gurdwaras from the Mahants. This movement produced a bulk of leaders including Master Tara
Singh. 2Formally inaugurated on 26 April 1902. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and
Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 4.
3 Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), 3.
4 According to the Census Report 1941, the Muslims were about 16217000 (57%), Sikhs were
3757000 (14%), Hindus were 6302000 (24%) and total non-Muslims were 12200000. Tara Chand,
History of the Freedom Movement, vol. IV (Lahore: Book Traders, 1972), 183.
5 David Page, Prelude to Partition, The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System on Control:
1920-1932 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 85.
6 The Church launched missionary activities to secure conversions from the local religious
communities of the Subcontinent. They successfully did their job with the support of the British
government.
7 Singh Sabha movement was a counter move to the Christian activities and it not only stopped
the Sikh conversions but also elevated the Sikh image in the society. See details, Ian Talbot, India and
Pakistan (New York: Oxford university Press Inc., 2000), 101.
8 Chura or Choorha is one of the lowest classes by the social order in the Punjab.
9 Nina Puri, Political Elite and Society in the Punjab (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1985), 7.
10D.
Petrie, “Secret C.I.D. Memorandum on Recent Development in Sikh Politics, 1911,” in
The Punjab: Past and Present IV, part II (October 1970): 304-6.
11
G. W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab since Annexation (Calcutta:
The Superintendent of Government Printing, 1882), 33-36.
12
Ian Talbot, Punjab and Raj 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), 32; also
see Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs: 1839-1964, vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), 94-95.
13
John Clarck Archer, The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus, Moslems, Christians and Ahmadiyyas,
A Comparative Religion (London: Princeton University Press, 1946), 179-80.
14
D. Petrie, “Secret C.I.D. Memorandum,” 304-306..
15
Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 68.
16
Ganda Singh, The Singh Sabha and other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab, 1850-
1925 (Patiala: Publication Bureau, Punjabi University, 1984), 160
17
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 324.
18
Nina Puri, Political Elite and Society in the Punjab, 136
19
Before 1857, the British adopted anti-Sikh measures which were criticised by Cunningham.
See details in Joseph Davy Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, rep. (New Delhi: Rupa Paperback,
1849).
20Principal
Gurdial Singh Grewal, Freedom Struggle of India by Sikhs and Sikhs in India, vol.
1 ( n.p., n.d.), 165 and 169.
21 Ibid., 187.
127.
22 Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan, 109.
23 Francis Robinson, Islam, South Asia and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
24 An English man Allan Octavian Hume founded the Congress on 28 December 1885 and
remained its pushing force until 1906. George Yule in 1888, William Wedderburn in 1889 and 1910,
Alfred Webb in 1894, Henry Cotton in 1904 and Annie Besant in 1917 presided over the Congress’
sessions. S. R. Mehrotra, “The Early Indian National Congress, 1885-1918: Ideals, Objectives and
Organization,” in B. R. Nanda, ed., Essays in Modern Indian History (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1980), 46; see also Claude Markovitz, ed., A History of Modern India, 1480-1950 (London: Anthem
Press, 1994), 360-361.
99

25 Ibid., 45-48.
26 The Time-lag theory, -Aparna Basu, “Growth of Education and Muslim Separatism, 1919-
1939,” in B. R. Nanda, Essays in Modern Indian History, 224.
27 Chief Khalsa Diwan changed its name before the elections of 1936 as Khalsa National Party
under Sir Sundar Singh Majithia. In election, it issued manifesto including rejection of Communal
Award, struggle for swarajya, and work against division of urban and rural classes. KC Gulati, The
Akalis Past and Present. New (Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 72-73.
28 Dr. D. S. Gujrani, “Congress in the Rural Punjab,” The Punjab, Past and Present XVII-I
(April 1983): 93.
29 Jagtar Singh Pakkar, Muslim Politics in the Punjab (New Delhi: Deep and Deep
Publications, 1985), 343-45.
30 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947) (Lahore: Book Traders, 1976),
109.
31 rd
H. V. Hodson, The great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan 3 ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co.,
1970), 8.
32Dr.
Padmasha, Indian National Congress and the Muslims, 1928-1947 (New Delhi: Rajesh
Publications, 1979), 3.
33
H. I. S. Cotton, “New India or India in Transition,” in Padmasha, Indian National Congress
and the Muslims, 9-10.
34 Gurdial Singh Grewal, Freedom Struggle, 164.
35 A. B. Rajput, The Constituent Assembly (Lahore: Lion Press, 1946), 6.
36 Ibid., 8-9.
37 A. S. Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej (Lahore: Republican Books, 1987), 31.
38 A. B. Rajput, The Constituent Assembly, 12.
39 Writers like Robert Aura Smith believe that the British ruled over India with the policy of
Divide and Rule. See Robert Aura Smith, India Divided (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1946), 37.
40 J. S. Pakkar, Muslim Politics, 342.
41 Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim History in South Asia, 4 th Imp. (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2007): 158.
42 Khalid Shamsul Hasan gives wrong names and writes Mian Muhammad Shah Din (1868-
1918), Mian Muhammad Shafi (1869-1932), Shaikh Muhammad Umar (1871-1919), Shaikh Abdul
Qadir (1874-1950), Allama Iqbal (1876-1938), Muhammad Yousuf Shah (1851-1926) and Munshi
Mahboob Alam (1863-1933) represented the Punjab. Khalid Shamsul Hasan, The Punjab Muslim
League and the Unionists (Karachi: Ushba Publishing International, 2005), 7. Razi Wasti gives the
leaders from Punjab including Omar Hayat Tiwana, Mian Mohamed Shah Din, Syed Mohamed
Husain, Col. Abdul Majid Khan, Khawaja Yusuf Shah, Mian Mohamed Shafi, Shaikh Ghulam Sadik
and Hakim Ajmal Khan. Syed Razi Wasti, Muslim Struggle for Freedom in British India (Lahore:
Book Traders, 1993), 103-104.
43 Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Sube di Gatha (Gurmukhi) (Sarhind: Lokgit Parkashan, 1992),
30.
44 Dr. K. L. Tuteja, “The Sikhs and the Nehru Report,” The Punjab Past and Present XV-I,
(April 1981): 130.
45 Muslims got 48%, Sikhs 18% and Hindus 24%. Total seats were 175. Muslims were given
84, Sikhs 31 and Hindus 42. Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in Punjab, 1920-1947 ((Tokyo: Institute for
the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1981), 16.
46 Satya M. Rai, Punjabi Heroic Tradition, 1900-1947 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1978), 132.
47 The representative political as well as religious platform of the Sikhs, founded in 1902 as
offshoot of the Singh Sabha. It was a pro-British organization under Sir Sundar Singh Majithia.
Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs¸ vol. II, 145.
48 Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyr remained Lt. Governor from 26 May 1913 to 26 May 1919.
49 Gurmit Singh, History of Sikh Struggles (1946-1966), vol. 1 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers
& Distributors, 1989), 79.
50 The Hindus and the Muslims agreed that to compensate the minority more seats be allocated
from the seats of the majority community.
51 File. vol. 149, Archives of Freedom Movement.
52 Tuteja, “The Sikhs and the Nehru Report,” 130-31.
53 Muazaz Punjabi, Siasiyat-i-Punjab, (Urdu) (Lahore: Muslim Printing Press, n.d.), 24-25.
100

54 Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 218-19
55 Paisa Akhbar, Lahore, 7 January 1913.
56 Ibid., 14 January 1912.
57 David Page, Prelude to Partition, 71.
58 Ibid., 87.
59 Amarjit Singh, Punjab Divided: Politics of the Muslim League and Partition 1935-1947
(New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, Distributors, 2001), 30.
60 See detail, R. Coupland, The Future of India, 3 rd Imp. (London: Oxford University Press,
1945), v-vii.
61 Kirpal, Partition of Punjab, 17.
62 See details in Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab
(Chandigarh: Government of Punjab, 2004); and Zarina Salamat, “The Role of British Punjab in the
National Politics 1919-1920,” Journal of South Asian Studies 9 (July 1992): 89-112.
63 Jallianwala Bagh was situated in Amritsar near the Golden Temple in which the anti-Rowlatt
Act protesters were gunned down by the British.
64 Muslims of the Subcontinent protested against the British action in Turkey, the Ottoman
Empire. The Hindus and Sikhs also sided with them under Gandhi. This era is marked as the period of
Muslim-Hindu unity.
65 K. C. Yadav, “The Partition of India: A Study of the Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1849-
1947,” The Punjab Past and Present XVII-I (April 1983): 117.
66 Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited,
1978), 130.
67 K. L. Tuteja, “Sikhs and the Congress: 1930-40,” in Verinder Grover, ed., The Story of
Punjab, Yesterday and Today (Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), 450.
68 Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, A Political Biography (Bombay: Longman, Green & Co. Ltd.,
1946), 146.
69 Claude Markovitz, ed., A History of Modern India, 1480-1950, 366-67.
70 Imam Mehdi is a descendent of Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH) and according to
the Muslim belief, he will reappear before doomsday. Paisa Akhbar, 12 November 1920.
71 Guru Nanak Dev used the word Akal as Eternal, Guru Hargobind (1595-1644) managed his
royal styled seat as Akal Takht but it was Guru Gobind Singh who popularized the term Akal as the
name of God among his Sikhs. The five followers baptized by Guru Gobind Singh were the first
Akalis. According to the Sikh sources, “Akalis would not be Akalis if they served not the oppressed.”
According to Harbans Singh, Nihangs were known as Akalis. Akali Naina Singh, a Nihang warrior of
eighteenth century Shahid misl, is credited to set traditions for the present day Nihang Sikhs wearing
turbans. The Akalis as regiment served in the army of Raja Ranjit Singh. They were also supposed to
be the guardians of the Sikh “conscience and morals.” Harbans Singh ed., The Encyclopedia of
Sikhism, vol. 1 (Patiala: Punjabi University Patiala, 2002), 39-41.
72 Waris Shah comments about the Misls,
Jadon dais te Jat sardar hoey,
Ghar-o-ghari Jan Navin sarkar hoe,
(When Jats dominated the Punjab, Every house seemed to be having a new and independent
government), Abdul Aziz Sheikh, Heer Waris Shah (Lahore: Al-Faisal Publishers, 2001), 491.
73 Syed Shabbir Hussain, Sikhs at Crossroad (Islamabad: Kamran Publishing House, 1984),
51.
74
H. L. O. Garrett, The Punjab, A Hundred Years Ago, rep. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1997), 28.
75
Ibid., 53-54.
76
M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege within Challenges to a Nation’s Unity (New Delhi: Roli
Books, 2003), 134.
77
Sir Herbert William Emerson remained Governor of the Punjab from 12 April 1933 to 1
February 1934 and then from 9 June 1934 to 4 April 1938.
78
Letter from Emerson to Viceroy on 8 May 1937, Linlithgow Papers in Dr. P. N. Chopra, ed.,
Towards Freedom, 1937-47, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical research, 1985), 489.
79
Ganda Singh, The Singh Sabha and other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab, 160-
166.
80 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, eds., Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the
Partition of the Subcontinent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 254-255.
101

81 Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab, 112.
82 Extract from Weekly Report of the Director, Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department,
Government of India, Dated Simla, 17 th October 1923, IOR: L/P&J/12/170.
83 In Nabha State, 40 miles from Ferozepore, and founded by Jaito, a Jat Sidhu by caste.
Jawahar Lal Nehru and Jaito Morcha (Patiala: Punjab State Archives, 1973), 1.
84 Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department, Government of India, Dated Simla, 26 th
September 1923. IOR: L/P&J/12/170.
85 Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London: Earnest Benn Limited, 1963), 132.
86 Daily, Akali (Urdu) Amritsar, 23 September 1939.
87 Bhagat Singh, a Sandhu Jat from Banga, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad, Pakistan) who took
some part in the Akali struggle, had been a member of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association,
Kirti Kisan Party and Naujawan Bharat Sabha. In the Assembly Bomb case he was sentenced to
transportation for life. Harbans Singh, The Encyclopedia of Sikhism, vol. 1, 316-18.
88 Aik Muazzaz Punjabi, Siasiyat-i-Punjab (Urdu) (Lahore: Muslim Printing Press, n.d.), 24-
25.
“The Babbar Akali Movement and its Ideology,” Punjab History Conference: Proceedings
September 29-30, 1972 PHSD, Punjabi University Patiala, 236-237.
90 Kamlesh Mohan, “The Babbar Akalis: An Experiment in Terrorism,” Journal of Regional
History 1 (Amritsar 1980) 167.
91 Punjab Legislative Council Debates, vol. IV, 2 August 1922 (Lahore: Punjab Government,
1923), 139.
92 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, “Redefining Constitutional Politics: the N-WFP and the Raj, 1901-
1932,” The Calcutta Historical Journal XXI & XXII, Special Number (1999-2000): 118.
93 J. S. Grewal, The New Cambridge History of India: The Sikhs of the Punjab, rep.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 168.
94 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 2 nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996 and 2005),
197.
95
Akali, 5 August 1929.
96
After Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, Gandhi visited Punjab and encouraged the Sikhs to found a
party that could counter the Chief Khalsa Dewan. As a result, the Central Sikh League was founded in
winter 1919. M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within Challenges to a Nation’s Unity, 137.
97
Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, 168.
98
Harbans Singh, The Encyclopedia of Sikhism, vol. I, 84.
99
Akali, 29 July 1929.
100
Tuteja, “The Sikhs and the Nehru Report,” 138.
101
Prithipal Singh Kapur, “Role of Master Tara Singh,” in Amrik Singh, ed., The Partition in
Retrospect (Delhi: National Institute of Punjab Studies, 2000), 61.
102
Ganda Singh, “The Origin of the Hindu-Sikh Tension in the Punjab,” Journal of Indian
History 39, part 1 (April 1961): 119-120.
103
Tahir Kamran, “Communal Antagonism in the Politics of Punjab (1900-1909) and the Birth
of Punjab Muslim League,” The Historian I (July-December 2002): 34.
104
The Arya Smajists even attacked the Sanatan Dharam, the Hindu faction. The Sanatan
Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab protested against a book entitled Radha Krishna published by the
Arya Samaj, Kraula Bagh Delhi which was “provocative and offensive to the Sanatanists.” File no.
10330- 10331, Department of Press Branch, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore.
105
Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab, 117; see also Speech
by Sirdar Kapur Singh in the Indian Parliament on 6 September 1965 in International Journal of Sikh
Affairs 8, no. 2 (November 1998): 3-6.
106
S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47 (Lahore: Vanguard Books,
1992), 187.
107
Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947
(New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1999), 130.
108
Y. P. Bajaj, “Unionist Politics and the General Elections of 1936-37: An Analysis,” Punjab
History Conference, 20 th Session (Punjabi University, 1987): 372.
109
Abdullah Malik, Punjab ki Siasi Tehriken (Urdu) (Lahore: Takhliqaat, 2003), 19.
102

110 Fazl-i-Husain seems very careful in touching the communal issues as he wrote in his diary
on 6 May 1930, “Had a visit from Shamasdin, a Punjabi who has lived in East Africa a long time. He
confidently raised the question of Muslim and non-Muslim in Kenya. I asked him not to raise it and not
let anyone else raise it.” IOR: Mss. Eur. E 352/6 (Dairies), Fazl-i-Husain Collection.
111 K. L. Tuteja, The Sikh Politics 1920-40 (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984): 200.
112 Waheed Ahmad, “Source Material for Writing Modern Indo-Pakistan History,” Journal of
the Research Society of Pakistan VII (April 1970): 16.
113 Mian Ahmad Yar Daultana, “Leaves from a Unionist’s Diary,” The Civil and Military
Gazette, October 25, 1936.
114 Views of the Local Government on the Working of the Reforms, 1924, (CMD)
2324, 200-201 in Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Communal Competition for Power in the Punjab and
the Unionist-Muslim League Co-operation, 1924-26,” South Asian Studies 6 (January 1989):
21.
115 Prithipal Singh Kapur, “The Role of Master Tara Singh,” 62.
116 David Page, Prelude to Partition, 72.
117 IOR: Mss. Eur. E 352/6 Dairies, Fazl-i-Husain Collection.
118 Ibid.
119 Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, 167-168.
120 I have used this term for the administrative system at the village level. Numberdar, Zaildar
and other elements were endowed with powers to ensure peace at the bottom level.
121 Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Pre-Partition Punjab,”
paper delivered at the WUN South Asian Virtual Seminar Series, University of
Southampton, UK, 6 May 2008; see also http://www.uwex.edu/ics/stream/session.cfm?
eid=11900&sid=16502.
122 See Javed Haider Syed, “Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan-A Political Biography” (M.Phil. Thesis,
Quaid-i-Azam University, 1985), 117-119.
123
Sir Sikandar Hayat’s Speech in the Dyal Singh College, Lahore on 26 February 1938,
MS210/22, Papers of Col. Nawab Khizar Hayat Tiwana (Tiwana Papers).
124
Gurnam Singh Rekhi, Sir Sundar Singh Majithia and his Relevance in Sikh Politics (New
Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Ltd., 1999), 82-83.
125
Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Punjab under the British Rule, 1849-1947, vol. II (1902-1932)
(Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 57-58.
126
S. Sahni, “Sikh Politics: 1927-47” (Ph.D. diss.) in Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and
Sikh Politics, 1920-47” (Ph.D. diss., Guru Nanak Dev University, 2005), 48n.
127
The Civil and Military Gazette, 20 October 1936.
128 Ibid., 21 October 1936.
129 “Meem Sheen ki kuchh yaden kuchh baten,” Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) 11 September 1992.
130 Nijjar, Punjab under the British Rule, vol. II, 158.
131 Punjab Unionist Party: Rules and Regulations (Lahore: Punjab Unionist Party
Headquarters Secretariat, 1936), 24.
132 Tuteja, “Sikhs and the Congress: 1930-40,” 453.
133 Sardar Sampuran Singh from Lyallpur had been the MLC of the Punjab. He represented the
Sikhs in the Round Table Conference along with Ujjal Singh.
134 Sardar Ujjal Singh (1895-1985) was an MLC in the Punjab Legislative Council in 1926. He
had been Parliamentary Secretary (Home) in the Unionist government from 1937 to 1942.
135 Sikh Memorandum presented by Sardar Ujjal Singh at Indian Round Table Conference
(Second session) 12 November 1931. file No. 15, Quaid-i-Azam Papers.
136 See details in A Punjabi, Confederacy of India (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1939), 243-
262.
137
Gulati, Akalis Past and Present, 58, 238.
138
Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution and Present
Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 122; see also International Journal of Sikh Affairs 8
(November 1998): 2. Editorial.
139
Tuteja, “Sikhs and the Congress: 1930-40,” 453.
140
Ibid., 454.
141
Joseph T. O’Connell, et al., ed., Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century
(Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for Sikh South Asian Studies, 1988), 242n. 73.
103

142 Sardar Kapur Singh, “Betrayal of the Sikhs,” International Journal of Sikh Affairs 8
(November 1998): 3.
143 Sir Sikandar’s Speech in the Assembly reported in the CMG on 8 March 1941; Fazl-i-
Husain believed in separate electorates. He conditionally agreed on the principle of joint electorates
moved by the Sikh and Hindu leaders but they (Jogindra Singh and Narendra Nath) did not fulfill ther
commitment. Fazl-i-Husain believed that Sikhs were getting more representation than their actual
population (13%), therefore, they would not accept the joint electorates. They had no importance out of
the Punjab. The other factor was a clear majority of the Muslims according to their numerical strength.
Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, A Political Biography (London: Longman, Green & Co. Ltd., 1946), 279-
280, 281n.
144 Tara Chand writes 31 Sikh seats. Tara Chand, History of Freedom in India, vol. IV, 183.
145 “The Reception of the Award,” The Round Table: A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the
British Commonwealth XXIII (December 1932 to September 1933): 149.
146 Narang, Storm over the Sutlej, 61.
147 Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 1920-47,” 108-10.
148 A Mosque near Railway Station Lahore, constructed by Abdullah Khan, cook of Dara
Shikoh, the then Punjab Governor. Bhai Taru Singh in 1746 was ‘martyred’ near the Mosque therefore
this place was named Shahidganj. After this, his smadh was also built at this place but with the passage
of time the Sikhs encroached whole of the area including the Mosque. Janbaz Mirza, Tehrik Masjid
Shahidganj (Lahore: Maktba Tabsra, 1988), 44-46.
149 Ibid., 57-58.
150 Ibid., 35-3.
151 Statement by the Premier published by the Director, Information Department, Punjab
Lahore on 16 March 1938, MS210/22, Tiwana Papers.
152 Janbaz Mirza, Tehrik Masjid Shahidganj, 66-71.
153 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 206-207.
154 Letter from Firoz Noon to Fazl-i-Husain on 8 August 1935, MSS. Eur. E. 352/12, Sir Fazl-
i-Husain Collection.
155 Statement by the Premier published by the Director, Information Department, Punjab Lahore
on 16 March 1938, MS210/22, Tiwana Papers.
156 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 183-84. Allama Mashriqi was the chief of
Khaksar movement.
157
Names including Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Maulvi Abdul Qadir Kasuri, Mian Abdul Aziz,
Raja Narendra Nath, Pandit Nanak Chand, Sardar Buta Singh, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Sardar Sampuran
Singh and Mian Ahmad Yar Daultana (Convener). Ibid.
158
Ibid., 184.
159
Janbaz Mirza, Tehrik Masjid Shahidganj, 244.
160
Letter from Emerson to Viceroy on 8 May 1937, Linlithgow Papers in PN Chopra, Towards
Freedom, 1937-47, vol. 1, 489.
161
CMG, 16 January 1940.
162
Ibid., 1 March 1936.
163
Ibid., 28 May 1936.
164
Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 187.
165 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1978), 176-177.
166 Akali Party’s Election Manifesto, The Tribune, 20 June 1936.
167 R. N. Vohra, “The Akali Dal and the National Movement,” Punjab History Conference, 20 th
Session (Patiala: Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, 1987): 339-40.
168 Amarjit Singh writes that 44 League candidates contested elections which is not a correct
figure. Amarjit Singh, Punjab Divided, 44.
169 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972),
224.
170
Muslim seats in UP were 64 and ML won 27. Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian
Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India’s Partition, 1928-40 (Lahore: Book Traders,
n.d.), 252, 109.
171
Letter from Emerson to Linlithgow on 22 February 1937, Linlithgow Papers in PN Chopra,
Towards Freedom, 1937-47, vol. 1, 166.
172
Letter from Emerson to Viceroy on 8 May 1937, Ibid., 489.
104

173
Mushirul Hasan, ed., India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 235.
174
Dr. Sikandar Hayat, “Charisma, Crisis and the Emergence of Quaid-i-Azam,” Quarterly
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society L (January-June 2002): 31-46.
175
Relations with the Punjab leaders can be observed through the correspondence between
Jinnah and the leaders, see S. Qaim Hussain Jafri, ed., Quaid-i-Azam’s Correspondence with Punjab
Muslim Leaders (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1977); se also Wakeel Anjum, Daultana Dastan (Urdu)
(Lahore: Jang publishers, 1996), 42 and passim.
176
Ahmad Yar Daultana, “Leaves from Unionist’s Diary,” The Civil and Military Gazette, 21
October 1936.
177
Letter from AY Daultana to MA Jinnah on 28 March 1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The Quaid-
E- Azam Papers 1940 (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1976), 96-97.
178
Nijjar, Punjab Under the British Rule, vol. III, 160-161.
179 The Times of India, 22 May 1937.
180 Nijjar, Punjab Under the British Rule, vol. III, 161.
181 Nehru’s visit of Lahore in that respect was also a threat to him.
182 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 192-193.
183 P. Moon, Divide and Quit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 17.
184 Yadav, “The Partition of India,” The Punjab Past and Present, 130.
185 FR, L/PJ/5/238.
186 The “Shiromani Akali Dal unabashedly agreed to atomise its regional character by agreeing
that Akali candidates, returned to the legislature, would form part of the Congress Legislative Party and
be amenable to its discipline.” Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 208; see also KL Tuteja, “Sikhs and
the Congress: 1930-40,” 455.
187 Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Muslim-Sikh Relationship (1921-47) A Brief Survey,” Journal of the
Pakistan Historical Society XXXIX, Part III (July 1991): 271-272.
188 Secretary of State for India on the Indian Political Situation, 26 November 1937, Cabinet
Papers in Chopra, Towards Freedom, 1196.
189 Qalb-i-Abid and Massarrat Abid, “Unionist-Muslim League Relations and the Punjab
Administration,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan 45 (July-December 2008): 91.
190 Letter from Emerson to Linlithgow on 12 November 1937 in Lionel Carter, ed., Punjab
Politics, 1936-1939: Start of Provincial Autonomy (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2004): 147-150.
191 Gulati, Akali Present and Past, 77.
192 Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab, 1926-47 (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 174.
193 FR, L/PJ/5/238.
194 “Khawja Hasan Nizami ke Note,” (Muslim League ka Jalsa) weekly Munadi (Urdu, Delhi) 1
January 1939.
195 Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab and Political Position of the
Muslim League,” in Massarrat Abid and Qalb-i-Abid, eds., History, Politics and Society: The Punjab
(Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 2009), 231.
196 Weekly Munadi, 8 February 1940.
197 Qalb-i-Abid and Massarrat Abid, “The British Response to the Demand for Pakistan: Prelude
to the Lahore Resolution and the British Reaction,” Journal of Research 19 (2002): 78.
198 Khwaja Hasan Nizami, “Muslim League kay liey kam,” Weekly Munadi , 8 January 1939.
199 Munadi, 16 January 1939, 4.
200 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 142-145.
201 Tuteja, “Sikhs and the Congress: 1930-40,” 449.
202 Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab 2 nd ed. (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1989), 10.
203 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 194-195.
204 Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, 10-11; see also Tahir Kamran, “The Unfolding
Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses,” Journal of Punjab
Studies 14 (Fall 2007): 187-210.
205 Presidential Address of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal on 29 December 1930, Syed Sharifuddin
Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947 (Karachi:
National Publishing House Ltd., 1970), 159
206 Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, 63.
105

207
Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle on the Punjab, 1897-1947 (New
Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1984), 179-80.
208
Tara Chand, History of Freedom, vol. IV, 167.
209
A Punjabi, Confederacy of India, 188.
210
Tuteja, “Sikhs and the Congress: 1930-40,” 451.
211
Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department Simla on 7 November 1923, , Government of
India, L/P&J/12/170.
212
Intelligence Bureau on 26 September 1923. Ibid; see also Jawahar Lal Nehru and Jaito
Morcha; also see Sohan Singh Josh, Akali Morchian da Itehas (Gurmukhi) (Delhi: Naaavyug
Publishers, 1972), passim.
213
The Intelligence Bureau Report on 21 November 1923, IOR: L/P&J/12/171.
214
Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha institute of religious studies, 1981),
59.
215
Ian Stephens, Pakistan, 135-136.
216
Balwant Singh Anand, Guru Nanak: His Life was his Message (New Delhi: Guru Nanak
Foundation, 1983), 110. It is yet to decide whether the poet was Baba Farid or Farid Sani, his
successor. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 310.
217
Abdul Majid Khan, “Muslim Devotees of Guru Gobind Singh,” The Punjab: Past and Present
XII-II (October 1978): 402-404.
218
H. S. Bhatti and Daniel M. Michon, “Folk Practices in Punjab,” Journal of Punjab Studies 11
(Fall 2004): 139-154.
219 Hari Ram Gupta, Later Mughal History of the Punjab, 44.
220 Ganda Singh, The Singh Sabha, 164-65.
221 Ibid., 76.
222 Ibid., 77.
223 Daily Paisa Akhbar, 10 July 1914.
224 Gadar movement was founded in USA in 1912 as an anti-British drive under Baba Sohan
Singh Bhakna. It was imported to India later in 1914. It believed in violence against the British
imperialism in India. see detail, Sohan Singh Josh, Hindustan Gadar Party, A Short History (New
Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1977).
225 As we find many Muslims like Maulvi Abdullah s/o Nizam Deen, Jagraon (Ludhiana),
Rahmat Ali, Wazidke, Patiala, Abdullah, Lahore, Fazal Din s/o Noor Din, Fateh Garh, Hoshiarpur, etc
with the Ghadar movement. Gurdial Singh Grewal, Freedom Struggle for India by Sikhs, 350-359.
226 CMG, 6 July 1919.
227 Ibid., 27 September 1919.
228 Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, 74.
229 Ibid., 134-35.
230 Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 210n.
231 Speech by Jinnah in Annual Session of the Muslim League in April 1924 in Muhammad
Saleem Ahmad, Promise and Fulfilment: A Documented History of All India Muslim League
(Bahawalpur: Department of History, 2005), 159.
232 Statement by Khizr Hayat Tiwana, MS-210/19, Tiwana Papers.
233 KC Yadav, “The Partition of India,” 110-111.
234 Udham Singh (Ram Muhammad Singh Azad) requested the Secretary, Khalsa Jatha to provide
him the book, Hir Waris Shah when he was in jail. JS Grewal and HK Puri, Letters of Udham Singh
(Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1974), 43
235 Ian Talbot, ed., Amritsar: Voices from Between India and Pakistan (London: Seagull Books,
2007), 114; see also Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India
(London: Curzon Press, 1996), 5.
236
Sikandar Hayat’s address to the District Board Ludhiana on 21 August 1937, MS-210/22,
Tiwana Papers.
237
Prof. Khizar Hayat Virk, Interview by the researcher on 10 August 2003 at Lahore.
238
Paisa Akhbar, 21 March 1916.
239
Akhtar Sandhu, “Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Pre-Partition Punjab.”
240
For detail on traditional village life in Punjab, see Malcolm Lyall Darling, Wisdom and Waste
in the Punjab Village (London: Oxford University Press, 1934) and The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity
106

and Debt, 2 nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1928) by the same author; also see Zekiye Egler, A
Punjabi Village in Pakistan (New York: Columbia University, 1959).
241
Malcolm Lyall Darling, Wisdom and Waste in the Punjab Village, 280.
242
Agape is a love which is spontaneous and natural on the basis of humanity. It believes that
human should be loved as all are creature of God. John J. Ansbro, Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Making
of Mind (Maryland, New York: Orbis Books, 1982), 8-9.
243
V. S. Suri, “Outstanding Family Archives in the Punjab,” The Indian Archives X (January-
December 1956): 20-24.
244
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Voice from the Rural Punjab-Muslim-Sikh Relations in the British
Punjab,” paper delivered at the PRG Meeting, Coventry University, UK, 28 June 2008; visit also
http://theprg.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/Akhtar-coventry-presentation2.doc.
245
H. N. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register1919-1947, vol. II (1940) (New
Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), 90. In the World War I, from 1914 to 1919, the
Punjab provided 349,688 out of 6,83,149 Indian troops. David Page, Prelude to Partition,
49.
246
Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary for the week ending 15 May 1923, IOR:
L/P&J/12/170.
247
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, “Knowing the ‘Other’ in Civilisational and Cultural Terms,” in Ajeet
Cour and Pankaj Bhan, eds., Cultural Connectivity for Peace in South Asia (New Delhi: Foundation of
SAARC Writers and Literature, 2005), 94.
248
Akhtar Sandhu, “Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Pre-Partition Punjab.”
249
Dr. Mazhar Mehmood Sherani, Interview by the researcher on 12 June 2005 at Lahore.
250
Narang, Storm over the Sutlej, 42-43.
251
Prithipal Singh, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab, 42.
252
Arya Kumar Sabha and Sanatan Kumar Sabha were the organizations working for the Hindus
in the school.
253
Daily Paisa Akhbar, 13 July 1919.
254
Tuteja, “The Sikhs and the Nehru Report,” 130.
255
“Are the Sikhs A Nation?,” Editorial, The Eastern Time, 8 August 1944.
256
Sirdar Ujjal Singh, “Sikhs and the Civil Disobedience Movement,” The Khalsa Review 1
(June 1930): 53-54.
257
“The Reception of the Award,” The Round Table: A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the
British Commonwealth (London) vol. XXIII (December 1932 to September 1933): 144-145.
258
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 201.
259
Naranjan Dass Mohaya, “Administration of Law and Order under the Unionist Party (1937-
1941),” Punjab History Conference, 20 th Session (Punjabi University, 1987): 376-78.
260
CMG, 13 October 1936.
261 Ibid., 7 October 1936.
262 Ibid., 20 November 1936.
263 Ibid., 24 November 1936.
264 Ibid., 24 and 27 November 1936.
265 Ibid., 28 November 1936.
266
Ibid.
267
Ibid., 4 November 1936.
268
Ibid., 17 October 1936.
269
Ibid., 16 January 1940.
270
Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 19 February 1940 in Lionel Carter, ed., Punjab Politics,
1940-1943 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 75-80.
271
Sir Henry Duffield Craik remained in the Punjab Governor’s office from 4 April 1938 to 7
April 1941.
272
Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 4 March 1940 in Lionel Carter, Punjab Politics, 1940-
1943, 80-84.
273 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 28.
274 Satya M. Rai, Punjabi Heroic Tradition, 161.
275 The Sikhs and Hindus were almost the same even in their religious outlook as a large
literature was published by the Sikhs like Ham Hindu Hein etc. to prove that they were Hindus. The
Sikhism did not believe in idol-worship despite the fact that the Golden Temple was filled with the
107

idols till the first decade of the 20th century. The Gurdwaras were under the Hindu priests. Both
communities could inter-dine and inert-marry, etc. This could not be erased from their minds within
weeks rather it required a long period cleanse their minds from these effects.
276 Professor Khizar Virk, Interview by the researcher.
277 Ian Talbot, Amritsar: Voices from Between India and Pakistan, passim; oral history accounts
also testify it.
278 Ar-Rai, 25 February 1921 in Hasan Masud, “Communal Relations in British Punjab, 1919-
1939” (M.Phil. thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2001), 21.
279 In the Punjabi villages, 95% families had no washrooms in their houses therefore they had to
go outside to use the fields for call of nature. The fields worked as open-toilets.
280 Letter of the Muslims of Raja Jang to the Governor-General, file No. 1098, QAP.
281 Prakash Tandon, Punjabi Century, 1857-1947 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), 102.
282 Aik Muazzaz Punjabi, Siasiyat-i-Punjab, 28-29.
283 Garrett, The Punjab, A Hundred Years Ago, 54n
284 Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab, 42.
285 Ibid.
286 Ikram Ali Malik, “Cow-Killing as a Factor of Socio-Political Dichotomy in South Asia: A
Case Study of Cow-Killing in the British Punjab, 1849-1901,” South Asian Studies 1 (January 1984):
83-85. 287Prithipal Singh Kapur, Main Currents of Freedom Struggle, 42-44.
288 Slaughter with one strike.
289 Muslims cut half the throat of goat or sheep and recite some specific verses (halal) while in
Jhatka, Sikhs with one strike separate the head from the rest of the body of a goat or sheep. If head of
the goat is separated totally, the Muslims consider it haram (religiously forbidden) while the Sikhs
consider the goat haram if its head is not separated with one strike.
290 JS Pakkar, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 160.
291 CMG, 24 November 1936
292 Letter from Master Tara Singh to Sir Sikandar Hayat on 10 September 1937, Linlithgow
Papers, in P. N. Chopra, Towards Freedom, 1937-47, vol. 1, 950-951.
293 The Muslims like Attari and Abdul Karim wrote to the paper that if these Muslims were paid
the cost of their houses, they would be ready to shift to somewhere else to get rid of the cruel Sikhs.
Daily Paisa Akhbar, (Lahore) 20 September 1914.
294 CMG, 18 January 1940.
295 Hindustan (Lucknow), vol. 3, no. 8, 19 February 1939, 11.
296 Atamjit Singh, “The Language Divide in Punjab,” http://www.punjabilokcom/misc/education/
languag edivide5.htm, 24/12/2003.
297 CMG, 25 October 1936.
298 Comrade Bishan Singh, interview by the researcher at Delhi; Rehmat Bibi, age 119 years,
interview by the researcher at Feroz Wattuan, District Sheikhupura, 21/2/2004 and Khurshid Bibi D/O
Ch. Qadir Bakhsh, Interview by the researcher at Alipur Chak 6, Pattoki District Kasur.
299 MSS. EUR. F 125/135.
300 Letter from Tara Singh to Sir Sikandar on 10 September 1937, Linlithgow Papers, in Chopra,
Towards Freedom, vol. 1, 951.
301 CMG, 17 November 1936.
302 Letter from Tara Singh to Sir Sikandar on 10 September 1937, Linlithgow Papers, in Chopra,
Towards Freedom, vol. 1, 952.
303 Javed Haider Syed, “Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan,” 359.
304 Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 235.
305 Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, 140.
306 Sir Zafarullah Khan also used ‘Pakistan’ in his scheme presented to the Viceroy on 6 March
1940, MSS. EUR. F 125/135.
108

CHAPTER TWO
THE LAHORE RESOLUTION--A PERMANENT CLEAVAGE
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SIKHS
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 had an immense political impact on the Punjab
politics. In particular, the prospect of a Muslim homeland raised anxieties for the Sikh
political leadership which by this time was dominated by the Shiromani Akali Dal.
The Sikhs from time to time had raised their demands for the protection as the politics
became more democratized. But their demands had not been fully accepted either by
the British or the Congress and merely distanced them further from the Punjabi
Muslim sentiment. The Sikh demands were weak because they always worked in
reaction to the Muslim political developments. This chapter aims to look into the
Muslim-Sikh relations in the backdrop of the Lahore Resolution up to the time of the
Cripps proposals.
The Muslim-Sikh relations had been somewhat good but the Lahore
Resolution of 1940 drew a hard-line and widened the gulf between the two
communities even in the rural areas. To the Sikhs, the Pakistan scheme had ended any
possibility of settlement with the Muslims. It created a crisis in the Punjab particularly
in the Sikh politics. The Hindus adopted different styles of opposing the Pakistan
scheme from different platforms nevertheless the strongest reaction came from the
Sikh community because the Punjab, ‘cornerstone’ of the League’s plan, was a sacred
land of Sikhs. Despite their fullest endeavours, they could not find a solid scheme to
counter the Pakistan scheme. They planned resistance of Pakistan instead of making a
plan to meet the rapidly changing situations of the 1940s. In the crucial phase of the

freedom movement, the Sikh leadership ignored all the situational realities of the day
relating to the panth, their sister communities and the turning tide of the Indian
history. This further weakened the nature of the Muslim-Sikh relationship in the
Punjab. The Sikhs by and large remained disunited, leaderless and directionless. As
far as the Sikh attitude towards the Muslims was concerned, the Sikhs continued to
portray them as the worst evil. The Akalis proved equally unsympathetic to the
Muslims whether they were Leaguers or the pro-British Unionists. They were
confused because their utmost desire was to remain with the defiant Congress but at
the same time they never wanted to lose the opportunity of the recruitment in the
army. Moreover, they did not want to surrender the benefits for their community
which the Muslims could have from the British.
110
The Unionist Premier, Sir Sikandar Hayat, had already assured the British of
the Muslim support in the war. And the Unionist Muslims after the Jinnah-Sikandar
Pact “were technically members of the League” 1 at that time as Ahmad Yar Daultana
admitted in his letter to Jinnah, “I am a member of the Muslim League and my
relations of loyalty with you will always remain un-shattered.” 2 Under the Muslim
threat and the personal benefits, the Sikhs decided to support the British and fought
zealously in the World War I leaving behind all their homes and dear kinspersons.
According to Khushwant Singh, the main purpose of the Sikh recruitment was to arm
the community so that after the British departure they might utilize these army men as
the Khalsa fauj. 3 The Hindu Mahasabha had a similar sentiment. Its Working
Committee on 22 September 1940 passed a resolution opposing Gandhian approach
on the recruitment. The leaders said that the war was a big opportunity “for the
general militarization of the Hindus, and for the organization of the system of India on
sound and up-to-date modern lines, so that India be converted into a self-contained

defence unit.” 4 The Sikhs and Mahasabha Hindus were united against the Muslim
League and were trying to increase their fighting strength.
Communal Tension
111
The communal clashes in towns such as Shahpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,
Gujranwala, and Ludhiana caused an additional setback to the Muslim-Sikh relations.
Local conflicts coincided with the constitutional deadlock between the main political
parties none of whom appeared willing to compromise. In the first week of March
1940, Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, President, the National Liberal Federation of India depicted
the deplorable political situation in which the Congress was held responsible for the
constitutional deadlock:
It shows no desire on the part of the Congress to reach a peaceful settlement of the
Indian problem. While inveighing against British imperialism and exploitation, it is
blind to the dangers of a much worse imperialism and exploitation…Democracy, in
Congress eyes, apparently means subservience to the High Command and ultimately to
Mr. Gandhi. The Congress, by its methods, alienating more and more several minorities
and is working against national unity…I agree in the Congress repudiation of ‘attempts
to divide India or to split up her nationhood,’ but earnestly trust that the Congress will
counteract these attempts by deeds of conciliation and not merely by words of
repudiation. As it is, the Congress has contributed largely to the separatist tendencies
by antagonising the minorities. 5
The Congress resigned from the ministries (22 October 1939) in seven provinces
which gave Jinnah an opportunity to gain strength in the provinces as an alternative
political force. Therefore, in the current scenario, the League had its governments in
NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan while to K. C. Yadav, “Punjab and Bengal already
were his.” 6 In the beginning of March 1940, Dr. Muhammad Alam, MLA, resigned
from the Deputy leadership of the Congress party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly
and analyzed the Hindu attitude of the Congress which was not confined to sideline
Jinnah and his party but to all the Muslims; it never acknowledged the services of
other nationalist Muslims who were compelled to desert the Congress gradually. He

further stated that the war had made the situation very fragile and crucial therefore the
Congress must change its attitude towards the Muslim rights because soon the
situation would change in the country: “The time for fighting over rights against the
British Government is soon to change into a time for distribution of rights.” 7
Furthermore, the nationalist Muslims kept on pressing the Congress leaders to change
their behaviour towards the Muslims. An article published in Hindustan depicts the
grievances of the Congressite Muslims:
Today we have issue of the Muslim inclusion in the Congress before us and amazingly
all aspects related to the issue are surfacing out time to time. To me, the severest and
the most important point is the “Hindu mentality” that the Congressite leaders
themselves have presented as a big psychological hurdle. In general, the atmosphere of
the daily routine work and meetings of the Congress does not attract the Muslims. For
example, our national songs, language of the proceedings, traditions, etc. were
pestering and irritating to the Muslims. And civilizationally it can conspicuously be
said a “Hinduiyat.” This is the root cause, which blocks the Congress’ popularity
among the Muslims. It is listened that Comrade M. N. Rai too has conceded the very
point. 8
This was the original face of the Congress, which always made the Muslims feel that
they were inferior and aliens. On the other hand, the Sikhs were not ready to tolerate
even parleys between Congress and the League. On the League-Congress dialogue,
the Executive Committee of the Khalsa National Party in the Punjab Assembly under
Sir Sundar Singh Majithia, 9 the Revenue Minister, resolved that the Sikhs’
apprehensions had increased after watching the current political situation of India in
which the Sikh demands got no attention. He further elucidated that the Gandhi-
Viceroy and then Jinnah-Gandhi discussions showed that the Congress was ignoring
the Sikh claims just to pacify the Muslims because during these negotiations only the
Muslims were being considered as an important minority. 10 Although the Sikhs
desired to participate in the discussions on the communal issue but as a matter of fact
112
the Hindu leadership and others perceived that the Sikhs could not survive without the

Hindu support. If the Congress was satisfied, the Sikhs would have felt the same
ultimately.
113
At Lahore, a major clash took place between the Khaksars and the police and
caused serious bloodshed (19 March 1940). Sir Sikandar requested Jinnah to prorogue
the League’s session but Jinnah refused. According to Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, every
Muslim house was sad and mourning the poignant incident but the Sikhs were pleased
on the police action against the Khaksars. 11 Under such a stringent atmosphere, the
League held its annual session at Lahore in March 1940 in which its leadership set a
goal to achieve Pakistan before the Indian Muslims. Sir Sikandar participated in the
drafting process of the Lahore Resolution commonly known as the Pakistan
Resolution. 12
The Lahore Resolution
Jinnah had declared that the Lahore League session would be a landmark in the
future of the Muslims of the Subcontinent. Distinguished Punjabi Muslim leaders like
the Premier Sir Sikandar, Khizr Tiwana, Mian Abdul Haye and Sir Shah Nawaz of
Mamdot welcomed Jinnah to the ceremonial platform of Lahore. The people in
thousands were waiting for their leader outside the Railway Station while the streets
had been decorated to show love and devotion for the League leaders. 13 In his
presidential address on 23 March, Jinnah gave a complete reply to the Ramgarh
Congress’ session ideology by saying that the spiritual, financial, cultural, social and
political differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims were fundamental and
deep-rooted which maintained the dividing line between the two throughout the
centuries. After experiencing a close interaction of a thousand years, both the
communities never merged into each other and were still separate and distinctive.

Merely the democratic constitution could not unite them forcibly together. Binding to
such a system was an un-natural and artificial effort of the British in the guise of the
parliamentary system. 14 The major portions of the Lahore Resolution are as under:
…no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims
unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically
contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such
territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are
numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be
grouped to constitute Independent States… That adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units
and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them… 15
According to Sir Craik, the resolution produced three results which elevated the
Muslims to speak more forcefully for their rights, including the status of the League,
unchallenged leadership of Jinnah and the unanimity of the Muslims on the Pakistan
demand. 16 The Lahore Resolution 17 was eventually to provide a rallying point for
Muslims from the majority and minority provinces who had possessed different
political interests. Its immediate impact was to invoke a hostile reaction among all the
factions of the Sikhs.
Sikh Reaction to the Lahore Resolution
114
The Pakistan Resolution passed by the League provoked a new sense of rights
among the Indian Muslims by determining the clear-cut destination of Pakistan but
proved a ‘bomb-shell’ to the Sikh community. Despite the rampant factionalism in
Sikh politics, all the Sikh groups were firmly united on one point, opposition to the
Pakistan scheme. To Tai Yong Tan, the Resolution of 1940 brought a colossal unrest
for the Sikh community. Their anger was genuine because it was a direct threat to the
economy, canal colony lands, religion and existence of Sikhs. 18 On 24 March 1940,
Kartar Singh and Master Tara Singh led a Sikh procession in Amritsar and
condemned the idea of Pakistan. They advised the Sikhs to get ready for sacrifices

against the Muslims. 19 Sikhs were hit the most by the Lahore Resolution. The
Shiromani Akali Dal declared it out rightly “a declaration of the civil war.” 20 Even
before the passage of the Lahore Resolution, the Sikhs had been raising voice against
the expected Muslim demands for a separate state. The All India Akali Conference
was held at Attari (15 miles from Lahore) on 10-11 February 1940 in which the Akali
Sikhs from all the parts of India participated. Isher Singh Majhail, Professor Ganga
Singh, Santokh Singh, Sant Singh, MLA, and Partap Singh, MLA condemned the idea
of a separate Muslim state. They also criticized the Unionist ministry. Teja Singh of
Akarpura said in his presidential address that the Unionist Muslims were spending the
government finances to spread Islam. The speakers expressed determination that the
Sikhs would always work to strengthen the Congress position. They also advised the
audiences to set up the Akali Fauj Centres in every village. 21 To H. N. Mitra, the
Sikhs pledged in this conference that the endeavours to convert the Punjab into
‘Pakistan’ would be resisted by all possible means. 22 On the question of Pakistan,
according to Joseph T. O’Connell, they were even ready to sacrifice Indian
independence which was their political creed. 23
115
Master Tara Singh argued soon after the League resolution that if the Indian
Muslims feared from the Hindu majority, the Sikhs too feared from the Muslim
domination in the Punjab. 24 The Pakistan scheme created panic among the common
Sikhs and the recruitment efforts in 1940 were severely downed. Major-General
Lockhart reported that the main factor behind the Sikh reluctance to enlist and the
desertions from the army was that the Sikhs thought that if they went to the front
abroad, their property, lands and villages would be attacked and occupied by the
Muslims who desired to capture the Punjab. The Sikhs, therefore, wished to live in
India to look after their families and community and protect them from the Muslims.

The Sikhs would be contented if the concessions were to be given to the Congress
rather than the League. 25 The Sikhs were well aware of the dangers which they faced
but the situation required them to come up with remedies. Master Tara Singh himself
writes in his book that Pakistan meant ‘Muslim Raj’ either in the name of Pakistan or
without it. To him, Pakistan created a new sense of prejudice in the Muslims and
increased apprehension of the non-Muslims. He further says that the rule in the
Punjab by the Unionist Muslims was enough to irritate the Sikhs but the Leaguers had
been pinching them more and more by adopting the word ‘Pakistan.’ 26 On 20 May
1940, 125 Sikh leaders gathered at Lahore who established Guru Raj Khalsa Darbar to
achieve an independent state of Khalistan from Jumna to Jamrud. They also planned
to have two more states including Takht Sri Hazur Sahib (Hyderabad State) and
Takhat Sri Patna Sahib. They claimed to regain the areas which had been under the
Sikh rule. In the next meeting presided over by Gopal Singh Gargaj on 23 May, the
Sikh leaders discussed the practicality of the scheme. 27 This meeting was a countering
measure to the idea of Pakistan.
Pakistan Resolution and the Congress
116
In the practical parlance, the League had demanded Pakistan on the basis of
the Two-Nation Theory. The Times of India threw light on the League session of
Lahore and wrote that the Congress Session of Ramgarh highlighted the single nation
theory in India as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had argued while the League retaliated
with the Two-Nation theory. 28 The popularity of the League pervaded all the Muslim
minds. Raghuvendra Tanwar depicts the post-League session situation that “With
every passing day after the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution the League moved one
step closer to its goal of a separate home land for Muslims.” 29 The sane minds could

look into the sharply changing situation. The Times portraying importance and
numerical strength of the Muslims wrote that the course of Muslim feelings could not
be “brushed aside.” The other communities would have to accommodate them in the
constitutional war. “The French are a minority in Europe, which does not imply that
they must submit to German domination.” 30 Jinnah himself asserted in January 1941
that the “Muslim League now represents 90 per cent Mussalmans” 31 in the
Subcontinent which meant that the increased support of Muslims created more
congenial atmosphere for the League leader to continue his struggle.
117
As far as the British response to the Pakistan scheme was concerned, they, as
usual, favoured the united India and seemed satisfied that the Muslim demand had no
backing of the Muslim majority provinces. Lord Linlithgow 32 expressing his adverse
remarks against the League and Jinnah’s move wrote to Zetland 33 that they could not
make a plan as an alternative to the Hindu domination. 34 Zetland supported
Linlithgow’s standpoint by saying that he disagreed in April 1940 with the League’s
proposal for the Indian vivisection. He said that to concede such a demand would
mean to dishonour the efforts of the British and Indians for the unity of India. 35 In fact
Zetland had always been in favour of the united India. He had expressed the same in
1938 by saying that they would have “insuperable difficulties” in the acceptance of
any move that would result in the territorial separation from the Indian Union. 36
Moreover, in 1942, Linlithgow wrote to Amery 37 that it was the Hindu community
which “made a mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they
have given substance to a shadow.” 38
The Congress had many friends in England 39 who always paved the way for
the Congress’s popularity through effective propaganda. The press generally
supported whatever the Hindu leadership stood for. The New Statesman in 1942

favoured Gandhi’s campaign and condemned the government’s decision to exempt
the Muslims from the fines. Lord Huntingdon wrote in his book titled Common Sense
About India (1942) that the British should withdraw from India and surrender the
political powers to the Congress. Professor Laski through the Manchester Guardian
pressed on the Viceroy to accommodate Gandhi through dialogue. The wife of Lord
Pethick-Lawrence in August 1942 appreciated Gandhian campaign of civil
disobedience through a letter to The Times. 40 All these fronts were facilitating the
Hindu struggle, even Sir Stafford Cripps, a friend of Nehru, extended greetings on the
success of Congress in the elections 1937 and latter had been continuously in contact
with him before he was sent to India in 1942. 41
118
The Congress leadership adopted erratic attitude towards the Lahore
Resolution and the Sikhs. In the beginning, they tried to conceal their real feelings
about the Pakistan scheme but they could not help exposing themselves with the
passage of time. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad said that Jinnah’s scheme would be
disastrous to the interests of all the communities equally. 42 In a meeting of the
Congress in 1940, Rajendra Babu said that “the recent resolution of the League meant
civil war” without caring as to what his leader Gandhi was uttering in favour of the
Muslim separatist movement. In the same meeting, Gandhi had said that “If Muslims
want separatism, he will not oppose.” 43 Gandhi in April 1940 declared the fight
against the Muslim scheme of partition through non-violent methods 44 but at the same
time he conceded that all the communities had a right to demand their due political
share which suited them. Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari, Maulana Azad and other
Congress leaders considered that the Pakistan scheme was absurd. They believed that
the Muslim masses would never back it. The other Congress leaders expressed their
incapability to oppose it if the Muslims desired it. During May 1940, they made it

clear that the Congress wished no use of coercion against the Pakistan demand. The
Congress did not make any formal statement or pass a resolution against the partition
scheme of the League till April 1942. 45 The situation after the Lahore Resolution
shows that no community of India or Punjab including the British had any sympathy
for the scheme presented by the League. The British may have been conducive to the
Muslim rights but they showed no favour for the Pakistan idea. Therefore, the League
leadership had to plead its case on the universally accepted principle of self-
determination.
Sikh Strategy
The Sikhs had been complaining against the Muslim domination in the provincial
legislature and proposed an increase in their representation from time to time. The
situation became worse because the League had declared a plan to have a permanent
Muslim ‘domination’ in the Punjab. The Muslim state was not an abrupt show of the
Muslims rather this idea “had been in the air since 1930, and the idea of a physical
division of the country had been underlined by the Muslim League throughout
1939.” 46 Therefore, the rival community was ready to fully oppose it. Demand for
division and its opposition went simultaneously as parallel forces. The prime Sikh
strategy was to show utmost annoyance through the press and public statements. A
day after the ‘Pakistan Resolution’ the Akalis organized a conference at Anandpur in
which Giani Dhanwant Singh and Master Ajit Singh strongly criticized the idea of
Pakistan. 47 On 27 March, the executive committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal in a
meeting at Amritsar condemned the Pakistan scheme. 48 The Khalsa National Party
held a conference at Lahore on 29 March in which the idea of Pakistan was rejected.
119
The Revenue Minister Sundar Singh Majithia warned that the Lahore Resolution was

fraught with grave dangers. A resolution passed at the conference expressed the Sikh
sentiments that “it would be the height of audacity for anyone to imagine that the
Sikhs would tolerate for a single day the undiluted communal Raj of any community
in the Punjab which is not only their homeland but also their holy land.” 49 According
to the resolution:
In the opinion of the party the resolution of the Muslim League has created a situation
which may mean a parting of the ways for the Sikhs and Muslims with whom the
Khalsa National Party has been co-operating in the Provincial Autonomy regime in the
best interests of the province and the Sikh community. 50
On 29 March 1940, the City Akali Jatha of Amritsar passed a resolution against the
League’s demand for the Muslim state. 51 All the Sikhs who had otherwise been
disunited were united in making statements against the Pakistan scheme. The
Communist Sikhs favoured the Muslim right of self-determination but appeared
confused in their response to the Pakistan scheme. They on 5 April arranged a
conference at Attari which was attended by the eminent leaders like Sohan Singh
Josh, Ghulam Fatima and Gopal Singh Qaumi to give a reply to the Akalis. The
conference deplored the communal activities of the organizations such as the
Khaksars and the Akalis at the same time opposition was raised to the Pakistan
scheme. Although the Intelligence reports considered it a weak counteraction to the
Akali conference of March 1940 52 but through the speeches they had conveyed their
message to the Sikhs, Muslims and the Hindus that on the issue of the partition
scheme of the League they were with the Sikhs and Congress. They raised objections
to the Akali Dal because of its religious claims to represent all the Sikhs and its
verdict that their political opponents were “traitors to the panth.” 53 At Pherala
(Lyallpur) on 6 April 1940, Master Tara Singh briefed the audience about the Akali
understanding on the current political scenario and the Akali policy to deal with the
120
situation. He said that the Sikhs were fighting a war for survival. The weak position of

the British in the war could result in a great change in the politics while the Leaguers
had called them for the civil war. He further maintained that the British government
had discouraged the Sikhs therefore they had “become religiously very weak.” 54
121
Giani Kartar Singh, the brain of the Akalis, held that the Muslim scheme of a
separate state aimed to enslave the Sikhs. 55 The SGPC postulated the Sikh co-
operation with Sir Sikandar on the war efforts to his resignation from the League. 56 In
an anti-Pakistan conference at Lyallpur, Master Tara Singh repudiated the ideology of
Muslim separatism. 57 In a Sikh diwan at Nankana Sahib, the Pakistan scheme was
deprecated. 58 The Pharala Akalis Conference (Lyallpur) on 6-7 April 1940 attracted a
big throng to which the Sikh leaders like Ishar Singh Majhail, Master Tara Singh, and
Kartar Singh MLA, delivered anti-Pakistan speeches with determination that the
Sikhs “would forcibly resist” such an idea of the Muslim state. They even demanded
that Sir Sikandar should disown the League 59 to show his impartiality.
Baba Kharak Singh of the Central Akali Dal maintained that the vivisection of
India would never be allowed and the Sikhs would undermine the anti-India
campaign. 60 The Sikhs expressed their anger in the speeches made in the Akali
Conference held at Hasanabdal. They termed the Lahore Resolution as the end of
peace of the region. 61 On 15 April 1940, at Lucknow, Master Tara Singh, President
of SGPC, made a tirade in the UP Sikh Conference decrying the League resolution for
a Muslim state. He demanded that the UP Sikhs must not be treated as the Punjabi
Sikhs who were under the Unionist Muslims. 62 He further said that the Pakistan
scheme would mean a civil war and “the Muslims would have to “cross an ocean of
Sikh blood” 63 for the accomplishment of their task. The Central Khalsa Youngmen
Union in April 1940 pledged to suffocate the Pakistan scheme. 64 The Sikhs launched a
series of protests through conferences in which they condemned the Pakistan scheme

ut were silent on counter proposals as solution to the communal problem which
could be acceptable for all the stakeholders. The Sikh conferences attracted big
gathering from the rural areas who conveyed the infused anti-Muslim feelings to the
other community members. They also rejuvenated Sikh bitter memories of the
Mughal oppression and their sacrifices.
122
On the other hand, the League was busy to spread the idea of Pakistan in the
minds and hearts of the Muslim masses. According to the Intelligence Reports, the
League held eleven meetings at mosques in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Rohtak,
Jullundur, Jhelum, Karnal, Gurdaspur, Lyallpur, Jhang, Rawalpindi and Simla and
celebrated the ‘Pakistan Day’ on 19 April and passed pro-Pakistan resolutions. In the
Rawalpindi meeting, Dr. Muhammad Alam declared that the Muslims were ready to
sacrifice their lives for their own cause but not for the Hindu raj. 65
Master Tara Singh, always spoke in terms of sacrifice, but in resistance to
Pakistan he urged the Sikh militants to get ready for an action to block the possibility
of emergence of Pakistan. 66 In July 1940, the government reports depicted the Sikh
intention that they would undermine the hopes of the Muslim self-determination at
any cost. For this purpose, they had started purchasing weapons and ammunition.
They were buying Kirpans and axes in large numbers so that the Sikhs could use them
in case of a fight. 67 The SGPC and the Akali Dal organized a commemorative
ceremony for the Sikh martyrs of the Ghallughara. A gathering of 20,000 Sikhs
pledged to resist the Pakistan drive 68 along with the revival of the Akali Saina (Sikh
army). 69 The Muslims protested and condemned the Ghallughara Day celebrations
and warned that such activities would “inflame the communal feelings” in the
region. 70 Despite sensing the Muslim feelings, they kept on launching anti-Muslim
activities throughout the region. Another Ghallughara Conference was arranged at

Gujarwal (district Ludhiana) on 15 June 1940. The leaders held a secret session in
which they discussed the establishment of the Sikh state if the British government
collapsed. The report informed the conference about “the distrust between the Sikh
and Muslim communities in the Ludhiana district.” 71 Dr. Satyapal considered the
Sikhs as communalists on the celebration of the Ghallughara Day. 72 The Sikhs
organized the Ghallughara days or conferences almost in all the Sikh centers and
caused friction between the two communities. Nothing was done however to stop this
communal hatred. The British government was not taking the Sikh activities against
the League’s Pakistan scheme seriously. 73 The Sikh press fully participated in the
anti-Pakistan activities and said that they would never let the Muslims establish their
rule over the Sikhs. The Muslims had to face fierce hurdles. 74
123
An array of the non-Muslim political forces was against Pakistan and
intimidating the Muslims through speeches, press statements, physical trainings and
parades. In April 1940, the SGPC held a meeting at Amritsar in which Dalip Singh
Doabia expressed that creation of the Muslim state would remain a dream for good.
He hoped that the Sikh legislators would “withdraw their support from the Unionist
ministry unless its Muslim members dissociated themselves from Muslim League.” 75
The Khalsa Defence League was organized in 1940 under the Maharaja Patiala with
Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar as its members. The pro-government Khalsa
National Party refused to co-operate with the Khalsa League on the inclusion of the
Akali Dal. The clash of personalities remained a permanent feature of the Sikh
politics 76 despite raging campaigns against the Pakistan scheme.
In November 1940, the Sikhs came to know that the British desired to
establish an Ahmadi 77 state (covering area of 10 miles) in Qadian, district Gurdaspur
which caused bitterness between them and the Muslims. A big procession of the

Akalis passed through Qadian chanting anti-Qadian state slogans. Udham Singh
Nagoke, Parlok Singh, Teja Singh Akarpuri and many others addressed the
conference (17-18 November) held near Qadian. Parlok Singh appealed to the
government not to form “an infant Pakistan in the Punjab.” Nagoke spoke against the
proposed Ahmadi state and Pakistan and exhorted the Sikhs to join the Congress and
the Akali Dal. Pandit Dhirat Ram of Qadian told stories of the painful experiences of
the non-Ahmadis of the area and requested the Sikhs to save them from the cruelty of
the Qadiani Muslims. 78 The Sikhs found allies in the Hindu Mahasabha. In December
1940, an Anti-Pakistan Conference was arranged under the chairmanship of Mr.
Anney, a Mahasabha leader, who said that the Muslims were planning to rule India
without using weapons. The Conference also condemned the Pakistan scheme.
Thousands of non-Muslims attended this Conference including Master Tara Singh. 79
124
In March 1941, an anti-Pakistan conference was arranged at Lahore in which
the Hindus mostly from the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP participated. This was
originally conceived as purely a Hindu gathering, but the Sikhs enthusiastically joined
them because they were following the same agenda. Shyama Prasad Mukerji of the
Hindu Mahasabha, in his presidential address promised that 280 million Hindus
would be a big hurdle for the Pakistan scheme. He said that Pakistan would be
confined to the papers, pamphlets, slogans and the speeches only. He requested the
Sikhs to strengthen the hands of the Mahasabha to achieve their destination. M. C.
Khanna, a leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party (NWFP Assembly), denounced
the Muslim state. Bhai Parmanand asked the audience to use weapons to upset the
Muslim hopes. 80 The Hindus and Sikhs had joined hands with each other as usual.
According to the Police reports, Mahasha Khushal Chand Khursand was provoking
the Akalis against the Unionist government. It was also reported that Dr. Gokal Chand

Narang, Raja Narendra Nath and Bhai Parmanand had deliberations with Master Tara
Singh and the SGPC leaders to organize ‘Hindu Sikh Unity League’ under Master
Tara Singh. Its major aim was to take joint action against the Muslims in case of
attacks on the Hindus or Sikhs. The other purpose was to counter the Unionist
government and the Pakistan scheme. 81 The programme of the Hindu-Sikh Unity
League apparently was a defensive plan against the Muslim attacks but observing the
Sikh and Hindu leaders’ statements and activities, one can easily infer that it was
being organized to perpetrate violence against the Muslims.
125
The All-India Akali Conference was held on 15-16 February 1941 at Rurka
(Roorka) Kalan district Jallandhar in which the Sikhs presented their demands in
detail. The SGPC passed resolutions such as the release of the Sikhs of Sargodha,
approval of the SGPC in any legislation regarding Sikh religion, introduction of
Gurmukhi and Hindi languages in schools, removal of ban on Jhatka and waiving off
tax on religious and the educational institutions. Master Tara Singh appealed to the
Muslims and Hindus to support them in their struggle for justice and religious
freedom. He further expressed that the government could infuse a sense of security
into the Sikhs by conceding these demands. 82 He wrote to the Governor on 28
February 1941 that the provincial government had launched a policy against the
Sikhs. 83 Governor Craik on 3 March 1941 wrote to Linlithgow that Tara Singh was
wrong if he thought that the Punjab Ministers had an anti-Sikh policy. 84 Master Tara
Singh met the Governor and the Premier in a friendly atmosphere in which Sir
Sikander assured that all the possible measures would be taken to meet the Sikh
demands. Craik passed his comments through a letter to the Viceroy that Master Tara
Singh lacked the leadership qualities:

126
Tara Singh cut a poor figure in argument with Sikander. He was shaky about the
facts and has no gift for expressing himself lucidly, but like most Sikhs he is
extraordinarily tenacious about his own point of view and incapable of seeing that
there can be any other. 85
At Gojra, near Lyallpur, B. Singh Daler presiding over the Akali Political Conference
on 8-9 March 1941 promised that the Sikhs would launch morcha if their demands
passed at the Rurka Kalan conference were not conceded. Amar Singh Dosanjh said
that the Sikhs under the Unionist ministry were pushed to the bottom of the society. In
another conference at Chajjalwadi (Amritsar) Isher Singh Majhail, Giani Puran Singh
and Joginder Singh Shant strongly disapproved the Unionist government on the issues
of Jhatka, Gurmukhi, and discriminatory treatment with the Sikhs. The principle of
the Gandhian non-violence was repudiated in the conference. 86 According to the
Intelligence Report, the Muslim-Sikh relations deteriorated speedily in the province
and the Sikhs under the fear of the Muslim attacks were putting all energies in
collecting weapons and giving physical trainings to their people in all of the Punjab
districts. The Muslims were investing their energies in the Pakistan demand while the
Sikh leadership was working on a retrograde agenda, dependence on violence. 87 Even
Master Tara Singh demanded that the British should let the Sikhs and Muslims settle
their problems with weapons. In the same meeting at Amritsar, he attacked the
Unionist ministry and declared that the Unionist government was a band of the Sikh
and Muslim traitors. He attributed all the Sikh problems to the Unionist government
and indicated towards the following problems:
1. Ban on Jhatka, which was an interference with the Sikh religious affairs.
2. Unionist government was working to perpetuate the Muslim dominance and
weaken the Sikh panth.
3. The immoral activities of the Muslim ministers including “outraging the
modesty of Hindu and Sikh girls in College hostels, especially those in the
Medical School, Amritsar.” 88
He also alleged that the British government had collaborated with the Muslims to
prolong their own rule. The speakers protested against the Sikh murders at Sargodha
and Amritsar, ban on the Nishan Sahib, and the passive response on the issue of the

Sikh inclusion in the expanded Viceroy’s Council. 89 All the problems pointed out by
the Sikh leaders were meant to counter the Pakistan scheme. They were looking for
the British support but at the same time they accused them of working under the
policy of ‘divide and rule.’ The voice for the Sikh kingdom was raised as usual, but
not as a well-worked demand.
127
The Nihang issue 90 was another problematic area of the tension in the region.
The Nihang Sikhs were found engaged in immoral activities. They had also refused to
obey the court orders regarding ban on the Nishan sahib. Many Nihang Sikhs were
arrested in the case of trespassing Anant Ram’s house in Sialkot but their associates
started protesting against these arrests. 91 The police got reports that in many cities like
Kasur, Gujranwala, and Amritsar, the Nihangs were strengthening their numerical
position and were involved in the illegal activities. They traveled without tickets and
terrorized the commoners at the public places through violent postures. 92 Isher Singh
Majhail advised the Sikhs to help out the Nihangs and store the spears in the
Gurdwaras so that they could be used when needed. He accused the Hindus for giving
money to the Akalis just for their own benefit. He said that the fight with the Muslims
was inevitable therefore the panth must increase the number of Nihangs particularly
in the central areas of the Punjab. In all these meetings, they kept on condemning the
Pakistan scheme and the Unionist ministry in the Punjab and ban on Jhatka. 93 On the
Nihang issue, Master Tara Singh warned his followers that the Nihangs could seize
the Gurdwara funds if they gained more strength, therefore, the Akalis must be careful
in helping them. In the meeting of the SGPC held in July 1941, the Sikh leaders tried
to arrive at some agreed action against the Arms Act and the High Court decision
against the Nishan sahib. Udham Singh Nagoke was of the view that Nihangs were
armed with spears who could be useful in clashes with the Muslims, therefore, they at

any rate must be defended. The Sikh leaders anyhow advised the Nihangs to confine
to the Gurdwaras. 94 The Akali approach ostensibly was evident by their political
activities and response to the events. Amazingly, they were not prepared to tolerate
any faction of the Sikh community which could challenge their authority in the
political, religious or financial matters. They were keener to obtain the Gurdwara
funds rather than the future of the Sikh community. They had never tolerated any
parallel leadership within the community and attacked those who stood outside their
ranks. In the Sikh Political Conference held on 29-30 May 1941, they insulted Sardar
Bahadur Ujjal Singh, MLA when he was talking about the Sikh recruitments for the
war. He “was howled down by audience” notwithstanding, Gurbachan Kaur who
came under escort of fifty armed Nihangs and repeated the same advice uttered by
Ujjal Singh to the same audience but nobody questioned and insulted her. 95
128
The Akali leadership most of the time took submissive decisions which led
them to a confused policy. The Governor on 13 January 1941 wrote to the Viceroy
that Major Short, an experienced officer and Sikh enthusiast, had been in contact with
Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders. To Major Short, Master Tara Singh along
with his lieutenants was “genuinely anxious to stimulate recruitment,” but they could
not do it openly because of the fear of the others who could project them “as
reactionaries and supporters of Government.” He further reported that the Akalis
agreed to continue the British support by supplying agents who would propagate and
make every effort for the recruitment. Short opined that the Sikh recruitment
depended on their own efforts and government could not be effective in this regard. 96
In April 1941, the Daska Akali Conference was arranged in which Sant Singh, MLA,
used objectionable language for Jinnah and pledged to oppose the stunt of Pakistan at
any cost. He said that Pakistan would only be achieved over the dead bodies of the

Sikhs. 97 They shouted against the Muslim Premier of the Punjab and observed that
even before the establishment of Pakistan the Premier during his four year regime had
made the Punjab a virtual Pakistan. His policies reduced the minorities to “the
drawers of waters and hewers of wood” and all the important appointments were
given to the Muslims. They also maintained that Sir Sikandar had sent Feroz Khan
Noon to the Viceroy’s Executive Council instead of giving the Sikhs a seat in the
central cabinet. 98
129
Many people were of the opinion that the Nihang activities had compatibility
with those of the Akalis but Kehr Singh repudiated the allegations regarding Nihangs’
planning to constitute an Akali army. There were discussions about the funds required
for future defence purposes. Madan Mohan Malaviya arranged a conference at
Benares to ponder over the safeguards for the Hindus in the possible future clashes.
Before leaving to join the Benares conference, Master Tara Singh talked to the Akali
leaders to seek comments on a Hindu proposal which was to offer Rs. 500,000 for the
Hindu protection against the Muslim attacks. The leaders suggested that the
Shiromani Akali Dal and the Hindu Mahasabha should be given equal share of the
money. They also urged him to consolidate the organizations such as Akali Saina and
Ram Saina. 99 On 2 November 1941, the Akhand Hindustan Conference was arranged
by the Hindus and Sikhs in which Master Tara Singh through a resolution declared
that he disliked the Khalistan scheme as he did regarding the Pakistan scheme. The
Hindu and Sikh leaders also advised the audience to give unconditional support to the
British in the war so that they might reject the Pakistan scheme. 100
It is not amazing in the perspective of the leadership-crisis in the Sikh
community that the Akali leaders were accepting money from the Hindus and using
the Gurdwara funds against the Muslims. Some of the Sikhs talked of the Sikh state

while Master Tara Singh vividly declared that Khalistan meant as much of a betrayal
of the Indian nationalism as the League had done by demanding Pakistan. To meet the
Pakistan challenge, the sole solution the Sikhs found, was the strategy of violence and
joining hands with the Hindus. In Ajit, Master Tara Singh wrote that Sir Sikandar was
the worst enemy of the Akali Sikhs. He disclosed a violent plan to occupy Lahore in
1940 after the expected defeat of the British in the war. The Sikh Jathas had been
deployed on the appropriate places from where they could easily capture Lahore.
Master Tara wrote that they did not arrange for guns because during attack it was
quite easy to snatch ammunition from the police stations. The surrender of Lahore
could establish the awful authority of the Sikhs which would make further plan very
easy. 101
130
L. V. Deane 102 filed a report on the Sikh politics on 13 January 1942 observing
that the Sikh political parties were working on the traditional lines. The pro-Unionist
Khalsa National Party was not still organized at the grassroots level. It had very little
hold on the Sikh masses. The Central Sikh League which associated itself with the
All-India Sikh League too had no reliable workers. Giani Sher Singh had deserted to
seek refuge under the SAD just ‘to save himself from prosecution for embezzlement.’
The Central Akali Dal aimed to damage the position of the SAD. Though it demanded
inclusion of a non-Akali member in the Viceroy’s Executive Council but as a matter
of fact it had ‘no constructive programme’ for the Sikh community. When the Kirti
Kisan Party was banned, the Punjab Kisan Committee emerged and tried to work on
the communist lines but it enjoyed no popular support and was confined to the
specific areas of the province. The Sikhs were represented in the Punjab Communist
Party but like other Kisan organizations the government action made them
unimportant. The Sikh element in the Congress also had little importance in the Sikh

masses. The Akali Dal was a well entrenched party and had firm control over the
Gurdwara funds but had no agreed programme for the Sikhs. The Akalis opposed the
non-violence principle of Gandhi but even then they could not sever their uneasy
association with the Congress at the same time they favoured the Sikh recruitment in
the British army. The Akalis had been raising their voice against the Unionist ministry
on the points of the Pakistan scheme, pro-agriculturists policy, jhatka, Muslim
favouritism in the appointments, Sikh seat in the Executive Council and ban on Hindi
and Gurmukhi in the primary schools. The report further said that the Akalis had no
solid programme to pursue. 103
131
The Akali party faced dissension between Giani Kartar and Udham Singh
Nagoke on the presidential nomination in 1942. Seeing this friction, Master Tara
Singh ended this fight by forwarding his own name as the president of the SAD. In his
brief speech, he said that although the Akali Dal was not allowed to join the Khalsa
Defence of India League but even then they would favour the Sikh recruitment policy.
He also declared that the Sikhs would support the Congress policy of complete
independence. 104 The Akali leadership felt that Sir Sikandar wanted the British-Sikh
relations to be bitter and unfriendly. 105 The CAD arranged a conference at Muktsar,
district Ferozepore on 13 January in which Baba Sohan Singh, Rais of Muktsar,
accused Master Tara Singh and his associates of misusing the Gurdwara funds. The
conference passed a resolution against the Pakistan scheme and ban on jhatka. On 21
January 1942, speaking to 5,000 people in a conference of the SAD at Chheharta
(Amritsar district), Mohinder Singh Pihariwala declared that the Sikhs were
confronting the issue of Pakistan, Jhatka and Punjabi language. The speakers
criticised the British and demanded a seat in the Executive Council for the Sikhs. 106
Sometimes, the Akalis joined hands with the other forces just to create problems for

the Unionists. For example, the small traders were at protest against the Unionist
government on the issue of tax. The Akali Dal took up the issue because they had
connection with the trading classes but more to weaken the Unionist government. The
Akali Dal provided them jathas and other support while Shah Nawaz Khan of
Mamdot asked in the meeting of the League Provincial Working Committee at Lahore
on 15 February for action against the leaders who were participating in the beopari
agitation. Nevertheless, this point was not conceded as many Leaguers pointed out
that the Muslim shopkeepers were also affected by the Sales Tax Act. The Congress
and Ahrars joined the Akalis in the on-going agitation of the small traders. 107
132
On 26 February, a meeting of the Working Committee of the All-Parties Sikh
Conference was held in Lahore which Sardar Baldev Singh presided over. Through
the resolutions, the leaders demanded formation of a national government at the
centre with acceptable Sikh representation. In another resolution, they appealed to the
Congress to honour the Ravi pledge of 1929 (Lahore). They also constituted a
committee which met on 28 February and wished to send a deputation consisting of
Master Tara Singh, Sir Joginder Singh and Baldev Singh with 12 other leaders to
convince the Sikh masses of the Punjab to be united to cope with the critical political
situation. In another conference, the speakers condemned the Unionist government
while “various irresponsible speakers recited poems vilifying the Unionist
Ministry.” 108 Master Tara Singh presided over a secret meeting of the Akali Dal
which suggested various changes in the sums of Akali Dal and the SGPC so that the
balance of the SGPC could be maintained properly as required by the Gurdwara Act.
Master Tara informed the activists that he had given a task through a circular to all the
Gurdwaras of the Punjab for raising the Sikh volunteers so that they could be called to
Amritsar whenever required. The volunteers would maintain their distinguished status

with yellow coloured uniform, called ‘Shahidi Wardi.’ Through a letter, he also
conveyed the Sikh sentiments to Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India (1940-
45) against the Pakistan scheme and Jinnah, and put up a demand for formation of a
national government at the centre and consultation with the Sikhs on any
constitutional move in future. 109 Giani Kartar, MLA, in another meeting at the Akali
Diwan (Amritsar) assured the British of the Sikh military support but in return
demanded an assurance for the Sikh rights. 110 In an Akali conference held at
Anandpur (Jallandhar), the speakers like Ganga Singh Badal, Achhar Singh, Giani
Mehr Singh, Professor Ganga Singh and Labh Singh addressed the different sessions.
The huge gatherings listened to their leaders who declared that the Sikhs would never
support the British in the war. They gave a verdict that the supporters of the Khalsa
Defence and the British were not the real Akali Sikhs. Baldev Singh said that the
Unionist ministry was a staunch anti-Sikh coalition. 111 Master Tara Singh was present
in the session but he did not reiterate the Akali policy of the British support in the
war. Baldev Singh was an important ally of the Unionist and British government but
he too posed as an opponent to the government.
133
At the Doaba Diwan, Giani Mehr Singh spoke out against the principle of non-
violence and appreciated Sobhash Chandra Bose. He also suggested the Akali Sikhs
to establish their own rule with the help of weapons. The communal disturbance
would be the best opportunity to materialize this dream. At Baba Nath Singh Shahid
Akali conference (Sialkot) on 15 March 1942, Santokh Singh urged the need to
manage wheat supply to the Sikhs in the villages. He held the Punjab government
responsible for the wheat shortage. Sardar Gurmukh Singh, MLA, condemned the
idea of establishment of a Muslim state and asked the British to approve the demands
sent by Master Tara Singh to Mr. Churchill. Gopal Singh Qaumi spoke to a Sikh

Diwan at Rawalpindi on 17 March and asked the Sikhs for organising a jatha
comprising 500 Sikhs to protect the community. He also expressed satisfaction that
Sir Cripps had been sent to India to meet the constitutional challenge. 112 The Akali
Sikhs and the League adopted the policy to help out the rural Sikhs and Muslims to
overcome the shortage of the consumer goods which strengthened their position while
their popularity undermined the Unionist position.
134
The provincial authorities had been expedient in the communal affairs and
never took a stern action against the violent activities of the Sikh leaders but they
maintained the writ of law when the illegal forces clashed with the British interests.
They arrested Udham Singh Nagoke due to the rumour that he was preparing the
Sikhs to seize power in the province. Master Tara Singh condemned his arrest and
said that the Sikhs had the right to organize themselves for the protection of their
Gurdwaras and the community. He, in a meeting at Amritsar, said that the Punjab
government was unable to control the violence therefore it was a duty of the Akalis to
safeguard the sacred city of Amritsar from looting. The CAD passed a resolution on
22 March that the Sikhs should be given the same rights which the Muslims had been
enjoying in the Muslim minority provinces. The disunity, however, remained a
dilemma of the Sikh politics and Baba Jiwan Singh, leader of the Mazhabi Sikhs, also
came forward and appealed to the Viceroy to permit them to place their demands
before Sir Stafford Cripps in a separate political entity. 113 The Sikhs in the Sikh All
Parties Committee (June 1942) expressed concern over the British response to the
Sikh loyalty and sacrifices for the Empire. They said that since the British advent in
the Punjab the Sikhs sacrificed their lives for the British Empire but in return their
“position in the Punjab which England promised has been finally liquidated” 114

against all promises. They kept on reminding their past services but could not spell
out what exactly their demands were.
Popularity of SAD and League
135
At Fatehgarh Sahib (Sirhind) in the Patiala Sate, the Sikhs gathered to
commemorate the murder of the two young sons of Guru Gobind Singh by the
Mughal governor of Sirhind where Giani Kartar and S. Kartar Singh 115 expressed the
strong support for raising the Sikh living standard in the Patiala State. Later on all the
points mentioned by the speakers were published in a pamphlet to emphasise the
demands. The Sikh leaders hoped that His Highness would win the Sikh hearts by
appointing a Sikh as his Prime Minister. They demanded 60 per cent share in the State
services, changes in the management of the Gurdwaras and Sikh shrines with their
properties under the jurisdiction of the Gurdwara Act. Voice was raised for Gurmukhi
to be declared as official language and its compulsory study for the Sikh youth. They
asked for a Legislative Assembly in which the Sikhs should constitute a majority.
These demands were unanimously passed by the Sikh Dewan at the Annual Shahidi
Dewan held on 26 December 1941 and endorsed by the Amritsar meeting of the Akali
Dal held on 19 and 20 January 1942. 116 Through such demands, the Akalis tried to
interfere in the Princely State’s affairs. No doubt, protection of the Sikh rights was
their duty but at this crucial time they should have avoided opening more fronts to
remain focused on their core issues.
The Police report of 31 January 1942 reported about the period from October
to December 1941 accepted the SAD as the most popular party at that time among the
Sikhs. 117 The appointment of Jogindar Singh as the Chief Minister of Patiala
strengthened the Akalis who were gratified with a strong hold on the affairs of Patiala

and other Sikh states. 118 Unlike the Akalis, the League’s ideological and constitutional
performance gained profound support of the masses who seemed fully prepared to
play their due role in the political activities. According to the Intelligence Report, the
Punjabi Muslims had full devotion to the League for its constitutional attitude while
they disliked the Congress. 119 The Punjab Students’ League held the Pakistan
Conference at Batala on 27 February 1942 in which Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, MLA
(Central), Sheikh Chiragh Din and Professor Dildar Khan appreciated Jinnah’s
leadership and pledged to support the Pakistan movement. 120 The League declared
that the 23 rd March should be celebrated as the Pakistan Day with full zeal. The
Intelligence Reports revealed the high graph of Jinnah’s popularity among the Punjabi
Muslims and the leaders in the Ahrar Working Committee meeting at Lahore
expressed the opinion that Jinnah was working for the Muslim interests and the Ahrar
leaders could never be effective among the Muslim public if they “denounced Mr.
Jinnah and the Pakistan scheme.” 121 The leadership of Jinnah and the Pakistan
demand had stricken from a common person to the Unionist Premier, Sir Sikandar
who expressed his views in a public gathering that he had not been against the Lahore
Resolution which ensured a peaceful life for the Hindus and Sikhs in the Muslim
majority region. Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that the Premier could never part with the
League. 122 The Pakistan scheme of the Muslims and the anti-Pakistan or anti-Muslim
outbursts of the Akai Dal popularized the two parties in their respective communities.
The political and religious organizations, hierarchy and the ministers could feel this
profound change in the political domain. The Unionist Muslims sometimes sided
openly with the Pakistan scheme which caused uncertainty in the minds of their Sikh
and Hindu allies in the Assembly.
136

Muslim Preparations
137
The word ‘protection’ remained very popular during these years and different
parties publicly passed resolutions for recruiting volunteers in the name of
‘protection.’ In a meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at Amritsar, Maulvi Abdul Hanan
and Maulvi Baha-ul-Haq Qasmi criticized the British “for not training and arming
Indians.” In a Working Committee meeting held at Lahore on 19 March 1942, the
leaders advised their workers to raise volunteers for self protection. 123 The Khaksars
decided the same in an Amritsar meeting that they must work under Hilal-i-Ahmar
and volunteers be raised “to protect the community in times of internal unrest.” 124 In
Sheikhupura district, Maulvi Zahir Niaz Begi lauded the Muslim state and enrolled
1,000 Muslim National Guards who were given training in lathi fighting. 125 The
Sikhs, Hindus and the religious parties of the Punjab felt the necessity to organize the
masses for self-protection. This sense of insecurity and mistrust of other communities
presented a woeful picture of the Punjabi society as the British rule drew to its end.
The provincial authorities seemed ineffective in this regard. All the communities were
scared and felt insecure from the other communities. According to the Governor’s
report:
No communal incidents of importance have been reported. As indicated in the
foregoing portions of this report, fears of internal unrest and feelings engendered by the
conflicting constitutional claims of rival political parties have combined to heighten
communal unrest and mistrust. One result of this has been a tendency to revive
volunteer organisations, the advertised objects of which are invariably innocuous,
though rival bodies show little disposition to accept them at their face value. The ban
on uniforms and military drill prevents these bodies being organised on a directly
military basis, but Akali efforts to organise the Sikh community clearly contemplate a
resort to violence in certain circumstances, and contribute to intensify communal
suspicion. 126
Though, the Muslim National Guards, Sheikhupura collected the Muslims for the
training but it cannot be generalized that this organization had become strong enough
in all the areas of the Punjab. Yet much was required to popularize it.

Muslim-Sikh Tension
138
Although the Punjab government tried to restore peace but the Muslim-Sikh
riots continued. The year of 1940 produced nothing good in this regard and clashes
took place during the Moharram processions. The communal uneasiness furthered
when “a communal fracas between the Hindu Jats and the Muslim Kamins broke out
on 7 th April, 1940” in Lahara, district Rohtak. The next year showed unchanged
trends in the communal relationship as numerous riots occurred on 14 March at
Amritsar and in May and June at Bhiwani district Hissar. Mian Iftekhar-ud-Din,
President of the Punjab Congress, organized a unity conference to restore peace and
invited the League, Akali and Mahasabha leaders but it produced nothing beneficial
regarding the communal harmony. Mohaya writes that “the Punjab had ranked as a
province in which public peace was in serious and constant danger from terrorism.” 127
Communalism was not confined to the physical clashes on the roads but was
prevailing in the institutions and other departments as well. The Sikhs had been
claiming that the Unionists had appointed the Muslims on all the key posts to relegate
the Sikhs to an ineffective position. But a Muslim newspaper retaliated with accurate
figures that the non-Muslims were ruling in the Forest Department with a high
percentage which was against the Muslims. 128 Such kind of differences did not fare so
badly for the future as did economic boycotts and rumours of armed assaults. The
Muslim-Sikh tension arose in district Gujrat and both the communities started boycott
of each other but the situation settled down as the Muslims and Sikhs agreed to end
the boycott at Ala village. In Gujranwala, tension arose when the Sikhs celebrated
Ghallughara Day and the Muslim residents protested against the Sikh speeches and
asked the Muslims to prepare for any emergent situation. The tension was furthered

when a rumour pervaded that the Muslims would attack the Sikhs on 31 May 1940.
Nevertheless, the Deputy Commissioner called the leaders of both the communities
who promised to maintain peace in the area. 129 In the same city, the Muslims
protested against the orders issued by the DC which irked them. He had filled the post
of the Civic Guard with a Sikh candidate while the Sikhs made only one percent of
the total population. 130 The Muslim-Sikh tension proved pernicious to the communal
harmony of the region. Through an editorial, a Muslim newspaper pointed out the root
causes of the Muslim-Sikh tension and wrote that during the Muslim rule, the Sikh
sacred places were insulted while the Sikh rule was recalled as Sikha Shahi which
meant authoritarian and insulting rule to the Muslims. Their holy places were insulted
and the Muslims could not say Azan in the Sikh dominated villages. The Sikhs and
Hindus were the same as they inter-dined and intermarried. The Hindu Mahasabha
considered them as co-religionist and the Akali leaders strongly supported the Sikh
separation from the Hindus in the religious identity but were ready to work closely
with the Hindu Mahasabha where it made strategic sense. The editorial continued that
the Sikhs wanted to take a big portion of the Punjab and gift it to the Hindus. The
paper further questioned as to why the Sikhs demanded a Sikh state if they were
actually Hindus. They ought to join Pakistan if they were a separate nation. They were
opposing the partition of India as well as demanding the same. 131 The initiation of the
Sikh province could be a supportive demand for the League but the painful aspect was
that the Muslim-Sikh understanding was dwindling day by day.
Sikh Preparations for Violence
139
The Police reports verify that the Khaksar activities added to the Sikh fears
and in response to this they were arming themselves against the Muslims. They held

meetings in Mandirs and Gurdwaras and advised their communities to organize the
defence bodies at mohalla level. 132 The Sikhs under the Akali patronage were proudly
involved in the violent activities. The Akali Dal had the militant offshoots which
practiced Gatka (wielding a stick in a fight) and physical exercises. On 3 March 1940,
the Akalis held a meeting at Lahore where the leaders condemned the ban on the
Akali regiments. 133 The members of Akali Sena of Tarn Taran were fully engaged in
practicing Gatka. 134 The Police reports informed the authorities that Teja Singh
Akarpuri and Isher Singh Majhail were preparing a scheme which would assign every
Gurdwara Committee to plan a programme for the physical training of 20 to 50
Akalis. These trained Akalis would extend training to the rest of the Sikh community
in the Punjab. Every trainee would be given Rs. 10 with the facilities of food and
accommodation. The report further revealed that they had planned to encourage the
Akalis “to procure arms smuggled from the North-West Frontier Province.” 135 Master
Tara Singh explained in a conference at Pherala that the Khaksars by show of their
military strength in the bazaars were busy to overawe the people. The government
took action against these activities very late and banned drill which was not a correct
decision. The action was taken observing the Sikh force in the Attari Conference. He
motivated the audience to continue strengthening the Akali Fauj by increasing its
number and practicing Gatka daily. 136 In July 1940, a Hindu from Dera Ghazi Khan
disclosed under the Rawalpindi Police custody about his provincial Hindu gang which
had planned to kill the Muslim leaders. In January 1941, the Delhi CID arrested a
fully armed Sikh band. During enquiry, Gyani Rattan Singh revealed that they had
smuggled arms from the NWFP and aimed to snatch weapons from the guards. The
Sikh preparations against the Muslims were going on in all the corners of the
140
country. 137 The Governor during the second half of May 1942 presented a very

serious state of the “rearmament.” According to the report, unlicensed fire-arms had
been abundantly obtained in the province. The CID arms staff which was assigned the
duty to disarm the people found about 1,000 fire-arms in the Hissar district in a few
weeks. It was further informed that the illegal weapons in Hissar had been obtained
from the States of Patiala and Bikaner. 138 On 15 April 1942, the Hindu and Sikh
locals gathered at Rawalpindi and decided to take arms for protection against the
activities of the bad characters. “It was accordingly decided to distribute tridents in
every mohalla for this purpose.” 139
141
The rural Punjab remained peaceful but the conferences were mostly attended
by the rural Sikhs which was to have negative implications for its continued
tranquility. The Akalis stepped up their efforts to secure rural support. After
discussions on the current situation, the Akali leaders met in Amritsar (3-5 May 1942)
and decided to launch propaganda in the rural areas through the Dadhi Jathas. 140 The
Hindu allies of the Sikhs were equally engaged in such activities. Dr. Gopi Chand
disclosed that Gandhi was sure of the victory of the Axis powers and the Japanese
invasion of India after the rainy season. To him, it would be the best time to start civil
disobedience movement. The Congress also continued its workers’ physical training
particularly the use of lathi fighting. A lawyer Sham Lal at Hissar supervised this
training. Fifty-six volunteers from the towns of Ferozepore, Fazilka and Abohar also
joined this training plan. 141 The Akalis were increasing their violent activities day by
day. They were intimidating even the other Sikh parties. It was reported that the
Akalis used force in preventing the other Sikh parties like communist Sikhs and the
Central Akali Dal from propagating their agenda in the Sikh masses. They also
pressurised the Jallianwala Bagh committee not to allow the Central Akali Dal to have
a meeting in the Bagh. On 13 July 1942, the Akalis tried the Kirti Kisan workers to

abandon their meeting at Guru ka Bagh. The meeting was held away from this site in
which the speakers used rough language for the Akalis. 142
142
The murder of a Sikh, Autar Singh in Sargodha, badly affected Muslim-Sikh
relations and the Unionist government showed biased reaction in the administrative
measures. 143 In all the conferences since the murder, the Sikhs condemned the district
and provincial authorities and held protests in all parts of the Punjab. The Hindus in
general and the Hindu Mahasabha in particular worked in Lahore to collect more
funds and volunteers to protect Hindus and Sikhs. It added tension immensely to the
decaying Muslim-Sikh relations. 144 In a conference, Master Ajit Singh, Secretary
General of Shiromani Akali Dal, issued a circular that the Sikh community should
observe 28 July as the Autar Singh Shahidi Day. The Akalis decided to inaugurate a
training camp at Chheharta (Amritsar) in September. The trained Sikhs were supposed
to open new camps in their native districts. In a conference on 17-18 July 1940, Isher
Singh Majhail maintained that the Sikhs were not safe in the Punjab districts
administered by Muslim Deputy Commissioners. He said that the “hooliganism” was
increasing in the Muslim areas. 145
The members of the Akali Sewadars and Akali Saina carried on the exercise of
Gatka in the areas of district Amritsar according to the Police reports. 146 An Akali
Diwan was organized at Ugoke near Sialkot on 22-24 October 1940 in which Master
Tara Singh emphasized that the Sikhs must join the army with an objective that they
were not supporting the British but to militarize their own community. 147 The
speakers at Diwan (Amritsar) held on 30-31 October 1940 condemned the Pakistan
scheme and advised their fellow Sikhs to strengthen the Akali Saina and learn how to
use weapons. 148 A similar message was conveyed by Master Tara Singh in Lahore on
30 May 1941 in which he said that the Unionist government was purely a Muslim rule

in the province therefore the Sikh Gurdwaras needed attention for protection
particularly where the Sikhs were in acute minority. Giani Kartar emphasized that
they must train the community by organizing the Akali Saina and Akali regiments at
all levels. Tara Singh announced the deployment of 1,000 Akalis on the Lahore
Gurdwaras and urged to mobilize the community against the ban on Jhatka. 149
143
The Sikhs’ preparations were copied by the Hindu communal organizations. In
a conference, Jugal Kishore Birla agreed to the views of Dr. B. S. Moonje that the
Arya Vir Dal members should be trained on the lines of the Akali Dal. Sant Singh,
MLA said that Pakistan was not possible until the Sikhs were alive in the country. 150
The Punjab Hindu Students’ Federation arranged an anti-Pakistan meeting at Lahore
on 10 May 1942 in which Master Tara Singh said that Pakistan reflected the policy of
Aurangzeb and was to be put to an end by the Khalsa. The audience burnt a paper
named as the Pakistan scheme. 151 The anti-Pakistan Sikh conferences were very
provocative for the Muslims. The Akali Sikhs and the Hindu Mahasabha propagated
for their joint gathering at Sultanwind (district Amritsar) on 13-14 June 1942 while
the CAD planned to hold an anti-Pakistan conference in Lahore on 17-18 June. The
Intelligence reports observed that these conferences “have evoked Muslim
resentment…and relations between the two communities are likely to become
increasingly strained if such plans mature.” 152
Astoundingly, the Sikhs were setting the house on fire wherein they were
residing. Attempts to improve communal harmony were meager and unimportant. The
Unity Conference was a good step in this regard but disappointingly it could not fill
the gap created by the communal animosity and suspicion. In July, the Majlis-i-Ahrar-
i-Islam arranged a Unity Conference at Sialkot in which Hindu, Sikh and Muslim
leaders shared goodwill for each other. But it generated controversy over the Pakistan

scheme and by condemning the idea of the Muslim state Daulat Ram Bhatia said that
the Pakistan idea was being encouraged by the imperialist government. Sheikh
Hissam-ud-Din criticized the British policies in India. Sardar Mangal Singh called for
communal calm and reiterated that the Pakistan issue could be settled after the British
departure. Sayed Ataullah Shah Bhukhari frankly admitted that harmony could never
be achieved because hatred was very deep rooted. He, as evidence, quoted that
Gandhi “refused to eat food prepared by Muslims and….Sikhs were collecting arms
in order to establish their own rule.” 153 During this time, communal relations were
deteriorating.
144
In May 1941, the Sikhs took out a procession in Sargodha in commemoration
of the Guru Arjun Dev’s martyrdom. This city had already experienced tension
arising from the procession routes. Once again the Jama Mosque was on the Sikh
procession route. The procession was crossing the Mosque area when Dalip Singh “a
notorious local agitator,” incited the Sikhs who started playing music. The next day
3,000 Muslims gathered in the Mosque and showed their annoyance over the irritating
and insulting behaviour of the Sikhs. 154 In June, the Muslims of Amritsar who
gathered in Khair Din’s Mosque spoke against the discriminatory behaviour of the
Municipal Committee Amritsar and accused that the officials had dismantled the
Muslim buildings while they had not removed even a brick of the Hindu and Sikh
houses. 155 The Sikh political parties were staging protests against Pakistan and the
Unionist government by arranging conferences all over the province. 156 All of them
expressed stereotyped points, generally condemning the government on the issues of
Jhatka, Gurmukhi, ban on Kirpan, biased treatment towards the Sikhs, the League and
the Pakistan scheme.

Demand for Sikh State
145
The sentiments of the Sikhs were at boiling point after 23 March 1940 under
these stringent conditions some Sikhs spoke out for a separate homeland. To Anup
Chand Kapur, the Akalis at Attari (district Amritsar) soon after the League resolution
demanded Khalistan extending its boundaries from the river Chenab to the river
Jamna. 157 The Khalsa National Party on 29 March 1940 demanded to restore the
Punjab of Maharaja Dalip Singh to the Sikhs. 158 A Guru Raj Khalsa Durbar was
organized in a meeting at Amritsar on 19 May 1940. Its main objective was to take
the Punjab back from the non-Sikh rulers and to convert it into a Sikh state between
the river Jumna and Jamrud. Baba Madan Singh Gaga and Jagjit Singh, Editor,
Khalsa Sewak, were the eminent members of the committee to materialize this
scheme 159 while Dr. V. S. Bhati, a Sikh from Ludhiana, put forward a scheme of
Khalistan, a buffer state between Pakistan and Hindustan. It would consist of the Sikh
districts and states and function under Maharaja Patiala. Furthermore, a sub-
committee was approved and assigned to work on the scheme. But Master Tara Singh
strictly condemned such seceding sentiments among the Sikhs. 160 To Anup Chand,
Dr. V. A. Bhatti through a pamphlet also demanded Muslim areas “running through
Bahawalpur, Sindh and Rajputana enabling the Sikhs to have an outlet to the Gulf of
Cutch.” 161
The scheme on which the Akalis laid stress continuously was the Azad Punjab
scheme but it had to face severe criticism and opposition. The Governor in the
fortnightly report for the first half of December 1942 portrayed that the Akalis did not
seem much active in propagating the “Azad Punjab” scheme. The Hindu Mahasabha
leaders clarified their position by saying that they had a principal stand against the
Pakistan scheme therefore they were also opposed to the Azad Punjab scheme. The

scheme could not gain unanimous opinion of the Sikhs who remained divided. Master
Tara Singh and other leaders toured the western Punjab but could not secure favour
with the exception of the central Punjab. The All-India Sikh Youth Conference held at
Lahore supported this scheme but with an amendment. They opined that the scheme
should have the approval of two-third of the Sikh community. The Central Akali Dal
and Namdhari leaders also opposed the scheme. The Akalis decided to hold a
conference at Bhiwanigarh in Patiala State to prepare the panth to follow their
decision but success could not be expected for this scheme. 162 Though they avoided
using the term ‘Azad Punjab’ scheme, they pursued it persistently by demanding re-
demarcation of the Punjab boundaries.
146
Master Tara Singh strode very carefully. He declared that the Sikhs would not
demand Khalistan if the Muslims abandoned Pakistan. 163 This attitude appeared
vacillating to those outside the community and did not convince the British for
consideration of the Sikh demands. Other Sikh leaders however continued to talk of a
Sikh state. In 1942, Sardar Kirpal Singh Majithia declared that they desired to
establish the Sikh rule. The Working Committee of the Central Akali Dal was
organized in Amritsar on 2 April 1942 in which the party reversed the core policy and
issued statement in favour of the partition. Baba Kharak Singh rejecting Cripps
proposals said that India was going to be partitioned in near future and the Sikhs had a
right to demand a separate Sikh state extending from River Jhelum to River Sutlej if
the division was inevitable. 164 The report said that the Sikh leaders were uncertain
about how to block the Pakistan scheme. They also doubted, whether Khalistan would
be the best alternative for the Sikhs or not. On the other hand, the Khalsa Youth
League was propagating for Khalistan. 165 On 2 May 1942, at Amritsar, Master Ajit
Singh declared that Khalistan would be achieved with the help of sword. In the

Working Committee meeting of the Central Akali Dal at Lahore, Bakhshish Singh,
editor of Khalsa, called to launch a movement for the attainment of Khalistan. 166 The
police report said that Master Tara Singh also discussed the issue of the partition and
the Sikh rule in the non-Muslim minority areas with Vir Savarkar, the Mahasabha
leader. 167 According to the police report, the Akalis demanded the Azad Punjab after
the Sikandar-Baldev Pact (15 June 1942). 168 The Akali conference was held in Kot
Moman (district Shahpur) on 2-3 October 1942 in which Dalip Singh of Sargodha
opposed the Pakistan scheme and said that the Sikhs desired no Khalistan. Giani Sher
Singh approved the Sikandar-Baldev Singh pact and demanded the re-demarcation of
the Punjab in which no community would be in an utter majority. 169 Baldev Singh
expressed his fury against the Pakistan scheme and said that he would prefer slavery
to the partition. Giani Sher Singh elucidated that if the idea of Pakistan was
materialized, they would establish Khalistan. In November 1942, a Gurmukhi poster
was displayed with the signature of Bhagwan Singh which demanded the “revision of
provincial boundaries” of the Punjab. Sardar Kartar Singh, an Advocate from Patiala,
and Professor Ganga Singh emphasized the need for re-demarcation of the provincial
boundaries to establish the Sikh rule. 170
147
The lack of vision and disunity was profoundly affecting the Sikh politics.
According to an Intelligence report, Master Tara Singh refrained from personal
discussions with Jinnah 171 while it was an undeniable reality that nothing was possible
without negotiations on the conflicting issues. As a matter of fact, Tara Singh
possessed no political and constitutional arguments on which he could face Jinnah, a
staunch constitutionalist. Disunity overwhelmingly gripped the Sikhs and the leaders
could be distracted by trivialities. Sant Singh, an MLA resigned from the All Parties

Sikh Conference in 1942 just because his name was not included in the Sikh
delegation which was to meet the Cripps Mission. 172
Congress and Sikhs
148
The Akalis differed from the Congress on the issue of support for the war
effort with the government, but expected support from the organization in their anti-
Pakistan stance. 173 The myth that the Sikhs were their saviours was retained and
projected by the Hindus. The Congress had included the Sikh members in the
Congress Working Committee more than their proportion. Sardar Sohan Singh Josh,
MLA, in a Congress meeting, necessitated a volunteer corps to counter the communal
organizations. 174 The Congress continued brainwashing the Sikh leadership and the
masses that only the Congress could save their interests in the on-going struggle for
freedom and on the issue of Pakistan. 175 In such an uncertain situation, the Sikhs were
struggling for the rights without any agreed voice. Some Muslims perhaps under the
stress of the communitarian dominance tried to show their balanced position on the
Muslim and non-Muslim issues and criticized the Congress, League and Akalis
equally. On 20-21 September 1940, they arranged an Azad Khyal Muslim Conference
presided over by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. He objected that the Congress
claimed to be a secular party but the communalist Akali Sikhs were speaking against
the Muslims from the Congress platform. He further said that Master Tara Singh and
the Maharaja of Patiala had planned for the Sikh raj in the Punjab. He also
complained that the Congressite Muslims had lost respect either in their own
community or in the Congress circles. 176 In this way, the nationalist Muslims within
the Congress were raising voice against the Hindu leadership on the issue of the Akali
Sikhs.

149
On the other hand, the Sikhs continued their submissive allegiance to the
Congress. The CAD condemned the Akali-Unionist pact of 1942. Sardar Mangal
Singh, MLA appealed to the Sikhs to resist this pact. He went to Wardha with
suggestions for the Congress Working Committee members that the Punjab Congress
should be given under the leadership of Baba Kharak Singh after the betrayal of the
SAD. The Intelligence report concludes that both the SAD and CAD did not want to
lose the Congress support. The leaders found themselves helpless in the political
arena without the Congress. 177 The analysis proved true because Master Tara Singh
had to request Vir Savarkar to convince the Congress leadership to avoid attacking the
Akalis. The Akali leaders also laid stress on the Sikhs to join the Congress in large
numbers to influence the decision-making strength of the party. 178
Sikandar and Pakistan
The Unionists Muslims and non-Muslims pretended to be above all the
communal differences but one can observe through the Punjab Assembly debates
wherein the Muslims seemed scared to discuss the Qur’anic verses because it might
create religious tension. Discussing the Primary Education Bill, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-
Din, the Speaker, had to interfere in the debate with the following remarks:
What I said was that it would be enough to say that according to Islam purdah is
necessary and must be observed and that this Bill should not interfere with it. But to
quote Quran Sharif and translate on the floor of the House might, as already stated, result
in unpleasantness. I do not wish the Quran to be discussed and criticized. 179
The League’s political activities were irritating for Sir Sikandar. Feeling himself
sandwiched between the League and the non-Muslim allies, he tried to wriggle out of
the situation but his efforts came to naught. He was to maintain his coalition
government and confidence of Jinnah simultaneously. The Premier was obliged that
Jinnah had never created problems for him even over the issues of the Khaksar-Police
clash in 1940 at Lahore. Sir Henry Craik wrote to Linlithgow on the wise leadership

of Jinnah that he did not provoke clash between a government headed by a Muslim
and the League. He not only facilitated the Punjab ministry but also secured the unity
in the League circle. He further wrote that through his wisdom, Jinnah “increased his
influence over Leaguers in the Punjab.” 180 Sir Sikandar had to appease the Muslims
by presenting himself a pure Muslim leader and, on the other hand, opposed Jinnah to
pacify the non-Muslim allies as he did in a speech at Lyallpur. While addressing the
Pakistan Conference arranged by the students, he portrayed himself as a pure Muslim
by saying that he prayed five times regularly but Quaid-i-Azam did not. He also
named Pakistan as ‘Lughwastan’ (farcical) but the audience shouted Pakistan
Zindabad, Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad and none uttered the same for Sir Sikandar. 181 He
spoke to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941, rejecting the Muslim
raj in the Punjab as the League had envisaged but simultaneously “Sikandar dared not
repudiate Jinnah.” 182 According to the government reports, he “in deference to Mr.
Jinnah’s unique position in Moslem community was reluctant to cut adrift from the
League.” 183 In fact, the Sikhs were criticizing Sir Sikandar’s participation in the
arrangements of the League session and drafting of the Lahore Resolution. They
sought what stand particularly on the Pakistan scheme the Premier had. Therefore, in
his address to the Assembly he cleared his position by saying the following:
I have often heard them [Sikhs] say: ‘We are nationalists and therefore we will not
allow any partition of India’- very laudable sentiments....But I should like to point out
to my Sikh friends that if they press for a powerful and superimposed Centre at the
expense of the provinces, they will be doing gross injustice to the Punjab and
incalculable harm to their own community. They should not forget that they constitute
only one per cent of the population of India and even if they get 100 per cent weightage
they cannot expect to get more than 2 per cent representation at the Centre…. 184
In fact amidst the inflammatory atmosphere, the Premier tried to dilute the situation.
The League resolution had tarnished the secular image of Sir Sikandar. To remove the
horrors of the non-Muslim allies, he in December 1940 stated that he could never
150
concede the League demand to establish the Muslim domination in the Punjab. 185 But

his anti-Pakistan statements were not sufficient to satisfy the Sikhs. Sir Sikandar was
informed that the Sikhs might mount pressure for their own independent state. He
feared that the on-going communal tussle might result in some major clashes in the
province. In the beginning, it was perceived that the Pakistan demand was one of the
bargaining tactics of the League but by and by it became clear to Sir Sikandar that the
League’s struggle was not a phony war. All such developments upset him because by
opposing Pakistan his image as a Muslim leader would be seriously damaged, while
by siding with the Muslim state he would lose the non-Muslim support. To counter
this difficult situation, he tried to adopt a reconciliatory role between the rival
forces. 186 But his ambivalent attitude to the Pakistan scheme increased insecurity in
the Sikh community. He had the support of Chhotu Ram, an anti-Pakistan Hindu Jat,
but contrarily he could not resist the Muslim Students’ Federation and donated them
money to meet the expenditures of a conference in support of the Pakistan idea. By
giving this money, he showed his commitment to the Pakistan scheme. Before
Jinnah’s visit to the Punjab, he tried to convince the League leaders to drop the
Pakistan idea but on their refusal he dared not to resign from the League Working
Committee because he did not want to give space to his Muslim opponents to fill his
seat. But at the same time, he continued his struggle to satisfy the non-Muslims and
for this purpose he made an anti-Pakistan speech in the Assembly on 11 March
1941. 187 In a speech delivered at Government College Lahore, he said neither Pakistan
nor Khalistan, instead only the Punjabis would rule over the Punjab. 188 Jinnah did not
pressurize the Unionist Muslims over the issue of the Pakistan scheme though a
severe criticism from the old Leaguers came against them. They were of the view that
the Unionist Muslims were not working fairly with the League and its leaders. They
151
raised many questions before Jinnah i.e., the passive role of the Unionist Muslims on

the Pakistan issue, by-elections and the League membership but he did not think it
right time to take action.
152
Jinnah had an alternative force which could work in remote areas of the
Punjab and convey the message of the League. According to Qalb-i-Abid, he
activated the Punjab Muslim Students’ Federation who organized conferences to
support the Pakistan scheme. The Muslim youth marvelously fulfilled their leader’s
hopes and infused the Pakistan idea into the minds of the Muslim masses. Now they
had an organization to counter the anti-Pakistan propaganda. The mobilization of the
students proved a successful experience and the League got the support of the masses
and financial assistance. 189 In a conference arranged by the MSF 190 at Lahore in
March 1941 in which a huge gathering listened to their leaders, Jinnah said that
Pakistan had become an issue of life and death. He refuted the Hindu stand that
Hindustan was a land of Hindus only and it had been a unity throughout the history.
In this conference, Jinnah re-assured the Sikhs that their rights would be better
secured in Pakistan while in India they “would be a drop in the ocean.” 191
The League’s influence in the Muslim rural areas was growing rapidly and the
people were zealously ready to register themselves as the League members. In
October 1940, the Muslims of Gohana (district Rohtak) wrote to the Hon. Secretary of
the League that a maulvi (Muslim priest) came to them and asked for the League
membership fees so that the League could issue the membership forms. They
complained that the people paid the asked fees to the maulvi but still they received no
membership forms as he had promised. 192 The dilemma of the League membership
was that the League had poor interaction with the rural workers. Nevertheless, no
evidence shows that the Muslim masses got the League membership forms and
refused to fill them out. The common Muslims took part in the struggle for Pakistan

scheme as and how they could afford. Moreover, the League plunged into the regional
politics just before the 1937 elections and since the critical issues busied the
leadership however they tried their level best to bring the masses into the League fold.
The Muslims wrote letters to the League leadership with valuable opinions and
suggestions as in February 1941 Shah Nawaz Khan outlined the facts about the
proposed Pakistan territory. He suggested not to demand Aligarh and Delhi because
with the inclusion of these areas into Pakistan, the percentage of the Muslim
population would go down. 193
153
The Sikh politics seemed still under the influence of the command of the
Congress. Their leadership demonstrated no independent vision in the politics during
these years. They just reacted to what the Muslims did and always asked for what the
Muslims had been given in the non-Muslim majority provinces. In the Punjab, the
Sikhs desired and demanded the end of the Muslim domination in the provincial
Assembly. The Akalis had an ambivalent relationship with the Muslim Unionists who
frequently condemned them after the Sikander-Jinnah Pact but at the same time tried
moving closer to them. The Akalis were against Sundar Singh Majithia but after his
death on 2 April 1941, the Akalis overpowered the other Sikh parties. Even the
Khalsa National Party came closer which helped them to narrow their difference
towards the Unionist Party. Nevertheless, the animosity between the Unionist
Muslims and the Akalis could not be rooted out and on 3 August 1941, they organized
the Anti-Unionist Government Day. 194 The Sikhs never spared the Unionist Muslims
whenever they found an opportunity. In the Assembly question hour, Khizr Tiwana,
the minister, could not answer the questions raised by the Unionist Sikh Sardar Sumer
Singh who raised his voice against corruption:
…if they considered the amount of money that had been spent on the Punjab roads, he
would say they were not as good as they should have been. He argued the corruption was

esponsible for this and he suggested that the schedule of rates of the Department was
necessarily excessive and should be reduced. 195
He further argued that all the officers had been provided with free accommodation but
they were still getting allowances from the government for this purpose. 196
154
Lord Linlithgow proposed to bring the on-going communal deadlock to an end
and offered expansion of the Executive Council, establishment of a War Advisory
Council and according some rights to the minorities in the constitution in August
1940 but both the Congress and the League rejected it. 197 The Viceroy could not
afford the loss of the League’s support due to the on-going war and according to
Gulati the Muslim leadership was making the full use of the “golden opportunity”
given by the war “to manoeuvre for political advantage.” 198 The Viceroy reassured the
League about the minority rights and that the power could not be transferred to the
Indians unless they would arrive at some mutually agreed settlement. 199 The Viceroy’s
flexible attitude towards the League further increased the Sikh apprehensions. They
were sacrificing their lives for the British masters in the battlefield and in return
expected warm response in the case of their demands particularly against the League
but their whole efforts were proving futile. It was really a somber picture for the Sikh
community.
The Akali-Congress harmony was shattered for the time being when
Rajagopalachari and Gandhi indicated that the League’s demand for Pakistan be
considered as a rational scheme to win the Muslim support. Master Tara Singh
condemned the attitude of Gandhi and Abul Kalam Azad. 200 To Bajwant Kaur,
offering the Prime Ministership to the League (Sporting offer) in 1940 by a close
associate of Gandhi was the first recognition of the Pakistan scheme. 201 The Sikh
League appealed to the Congress to be aloof from the offers made by the Viceroy and

Rajagopalachari on 23 August 1940. Speaking to the Akali Political Conference at
Murrer (district Sheikhupura) on 7 October 1940, Ajit Singh, General Secretary of the
Akali Dal, reminded the Congress about the Ravi pledge of 1929 and asked them to
support their demands. Master Ajit Singh expressed disapproval of the Pakistan
scheme and the ‘sporting offer’ to the Muslims by Rajagopalachari. 202 According to
the Governor’s report, the communal situation of the Punjab in September 1940 was
constantly unsatisfactory and the Akali reaction to the sporting offer and the Hindu-
Sikh verbosity against the League divulged the cleavage between the Muslims and
Sikhs. Dipalpur (Montgomery district) was caught by the communal clashes during
this period and was accelerated by this time due to the issue of the cow slaughter. 203
155
In the late 1940, the Congress-Sikh relations went cold as Gandhi wrote many
articles and gave statements against the Sikhs. In a letter on 16 August 1940 to Master
Tara Singh, Gandhi advised,
As I told you, in my opinion, you have nothing in common with the Congress nor the
Congress with you. You believe in the rule of the sword, the Congress does not… Your
civil disobedience is purely a branch of violence. I am quite clear in my mind that being
in the Congress, you weaken your community, and weaken the Congress. You have to be
either fully nationalist or frankly communal. 204
The Sikh community was under a constant stress due to Gandhi’s letter to Master Tara
Singh but it furthered the on-going strained situation when an article titled ‘Sikhs and
Sword’ by Gandhi appeared in the Harijan on 29 September 1940 in which Gandhi
had written that he disliked the whole Sikh community if it considered Master Tara
Singh their undisputed leader. But he promised to maintain the commitments of the
resolution of 1929 regarding the Sikhs. 205
Master Tara Singh had dual membership; he was President of the SGPC and
SAD and also a Congressite. After constant indignation by Gandhi, he resigned from
the Punjab Congress Working Committee but dared not tell the original background
of his resignation. He told that he had resigned due to personal reasons so that the

Akali policy of co-operation with the Congress would continue. 206 Sangat Singh is of
the opinion that Gandhi’s advice to Tara Singh to be communalist or nationalist was
the best instrument to meet the challenging political developments of the subsequent
years 207 but he could not get rid of the Congress. He could play a better and
constructive role for the Sikh future if he had accepted the reality of the communal
politics suggested by Gandhi. He was representing the Sikhs and working for his
community therefore he ought to have accepted his communal role and pursue the
right direction but due to some undeclared reasons he did not expose his real
intentions.
156
The year 1940 proved turbulent in the Punjab politics pushing the regional and
national politics to the new communal problems. All the communities living in the
Punjab started thinking in the perspective of the new developments of the communal
tussle. The good days seemed to have gone forever when the communities used to live
with compromising attitude but after the partition scheme most of them started
reviving the negative elements of the combined society. The writers started giving
comparative analysis of the communities in the light of the new political trends.
Writing on the situation during 1941, Sir William Barton raised a question pertinent to
the majority and minority issue in the Subcontinent that the minorities in the Muslim-
ruled provinces were not happy. He explained that the non-Muslim minorities of
Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and Bengal were not satisfied with the performance of the
Muslim governments and these minorities described the Muslim rule “as a reign of
terror.” They appealed that the Governors ought to do justice in this regard. Even the
Hindus complained against the oppressive treatment of the cross-communal
government of the Punjab dominated by the Muslims. Politics apart, the officials had
been divided on the communal line conspicuously. The Sikh officers openly started

anti-Muslim activities. In 1941, Sardar Kapur Singh, DC Karnal, made the Nawab
families of Karnal and Kunjpura ineffective and cancelled their weapon licences.
Approximately 80 per cent of the Muslims of this district were denied the licences of
firearms while the DC issued new firearm licences to the Sikhs and Hindus. 208
Besides, the non-Muslim officials continued disgracing the Islamic signs and the
Muslims resisted it to the core. In Kethal (Karnal District), the policemen plucked the
beards of the suspected Muslims during the questioning but one of them said that he
could do whatever he liked except disgracing the beard because it is a Sunna of the
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 209 All such improper activities helped in deteriorating
the Muslim-Sikh understanding.
Jinnah Asserts Authority in Punjab
157
Jinnah turned to the regional politics before the elections of 1936-37 and
according to Nijjar, within about an year he won favour of the top Muslim Unionist
leadership which pleased the Muslim masses throughout India. 210 After winning over
the Muslims, he announced what the Muslims of the Subcontinent required as a
settlement of the communal tangle. The League demanded separate homeland for the
Muslims as a sole solution to the constitutional and communal problem in the British
India. The anti-Muslim organizations and political parties construed it as ‘civil war.’
The Hindu and Sikh communities started breathing fire against the partitioning
proposal of India. It created a “civil war” mentality throughout the society. 211
The Pakistan movement entered decisive phase; Jinnah demanded his nation
and the party for a total submission and binding to the party discipline. No agreement
with any authority was allowed without the League’s approval. During 1941, Sir
Sikandar from the Punjab, A. K. Fazlul Haq from Bengal and Maulvi Saadullah from

Assam joined the National Defence Council initiated by the Viceroy. Jinnah took
stern action against all these Premiers and asked for their explanation. The League’s
argument was that being the League members they were bound to seek permission
from the party before joining any forum while the Premiers contended that they had
joined the Defence Council in their official capacity. Jinnah was now fully prepared to
exert his authority in the Punjab after observing the past group politics of the Unionist
Muslims. After an enquiry, the League Working Committee ordered all of them to
resign from the Council. In a meeting on 25 August 1941, the Committee was
informed that Sir Sikandar and Muhammad Saadullah had consented to resign
therefore no disciplinary action would be taken against them. 212 The incident had a
great impact on the political scene of the Punjab and India as a whole. Through this
action, Jinnah challenged the British authorities and force of the Unionists and
succeeded in establishing party discipline in the second line of the Muslim leadership.
It also increased the League’s importance in the eyes of common people. The League
was increasing its influence in the Punjab politics day by day by repudiating the
existence of the Unionist party. Jinnah did not sideline the Unionist Muslims abruptly
rather he mitigated their influence gradually by infusing the cause of Pakistan in the
Unionist Muslims and the common folk. He sometimes adopted an assertive attitude
in establishing the party discipline in the political circles of the Muslim Punjab.
During his address to the annual session of the Punjab League Conference (Lyallpur)
held in November 1942, he said that “Ministers” must be clear about their position.
They could not enjoy the office without the League’s consent. 213 The popularity of the
League leadership can be gauged by the statement of Sir Chhotu Ram in which he
stated that 70 per cent of the Muslim members who were on the Unionist benches
158
were in reality a force behind Jinnah and his Pakistan scheme. 214 Before this, Gandhi

had admitted that within two years, Jinnah and the Pakistan idea had gained
tremendous support of the Muslims. 215 The increasing influence of Jinnah on the
Unionist Muslims upset the Sikhs. The on-going Sikh cry proved true in which they
had reiterated that the Unionist government meant the Muslim raj in the Punjab. The
Premier’s submissiveness had alarmed them. This also increased influence of the Sikh
leaders among their masses because the communalist character of the Unionist
Muslims was proving true.
Cripps Proposals
159
By the beginning of 1942, the British position in the war in Asia was very weak
and the Japanese seemed close to capture India. Churchill, the Prime Minister, sent Sir
Stafford Cripps, a war cabinet member, to India with a political package as a solution
to the constitutional problem. The major objective was to secure cooperation of the
Indian communities in the war and to release the American pressure as R. J. Moore
writes:
Against his long and fiercely held imperialist prejudices, Churchill was forced by the
pressure of Cripps, his Labour colleagues, and the Americans to acquiesce in the offer of
post-war Indian Independence and wartime association of the Indian parties with the
central government. 216
The British were well aware of the background of the Muslim-Sikh problem. On 8
March 1942, Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India circulated comments made
by Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, 217 to the Committee on India of the War Cabinet in
which he contended that the Sikhs lacked leadership of all-India level and clear vision
to follow:
The Sikh position is more complex. There is always an extreme element which hates the
Muslims on historical grounds as the successors of Moguls who persecuted Sikhs and the
Gurus and hates the British because they brought Sikh rule to an end in the Punjab. They
cherish vague ideas that general disturbance is not a bad thing because it may give birth
to opportunities for the restoration of the Sikh Rule in the Punjab. There has never been a

Sikh of real importance on the All-India political stage or one prominent as a leader in
Congress circles. 218
Cripps arrived in India in March 1942 and had discussions with the local leaders. The
Viceroy referred Cripps to Sir Sikandar for first hand information but Cripps was
reluctant to meet the Punjab Premier in the beginning but ultimately the meeting was
arranged. In this meeting, the Premier appreciated the draft proposals of Cripps as far
as the Punjab was concerned. Nevertheless, the Punjab Governor, in the perspective
of his past erratic behaviour, informed Cripps not to rely on Sikandar’s opinion. 219
The Sikhs and the Muslims were important to Cripps who believed that the British
had no problem in the Punjab if the Muslims and Sikhs came to an understanding.
Although, Master Tara Singh had demanded the government not to entertain Sardar
Kirpal Singh Majithia because of his non-representative position among the Sikhs but
Sardar Majithia was given the opportunity to meet the delegation. He after the
meeting of the Chief Khalsa Diwan in Amritsar placed the demands before Cripps.
The demands included national government, joint electorates with reserved seats, no
right for secession of province, and due share of the Sikhs in all national and
provincial domains. 220
160
In a meeting of the Working Committee of the Sikh All Parties Conference on
16 March, Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar, Santokh Singh, Joginder
Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh expressed a cordial welcome to Stafford Cripps with
favourable expectations regarding due share in the national government and
communal compromise in the Punjab. They also appointed a sub-committee which
was given the task to draft the Sikh demands. The committee included Baldev Singh
MLA, Santokh Singh MLA, Giani Kartar MLA, Master Tara Singh and Sant Singh,
MLA. 221 The Congress was stuck with the Cripps Mission on the issue of immediate

transfer of power in general and defence department at that moment in particular. 222
Master Tara Singh took Baldev Singh, Ujjal Singh and Jogindra Singh with him and
met Cripps on 27 March. They went through the proposals and asked Cripps for the
measures for the Sikh protection. Cripps clarified that they had only a few options
available to them. He told the Sikh leaders point-blank that they had a weak position
with no sound grounds to back up their demands therefore they must adopt a ‘give
and take’ policy with other stakeholders. They should persuade the Congress on the
basis of their important position to include maximum clauses for Sikh rights. The
Congress would accommodate them because the Congress definitely needed their help
at the centre. And if they were unsatisfied with the Hindus, they could bargain with
the League because the Sikhs were an important minority in the Punjab and the
League could not condone the Sikhs in the plebiscite to materialize the dream of
Pakistan. Through this bargaining process, they could force them for the required
concessions. The main agenda could be a semi-autonomous Sikh district on the Soviet
model or partition of the Punjab into parts:
If, when the constitution was finally settled, the Moslems decided that they had not got
sufficient concessions to enable them to remain within the Indian Union, then it would
be necessary for them to obtain a vote of non-accession by plebiscite in the Punjab.
..The probability would be that they would try to get the Sikh vote to support their
action and in order to do so would offer minority protection clauses…. 223
In fact, the British viewed the Sikh position better in the Muslim bloc than other
options. 224
161
Some Congressite Sikhs led by Sardar Dasaundha Singh, negotiated with
Cripps and demanded further partition of the areas on the caste basis if a Sikh state
would be conceded. They clearly opposed the Sikh state and damaged the panth. The
Sikh leaders busied themselves to fight for insignificant official benefits. Sir B.
Glancy 225 conveyed the same to Linlithgow as under:

The obvious course for the Sikhs to pursue is to seek a satisfactory basis for combining
with the major community in the province. The Sikhs are still clamouring for what they
profess to regard as their due representation on the Governor-General’s Executive
Council and in the Punjab Cabinet. 226
To Sangat Singh, Cripps gave the Sikh leaders many hints as guideline on which they
could secure their better future. Unluckily, the Sikh leaders could not understand the
propositions Cripps offered to them. He wanted them to pursue a well-worked out
course of action indicated to them in the meeting. India was undergoing the process of
decolonization and the main parties had set tangible goals before them. 227 Therefore,
in this situation, the Sikhs should have selected clear objectives to achieve. But they
failed to present any cohesive and agreed demands before Cripps. 228
162
The Cripps Proposals produced nothing concrete in favour of the Sikhs. On 31
March 1942, the SGPC presented a memorandum to Cripps in which as usual they
asked for the re-demarcation of the Punjab boundaries from the river Ravi to Delhi.
The language and points of the memorandum were mostly the same as those
presented in the RTC by the Sikh representatives. The memorandum evaluated their
services towards the British empire and their past political status in the Punjab. They
also expressed their resentment on the points of Cripps proposals which undermined
the Indian integrity and the Sikh position. In the memorandum, they presented facts
and figures about the communal proportion in different areas of the Punjab. They
maintained that originally Jhang and Multan districts and trans-Jhelum areas were not
a part of the proper Punjab. They demanded not to include these areas into the Punjab.
They gave figures up to the Ravi:
Muslims 4,505,000
Sikhs and other Non-Muslims 7,646,000
With population of Multan and Jhang districts:
Muslims 8,288,000
Sikhs and other Non-Muslims 9,348,000
Source: Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, 15-16.

They contended that the Sikh population in the states was 2,600,000 which could
further reduce the Muslim ratio. 229 In the memorandum, they slipped from the
demands to threats and expressed their anger that they were not considered justly by
the British. They included the Sikh claims as under:
163
• From 25 to 33 per cent share in the Punjab cabinet and the Sikh representation
should be compulsory in the cabinet,
• There should always be a coalition government in the Punjab,
• The Punjab be re-demarcated into two parts from the Ravi to Delhi consisting
of Ambala and Jullundur Divisions and the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and
Gurdaspur,
• The Sikhs be given weightage as the Muslims enjoyed in different provinces
as minority,
• Five per cent representation in the centre,
• One Sikh minister in the central cabinet,
• Defence Advisory Committee be created with one Sikh seat in it,
• The Sikh status be maintained in the Indian defence forces,
• Sikh share in Indian and provincial services be maintained on existing lines or
as the Muslims had in other minority provinces,
• Only the Sikh members would decide on the laws pertinent to the Sikh
religion in the Legislature,
• The State would not interfere with the religious matters of the Sikhs,
• The Gurmukhi script would be introduced where necessary. 230
The Sikh memorandum was made lengthy with the arguments which they had given
so many times before like in the RTC and on other occasions. In fact, they had
repeated the decades old demands in the memorandum and the new situation had not
moved them to float demands according to the current scenario. The British tried to
guide them but it could not mould them. Cripps as enunciated by Joginder Singh
Shant advised the Sikhs sarcastically “to baptise one member from each Hindu family
as a Sikh” 231 to increase number of their population.

164
The Sikh Memorandum also had an Annexure of the Muslim population in the
Punjab districts according to 1931 census report. According to this Annexure, the
Muslims had a clean majority in the western districts from Lahore to DG Khan while
they had a slight majority (50.8%) in the Gurdaspur district. They also made
reasonable percentage in rest of the eastern districts:
District Muslim Population
Amritsar 47.0%
Ferozepore 44.6
Jullundur 44.5
Hoshiarpur 31.8
Ludhiana 35.1
Source: Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab, 21-22.
Interestingly, they did not give the Sikh percentage in the same districts because
without the other non-Muslim populations their claim to be a majority in the eastern
districts had no importance. According to the Eastern Times, except Ludhiana the
Sikhs were in a smaller proportion than the Muslim population in the eastern districts:
District Sikhs
Amritsar 35%
Ferozepore 33
Jullundur 26
Ludhiana 46
Source: The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.
The British administration showed concern over the possible Sikh reaction to the
rejection of their demands. In a letter to the Viceroy, the Punjab Governor wrote that
Master Tara Singh’s task had become easy “to stir up communal feeling at the alleged
danger of the Sikhs being subjected to Muhammadan rule.” He further wrote that the
“practical objections to “Khalistan” are even greater than those which lie in the path
of Pakistan.” 232
Cripps tried to accommodate all the communities in his proposals. The Congress
on 2 April 1942 signalled its opposition to the Cripps proposals. The Congress and
Sikhs rejected the Cripps proposals on the possibility of the Indian partition with the

provision that provinces could opt out of a future Indian Constituent Assembly while
the League rejected it finding no clear-cut acceptance of Pakistan. 233 Once again the
Sikhs were with the Congress following their ideology and action. The Congress
Working Committee in the same meeting passed a resolution that they could not
compel any people of any unit “to remain in an Indian Union against their declared
and established will” and all the units would have full autonomy under the strong
centre. 234 Nevertheless, the Congress consented to join the interim government but
Cripps did not accept and went back on 12 April 1942 with a dream of Hindu-Muslim
unity. The US government forced the British Prime Minister to resume efforts of Sir
Cripps in India and try to come to terms with the Indian political parties. 235 It was a
direct pressure by the US for handing over power to the majority community but the
British Foreign Office wrote to Washington on 5 March 1942 that the important
community like Muslims could not be ignored:
We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war
carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We
must not on any account break with the Moslems who represent a hundred million people
and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have
also to consider our duty towards thirty or forty million untouchables and our treaties
with the princes states of India, perhaps eighty millions. Naturally we do not want to
throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion. 236
The US continued pressure on the British by calling the British colonial policy “as
equivalent to the private estate of a landlord.” 237 In response to this stress, the British
got infuriated and wrote to Viscount Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington,
that “We should certainly not tolerate any interference by foreign countries.” 238 But
even then they had to be accommodating towards the criticism by the US writers and
government particularly the public opinion. 239 The British tried to placate the US to
“secure their general goodwill” 240 to continue getting their military support in the on-
going war.
165

166
The Intelligence report passed extremely surprising comments on the Sikh
leadership that even after the withdrawal of the Cripps offer, the Sikh leadership kept
on propagating against the Cripps proposals in the public conferences. 241 The
Governor’s report concluded that as repercussion of the Cripps Mission no communal
incident of any importance occurred but it badly affected the communal relations. The
Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSSS), 242 the military offshoot of the Hindu
Mahasabha gave a call for membership. The report said:
The activities of this body, which are prosecuted as unostentatiously as possible, keep
within the letter of the law, but its communal proclivities and the fact that its leaders
might not be averse to enlisting Japanese aid to attain their object makes it necessary to
regard them with considerable suspicion. Meanwhile, Akalis continue their efforts to
organise the Sikh community in a semi-military footing, and Congressmen persist in
proclaiming that the people should not look to the Government agencies for protection in
times of emergency, but should instead band themselves into volunteer brigades under
Congress direction. 243
The uncompromising Congress leadership again had to turn to the League and started
showing greater flexibility towards the demand for Pakistan. The day after Cripps
moved back to England, Gandhi expressed his emotions through an article in Harijan
that the demand of the Muslims as a nation could not be challenged. They as a nation
had a right to ask for the partition of India, but at the same time the Hindus had a right
to resist such a partition. Moreover, C. Rajagopalachari along with some Congress
leaders resolved and accepted the Pakistan demand to win the Muslim support in the
freedom struggle. This change in response gravely alarmed the Sikh leaders. Despite
the stormy criticism, Nehru said that the “Muslims had the right to secede from
India.” 244 The Akali leaders arranged several meetings in which they attacked the
British on ignoring the Sikh interests, rejected Rajagopalacharia on his pro-League
role, and snubbed the Unionist ministry. They alleged that the Muslim Unionists had
been favouring the Muslims in the appointments at the cost of the Sikh rights. 245 The
common Muslims appreciated the Achari’s farsightedness but the Hindus and Sikhs

criticized the pro-Pakistani Madrasi group under Achari and the Punjabi Congress
leadership under Mian Iftikharuddin. Kirpal Singh called a meeting of the Sikhs in
Amritsar in which Master Tara said that Pakistan was being imposed on the Sikhs but
they were fully prepared to fight with the Muslims. 246 The Akalis pledged in a
conference at Amritsar to make the Pakistan scheme a mere dream. 247 The Akalis
should not have been so furious as their representative Master Tara had also been
invited to the talks with Jinnah at Delhi 248 but they showed a lot of anger on the
accommodating attitude of the Congress towards the League, which merely displayed
their hatred towards the Muslims.
167
Observing the popularity of the Pakistan scheme among the Muslims, the
Hindu leaders tried to convince the League to postpone it till the end of the war. But
the Muslim leadership was well aware of the expected betrayal of the Congress.
Therefore, Jinnah always responded to every move with sagacity stressing on what
the League had demanded. The Sikhs should have struggled for their own rights
collectively but at this very sensitive moment the Sikh leaders of all the parties were
following separate agendas. Sardar Kharak Singh, President CAD, said on 1 April
1942, that the Cripps’ Proposals were entirely anti-national. The Cripps Mission
paved the way for separation as enunciated by the Muslims on the religious basis then
“not to speak of one Pakistan, as many Pakistans may be established.” 249 On 5 April
1942, a meeting of the Moderate Sikhs was held at Amritsar in which 150 Sikhs
including the leaders such as Sardar Jodh Singh and Sardar Buta Singh participated
and after four hours’ discussion they issued a statement that the Defence department
be transferred to the Indians. The secession of the provinces should not be
accommodated and joint electorates be introduced with reservation of the minority
seats including the Sikhs. 250 The resolutions passed by the Moderate Sikhs with the

same language and demands adopted by the Congress. Jinnah had already explained
his position regarding the Defence portfolio in late 1940. In an interview with the
Viceroy on 25 September, Jinnah demanded the Defence portfolio for himself or his
nominee, otherwise it must not go to any Indian political party. 251
168
After the Cripps proposals, a letter by a Sikh was sent to Jinnah suggesting
solution to the Sikh question. The writer explained that the Sikhs had been nobody in
their own homeland before 1920s but they got prestige not on numerical basis but the
military strength in the shape of the Akali Dal. The solution of the Muslim-Sikh
problem was that a new state be created for Sikhs where all the communities should
have balanced population. Otherwise, Pakistan was a matter of life and death for the
Sikh community. He went on to say that the idea of Pakistan was conceived from the
Muslim theocracy where according to the Lahore Resolution the Muslims would live
and develop their culture, social and religious values independently. 252 The Islamic
idealism would ruin their military status:
Jinnah desires Muslim States and at the same time he also like [likes] the Sikhs to be a
part of this Pakistan….Sikhs will form an inalienable part of Pakistan, where there is
going to be perhaps no democracy, and without democracy, there are, no minority rights
but forceful suppression, persecution, conversion or elimination…Sikhs constitute not
merely a nation but are a cent per cent military organization and have a born right to rule
by virtue of their creed…We refuse to form ourselves into a slave community under
fanatical Mohammedan tyranny. That we, in no case, would be under Pakistan…Unlike
Hindus we will not have any neighbouring co-religious state to back and sanction the
promised minority safeguards. 253
The writer also suggested that Khalistan as buffer state could be created with the
consent of the Muslims and Hindus. 254
Sikhistan was impossible to achieve as seen by L. S. Amery, the Secretary of
State for India because of the scattered population of the Sikhs. He accordingly wrote
to Linlithgow that the administration should avoid exposing any administrative move
so that the Sikhs would not have “false expectations.” 255 Amery warned the Viceroy
that the British must clear their minds about the factual conditions and seek various

possibilities. He further observed that he should visualize that the Sikh state was
unworkable without an extensive exchange of population. Amery was well aware that
the Sikhs felt insecurity under the proposed state of Pakistan which could instigate
them to demand their own space in the Punjab as he wrote to Viceroy that “the more
Pakistan is pressed the more the Sikhs are likely in their turn to press for a degree of
autonomy sufficient to protect them from Muslim domination.” 256 In reply, the
Viceroy expressed the same feelings on September 1942:
My judgment is, quite frankly, that the Sikhs though a nuisance well worth placating, are
a relatively small nuisance. But there are no circumstances I can think of in which it
would be practical politics to consider any sort of “Sikhistan” ; and I would not think it
wise even to mention it to Glancy. 257
The British adopted a pragmatic approach to solve the communal issue in the light of
the ground realities. They definitely wished to facilitate the Sikhs but approval by the
other parties was essential to materialize any new arrangement.
169
Commenting on the Sikhs and Cripps’ proposals, Nawa-i-Waqt (a pro-Muslim
League paper) wrote that the Sikh question was merely a regional matter but the
Hindu press had highlighted it as a big issue. Cripps had made it clear to the Sikh
leaders that their issue was of a trivial nature which could be resolved through
bargaining with the League. He also suggested that Master Tara should contact Jinnah
and clear his mind relating to the Muslim-Sikh problems. 258 According to Khushwant
Singh, it was not astonishing if Cripps conceded the Muslim state because many states
were already there in the Subcontinent. But the Muslim demand to be separate from
the Indian union was really a success of the League. While Cripps on 29 March 1942
refused in a press conference the acceptance of the Pakistan scheme. 259 The clause of
‘non-accession’ seems a tactical ruse to secure the League support in the war efforts.

Sikandar-Baldev Pact 1942
170
The bitterness between the Muslims and Sikhs could be detrimental to the
government and the war effort. Therefore, the British “worked to bring about
Sikandar-Akali rapprochement.” 260 Baldev Singh with the support of the members of
the Khalsa National Party, the Akali Dal and the independent members had formed
the Punjab Sikh United Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in March 1942. Its
major objective was to reach at some agreed solution to the Sikh problem. It was able
to conclude the Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact on 15 June 1942. 261 At Lahore, on 15
June 1942, Sir Sikandar announced the terms of the pact. 262 Through this agreement,
the Sikhs and the government tried to settle outstanding issues which had threatened
the stability of the Punjab. The Pact allowed the communities to use either the meat of
Jhatka or Halal. The teaching of Gurmukhi was promised in the institutions wherein
sufficient Sikh students would be enrolled. The communities would be free to take
stand in the Assembly relating to their religious matters. The Unionist Premier
pledged to support the Sikh representation at the centre. The Punjab government
agreed to ensure the implementation of 20 per cent quota in services for the Sikhs. 263
The real reason behind the Pact was that in the early 1940, the Sikh desertions
from the army immensely increased while some Sikhs disobeyed the officers’ orders
which led the British to take stern action against the Sikhs. They even proposed to
disband the Sikh units and stop future Sikh army recruitment. The Punjab government
suggested adopting reconciliatory measures to restore the loyalty of the Sikhs.
Numerous experts on Sikhs were given the task to dig out the roots and solution to the
problem. Soon Major Short was given the task to normalize the situation. Master Tara
Singh in July 1940 issued a press statement in which he advised the Sikh soldiers to
perform the duties as pledged because it would be the “only way of maintaining our

position in an uncertain future.” 264 The Akalis and other Sikhs could not afford the
loss of the Sikh benefits, which they were enjoying as a martial people. On the other
hand, they were reluctant to become part of the Muslim government which they had
been criticizing. They were well aware that the anti-British activities might deprive
them of the British favours in the political domain.
171
Major Short, by using his friendly relations with the leading Sikh personalities
helped end the crisis. During these parleys, he won over the Governor, Sir Sikandar
and the Sikhs. He was of the opinion that the Anglo-Sikh amity was directly related to
the Muslim-Sikh friendly relations. Thus he started working for an alliance between
the Muslims and the Sikhs. The Akalis were deadly against Sir Sikandar for his open
support to the Pakistan scheme while Sikandar disliked and considered the Akalis
untrustworthy. To him, the insatiable nature of the Akalis was hard to meet; they
forwarded demand after demand “and nothing would win their permanent
attachment.” 265 Short’s efforts, nevertheless proved fruitful and the Sikandar-Baldev
Singh Pact was signed. The main achievement of Sikandar government was that the
Akalis did not join Gandhi’s protest in August 1942. But as a matter of fact, it was a
timely patch-up. 266 Master Tara Singh in his presidential address threw light on the
Pact and said that the Pact “is purely a communal” in nature and did not compel them
to follow the Unionists’ agenda. He also pointed out that such a pact in itself could
not change the mentality of the officials and government therefore it had no political
importance. Sir Sikandar, Baldev Singh and the Akali leadership still had different
political agenda to follow. He further declared that the coming events would testify
the reality of the pact. 267 In the same speech, he said that he believed that Pakistan
was to rule over the Sikhs. “If it is not so, what is it then?” 268 According to Master
Tara Singh, the role of Raja Nerendra Nath, Sir Narang, Mahashe Khushal Chand

(Daily Milap), Mahashe Krishan (Daily, Partap), Goswami Ganesh Das and Bhai
Parmanand was significant in concluding the pact. 269 It is noteworthy as to how much
the British officers and the Hindus had influence on the Sikh politics. It has also
exposed that the Hindus had been working for the British masters. The Akali
leadership’s reaction to the Pact depicts the confused and ambivalent politics as they
supported it in vague terms and opposed it as well. According to Jaspreet Walia,
through this Pact, Master Tara Singh once again lifted the Akalis to the top of the
Sikh politics. 270 While Tara Singh writes in his book that the Akalis selected Baldev
Singh for the ministership finding him affiliated neither with the Congress nor the
Akali Dal. By this, the Akali Dal could continue the anti-Unionist campaign by
projecting that no Akali was there in the Unionist government and this would not
displease the Hindus because the Sikhs did not want to dissociate with the Congress.
Master Tara Singh further pointed out that Sir Sikandar was determined to destroy the
Akali Dal. 271 Nevertheless, the benefit Sikandar gained from the Pact was that the
Akalis did not participate zealously in the civil disobedience movement launched by
Gandhi. The Pact accelerated the anti-Tara Singh moves within the Sikh community
as the Communist Sikhs and Central Akali Dal called it a double-standard in Master
Tara’s personality and selfishness of the Akalis. Anyhow, this friendly step appeased
the Sikh passion against the Muslims and lessened the degree of the communal hatred.
To Tai Yong, it entirely ceased the anti-Unionist activities of the Akalis. 272 The
strained situation created by the Sikh anti-Pakistan conferences and statements could
not be stopped with a single pact to bring the Muslims and Sikhs closer. Some big
decisions were required to bring about lasting amicable Muslim-Sikh relations which
seemed impossible because no group in the Punjab was working seriously and
honestly for the communal harmony.
172

173
Nevertheless, Baldev Singh thought this Pact very beneficial for the Sikhs and
on 26 June 1942, he became minister of the Unionist government. Neither Congress
nor League was happy about the Pact. Master Tara Singh declared this Pact as a big
achievement but at the same time, he opined that the political issues of the community
persisted as unsolved and for that they would continue their fight against the
Unionists. To Tanwar, Master Tara Singh was justified in his assessment because the
Sikandar-Baldev Pact was merely a blend of assurances, pledges, and
acknowledgments of the social, cultural and religious values. It did not solve the core
issues therefore it lacked importance as the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact had. Jinnah
expressed a deep concern over the Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact. To him, it was a clear
violation of the party discipline because Sir Sikandar being a League member was
bound to take consent of the League leader. 273 Nevertheless, this pact became
meaningless when Jinnah visited the Punjab in November 1942. Sir Sikandar could
not face “the champion of Pakistan” and surrendered what he gained through the Pact
with the Sikhs. This added to the Sikhs’ apprehensions who came to the conclusion
that Sir Sikandar was not sincere and was ‘playing a double game.’ The Premier
passed away suddenly in December 1942 274 but before his death he was a member of
AIML Working Committee. A few weeks before his death he had stated publicly that
he might disagree with Jinnah but he could not disobey him. 275
The succession of Sikandar was a sensitive issue about the Governor reported
to the Viceroy that Khizr Hayat Tiwana was not a suitable successor of Sikandar
Hayat. 276 Some of the anti-Unionist people also propagated that Tiwana family had
always been the British stooge who looked down upon the Muslims. Such people
believed that his appointment would be a great misfortune for the Punjab. It was also

projected that the Governor had placed him just to destroy the image of the League
and Jinnah. 277
174
The third All-India Akali Conference at Vahila Kalan (Lyallpur district) was
held on 26-27 September 1942 presided over by Master Tara Singh. The main
resolutions passed by the 15,000 Akali gathering were that the Sikhs would support
the Congress demands for the Indian independence and provisional cabinet at the
centre. The Akali leader said that the efforts to establish Muslim domination in the
Punjab would only result in a foreign rule. He went on to condemn the Pakistan
scheme and asserted that trust in the British was necessary, however the Sikhs would
support any agreement by which the civil administration would be placed in the
Indian hands immediately. He also said that the British should quit India at once
without any condition. Giani Sher Singh supported the partition of the Punjab into two
portions so that a Sikh majority could be secured. 278 The points raised by Tara Singh
in this speech were not clear as usual except the support to the Congress and national
independence. The foreign rule to which Master Tara Singh hinted in his speech could
be the Japanese because before this, he had cleared that the Sikhs would prefer the
Japanese rule to the Muslim domination in the Punjab. Therefore, this speech was a
threat to the British authorities that in case of Pakistan, the Sikhs might join the anti-
British forces. In this conference, they also pressed for the partition of the Punjab. The
Governor reported to the Viceroy that in the subsequent Akali meetings “fresh
emphasis on the need to counter pro-Japanese tendencies” was laid. They beset a plan
to the re-demarcation of the Punjab to achieve a balanced proportion. 279 The Akali
leaders started testing political reaction on the re-arrangement of provincial
boundaries synonymous to the ‘Azad Punjab scheme.’ The immediate reaction of the
Hindu press was very hostile and the Vir Bharat declared Master Tara Singh as

Jinnah. Master Tara Singh explained through a press statement that the Akali plan did
not desire to form Khalistan outside the federation. The report found Jinnah “willing
to consider it favourably.” 280 During the first half of December 1942, Master Tara
Singh and Giani Kartar tried to convince the Sikhs to support the Azad Punjab
scheme. They got a meager sympathy from their co-religionists but could not secure
either the Muslim or the Hindu support. However, the Akali leadership seemed
convinced to continue the traditional policy of opposition to the Pakistan scheme. The
leaders also attacked the Unionist government and pledged that the Sikhs would never
accept the majority rule of the Muslims. They also claimed that the Unionists were
violating the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact therefore the Unionist regime was
tantamount to Pakistan. They also complained that the recent visit to the province by
Jinnah had accelerated communalism in the Punjab. 281
Leadership of Master Tara Singh
175
Master Tara Singh acted erratically and changed his statements on a daily
basis. His statements depicted the illusory future of the Sikh politics. He had no clear
vision of the current and future political developments. Sometimes he seemed
vociferous against Pakistan and simultaneously he would be ready to concede the
demand of Pakistan if the League consented to concede Sikh demands like the Sikh
state. In the public, he would seem determined to massacre the Muslims and
somewhere else he posed to be a pacifist. He at one time was a secessionist,
integrationist, violent strategist, pacifist, nationalist and communalist. He did not have
the sagacity to produce a futuristic vision and solid programme for his community. J.
S. Ahluwalia shared the same views in an article in The Eastern Times and exhorted
the Sikhs that their Gurus had sacrificed their lives to expel the Muslim rulers from

India and being original nationalists they must put in every possible effort for the
national integrity and save their birthplace. 282 In September 1942 while presiding over
the All-India Akali Conference, Lyallpur, Master Tara Singh said that the Muslims
should postpone the demand of Pakistan and in return the Sikhs would cease their
struggle against the idea of Pakistan. He did not want to disturb the British who were
fighting against Japan for the Indians: “Pakistan or no Pakistan can easily be
postponed till after the war.” 283 Although he talked of some peaceful avenues to
prorogue this issue but in the same speech, he repeated that the Muslim demand for
Pakistan was a call for civil war. This demand had already caused tension between
Muslims and Sikhs and if they went on insisting on their demand, the civil war
between the Sikhs and Muslims was inevitable. 284 The postponing of the Muslim
struggle for Pakistan till the end of the war meant to follow the Congress policy which
could never be acceptable to the League.
176
Master Tara Singh yet had no clear picture of the prevailing political situation
which had created confusion in the Sikh minds. He said that the demands for Pakistan
and complete independence were inconsistent because if the British granted Pakistan
and independence then who would enforce the agreed formula? On the other hand,
there would be no independence if the English stayed in India; and if they left India
then which force would implement the English decisions. If the British decided in
favour of Pakistan then they would have to stay in the Subcontinent to execute their
decrees. He further elucidated that if the Muslims desired to establish Pakistan with
the British support and demand their expulsion only after the consolidation of
Pakistan, it would be a blind trust in the British masters. By this strategy, they could
not succeed to have independence. 285 Such speeches by the Akali leadership, full of
assumptions could please his followers only otherwise the international and national

ealities had left the only option for the British to liberate India. The issue they were
facing was to have an honourable return by concluding some agreed plan pertinent to
all the political stakeholders in India.
177
The Sikh destiny was in the hands of Master Tara Singh who sometimes
confessed that he was unable to chalk out any future plan for the Sikhs:
I cannot chalk out a particular plan of action. I can only say that the times are hard and
the situation is complicated. God alone be our guide in such times. I ask you to pray to
God, and cleanse your mind of evil by recitation of Gurbani and meditation upon God’s
name. That is the only sure right path…Holy people must be our guide. 286
This speech depicts the words of a weak leadership. It seems Master Tara Singh was
turning to religious fatalism rather than focusing on the stormy politics of the day just
to secure help in some specific problematic domains within the community. His main
target in fact was to isolate the other Sikh leaders from the Sikh masses. His speech is
full of tactics rather than sincerity towards the Sikh nation. He talked of peace and
tranquility to pacify the pacifists; his declaration of Pakistan as invitation to civil war
was to pacify the extremist Sikhs; his exhortation to consult the religious book and the
will of God was to enhance his religious status as a spiritual leader and his advice to
take guidance from the holy people was to curry the Sikh Granthis or others. It was
just to save his position as a leader otherwise he was confessing his inability to chart
out a plan for the Sikh community at the pinnacle of the Sikh struggle.
League Assures Sikh Rights
In the Lahore Resolution, the Muslim leadership tried to determine the
majority and minority rights. It accepted the cultural, economic, religious,
administrative, political and other rights of the minorities particularly to satisfy the
Sikhs. The Sikhs should have come to the table with Muslims to bargain on the lines
given by the League in the Lahore Resolution. But without consultation they declared
‘crusades’ against the Pakistan scheme. The propaganda was perilously worsening the

Muslim-Sikh relations in all the areas of the Subcontinent. The Congress leaders
reacted not as zealously as the Sikhs did. During the 3 rd annual gathering of the MSF
in January 1940 at Aligarh, Liaqat Ali Khan had clarified that the League was not an
adversary to its sister community’s rights. He made “it perfectly clear that the League
wanted freedom for every community. Congress nationalism on the other hand
wanted domination of one community on all others.” 287 On 1 April 1940, talking
about the Sikh position, Jinnah said that they would be an effective community in
Pakistan while in India “their voice would be negligible.” In the Muslim Punjab, they
would enjoy an honourable and effective place. 288
178
The Muslim leaders were fully optimistic about the popular response to the
Pakistan idea by the Muslims. They were giving hope to the Muslims that the
government would work on Sharia 289 in Pakistan as Raja of Mahmudabad said at
Lahore. 290 Since, he was well aware of the impact of the theocratic version of Islam
perceived by the non-Muslims. Through a letter to Jinnah, he indicated towards the
campaign against Pakistan launched by the Hindus of Lucknow. He wrote that the
biased attitude of the Hindus would create a favourable atmosphere within the Muslim
community. As far as the Sikhs were concerned, Raja Sahib wrote that the Muslim
leadership must be careful while using the term ‘Islamic state’ because the non-
Muslims feared the repetition of the Muslim theocracy they had already experienced
during the Mughal rule. He clarified:
When I say Islamic State I do not mean a Moslem State. The Hindu and other sects are
really affraid [afraid] of the repetition of another Ghori, Ghaznavi, or Moghal empire and
they are perfectly justified in holding these suspicions against all Moslem
domination…Their past experience…as well as our…have shown that a Moslem power
may not be necessarily be an Islamic one. 291
It is perfectly clear that the League’s struggle for Pakistan was not to enslave any
community or to revive the memories of the Mughal rule rather the minority rights

had been assured in the Lahore Resolution. Despite this, the Sikhs were alarmed about
the proposed Sharia laws in the Muslim state. 292 Therefore, they propagated that in
the proposed state of Pakistan, the Sikh existence would be in danger. They projected
the point that the Muslim rule would eliminate the Sikhs and Sikhism from the earth.
In fact, the Sikhs were not sensing the nature of events and demands of the current
scenario. Instead of the near past, they were doing politics in the light of the past
history of the Subcontinent. Notwithstanding, there was no forcible conversions or
ban on any kind of religious practices under the Unionist government whom they
usually called the ‘Muslim Raj.’ They saw the League as a theocratic party but they
had no example to quote that the League had supported any anti-Sikh movement.
They could see the League leaders’ response when the Mazhabi Sikhs in March 1940
demanded rights as a separate community from the Sikh panth. The leaders of the
Mazhabi Sikhs contacted the Muslim leaders and desired to discard Sikhism. The
CMG reported that the League leaders did not provoke the Sikh sectarianism. They
never welcomed the Sikh conversions to Islam. 293 This incidence was never
propagated and projected either by League or the Sikhs which testify that the League
leadership was not pursuing the policy of religious persecution in the proposed
Pakistan. In March 1941, observing the Sikh anxiety, Jinnah tried to make the Sikhs
understand the sensitivity of the time. He warned them that they numerically were too
small to be weighed honourably in India and their position in Pakistan would be
effective and honourable. They would be an important political partner in the
Punjab. 294 These assurances could not move the Sikh obstinacy and they never ceased
their anti-Pakistan activities. Sir Nazimuddin talking about the Sikh question during
his address at the annual session of the Punjab Muslim League Conference held in
179
November 1942 said that the Sikhs had got a prominent position in the last twenty

years with a powerful voice at the national level. The League could never ignore
them. 295
180
The Leaguers assured certain rights for the Sikhs through different proposals to
win the Sikh cooperation. Some of the assurances were projected in The Eastern
Times, Lahore in September 1942:
1. The provinces in Pakistan would not be authorized to pass any law affecting
the Sikh religion without the consent of two-third of the Sikh members.
2. Gurmukhi would be the second language in the schools where demanded by
the Sikhs.
3. The government would not interfere in the Gurdwara affairs managed by the
Central Sikh Committee.
4. The Punjab government would give the Sikhs 20% share in all the government
services.
5. The Sikh community would enjoy 20% representation of total elected
members of the Punjab Assembly.
6. One-fifth of the total strength in the Punjab cabinet would be extended to the
Sikhs.
7. In the federal cabinet and all the federal government departments the Sikhs
would be given 10 per cent quota. Moreover, in all three forces of Pakistan,
the Sikhs would be given fixed 20 per cent share of all the recruitments from
the Punjab. 296
Master Tara Singh writes in his auto-biography that during the Quit India Movement
in 1942, Gandhi, Nehru and others were in jail and Rajgopalachari was trying for a
communal unity to force the British to leave India. This effort concluded indirect
negotiations between Jinnah (at his own house) and 20 to 25 Sikh and Hindu leaders
at Birla House. Raja Maheshwar Dyal was playing the role of a middle man. Jinnah
and the non-Muslim leaders concluded an agreed settlement according to which
Pakistan was to be acceptable in the areas wherein the Muslims made 65 per cent of
the population but Swami Ganesh Dutt who joined the talks later through Gokal

Chand Narang rejected it. Master Tara Singh writes that “thus the compromise failed
due to us and not due to Jinnah.” 297 It shows that in 1942, the Akalis along with the
Congress leadership had accepted the Pakistan demand and they were merely
concerned with the territorial redistribution.
181
Many hopes of a Muslim-Sikh understanding were attributed to the Provincial
Muslim League Conference at Jullundur on 15 November 1942. The Akali leaders
including Giani Kartar adopted a realistic approach to the situation. They, it was
reported, opined that Pakistan seemed inevitable therefore they must secure
confidence of the League because in the united India their status would be
ineffective. 298 In this perspective, the Jullundur session was very important in the
history of the Muslim-Sikh relations. In the speech, Jinnah requested the Sikhs to pull
themselves away from the Congress cloak and settle the matters with the Muslims. 299
The Sikhs maintained their demands for re-demarcation of the province as Master
Tara Singh resented Jinnah’s statement in which he talked to achieve Pakistan through
force. 300 Although Jinnah always gave statements keeping the constitutional terms and
the counterpart Congress in his mind and surely the statement did not mean to
humiliate the Sikhs. According to the Intelligence reports, Jinnah’s visit to the Punjab
worsened the Muslim-Sikh relations. The Muslim-Sikh unfriendliness was again
revived and the Akali Sikhs deplored Jinnah’s refusal to accept the right of self-
determination for the Sikhs scattered in different areas of the Punjab. Jinnah
considered them a ‘sub-national’ group and was not ready to accept the re-
demarcation of the Punjab. It made the Akali-League patch-up impossible in the
current political scenario. 301 The hopes of the possible patch-up between the two
communities were over-run by the assertive and blunt stand of Jinnah and it roused
the anti-League sentiments among the Sikhs. The Sikhs in general concluded that it

was better to focus on Sir Sikandar rather than on Jinnah. Master Tara Singh repeated
his pledge with the Hindus regarding partition that he was not in favour of Pakistan
and Khalistan. 302 But once more it was reported in November 1942 that an informal
agreement had been concluded between Akalis and the League. The Eastern Times
welcomed this agreement and evaluated its importance. In an Editorial, the newspaper
favoured what points were included in the ‘Amritsar rumour.’ All the points including
Halal-Jhatka were repeated and maintained that the Sikhs must not worry about their
rights as Islam had already assured all rights to minorities. 303 The Eastern Times
appreciated the agreement but at the same time the paper disagreed with the demand
of Sikh state and Amritsar its centre. The Editorial said that the Sikhs had many
sacred places in several cities but enjoyed majority nowhere in these cities therefore
they could not be declared as the Sikh states. The paper wrote that being scattered
people, the Sikh demand for a Sikh state could not be justified. The Sikh state would
be an injustice with the Muslims and Hindus. The paper further noted that the Sikhs
had already five Sikh states, Patiala, Nabha, Faridkote, Jhind, and Kapurthala and
these were enough for them. 304 Jinnah said that the Sikhs were their friends and
advised them to redeem themselves from the Congress and have dialogue with the
League:
I am on the Punjab soil, I should like to say that question between Hindus and Muslims is
an all-India question, and the question between the Sikhs and the Muslims in the Punjab.
If our Sikh friends wish…Let us not talk at each other; but let us talk to each other. We
have no designs on our Sikh friends…Let us sit together and I pray to God that we shall
come to a settlement. 305
Jinnah kept all the venues of a mutual discussion open but one thing hurting the Sikhs
was that he had opposed the Sikh status. 306 Baldev Singh stated that they did not need
freedom with the vivisection of India. Responding to Jinnah’s Jullundur speech, the
182
Tribune wrote that the Sikhs had the same right in the Punjab which the Muslims had

in India. Being scattered “they have no politics of their own and have always behaved
as tools in the hands of the Hindus.” 307 The Hindu press highlighted Jinnah’s
statement of sub-nation about the Sikhs and put in all the devices to “make
Pakistanists recoil from their goal.” Ashar Yasin through an article observed that
3050000 Sikhs could not compel two crore and thirty-six lakhs Muslims to act
according to their desire. The following figures show hollowness of the Sikh demand
for self-determination:
District Total Sikh Population Percentage
Jullundur 9,43, 721 2,49,571 26
Ludhiana 6,72,494 3,12,829 46
Ferozepore 11,56,732 3,88,108 33
Amritsar 11,17,120 3,99,951 35
Lahore 13,78,970 2,44,304 17
Source: The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.
The writer also commented that the threatening statements by the Sikhs could not
increase their numerical strength. 308
183
The violent activities of the Sikhs were badly effecting the Muslim-Sikh
relations. The circumstances were dragging the two communities to a great danger.
New peaceful developments seemed a dream while the antagonistic past was
overtaking day by day. The Muslim religious forums were still struggling to regain
the Shahidganj Mosque from the Sikhs. 309 But the Muslims as a community launched
no campaign against the Sikhs as the Sikhs had done against the Pakistan scheme.
Amidst this critical phase of the communal problem Chhotu Ram took another step to
save the communal unity and tried to organize the Jats irrespective of their religion.
The All-India Jat Conference held its session at Delhi. Chhotu Ram said that they
aimed to eliminate the influence of the Mullah, Pandit and Granthi from the politics
and it would be the best way to achieve communal unity. He was of the opinion that
the Hindus had control over the caste system in the domain of politics but the

Muslims and Sikhs were under the religious stress. 310 He addressed another Jat
conference at Sonepat where he pledged to resist any endeavor “to create an Islamic
state.” 311 He was putting his energies to secure the territorial integrity of the Punjab
but the League’s drive was so forceful that it could not be checked by such a small
maneuver.
Leadership Crisis in Punjab
184
Resolution of the Punjab problem was handicapped by the fact that this region
had not produced an all-India level political leadership. They never seemed inclined
to go beyond the political boundaries of the Punjab. The leaders worked in the central
council for a few years and returned to the regional politics. They never tried to assert
their position in the national politics. The provincial leadership either Muslim or
Hindu remained incessantly under the national command of the respective
community. The Sikh politics remained constantly under the influence of the
Congress which was led by a different community. The Punjabi politicians could not
get out of the regional politics because it was materially beneficial and supportive in
maintaining their rule in their respective areas. They were keener in the personal rule
rather than the national interests. Jawaharlal Nehru said in May 1942 at Lahore that
the “Punjabi political workers lacked a sense of responsibility and were interested in
petty party squabbles to the exclusion of matters of vital importance.” 312
The Muslim-Sikh relations during 1940 to 1942 presented a critical form of
communal tussle in the political domain of the Punjab. The League, after experiencing
a bitter time under the Hindus, ultimately demanded a separate Muslim state in the
north-west and north-east of Indian Subcontinent. The demand relating to the north-
west created crisis in the Sikh politics. All their stakes were involved in the Punjab

therefore they retaliated with anger and pledged to resist Pakistan by sacrificing their
blood. It was a very critical juncture as far the Sikhs were concerned but their
leadership never found a way to meet this challenge. The Sikh public reacted with a
strange temperament and no effective criticism came from the Sikh masses against
their leaders on their duality of character or weak role in the political matters but they
at the same continued backing their political organisations. The Sikhs had conflicting
opinion about the political on-goings while the Akali leaders never worked in one
direction. They discussed no options for the community except exhortation to fight,
for which they were collecting weapons. The Sikh politics remained under scattered
minds and the Hindu influence. The Governor’s reports in April 1941 depicted truly
the contradicting attitude of the Sikh leadership:
Akalis with Congress leanings consider that Sikhs should throw in their lot with Congress
and concentrate on persuading it not to accept the scheme; Master Tara Singh and Giani
Kartar Singh consider that an Akali-Hindu alliance offers the best chance of resistance;
while Baba Kharak Singh considers that Akalis, instead becoming subservient to the
Hindu Mahasabha, should attempt to enlist the sympathies of “nationalist” Muslims.
Meanwhile, the Khalistan alternative is being kept in the background, though efforts
continue to be made to arm the community and to place it on an organised and semimilitary
basis on the plea of self-preservation. 313
The Sikh leadership had opened all the fronts simultaneously. They wanted to get
sympathy of the British, Hindu Mahasabha, Congress and the Unionists though all of
them had never treated them as an equal in the political arena. All of them promised
but none kept his word. The sad aspect of the Sikh leadership was that despite this ill-
treatment, they continued working under the same strategy. They still could not
overcome these psychological weaknesses. Master Tara Singh in October 1940 said
that the Sikhs must neither rely on the Congress nor the British. 314 This advice made
political sense but he himself could not carry it out. Another aspect of the Sikh
politics was that they could not show courage to step forward towards the League.
185
Their attitude towards the League was more arrogant than the Congress. They kept on

intimidating the stakeholders with a threat to start civil war to solve the communal
tangle in the Punjab. Due to these reasons, one observes the lack of mutual dialogue
between the Akali and the League leaders which further widened the gulf between the
two communities. The specific environment justified the League in initiating its own
political programme which could redeem their community from the threats and agony.
Notes
186

Chapter Two
187
1
Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs: 1839-1964, vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), 239-241
2
Letter from Ahmad Yar Daultana to MA Jinnah on 28 March 1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The
Quaid-E-Azam Papers 1940 (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1976), 96-97.
3
Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 240-41.
4
H. N. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register 1919-1947, vol. II, 1940 (New Delhi: Gian
Publishing House, 1990), 75.
5 CMG, 5 March 1940.
6 K. C. Yadav, “The Partition of India: A Study of the Muslim Politics in Punjab, 1849-1947”
The Punjab: Past and Present XVII-I (April 1983): 133.
7 CMG, 6 March 1940; see more details in the Letter from Dr. Muhammad Alam to Jinnah on
24 January 1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The Quaid-E-Azam Papers, 41-42.
8 Translation of “Congress mein Musalmanon ki Shirkat aur “Hindu Zehniyat” ka Sawal,”
Weekly Hindustan, (Lucknow) September 12, 1937, 5-8.
9 Sir Sundar Singh Majithia was the man who recognised the Sikhs as an important and
separate minority. The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1941 (Lahore: Superintendent
Government Publishing, 1942), 405.
10 CMG, 6 March 1940.
11 Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Chand Yadein Chand Ta’surat (Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1992),194.
12 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 241. Not only Sir Sikandar Hayat but also the
other prominent Unionist Muslims participated in the session. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Chand Yadein
Chand Ta’surat, 195-97.
13 CMG, 22 March 1940.
14 Ibid., 24 March 1940.
15 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League
Documents: 1906-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1970), 340-41; for detail see, Dr.
(Miss) Kaniz F. Yusuf, Dr. M. Saleem Akhtar and Dr. S. Razi Wasti. Pakistan Resolution Revisited.
(Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1990) and Latif Ahmad Sherwani,
ed., Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1969).
16 Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 1 April 1940 in Lionel Carter, ed., Punjab Politics, 1940-
1943 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 108.
17 It is generally perceived that the non-Muslim press projected the Lahore Resolution as the
‘‘Pakistan’ Resolution’ but as a matter of fact, the Muslim press too used the word ‘Pakistan’ as CMG
used the same on the very next day. CMG, 24 March 1940; Majlis-i-Kabir was another organization
which was using the word Pakistan. Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan was founded in 1937 by the young
Lahorites, Abdullah Anwar Baig, Khurshid Alam, Sahibzada Abdul Hakim, Sarwar Hashmi and others.
It used a letter pad with a map of Pakistan. Its leaders were in touch with the League leaders but after
the Lahore Resolution this organization went into background. Sarfraz Mirza, Tasawar-i-Pakistan se
Qarardad-i-Pakistan Tak (Lahore: 1983).
18 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia ((London:
Routledge, 2000), 101-102.
19 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 151.
20 Shiv Kumar Gupta, “Sikhs and the Partition of the Punjab,” Proceedings of the Indian
History Congress, 58 th Session, Bangalore, 1997 (Aligarh, 1998): 591-98; see also Indu Banga, “Crisis
in Sikh Politics, 1940-47,” in Joseph T. O’Connell et al., Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth
Century (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1990), 236.
21 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 73.
22 H. N. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 356-57. According to Mitra, the
Akali leaders held conference on 12 February 1940 at Atari and expressed concern over the idea of
Pakistan. Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 235n.
23 Joseph T. O’Connell, ed., Sikh History and Religion, 239.
24 The Times of India, 25 March 1940 in Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of
India: 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 60.

559.
25 Note by Major-General Lockhart, Military Secretary, India Office, L/PO/6/106b (iii) ff 266-
26 nd
Master Tara Singh, Pakistan (Gurmukhi) 2 ed. (Amritsar: Shiromani Akal Dal, n.d.), 2.
27
Triune (Lahore) 22 May 1940.
28
The Times of India (Bombay) 25 March 1940; see details in Editorial of CMG, 24 March
1940.
29
Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947
(New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1999). 150.
30
CMG, 28 March 1940.
31 PREM 4/45/1.
188
32 Linlithgow remained the Indian Viceroy from 18 April 1936 to 1 October 1943.
33 Zetland was the Secretary of State for India during the period of 1935-1940.
34 Linlithgow to Zetland in Prof. Waheed-uz-Zaman, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah:
Myth and Reality (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1976), 59; also see Sikandar Hayat, “Quaid-
I-Azam Jinnah and the Demand for a Separate Muslim State: Resolution Reappraised,” Journal of the
Research Society of Pakistan XXIV (October 1987): 12.
35 Waheed-uz-Zaman, Myth and Reality, 59; Sikandar Hayat, “Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the
Demand for a Separate Muslim State,” 12.
36 Letter from Zetland to Linlithgow on 13 December 1938, Oriental India Office Collection,
vol. III, F I 25/6.
37 Leo Amery was the Secretary of State for India during the period of 1940-1945.
38 Linlithgow to Amery on 5 September 1942, MSS.EUR.F. 125/11.
39 K. K. Aziz, Britain and Pakistan: A Study of British Attitude towards the East Pakistan
Crisis of 1971 (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1974), 30.
40 Ibid.
41 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 4-9.
42 CMG, 28 March 1940.
43 Proceedings of Congress Working Committee, Wardha, 16-19 April 1940 in R. J. Moore,
Churchill, Cripps, and India, 39.
44 CMG, 14 April 1940.
45 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 2 nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996 and
2005), 236-37.
46
Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 235.
47
The Tribune, 27 March 1940.
48
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 151.
49
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 357 also see Gurnam Singh Rekhi, Sir
Sundar Singh Majithia and his Relevance in Sikh Politics (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999),
125-126
50O.
P. Ralhan and Suresh K. Sharma, eds., Documents on Punjab 6, part II, Sikh Politics
(1927-1947) (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1994), 491.
51
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 16.
52
Ibid.
53
Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1986),
197.
54
Presidential Address by Master Tara Singh, Letter from Akali Dal to Maharaja Kapurthala
on 11 April 1940, Political Department, Political Branch, IOR: R.1/1/3554, File no. 15 (22)-P (S) 1940.
55
The Tribune, 2 April 1940.
56
Ibid., 5 April 1940.
57
Ibid., 8 April 1940.
58
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 191.
59
Ibid., para 178.
60
The Tribune, 11 April 1940.
61
CMG, 14 April 1940.
62
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 358.
63
Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 236.
64
The Tribune, 18 April 1940.
65
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 292.

66 CMG, 18 April 1940.
67 S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd.,
1992), 238-39.
68 The Tribune, 28 May 1940.
69 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 230.
70 Ibid., para 244.
71 Ibid., para. 300.
72 Ibid., para 242.
73 Letter from the Viceroy to the Governor Punjab on 18 April 1940, Mss. Eur F125/149, 31
Linlithgow Papers.
74
FR, 30 April, 1940, L/P&J/5/243.
75
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408,para 164 and 178.
76
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 210.
77
Ahmadi or Qadiani people were the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiani
(Gurdaspur) but other Muslim sects opposed his religious beliefs.
78
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 515.
79
Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 239.
80
CMG, 6 March 1941.
81
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 130.
82
Resolution of the SGPC in Lionel Carter., Punjab Politics, 1940-1943, 227, 232-33.
83
Letter from Master Tara Singh to Craik on 28 March 1941 in Ibid., 231.
84
Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 3 March 1941. Ibid., 230.
85
Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 17 March 1941. Ibid., 240.
86
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 130.
87
Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941,
Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file
no., S-409, para 1.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid., para 355.
90
Nihang Sikhs were extremists and were involved in unlawful activities like violation of ban
on Kirpan, etc.
91
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file no. S-409, para 180.
92
Ibid., para 272.
93
Ibid., para 284.
94
Ibid., para 294.
95
Ibid., para 245.
96
Letter from Governor to Linlithgow on 13 January 1941, L/PJ/5/244.
189
97
CMG, 1 April 1941.
98
Letter from Bahawal (Gujrat) to MA Jinnah on 14 August 1941, file no. 1099, QAP.
99
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 305.
100
Ibid., para. 481.
101
Master Tara Singh, “Akalion ke Khilaf Sazshen,” Ajit in Editorial, Inqelab, 18 January
1946.
102Assistant
to the DIG of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.
103
Supplement to the Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 10 January 1942,
no. 2, S-410.
104
Ibid., para. 21, 32, 36.
105
Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945),
128.
106
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 36.
107
Ibid., para. 86, 89.
108
Ibid., para. 109, 111.
109
FR, March, 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
110
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 119.
111
Ibid., para 129.
112
Ibid., para 129.
113
Ibid., para 139.
114
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1942), 149.

190
115
Sardar Kartar Singh MA, LLB, Advocate High Court Patiala was the Chairman of the
Reception Committee.
116
G. Kartar Singh MLA, Lyallpuri, Patiala Administration and the Position of the Sikhs
(Pamphlet) (n.d.) R/1/1/384 File No. 353-P(S)/42. Political Department.
117
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211.
118
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 139.
119
Ibid., para 112.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid., para 130-31.
122
Ibid., para 140.
123
Ibid., para 132.
124
Ibid., para 142.
125
Ibid., para 294.
126
FR, March, 1942, L/PJ/4/245.
127
Naranjan Dass Mohaya, “Administration of Law and Order under the Unionist Party (1937-
1941),” Punjab History Conference, 20 th Session (Patiala: Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi
University, 1987): 379.
128
The Eastern Times, 7 November 1942.
129
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 269-71.
130
Letter from WS Dhory, Bat-at-Law, Secretary District Muslim League in The Eastern
Times Lahore, 6 December 1942.
131
The Eastern Times,18 December 1942.
132
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 267.
133
Ibid., para 113.
134
Ibid., para 272.
135
Ibid., para 385.
136
Presidential Address by Master Tara Singh through a Letter from Akali Dal to Maharaja
Kapurthala on 11 April 1940, Amritsar, Political Department, IOR: R.1/1/3554, File no. 15 (22)-P (S)
1940.
137
Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941,
Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file
no. S-409, para. 1.
138
FR, May 1942, L/PJ//245.
139
Secret Police Abstract, file S-410, para. 182.
140
Ibid., para. 206.
141
Ibid., para 294.
142
Ibid., para 329.
143
Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad, 130.
144
Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941,
Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file
no. S-409, 1940, para 343.
145
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, file no. S-408, para. 354.
146
Ibid., para 461.
147
Ibid., para 484.
148
Ibid., para 492.f
149
Ibid., file no. S-409, para 272.
150
Ibid., S-410, para 154.
151
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file S-410, para 225.
152
Ibid., para 203.
153
Ibid., S-409, para 324.
154
Ibid., para 249 and 326.
155
Ibid., para 260.
156
Ibid., passim, para 144.
157
M. Aslam Malik, “Sikh Reaction to Pakistan Resolution 1940,” Pakistan Journal of History
& Culture XVIII, no. 2 (July-December 1997): 49.
158
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 357.
159
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 244.
160
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211.

191
161
Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis: An Analytical Study (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co.,
1985), 64.
162
FR L/PJ/5/246.
163
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 266.
164
Ibid., file no. S-410, para 162.
165 Ibid., para 183.
166 Ibid., para 206.
167 Ibid., para 295.
168 Ibid., para 452.
169 Ibid., para 473.
170 Ibid., para 529.
171 Ibid., para 517.
172 Ibid., para 174.
173 Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 103
174 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 242.
175 Ibid., para 266.
176 Ibid., para 450.
177 Ibid., S-410, para 390.
178 Ibid., para 402.
179 Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 11, 1940 (Lahore: Superintendent
Government Publishing, 1941), 99.
180 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 60.
181 Letter from Malik Barkat Ali to Jinnah on 21 July 1941 in Rizwan Ahmad, comp., The
Quaid-i-Azam Papers, 1941-42 (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1976), 63-64.
182 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (London: A.B.
Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), 183-85.
183 External Affairs Department, Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 29 July
1943, IOR: L/PJ/8/662 (Punjab Ministry Affairs and Appreciations).
184 V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, rep. (Kothrud, Poona: Sangam Books
Ltd., 1979), 456-457.
185 FR 15 December 1941, L/PJ/5/244.
186 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 241.
187 Ibid., 244.
188 Letter from S. Muhammad Sabir Jaffery to MA Jinnah on 5 February 1941, Ropar. vol. 138,
Archives of Freedom Movement.
189 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 242.
190 The Muslim students mainly used the platform of the All-India Students Federation, a
Hindu-sponsored organisation. The Muslim Students Federation was founded in 1937; see details,
Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, The Punjab Muslim Students Federation, 1937-1947 (Islamabad: NIHCR,
1991), xiv and passim.
191 FR, 15 March 1941, L/PJ/5/244.
192 Letter from Gul Muhammad Khan, Honourary Secretary, Muslim League Gohana to Hon.
Secretary, Muslim League, Delhi, 24 October 1940, vol. 132, AFM.
193 Letter from Shah Nawaz Khan to MA Jinnah on 8 February 1941, file no. 1099, QAP.
194 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 158.
195 CMG, 31 March 1940.
196 Ibid.
197 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 243.
198 K. C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 87.
199 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History, 1858-1947 (Lahore: Book Traders, 1976),
296-97. 200Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 230.
201 Bajwant Kaur Dhillon, “Demand for Pakistan: Role of Master Tara Singh,” in Verinder
Grover, ed., The Story of Punjab: Yesterday and Today (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995),
537.
202 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1919-1947, vol. 1 (1940), 323.
203 FR, September, 1940, L/PJ/5/243.

204
Letter from Gandhi to Master Tara Singh on 16 August 1940 in Sangat Singh, Sikhs in
History, 211-13.
205
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211-12.
192
206 On the other hand, the Akali members of the Congress Working Committee, Punjab assured
the Congress that the Sikhs or Akalis could never leave the Congress. Sampuran Singh, MLA, Partap
Singh, MLA, Darshan Singh Pheruman, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, S. Basant Singh of Moga and
S. Labh Singh were prominent among this CWC. Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408,
para. 475.
207Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 212.
208 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988). 150-
151; see also file no. 1090/60, QAP.
209 Letter from Muhammad Fazl Qadeer Zafar Nadvi, Secretary Anjuman-i-Islamia, Kethal
District Karnal to Secretary Muslim League on 2 November 1941, vol. 138, AFM.
210 Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Punjab under the British Rule, 1849-1947, vol. III (1932-1947)
(Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 160-161.
211 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register1919-1947, vol. II, 1940, 73.
212 Ibid., vol. II, 1941, 212-213.
213 Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799-1947 (Lahore:
Research Society of Pakistan, Punjab University, 1970), 531.
214 The Eastern Times, 8 November 1942.
215 Interview of Gandhi by Sir Stafford Cripps in Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of
Power, 1942-47, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970), 499.
216 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, v.
217 Sir Geoffrey Fitzhervey de Montmorency, Governor of the Punjab during 9 August 1928 to
19 July 1932 and then from 19 October 1932 to 12 April 1933.
218 Parliamentary Debates,(Central) L/PO/6/106b (ii) ff 1212-265.
219 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 248-49.
220 Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para. 162.
221 Ibid., para. 129.
222 The Congress wanted the Defence Department to be handed over to the Indians which was
opposed by the British and Jinnah. FO/954/12A.
223 Henry Hayes, ed., The Sikh Question in India (London: Helms Publishing, n.d.), 7-9.
224 Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy on 1 March, 1942, L/ PO/6/106b (iii)
ff 266-559.
225 Sir Bertrand James Glancy remained Governor of the Punjab from 7 April 1941 to 8 April
1946.
226 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol. II, 7; also see Gurmit
Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha Institute of Religious Studies, 1981), 46.
227 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 213-214.
228 Harjindar Singh Dilgir, Shiromani Akali Dal: Ik Ittehas (Gurmukhi) (Jullundur: Punjabi
Book Co. 1986), 35.
229 Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), 15-16.
230 Sikh Memorandum presented by SGPC to Sir Cripps on 31 March 1942 in Kirpal Singh,
The Partition of the Punjab, 15-21.
231 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-410, para. 174.
232 Letter of Governor Punjab Glancy to Viceroy Linlithgow in Henry Hayes, The Sikh
Question in India, 11.
233 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 250; see also B. K. Mishra, The Cripps
Mission: A Reappraisal (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1982), 125 and passim.
234 Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution and Present
Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 131-132.
235 Message from US President for the British Prime Minister on 12 April 1942, FO/954/12A.
Lord Linlithgow in the beginning had opposed such a mission to India and threatened to resign but later
on, he agreed. The British government was of the view that such a mission was necessary to project the
British sincerity to the world and to gain time for further workout. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj,
1849-1947, 188.
236 Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, FO/954/12A/0/427.

193
237
Letter from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, on 13 December 1942, FO/954/12A.
238
Letter from Prime Minister to Lord Halifax, on 19 September 1942, PREM/46/4b.
239
Letter from Washington to Foreign Office on 16 September 1942,Ibid.
240
Letter from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, on 13 December 1942, FO/954/12A.
241
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, Para. 174.
242
RSSS was initiated in 1925 by Keshav Rao Bali Ram Hedgewar, a doctor from Nagpur.
243
FR, April 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
244
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 131-133.
245
FR, April 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
246
Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 251.
247
CMG, 15 April 1942.
248
Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 1920-47” (Ph.D. diss., Guru Nanak
Dev University, 2005), 147.
249
The Indian Annual Register, vol. I, 1942, 344.
250
Ibid., 256-57.
251
Jinnah, interview with the Viceroy on 25 September 1940, PREM 4/45/1, National
Archives, London.
252 “The Sikh Problem,” file no. 930, QAP.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Letter from Amery to Linlithgow on 20 August 1942, MSS.EUR.F. 125/11.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid., on 5 September 1942.
258 Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) 11 April 1942.
259 Khushwant Singh, The History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 250n.
260 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 214.
261 Gulati, Akalis Past and Present, 82-83.
262 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I (1942,), 344-46.
263 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 158-59.
264 Master Tara Singh’s press statement in July 1940, Short Collection, Mss Eur F 189/3.
265 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, 32-34.
266
Ibid., 36-37.
267
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. II (1942), 299.
268
Ibid., 300.
269
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 214n.
270
Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics,” 209.
271 Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad, 133.
272
Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 105.
273
Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 160.
274
Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 106.
275
Sikandar Hayat, Aspects of the Pakistan Movement (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1998),
113.
276
Letter from Governor Punjab to Secretary of State for India on 1 January 1943, IOR:
L/PJ/8/662.
277
Extract from Broadcast on 2 January 1943, Rome news in Hindustani, in Letter from
Government of India, Department of Information and Broadcasting, to the Secretary of State for India,
4 January 1943, ibid.
278
FR, September, 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
279
Ibid., October, 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
280
Ibid.
281
Ibid., December 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
282 J. S. Ahluwalia, “Sikhs! Beware of Congress Wills,” The Eastern Times, 30 August 1942.
283 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register,, vol. II (1942), 299.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid., 300.
287 CMG, 4 January 1940.

194
288
“The Sikh Problem,” file no. 930, QAP.
289
Islamic laws
290
Sharifuddin.Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 341.
291
Letter from Raja of Mahmudabad to Jinnah on 28 July 1940 in Rizwan Ahmad comp., The
Quaid-e-Azam Papers 1940, 111-112.
292
Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 60.
293
CMG, 13 March 1940; see also letter from the President Bawa Jiwan Singh Dal (Mazhabi
Sikhs’ organization) to Quaid-i-Azam, n.d. file- F-930, QAP.
294
CMG, 2, 4 and 15 March 1941.
295
Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings, 529-30.
296
The Eastern Times, 27 September 1942.
297
Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, 60-61; also see Jaswant Singh, Master Tara
Singh: Jeevan Sangharsh tey Udaish (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: 1972), 191-92.
298
Police Abstract, 1942, file no. S-410, para 513.
299
Ibid. para 518.
300
Ibid .para. 517.
301
Ibid. para. 525.
302
Ibid. para. 546.
303
The Eastern Times, 24 November 1942.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid., 17 November 1942.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid., 20 November 1942.
308 Ashar Yasin, “Hollowness of Sikh Claims Exposed,” The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.
309 Volume 132, AFM.
310 The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.
311 Gulati, Akalis Past and Present, 89.
312 Secret Police Abstract, S-410, para. 217.
313 FR, April, 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
314 The Tribune, 31 October 1940.

CHAPTER THREE
PUNJAB: TOWARDS POLITICAL SPLIT
The World War II was causing serious setbacks to the British in the battlefield
which influenced their policies in their colonies. This change disturbed the pro-
government as well as the rural set-up of the Punjab. The Muslims and Sikhs had been
struggling for the political rights on the basis of their importance but the official and
political developments in the early 1940s i.e., the Lahore Resolution and the Sikh
reaction, Cripps proposals, Sikandar-Baldev Singh pact and Achari formula changed
the course of the Punjab politics. The League claims were based on democratic rights
for self-determination. The Sikhs continued their politics on the basis of their previous
occupation of the area and military services rendered to the British but without any
specific agenda. The League after 1940 worked to advance the Pakistan demand and
pursued it vigorously, while the Sikhs were still in a confused state with a variety of
demands on which they never seemed united. The Sikhs lacked a strong leadership
and clear vision. They were confused about how to deal with the declining Unionists
and the Pakistan scheme and vociferously continued opposing the Unionists and the
advocates of Pakistan. The Sikh leadership depended on the Hindu leadership and
British administration and at the same time kept on condemning the both. They were
unable to play a decisive role in the Tiwana-Jinnah tussle, although they supported the
Punjab Premier as the best bet to derail the Pakistan movement. This chapter will look
into the political developments from 1943 to the 1946 elections in the perspective of
the Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab.

196
This era presents deplorable scene of the Punjab politics as the League-
Unionists and League-Sikhs tussle continued, whereas the Hindus pushed the
communities to a painful point of violence. The League was winning over all factions
of the Muslim society sidelining all the anti-League forces. The popularity of the
League leadership forced the Congress to bargain with it which resulted in parleys
such as Achari formula, Jinnah-Gandhi Talks which increased depression,
disillusionment and resentment among the Sikhs. The Sikh politics exhibited nothing
new, rather the leadership continued anti-Pakistan campaign with violent statements.
They repeated their demands such as Azad Punjab or Khalistan while the other pro-
Congress Sikh groups opposed the same. In most of the cases, they showed no
uniformity in their own package of demands. The Viceroy provided another
opportunity for the Indian politicians to agree on some terms but the discussions at
Simla to settle the constitutional affairs ended in naught and the Congress-League
understanding could not be achieved. The violent activities of the Akalis and the
communal riots further upset the rural peace. These tense conditions ultimately
dragged the decision-making leaders to the masses to ascertain their will through
elections in 1946. The result of the elections proved that the Punjab was required to be
divided on the communal lines.
Popularity of the Muslim League
The League and its programme won support among the Muslims and
consequently became assertive in the political affairs. Within the Punjab, the League
began to secure support in the rural areas which had previously been dominated by the
Unionist landlords. For the first time, the League was able to hold conferences
amongst a population formerly subservient to the bureaucracy and the feudal set-up.

197
The latter seemed unable to tackle the political manoeuvring and popularity of Jinnah
and his Pakistan movement. Although some of them sympathised with the League but
were reluctant at first to break up with the Unionist Party which had always held the
support of the powerful British bureaucracy. The changing pro-League political
scenario did not find favour with the British who preferred to work in a wartime
situation with their long-term Unionist allies, rather than with Jinnah who represented
a less predictable political force. The Punjab Governor Sir B. Glancy in a letter to the
Viceroy on 17 April 1943 noted both Jinnah’s unpredictability and the likelihood that
he would gain support from the Unionists in the eventuality of an open clash with
them. He feared that a fair number of the provincial politicians were ready to betray
the Unionist Party for their personal benefit. 1 In 1944, the Governor’s reports and
general perception portrayed very strong political influence of the League in the
province. The Times analysed the political situation of the Punjab and wrote that the
breakdown of the Jinnah-Tiwana talks would cause split of the Unionist camp and its
members could leave the party. Two of Tiwana’s Muslim under-secretaries resigned
and up to 25 Muslim members of the Assembly would cross the floor. Surely, the
League might prevail in the Punjab in the next elections. 2 These views were shared by
a number of the Hindu newspapers in May 1943 regarding the growing popularity of
the League in the Punjab. There was anticipation that the Unionist Ministry would be
replaced by the League at the next elections. This period according to the Governor’s
reports was fraught with the rumours based on the sharply changing scenario. The
Hindu papers assessed that Ch. Chhotu Ram could dissociate with the Unionists while
some speculated about the possibility of the League-Akali coalition Ministry in the
Punjab. The Hindu press, under such speculations and stress condemned the Akalis
and accused them of intriguing against the Hindus, selling the Sikh panth to the

198
Muslims and making them the king. The Muslim papers reaffirmed that the Muslims
were determined to have Pakistan. 3 Some writers such as Bhagwan Josh have
subsequently pointed out that the Communists believed that in 1943 the League had
gained popularity and the status of a popular party in the Punjab. 4
The Punjab Provincial League chalked out a plan to activate the primary
branches of the League in every village of the Punjab 5 which presently existed merely
in the files. The League compiled a comprehensive report about the tour the leaders
had made throughout the Punjab. The first tour was made specifically to popularise its
message at the grassroots level while for the second tour, the leaders were assigned to
contact the MLAs of the Multan division. Mian Mumtaz Daultana worked in Multan
while Raja Ghazanfar Ali and Syed Mustafa Shah Gilani arranged meetings in
Rawalpindi and Sargodha regions. The other League leaders of the Punjab presented
the League cause successfully to the Muslims of different districts of the Punjab. The
Rawalpindi Students Conference on 17-18 June successfully disseminated the League
message to all strata of the Muslims. It was also mentioned in the report that the anti-
Akali group of the Communist Party and Kisan Sabha (5 members) was inclined to
join the League group in the provincial Assembly; all of them were pro-Pakistan but
needed to be assured of the right of self-determination. 6 The League with the Pakistan
idea penetrated into the streets of the villages of Sargodha, Ludhiana and other
Muslim areas of the Punjab. 7 As a strategy, they divided the Punjab into five zones for
propagation of the League aims. According to the Governor’s report, in the second
half of October 1945, “Two Unionist MLAs of the Rawalpindi District have officially
joined the League.” 8 On 7-8 October 1944 at Khanewal (Multan district), the Multan
District Muslim League organised a conference, Sardar Shaukat Hayat presided and
Raja Sher Zaman Mehdi from Jhelum, Karim Bakhsh Haidri from Muzaffargarh, Ch.

199
Nasar Ullah Khan of Jahanian, Zain-ul-Abdin 9 and others expressed their full
confidence in the leadership and ideal of Jinnah. The report recommended that the
Sikhs should support Pakistan and labour enthusiastically to achieve Khalistan. 10 Syed
Sajjad Zaheer writes that he saw a political training school at Bhagwanpura, Lahore to
politically equip the League workers of the 13 districts. 11
The anti-League politicians within the Muslim community turned to shore up
their position. When a Unionist Muslim candidate was asked of the League popularity,
he replied that the price of such popularity was only five lakh rupees which he could
afford easily. The Unionist Party could not be equated with the colossal popularity of
the League. Its leadership was not capable of thinking about the future of the Muslims
or the Punjab instead its thinking was narrowed to the ministry-making tactics only. 12
The increasingly bleak political prospects made the Unionists more dependent on the
British. 13 They never tried to initiate the party branches in the province. Even in these
critical days, they kept on pursuing the traditional agenda and strategy but resorting to
patronage and inducements proved counter-productive amongst the Muslim masses.
The common Muslims ineligible to cast votes strengthened the League by an open
show-off. For example, Jinnah travelled from Rawalpindi to Lahore by GT Road in
1944 and a huge number of the Muslims gave him a warm welcome by standing along
the road which helped the Muslims to be united under the League leadership. 14
Communal Situation
The Punjab government had never successfully promoted the inter-communal
harmony at the masses level, although working through the official channels they had
attempted to do this at the elite level. The Punjab Communal Harmony Movement
was initiated, largely as an official task. Headed by the Punjab Premier Malik Khizr

200
Hayat Khan Tiwana as its President, it activated the government officials in the
communal politics. The Punjab government issued a press note on 24 March 1943 by
which the government servants were permitted to use their influence to bring
understanding between the communities. 15 The government’s step to launch a
movement for communal harmony was an appreciable step but the use of the
bureaucracy in this effort was fraught with grave dangers. The officials were not
supposed to participate in the politics but in the name of the communal harmony they
were put to this job. Intentionally or unintentionally the government servants now
could easily favour any community. Despite a very honest effort on the part of the
officers they could be blamed as communalist by the rival party. It was very risky
because the Muslims and Sikhs had already complained about the communal
proclivities of the officials on many occasions. Ordinary people played their due role
irrespective of its value or futility. Tara Singh Kalra for example, from Lahore wrote
that there was no reason to quarrel if the sacred books of the Sikhs and Muslims had
different languages; all must see the message of both the books which speak for peace
therefore, the religions demand harmonious relations between the peoples. 16 Everyone
was aware that the communal tension between the Muslims and Sikhs could be
pernicious to their respective future but only a few wrote and struggled against this
tension. These meagre efforts were drowned in the giant noise of the communal
uproar. Nevertheless, the people went on trying for the Muslim-Sikh understanding on
their own. Malik Barkat Ali reiterated that patch-up between the Muslims and Sikhs
was not impossible because if Sir Sikandar could run the Punjab government good or
bad by uniting the conservative members, then the enlightened Hindus, Muslims and
Sikhs could also be united into a stronger nationalist party which could work on the
national issues. 17 Many other bridging elements were there to bring the Punjabi

201
communities to an agreed agenda but the motivating force was required to do it
practically. The saintly heritage remained a guiding and binding force for them. The
Muslims had been quoting it from time to time to maintain peace in the region.
Muhammad Sharif Jallandhari, an anti-Jinnah writer, wrote in a pamphlet that Hindus,
Sikhs, and Muslims had great reverence for Guru Nanak Dev and Hazrat Baba Farid.
Under such common factors, the brave Muslims, prudent Hindus and industrious
Sikhs could build a foundation of the Punjabi nationalism. 18
The voice of unity came from the common people while main bulk of the
Unionist politicians was busy in retaining their power even if this was at the cost of
the unity. Ch. Chhotu Ram sought to use a common Jat identity to transcend religious
divisions. In Lahore, on 27 March 1943, the All India Jat Conference was called for
unity of the Jats for their economic and political rights. This was moved by Naunihal
Singh, member of National Defence Council. Sir Chhotu Ram, the Revenue Minister,
moved several resolutions in which the Jats were appealed to unite irrespective of
their religious affiliations. Chaudhri Tika Ram, MLA and Chaudhri Riasat Ali, MLA
spoke to the gathering. 19 The move for the Jat unity (Jat Mahasabha) 20 shows that the
Unionist leaders were severely damaged by the new political developments in the
region. Ch. Chhotu Ram, a founding member of the Unionist Party had always
pursued a Jat identity in the politics, but now redoubled his efforts in this respect. He
opined that religion must be confined to the religious places and all the Hindu, Sikh
and Muslim Jats should wok with secular ideas and unite on the caste basis discarding
pandit, granthi and maulvi. The changing environment of the Punjab did not permit
these efforts to bear fruit, although it was not until after Chhotu Ram’s death that the
Hindu Jats of Rohtak deserted the Unionist cause for the Congress, just as the Muslim
and Sikh Jats had affiliated with the League and Akali Dal respectively.

202
On 28-29 August 1943, a League meeting was held in Chak No. 258/G.B.
district Lyallpur and Maulvi Jamal Mian (from Lucknow) presided. The resolutions
passed by the meeting laid stress on the replacement of the Unionist Ministry with the
League Coalition Ministry. They also condemned Chhotu Ram’s activities in the
Punjab and requested the Muslim Jats to stay away from the Jat Mahasabha. The
resolution also demanded the government to ban the publication and sale of Qur’an by
the non-Muslims. 21 Chhotu Ram spoke to the Jat Mahasabha at Lyallpur and admitted
that religion provided foundation to organise the communities for the political rights.
He advised that the Jats could join any political organisation in their individual
capacity either to achieve Azad Punjab, united Punjab, Pakistan or united India but
the political ideals of the Jat Mahasabha did not allow its followers to be a part of
such politics. 22 Chhotu Ram’s exhortation to the followers signified the depressing
condition of the Unionist leadership which had not been able to work out a way to get
rid of the rising popularity of the League and the SAD whose ideals had been
embedded in the minds of the masses. His contradiction regarding the Jat Mahasabha
was entirely directionless and lacked a solid solution to the communal problem of the
day.
A scheme by an unknown Sikh to settle the Muslim-Sikh question appeared in
The Eastern Times. Through this scheme, he demanded for 2 Sikh ministers out of 7
in the provincial cabinet and re-election of the ministers, Prime Minister through a
joint voting and fair representation in the services. He further wrote that the League
should accept the separate and independent education board to meet the Sikh
educational needs, separate electorates and proportional representation for the
legislature and recruitment in the supreme judicial courts for them. The pleader was
more concerned with the central districts. 23 The above scheme was not owned and

203
backed by any major party or group of the Sikhs which could influence the political
course of the Punjab situation. A meeting of Amritsar District Kissan Committee was
held on 18-19 September 1945 in which according to Sardar Gehl Singh 3000
Muslims joined in a traditional way. Danyal Latifi, deputy secretary of Punjab
League, conveyed a message of the Muslim-Sikh unity. 24
Muslim League-Akali Understanding
In the political domain, a strange development occurred when the Akali Dal
and the League decided to launch a coalition ministry in the NWFP and Ajit Singh
Sarhadi joined the coalition government as Minister in May 1943. 25 The Akali Dal
accepted it with the condition that nomenclature of the NWFP government would not
be the League coalition ministry and the Pakistan scheme would not be moved and
discussed in the Assembly. 26 It was really a new experience in the political history of
the British India in the area of the Muslim-Sikh relations. This was a goodwill gesture
by both the rival camps which repudiated the myth that the Akalis and Leaguers could
never come to terms. It was really of great importance because it occurred between
the traditional foes (as the Sikhs perceived) in the sensitive period of the 1940s when
communalism had reached its peak. Such a good decision in such stringent
atmosphere should have been welcomed by all the nationalist forces because unity
could pave the way for a settlement in India but the Hindus raised a voice against this
understanding. The Governor of the Punjab wrote to the Viceroy that the Hindu press
did not tolerate the Muslim-Sikh patch-up. It was trying its level best to revive friction
between the two political parties. The Hindus discoloured the League-Akali
understanding in the NWFP Assembly. 27 The Hindu press ridiculed the Akali attempt
to seek a deal with the League. 28 Although, the Haripur clash in January 1944 harmed

204
the Muslim-Sikh relations but the Hindus exploited it to a great extent. According to
the Governor’s report, they in any situation could not see the Sikhs with the League
and any move for appeasement between the two communities could hurricane their
sentiments. The Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu groups considered it a Sikh
betrayal to the Hindus and exhorted them to give up this rapprochement.
Azad Punjab Scheme
The Akalis under the internal and external burden finally concluded that the
re-distribution of the Punjab boundaries envisaged in the Sikh memorandum in the
RTC might be the best solution to the existing deadlock. Master Tara Singh in 1943
presented the Azad Punjab Scheme as a counterpoise to the Pakistan scheme. This
scheme sought the areas up to the river Chenab. Jaspreet Walia opines that Master
Tara Singh did not claim areas next to the Chenab River because the areas beyond this
river had “cultural affinity” to the Frontier. She concludes that Pothohar and Pashtoon
cultures were similar therefore the Muslim majority areas were asked to be merged
into the NWFP. 29 In actual fact, both the areas have entirely different cultures. 30 The
Akali leader suggested an ultimate solution to the ongoing communal problem of the
Punjab in the redistribution of the Punjab boundaries between the mixed population of
the Muslims and Hindus and Sikhs. They had not consulted any other stakeholder
which left little hope for success but the Akalis invested all the energies to popularize
the Azad Punjab scheme. However, a strong opposition emerged against this scheme
within the Sikh community.
Baba Kharak Singh in Roomi, a place in Ludhiana district, addressed an
Akhand Hindustan Conference on 19-20 June 1943 and rejected the vivisectionist
scheme of the Azad Punjab by Master Tara Singh and Jinnah group. 31 In June 1943,

205
addressing the Anti-Pakistan Conference at Lahore, Baba Kharak Singh pledged that
the Sikhs would fight Jinnah and Master Tara if they dared to vivisect India because
Azad Punjab and Pakistan were a synonym to each other. 32
The All-India Shiromani Akal Dal Conference was held at Bhiwanigarh
(Bhowanigarh) in the Patiala State on 14-15 March 1943. Master Tara Singh presided
over the fourth annual session of the conference and the speakers sought enthusiastic
support from the audiences for the Azad Punjab scheme. 33 According to Mitra, Master
Tara Singh briefed about the Azad Punjab and said that this achievement would
enable the Sikhs and Hindus to get rid of the Muslim domination and Pakistan. He
further explained that they would add to 40 per cent (15% Sikhs and 25% Hindus)
without the Hindu Jats and Achhoots (untouchables) who were inclined to the
Muslims for their personal benefits. The Azad Punjab would force the Indian Jats to
change their attitude because they had natural inclination to the non-Muslims. Master
Tara Singh also bragged that this scheme could not be disadvantageous to the
Hindus. 34 His concern was profoundly true because the Azad Punjab scheme had less
benefit for the Sikhs but it could surely benefit the Hindus because it could enable the
Hindus to establish a permanent domination over the Sikhs but they kept on opposing
the very scheme.
A meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal Committee was held at Amritsar on 4-5
June 1943. In his presidential address, Master Tara Singh fixed the boundaries of the
Azad Punjab which included Ambala, Jullundur and Lahore divisions, the Lyallpur
and Montgomery districts, and a portion of Multan. 35 The next day, the Working
Committee issued a statement in which they postponed the boundary issue and
declared that it would be decided later by a free and unbiased commission. Later, they
advocated for the same boundaries which had already been fixed on 4 June. 36 The

206
Akalis remained critical of the Unionist government as usual and asserted that the
coalition ministry could not protect the Sikh rights:
It is true that S. Baldev Singh’s ministership cannot protect us from all the zulum of the
Muslim members, influential persons and officials whose heads have been turned by this
intoxicating powers...I demand Azad Punjab. 37
The Akali Conference was held at Udhowali district Gurdaspur on 18-19 September
1943 in which Jathedar Teja Singh repudiated the Sikh representation in the Punjab
and demanded joint electorates. He also supported the Azad Punjab scheme. In
another Akali conference held at Dhaniwala, district Montgomery, Sardar Sampuran
Singh, MLA, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Giani Sher Singh repeated
the demands for re-demarcation of the Punjab boundaries. The speakers of different
conferences held at Durbar Sahib Kartarpur, Bains Tani (district Hoshiarpur),
Nankana Sahib and Pakpattan condemned the Pakistan idea and demanded the Azad
Punjab. 38
On 23 April 1943 an Akali meeting was held in Amritsar wherein the Sikh
speakers decided to announce a board to investigate and suggest measures relating to
the grievances of the Sikh officials working in the different government departments
including District Boards and Municipalities. The next day, the eligibility for voting
in the Gurdwara elections was unanimously decided which was that a Sikh who did
not drink, smoke and eat Halal meat could cast the vote. The speakers also resolved in
favour of the Azad Punjab scheme. Giani Kartar left for Delhi to negotiate with
Jinnah on the Azad Punjab scheme. 39 The Police report reveals that the Giani could
not get complete willingness from the League leader. 40 The report gives further
information of the meeting that, Giani Kartar was quite optimistic in getting the
approval of the Azad Punjab, as a Hindu group under Seth Jugal Kishore Birla, Raja
Gopalachari and K. M. Munshi had conceded the scheme. He also informed that

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Gandhi showed his willingness to accept the agreement concluded between Shyama
Prasad Mukerji, Master Tara Singh and the League. Giani Kartar was pleased that he
had an opportunity to get approval of the Azad Punjab scheme. 41 He went on to secure
benefits for the Sikhs and held negotiations with Jinnah in Bombay. The Police report
says that Jinnah remarked that the Azad Punjab was acceptable if the Sikhs would
concede Pakistan. Both the schemes could be more fascinating if the exchange of the
populations was pinned with it. Giani Kartar promised Jinnah that he would try to
obtain the support for Pakistan if the League would support the Azad Punjab publicly.
The Giani group continued seeking a way out to secure the Muslim-Sikh harmony but
the anti-Pakistan conferences of the Akalis overbalanced the situation. 42 According to
the Police reports, Giani Kartar also assured Jinnah for the support in the Punjab
Assembly if the League succeeded in forming the ministry in the Punjab. 43 No doubt,
such assurances of the Sikh leaders convinced the League leadership that a Muslim-
Sikh patch-up was not beyond the realms of possibility.
Anti-Azad Punjab Sikhs
According to the resolution passed by the All-India Sikh Youth Conference
held at Lahore on 30-31 January 1943, a referendum of the Punjabis on the Azad
Punjab scheme was suggested. Master Tara Singh presented a solution in the form of
Azad Punjab which only could save the Sikh future as an honourable community in
the Punjab. He also suggested that the Muslim majority districts should be attached to
the NWFP. Baba Kharak Singh in his presidential address to the All-India Akhand
Hindustan Conference at Lahore on 6 June 1943 condemned the League and Akali
Sikhs who had joined hands in the NWFP government. He also pointed out that the
demand for Azad Punjab had justified the Pakistan scheme. The Sikhs, he asserted,

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would block the anti-nationalist activities of Jinnah and Master Tara Singh with
tremendous power. 44 It was the Sikh community who had opened fire from every
corner on the Muslims while the League leadership was expecting a policy based on
an open mindedness from the Sikhs as Professor Hassan Suhrawardy wrote in 1943
that “they will show the characteristic clear thinking and broad-mindedness of brave
people.” 45 But the Sikhs did not demonstrate geniality towards the Muslims. On the
other hand, the Akalis went on raising demands in favour of the Azad Punjab scheme
although there was a little hope of the Hindu support. The Azad Punjab Conference
was held at Amritsar on 28 February 1943 which consoled the Sikhs, as eight
thousand persons from the Central Punjab attended this pro-Azad Punjab gathering. 46
This convinced the Akalis to continue the efforts to popularise the scheme. The
Partap, however, wrote that the Azad Punjab scheme should be shelved because both
Hindus and Sikhs had rejected it. 47
Very furious opposition came from the Sikhs of the northern Punjab districts
which were not declared as a part of the proposed Sikh province. Nevertheless, in
April 1943, Master Tara Singh showed willingness to include the districts of
Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock which placated the Sikhs of the region. 48 Practically
the Akali leadership took no solid step in this regard and the Sikhs of these areas kept
on crying against the Akalis. The assurance to include Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi
was not feasible and there was no possibility of the Muslim acceptance to surrender
these areas. Tara’s promise seems to be a political gimmick to get rid of the severe
opposition from his followers. In the Punjab Provincial Hindu Conference held at
Lyallpur on 30 April 1943, Dr. Mukherji advised the Hindus and Sikhs to be united
against the common foe, the claimants of Pakistan which would be detrimental

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economically and politically for the solidarity of India. Through a resolution, the
Azad Punjab scheme by Sikhs was disapproved. 49
The leadership crisis in the Sikhs continued from bottom to top level during
these years and the regional leadership proved no different from the provincial one.
For example, all the seven Sikh members of the Rawalpindi district were expelled
from the Akali Dal due to their opposition to the Azad Punjab scheme. The Lyallpur
Akali Dal branch was also suspended on the charge of working against the parent
party. 50 Master Tara Singh in his book refers to this reality and writes that the Sikh
leaders of Rawalpindi who had opposed the Azad Punjab had been his supporters but
they launched a campaign against the scheme. When they were deprived of the
Presidentship of the Gurdwara Panja Sahib, they tried to contact him through Giani
Kartar and offered that they would work for the Azad Punjab scheme if this
Presidentship was restored. 51
In the Shiromani Akali Dal Conference at Nankana in November 1943,
Harcharn Singh Bajwa condemned the Azad Punjab scheme. In the same conference,
Master Tara Singh evaluated the Azad Punjab scheme and fully supported the drive
for the Sikh rights. 52 Baba Kharak Singh organised the anti-Azad Punjab conferences
and awakened the Sikhs against the Akali politics. During the Akhand Hindustan
conference held at Rawalpindi on 4-5 December, the speakers snubbed the Akali role
in advancing the League agenda of Pakistan. The NWFP Congress leaders delivered
objectionable speeches and many speakers accused the Akali leadership of furthering
the British policy of divide and rule. 53
Harbans Singh Sestani and Amar Singh, editor of Sher-i-Punjab, in the
Akhand Hindustan Conference held at Chakwal (district Jhelum) 54 on 14-15
September 1943 rejected the Azad Punjab scheme. 55 The Sikhs from Rawalpindi

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continued opposition to the Azad Punjab scheme and opened a branch of the Central
Sikh League. In reaction to this, the Akalis decided to hold a conference in Panja
Sahib, district Attock on 14 August 1943. The Akali leadership ordered the armed
Akalis to be active during this conference to maintain order. 56 On 16 August 1943, the
Anti-Azad Punjab Conference was also held at Punja Sahib which Baba Kharak Singh
presided over. 57 He expressed his anger over the Azad Punjab and Pakistan schemes
and declared Master Tara Singh and Jinnah as the agents of the British government.
He repeated the unequivocal faith of the Sikhs in a united India and said that the Azad
Punjab scheme was launched to weaken the central government of India. 58 While, a
pro-Azad Punjab conference, the Attock Akali Conference was concluded the same
day (16 August) at the Bardari Gurdwara; Sardar Haram Singh, Advocate from
Lahore chaired. Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar MLA, Giani Sher Singh and
Principal Ganga Singh reiterated their full support in favour of the Azad Punjab.
Ganga Singh made a tirade against the Hindus particularly the Arya Samajists and the
Hindu press. The resolution also expressed deep concern over the food situation in the
country and demanded formation of a national government. 59 According to the
Intelligence reports, in the Azad Punjab Conference on 14-15 August, Master Tara
Singh and Giani Sher Singh spoke for the establishment of a Sikh province, whereas
the same day, at the same place Baba Kharak Singh arranged an Anti-Azad Punjab
Conference which threatened the peace as many Sikhs came with axes but the
proceedings concluded peacefully. 60
The commitment with the Azad Punjab scheme was resented by the Jullundur
chapter of the SAD. Under Babu Labh Singh’s leadership, it challenged Master Tara
Singh and threatened that, many Sikh leaders from Amritsar, Lahore, Sheikhupura,
Ferozepore and Ambala would resign from the party if the Akalis tried to abandon

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their nationalistic character. Master Tara Singh was quite perturbed by this incident. 61
In an Akali meeting on 27 August 1943, Babu Labh Singh had a clash with Giani
Kartar but he himself had to walk out when the Giani reiterated that they would do
anything to conclude an agreement with the British, the Congress or even the League
to achieve the Azad Punjab. On 5-6 September 1943, Master Tara Singh, in the Akali
Conference at Thatian Mahatan (Amritsar district) expressed the importance of Azad
Punjab and condemned the Pakistan scheme. He also evaluated that the Hindus had
achieved much benefit because of the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact. 62 The leaders
intended to convey that their politics would protect the Sikh rights.
The Akhand Hindustan Conference rejected the Azad Punjab and Pakistan
scheme. The same day, in the latter conference, the Sikhs demanded resignation from
Sardar Baldev Singh and expressed dissatisfaction over the Unionist-Akali pact. The
Akali Conference at Lahore (Minto Park) passed a resolution in favour of the Azad
Punjab on 7 July 1943 (Jor Mela, the day of assassination of Guru Arjun Dev). It was
presided over by Giani Sher Singh who supported the Azad Punjab. The Akalis
passed three resolutions within three minutes but no speech was made to explain and
second the spirit and background of the resolutions. Master Tara Singh maintained
that the Sikhs had only a minor difference with Hindus whereas a vast political gulf
existed between them and Muslims who desired a permanent rule over the Sikhs. He
further said that the only solution to the political deadlock was the establishment of
the Khalsa Raj. 63 Actually, the Sikh leader meant by the term ‘Khalsa Raj’ a
sovereign Sikh state which was against the spirit of the Azad Punjab scheme. In fact,
the Akali leadership had no firm and clear vision of the demand for the Azad Punjab.
This is evident from the fact that in the Chauthi Sarb Hind Akali Conference in

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October 1944, Master Tara Singh consented to abandon his Azad Punjab drive if the
Sikhs demanded a Sikh state instead of his own scheme. 64
Muslim Reaction to the Azad Punjab Scheme
The Azad Punjab scheme attracted the attention of the Muslim circles but as a
matter of fact, the Sikh claim had numerous drawbacks. They were claiming the areas
overwhelmingly populated by the Hindus and the Muslims while the Sikhs possessed
very meagre percentage in all the districts of Ambala and Jullundur divisions:
City Hindus Muslims Sikhs
Hissar 64.8 28.33 6
Rohtak 81.6 17.22 0.15
Gurgaon 76.42 23.40 0.7
Karnal 66.93 30.58 2
Simla 76.38 18.20 2.67
Ambala 48.41 31.64 18.44
Kharar Tehsil 36.9 22 39
Ropar Tehsil 23.3 37.7 41.1
Source: “Akalis’ Azad Punjab Scheme,” Editorial, The Eastern Time, 27 October 1944.
The central districts had a better proportion of the Sikh percentage but mostly the
Muslims were more in number than the Sikhs:
City Hindus Muslims Sikhs
Amritsar 15.35 46.5 36.14
Ferozepore 19.6 45.08 33.68
Moga Tehsil 11 24 65
Ludhiana 20.36 36.92 41.69
Ludhiana Tehsil 21.8 39.3 38.3
Jullundur 17.6 45.17 26.4
Hoshiarpur 40.0 36.6 16.9
Kangra 94.1 5.09 .5
Source: “Akalis’ Azad Punjab Scheme,” Editorial, The Eastern Time, 27 October 1944.
The government of a minority over the majority communities was impossible
therefore the Azad Punjab scheme could not expect Muslim sympathy. The pro-

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League paper, The Eastern Times, pointed out that because of the existing proportion
of the population, even if the Azad Punjab came into being the Sikhs would have to
depend on the Hindus. Though the Sikhs were culturally closer to the Hindus yet they
should not forget Guru Nanak Dev’s teachings. 65 This reminder reveals that the
Muslim opinion looked for a basis for the Sikh rapprochement based on the message
of love and fraternity propounded by the founder of the Sikh religion.
Anti-Tara Singh Campaign
The Sikh opposition to the Azad Punjab idea gained strength to such an extent
that forty eminent local Akalis in Amritsar held a meeting in which a series of
resolutions were passed criticising Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar and Giani Sher
Singh. They opposed the Sikander-Baldev pact and demanded that Tara Singh be
replaced as the Akali leader. Baba Kharak Singh in an Akhand Hindustan conference
arranged at Lahore also condemned the Azad Punjab scheme. The Governor’s report
analysed that while there was a meagre opposition against Master Tara Singh in the
Akali Dal, he was sufficiently perturbed to start pressing the government to
implement the Unionist-Akali agreement particularly with reference to the use of
jhatka meat in the government institutions. He hoped that such a measure would
deflect criticism from his leadership. 66
The Sikh-Hindu relations experienced a number of ups and downs not just
because of the political issues surrounding the Azad Punjab scheme, but also because
of the long held view of the Hindu communal organisations that Sikhism was not a
separate faith, but was a part of Hinduism. The Executive Committee of the SGPC in
May 1943 passed a resolution that the Sikhs were not Hindus and the defiant Sikhs
who followed the Hindu slogan could not be the true Sikh representatives. It also

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condemned the Sikhs who had participated in the Punjab Hindu Conference of
Lyallpur. Responding to this, Sardar Sant Singh argued that Master Tara Singh
himself had participated in many Hindu Mahasabha conferences and invited the
Hindu leaders to the Akali conferences. Therefore, he had no reason to question his
participation in the Hindu Sabha Conference. 67 Sardar Sant Singh accused that the
Azad Punjab scheme was in fact initiated by Mr. Amery. Tara Singh responded that
this scheme was first introduced at the Delhi residence of Sardar Sant Singh in 1931
when the Sikhs from all schools of thought gathered to formulate demands ‘to be
presented to Gandhi on the occasion of Gandhi-Irwin Pact.’ 68 In an editorial of the
Eastern Times, this was admitted that the Sikhs had developed separate identity
during the last few decades therefore they were a separate community from the
Hindus but the Hindus still considered them as the co-religionists. This situation
emerged due to the unquestioned allegiance of the Sikhs to the Hindu leaders. The
paper wrote that some Sikhs actually had been victim of the Indian nationalism as
some Muslims also claimed to be the nationalists:
...the Sikhs have usually played the second fiddle in the Hindu orchestra become easy
victims of Hindu exploitation and let themselves be made tools of Hindu Communal
politics, the same as the aforesaid Muslims let themselves be exploited by the Hindus.
This exploitation of the Sikhs by the Hindus is likely to continue until the Sikhs do
develop a strong Sikh consciousness. 69
The paper had already commented that the Hindus were using the Sikhs in the Punjab
for their own political interests. The Sikhs could only resist this by asserting a
separate communal identity. 70 The Hindu Mahasabha had launched a strong campaign
against the prospect of Akalis’ cooperation with the League by maintaining its
traditional stance that the Sikhs were Hindus. This propaganda was abandoned and
neutrality was ensured towards the Azad Punjab in return for withdrawal of the Akali
Ministers from the Punjab and NWFP provincial governments. In return, Master Tara

Singh consented to resist any possibility of formation of a League Ministry in the
Punjab and progress of the Pakistan movement on the Assembly floor in the NWFP.
Both issued a press statement in which the Sikhs were advised to strengthen the Sikh-
Hindu unity to plan better against the Pakistan scheme. Master Tara Singh was of the
opinion that the Azad Punjab presented the best solution to the current communal
deadlock. 71
215
The Akali leadership as a result of this agreement got relief from the Hindu
propaganda. Now they could focus on the important issues pertaining to the Sikh-
Muslim question. Nevertheless, the Azad Punjab scheme and handling of the political
affairs by the Akali leadership continued to cause dissension within the Sikh circles.
Though the supremacy of Master Tara Singh was not challenged but the cooperation
with the Muslims and particularly the League created doubts in the Sikh minds. His
Azad Punjab scheme was the main issue between the Jats and non-Jats. Both the rival
groups held conferences in the Campbellpur district (August 1943) which were likely
to lead to a clash. The Sikhs living in the Muslim majority areas seemed averse to the
Azad Punjab idea. According to them, they were being pushed permanently under the
Muslim domination at the cost of the advantages of the Sikhs of the Central and
Eastern Punjab. Master Tara Singh in the personal meetings tried to convince them
that the Azad Punjab was not an ‘anti-national’ idea. It resembled the case of NWFP,
Sindh, Delhi and Orissa and it would safeguard the Sikh interests against Pakistan.
But these arguments proved futile and convinced the Akali leadership not to pin their
hopes in only the Azad Punjab scheme. The Akali leaders despite the dissensions
remained dominant within the community politics because of their control of the
management and hence funding of the Sikh Gurdwaras. 72

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The Sikh community remained highly factionalised. Giani Kartar was opposed
by the pro-Congress Nagoke group within the Akali Dal. Nevertheless, an agreement
between the Nagoke and Giani groups regarding nomination of the candidates for the
Punjab Assembly took place. It was a good step to end rivalry but, the Punjab
Governor reported, the agreement was ineffective as both the groups intended to
support their own candidates secretly. The Akali Sikhs showed no enthusiasm in the
celebrations of the Indian National Army officers’ release which was another erratic
trend of the Akali politics. 73 The Akalis were facing internal and external threats
during this period. The Hindu press was claiming and presenting the Sikhs as Hindus
openly while they were victims of disunity within and outside the party. The Akali
leadership had a biased attitude towards some specific groups in the party which was
diverting their attention from the real political issues.
According to the report of August 1943 by F. C. Bourne, Chief Secretary,
Punjab, Master Tara Singh instead of adopting neutrality in the tussle between the two
Akali groups continued supporting one group secretly against the other. 74 The internal
and external stresses along with his personal desire encouraged Master Tara Singh to
co-operate with the Congress. Talking to the Hindu-Sikh Unity Conference at
Muktsar district Ferozepore on 29 September 1943, he said that only the joint effort of
the Sikhs and Hindus could block the Pakistan scheme. 75 This was a withdrawal from
his earlier stance in response to the criticism of his attempts to come closer to the
League. 76 According to the Police reports, he was dejected by the Akalis of Jullundur
and Amritsar who were angry about the pro-Muslim and anti-Congress politics and on
the defeat of the Akali candidate against the Congress in the NWFP. 77 All the
opposition narrowed to the leadership of Master Tara Singh. In February 1944, the
Governor reported that the opportunist policies of the communal Akalis and the

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unpopular ‘Azad Punjab scheme’ caused rupture in the Akali fold and Master Tara
Singh and Giani Kartar lost the trust of a reasonable number of their followers. 78
On 4 March 1944, Master Tara Singh decided to resign from the Presidentship
of the SGPC and SAD. He declared his isolation ‘permanently’ from the politics and
announced that he would continue working ‘as a religious preacher’ and anti-
Communist leader. According to the Governor, such a withdrawal of the politicians
was pervasive in India. They did this to get a relief from the pressure of their
opponents. He further reported that Master Tara Singh had been a dictator of the
eminent political faction of the Sikhs. He had followers without discipline and control.
The reasons behind this surprising turn were presented as his ill-health and defiant
attitude of the Akalis towards his policy. But his resignation showed his helplessness
against the exploitation and political position of Giani Kartar. Many newspapers
described his resignation as a “political stunt.” 79 Despite his resignation, he kept on
guiding the two organisations. 80 The Police report considered his resignation “an easy
way out of an awkward position.” 81 The report further revealed that Giani Kartar
opposed him to be the president of the forthcoming Akali Conference in April
therefore to avoid this insult he chose to step away from the Akali Dal and SGPC.
Nevertheless all the Akalis still believed that Master Tara Singh would continue
guiding the party like Gandhi. The report maintained that the Akali defeat in the
NWFP bye-election against the Congress pushed him to resign from the office. 82
Whatever the reason might be, the resignation of Master Tara Singh was inappropriate.
If he resigned due to the defeat in NWFP, it was an act of cowardice but if he did so
to avoid the possibility of his insult in the Akali conference, it was entirely on the
personal basis. Giani Kartar or the other group might not need him but the Sikh
community was generally looking towards him in this critical hour. Nevertheless, his

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constant contact and guidance to the Akalis maintained the spirit of the party and his
followers. It could have been very dangerous if he had entirely abandoned politics
because of his important position in the Sikh circles.
Achari Formula 83 (1944)
Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (a Congress leader) presented his formula in
which he suggested that by conceding Pakistan, the Congress could secure the
League’s cooperation in the freedom struggle against the British but the League
rejected this offer on 30 July 1944. According to this offer, the League leadership was
informed that after gaining independence, a commission would be established to re-
distribute the boundaries of the contiguous districts of the Muslim majority and
plebiscite would be held to obtain the consent of the people concerned, whether they
wished a total separation or to federate with India. The Congress’ offer gave
additional credence to the Pakistan demand. Nevertheless Tai Yong is of the view that
the formula was a ‘shrewd’ move to turn the spotlight on the minority issue in the
Punjab and other weak aspects of the Pakistan scheme. 84 As a matter of fact, it was a
shrewd proposal which was a segment of the Congress’ secret strategy throughout the
years so that the League could be induced to abandon the Pakistan plan until the
British departure. It could have played havoc for the League if the leadership had
accepted such an offer. Behind this move, the Congress desired to obtain
independence first and then deal with the Pakistan scheme. By doing so, the League
could be forced to be dependent on the Hindu majority in the Central Assembly after
the British departure. But this tactic was countered by the sagacity of Jinnah who
openly demanded the British to divide India first and then quit.

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People who were following a policy of not rendering any importance to the
League were now anxious to seek the support of its leadership. Nevertheless, it once
again displeased the Hindus and Sikhs. Both the communities opposed Gandhi
strongly for his approval of the demand of Pakistan. The All Parties Sikh Conference
at Lahore was held in which the Sikhs condemned the Achari formula and rejected
Jinnah’s goodwill gesture towards them. According to Master Tara Singh,
Rajgopalachari opined that the Punjab and Bengal should not block the independence
of the other Indian provinces. 85 He called a Sikh gathering at Amritsar on 20 August
so that an agitation could be arranged against this formula. It was also decided that the
Sikhs would chalk out a future plan regarding Pakistan, Azad Punjab, and other
options. The Governor reported that the Akalis were ready to join hands with Baba
Kharak Singh if he would not stress the anti-British and anti-Azad Punjab demands. 86
All Parties Sikh Conference at Amritsar on 1-2 August 1944 was another show of the
Akalis which addressed numerous issues including Achari formula, 87 Sikh State and
Muslim domination including appeal to Master Tara Singh to rejoin the politics. Giani
Kartar interrupted a speaker, S. Kapoor Singh, and said that others desired division of
India to destroy the Sikh community while the Sikhs demanded this in the favour of
the Sikh panth. He further said that he never objected to approach Gandhi but the
beggars enjoyed no right to choose. The Sikhs had been reduced to the present state of
helplessness because they always went with ‘folded hands to Gandhi.’ Gandhi always
preferred to please Jinnah instead of the Sikhs. Sardar Mangal Singh reminded the
audience that protection of the Hindus was their responsibility. The Muslims, he said,
were planning to capture the boundaries from Constantinople to Delhi while Gandhi
was struggling to convince Jinnah to come to terms. The conference repudiated the
Achari formula and the Pakistan scheme and supported an independent Sikh State

220
while Master Tara Singh exhorted only for the Sikh-Hindu unity against the Achari
formula 88 and said nothing pertinent to the Azad Punjab scheme.
On the other hand, the Communist Sikhs like Amar Singh Jhabal, Sarmukh
Singh Jhabal, Baba Wsakha Singh and Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna appreciated the
services of Gandhi and advised the Sikhs to trust the Mahatma. Sardar Amar Singh
Jhabal castigated the Sikhs who feared to be divided in case of the partition and said
that a Sikh could protect himself even if a lone Sikh remained in Pakistan. The
conference also favoured the Achari formula. 89 This was a confused situation where
some of the Akalis castigated Gandhi while others favoured him; most of them were
the Congress supporters. Neither anti-Gandhi nor pro-Gandhi Akalis could sever their
relations with the Congress. On the other hand, Gandhi continued his own policy
similar to the Sikh leadership’s when he replied to Sardar Durlab Singh, General
Secretary of the Central Sikh Youth League, that he was not authorised to speak as the
Congress leader but he assured that the interests of the nationalist Sikhs would be safe
in the Congress’ hands. He also assured that in case of Jinnah’s acceptance of the
formula, he would approach the Sikhs to secure their support. 90 Sangat Singh writes
that Gandhi pleaded his disassociation with the Congress as a political gimmick
otherwise his role might be perceived as “a dictator” in the political affairs of the
Congress. 91
The Achhoot Hindus also opposed the Achari formula and said that they would
never concede any settlement between Gandhi and Jinnah unless it was acceptable to
their representatives. They were of the view that by partitioning India, the depressed
classes would be divided and enslaved by the major communities, therefore they
would never tolerate the partition and they would sacrifice everything if needed. 92 In
the Akali Silver Jubilee Conference at Jandiala (Jullundur) on 25-27 November 1944

221
Ishar Singh Majhail said that Akalis had always remained with the Congress in their
political beliefs and actions. 93 This conference provided the Akalis an opportunity of
countering the anti-Akali propaganda by the Communists at Jandiala in September.
Various speakers addressed the well attended sessions of the conference and declared
the Communists as opportunist, atheists, Soviet agents and paid workers of the British
government. They accused that the Communists supported Pakistan which meant to
put the Sikhs under the Muslim subservience. 94 This indicates that the Communists
were a tangible stress to the Akalis which was distracting them from the important
political issues. Master Tara Singh declared Sikhs as a nation in 1944 and demanded
political rights as a leader of a separate nation. Amazingly he did what Lord Auckland
had done a century ago and Maharaja Dalip Singh just 58 years ago. 95
Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944)
Jinnah disapproved the Achari formula but consented to talk to Gandhi to
resolve the political deadlock. 96 On the basis of the Lahore Resolution and Achari
formula, the Gandhi-Jinnah talks took place in September 1944 which ultimately
came to naught on the refusal of Gandhi to negotiate with Jinnah on the basis of the
two nation theory 97 as Jinnah stood for the distinctive and separate outlook and
philosophy of life. He urged that the Muslim status as a ‘nation’ could be tested by all
the existing international definitions of a nation. 98 The Communists supported the
Gandhi-Jinnah agreement which could affect the Sikh position 99 that is why Master
Tara Singh stated that any understanding between Jinnah and Gandhi would force the
Sikhs to leave the Congress. 100 Mangal Singh alleged that Gandhi had restored
Jinnah’s image by agreeing to talk to him. In the All India Akali Conference at Lahore
on 14-15 October 1944, Giani Kartar said that the foolish Sikhs would rely on the

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British, Gandhi and Jinnah. Master Tara Singh through a resolution accused that
Gandhi was always out to please the Muslims and ignore the Sikhs. He opposed any
plebiscite in the Punjab because every Muslim would vote for Pakistan. He justified
his demand for a separate Sikh state through an example of Ireland which had less
population than the Sikhs in the Punjab. He and Mangal Singh also demanded
resignation of Gandhi from the Congress. 101 The Sikhs demonstrated very strong
opposition to the Achari formula in the all-parties Sikh conference held at Amritsar on
20 August 1944. They pledged to resist it by all means. The conference proved more
representative of the Sikh opinion than other conferences held for several years in past.
It made possible to persuade Master Tara Singh to end the self-imposed aloofness
from the politics (although he had never been aloof from). Before the conference, he
appealed to Gandhi that the Achari formula would result in the division of the Sikhs
into two parts which might force them to serve the two big majorities i.e., Hindus and
Muslims. He also talked of a Sikh-Muslim agreement before the Hindu-Muslim
settlement. 102 According to the Governor’s report, the political obscurity convinced
Master Tara Singh to reappear on the political scene. The main purpose of this
reappearance was to balance Giani Kartar and Nagoke groups and to influence the
Sikh policies. 103
The Muslim-Sikh settlement was a good line taken by Master Tara Singh to
achieve confidence of the Muslims which could be advantageous for the future
planning but the process for such an agreement could not be initiated because they
were already at the point of no-return. Nonetheless, such an agreement could play a
better role in bargaining with the Congress. The Congress could not tolerate coercion
from the Sikhs because it could make the Hindu leadership subservient to the Sikhs
which was impossible in the presence of democratic norms and assertive leadership.

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The Sikhs should have understood that the Hindus had been ignoring the biggest
minority (Muslims) for decades then how could they accept the veto role of the Sikhs.
By observing this situation, Master Tara Singh should have adopted alternate lines to
deal with the issues.
Against Gandhi’s overtures to Jinnah, Master Tara Singh ramified that Gandhi
wanted Pakistan in the Punjab therefore the Sikh speakers in a conference cleared that
the vague assurances could not impress upon them. He fixed 3 September 1944, the
day of protest against the Achari formula. He demanded that the establishment of a
Sikh state be preceded if the Congress leadership desired to reach some understanding
with the League. He further said that the Sikhs must join the army in more and more
numbers because their political importance mainly “depended on their military
power.” 104 It was not a democratic claim of the Sikhs to have Khalistan or even to
press for their demands on the basis of the military services and taxes they were
paying. But Master Tara Singh continued his traditional style without finding a new
avenue to solve the problem. The Hindu and Sikh newspapers projected the All
Parties Hindu Conference and the All Parties Sikh Conference fully favouring the
views of the leaders against the Achari formula and Gandhi. On the other hand, the
Muslim press ‘reminded the Sikhs that their economic interests were spread all over
the Punjab.’ The press tried to convince them to support Pakistan if they sought their
unity. It also warned them that their antagonism to the Pakistan scheme cleared that
“they were becoming willing tools in the hands of the Hindu Mahasabha." 105
Nevertheless, the breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks upset the Nationalist Sikhs,
while it relieved the other Sikhs who criticised Gandhi’s politics. 106

Sapru Committee
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In November 1944, non-partisan people tried to break the constitutional
deadlock. The main issues addressed were the Pakistan scheme, territorial division as
alternative and communal rights. 107 The conciliation committee known as the Sapru
Committee tried to settle the communal question. The Sikh leaders from all the groups
met in Amritsar on 28 December 1944 to finalise the demands which Master Tara
Singh would place before the Conciliation Committee. 108 Sardar Harnam Singh wrote
a booklet, Punjab: The Homeland of the Sikhs, in which he argued that the Punjab
belonged to the Sikhs only but the committee addressed the Sikh question as a
regional issue which was not acceptable to them. 109 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru visited
Lahore. The League and Ahrars boycotted the Committee but the nationalist Muslims
and Allama Mashriqi discussed the political situation. Master Tara Singh placed the
Sikh demands like adequate increase in the Sikh representation in the Executive and
Legislature. He also presented the base of his claim that the Muslim majority in the
1941 census had been registered with exaggerated numbers therefore the Sikhs should
be given proper importance on the economic, military and historical basis. The Sikhs
did not concede the vivisection of India but if the Pakistan scheme was conceded,
they had the right to demand a Sikh state. 110
In March 1945, Baldev Singh wrote foreword of the Sikh memorandum and
observed that the second part consisted of the Sikh claims presented to the Sapru
Conciliation Committee. The memorandum was signed by the Sikhs from all strata of
political, public, social and religious life including 18 members of the provincial
legislature, SGPC, SAD, CSL and Chief Khalsa Diwan. The Sikh homeland was
demanded on the importance of the community who were determined that they would
never consent to accept a theocratic Muslim state, Pakistan. They favoured a united

225
India with their rights and privileges. 111 According to the Sikh memorandum, Dr.
Shaukat Ullah Ansari analysed that without the central areas of the Punjab where the
Sikhs were concentrated, the Pakistani Punjab would comprise barren and desert areas.
After secession of the central Punjab districts to the Azad Punjab or Sikh state,
Pakistan would be deprived of the Muslim intelligentsia and the best soil of the Indus
region while the remaining areas would be the sandy tracts of Bahawalpur and
Khairpur States, rocky Rawalpindi Division, the sandy stretch of the Multan Division
and Sindh. The mountainous and un-agricultural areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan
could not serve the newly established state properly. 112 Therefore, the Pakistan
scheme was nothing without the central areas of the Punjab which the Akali Dal had
claimed. Such a conflicting stand by the Akalis and the Leaguers could aggravate the
situation regarding the communal relationship in the region.
Jinnah-Tiwana Tussle
Khizr Tiwana according to the Jinnah-Sikandar understanding was a League
member. The old Leaguers had never been satisfied with the performance and
intention of the Unionists and criticised their ill-working for the League. Gradually,
Jinnah decided to take action to bring discipline in the League ranks. The test case
was the nomenclature of the coalition government of the Punjab. Tiwana had declared
in the Punjab Assembly that he would try to strengthen the League in the province.
Malik Barkat Ali welcomed it but when Sardar Santokh Singh stated that the League
had laid a trap for the Premier, the former clarified that the League desired to do the
same which the Sikhs had already done in the Assembly under Baldev Singh. If the
Sikhs could be united within the Assembly, why should the Muslims be resisted to do
so? 113

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In April 1944, the Communist paper, People’s War threw light on Jinnah’s
advance in the Punjab and commented that he had successfully brought the Muslims
under the League’s discipline by negating the politics of personal interests. 114
Actually, by December 1942, the Unionist Party had lost its three strong pillars i.e.,
Sir Sikandar, Sundar Singh Majithia and Ahmad Yar Daultana. The League was ready
to open decisive front against the rebel Unionist Muslims. He during his Punjab tour
and stay with Iftekhar Mamdot presented 3 points to Tiwana:
a) Allegiance of all the Unionist Muslim Assembly members to the League only,
b) Change the nomenclature of the Unionist coalition government,
c) The new name would be the League Coalition Party. 115
Tiwana not only refused to come to terms but also annoyed Jinnah by not replying to
his letters. Jinnah-Sikandar Pact which was aimed to keep the Muslims united now
emerged as a source of conflict between the League and the Unionist party. Jinnah
deeply understood the Punjab politics as his weaker position did not disturb the
Unionist-League members. In the beginning, he gave more importance to the opinion
of the Unionists ignoring the protest of the old Leaguers because he waited for a right
time to strike. Now he considered this to be the best time to assert the party discipline
in the Punjab. He asked Tiwana to change the coalition party name from the Unionist
to the League coalition party which the Premier refused to do. Tiwana took the
traditional line that the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact envisaged to retain the Unionist label in
the Assembly while out of it all the Unionist Muslims would back the League.
Whereas Jinnah adopted the line that the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact existed nowhere in
black and white and being member of the League, the Punjab Premier was bound to
obey the central command. The Governor was behind the Premier and ultimately this
conflict ended in chaotic results as far as the Unionist Party was concerned. The

227
Punjab League had been arranging meetings and conferences in different cities and
passing resolutions in which they complied with the League standpoint in all the
affairs. The Punjab Muslim League Conference at Sialkot reiterated support to the
League and demanded the Unionists to change the coalition name. It also tried to
impress upon the Muslim Unionists to join hands with the League. 116 The support to
the viewpoint of the League leader shows that the majority of the Muslim community
was backing him in the struggle to achieve Pakistan.
To Ikram Ali Malik, the Punjab was very important to win the goal of
Pakistan therefore Jinnah asked his workers to convey the League message to the
Muslim masses in every corner of the Punjab especially the villages and establish the
League’s branches. He assured that their practicality would result in the establishment
of Pakistan. 117 Some writers are of the opinion perhaps on the basis of the Governor’s
report of March 1944 that the “Muslim League leaders in the Punjab had misled him
[Jinnah] by greatly exaggerating the strength of the League in the Province” 118 and
issued the verdict that Jinnah did not know much about the Punjab politics as Imran
Ali observes 119 but as a matter of fact, Jinnah knew every detail of the Punjab politics
because he prevailed over the Punjab politics within a few years. His wisdom and
political insight convinced him to wait for an appropriate time to take action. Before
this, he endeavoured to keep the Punjabi Muslims united inside and outside the
provincial Assembly. By the time, they would be sure about the League mission for
the Indian Muslims and integrity and commitment of the League leadership. The elite
styled politics of the Punjab needed big personalities to have impressive voice which
Jinnah secured within a short span of time. Bertrand Glancy indicated to this strategy
and wrote to the Viceroy that Jinnah intended to enter the Punjab political set up soon
but the exact moment was still beyond speculation. 120 To Ian Talbot, Jinnah was fully

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in picture as to how the Punjab situation was to be dealt. He was aware that the
League should not assert its full authority in the Assembly because any stern action at
this stage would result in an open fight between League and the Hindus and Sikhs
which might lead to the Governor’s rule. Therefore, he seemed keener to popularise
the League and its programme as “his sights were set on a far higher goal than merely
running an effective administration in the Punjab.” 121 Responding to a letter, Jinnah
himself clarified in June 1944 about his strategy while dealing with the regional
matters. He wrote,
I am not influenced by any person or persons, nor am I actuated by any feeling of ill-will
against anybody....I am only concerned with maintaining the prestige and the reputation
of the All-India Muslim League and upholding its creed, policy, and programme. 122
In March 1944, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Parliamentary Secretary, invited Jinnah
to a tea party in which 65 Muslim MLAs including the Premier and the Ministers
participated. The discussion was not to be disclosed but it was supposed that Jinnah
had clarified that the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact was a misnomer and far away from reality.
The League was not a party to any agreement. He further explained that Sir Sikandar
himself prepared the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact and projected it as suited to him. He
intended to show the world that the League enjoyed the full support of the Punjab.
Jinnah cleared that he could not object and oppose such a propaganda therefore he let
it go on. He also clarified that the Unionist members were the Leaguers from the day
they had signed the League membership forms. They were no more members of the
Unionist party but of League and in this capacity, they were independent to make
coalition with Chhotu Ram, Manohar Lal and Baldev Singh. 123 Tiwana claimed that
he had no objection in changing the name of the coalition but he had to keep his word
with the non-Muslim members. He further wrote that he appealed personally to Jinnah
that they could chalk another name except ‘Unionist’ or ‘League.’ Jinnah rejected his

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proposal while the Premier was morally bound to his commitment to the minorities.
Jinnah desired to talk to the Hindu and Sikh leaders but the main hurdle between them
was the Pakistan demand 124 while Jinnah tried to convince that by the compromise,
the Muslim Ministers would support the Pakistan demand and the non-Muslim
Ministers would “not oppose Pakistan publicly in their official capacity.” 125
Baldev Singh expressed his concern over the situation and said that he was not
a Unionist but would oppose Jinnah’s move against this coalition. Though Jinnah
showed his willingness to allay the fears and work with the Sikhs and Hindus in the
coming government but the Sikhs had no soft corner for the League. Baldev Singh
said that victory of Jinnah over the Unionist Party would mean to commit ‘to a vague
Pakistan scheme.’ 126 He further said that the aggressive communalism would be
detrimental to the war effort. Although Major Short, a Sikh specialist, brought the
Akalis and Unionists together to better serve the war needs but Baldev Singh stated
that he had joined Sir Sikandar in 1942 only to eliminate communal bitterness. Jinnah
retaliated that Baldev Singh did not represent the Sikh community as he owed support
of only 10 Akalis out of 28 Sikh members. He also repudiated Baldev’s stand that
coalition with the League would mean to accept Pakistan and requested them to
formulate demands and conditions they desired; they would find the League
sympathetic to them. 127
Jinnah met Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh on 29-30 March 1944 for a patch-
up. 128 Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana as Chairman, Reception Committee drew the
Sikh attention towards the flattery of the Hindus and tried to convince them that their
position in Pakistan would be very important. He also expressed the willingness to
have a settlement with the Sikh friends 129 but the anti-League impression could not be
evaded. As usual, the Sikhs remained victim of the habitual vacillation in wooing the

230
League. In Amritsar on 13-14 May 1944, the Akali Conference was held while Giani
Kartar presided. Through speeches and resolutions, the Azad Punjab was supported
while the Pakistan scheme was rejected. The interference of Jinnah in the Punjab
politics was highly criticised and Baldev Singh’s refusal to cooperate with Jinnah was
admired by the conference. 130 The Unionists were still doing the outdated politics far
away from the masses and the national politics.
The stand taken by Tiwana in 1944 indicates the selfishness of the Muslim
Unionists in the provincial politics. The main argument was that the Punjabi Muslims
were 57 per cent of the population but the representation in the provincial Legislative
Assembly had squeezed them to the lesser percentage. In such a situation, the
Muslims alone could not be able to form ministry, no matter the Punjab remained
with Hindustan or Pakistan. It was the Muslims who suffered more than other
communities. 131 The standpoint of Tiwana was a traditional argument which Fazl-i-
Husain had placed before Jinnah in 1936. This argument revolved around the creed
that the Unionist Muslims had been posing themselves cross-communal just to occupy
the Premier’s office. They never argued that being above the religious affiliation the
Sikhs and Hindus were their brothers. They never demonstrated such kind of attitude
to offer their Sikh or Hindu ‘brothers’ an opportunity to enjoy the Premiership even
for a single day. This was the reality with the Unionist Muslims’ politics while Jinnah
believed in a fair play in the politics.
Glancy was perturbed by the Jinnah-Tiwana talks, perhaps recalling
Sikandar’s weak position in front of Jinnah but the termination of the dialogues
pleased him. He did not like the League’s interference in the Punjab affairs because to
him the split in the Unionists could deprive the British of the military support they
had in the existing arrangements. 132 Tiwana visited numerous cities and spoke out in

231
favour of his standpoint against Jinnah. In his addresses at Ludhiana (13 July),
Lyallpur (29 July), Multan (3 August), he focussed on the point that the minority
cooperation was important in the ministry-making process and he was fulfilling his
pledge with the non-Muslim leaders while Jinnah wanted to undermine it. On 7 July
1944, he expressed the same views at Montgomery (now Sahiwal) i.e., that the
minorities could not be sidelined therefore, he was unable to please Jinnah. 133 He
propagated in his press statements, dialogue and speeches that he could not ignore the
Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus. As a matter of fact, it was propagated that the League was
an anti-minorities party. Notwithstanding, Jinnah had never refused to have an
understanding with the Sikhs and Hindus rather he had cleared Tiwana that he was
ready to talk to Chhotu Ram, Manohar Lal and Baldev Singh on the issue of the
nomenclature of the Assembly coalition, as Tiwana himself confessed in his personal
record. Furthermore, it was the League which advocated weightage for the minorities
but now it was being projected as an adversary to the minority interests. As a matter
of fact, the Governor was not in favour of the League’s influence in the Punjab at the
cost of the Unionist Party and Tiwana was following the Government’s line to
minimize the League influence.
Mehr, projecting the services of the Unionist Muslims to the Muslim
community of the Punjab, said that the Unionist government worked against the
money-lenders which were helpful to the Muslims. It had formed government with
the help of the likeminded non-Muslims and supported the poor; majority of such
people were Muslims. To him, Tiwana had claimed that the comparison of the figures
of the Muslim services with those of 1937 would prove that the number of the
Muslims in the services had been outstandingly increased. 134 It further revealed that
the Unionists Muslims were struggling only for the Muslim community. The

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Governor played entirely an undemocratic attitude to the Jinnah-Tiwana tussle and
reported that Jinnah was adding trouble to the Punjab affairs. 135 It was a democratic
right of any party to launch political activities and revise political plans and agenda
but the Punjab Governor did not tolerate the League’s influence in the province
because he thought that the Unionist Government while treating the minority issue
was not a Muslim government but a ‘Punjabi Government.’ 136
The Sikhs always responded with a messy and distracted retaliation to any
crisis regarding the Punjab politics. During the Jinnah-Tiwana talks, the Sikh leaders
had been giving different arguments in different directions. Giani Kartar followed the
strategy to secure maximum concessions from all the governments including the
League’s but the Nagoke group followed the Congress line and opposed Giani’s stand
regarding alliance with the League. Moreover, both were the recognised rivals to each
other within the party. The League had been portrayed so badly by the Akali leaders
that no return to a normal situation was possible in the current scenario. The enmity
with the Muslims in general and the League in particular had been entrenched gravely
in the hearts of the Sikhs. In the All Parties Sikh Conference held at Lahore on 23
April 1944, the audience were asked by the speakers about the cooperation with the
League and the majority of them went against Jinnah. The report says that Giani
Kartar would not press his desire to support the League leaders. 137 In another All
Parties Sikh Conference held at Lahore in May 1944, it was decided that the Sikh
community should not render any help to Jinnah because this non-cooperation would
force him to feel the Sikh importance. Nevertheless, it was decided not to close the
doors for negotiations with the League which could enable them to approach him to
secure concessions in case of the League Ministry in the Punjab. 138

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Jinnah’s insistence on the nomenclature was a clear ultimatum to Tiwana i.e.,
to become a Leaguer or to be prepared to be sacked. His disgracing attitude to Jinnah
by not responding to his letters, phone calls and demands annoyed the League
leadership, which expelled him from the League on 27 April 1944 and asked the
Muslim Ministers to resign. Qalb-i-Abid writes that Tiwana adopted a defiant attitude
after his meeting with the Governor and the Viceroy. 139 Imran Ali analysed that
Jinnah miscalculated the expected response by the Muslim Unionists from the rural
areas because despite the League-Unionist tussle the Muslim leaders in the Assembly
remained in the rival camp to the League. 140 As a matter of fact, Jinnah was more
concerned with the support from the Muslim masses rather than the Assembly leaders
because in the on-going struggle he should have popular strength on his back. He
thought it to be the right time to establish the writ of the League. David Gilmartin
writes that by this measure, the League secured a popular place among the rural
Muslims in the coming period. 141 On the other hand, the Premier retaliated with the
same force and dismissed Sardar Shaukat Hayat as he was about to resign from the
cabinet. 142 Nevertheless, the expulsion of Shaukat Hayat from the cabinet increased
his popularity among the common Muslims. He was given a big welcome at Sialkot.
Most of the Muslims were of the view that being an anti-Unionist, he was expelled
from the ministry. 143 In a meeting, Giani Kartar said that Shaukat Hayat’s expulsion
had popularised the League and transfers of the pro-League officers and ban on the
League meetings by the Unionist government would be a blunder at their part. 144 On 8
May 1944, on the way to Jammu, Jinnah stayed at Gujranwala and spoke to a
gathering of 4,000 Muslims asserting that the Muslims desired to have a Muslim
government in the Muslim province but the non-Muslims were creating hurdles. The
League intended to facilitate the minorities fully and justly in Pakistan. He also

234
advised the Muslim landlords to unite in the Assembly to abolish the blackmailing
status of the minorities. 145
The anti-Jinnah Sikhs relaxed after the refusal of Tiwana to accord allegiance
to Jinnah. To them, they were now in a position to secure their rights like Gurmukhi
language, Jhatka, and more representation in the Assembly. The Police report relates
that Baldev Singh was under the influence of Chhotu Ram while Giani Kartar was
waiting for the passage of the Gurdwara Act Amendment Bill which would give him
enormous powers to utilise Gurdwara funds. On the other hand, Master Tara Singh
desired to achieve the same status among the Sikhs which Gandhi had in the
Congress. 146 On 3 May 1944, a conference of 50 prominent Sikhs felt relieved on the
failure of the Jinnah-Tiwana talks.
The Hindu press adopted the policy of the Hindu Mahasabha and held a secret
meeting at the house of Bakhshi Tek Chand, a Mahasabha leader, and decided to
oppose Jinnah and support Tiwana. The Unionist government continued bribing the
Inqelab, Ihsan and Shehbaz (prominent Muslim newspapers of Lahore) which openly
played an anti-League role. 147 Furthermore, in June 1943, the Unionist government
had awarded lands under Section 3 of the Punjab Jagir Act 1941 to many supporters
of the government including many Sikhs 148 and thus continued the policy of
compensation which was nothing more than bribery to secure the support of different
circles. The Hindu press which was anti-Unionist now supported the Unionist
Ministry tooth and nail in defying Jinnah and the League. To them, the Unionists were
a lesser evil. They remarked that Jinnah would never accept defeat and would try his
level best to achieve what he had planned. On the other hand, Jinnah repudiated the
dual membership of the political parties and explained that the League members had
to opt either for the League or Unionist party. The divided loyalty would not be

235
entertained. 149 The League reported in July 1944 that the expulsion of Tiwana resulted
in the Muslim unity and “purged our ranks of hypocrites and traitors.” 150 The Hindu
and Sikh press considered the Premier’s expulsion from the League would weaken the
League while the pro-League papers especially The Eastern Times and Zamindar
declared it as an end of the political career of the ‘anti-Muslim’ Premier. According to
the Governor reports, the administration felt that the Sikh opposition to the League
might be a tactic but pernicious to the Sikhs. 151 The entire political situation seemed
favourable to the League.
Decaying Unionist Party
The Punjab Unionist Party was losing ground very sharply due to its negligible
performance in the past. It was perceived that the Unionists tried to divide the Punjab
into urban-rural and agricultural-non-agricultural classes. They also tried to keep the
common Punjabis of the rural areas politically un-conscious and controlled them
through the semi-educated class of zaildars, nambardars, sufedposhes and petty
officials. In the elections of 1937, there were several Unionist candidates in one
constituency and the winner was to be accepted as the Unionist candidate. The
administrative resources were used to sustain the feudal class rule over the masses.
There was no branch of the party outside the Assembly. The episode of 1944
witnessed the Jinnah-Khizr talks which awakened the masses more actively about the
Punjab politics who put their lot on the League side. 152 This impression among the
masses diminished the influence of the Unionist Muslims. The new rhetoric and
assurances of the Unionists proved ludicrous to attract the people against the League
politics.
The Punjabi feudal class supported the British in the war through all the
possible means while the common people responded zealously to the war efforts

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under the traditions of loyalty and economic motives. They provided approximately
one million Punjabis to the army. The farmers produced large cash crops and saved
huge money. The poverty-stricken families got relief when their youth sent them
handful money. Many used this money to get back their mortgaged land from the
money-lenders. It increased their power of purchase while the shortage of consumer
goods hit the society as well as the Unionist government severely. The financial
prosperity also influenced the relationship between the landed tycoons and the
peasants. 153 The landlords were not losing respect rather the rise of the middle and
lower middle class to a prosperous class started restructuring the fabric of society so
the change was imperative to be. The Punjab perhaps for the first time was observing
such changes at the bottom level. A complete change was impossible overnight
however it lifted the depressed classes from the dependent to somewhat independent
status.
The British needed the cooperation of the commercial class but the Punjab
government was still pulling on the pro-agriculturists policy which was severely
criticised by the central government. Ch. Chhotu Ram had advised the farmers to
preserve the stocks of wheat and sell when they would be able to get better price. It
resented Lord Linlithgow. Bertrand Glancy clarified the Jat Minister’s position but the
Viceroy compelled the provincial government to reverse the policy. This attitude
caused resentment in the fighting soldiers who felt that their families were being
humiliated and deprived of the right of profit:
The introduction of requisitioning and rationing of grain angered the Unionist Party’s
rural supporters. It seemed to them that they were being discriminated against, as the
Hindu and Sikh businessmen were free to make large wartime profits. They also resented
the increase in Government interference …. the Punjab people’s rural population became
subject to a wide range of Government regulations. 154

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The economic depression increased the problem of the Unionist Ministers. The
common people were running after the consumer goods and the condition was getting
worse during the war ending years. To Ian Talbot:
…by 1944 it suffered as badly as the towns from shortage of consumer goods and
inflation. The Lahore Retail Price Index rose from a base of 100 in August 1939 to 371 in
August 1945. It had climbed still further to 398 by the time of the 1946 lections. Until
1944, the high prices which the farmers gained for their wheat and other agricultural
produce largely outweighed the increased prices and shortages of consumer goods. 155
Baldev Singh expressed these painful facts in the Assembly that the shortage of
kerosene oil, cloth and the other daily necessaries of life was a reality. The rural and
urban areas had been affected by the shortage and the government was giving priority
to control the situation positively. He further said that the heavy cold increased the
price of “fire wood and charcoal during January 1945.” 156 The people alleged that
Baldev Singh made huge money from oil and he was the main culprit in the consumer
good crisis:
The preset condition of the grains in the Punjab is the direct result of your kindness. The
Punjab which could supply and feed the whole of India, is suffering so much
dearness....You in collusion with other Civil Supplies Officers and Traders have made up
a gang to rob the country in the open day light, and we are afraid lest here the Bengal
destruction face us, if it goes on a little more...you have earned lakhs of rupees from it...
you suck blood of lakhs of people, who have no voices. 157
Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh had been accused in October 1943 that due to the
Premier’s backing, they were opposing rationing and price-planning by the
government. 158 It was also alleged that in February 1945, Tiwana on the behalf of the
Punjab government earned huge commission from the traders and made favourable
changes in the rules and regulations. 159 This problem continued during the aftermath
of the war and in January 1946, the depot holders on the complaint of the shortage of
cloth replied that they too were facing the same problem which the people did but as a
matter of fact cloth was not available even in the storage. 160

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Chhotu Ram died in 1945 which was a severe blow to the Unionists.
Newspapers paid many tributes to the Jat minister. The pro-League newspaper, The
Eastern Times, published him as a radical communalist and wrote that his death
would relieve the Muslims of the Punjab. A few papers were also of the opinion that
the death of the minister had made the survival of the Unionists doubtful. 161 This
incident and other challenges increased problems of the Unionist government. As a
matter of fact, the regional character of the Unionist Party could not face the stature of
the League. To Anita Inder Singh, the Unionist Party was doing politics for Dominion
status or the united India while the League was advocating the case of the Muslim
state; the Unionist Muslims had been struggling by creed to protect the interests of
one class-the zamindars while the League was a voice of all the Muslims living in
every corner of the Subcontinent. 162 All these circumstances caused unpopularity of
the Unionists who were under a gigantic pressure of the League. The common
Muslims had turned fully to the League leadership.
The Sikh politics throughout this era revolved around the League’s
movements. In the areas of violence, they remained at forefront through volunteers’
training, violent press statements and anti-Pakistan tirades in the conferences. Master
Tara Singh criticised the Pakistan scheme and said that the Muslim state would engulf
the Sikh community which was concentrated only in the Punjab. Therefore, in no case
they would be “willing to submit to Pakistan.” 163 On 3 August 1943, in Bhopalwala
near Sambrial (Sialkot), the Sikhs slaughtered a goat with jhatka which raised
Muslim-Sikh tension in the area. The Muslims protested against the jhatka and
declared that they would slaughter a cow while the Sikhs retaliated by announcing the
slaughter of pigs if the Muslim would slaughter a cow. 164 Giani Sher Singh addressed
a Sikh gathering at Gurdwara Dera Sahib, Lahore on 2 May 1943 in which he raised

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the point that the Sikhs were equally eligible to claim separate Sikh State if the
Hindus and Muslims could demand it. 165 Sardar Sant Singh MLA (Central) said in his
presidential address speaking to the Hindu-Sikh Milap Conference on 18 March 1944
(Gurudatta Bhavan, Lahore) that the Sikandar-Baldev Pact was a surrender of the
Akalis to the Muslim administration; it was a strange pact in the parliamentary history
that Baldev Singh was allowed to sit with the government and the rest of Akalis on
the opposition benches. Sardar Nidhan Singh Alam added, the Hindus were Sikhs and
the Sikhs were Hindus. Sir Gokal Chand warned the Sikhs about the trap of the
Muslims. 166 Seth Jugal Kishore Birla appealed to the Sikhs for the postponement of
the Azad Punjab scheme till after the war. He was the man who along with K. M.
Munshi of Hindu Mahasabha in Cawnpore on 30 December 1942 had suggested, ‘Let
the Mohammedans have Pakistan in those portions of the Punjab and Bengal where
they are the majority.’ He demanded separation of the Hindu and Sikh majority areas
to live their own lives. 167
The Sikhs were perturbed immensely while the Punjabi Hindus adopted the
principle of “wait and see” because the Congress and League settlement could change
the whole scenario of the national and regional politics. It could increase the number
of the dissentient Muslim Unionists as well. As far as the separate Sikh State was
concerned, the Hindu opinion was divided. Some considered it an escape from the
tyranny of the Muslim domination while some were opposed to the partition of India
in any form. By and large, the Hindus were depending on the Sikhs to reject Pakistan
for them. 168 The Hindu Mahasabha was opposing the Akali demand of Azad Punjab
zealously and advancing the Congress programme but the Akalis were clinging to
them. The Sikh leaders gave warnings to the Hindus just to satisfy their followers and
posed of having an independent course in the politics. On the other hand, the Hindu

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leaders were presenting Sikhs as Hindus. Disturbed enough by the propaganda,
Master Tara Singh gave the last warning to the Hindu leaders who kept on saying that
Sikhs were Hindus. In August 1944, the Sikh-Hindu relations remained bitter in the
NWFP on the issue of ‘removal of the Granth Sahib from certain Mandirs.’ 169 The
Eastern Times in an editorial suggested that the Sikhs should not speak the Hindu
diction in the politics rather they should take independent decisions as a nation:
If they are a nation in their own right, then they should also stop appealing to nationalism,
then they should also stop being tools in the hands of the Hindu Mahasabha leaders and
should have independent political policies of their own, as every self-respecting nation
does. 170
The editorial also reminded what Jinnah had said regarding their position that Akhand
Hindustan would mean ‘Hindu rule’ and ‘the Sikhs will have absolutely no position in
Akhand Hindustan.’ Contrary to this, they would be far better in Pakistan where they
could survive as a nation. 171
Jinnah invited the Sikh fury when he called them a sub-national group,
although he used the same term for the Muslims of the UP 172 but infuriated the Sikhs
vehemently. They perceived that Jinnah did not accept them as a nation. Whereas he
explained the term sub-nation in a press conference at Lahore in August 1944 and said
that the sub-national group meant the scattered position of a minority community in a
territorial unit. He considered the Sikhs a nation with a right of self-determination
equal to the Muslims. He further cleared that he had used the term in the
constitutional language even for the Muslims in the minority provinces. Master Tara
Singh continued uttering irresponsible statements which strained the Muslim-Sikh
relations. In August 1944, a statement appeared enunciated by him which shows the
leadership crisis in the Sikh community:

Why should the Sikhs send their petition to Mr. Jinnah? Why should he presume that he
and Mr. Gandhi are the final authorities who can seal the fate of the Sikhs? I do not admit
that they are the alms-givers, to whom I should bow and beg with folded hands. 173
241
The paper writes that such a language suited a hot-headed fanatic but not a statesman.
Pleasant manners were valuable equipment for negotiations. 174 Actually, such hot
words could sustain his leadership in the Sikh community otherwise the Sikh question
at that moment required very prudent and well-worked out statements which could
help in levelling the ground in the Sikhs’ favour.
The Governor reported that in the conferences the Sikhs showed enthusiastic
determination to fight against Pakistan; ‘if necessary by force.’ The Akalis succeeded
in rallying the rural Sikhs in opposition to proposals by Gandhi and Rajgopalachari.
The speakers reminded the audience during the meetings about the Mughal atrocities
with a pledge that they would never let the Muslims repeat the same under Pakistan.
They being a separate nation advanced the idea of a separate Sikh state as a solution
to the communal problem. They also warned the government that the acceptance of
any agreement by Gandhi and Jinnah would mean rejection of the Sikhs which would
result in a direct clash with the government. 175 Master Tara Singh in the Akhand
Hindustan conference at Delhi assured the Hindus of the Sikh support in their fight.
Nevertheless, he said that neither Hindu nor the Muslim rule would be tolerated by
the Sikhs in the Punjab. 176 Bold words, but not pursued practically, Sangat Singh
comments on this statement by Master Tara Singh. 177 He suggested no way out to get
rid of the Hindu and Muslim majorities. By the democratic norms, 13 per cent Sikhs
could not rule over the majority communities therefore it is amazing why the Akali
leadership was so confident to oppose both the communities. The Akali leadership
adopted a strange style of castigating all the major parties and maintained it until the
final breakdown. Sangat Singh depicted the same that the Sikhs could not succeed

242
because they had opened all the fronts including the British, Congress and League 178
but the Akali leadership continued this style to cope with the issues.
On 14 October, Pritam Singh Gojran declared that the Sikh state was the Sikh
belief if Pakistan was conceded to the Muslims. The Sikhs would never tolerate the
vivisection of India. Gandhi did not keep his pledge of 1929 and wanted to “sell” the
Sikhs to Jinnah. 179 The SAD held the 5 th All-India Akali conference at Lahore on 14
and 15 October 1944 attracting about 8,000 people from all the corners of the
province. The conference emphasized that no communal settlement would be
accepted without the consent of the Akali Dal. It demanded a Sikh State or Azad
Punjab in case of conceding Pakistan. The Sikh speakers pledged that Pakistan would
be resisted “by force of arms.” The idea of provincial autonomy was declared as the
“Aurengzeb rule.” 180 The Akali Sikhs were attacking Gandhi and Jinnah which made
both the Muslims and Hindus furious. Their demands were a Sikh state or at least
Azad Punjab under united India. The idea of a Sikh state was contrary to a united
India. Azad Punjab was not acceptable to the other stakeholders and could not make
the Sikhs a majority community. They were dependent on Hindus who were the target
of their fury. In this entirely elusive situation the Sikh leadership was not looking for
alternative proposals. Giani Kartar took a sane line to bargain with the Muslims who
were a direct party in the Punjab political crisis so that they might obtain maximum
package of rights but soon things changed without any serious effort and the Akali
politics drifted towards the Congress with a meagre opposition from Giani Kartar. 181
According to Mitra, Sardar Pritam Singh in his opening presidential address
demanded the Sikh state on the basis of their importance and the land being under the
Sikh possession and Master Tara Singh declared the Muslim domination in the Punjab
as the “Aurangzebi Raj” even without the establishment of Pakistan. 182 Sangat Singh

243
writes that the League had confused the Sikhs to the extent that despite the presence
of an Akali Minister in the Punjab government they were not sparing the allied
Unionists. 183
The Hindu press appreciated the Akali leaders on the stand against the Indian
partition but condemned the Sikh state and denigration of Gandhi. The Muslim press,
on the other hand, stated that the Akali leaders had put themselves in a ridiculous
situation because by arousing their community against the Muslims and, by fostering
communal ill-feeling they would gain nothing. Instead, it advised them to come to a
settlement with the League which was prepared to concede their legitimate
demands. 184 The Hindus and Sikhs were vociferously speaking whatever they liked.
Nobody foresaw as to what direction the Punjab was going to. As far as the Sikandar-
Baldev pact was concerned, Sardar Durlab Singh in November 1944 in a letter to
Gandhi disclosed that the Akali Sikhs concluded this settlement with the consent of
the Congress high command and Gandhi did not reject this claim. 185
The politics of the time demanded a mature leadership which could cope with
the ups and downs of the regional and national politics but unluckily such kind of
leadership was not available in the Sikh circles therefore the major hurdles and
setbacks could not be overcome. Mediocrity in the leadership was manifested in a
letter from an eminent Sikh from Lyallpur to Lord Wavell. He wrote that the parity
claimed by Jinnah should be applied to the Sikhs also and if Jinnah did not accept it,
he should be forced to retire from the politics because “None in the world is
indispensable.” 186 An Akali leader expressed his views against the Muslims that the
Muslims had assassinated the Gurus, their Children, 5 Piyaras and many Sikhs during
the Mughal rule, therefore they would not let it be repeated in Pakistan. The Pakistan
dream could be materialised after 50 lakh Khalsas were beheaded and double the

244
number of the Muslims met the same fate in the Punjab. He also clarified that the
Sikhs had fore-viewed Pakistan in the form of the Unionist Ministry and Haripur
incident. 187 No statement or speech could be found without threats and anti-Pakistan
uproar. The top leadership was keener to grab funds rather than to have a better future
for the community. They had many economic plans but little in the political domain.
The Chief Secretary in a report in January 1945 wrote that the newly passed
Gurdwara Act Amendment Bill strengthened the Akali hold over the Sikh peasantry
and the party. It would help them evade the Communist influence who could
challenge them in the coming Gurdwara elections. The Executive Committee of the
SGPC held its meeting on 3 February and decided to control the finances of the seven
important Gurdwaras of the Punjab directly through managers. It was to increase the
SGPC fund which expected eight lakh rupees increase in the SGPC budget. They
proposed that the money should be spent on the social plans for the uplift of the
community. It was also proposed that radio station, bank, factories and a secretariat
should be established to promote the Sikh standard of life. 188 Not only the Akali party
but the Ahrar party was also enjoying the Congress funding. It got a donation of Rs.
50,000 from the central Congress funds to contest elections against the League. 189
The sixth All India Akali conference, held from 29 September to 1 October
1945 at Gujranwala, attracted approximately 8,000 Sikhs. The show-of the men armed
with kirpans and spears projected the efficient organisational expertise of the Akalis.
They did not fear that such a demonstration could result in the breach of the peace any
time. According to the Governor’s report, in case of disturbance, it would be
impossible for the Police to suppress the Akalis who were armed and disciplined
properly. The excited man-power and weapons of the Akalis would be a great hurdle
in restoring peace in the region. The proceedings of the conference were mainly

245
related to the anti-Pakistan and anti-Communist propaganda in the elections. The
presence of representatives from all the Sikh groups except the CAD increased its
importance. It was also decided that the Sikhs should support the Congress where the
national issues were involved. 190 The Akalis were so forceful that the Chief Secretary
and Governor seemed unable to handle them. This situation was a vivid negligence on
the part of the provincial authorities, either they were facilitating or ignoring the
Akalis otherwise the British had coped with much graver situations in India
effectively. The Viceroy followed the line suggested by the provincial administration.
It was a sign of inefficiency by which the violent activities of the Sikhs against the
Muslims were being unleashed. Through this conference, the Sikhs declared their
future or post-election policy in the Punjab. It was a setback to the League and the
Unionist Party that the Akalis were not ready to accept them as their friends. The
League’s enthusiasm to bring the Akalis into its fold remained a dream though it was
impossible in the presence of the violent element, a strong anti-League and the pro-
Congress group within this party. The financial help from the anti-Muslim actors was
a dominant factor which cornered the League in the Punjab politics. In October 1945,
the Qaumi Jang revealed that the Akalis were being funded by the Maharaja of Patiala
and other states. 191 The Akalis had collected 13 lakhs rupees to contest elections with
the influence of the Unionist government and Baldev Singh. It was conveyed to them
that the Unionist Party would provide Rs. 5 lakhs while Baldev Singh would donate
Rs. 3 lakhs from his own pocket. They would receive Rs. 5 lakhs from other investors
and mill owners as well. 192
Jawaharlal Nehru in his speech on 18 November 1945 discussed the Sikh
problem as an important question and pledged that the Punjab could not be detached

246
from India. He resented the Akali Dal and League discussions for a mutual
understanding:
Akalis say we will defend Sikh rights....They oppose Pakistan but they have negotiated
with the League through the back doors so many times. They have sought the help of
the British Government also...Mr. Jinnah told the English press...that the British
Government should give Pakistan. Whatever their strength may be they cannot make
Pakistan here even with the help of the British Government. This problem can only be
solved by a compromise. 193
Nehru reiterated the Congress stand to work for the Indian freedom for the
establishment of Hindu rule and negated all the demands or contentions made by the
League and the Akali Dal for the cooperation. He rejected the Azad Punjab, Sikh state
and Pakistan ideas without considering how much popular support these demands
were enjoying. Negotiation with the political parties was the democratic right of any
party but Nehru opposed it while he also acknowledged that the problem could be
solved “by a compromise” which was not possible without negotiations. The point
raised by the Congress leader leads to the conclusion that the Congress leadership did
not like an independent role of the Sikh political parties rather it bound them to the
permission of the Congress high command for taking any initiative to negotiate with
the League.
The Sikhs were disunited but on the issue of Pakistan they had the same views
as Baba Kharak Singh who expressed his emotions addressing the Central Akali Dal
Conference at Lahore on 30 September 1945 and said that Pakistan was not
acceptable even to a Sikh child. 194 On the occasion of Hola fair in February 1945 at
Kiratpur and Anandpur (Hoshiarpur), the Akalis concluded many dewans in which the
speakers condemned the Pakistan scheme and the Unionist government. They also
threw light on the Muslim brutalities met to their Gurus during the Muslim rule in
India. 195

247
The meeting between Jinnah and Kartar Singh marked nothing new rather it
was confined to the Gurmukhi language, Jhatka, Sikh representation in the
government services, and legislation on the religious issues in the League government
on which Jinnah had responded positively. 196 The Akalis under the influence of Giani
Kartar were also ready to cooperate with the League but “on the basis of most
exaggerated and quite fabulous Sikh claims.” 197 He continued his policy to voice for
cooperation with the League which was more beneficial than other partnership.
Master Tara Singh did not approve this policy which produced uncertainty about the
Akali support to a pure League ministry. Giani Kartar could not take a defiant
direction in this regard as the Hindu Jats also opposed formation of the League
cabinet. 198 He though not in a position to bring any major change in the political
environment alarmed the anti-League elements that the Sikhs could have an alliance
with the League. In a secret meeting of Working Committee of Akali Dal at Amritsar
in March 1943, Giani advised the audience that the Sikhs should avoid clash with the
British and future plans of the Akalis must be kept secret from the government. For
this purpose, the Akali volunteers should be dressed in normal clothes and the leaders
should not pass written instructions to the workers. 199 During this era, the Akali
leadership negotiated with Jinnah and Savarkar. They tried to benefit from the
League-Unionist differences. 200 Giani Kartar was of the opinion that Sikhs could
secure more benefits from the Muslims than the Hindus. He also sought the
Government support. The Muslim press supported him on the approach of Muslim-
Sikh understanding. He favoured a North India Federation from the NWFP to Bengal
wherein the Sikhs might have a 10 per cent representation in all the political bodies
and army. By this, the Sikh identity was possible rather than merging as nobody in

248
India or Pakistan. 201 It was a just opinion because the League was determined to
achieve the final destination of Pakistan.
Giani Kartar in his tilt towards the League was accused of being a
communalist and anti-nationalism but despite all this, he continued his plans for more
favourable political terms for the Sikh community. He was reported to be willing to
launch an Akali-League coalition ministry in case of end of the Unionist Ministry.
Nevertheless, the Akalis and Congress agreed on the support of Sikh recruitment in
the Army 202 which brought both closer to each other.
League’s Assurance of Sikh Rights
The Sikhs were crying against the Muslim domination on the other hand the
League leaders were advising the Sikhs not to be suspicious on the minority rights in
Pakistan. They also assured that their rights in the services would not be trampled
upon by the Muslims. 203
Jinnah’s honesty and moral integrity should have never been doubtful because
he had played a very positive role during the very important occasions like the
Gurdwara reform movement and Shahidganj incident. Lord Wavell wrote to Amery
on 15 August 1944 that Jinnah agreed to the Sikh autonomy within Pakistan but the
Sikhs did not like this proposal. 204 In 1944, Jinnah assured the Sikhs that their rights
would be honoured in Pakistan. He also maintained that all the communities had the
right of self-determination. 205
Communal Tension
The Sikhs participated in different negotiations and sometimes agreed to the
proposals but all proved unsatisfactory. Sometimes, the non-Muslim officers

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particularly the Sikhs adopted derogatory attitude towards the Muslims in general and
the Leaguers in particular which increased the apprehensions of the Muslims. One of
the main complaints came from Karnal where a Sikh Deputy Commissioner pursued
openly the anti-League policy. On 6 June 1943, the Working Committee of the Karnal
District League passed numerous resolutions against the anti-Muslim behaviour of the
DC Sardar Kapur Singh, ICS. The Muslims expressed their profound resentment on
his actions against the well-known Muslim families of the Karnal district. They
protested on the harassing and victimising measures of the district administration and
demanded the transfer of the DC and appointment of an enquiry body to look into the
matter. They also warned the Punjab government of grave consequences if they did
nothing to redress the grievances of the Muslims of Karnal. 206 The government was
strictly against the people who were involved in the anti-British propaganda regarding
the .war while in other matters the Governor took no suitable action. The provincial
government was not keen to address the Muslim problems. The district administration
seemed getting out of the provincial control. They were supposed to punish the anti-
British leadership but not against the elements who were sabotaging the peace of the
Punjab. In January 1945, the court sentenced one year imprisonment to Ajit Singh
Ambalvi on the anti-government speech in September 1944 in an Akali conference
under rule 38 DOIR 207 but such strict action was not taken against the leaders who
had been responsible for the communal violence. For this reason, the communal riots
went on to worsen the Muslim-Sikh relations. A few Muslim farmers at Malakpur,
district Ambala injured some Nihangs because they had destroyed the crops which
caused communal tension. 208 Master Tara Singh presented the Sikhs as champion in
the cow-protection and said in his presidential address to the Dhundial Sikh
Conference on 3-4 October 1943 that:

In the Punjab the Sikhs are the only people who actively protect the cow. There have
been riots and murders. The Sikhs alone fought for protection of cow and the Shiromani
Akali Dal was the only organisation which rendered help in the resulting cases. 209
250
B. S. Moonje said in June 1943 that the Hindu community felt humiliated by the
behaviour of Jinnah towards Mahatma Gandhi. According to him, the Hindu
Mahasabha only could cope with the on-going communal problem and Gandhi despite
his respectable status would not be allowed to gift Pakistan to Jinnah. 210
According to the CMG, the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSSS)
continued training volunteers despite ban on the military drill. They had also
increased the number of branches of the Sangh considerably. Recently they had
arranged training of sham-fightings as a semi-military wing. 211 The Police reports
noted that RSSS had eagerly engaged its workers in the physical training and lathi
fighting in the districts of Karnal, Rohtak, Ambala, Jullundur, Montgomery and
Rawalpindi while new branches in Lahore, Gurdaspur and Amritsar were opened in
January 1944. 212 At Sangrana (Amritsar district) on 7 January, Master Tara Singh
inaugurated the training of the students. These paid students were given the task to
oppose the Communists and advocates of Pakistan in the rural areas. 213 A police
report concerning the ‘terrorist situation of the Punjab’ explained how the Sikhs had
chalked out anti-Muslim plans. During October 1943 to March 1944, the Akali Sikhs
including top leaders had been involved in arms smuggling from NWFP to the Punjab.
All this was disclosed by Harbans Singh, Gainda Singh and Nirmal Singh during the
Police interrogation. The report further disclosed that Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar,
Udham Singh Nagoke, Ishar Singh Majhail, Jathedar Mohan Singh, Sohan Singh Jalal
Usman and other known Akali leaders had been demanding the arms since 1935.
They wanted to buy weapons to protect the Sikhs from the Muslims. The weak
position of the British in the war in 1940 also encouraged them to plan for the seizure

251
of the Punjab by force. Master Tara Singh handed over Rs. 8,700 to Harbans Singh
for 20 rifles, 8 revolvers 3,650 rounds and 80 “sticks of dynamite” from the Frontier.
The ammunition transactions from Tribal Territory were made after the discussions
concluded at the Gurdwara Punja Sahib. Apart from the Punjab districts, the Sikh
States like Patiala, Faridkot and Jind were also among those which attained arms from
the NWFP to target the Muslims. 214
On 11 April 1944, the All-India States Hindu Mahasabha Conference through
its resolution praised the British Viceroy on his stand for the united India. It also
demanded from the states to repeal the Arms Act. 215 The Governor reported that in the
second half of October 1945 two RSSS members from Nagpur, Apte and Dadarao
Parmarath had been busy in provoking the Hindus in the Punjab. At public meetings,
they insisted that the Hindus must be trained on military lines. In a secret meeting,
Dadarao Parmarath advised their co-religionists to join the army and the Police with
the intention of “establishing a Hindu raj with a properly organised body of trained
soldiers.” 216 The Muslim League National Guards recruited some persons but
according to the report of June 1944, the organisation did not have stable position.
The Governor’s report told that the Muslim Students’ Federation conference held at
Rawalpindi infuriated the non-Muslims of Rawalpindi who revived a Hindu volunteer
organisation, the Shakti Dal. During this fortnight, the Khaksars and the RSSS
workers remained active on small scale. The RSSS workers joined the training camps
at Nagpur and Meerut. 217 The Muslim National Guard in its aims and activities was
not a violent organisation. 218 The Khaksars had about 4,000 workers in the Punjab in
June 1943. All these volunteers wore red badges on khaki or plain dress with belchas
(spades) in their possession which they used as weapons in any emergency. They
propagated their mission in the mosques particularly “in rural areas.” 219

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The communal riots in Haripur, district Hazara (NWFP) influenced the course
of the Punjab politics. The north Punjab had always been sensitive in the communal
frenzy. Though communalism had taken most of the areas in its grip nevertheless the
north had been producing explosive impact on the Muslim-Sikh politics. The Punjab
Governor commented in January 1944:
The façade of Sikh-Muslim unity has been shaken by the communal riot at Haripur in the
NWFP which the Congress and Hindu press has exploited to expose the impracticability
of a coalition Government in the NWFP and any of permanent Sikh-Muslim political
understanding. 220
The Sikh community expressed great concern over the loss of the Sikhs in the Haripur
incident that caused bitterness throughout the Punjab and jeopardised the League-
Akali understanding. An unknown Akali leader wrote a letter to Jinnah in which he
gave reference of the Haripur riots and the Unionist Ministry and demanded the Sikh
state. He also retrospected that the Muslims had been the killers of the 9 th Guru (Tegh
Bahadur) and 4 sahibzadey. 221 On 30 January, the Akalis observed the “Haripur Day”
in Amritsar under SGPC, Golden Temple Committee, City Akali Jatha, and City Sikh
League. The speakers expressed mourning through different resolutions. Other such
meetings were arranged in Ram Das, Tarn Taran, Rawalpindi, Gujrat and many other
cities of the Punjab. 222 The Haripur riot busied the Akalis to cope with the political
and religious situation. The pro-Congress Akalis pressurised the Akali leadership to
leave the NWFP coalition ministry while Master Tara Singh intended to maintain the
political position which they had acquired under the coalition ministry. According to
the Governor’s report, to divert the attention of the community, the Akali leadership
decided to observe 30 January as “Haripur Day” to register protest through
resolutions. 223

253
This political strategy reflected the standpoint of Giani Kartar, MLA and
Savarkar which persuaded the Sikhs and Hindus in the minority provinces to collect
political advantages by joining the Muslims in the government. To them, the
unchallenged position of the Muslims in political control would be dangerous. While
a strong undercurrent of opposition to this policy by the extremist elements like
Udham Singh Nagoke group considered such politics as putting “nationalism” under
the communalism. 224 Nevertheless, the League and Akali ministers visited the
affected places of Haripur and restored peace. The Muslim newspapers expressed
great concern over the Haripur riots and wrote that the attacked Sikhs were in a poor
position to face the onslaught of the majority community therefore the Sikhs must
have been protected by the Muslims. 225 Glancy wrote that the Sikhs were “more
confused than ever” because of the uncertain condition prevailing throughout this
period. 226 The communal problem was not confined to Haripur only, the adjacent or
the close areas were also affected to a large extent. In Rawalpindi city, Nishan Sahib
on the Gurdwara Jaswant was brunt by the Muslims in the same month, and a squad
of four Muslim boys were arrested who were held responsible for this ignominious
action. 227
On 26-27 February the Akali conference was held in Abohar, district
Ferozepore which was attended by Master Tara Singh and Principal Ganga Singh.
The speakers condemned the Sikh Communists and supported the Azad Punjab idea.
Master Tara Singh said that the idea of partition was not new and Gandhi knew it well
since the Round Table Conference. He also assured the anti-Muslim groups that the
Sikandar-Baldev Pact was of a temporary nature which would strangle the Pakistan
scheme. 228 The Akalis were playing a double game on the Sikh-Unionist question.
Master Tara Singh asked the Akali branches of the Punjab to send the lists of cruelties

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perpetrated by the Unionists to them to Amritsar. 229 Like many issues, he, on this
very pact always showed a confused policy which damaged the Akali image among
the other political stakeholders. In his autobiography he writes that Sir Sikandar Hayat
never acted as promised in the pact. 230
According to Jaspreet Walia, the quality which made Master Tara Singh
undisputed leader of the Sikhs was his anti-Pakistan character. 231 The leaders should
be known by the ideology, political vision, statesmanship, dialogue skills, but Master
Tara Singh was recognised by the quality of hatred against the League and its
demands. Master Tara Singh approved the Sikh Students’ Federation in August 1944
and pledged to expand it to the provincial level. It was the first Sikh students’
organization formed at Lucknow with the creed to achieve Indian independence and
opposition to the Pakistan scheme. The Federation pledged to fight Pakistan, if the
Sikh rights were ignored. 232 In June 1945, the hostile attitude of the Unionist
government towards the League was witnessed when the provincial authorities did not
take action against the Akali Dal on violating the government orders regarding
meetings in the Minto Park, Lahore. A few months earlier, the League meeting was
not allowed at the orders issued by the government under which no meeting except
Dusehra and Eids were be permissible in the Minto Park. The SAD held a conference
in the same park and no official resistance was applied to implement the orders
against this violation. 233 Such measures by the provincial government were definitely
causing unrest and resentment among the Leaguers and the common Muslims as well.
The Sikhs had been conscious about the Muslim-Sikh position in every field
of life. The Tribune published a news that seniority of a Sikh officer in the
Agriculture Department had been overlooked while no one told the exact story that
this person had got selection grade with the help of Sardar Jogindra Singh. The

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Eastern Times pointed out that Sikhs had awakened after 12 years only when the issue
involved a Sikh officer. 234 The paper in December 1944 pointed out several cases in
which Chhotu Ram, Jogindra Singh and others had facilitated their co-religionists in
the official promotion due to favouritism. 235 Perhaps the Sikh leadership was not
capable to face national and international crises therefore they were still engaged in
the basic demands for their community. For example, the Sikhs from Peshawar passed
a resolution for elimination of their problems in government services formula. The
resolution explained that there was only 1 Sikh seat out of 52 therefore the Sikh seats
of EACs (Extra Assistant Commissioner) be increased. The Sikhs also complained
that the Sikh and Hindu toppers were rejected in the provincial services merely on the
seat allocation criterion. 236 The small community scattered throughout the
Subcontinent was efficiently interlinked by the Gurdwara management. Therefore,
resentment in any part of India reached ultimately the Punjab and furthered the
communal situation.
The Akali leaders met Maharaja Kapurthala in which they placed demands for
Jhatka shops and Gurmukhi language. 237 Such meetings increased the Akali
interaction with the States. In December 1944, two Sikhs were killed and many
injured due to cow-slaughter at Mandiala district Amritsar. The villages joined in and
caused further tension in the region. 238 This incident was a small issue in view of the
giant stature of the communalism. The north Punjab areas remained sensitive
regarding Muslim-Sikh relations. In Amritsar RSSS attacked two Muslims on 27
April 1945 while in Gorakhpur (Hissar) Hindu-Muslim tension arose on the
construction of a new mosque. In Ferozepore city and Dera Baba Nanak (Gurdaspur)
Muslims, Hindu and Sikhs were engaged in a fight. 239 The Muslims in Lahore raised

256
slogans in favour of Pakistan and the Hindus retaliated with the shouts ‘Jai Hind’
which caused tension in the city. 240
Simla Conference
On 14 June 1945, Viceroy Lord Wavell broadcasted a package of promises
pertaining to full self-government. He proposed that the Executive Council would be
fully represented by the locals except the offices of the Viceroy and Commander-in-
Chief. All the major political protagonists were invited to Simla (June 25-14 July
1945) to give their input on the Wavell Plan. Master Tara Singh and Tiwana
participated in the Simla Conference. According to the Punjab Governor’s note, the
Punjab authorities had decided to project Master Tara Singh as a sole representative
of the Sikh community in September 1944. 241 Wavell had told Glancy that he had
planned to induce all the communities for representation in the interim government
which could convince the League to abandon the Pakistan demand. 242 The new
Labour government taking office on 26 July 1945 seemed keen to expedite the
process of Indian self-government. It was decided to hold elections on 21 August and
on 19 September for the central and provincial legislatures respectively. The Viceroy
came out with a plan to set up a Constituent Assembly and Executive Council
consisting of the major political parties. The newly elected assemblies were supposed
to elect representatives for the Constituent Assembly and to analyse the Cripps
proposals. The All India Akali Conference held in Gujranwala in September rejected
the Wavell Plan because the Cripps proposals had already been discredited by the
Sikhs who decided to contest the elections to discourage the Pakistanists and to save
the Indian integrity. 243 Glancy opposed Pakistan because it would result in a

257
widespread bloodshed, because, to him, the Sikh threat was not a bluff but a reality
and that the Sikhs would not submit to the Muhammadan Raj peacefully. 244
The League became weak after losing ministries during February 1945 in
Sindh, NWFP and Bengal and other political developments which questioned the
leadership of Jinnah but his clear vision and direction of his policies maintained the
spirit of the Pakistan struggle as he desired. He had confidence in bagging favourable
results in the bye-elections and having full support of the Punjab. 245 The Sapru
Committee envisaged parity of representation between the caste Hindus and the
Muslims, the Simla Conference got conformity on the principle of parity which
Jinnah had accepted reluctantly because the Scheduled Caste Hindu and Sikh
members would surely join the Caste Hindus which could put the Muslims in a weak
situation. 246 Ultimately the Conference produced nothing due to League-Congress
disagreement on the nomination of the Muslim representatives. To Edmund Muller,
the failure of the Conference indicated that the political question of India was not a
British-Congress problem but a communal tangle between Congress and League. 247
Tiwana got relief by this breakdown because he feared that any agreement between
the major parties at the centre could jeopardise the regional parties’ influence in the
politics particularly of the government. The Congress had demanded that it would
appoint the Muslim representatives while Tiwana had already threatened to resign if a
Unionist would not be included. Many writers attribute the failure of the conference to
the League leader but Iqbal Chawla infers that the conference failed due to the
obstinate attitude of Lord Wavell in favour of the Unionist Party. 248 The Punjab
Premier was more inflexible than the Congress in dealing with the League. Talking
about the causes of the failure of the Simla Conference, he clarified his position that
he could be blamed for sabotaging the conference, while he had promised not to take

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up the all-India issue regarding Muslims of India and kept his word. He gave his
judgement that the distribution of the Muslim seats was the main issue which resulted
in the failure. He suggested to the British that the government should not be optimistic
in settling the communal issue with submissive attitude rather the British would have
to take firm stand and action on it. 249
Tiwana stated to the API that there was debate among the people as to why the
Simla Conference had failed. Some people blamed League while others were of the
opinion that the League desired to go ahead and asked the Viceroy to continue the
conference but he had replied in the negative. In this way, responsibility of the failure
did not rest on the League. Tiwana writes that the government did not adopt a firm
stand on its policy therefore it could not bear good results. On 17 July 1945, he
reacted to Jinnah’s press conference (14 July 1945) in which he had held Jinnah
responsible for the failure of the Simla Conference. He went on saying that the
Conference failed because of the clashing demands of the League and the Congress
particularly regarding the Muslim seats. On the other hand, Muzaffar Ali Qizalbash
stated with the reference of Ch. Khaliquzzaman that the Simla Conference failed due
to the Congress and the British government. 250
In the course of Simla Conference, Master Tara Singh rejected Maulana
Azad’s proposal that the Akali Dal should send the Sikh name through the
Congress 251 which indicates towards ‘confident’ but not ‘independent’ course of the
Akali politics because in other domains, he was still under the Congress’ influence.
He, according to Ram Narayan Kumar, opposed Pakistan and demanded the Sikh state
“for the first time” 252 consisting of the central areas of the Punjab. He claimed a Sikh
state on the model of the Israel state which had been created with only 10 per cent of
the Jewish population. Sangat Singh opines that Master Tara Singh could not visualise

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that all this was possible only with the British consent. 253 He concludes that the
Congress and the League could not challenge any new decision made by the British.
But as a matter of fact, the consent of the stakeholders i.e., British, Muslims and
Hindus, was the main channel which could bring any change in the Punjab. Therefore
consultation with all the parties was very important in the struggle to achieve some
workable plan.
According to Tai Yong Tan, the Simla Conference increased fear of the
Muslim rule among the Sikhs “larger than before.” 254 It also caused a serious
resentment among the loyalist officials who considered the same as it was being
perceived by the common people in every district. They ridiculed the British attitude
and said that the enemies of England should not fear while her allied parties should
not expect any favour from them. As regards the Sikh politics, the Simla Conference
enhanced considerably the prestige of Master Tara Singh while the Sikh integrity had
greatly suffered and divided the community even more than before. The nationalists,
Giani Kartar and Nagoke groups were not agreeing on the representation of the
Executive Council. Kharak Singh was furious on the recognition of the Akalis as the
sole representatives of the Sikh community. 255 On the other hand, the anti-Akali Sikh
parties pressurised Master Tara Singh to call an All Parties Sikh conference so that an
agreed representative might be nominated. The Governor reported that a compromise
between the Sikh parties was not possible. 256
The League stand at the Simla Conference was highly appreciated by the
Punjab Muslims and Mumtaz Daultana reported that he witnessed a marvellous
impact on the minds of the Punjabi Muslims. 257 Master Tara Singh in a press
statement reminded that the Pakistan issue was a Sikh-Muslim question and not a
Hindu-Muslim matter because it had affected the Sikh community. In a response to a

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question on the minority position of the Sikhs in the central districts, Master Tara said
that he was pushing the demand of the Sikh state on the analogy of Palestine as Jews
secured homeland with only ten per cent population. 258 He also stated that the issue of
representation in the Council should be solved through an arbitrator. 259 In the Sixth
All India Akali Conference at Gujranwala on 9 September 1945, Ishar Singh Majhail
reiterated the promise to fight the British if they would support the establishment of
Pakistan. The Sikhs attended this gathering with a show of open arms and anti-
Pakistan chanting. Baldev Singh said that the Sikhs would refuse to support the
establishment of a Muslim state even if they promised to provide a paradise to the
Sikhs in Pakistan. In Pakistan, even the house of gold was not acceptable for them. He
also cooked up a story that Jinnah had refused to travel in a taxi of a Sikh driver so the
Sikhs could never trust Jinnah. 260
Tiwana, Pro-Pakistan?
The new political situation in the Punjab moved the parties to obtain opinion of
the masses about the representative leadership of the communities. The Unionist
Muslims found themselves in a weak position against their counterpart, the League.
The Unionist Party published a pamphlet in late 1945 titled ‘Pakistan, Muslim
Unioniston ka Atall Aqeeda’ (Pakistan, firm belief of the Muslim Unionists) in which
the Punjab Premier’s stand on Pakistan was projected. The Pamphlet stated that
Tiwana had an unshaken belief in Pakistan and his statement was published in the
papers on 27 October 1945. Tiwana said that they had differences with the League
leadership but not on Pakistan: Ham Pakistan Key Hami Hein (We are supporters of
Pakistan); the League and the Muslim members of the Unionist Party had no
difference on the Lahore Resolution and all of them were united on it; he reminded

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that he already had expressed the same on 6 June 1944 when he was expelled from the
League. 261 In September 1945, a draft of an article titled ‘The Punjab Premier and
Pakistan’ was placed before Tiwana. This article again was to clarify the Premier’s
position that he never uttered a single word against Pakistan rather he supported it
even after his expulsion from the League:
The All-India Muslim League Resolution of 1940 popularly known as the Pakistan
Resolution is the sheet anchor of Muslims in the Punjab as elsewhere I have on countless
occasions declared my faith in it and I purpose to stand by it. 262
Why Tiwana or the Unionist Muslims were trying to be adherents to the Pakistan idea?
The desire to have a grip over the Unionists as well as the Leaguers convinced him to
support the Pakistan scheme. As a matter of fact, the circumstances had conspicuously
changed because the League had made its place in every corner of the Punjab. The
Unionists were at the verge of a total collapse therefore they were not in a position to
oppose Pakistan because it could deprive them of the popular support if they had.
The Executive Committee of the Akali Dal met at Amritsar on 7 January 1945
in which the leaders pondered over the anti-Akali attitude of the Congress in
Ludhiana meeting. Giani Kartar asked the Akalis to get rid of the Congress but
Nagoke opposed it on the ground that the past sacrifices of the Akalis for the
Congress would go waste. 263 While at this crucial juncture, the Akalis handed over
their leadership to Babu Labh Singh 264 which proved another striking blow to the Sikh
panth.
Bureaucracy and Unionists
According to Ian Talbot, the people had become fed up with the traditional
politics of the Unionists. The British had accepted the League as the sole Muslim
representative political party. This surrender was a great setback for Tiwana. The

262
other blow was the death of Chhotu Ram 265 in 1945 which provided an opportunity to
the Congress to consolidate its position in the eastern districts of the Punjab because
no competent successor could tackle the politics like him. The Unionist position went
to the bottom when it faced defections from its ranks. The provincial authorities used
the administration to block such desertions. The tilt towards the League was pervasive
among the Unionist Muslim circles but many of them were hesitant because their
immediate desertion could deprive them of the sympathy of the bureaucracy. The
Unionist government was using the government machinery to maintain their influence.
They deployed police to barricade the Muslims who wanted to attend the League
meetings. The police was also assigned the duty to make the Zamindara League’s
meetings successful. During his visit to Mianwali, Tiwana told his party workers that
the district administration would give them total support and they could utilise the
services of the Police and the Deputy Commissioner in this regard.
Such undemocratic methods proved pernicious as the people started thinking
that the Unionists had no footing in the masses therefore they were using the crutches
of zaildars, nambardars and the government machinery. Ian Talbot further writes that
the Unionists’ image was entirely downed when they used a Hindu Deputy
Commissioner in Hoshiarpur district to restore the popularity of the Unionist Party.
The people started thinking that the ‘Khizri Muslims’ were not Muslims in the real
sense. During this era, the religious affiliation had become more important than the
tribal. 266 The Lahorites raised slogans, Qaum da chor Khizar murdabad (down with
Khizr, the thief of the nation) along with a new name, Sardar Khizar Singh. 267
Interestingly, the Muslim protesters declared Tiwana as a Sikh not a Hindu which
confirms the Muslim-Sikh hatred at that time. Another factor of such kind of feelings
among the common Muslims was that all the attacks, forces, propaganda, and other

263
methods were being used against the League which had succeeded in projecting that
Pakistan would be a peaceful and an honourable place for the Muslims. Therefore, the
Unionists’ activities could not shatter the Muslim enthusiasm.
Electioneering Campaign (1945-46)
The elections of 1945-46, the most important event of the Indian politics, were
to judge the people’s sentiments on the demands made by the political parties. The
Congress sensed the time and “made an all out bid to divide the Sikhs to finish them
as a forceful separate entity” but the Sikh leadership could not learn the lesson. 268 The
League approached the Muslim voters to obtain their will in favour of Pakistan while
the Punjab Unionist Party issued its manifesto in 1945 which highlighted its past
services to the province and the Muslims in particular. The Unionists claimed that 80
per cent population of the Punjabis lived in the rural areas which remained their focus
during their entire political past. They propagated the objectives to achieve:
• attainment of complete independence through constitutional strategy,
• to maintain the provincial autonomy,
• better facilities for the backward urban classes,
• national self-respect,
• to work for the Punjabi recruitment in the army,
• reorganisation for educational, industrial and agricultural development,
• rural uplift,
• working for cultural and religious integrity of all the communities on the basis
of tolerance. 269
The government planned to project their politics through the print media. The Paisa
Akhbar published the news with the reference of some prominent Indian newspapers
that the Punjab government had purchased the local newspapers, Hindu, Ajit, Inqelab,
Ihsan and Al-shehbaz, for its political purposes. The government had been giving Rs.

264
3000 grant annually to these papers in the name of war propaganda and this amount
had been increased to Rs. 17,000 then. The paper further communicated that the
governments could not be saved through such means. 270 The League came up with a
well-worked out plan in the elections. Their canvassing was based on two elements
i.e., Horrors and Hopes. They depicted what happened in the past with the Muslims
under the majority of the Sikh and Hindu communities. The League infused that the
anti-League victory would ruin the Muslims. The economic, religious, educational,
agricultural, political and other hopes enunciated by the Leaguers in the proposed
Muslim state was another aspect to attract huge number of the sympathisers. 271
The League propagated that they were out to fight the anti-Muslim forces.
David Gilmartin writes that Sardar Shaukat Hayat tried a lot to attract the Muslims in
the name of Islam. At Sial Sharif, Sargodha, he spoke to the Muslim League
conference in June 1945 and sought a promise not to leave the path of Islam while in
September 1946 he stated that there would be an Islamic government in Pakistan. In
February 1946, Pir Jama’at Ali Shah defending Jinnah at the Sunni conference at
Benaras, said that Jinnah was a saint of God. 272 Such statements had marvellous
impact on the people who had profound love for the saints. In the early February 1944,
he had already announced his full support to the Pakistan ideal. He conveyed his
voice to all the Muslims and appealed to make the annual session of the Punjab
League, Sialkot successful and sacrifice all what they possessed on the call of Quaid-
i-Azam. 273 His son M. Hussain Shah in December 1945 toured the Jhelum Tehsil and
issued the verdict that only the Leaguers were Muslims while the anti-Leaguers were
unquestionably infidels. 274 Maulana Syed Fazl Husain Shah, Sajjada Nashin Jalalpur
Sharif (district Jhelum) who enjoyed immense influence in whole of the district issued
a statement to support the League. 275 They used festival of Eid and Friday prayers as

265
platforms to convey that the support to Jinnah was their religious duty. The students
trained on religious lines played an impressive role in engraining the League in the
Muslim minds in the rural Punjab. 276
The Governor’s reports backed the facts when they referred to the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islam conference held at Lahore attended by 20,000 people including Pirs
and Ulema from all over the Punjab, Delhi, UP and NWFP. The speakers
unequivocally appealed to the Muslims to vote for the Leaguers “in the name of
Allah.” 277 The strategy proved effective in strengthening the League in the Punjab.
Notable point is that the students’ activities in favour of Pakistan had entrenched this
idea in the minds of the masses. The League’s decision to strengthen its position
through the students was projected by the Governor in June 1944 as a devious move
to further its objectives. The Leaguers were using mosques as a base for the party
politics and propagation for the Pakistan demand. They were doing all this under the
assertion that politics and religion in Islam are inseparable. The report warned that
boycott of the Hindu shops and opening of the Muslim shops in the villages would
end any possibility of communal understanding between the two communities in the
near future. 278 The propagation in the name of God or Islam was proving too
disastrous for the Unionist Muslims that the Premier had to issue a press statement in
which he warned the propagandists of legal action if they continued influencing the
voters in the name of Divine displeasure. 279
The Governor expressed concern about the Muslim League National Guards
and Jinnah’s anti-Unionist propaganda on religious lines. Tiwana informed the
Governor that Jinnah was inviting maulvis from the UP to the Punjab to challenge the
Unionist government “on religious lines.” 280 Nevertheless, the Punjab Muslim League
National Guards had no secret funds and motives, as the organisation advertised in the

266
Inqelab that the audited reports of the organisation had been placed in the office for
the public view 281 along with its source of income and expenditures. The governing
party also decided to secure mass support of the Muslims through religious
propaganda. The Unionist organiser in district Jhelum in the late December 1945
faced difficulty in countering the religious propaganda of the League and sought the
similar help from the party. He demanded that verdicts against the League should be
arranged from Bareily or Deoband. Other districts also faced the same situation
wherein the party leaders cried for the help of some religious oratory and verdicts. For
example, Multan district requested for sending maulvies. The party tried to meet the
demand by sending paid maulvis of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, Delhi, 282 a political
wing of Deoband established in 1919. The Zamindara League 283 of the district
Montgomery organised a camp on the annual fair of Baba Farid at Pakpattan to attract
the masses but it could not be effective as neither people nor Sajjadanashin gave them
any importance. On the other hand, the League had a privileged place during this
event. 284
A Sikh Election Board was made under Master Tara Singh to participate in the
coming elections who pointed out that the Congress and Communists were supporting
Pakistan while the Mahasabha was the only anti-Pakistan party but without any
importance in the political sphere. Nevertheless, he advised the Akalis to fully support
the Congress in the fight for Indian independence. 285 Dr. Gopi Chand concluded an
understanding between the Provincial Congress and the Akalis. As a result, the
Congressite Sikhs and the Nagoke group agreed that such avenues should be worked
out; this could provide a base for the Akali-Congress compromise at the national level.
By this formula, the Working Committee of the Akali Dal and the Congress
Parliamentary Board would pick the candidates with mutual agreement on the

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Congress tickets but with the conditions of safeguarding the Sikh interests and the
opposition to Pakistan. But Master Tara Singh did not approve it. The Akalis however
seemed hopeful of an eventual compromise despite the friction between Akalis and
the Congressites during the election campaign. 286 Under such expectations, the Akalis
continued the support of the Congress candidates. The Police reported that the Akalis
were supporting Dr. Gopi Chand because they had compromised with the Congress
on a few electoral constituencies. 287
According to the Governor’s report, the Akali Dal and the Congress started
discussion to conclude an agreement for the Punjab Assembly elections but it failed to
achieve the understanding. Azad and the other Congress high command expressed a
great concern over the breakdown of the negotiations. He instructed the Punjab
Congress to come to an agreement with the Akalis and Unionists even if the terms
were not favourable as they had desired. The extremist Akalis and Dr. Gopi Chand
maintained the enthusiasm to strengthen the group position while the Communists
forced Master Tara Singh to make a settlement. Sarat Chandra Bose made a visit to
the Punjab to mediate but could not produce any settlement. 288 In January 1946, at
Chakwal, the Congress organised its meeting a few yards away from the place where
the Akalis had organised their gathering. At Rawalpindi, the Akalis disturbed all the
arrangements made by the Central Akali Dal. The Akalis and Congressites were close
to fight but escaped. On the other hand, the Namdhari 289 Sikhs declared their support
to the Congress candidates in the elections. In the meanwhile, the League held 70
meetings in one week and the Muslim women and students were struggling hard to
secure the mass support for the Muslim state. It was reported that the students of the
Aligarh proved not effective during the mass campaign. 290

Using Government Machinery
268
The abuse of the government machinery against the League remained a salient
feature of the Unionist Ministry under the British Governor. Numerous cases were
reported to the League leadership in this regard. The League meetings were held to
deal with the complaints of interference by the Punjab officers against their candidates.
On 3 December 1945, the League Working Committee eventually decided to
approach the Punjab Governor and Viceroy to report the officers’ interference in the
elections and the postponement of the Municipal and Corporation elections. On 8
December, the League deputation met the Governor and demanded for an enquiry by
the British MPs and “Parliamentary supervision over the elections.” 291 The official
influence was utilised to the extent that Baba Kharak Singh and Gopal Singh Qaumi
had to say that Sardar Ujjal Singh and Baldev Singh were the ‘nominees’ of the
Punjab Governor. 292 On 17 January 1946, Jinnah addressed a huge gathering of the
Muslim women at Lahore in which he condemned the “Glancy-Khizar Axis.” 293 He
also condemned the Punjab government’s illegal interference in the electioneering
activities and consoled his followers by saying that if Gandhi, Patel and Nehru could
not damage the League what could the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and
Tehsildars of the Punjab do to the prestige of the League. He considered the
nationalist Muslims, Ahrars and Khaksars as henchmen of the government and
enemies of the League. 294
Chaudhry Ram Singh, Superintendent of Police, toured the area of Midh
Ranjha, district Shahpur and scared the supporters of the League’s candidate and tried
to pressurise the local eminent people to side with the Tiwana’s candidate. Sheikh
Manzur Ali, Revenue Assistant and District Election Officer, tried to influence the
voters against the League during his tour to Bhalwal Tehsil. 295 Raja Ghazanfar Ali

269
Khan issued a statement that the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of
Police were struggling hard through different inducements and threats to secure the
candidates for the Unionist Party against the Leaguers. He further said that they had
appealed to the Governor to issue orders for the impartial working of the district
administration but Glancy turned down the request. Jinnah stated that Glancy and
Khizr could not eliminate the party representing the millions of the Muslims. 296
Jinnah in his speech to the Muslim women on 17 January 1946 said that the
bureaucracy was interfering with the elections. 297 Khizr Tiwana, Chhotu Ram, Glancy
and the Ministers along with the officers were openly collecting money for the
Zamindara League. Amazingly, the senior British officials sometimes supported the
undemocratic and illegal activities of the Unionists who had been involved in
pressurising the subordinates to do all this for the defeat of the League in the
forthcoming elections. The Premier also disclosed about the Governor’s interference
and conveyed his message according to DC, Ludhiana that Shaukat Hayat in
particular and the Leaguers in general should not win the elections at any cost. 298 The
Governor and his machinery played a crucial role in the elections:
The Muslim intelligentsia is dead certain that if the official machinery had not been used
on the side of Unionists no member would have been returned on the Unionist ticket for
the Provincial Assembly. 299
The law and order situation during the elections is worth-discussing because no major
clash took place on the polling day as the Governor reported. Nevertheless many
minor brawls between the Akalis and Congressite Sikhs and between Ahrars,
Unionists and Leaguers occurred. 300 Interestingly, no clash between the Leaguers and
Akalis took place and it was the blessing of the separate electorates otherwise buying
voters and verdicts of profanity or traitors against each other could be poisonous to

270
the peaceful elections. It also shows that in the presence of all the past memories and
political grievances both the parties could go ahead for some mutual understanding.
Results of the Elections
The party position was as follows:
Party Seats
Muslim League 75
Congress 51
Unionists 21(13 Muslims)
Panthic Sikhs 21
Independents 07
Source: Letter from Glancy to Wavell, 28 February 1946 in Lionel Carter, ed., Punjab Politics, 1940-
1943 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 172-74.
The election results set a new trend in the history of the Subcontinent. As a
democratic tool, the elections pushed the minor parties to the bottom and the voters
supported the parties which had popular ideological base. It washed out the
Communists, Ahrars, Khaksars, Hindu Mahasabha and Radical democrats totally
from the democratic scene. 301 Mohar Singh, Prem Singh, Chaudhri Suraj Mal, M.
Mangoo Ram, M. Sant Ram, and S. Jagjit Singh (Landholder) returned to the
Assembly as the Unionists while D. B. S. P. Singha won as a Christian Unionist. 302
By this, the Unionist Party was relegated to a negligible political organ despite its
claim to represent all the Punjabi communities. It could obtain just 3 Sikh, 3 Hindu
and 1 Christian seat. The claimant of the ‘cross-communal’ party could win only 7
non-Muslim seats. The elections unseated fifty-seven Unionist Muslims and it could
secure only 21 seats. The Communists also did poorly by losing all the 4 seats they
previously held. 303
The results invoked great appreciation for the students of the Aligarh
University, Muslim Students Federation, Islamia College and other colleges of Lahore

271
and Amritsar who furthered the cause of Pakistan 304 and did a lot in winning the
elections. The Unionists faced severe setback in the elections as the results were
declared in favour of the League. Their best candidates had been defeated by the
Leaguers. Even Tiwana could save his seat with flooding money. According to his
son, Tiwana had to spend Rs. 8 lakhs during his election campaign. 305 Baldev Singh
had to utilise lakhs of rupees, government machinery and appeals in the name of
panth only then he could win his seat with a very close margin of a few hundred
votes. 306 According to T. P. Khalidi, the Jat ministers, Baldev Singh and Ch. Tikka
Ram were in trouble due to the Congress opposition and both had to spend a huge
amount of money. 307 Bibi Amar Kaur, sister of Bhagat Singh Shaheed, was jailed
because she had made anti-Baldev speeches in his constituency. 308
Many Hindu leaders viewed the League’s victory in the elections as of no
importance. To them, the victory did not reflect that the Muslims had voted for
Pakistan. Narayan Kumar wrote that the Muslim support for the League could not
mean the support for Pakistan. 309 Such assertions were preposterous because the
League had contested the elections on the basis of Pakistan agenda therefore the
victory of the League was a victory for the idea of Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru also
rejected the League’s success in the elections and said that the victory did not mean
the Muslim support for the Pakistan scheme 310 while Maulana Azad writes that Nehru
considered the League as a popular party after the elections and that the Congress
could have coalition with it. 311 Nehru had said in January 1946 that he would not
oppose the Muslims to join India against their will but it did not mean that they would
drag the other communities with them. Ram Narayan opines that he was tacitly
proposing partitioning the provinces. 312

272
The election results deepened the communal crisis and very little effort was
made to avoid the expected problems. The League triumphed in the Punjab against the
will of the Unionists and British and if its victory was to be marred it could not
remain silent. Sensing such circumstances, the decision-making authorities in the
government and political arena particularly the anti-League forces could save the
Punjab from a political split with specific measures. But a new drama was initiated to
transmute the League’s victory into a defeat. The Governor reported to the Viceroy
that the political situation was doubtful regarding the loyalties while the seat position
at that time did not indicate that any single party could make a ministry independently.
The Governor thus came to the conclusion that as no single party commanded a
majority in the Assembly so a coalition government was the only solution. 313 The
Governor’s analysis was very strange because everyone knew that under the
constitutional arrangement of the seat allocation to the different communities of the
Punjab, only a coalition government could be formed after every election. So, the
report was a clear message that the Governor was prepared to ignore the League’s
political breakthrough and was determined to deny the largest party in the Assembly
an opportunity to form the government.
The League’s victory, the disappointing performance by the nationalist
Muslims and Ahrar candidates and the total rejection of the Unionist party by the
Muslim masses were a stunning surprise to the Congress circles. Vallabhai Patel cried
that all their efforts, hopes and finances were wasted. All their expectations and
calculations proved false and wrong. Nevertheless, the possibility of a Congress,
Akali, and Unionist coalition relieved him but he too repeated the Congress creed that
“we can have no truck with the League.” 314 The success in the elections should have
convinced the so-called ‘democratic’ Congress to acknowledge the League as the sole

273
representative of the Indian Muslims and this was the best opportunity to bring the
League in the main fold of the national struggle but the Congress did not even accept
the League victory as a genuine change rather the Congress leadership in the coming
days stated that the League had befooled the Muslims.
The Governor reported that the results busied the parties in the Ministry
making. The Akalis would have a key position in any move to form coalition Ministry.
The report further depicted the situation that the coming Gurdwara elections and the
apprehension about Pakistan presented sufficient base to reject any possibility of
political working with the League. The Sikhs were furious due to the Congress
opposition in the elections and most of them regarded it as a Hindu party which had
not concern with the Sikh interests. The Akali MLAs empowered Baldev Singh to
negotiate with the political parties regarding the coalition government. 315 The Akali
Sikhs continued their targeted policy pertaining to the Muslim-Sikh relations. They
always seemed keen to win the Gurdwara elections which could enable them to
collect the Sikhs around them in the name of religion and provide them substantial
amount of funds. This distracted them from the main task at hand which was to
safeguard the Sikh political interests in the changing political circumstances.
In February 1946, Master Tara Singh issued a press statement condemning the
League activities in the Punjab. The Leaguers in their processions were chanting
slogans like, Le kar Rahen ge Pakistan and Coalition Ministry ko tor do. Master Tara
Singh said that the Sikhs knew that the main aim of such activities was to establish the
League rule which could never be tolerable for them:
We are pledged to fight against Pakistan and I wish to awaken the Sikhs in time to be
prepared to face the coming Muslim League onslaught. ..We must gird up our loins at
once to resist the coming danger and to protect our persons and our honour. 316

274
Master Tara Singh as the Chief Commander ordered re-organising the Akali Fauj in
all the areas but be confined to the indoor activities. 317 The Sikh leaders Giani Kartar
and Ujjal Singh negotiated on 28 February at Lahore with Mumtaz Daultana, Raja
Ghazanfar Ali and Shaukat Hayat in which the leaders of both the communities tried
to reach some agreement. 318 The Inqelab in its Editorial criticised the confused policy
of the Akali leadership and wrote on 28 February 1946 that Master Tara Singh first
stated that the Panthic Party would prefer section 93 (Governor rule) instead of
working with the League in the Punjab; two days later, he demanded equal number of
ministers in the League-Akali coalition government and then reiterated that the
League would have to abdicate its demand for Pakistan if it sought the Akali support
and in case of refusal it should support Khalistan in the central districts of the
Punjab. 319
In the sum, the Muslim-Sikh politics during the period 1943 to 1946 remained
victim of the traditional trends. The Akali leadership was still pursuing the claims,
mainly the Sikh state on Israel and Ireland models but without any well-worked plans.
Communal tension became more acute and the relations between the two
communities reached the simmering point. The elections eventually decided the
popular passion for Pakistan and Jinnah was approved as a hope of the Punjabi
Muslims while the Unionist Party lost not only the make-shift political arrangements
but also the myth of a popular and secular party of the region. Despite being allied,
the Akalis continued anti-Unionist government drive by declaring it as the
Aurangzebi Raj. It was disclosed that the Sikandar-Baldev Pact was concluded with
the consent of the Congress high command which always posed to be an anti-
imperialist and anti-Unionist party. The Akali Sikhs through statements, organisations,
and speeches threatened to apply violent methods against the Muslims. The Achari

275
formula was an acceptance of the League stature in the Indian politics which had been
denied in the past. On the other hand, the Akali-League patch-up in the NWFP
repudiated the Akali stand against the League which helped anti-Akali Sikhs to
strengthen their position in the community. The Akali leadership had to face severe
criticism because of its erratic and inconsistent political attitude particularly towards
the League.
The idea of Azad Punjab was not acceptable either to the Hindus or Muslims
but even then the Muslims had been supporting the idea of Sikh state, sometimes
motivating them to demand their homeland. The League believed in the principle of
self-determination therefore it favoured the Sikh state while on the other hand it knew
well that having no majority in any part of the Punjab the claim of the Sikhs would
never be honoured. The League had not supported the Sikh state as a party on the
numerical strength particularly in the central districts of the Punjab. The League could
not commit suicide by supporting the Sikh homeland because such a state could
deprive the Muslims of all the fertile areas which would be the sole feeding base for
the rest of Pakistan. Therefore, the League’s support for the Sikh state was a political
tactic to make them realise the weaknesses of their demand.
The time of Master Tara Singh’s retirement from the politics marked the era of
pro-League tilt among the Akali circles and much was talked of the cooperation with
the League in the conferences and statements. Most of the Akali gatherings had
addressed the issue and discussed the League-Akali understanding particularly by
Giani Kartar while after the re-emergence of Master Tara the issue was shelved and
rarely revived and discussed. The issue also showed the weak leadership of Giani
Kartar who without an ideological direction and commitment desired to maintain his
grip on the party affairs. He wanted to secure the League cooperation because in case

276
of its government the Sikhs would be able to collect more reasonable package of
rights but at the same time he was engaged in condemning Jinnah and Pakistan.
The Simla Conference proved that the British were trying to suffocate the
Pakistan scheme which escaped due to the farsightedness of Jinnah. Another fact was
confirmed that the Unionist Muslims were with the League on the all-India political
issues while within the provincial politics they had an separate agenda under the
British dictation. Although it was a tactic on the Unionists’ part but even then it
preserved a possibility of a sudden embrace with the League. This does not concede
that the Punjab was not with the League as the Sikhs felt. Furthermore, the League
had secured marvellous popularity among the Muslim masses and other factions of
the province which could be proved practically at any time of need. Unlike the past
years, the Congress and Akali Dal formally lost their stand regarding Pakistan and
League while the official policy went against Pakistan as demonstrated at Simla. The
rural Punjab had been infected after the violent speeches and election results. The
Muslim students and the Khaksars seemed busy in the rural areas mainly using
mosques for political purposes which moved the people to look at the politics in the
religious perspective with more enthusiasm.
No brawl or altercation between the Muslims and Sikhs during the elections
was reported which was a blessing of the separate electorates. It also indicates that the
understanding could be achieved with serious efforts by the political leadership but
the unbalanced influence of the Congress on the Sikhs, weak working of the League
on the Sikhs, exhortation of the Sikh leadership for violence against the Muslims and
the anti-League role of the Punjab establishment made any understanding impossible.
Through the elections of 1946, those Punjabi Muslims who were eligible to vote in a
restricted electorate demonstrated a decisive commitment to Pakistan. Now the future

277
course of the politics became tangible and discernible. The partition of the province
could be avoided by respecting the otherness of others, this lesson was deliberately
neglected by the Congress leadership. The communal tension further deteriorated. But
the leadership which could be compromising was the Sikhs and the Unionists which
could prevent the rift between Muslims and the Sikhs. The election results could be
the bridging element if both the communities had demonstrated flexibility. For the
first time, the Akali Dal and League had become major parties of the Assembly
therefore the land of five rivers expected a lot from them. The League being the
largest party in the Assembly had a right to form government in the province while
the Sikhs being claimant of the ‘sacred Punjab’ had a duty to side with the League
because only by siding with the League some way-out could be sought. However, the
Muslim-Sikh relations during the years 1943-46 exhibited no possibility of the
League-Akali patch-up in the Assembly which was a severe blow to the Muslim-Sikh
relations and could lead to splitting of the Punjab.

Chapter Three
Notes
278
1
Letter from the Punjab Governor to Linlithgow on 17 April 1943 in Nicholas Mansergh, ed.,
The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol. III (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1971), 898-99.
2
The Times, 1 May 1944.
3
FR, May, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
4
Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab, 1926-47 (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 174.
5 The Eastern Times, 24 March 1944.
6 Report from the Punjab Provincial Muslim League to the All India Committee of Action on
28 July 1944, Punjab I:6, Shamsul Hasan Collection,.
7 The Eastern Times 29 August 1944.
8
FR, October 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
9
President of the district Multan League.
10
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, S-412, para. 513.
11
Nia Zamana (Bombay) Weekly of the Hindustani Communist Party, 2 December 1945; see
also about scheme presented by Jamiluddin of Aligarh, The Eastern Times (Lahore), 6 February 1944.
12
Aziz Beg, “Khizar’s Fantasy,” The Eastern Times,10 January 1946.
13
Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947
(Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1999), 173.
14
Ian Talbot, Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition
Experience in North-West India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30; for details on crowd
studies, see the book mentioned.
15
B. File no. 195, H/General, 1943, Proceedings, Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Punjab
Archives, Lahore.
16 Letter from Tara Singh Kalra to MA Jinnah on 14 September 1944, file-930, QAP.
17 Mehr’s article [handwritten] in reply to the Muslim League’s Pamphlet, MS210/2, Papers of
Col. Nawab Khizar Hayat Tiwana (Tiwana Papers).
18 Muhammad Sharif Jallandhari, Iqbal aur Watan (A Pamphlet, 1945), 7-8 in MS210/3, Ibid.
19 H. N. Mitra ed., The Indian Annual Register, 1919-1947, vol. 1 (1943) (New Delhi: Gian
Publishing House, 1990) , 318.
20 In 1943, Ch. Chhotu Ram founded an organisation on caste basis. It was called Jat Sabha
and sometimes Jat Mahasabha.
21 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, 1943, file no. 411, para. 366.
22 Letter from Rafi Butt to Jinnah on 11 April 1944, Punjab IV, Shamsul Hasan Collection.
23 The Eastern Time, 27 October 1944.
24 Qaumi Jang (Bombay), 14 October 1945.
25 The Eastern Times, 26 May 1943.
26 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, 411, para. 195.
27 FR, May, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
28 FR, January, 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
29 Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 1920-47” (Ph.D. diss., Guru Nanak
Dev University, 2005), 210. The researcher has asserted cultural affinity between the Pakhtoon and
Pothohari cultures without any example like that of language, dress, customs or traditions. As a matter
of fact, there is nothing common between the two cultures in many domains of life.
30 Feroz Khan Noon presented resolution in 1922 in the Punjab Legislative Council against the
re-amalgamation of NWFP with the Punjab and argued that language, habits, geography, customs and
way of life marked the people entirely different from the Punjabis. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, “Redefining
Constitutional Politics: the N-WFP and the Raj, 1901-1932,” The Calcutta Historical Journal, vols.
XXI & XXII, Special Number (1999-2000): 118 (115-137).
31 Mitra , The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 298-299.
32 CMG, 8 June 1943.
33 FR, March 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
34 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 294-95.
35 CMG, 6 June 1943.

36 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 298.
37 Ibid., 301.
38 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file no. 411, para. 397 and 407.
39 FR, April, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
40 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file no. 411, para. 171.
41 Ibid., para. 178.
42 Ibid., para. 456.
43 Ibid., para. 471.
44 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 205-7.
45 Professor Hassan Suhrawardy, “The Indian Crisis: Muslim View Point,” Asiatic Society 39
(January 1943): 56.
46 FR, March, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
47 Ibid.
48 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, para. 159.
49 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 271-273.
50 CMG, 6 June 1943.
51 Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh: Jeevan Sangharsh tey Udaish (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar:
1972), 193; also see Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha institute of religious
studies, 1981), 47.
52 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file. 411, para. 484.
53 FR December, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
54 Chakwal, now independent district.
55 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file 411, para. 389.
56 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file no. 411, para. 320.
57 Sardar Sant Singh, MLA (Central), Amar Singh of Sher-i-Punjab (a magazine), Harbans
Singh Sestani, Labh Singh Narang, Maher Singh Chakwal, Durlabh Singh, Secretary, Progressive
Akali Party, and Bakshi Rachpal Singh Advocate, Rawalpindi, Chairman Reception Committee also
participated. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. II (1943), 300.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., para. 332.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., para. 365.
63 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1943), 296-297.
64 Jaspreet Walia, “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics,” 152.
65 “Akalis’ Azad Punjab Scheme,” Editorial, The Eastern Time, 27 October 1944.
66 FR, June 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
67 The Eastern Times, 10 June 1943.
68 CMG, 11 June 1943.
69 Editorial, “Are the Sikhs Hindus?” The Eastern Times, 19 June 1943.
70 The Eastern Times, 15 May 1943.
71 FR July, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
72 Ibid, August 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
73 Ibid, January 1946, L/PJ/5249.
74 Ibid, August, 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
75 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, para. 407.
76 Ibid., para. 546.
77 Ibid., 1944, file no. 412, para. 40.
78 FR, February, 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
79 FR, March 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
80 IOR: L/P&J/10/33.
81 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 114.
279
82 Ibid., para. 130.
83 Rajagopalacharia Formula is also described as Rajaji Formula, Rajagopalachariar Formula
and Achari Formula.
84 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London:
Routledge, 2000), 108.
85 Master Tara Singh, Congress Te Sikh (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Giani Press, n.d.), 7.

86 FR, August 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
87 Also called Rajaji formula.
88 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1944), 210-15.
89 Ibid., 215-16.
90 Letter from Durlab to Gandhi on 12 November and then Gandhi to Durlab Singh on 14
November 1944 in Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1944), 221-22.
91 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 222.
92 Letter from Master Gurbanta Singh (Editor and member District Board Jullundur) to Jinnah
280
on 25 August 1944, File-930, QAP.
93 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. II (1944), 223.
94 FR, November 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
95 Lord Auckland called the Sikhs a nation in 1840. See Letter from Lord Auckland to
Hobhouse on 23 January 1840 in Bikrama Jit Hasrat, ed., The Punjab Papers: Selection from the
Private Papers of Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, Viscount Hardinge, and the Marquis of
Dalhousie, 1836-1849 on the Sikhs (Hoshiarpur: The V.V. Research Institute Press, 1970), 34-35;
Maharaja Dalip Singh had done the same in the late 19 th century (15 May 1886 and onward writing
from Paris and other places). Gurmit Singh, History of Sikh Struggles (1946-1966), vol. 1 (New Delhi:
Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1989), 198, 201, 203.
96 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 122-123.
97 Rajwant Kaur Dhillon, “Demand for Pakistan: Role of Master Tara Singh,” in Verinder
Grover, ed., The Story of Punjab Yesterday and Today (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995),
538.
98 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1967), 46.
99 FR, September, 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
100 Ibid.
101 While Gandhi always said that he was not a member of Congress. See Punjab Police
Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 1944, file S-412, para. 512.
102 FR, August 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
103 FR, Second half of May, 1944. L/PJ/5/247.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 FR, October 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
107 K. C. Gulati, Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 106-108.
108 The Eastern Times, 30 December 1944.
109 Harnam Singh, Punjab: The Homeland of the Sikhs ((Lahore: n.p., 1945)) in IOR:
L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet Mission: Sikhs; see also Master Tara Singh, Panthic Nazarya (Urdu) (Amritsar:
Panthic Tract Society, n.d.), 3-6.
110 FR, January 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
111 Ibid.
112 Harnam Singh, Punjab the Homeland of the Sikhs, 46.
113 The Eastern Times, 6 April 1943.
114 People’s War, Bombay, 9 April 1944.
115 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1944), 221-24.
116 Ibid.
117 Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799-1947 (Lahore:
Research Society of Pakistan, Punjab University, 1970), 531.
118 FR, March 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
119 Imran Ali, Punjab Politics in the Decade before Partition (Lahore: CSAS, Punjab
University, 1975), 42; see also K. C. Yadav, “The Partition of India, A Study of the Muslim Politics in
the Punjab, 1849-1947,” The Punjab Past and Present 17-I (April 1983): 137.
120 Letter from Glancy to the Viceroy in Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (New
Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), 171.
121 Ibid., 170-71.
122 Letter from MA Jinnah to Murid Hussain Qureshi on 21 June 1944, File-1092, QAP.
123 MS210/13, Tiwana Papers.
124 Ibid.

281
125 FR, March 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
126 It had become a fashion to say that the Pakistan scheme a vague move but as a matter of
fact a map of Pakistan along with a slogan ‘freedom of India lies in Pakistan’ was displayed in the 13 th
session of All-India Muslim League held at Delhi in April 1943. The Eastern Times, 27 April 1943.
127 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1944), 227-29.
128 CMG, 31 March 1944; see also MS-210/13, Tiwana Papers.
129 Address of Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana to the Muslim Students’ Federation (4 th Annual
Session) at Lahore on 18-19 March 1944, vol. 230, AFM.
130 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 225.
131 Pakistan, Muslim Unioniston ka Atall Aqeeda, Wazir-i-Azam Honourable Malik Khizr
Hayat Khan ka Eham Bian (A Pamphlet published by the Unionist Party) in MS210/3, Tiwana Papers.
132 Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India (London:
Curzon Press, 1996), 117, 119.
133 CMG, 4, 8, 14, 30 July 1944.
134 Mehr’s article [handwritten] in reply to the Muslim League’s Pamphlet in MS210/2, Tiwana
Papers.
135Extract th
from Private Letter from Lord Wavell to Amery on 29 March 1944, Punjab
Ministry Affairs and Appreciations, IOR: L/PJ/8/662.
136
Enclosure to the Private Secretary (to the Viceroy) to the Private Secretary (to the Secretary
of State for India) on 10-8-43, IOR: L/PJ/8/662 (Punjab Ministry Affairs and Appreciations).
137
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 200.
138
Ibid., para 213.
139
Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Muslim-Sikh Relationship (1921-47) A Brief Survey,” Journal of the
Pakistan Historical Society 39, Part III (July 1991): 274.
140
Imran Ali, Punjab Politics, 42-43.
141
David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” in
Mushirul Hasan, ed., India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 222.
142
Yadav, “The Partition of India,” 136-137.
143 FR, April 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
144 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 283.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., para. 224.
147 Weekly, Qaumi Jang (Communist magazine, Bombay) 18 June 1944.
148 Namely Dalpat Singh, MLA (District Rohtak), Ch. Malkhan Singh (District Ambala),
Sardar Inder Singh (Hoshiarpur), Ch. Sher Singh Zaildar (Hoshiarpur), Sardar Basant Singh (Jullundur),
and Sardar Sikattar Singh (Amritsar). CMG, 6 June 1943.
149 FR, April 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
150 Report from the Punjab Provincial Muslim League to the All India Committee of Action, on
28 July 1944, Punjab I:6, Shamsul Hasan Collection.
151 FR, June, 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
152 “Official Interference in Election in Lyallpur District. Unionist Party.” 1944, Punjab I:34,
Shamsul Hasan Collection.
153 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947, 142-44.
154 Ibid., 146-48.
155 Ibid., 152.
156 Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates 1945, vol. 24, (Lahore: Superintendent Government
Printing, 1946), 110.
157 Letter from unknown person to Baldev Singh , undated, file-930, QAP.
158 Editorial, Qaumi Jang, 31 October 1943.
159 Qaumi Jang, Communist magazine, 18 November 1945.
160 Inqelab, 12 January 1946.
161 FR, January 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
162 Statesman, 5 April 1944 in Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-
1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 102.
163 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1943), 301.
164 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file S-411, para. 341.

165
Ibid., para. 178.
166
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1944), 196-98.
167
CMG, 27 March 1943.
168
FR, September 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
169
The Eastern Times, 9 August 1944.
170
“Are the Sikhs A Nation?,” Editorial, The Eastern Time, 8 August 1944.
171
Ibid.
172
Ibid.
173
The Eastern Time, 27 August 1944.
174
Ibid.
175
FR, September 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
176 Ibid.
177 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 219.
178 Ibid., 220.
179 Ibid.
180 FR, October 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
282
181 Ibid.
182 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1944), 218-220. One can observe the huge
difference between the original proceedings and the Governor’s report of this conference. The Akali
leader vividly castigated the Unionist government along with Pakistan scheme but the Governor
euphemised it in his report which indicates his bias towards Sikhs.
183 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 221.
184 FR, October 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
185 Letter from Durlab Singh to Gandhi on 12 November and then Gandhi to Durlab Singh on
14 November 1944 in Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1944), 221-22.
186 Letter from Master Sundar Singh to Lord Wavell on 28 June 1945, File-930, QAP.
187 Letter from an Akali (Amritsar) to MA Jinnah on 13 August 1944, File-930, QAP.
188
FR, January 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
189
Ibid,, January 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
190
Ibid., October 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
191
Qaumi Jang, 18 October 1945.
192
Weekly Nia Zamana, (Communist Party Bombay) 25 November 1945.
193
Nehru’s Speech at Moga on18 November 1945 quoted in OP Ralhan and Suresh K.
Sharma, eds., Documents on Punjab, vol. II (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1994): 118-119.
194
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1I (1945), 171.
195
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1945, file S-413, para. 107.
196
Ibid., 1943, para. 178.
197
Report from the Punjab Provincial Muslim League to the All India Committee of Action, 28
July 1944, Punjab I:6, Shamsul Hasan Collection, NAP.
198
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file S-411, para. 320.
199 Ibid., para. 131.
200 FR December 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
201 Ibid., September 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
202 Ibid., March 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
203 Speech of Sir Nazimuddin, the Bengal Premier, in the Gaya Pakistan Conference on 9 April
1944 in Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1944), 216-17.
204 Private Weekly Letters, From and to Secretary of State for India, 1943-44, IOR:
L/PO/10/21.
205 Major-General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, A Personal Record of the Partition of
India (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 28.
206 Resolutions No. 4-5 of the Working Committee of the Karnal District Muslim League on 6
June 1943, File-580, QAP.
207 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1945, file S-413, para. 107.
208 FR, April 1943, L/PJ/5/246.
209 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1943), 301.
210 CMG, 3 June 1943.

211 FR, January1944, L/PJ/5/247.
212 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 44.
213 FR, January 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
214 “Review of Terrorist Situation in the Punjab, 1 October 1943 to 31 March 1944,”
Supplement to the Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 1944, file S-412, para.4.
215 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1944), 194.
216 FR, October 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
133.
217 Ibid., June 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
218 Aims and Objects of the Muslim National Guard, F-111, QAP.
219 FR June 1943, /246.
220 Ibid., January 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
221 Letter of the Akali Leader to MA Jinnah on 13 November 1944, F-930, QAP.
222 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 58 and 67.
223 FR, January 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
224 Ibid..
225 Editorial, The Eastern Times, 11 January 1944.
226 FR, L/PJ/5/247.
227 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1944, file S-412, para. 30.
228 Ibid., para. 103.
229 Ibid., para. 567.
230 Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945),
231 Jaspreet Walia, Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 213.
232 The Eastern Times, 27 August 1944.
233 Ibid., 15 June 1944.
234 Ibid., 20 May 1943.
235 Letter published in The Eastern Time, 14 December 1944.
236 Resolution’s copy from President, Gurdwara Committee Bhai Joga Singh Ji, Peshawar to
283
MA Jinnah on 5 August 1944, File- 1102, QAP.
237
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1943, file S-411, para. 141.
238
The Eastern Times, December 1944.
239
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1945, file S-413, para. 212, 223.
240
FR January 1946, L/PJ/5249.
241
Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 249 and 249n.
242
Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 118-119.
243
Joseph T. O’Connell, Sikh History and Religion, 249.
244
Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 224.
245
Iqbal Chawla, “Punjab Politics and the Wavell Plan,” 69-67.
246
Anita Inder Singh, The origins of the Partition of India, 119.
247
Edmund Muller and Arun Bhattacharjee, India Wins Independence: A Connected Historical
Narration of India’s Freedom Struggle (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1988), 147-148.
248
Iqbal Chawla, “Punjab Politics and the Wavell Plan,” 69-67.
249
Tiwana’s statement, File no. SM-210/13, Tiwana Papers.
250
Ibid.
251
Prithipal Singh Kapur, “The Role of Master Tara Singh,” in Amrik Singh, ed., The Partition
in Retrospect, 68.
252 Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle, Origin, Evolution and Present
Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 136.
253 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 223.
254 Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition of South Asia, 109.
255 FR, July 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
256
Ibid..
257
Letter from Jinnah to Mumtaz Daultana on 31 July 1945, Punjab, III:36, vol. III, Shamsul
Hasan Collection.
258
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1I (1945), 136.
259
Ibid, 135.
260
Ibid, 164-169; see also Qaumi Jang (Bombay) 14 October 1944.
261
Pakistan, Muslim Unioniston ka atall Aqeeda, Tiwana Papers.

284
262
‘The Punjab Premier and Pakistan,’’ dated 24/9/1945 in MS210/9, Ibid.
263
Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1945, file S-413, para. 5, 18.
264
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 224.
265
Extract from Private and Secret Letter from Lord Wavell to Mr. Amery on 23 January 1945,
IOR: L/PJ/8/662.
266
Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, 129-130.
267
Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since
1850 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001), 470.
268
Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, 44-45.
269 Many other points were also there in the document. Manifesto of the Punjab Unionist Party,
Election 1945 (Lahore: Imperial Printing Works, 61 Railway Road, n.d.), MS210/3 in Tiwana Papers.
270 Weekly Paisa Akhbar 24 February 1945.
271 Yadav, “The Partition of India,” 138.
272 David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” 223-
224.
273 The Eastern Time, 6 February 1944.
274 Letter from Bashir Husain, Jhelum District Organiser, to Mian Sultan Ali Ranjha,
Zamindara League’s Secretary on 13 December 1945 in David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and
the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” 228 (198-232).
275 Inqelab, 11 January 1946.
276 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 160-61.
277 FR, Second half of January 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
278 Ibid., June 1944, L/PJ/5/247.
279 Premier’s Statement on 21 January 1946, MS-210/18, Tiwana Papers.
280 Extract from Private and Secret Letter from Lord Wavell to Mr. Amery on 20 June 1944,
IOR: L/PJ/8/662.
281 Daily Inqelab, 24 February 1946
282 Letter from Mian Sultan Ali Ranjha to Nawab Allah Bakhsh Tiwana on 16 January 1946 in
David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” 230.
283 Zamindara League was founded by Ch. Chhotu Ram in 1920s to work for the land-owning
people which later on merged into the Punjab Unionist Party. In the 1940s, Zamindara League was
used and meant to be the Unionist Party.
284 Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, 132.
285 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 224-25.
286 FR, November 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
287 Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1946, para. 19.
288 FR, January 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
289 A Sikh sect.
290 Secret Police Abstract, 1946, file S-414, para 20, 21.
291 FR, the first half of December 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
292 Secret Police Abstract, Lahore 1946, file S-414, para. 50.
293 Ibid., para 51.
294 Khurshid Ahmad Khan, ed., Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Some Rare Speeches
and Statements, 1944-1947 (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, PU, 1988), 114-119.
295 Report from Bhera on 4 January 1946, Punjab I:84, Shamsul Hasan Collection.
296 Inqelab, 16 January 1946; see also The Punjab Assembly Debates 1946, vol. XXV (Lahore:
Superintendent Government Printing, 1947), 116.
297 Inqelab, 19 January 1946.
298 Letter from A. M. Khan Leghari, DC Ludhiana, to the Secretary of State for India, undated,
file no. 1120, QAP (See details in Appendix 5).
299 “The Khizar Quisling Ministry,” Editorial, The Eastern Times, 26 March 1946.
February 1946.
300 FR, February 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
301 IOR: L/P& J/8/472.
302 IOR: L/P&J/8/472.
303 FR, February 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
304 T. P. Khalidi, “Punjab Assembly Elections- Second Week,” The Eastern Times, 19

285
305
Nazar Tiwana, Interview with the author on 13 December 1993 at New Delhi, Ian Talbot,
Khizr Tiwana, 148.
306
Durlabh Singh, “Akali-Congress Pact,” Editorial in daily Ranjit, Lahore, 17 December 1946;
Result of Ambala North:
Baldev Singh bagged 8226
Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh got 7277.
In another constituency:
Sardar Ujjal Singh 10460
Sardar Gopal Singh Qaumi got 10342. Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in Punjab, 1920-1947 (Tokyo:
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1981), 117.
307
T. P. Khalidi, “A resume of the First Week of 1946 Elections in the Punjab,” The Eastern
Times, 10 February 1946.
308
Nia Zamana, 26 May 1946.
309
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 138.
310
Ibid., 138-39.
311
Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1967), 129-30.
312
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 138-39.
313
FR, February 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
314
FR, February 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
315
Ibid.
316
Master Tara Singh’s statement, MS210/10, Tiwana Papers.
317 Ibid.
318 Inqelab, 28 February 1946.
319 Editorial “Punjab mein wazarat ka Masla,” Daily Inqelab, 28 February 1946.

CHAPTER FOUR
PUNJAB: TOWARDS GEOGRAPHICAL SPLIT
The election results clarified the position of the parties and their respective
popularity. Religion was behind the Indian politics and the political actors
experienced a tangible divide on religious lines throughout India and obviously the
Punjab was no exception. Religion affected the common culture adversely while the
latter had been playing a role of a bridging force between the Muslims and the Sikhs.
The results of the election had shattered the hopes of the traditional political tycoons
of the Punjab and increased the responsibilities of the integrationists to take the
separatists into confidence so that their self-assurance could be restored as equal
partners. The results necessitated that the real stature of the League should have been
accepted but the events of the years 1946-47 did not show any sympathetic attitude of
the Congress at the national level and the Sikh parties particularly the Akalis at the
provincial level towards the League. The undemocratic and thwarting attitude of the
Sikhs brought the communities into a confrontational struggle. They continued their
jingoistic strategy to exert their authority in the region. If the Sikhs had changed their
mind and supported the League in the Assembly, the Punjab’s history would have
been entirely different. Being the largest party in the Assembly, the League had the
democratic right to form the government but the political, bureaucratic and
administrative authorities joined their hands against it. Even the British machinery did
not uphold the democratic principles in the Punjab. They did it on the supposition that
the League government would not be acceptable to the minorities. All such political

287
developments and the reactions widened the gulf between the Muslims and Sikhs. The
legacy of violence fuelled the situation and that all the segments of the society were
affected by the militant activities. The League’s struggle was based on the
constitutional grounds which they, in most of the cases maintained during the political
developments in the subsequent period up to 14 August 1947. This chapter deals with
the Punjab politics during the years, 1946 and 1947 in the perspective of the Muslim-
Sikh relations. The Sikhs presented nothing new in the parleys with the Cabinet
Delegation, Viceroy, Governor and the League while the League remained adamant to
win Pakistan. The British were trying to withdraw honourably from India after
compensating all the communities but the Sikhs were their top priority. They were
determined to favour the Sikhs but the Sikh leadership had evolved no workable plan
which could be taken up by the British. Their territorial demands could not be
accepted by all the Punjabis, while the British did not want to impose a plan without
consensus. Their will to facilitate the Sikhs was exhibited through the Boundary
Award which caused a heavy loss to Pakistan.
Khizr Tiwana through a letter, on 8 March 1946 invited Nawab Iftekhar
Hussain Mamdot, the Punjab League President, to join the all-party coalition Ministry
so that the League could also secure its share in the responsibility of the
administration. He also assured that he himself was not keen to have any office in the
Ministry. 1 The very next day Mamdot replied that the Premier did not represent the
Muslim majority and he would be unable to stop their colleagues from joining the
League. 2 According to The Eastern Times, Mamdot had written that Tiwana should
approach the Governor and express his inability to form the government and stand
aside if his offer was genuine. 3 The Premier’s invitation was a tactic to induce the
Punjab League’s members to accept the ministries. It was a conspiracy and political

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bribery to cripple the League. The offer of the offices to his old lieutenants was also a
strategy to isolate Jinnah but the Unionists could not succeed. Tiwana should have
shown sincerity by rejecting the Premiership because that was a political right of the
League or the Congress which had more seats than the Unionists.
Nawab Mamdot had assured the Governor that the League was in a position to
launch its ministry with the help of the Akalis and other non-Muslim members 4 but
such a working relationship seemed difficult to achieve because of the hostile attitude
of the Sikhs and other non-Muslims towards the Muslims. 5 The Akalis were playing a
tricky game and had first approached the League but later joined the Congressite
forces. 6 To Qalb-i-Abid, the Sikhs supported Tiwana with the condition that he would
oppose the Pakistan scheme. 7 As a matter of fact, the Akali Sikhs had been obliged by
the Premier and Governor in the elections through strict verbal orders that the district
administration should use all the possible means in the support of the Akali and
Unionist candidates. 8 Therefore, the League’s hope for agreement with the Sikhs
would have been a miracle. In March 1946, the Unionist Party and the Panthic Party
concluded an agreement. According to it, both the parties with some independent
members of the Assembly formed a Coalition Party. It was decided that the
constituent groups would not surrender their identity out of the Assembly. The
agreement set free all the groups regarding the central politics. 9 The Hindus, Sikhs,
Unionists and other groups were pleased that they had pushed the League out of
power.
Tiwana-Congress patch-up was not an abrupt understanding but an outcome of
the constant contact between the two groups. A curt response of Tiwana to Jinnah
before and during the elections showed his future planning in the Punjab politics.
Observing the League’s acceptance among the Punjabi and other Muslims, he moved

289
to look for the Congress support in the post-election political scenario. On 2 February
1946, Sir Firoz Khan Noon (League leader from the Punjab) discussed this tilt in his
letter to Muhammad Nawaz Khan (a Tiwana’s supporter):
The situation as I see today is that the Unionist Muslamans will take away about 13
seats out of 87 Muslim seats, and I am informed Khizar has already negotiated with
the Congress and wishes to form a Ministry in coalition with them. …It is hardly
necessary for me to say that if you join the Congress at this stage the whole Muslim
Punjab will be very disappointed in you. 10
The letter reveals that Tiwana and the Congress were constantly in contact with each
other even before the elections. Though, the Congress was an anti-Unionist Party yet
the League’s popularity and dominant role compelled both to come closer against the
common foe.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, in an interview to the
CMG on 7 March 1946 stated that he had not approached the Panthic and the Punjab
Congress leaders until the Punjab League refused to have coalition with the Congress.
To him, Jinnah laid obstacles in the understanding with the Punjab League. Azad in
return to the Congress support demanded from Tiwana not to repeat the ill-treatment
what the Unionist governments had been doing for the last eight years. 11 Azad’s
understanding clearly indicated that the minorities had little sympathy for the
Unionists. As far as his blame that Jinnah was the main obstacle between the Punjab
League and the Congress was not correct because Jinnah could not let the history of
the UP ministry of 1937 be repeated when Azad and Nehru tried to eliminate the
League from the UP by offering undemocratic conditions to Ch. Khaliquzzaman and
others for joining the coalition ministry. According to the Governor’s report, the
Congressites were relieved by “Sardar Vallabhai Patel’s manoeuvres for the
Congress-Akali-Unionist coalition” against the League in the Punjab. As regards the
failure of the League-Congress negotiations, the Governor reported, it was the same

290
reason which Wavell tried to impose on the League. Azad was adamant that a
nationalist Muslim should be included in the Cabinet but this demand was waived of
in the negotiations with the Panthic bloc and Unionists. It had already been turned
down by the League. 12
Jinnah had attached more importance to discipline than office seeking.
However, ousting the League from its political right impacted badly on the Muslim-
Sikh relations. The hope for League-Akali cooperation was ruthlessly curbed. 13 Azad
boasts in his autobiography that the Congress being in minority secured a government
position but Nehru disliked it considering it an undemocratic step while Gandhi
appreciated it as a sensible solution to the Punjab problem. 14
The political manoeuvrings during March 1947 were a peak period. On 23
March, the British government sent a delegation to ascertain an agreed settlement of
the communal tangle in India. The Akali leaders went on presenting the claim for the
Sikh state. To secure the Sikh support (before an interview with the Cabinet Mission),
they wanted to convince the dissentients within the community but the efforts came to
naught. The dissenting MLAs arranged a meeting in the Assembly Chamber on 21-22
March 1946 at Lahore and concluded that the Sikh state, the major Akali demand, was
impossible to meet due to their lack of a majority in any district of the Punjab. The
Akali Dal nevertheless made preparations to place the demand before the Cabinet
Mission. On 28 March a sub-committee was established with Master Tara Singh
(Chairman) and Sardar Basant Singh as the Secretary. In addition, the Nihang Sikhs
for the first time declared their support for the SAD regarding the demand of a
separate state. 15 Despite anti-Sikh character of the Unionist Muslims, the Akali
leadership maintained alliance with them in the coalition government and at the same
time continued the violent utterances against them. Working with them was a suicidal

291
step for the Akalis because this support could strengthen the hands of their traditional
enemies. However, it was inevitable because the Giani Kartar group had advised the
Sikhs to cling to the power to secure privileges and benefits for the community. To
them, the Unionist Party was a lesser evil. By adopting such a policy, they could
please the anti-League forces and placate the sentiments of the religious extremists
within the Sikh community.
The Congress and Sikh tie up with the Unionists polarised the Muslim opinion
in the Punjab. The Muslims from all strata of life were scared that the Congress after
gaining power in the Punjab could undermine the League’s image through different
illegitimate means. The Congress was trying to establish its influence in the Punjab by
pushing the League into a corner. The Governor indicated in his letter to the Viceroy,
Wavell that “If Patel tries to run the Punjab and declare the Provincial League as
unlawful body, my Muslim Ministers will definitely resign and I shall then have to
invite Mamdot to form Ministry.” 16 Although according to Ian Talbot, Evan Jenkins
was one of the most competent British officers in India 17 but he seemed under
pressure in connection with the political manipulations within and outside the
government to maintain the Unionists in power. He preferred ‘expediency’ rather than
the ‘rule of law’ which had been a symbol of the British government in the past.
Amazingly, the Governor was favouring the undemocratic and illegal moves boldly
and openly while the Viceroy continued backing him without questioning. The war,
the main reason for expediency, had ended but Jenkins did not want to change the
British policy because of the Unionists and their own safety. His utmost endeavour
was to retain the traditional politics in the post-war arrangements. All went against Sir
Jenkins’ integrity. H. Trevaskis in his book The Punjab of Today writes that majority

292
of the British officers (85%) belonged to the middle class who did not support any
revolutionary steps which might oust the traditional forces from the power:
In general, almost 85% of the British officers in India came from a middle class
background, with deep roots in public school tradition of a generalist...They had an
overall tendency to dislike the shift of roles and functions between classes and
groups of men...the state was guided by the public interest as conceived by the
‘guardian bureaucrats, who distrusted the public will as being irrational and
uninformed. 18
The local and British officers continued backing the Governor in strengthening the
Unionists blindly at the cost of the League. 19 On the other hand, the Governor was
minutely observing the situation whenever all the anti-League designs were increasing
popularity of the League in the region. He shared these impressions in September
1946 that the present Congress government greatly resented the Muslims of the
Punjab. The pro-League sympathy was developing even in the pro-British families.
He further said that none could predict “how the Muslim members of the police and
Army will behave in the event of emergency.” 20 Ram Narayan Kumar writes that the
Sikh-Congress support to the Unionist party was a political blunder. The Sikhs forgot
that in 1941 Sir Sikandar had advised them to refrain from the centrist forces. They
had dug their own grave:
This was the last chance for the Sikh legislators to remember and act on the advice
which Sikander Hyat Khan, the premier of Punjab, had given them in March 1941 to
save the province from centrist manipulations. For the first time in the legislative
history of Punjab, the Muslims had elected the League as the single largest party
with the hope that it would lead the government. But for the first time in the history
of the province, an essentially Hindu government contrived by an unsound coalition
had been formed. The Muslims felt that the Hindus would now always succeed in
keeping them out of power. 21
The League’s right to make government in the Punjab was denied, which the common
Muslims perceived as a conspiracy against the League. The League leaders’ horrors
were justified as Hodson has observed:

It was a trump card in propaganda for Pakistan among the Muslims, who could say:
‘Even in the Punjab, even with a Muslim majority, the wily Hindus will be able to
rule you, with the connivance of Sikhs and businessmen and a few Muslim stooges:
the only way out is independence for your homeland.’ 22
293
The new Punjab ministry was formed entirely on an undemocratic basis. The attitude
of the British Governor, Congress, Sikhs and Unionists set a new example of political
suppression in the Punjab against the League. Actually, there was no space for the
Unionists but even then a Muslim had clinched the Premier office, why? In reality, the
traditional phenomenon that no non-Muslim could become Premier was retained as
myth. Chhotu Ram once had analysed that in case of the non-Muslim candidate for
the Premiership, many Muslim Unionists could desert the party immediately. It was
strange that the Premier had only 17 members from his own party and the majority
parties were to salute and obey him. It may be one of the unique incidences in the
political history that a person with meagre strength had been ruling over the majority
parties in the British India. Coalitions are concluded on the basis of numerical
strength and the portfolios are awarded according to the party position but in the
Punjab the situation was vice versa. The most prestigious office was being awarded
on the basis of religion.
The Assembly proceedings proved alarming and a motivating factor for the
Muslim members as well as the masses to be engaged in the politics. The masses
remained keen to know what was going on within the Assembly regarding the Muslim
and Sikh politics. Interestingly, when in March the Premier announced during the
Assembly session that the arrangements for prayers (Bajama’at Nimaz) had been
made in the Committee Room, Rana Nasrullah Khan made everyone laugh with his
taunt; he loudly asked, “Does Giani Kartar Singh or Sardar Baldev Singh call Azan
there?” 23 Although it was a point of humour but in fact an irritating point for the

294
Premier and the Sikh members as well. The Leaguers were not sparing the
government bloc on any area within or out of the Assembly.
The Akali-League compromise could not be materialised on the Pakistan
issue. The separate Sikh state was still a creed of the SAD and the leaders had been
demanding their homeland intermittently in the meetings and resolutions. The
Working Committee of the SAD invited all the Sikh organisations to share their
opinion in this regard. Through a resolution, the SGPC in a meeting on 9 March 1946
demanded an Azad Sikh State. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar remarked that “the
Congress is a Hindu organisation.” 24 The All Parties Sikh conference was held at
Amritsar on 9-10 June 1946. It attracted all the Sikh parties except followers of Baba
Kharak Singh and the Communist Sikhs. The conference was an impressive show of
power according to the Sikhs. It approved to set up a Council of Action and Panthic
Advisory Board under a Sikh officer Col. Narinjan Singh Gill, the Indian National
Army leader. The Congress high command called the Sikhs to Delhi where they, on
18 June 1946 were assured full support regarding their struggle for rights. 25 Soon, the
devotion to the Congress exposed Narinjan Singh Gill who, induced by Nehru,
declared the Congress as the true Sikh representative party. According to Sangat
Singh, he attempted to weaken the Akali strength. 26 He had declared in the press
statement after a meeting with the Congress leaders at Wardha that he was not
hesitant in declaring that the Sikhs believed that the Congress was their representative
in the national matters and the freedom. 27 By this statement, Col. Gill exposed the real
policy of the Akali or the Pratinidhi Board, which enraged the Sikh leadership.
The Governor reported that dissension prevailed within the Akali party and the
Panthic Advisory Board because of the pro-Congress statements of Narinjan Singh
Gill. On the election of the central legislature, the Sikhs were firm on the non-

295
inclusion of their representatives in the Constituent Assembly. But on Nehru’s
assurance, they consented to nominate 4 candidates for the election. The report says
that the Akalis accepted Nehru’s words “as a Congress order.” Nevertheless, the final
decision to join the Constituent Assembly remained pending. 28 The Sikhs had taken
the decision to boycott but could not sustain the strength of their decision. Very soon
they started thinking of reversing from their stand as the Governor reported in August
1946. The reason to revise their decision was the Congress’ resolution of assurance to
the Sikhs which, as usual they thought enough to abandon the boycott. The Sikh
leadership was still playing a role of an offshoot of the Congress party. The Congress
presented no concrete plan for the Sikh rights but only the lip-service of the Congress
made the Sikhs satisfied and they considered it their victory. 29
British Homework and Cabinet Mission
The arrival of the Cabinet Mission was an important event of the history of the
Muslim-Sikh relations in the British Punjab. The Akali Dal diverted its strategy from
the Azad Punjab scheme to the call for an independent Sikh state, an idea which it had
aired from time to time. The contradictory suggestions on the boundaries of the Sikh
state made the roots of the Sikh demand very weak. Master Tara Singh vaguely
expressed the areas of the state; Giani Kartar asked for Sikhistan including Lahore,
Karnal, Simla, Montgomery and Lyallpur districts along with the Sikh areas whereas
Baldev Singh suggested the areas consisting of three divisions of Lahore, Jullundur
and Ambala. 30 He, on 30 March addressing the Sikh Students’ Federation at
Gujranwala, demanded a Sikh state. 31
Before the Cabinet Mission started its working to obtain opinion of the local
leaders on certain issues, the Sikhs and other leaders had been engaged in ascertaining

296
the best solution of the communal problem favourable for their community. The Sikh
leaders were in a mess still sticking to the traditional politics having no better
alternatives to their demands and lacking a unified response. Sardar Surjit Singh
Majithia (1912-1995), MLA (Central) tried to impress upon the Akali Dal in
connection with the Sikh state and wrote in the late March 1946 at Lahore that the
proposed Sikh state was neither beneficial nor practicable solution. He was of the
view that by demanding a state, the Sikhs would concede the right of Pakistan, which
was outrageously a scheme of the vivisection of India. Secondly, the Muslims would
never surrender the proposed areas to the Sikh state particularly when these areas
were dominantly Muslim majority areas. The exchange of population would ruin the
agricultural economy by losing their fertile lands which was about 40 per cent of the
Punjab. Thirdly, the Sikhs had no majority in the area and the Muslims could not be
eliminated. Alternately, after detaching Jat Hindu and Muslim areas, the Sikhs would
be able to obtain their state, which would be a ‘tiny area’ wherein they would never
be able to protect themselves as an effective community. If a Sikh state was created
the Sikhs would have to seek help either from the Muslims or Hindus. Majithia
believed that all the Sikh problems could be resolved by the presence of joint
electorates with reserved minority seats in Akhand Bharat. 32 Majithia diagnosed the
genuine problems impressively pertinent to the Sikh community but could not hit
upon any new scheme beneficial for the Sikhs.
The British always adopted a well-worked policy before engaging the Indian
leaders in the negotiations. Though, the Cabinet Mission came to India without any
specific package or pre-planned solution nevertheless, they engaged their own
politicians to give their input so that the British delegation might have an agreed
direction shared by the British politicians on the political issues in India. The

297
delegation was provided every tool to deal with any situation before its departure. The
Viceroy expressed his opinion through a letter to the Secretary of State for India on 7
February 1946 that in case of the inevitability, he could recommend the Muslim
majority areas in the Punjab i.e. Rawalpindi, Multan and Lahore divisions less
Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts as Pakistan. Amritsar on the religious basis while
Gurdaspur with 51 per cent Muslim majority and due to geographical reason would
not go to the Muslim state. Though much of Lahore district depended on the upper
Bari Doab canal with headworks at Gurdaspur district made it awkward to be given to
India but the difficulties left no alternative solution. To him, the Sikh question would
still remain complex because any version of Pakistan would not resolve the
difficulties of the Sikh shrines, lands and populations. He furthered the H.M.G.’s
strategy towards the Muslims and Sikhs by suggesting negotiations on the boundaries
in which the Sikh interests could be carefully considered; by this, the region could be
saved from the Sikh violence. 33
Interestingly, the British had chalked out all the possibilities, the reactions and
the ultimate decisions including expected areas and boundaries of Pakistan early in
1946. The British were sure of the Sikh preparations for violence so they deliberately
did not want to adopt a clear policy towards the Sikhs because they perceived that any
formula would not satisfy them and this anger could move them to violent actions.
The British passive response to the violent and even illegal activities of the Sikhs
showed that they were more interested in settling the all-India question rather than
becoming entangled in regional complexities. They had been sympathetic to the Sikhs
but no workable plan was worked out to solve the issue. Regarding Pakistan, they had
worked out a detailed report, “Viability of Pakistan” which declared that the League’s
scheme was unworkable due to economic, strategic, geographic, administrative,

298
communication and defensive reasons along with the presence of threats from China,
Russia and Afghanistan. 34
Commenting on the Sikh question, Major Short wrote that the Sikhs would be
better placed in Pakistan rather than India. He said that first priority of Master Tara
Singh and Giani Kartar was the united India, however, both were prepared to join
Pakistan on reasonable terms. 35 Although the Governor and the other British officials
said much against the League but the Viceroy and many other British leaders had
been well aware of the Indian situation and popularity of the League. On 3 March
1946, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State for India that the Pakistan issue
being the most important would definitely come first during the negotiations therefore
the British government should determine a policy regarding this question because the
British Empire would have to face the biggest problem in this regard. Then he
suggested that the unity of India for peace, economy of India and the world would
convince him to save India from “complete partition” but the Muslims could not be
persuaded to accept a united India. On the other hand, if the Muslims were ignored,
H.M.G. would have to face the reaction from other Muslim countries as well. 36
Nevertheless, on 7 March 1946, the Secretary of State for India circulated a
memorandum directed by the British Prime Minister as a direction to the Cabinet
Delegation to India in which it was proposed that the Cabinet Delegation should have
deliberations and explore all alternatives without concentrating on any rigid formula.
The British Government desired the Indian leaders to reach at an agreed constitutional
package. 37 The British Prime Minister expressed his views regarding Indian question,
expectation from the Delegation and the Indian leaders’ response:
The temperature of 1946 is not the same as that of 1920, 1930, or even 1942... So it
is emphatically with the tide of Nationalism in Asia and especially in India... My
colleagues are going to India with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to

help her to attain that freedom as speedily and fully as possible…We are conscious
of having done a great work in India. We have united India, have given a sense of
nationality which she formerly lacked. She has learnt from us principles of
democracy and justice. When Indians attack our rule they base their attack not on
Indian principles, but on the basis of standards derived from Britain....Mindful as we
are of the rights of minorities we cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the
advance of the majority...We are too well aware of the existence of Minorities in
India. I think that Indian leaders are increasingly appreciative of the need for making
due provision for them within the Constitution. 38
299
The League resented the Prime Minister’s declaration about the minorities because
the speech was more favourable to the Congress’ point of view than that of the
League.
Negotiations with Politicians
On 23 March 1946, a delegation of three British politicians including Sir
Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Stafford Cripps, President of the
Board of Trade, and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, reached India. The
major objective of the Delegation was to explore the opinion of the Indian politicians
which could develop constitutional modalities to further the self-governance process.
On 28 March 1946, the Governor of the Punjab Sir B. J. Glancy in a meeting of the
Governors and the Cabinet Delegation discussed the provincial situation and said that
although the League had won the elections, the League leaders were not sincere to the
idea of Pakistan. The Governor briefed that the Sikhs could not leave the newly
formed coalition as it would be unlikely to think that they would shake hands with the
League. During the elections, they had negotiated with the Muslims but this was just
to increase their importance in the bargaining power with the Congress. The Governor
also expressed his views against Pakistan and in favour of united India and suggested
that the Congress should offer maximum concessions to the League to persuade them
to come to terms. The Governor was optimistic that the League would come to some
compromise ultimately. 39 The Governor presented an entirely contradictory report to

300
what he had done previously regarding the League’s strength. The report gave a
wrong perception that some League leaders were against the Pakistan scheme. His
suggestion that the Congress should change its policy towards the League and the
assurance that the Sikhs would not compromise with the League show that the
League’s strong position had jeopardised the Unionists’ position and made the
Governor very upset. Why did he need a way to strengthen the Coalition and
Congress’ position against the League if he expected a split in the League circles on
the Pakistan issue? As a matter of fact, all the government and political forces had
become defensive morally by pulling the largest party away from the right to make
ministry and all were busy in defaming the League now. In his report, he did not talk
to honour the will of the voters who had supported the League’s demand for Pakistan.
This report clearly exposed the pro-Congress attitude of the Governor who seemed to
be a Congress representative in the Punjab.
The Delegation interviewed the political leaders during the April which
brought out contradictory points of view on the fundamental issues; such as Congress’
clamour for the single Indian federation and single constitution while the League’s
insistence on Pakistan with separate Assembly to frame their own constitution. 40
Gandhi in his meeting with the Delegation on 3 April 1946 said that Jinnah himself
was not clear about Pakistan and in the discussion for 18 days (in conversation and
writings) with him the latter could not define Pakistan. But the reference of the Achari
formula and its acceptance given by the delegation upset Gandhi who denied it
immediately. However, when the delegation “produced his formula he was on his last
legs and said that he accepted it.” 41 This was the Pakistan scheme of Jinnah and he
had accepted it in writing. Gandhi said that Two-Nation theory was dangerous and not

301
acceptable because the Muslims were converts from Hinduism. 42 Jinnah retaliated that
it was not appropriate to throw these converted people out of the mainstream of life. 43
On 2 April, Nawab Mamdot was interviewed by the Delegation but he uttered
nothing about the Sikhs. Nevertheless, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah said that the
“Sikhs could have Sikhistan if they wanted it.” 44 Baldev Singh shared with the
Delegation that in the past, the Unionists adopted a tricky politics towards the Sikhs.
He argued that the Sikh demands should be treated not on the basis of population but
on their political importance. Cripps at this moment ‘reminded’ him about Khalistan
and Baldev Singh replied that they could have the Punjab less the Rawalpindi and
Multan divisions up to Chenab River as the boundary. He also demanded Lahore but
again reverted to the demand of united India. To him, the best solution was the
division of the Punjab between ‘Pathanistan’ and Sikhistan. He said that Jinnah was
ready to award much to the Sikhs but the experience with the Unionist Muslims did
not allow the Sikhs to trust them and revive the bitter experience. He further
elucidated that in the last elections every Muslim thought that he was about to be a
Mughal king. 45
In a meeting with the Delegation, Tiwana said that he might share his opinion
if the Delegation was ready to sideline the League and Congress. He suggested that
the British should not seek any agreement between the two major parties but enforce
what they perceived the best. He explained that the British should produce some solid
solution in order to remove the impression that the British were unable to make any
definite decision. He further reiterated that the Punjab should not be divided into
pieces and Pakistan was not a practicable solution as it would have regional
nationalities like Pathan, Sindhi, Baloch, etc. To him, the Sikhs would face severe

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difficulties in Pakistan. He claimed that he “believed in Pakistan” but the issue of re-
demarcation would please and satisfy none of the parties concerned. 46
Tiwana vaguely opposed Pakistan and Khalistan but supported the Indian
independence. He considered the Sikh resistance justified against the League’s
struggle. He also pointed out the impotence of the British in dealing with the political
deadlock and said that they should be assertive in their decisions without caring for
the consent of the League and Congress. This depicted an undemocratic and feudal
mentality of Tiwana. He would give no sane suggestion as the political conditions had
entirely changed after the war. He had talks with the Viceroy on 3 May 1947 in which
he warned him that the poor economic conditions of the proposed Pakistan could drag
it to the Communism. He also said that the Sikhs would never throw their lot in the
favour of Pakistan. Talking about the political future of the Punjab he suggested that
the province should be made an independent state with a defence agreement with
Pakistan and Hindustan. The partition of the province would mean to invite a civil
war. 47 The former Premier made his last attempt to clinch the Punjab to the traditional
landlords but the situation had become entirely unfavourable.
Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar and Sardar Harnam Singh had deliberations
with the Delegation. The Secretary of State for India put three questions before the
Sikh leaders to ascertain their opinion:
1. Whether the transfer of power be made to a single, two or more than two
bodies?
2. In case of two which party the Sikhs would prefer to join?
3. Would the Sikhs demand an independent state?
Master Tara Singh favoured united India but other leaders emphasised on the Sikh
state having the right to federate with any of the two countries. They explained that
they had undergone a difficult time under the Unionist government until the war

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which relieved them from the Muslim tyranny. Sardar Harnam Singh demanded the
central areas in the Sikh state on the basis of land, revenue and tax. He also objected
that the census of 1941 had falsified the number of the Muslims. Talking about the
areas to be included in the Sikh state, Giani Kartar asked for Jullundur and Lahore
Divisions along with Hissar, Karnal, Ambala, Simla (Ambala Division), Montgomery
and Lyallpur districts. 48 The Sikh leaders’ support to the united India was alarming
and had painful effect on the Muslims who considered it a disastrous move in which
the Sikh leadership intended to put 100 million Muslims under the ruthless Hindu
Raj. 49 The Sikhs demanded an independent state but even then they discussed that
they could not survive alone and desired to federate either with India or Pakistan. It
was a confused situation for all as to what the Sikhs actually wanted. The Sikh state
under any federation could be a sort of Azad Punjab, which had already been rejected
by many of the Sikh groups.
Cabinet Mission Proposals
The Mission suggested a Grouping under a weak centre and made three groups
of the total area. The Group B consisted of the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan
with representation of Muslims 23, Hindus 9 and Sikhs 4 in the central legislature. 50
The Cabinet Proposals were a clever plan of the British to please the main
stakeholders. By the plan, they tried to retain the territorial integrity of India and
Punjab; they united the Muslim majority areas and abandoned the Pakistan scheme.
They tried to fulfil the demands of the Congress, League and Sikhs. But the main Sikh
apprehension ignored by the Mission was their fear of the permanent domination by
the Muslims. The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the Plan on the ground that the Punjab
and the Sikhs had been put under the Pakistanists. 51 The Sikhs in protest against the

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Cabinet Mission Proposals took loudspeakers and started visiting the villages and
persuading the Sikhs to join the Akali meetings. However, it was reported that the
League leaders secretly approached the Sikh leadership and assured them that the
League was ready to concede the additional weightage to them but the Sikhs would
not agree to this offer. 52 According to Sardar Kapur Singh, the Cabinet Mission
wanted to create a Sikh state in a specific area but the Sikhs did not accept it. 53 This
claim does not stand true as the Cabinet Mission initiated no such a plan for the Sikhs,
as the Delegation came to India without any definite proposals and raised this issue in
the meetings with the Sikhs. A. S. Narang also supports this understanding when he
writes that the Cabinet Mission paid no attention to the Azad Punjab scheme,
Khalistan or Sikhistan. 54 It was just to ascertain the Sikh opinion and to ascertain any
possible alternative suggestions.
Sikh Reaction to the Plan
The Cabinet Mission Plan caused a considerable fury among the Sikhs. Master
Tara Singh addressed the Sikhs at Gojar Khan (Rawalpindi) and then at a Rawalpindi
meeting arranged by the Guru Singh Sabha (Sikh-Congress organisation). Giani Vir
Singh said that the Sikhs would hoist the Sikh flag instead of the Union Jack on the
Lahore Fort. 55 Master Tara Singh wrote to Lord Pethick Lawrence that the Cabinet
Mission had made the Sikhs dejected, cross and angry. By such recommendations, the
Sikhs would be left at the mercy of the Muslims in Group B. With only 4 seats they
could not expect any kind of justice from the proposed Central Assembly. He further
declared that the Muslim demands against the Hindu domination had been accepted
while the Sikhs’ had been ignored. He referred the attention to the section 15(2) and
section 19(7) and asked about any possibility for amendments in the

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recommendations. He questioned about the situation if the Sikh members disagreed
with the proposed constitution in Group B, the possibility to give them the right which
the Muslims and the Hindus enjoyed under section 15 (2) & 19(7)? 56 Pethick
Lawrence in reply reassured Master Tara Singh that they had picked up the best
alternative for the Sikhs as compared to the partition. 57 The Governor also reported
that the Sikhs were expressing their dissatisfaction through all the political platforms
and demonstrations. They had threatened to launch direct action which could destroy
the stability of the Unionist government. The Sikhs also reminded the Congress of the
Ravi pledge of 1929 and looked to the Hindu Mahasabha which had declared the
Cabinet Mission Plan as “anti-national, undemocratic and unacceptable to Hindus.” 58
The British responded positively to the Sikhs and the Viceroy and the Cabinet
Delegation discussed the Sikh position in an interview with Master Tara Singh and
Baldev Singh on 6 June 1946. Master Tara Singh said that the Sikhs were very
depressed over the statement of 16 May and particularly because they had just four
seats out of a total 36 in the Group. The Viceroy responded that it was based on the
population ratio. He maintained that the allocation of additional seats also could not
help the Sikhs change their minority status. He believed that the Sikhs as an important
minority could not be sidelined while he found Jinnah as a sympathiser of the Sikhs.
The Viceroy was sure that he did not intend to harm the Sikhs. Baldev Singh and Tara
Singh referred to the election of the Mayor of the City Corporation Lahore in which
the League Mayor had played a biased role with his casting vote. 59 The Viceroy also
warned them that in case of boycott, the Group would proceed on to make a
constitution without the Sikhs and this would be a grave mistake on the part of the
Sikhs. He drew their attention to the Statement of 25 May in which H.M.G. was to
ensure them the minority rights. The Viceroy emphasised that through agitation the

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Sikhs would certainly lose the sympathy and good offices. A. V. Alexander indicated
that the Sikh representatives in the Constituent Assembly would be able to speak
better for their rights, and they would also be represented in the Advisory Committee
on Minorities whose report and recommendations could not be overlooked. Stafford
Cripps emphasised that the trouble by the Sikhs would be fatal to their community
interests. The Viceroy promised that he would certainly try to help them. But at the
same time, he also thought that their “fears were exaggerated.” 60
The Sikh leaders were not exploring alternatives to their existing demands
instead they remained busy in countering the League’s demands. Therefore, Pethick
Lawrence wrote to Master Tara Singh on 1 June 1946 that after careful consideration
it was felt that the Cabinet Mission proposal was the best solution to the Sikh problem.
The Sikhs would have undivided India and the Punjab and would be able to maintain
their population undivided 61 and keep their sacred places with them. Pethick
Lawrence also assured Baldev Singh that the Sikhs would enjoy the best position in
the united Punjab and the plan would be the best mechanism to ensure their integrity
and rights. 62 In this sensitive situation, the Muslims as reported by the Governor did
not pursue the Sikhs to come to terms with them except an advice “to rely on Muslim
generosity.” 63 While the anti-Cabinet Mission Plan reaction testified that the Sikhs
would never come to an understanding with the Muslims. 64
The Sikhs ignored the Viceroy’s advice and rejected the Plan on 10 June 1946.
In the Panthic conference at Amritsar on 10 June 1946, they decided to launch ‘direct
action’ against the Cabinet Mission’s recommendations and fixed June 23 as the
“prayer day.” It was also decided that the struggle would continue till the Cabinet
Award was modified according to the Sikh demands. The Council of Action under the
Indian National Army (INA) leader Col. Niranjan Singh Gill, the dictator, was

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empowered to launch protests in this regard. They expressed concern over the
recognition of the Muslim demands by the Delegation. 65 The anti-League sentiments
gradually permeated the rural areas due to the political developments in India which
caused serious impact in the Punjab. The Sikhs from the rural areas were feeling that
Jinnah was not treating their community properly. Kalwant Singh Virk from
Phullarwan (Sheikhupura), a close friend of Giani Kartar, wrote to Jinnah that he
considered him a sole leader of the minority rights but by accepting the British
proposals he had “strangulated the Sikh aspirations” and “created some doubts.” This
was also testified by the speeches and statements he had made about the Sikhs. 66 The
letter depicts what the rural Sikhs were feeling before the partition was accepted by
the British government.
The appointment of Col. Gill, a new man to the Council of Action, did not
seem a wise step. Some of other Sikh leaders who had been in the mainstream of the
politics could have been inducted. It was not a time to introduce new faces. Sikhs as a
community were behaving in a strange way; when one group was ready to dialogue,
the other would decide to protest and the third decided to launch agitation. The Sikhs
went further in defying the British constitutional proposals when at Amritsar on 22
June the Sikh Panthic Board unanimously decided that Baldev Singh should decline
the Viceroy’s invitation to join the Interim Government. This was decided in the
presence of Col. Gill, Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, 14 Panthic MLAs, 3 Sikh
Congress MLAs of the Punjab and the Central MLAs. 67 The Punjab Governor had
reported on 17 June to the Viceroy that Baldev Singh had assured him of the Sikh
willingness to join the Interim Government and the elections to the Constituent
Assembly. 68

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Baldev Singh and Jinnah discussed the political situation relating particularly
to the Muslim-Sikh relations but it did not melt the ice. Baldev Singh on 28 June 1946
said that after meeting with Jinnah, he had come to the conclusion that his “price was
too high” because he sought the Sikh support to weaken the centre in some specific
matters. 69 Baldev Singh was optimistic that the League would soon lose its base in the
Punjab. He briefed the Governor on 10 August that two Muslim Unionists would win
the bye-elections in the landlord constituencies while 4 or 5 League members were
expected to join the Unionist Party which would increase the government’s strength. 70
The Akali leaders were confused in countering the mighty wave of the communal
politics while the Congressite Sikhs were clear in their vision. Udham Singh Nagoke
addressed at Gurdwara Dera Sahib, Lahore in December 1946 and said that the
Congress remained advocate of the Sikh claims on every step. A few Sikhs had
become Akalis after wearing black turbans. The Sikhs would launch crusades against
the politics of Grouping in India. He advised the Sikhs to pick up guns and cannons
and shed streams of blood if the Grouping was enforced on them. 71
The correspondence between Baldev Singh and Evan Jenkins continuously
discussed the Sikh question in the Punjab and their resentment over the Cabinet
Mission plan in which they had inferred that it had totally ignored the Sikhs and put
them under the Muslim domination for good. He also warned that the Sikh members
including himself could resign from the Assembly. 72 But the Governor argued that the
plan entirely coped with the Sikh question and through this plan their two major
problems i.e. Pakistan scheme and division of the Sikh community, had been
addressed. To him, the plan had diverted the Muslims from Pakistan which would
avoid the partition of the Punjab. But on 29 May, the Viceroy in a letter to the Punjab
Governor admitted that the Sikh leaders had displayed a deplorable behaviour. This

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misinterpreting by the Sikhs could go against the British. He keenly sought to
evaluate the depth of the Sikh position. 73 On the other hand, the news of the expected
resignation of Baldev Singh invoked hilarity among the Muslims of the Punjab who
had been victim of the prejudiced administration mainly in the Civil Supply and other
departments under his charge. 74
In May 1946, Baldev Singh said that he entirely believed in a united India and
feared that the Cabinet Mission Plan would result in the establishment of an
independent state. He explained that Jinnah had already proposed through Qazi Isa of
Balochistan a very attractive offer to secure the Sikh cooperation to draft a group
constitution. In return, the Sikhs would acquire more weightage in the civil services
and 40 per cent quota in the defence services. Baldev Singh admitted that the offer
was ‘superficially attractive’ and could attract some Sikhs but was not impressive for
him. He reported that Jinnah called him for negotiations but he had refused to see him
due to the fear that it could weaken his political position among the Sikhs. 75
On 5 June 1946, Major Short analysed that the Sikhs posed no danger to the
British but their overall attitude could be detrimental to the situation in the Punjab. If
they continued such manipulations, it would irritate Jinnah which would make it
impossible for the British to calm down the Muslim-Sikh rivalry in the Group B.
Therefore, the British should make them realise that they had been doing what was
the best for the Sikhs. They should convince the Sikhs to trust them and act according
to the British advice, but if they were not willing to accept the advice, they should be
allowed to destroy their position. 76
Sir Penderel Moon also analysed the Sikh-Muslim problem and said that the
real issue was the mastery of the Punjab. The Muslims sought the Punjab government
on the basis of their majority while the Sikhs wanted to eliminate the possibility of the

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Muslim raj with the idea to have balanced proportion of all the communities. He
compared the Muslim position in all India with the Sikhs in the Punjab. The League
leaders had not exerted to address the Sikh problem. They should have eliminated the
despondence of the Sikhs because they had no veto power in the Group B otherwise
they could take a decisive position in the affairs which could result in some big crisis.
They could be pacified with statutory share in the Punjab Government in the Section
B or by creating a new Hindu-Sikh province. The Muslims could accept any of the
two options or suggest some alternative acceptable for the Sikhs otherwise violence
would mar all the new arrangements. He further recommended that lobbying was
necessary to bring the Muslim-Sikh understanding. Moon also suggested that the
British should keep their own interests in mind and pre-empt any communal clash.
They should avoid any action which could result in the suppression of Sikhs. Moon
suggested formation of the League-Sikh government in the Punjab or purely a League
government in the province which could result in an encouraging situation. 77 Moon’s
analysis of the Muslim position in all India politics being similar to the Sikhs’ in the
Punjab was not well worked out because the Muslims were present in a reasonable
size in all the provinces of India and had majority in certain areas, which the Sikhs
lacked. This was the major setback to the Sikhs and difference between the two
communities therefore they were being treated differently by the British and the
Congress. As far as the League-Akali coalition government was concerned, it was the
best option but the Governor did not follow the line suggested by Sir Moon. Lobbying
could have been very fruitful to attract the Sikhs but the League did not establish any
wing or group of the leaders which could concentrate on the League-Akali politics.
The British organised negotiations for several times but the Indian leaders
could not arrive at any agreed demands. This tradition started before the Round Table

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Conference and was still persisting in the Indian politics. Ultimately, the leaders had
to be contented with what the British presented. The same was true for the Cabinet
Mission Plan which was sent by the British but could not be welcomed by the Indian
communities. Such uncertain conditions compelled the Viceroy to say that if the
Congress and League failed to come to a settlement “I have suggested to His
Majesty’s Government that they [British] should decide some definite and firm
policies to meet such eventuality.” 78 The Sikhs kept on pressing the British
government to bring some changes in the Cabinet Mission Proposals. Baldev Singh
wrote to C. R. Attlee (British Prime Minister) in this regard but replying to his letter
on 7 August 1946, Attlee rejected the Sikh demand of altering the Statement of 16
May. 79 On 9 August 1946, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution at
Wardha in which a request was made to the Sikhs to join the Constituent Assembly.
The Sikhs were waiting for such an appeal, so on 14 August they withdrew the
boycott of the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly. They demanded
the same rights given to the major communities in the communal matters. 80 Master
Tara Singh commented on the decision of joining the central assembly that he himself
along with Labh Singh, President of SAD was not in favour of it but they had
accepted it to maintain the unity of the Sikhs. They had also been assured of full
support if the decision could not be fruitful. Baldev Singh on 19 August expressed
satisfaction on the step taken by the Panthic Board. 81 By this, the Sikhs became
uncertain about the Congress pledge.
Sardar Harnam Singh placed a memorandum before the Congress president
and appealed for more forceful voice for the Sikhs. He also stood for full
representation of the minorities in the Advisory Committee under the Cabinet Mission
arrangements. The Panthic Pratinidhi Board and the legislators unanimously decided

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to depute a Sikh delegation for a meeting with Gandhi which would “request him to
help the Sikhs in getting adequate safeguards.” 82 Master Tara Singh said that the
position of the Muslims under the Hindus in India and the Sikhs’ under Muslims in
the Punjab matched each other regarding the minority rights. If the Muslims were
opposed to the Hindu domination, they should be willingly prepared to free the Sikhs
who would never tolerate their political hegemony in the Punjab. 83 He viewed that the
communities should forget to form governments of the majority community because
the communal differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims (Sikhs and Hindus)
were more deep-rooted than those between the British and the Germans. In India,
“nationality is based on religion.” 84 This is the point the League leadership had been
pressing throughout the history that the religious values never moved the communities
to merge into one nation, therefore, under the two-nation theory, the Muslims had a
right to opt out to preserve their religious and cultural heritage. Master Tara Singh
made this assessment very late when his own party was unable to take an independent
course away from the Hindu influence. On the other hand, Jinnah always accepted the
principle of self-determination of the other communities including Sikhs. But the
Akali leader most of the time tried to project Jinnah as an anti-Sikh leader. This was
harmful for his own community because the Punjab was passing through a very
critical phase and his community could benefit from a positive approach. The British
wanted to address the Sikh anxieties, but they could find no solid way out to redress
the Sikh grievances in the Group B. 85 But they were well aware of the importance of
the major parties. Abell (P.S.V.) wrote to Menon on 6 September that the Secretary of
State for India had agreed to the Sikh elections if all the Sikhs, Nehru and Jinnah
consented to accept. 86

Leadership Crisis
313
The Sikh leaders’ behaviour at this critical juncture was very immature and
they not only criticised the League but also the Unionists, the British and Congress. In
1946, a pamphlet was issued with the signatures of Master Tara Singh and other six
Akali leaders advising the Sikhs to fight the Hindus, Muslims and British who had not
catered for the panth interests. According to this pamphlet, the Sikhs were alone,
therefore they should be prepared to launch a war singly for their rights. 87 According
to the Police reports, the Akali leadership was severely upset under the stress of the
regional and national events including the coalition Ministry issue, delay of the
appointment of the Parliamentary Secretaries in the Punjab, ban on Kirpan by the
Bombay authorities, nomination of a Namdhari Sikh in the Lahore Corporation and
Cabinet Mission’s suggestions. 88 In July the report indicated that the Sikh opinion and
attitudes remained confused. They were nervous as to whether they should raise their
voice for Khalistan or to depend entirely on the Congress in the new situation:
The problem which confronts the Sikhs has become more difficult and it remains to
be seen whether their clamour will be for Khalistan or whether they will decide in
the changed circumstances to throw in their lot with the Congress. Among the Sikhs
opinion on these two points is as divided as it is on many others. 89
The Sikhs decided not to put their nominees forward for election to the Constituent
Assembly. The Sikh followers of the Congress boycotted because their defeat at the
hands of the Akalis was very clear. The Akalis boycotted because the constitutional
plan was “gravely inimical to Sikh interests.” As a result, when on 19 July the Punjab
Legislative Assembly met, it only elected the Muslim and the general seats. 90 The
Mahasabha enjoyed a nuisance value with deep importance in the Hindu community
and the Congress. The internal disunity of the Akalis made the situation worse. The
leaders were seeking for inconsequentialities. They continued to secure petty and

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personal benefits as Giani Kartar was opposed to be a Punjab Minister by Baldev
Singh on the ground of his tilt towards the Muslims and opposition within the Akali
party. In a meeting with Baldev Singh, Giani Kartar, the ‘brain of the Akalis’ started
weeping but it did not convince Baldev Singh and Sardar Swaran Singh from
Jullundur 91 became a Minister. 92
The League accepted the Cabinet Mission Proposals on 6 June 1946 with the
assurance by Lord Wavell that in case of the rejection by the Congress, the League
would enter the interim government. The Congress accepted the 16 May statement but
refused to join the interim government. 93 The British considered it satisfactory that
they ultimately had succeeded in winning the confidence of all the major parties. They
also succeeded in maintaining the geographical unity of India and the Punjab and had
also satisfied the League. According to Ispahani, the League by accepting the 16 May
statement had narrowed the Congress down to the foreign affairs, defence and
communication. 94
The British efforts were undermined when Nehru on 10 July refused to accept
grouping of the provinces. On the other hand, on 25 June, the Mission betrayed Jinnah
and refused to invite him into the interim government. It was an open violation of the
commitment and consequently on 29 July the League Council withdrew its
acceptance of the Plan. The League also declared 16 August 1946 as ‘direct action’
day. P. Hardy writes that “Jinnah himself publicly said his farewell to constitutional
methods.” 95 Satya M. Rai writes that the Punjab leaders persuaded Jinnah to take
military course against the Hindus and Sikhs. 96 This claim cannot be conceded
because it is an undeniable reality that Jinnah remained unmoved as a constitutionalist
throughout his political career. Jinnah rejected the Cabinet Mission Proposals and
pledged to achieve Pakistan as the sole objective. Nehru turned down the Cabinet

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Mission Proposals keeping the Indian political future in his mind. In fact, by
conceding the Mission proposals, India was going to be divided into three Groups
with a weak centre 97 which could result in more ‘Pakistans’ in future. The communal
issue was still there and the weak centre might face grave danger unable to convince
the rest of the units to remain within the Union. The ‘possibility’ of further territorial
split might have motivated him to reject the Cabinet Mission Plan. To Sangat Singh,
the Congress’ unreliable tilt forced the League leadership to adopt the communal
course:
Jinnah rightly argued that if the Hindus could change their position many times when
the British were still there and power had not yet come into their hands, what
assurances could the minorities have, once the British left. 98
Jinnah had understood the tactics of the Hindu politicians but the Sikhs were still
waiting for their mercy and help. Gulati writes that the League leaders displayed
furious sentiments by which they could never expect goodwill from the Sikhs. Sardar
Abdur Rab Nishtar, the League leader in NWFP, declared that the only way to
achieve Pakistan would be through sacrifice of the Muslim blood. He said that they
did not believe in Ahimsa, non-violence. Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan roared that they
were not apostles of the non-violence. Once infuriated, the Muslims could never be
subdued. Feroz Khan Noon stated that they would fight the British if they tried to put
the Muslims under the Hindu raj. The Muslims would inflict havoc more furious than
the onslaught of Changez Khan and Halaku. Direct action meant the violation of the
law. 99 The League leaders gave these statements from April to August 1946 100 when
the Congress had been tougher than ever and the violence had been inflicted upon the
Muslims in different areas of India and the Punjab. Though such provocative
statements upset the slight hope for peace at the moment but the League leadership
never issued any anti-Sikh statement which might cause tension between the Muslims

316
and Sikhs. The main target of the League had been the Hindu threats and biased
moves by the British. Nevertheless, Jinnah had instructed the Muslims to adopt
peaceful ways while observing the Direct Action Day (16 August 1946). The Punjab
Governor’s letter testifies this reality when he wrote to the Viceroy that the direct
action by the League was “primarily against Government and not against the Hindus
and Sikhs.” But he on the other hand feared that “Such a movement ...would almost
certainly lead to widespread communal disorder, though this would not be its
professed object.” 101
A feeble hope of the Muslim-Sikh cooperation emerged when the Sikh-League
understanding came to surface and the Panthic Board agreed to send emissary if
Jinnah sent an invitation. According to the Intelligence Report, the Board decided that
Master Tara Singh should meet Jinnah but without any proposals:
Master Tara Singh should make no definite request to Mr. Jinnah but should instead wait
to see what terms he had to offer the Sikhs....after Master Tara Singh and others had seen
Mr. Jinnah, they should also see the Hon’ble Sardar Patel, since the Sikhs do not wish to
do anything behind the back of Congress and the Hindus, as it were, lest this reacts
unfavourably upon them eventually. 102
P. E. S. Finny reported that Jinnah too was in a difficult position during the most
turbulent period but seemed willing to give the Sikh Province within the Group B. But
this agreement could create problems because if Jinnah came to a mutually decided
plan with the Sikhs (14%) then he would have to be lenient with the Hindus who were
28 per cent of the population. 103 In this way, the situation reverted to the complexity
of the Punjab question.
The Akalis had demanded inclusion of veto power in the Mission proposals
which the Mission refused. Stafford Cripps in his statement in the House of Commons
on 12 December 1946 opposed veto power to the Sikhs with the justification that such
a veto power should go to all the communities including Hindus in the Punjab. The

317
two vetoes certainly would never allow the Group to arrive at any decision. The Sikh
unity had been saved and weightage would further reduce the Muslim votes. Cripps
further said that Hindus and Muslims would actually be dependent on the Sikhs in the
new arrangements which the Sikhs could cash in, in their own favour. He also
expressed the view that the Sikh demand for the united Punjab had been conceded in
the proposed arrangements. 104 Tara Singh criticised Cripps’ statement in the House of
Commons and alleged that he was wrong in his assertion. In fact, the Sikhs favoured
the ‘beneficial’ partition of the Punjab. He said that the Cabinet Mission opposed the
veto right which had never been opposed by the British. He further said “Let us wait
and see how Congress tries to get us out of this difficulty.” 105 Master Tara Singh
repeated the confusion as he was not clear as to what claim could be beneficial for
them. He presented no solid and impressive argument with regard to the veto power.
Amazingly, he was again putting himself and the community at the mercy of the
Congress and trying to satisfy the Sikhs by saying ‘wait and see.’ What did the Sikh
leadership stand for if the Sikhs had to depend on the Congress? In this way, the Akali
leadership continued adding a new wave of depression to the Sikh community.
The role of the Congress in this period remained very weak in dealing with the
communal issues. This situation put a heavy burden of responsibility on the Congress
to attract the sister communities to unity but the leadership did not relinquish its
traditional enmity towards the League. To Ram Narayan Kumar, the first step by
Nehru to strike a blow to the possibility of the Indian unity was taken when he, on 6
July 1946, changed his decision regarding the Mission Plan with a vivid hilarity.
Nehru had stated that they were not bound by anything while the next day at Bombay
he stated in a press conference, “there will be no grouping.” 106 Nehru declared at
Benaras on 16 December 1946 that they would make the constitution in the

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Constituent Assembly according to their own pursuits which would become the
constitution of India whether the Britain conceded it or not. He clarified that they
were not bound to present the constitution to the British for approval. The Congress
leadership would never tolerate any external interference in this regard. 107
The Great Calcutta Killing took place during 16 to 20 August 1946 108 and cost
more than 4,000 lives while about 7,000 Muslims were massacred in Bihar 109
followed by the same in the UP, Bombay and Noakhali (Bengal). In the same month,
Nehru had joined the Interim Government and the League leadership fearing the
Muslim persecution at the hands of the Congress as in 1937, desired to join the
government but not the Constituent Assembly. 110 The Direct Action Day caused
havoc for the Calcutta citizens. To Ayesha Jalal, the Muslim mullahs and pirs
stimulated the extremist Muslims to launch jihad. 111 To Sangat Singh, on 17 August,
the Hindus led by the Sikh taxi drivers attacked the Muslims. The Sikh leadership
failed to dissociate the Sikhs in the Muslim-Hindu clashes. 112 Such communal
developments in other parts of India could not be a good news for the Muslims in the
Punjab who seriously resented the anti-Muslim turn of events. Jenkins shared his
opinion on the Calcutta riots that “I have given as to the responsibility of the
Congress and its sympathisers about the Calcutta disturbances.” 113 Lord Wavell met
Gandhi and Nehru and disseminated what he had seen in Calcutta. He said angrily
that the Bombay press conference of Gandhi had destroyed not only the hope of
Indian unity but also cost human lives at Calcutta on 16 August. The Congress
leaders protested and walked out. Later Gandhi cabled to Prime Minister Attlee
complaining against Wavell’s harsh wording. 114
Jinnah expressed his concern over the Noakhali riots and exhorted the
Leaguers to maintain peace following the Islamic principles of tolerance and

defending the weak. He appealed to the Hindus to react with the same towards the
Muslims. 115 According to the official statement, The Bihar State Killing¸ the Hindu
press had published exaggerated stories against the Muslims. 116 The Hindus on 25
October observed Noakhali Day in Bihar. The Congress leaders infused excitement
into the Hindu masses by chanting anti-League slogans like Khoon ka Badla Khoon,
(blood for blood) Jinnah ko Goli Maro, (gun down Jinnah) Pakistan ko Qabristan
Bana do (convert Pakistan into a graveyard) etc. 117
319
The Sikhs and Hindus could expect the Muslim wrath as a reaction to the
killings in other parts of India. The Punjab was already a communally infected region.
So the non-Muslims of the Punjab started lamenting for government measures for
their protection. Bhim Sachar complained that Muslims were planning to attack the
Hindus in Lahore, but the Governor assured him not to fear of such rumours; “our
civil intelligence is very good...I do not think the League leaders want communal riots
now.” 118 Premier Tiwana in October 1946 praised the Punjab Police as when many
provinces of India were under the duress of the communal frenzy, the Punjab
remained peaceful due to the best arrangement of the Police. 119 The Premier should
have referred the peace to the ‘secular and cross-communal’ Unionists but he
appreciated the Police for maintaining peace. On the other hand, Anita Inder Singh
marked the administrative impotency in the on-going communal disturbances, which
proved unable to control the situation. 120 It is a reality that the law-enforcing agencies
initially maintained peace in the Punjab but this could not be ensured in the long run.
The communal situation in the province remained tense as usual and affected
the rural areas gradually through the political activities of the parties particularly the
Sikhs. At the beginning of March 1946, the communal clashes were reported in
Lahore where the Hindu students of Sanatan Dharam College attacked the butchers

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who wanted to slaughter the cattle. On 15 March, riots broke out in Amritsar which
took two Hindu lives and seven injured. The next day, the police found one Sikh dead
and two Hindus and two Muslims injured. 121 The Inqelab reported on the Amritsar
riots that many Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs had got injuries while two Hindus and one
Sikh had been killed. The paper pointed out that no reason could yet be attributed to
this incident but the violent statements by the Sikh leadership caused tension and
resulted in the riots. The Muslims did not start the fight. 122
In May 1946, RSSS propagated that the Muslims were malich, unfaithful,
‘goonda’ and traditional enemies of the Hindus. It advised its followers to keep a
dagger or a knife on person so that they would be able to fight the Muslims and free
the country after some years. 123 The RSSS workers of the Rawalpindi Division
launched propaganda to train their co-religionists for the purpose of protection “in the
event of a civil war.” The Hindu youth joined the RSSS in great numbers in the
Ambala area and in Amritsar “the Sangh has figured in all recent communal
incidents.” The Governor wrote that the communal relations were still very tense. The
restoration of law and order in Amritsar did not mean permanent peace but that the
“fear persists on both sides.” On 18 March 1946, the Amritsar riot worsened the
communal relations in Jandiala, a village 15 miles away from Amritsar, where one
Muslim lost his life and eight got injured. The Muslims retaliated and burnt the
property and looted the shops of non-Muslims, both exchanged brickbats. Multan
presented the same dreadful situation as mentioned in the Governor’s reports. 124 The
communal tussle not only disturbed the Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab but it had
caused skirmishes everywhere. For example, the Sikhs and Hindus of Sindh filed a
protest against the Muslim injustice pertaining to the confiscation of the non-
Muslims’ lands. Hira Singh 125 wrote on 25 April 1946 that the decision to award the

Makhi Dhand land to the Sindhi and non-Sindhi Muslims only was an open injustice
to the Sikhs and Hindus. Confiscating the land of the Hindus and Sikhs and handing it
over to the Muslims was injustice. “This is the first fruit of Pakistan.” The Punjabi
Sikhs had invested thousands of rupees to acquire this land but their applications were
totally ignored. 126
321
In the All-Parties Sikh Conference held at Rawalpindi on 27-28 April 1946
was presided over by Sardul Singh Caveeshar. Mota Singh and Caveeshar urged that
the Sikhs must make united struggle under the Congress flag. Mota Singh advised the
Indians to keep a sword with them all the time “in order to fight British tyranny.” 127 In
the first half of May 1946, the Governor reported that the Sikhs remained indifferent
in the Hindu-Muslim clash at Amritsar and the communal harmony committees were
organised in all the areas of the Punjab which were working efficiently. 128 The report
seems merely a projection of his own efficiency otherwise the Hindu-Sikh joint
venture against the Muslims was taking their toll throughout the Punjab in shape of
riots. His last and the next weeks’ reports negated his claim of peace and harmony.
For example, in second half of June 1946, he reported that volunteer organisations
had become strong and well funded. It was also conveyed to the Viceroy that these
preparations had profoundly affected the Sikhs of rural and urban localities and “their
response to a call to action would be substantial.” 129 The Sikhs collected more
weapons after the Cabinet Mission went back. They acquired arms “from the dumps
left behind by the American Armed Forces. These were mainly in Assam and East
Bengal.” 130
Violence was much valued by the Akalis who in April 1946 awarded a Saropa
to Nirmal Singh who was a convicted man in the Kiratpur gang case. 131 The Central
districts along with rural areas were hit dangerously where propaganda, increase in

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volunteers and fund raising continued on a large scale. According to the Governor’s
report, many Sikh leaders spoke against the British at the well-attended meetings.
Thousands of them signed the pledge forms with blood. Action still lacked plan and
would require the Sikh unity to further any programme. 132 The communal tension had
also been reported from Hansi (Hissar) on 28 September, Ludhiana city on 25 October
and other areas. 133 In November 1946, the Governor wrote that the communal
situation of the province affected badly the working of the District officials who were
constantly under stress. To the District Officers, violence could erupt any time. The
Governor further reported that all the district officers had been keeping a careful
watch on the clashes but “even then the clashes could not be blocked.” 134 It can be
assumed that the Officers were defying the ‘efficient’ Governor or they had been
politicised to that extent that they lost the respect for law. The reports told that most
of the policemen were supporting the League. The Muslim League Guards and the
RSSS got much popularity among their communities and were heading for a big
conflict. 135 Much had been written about the National Guards but as a matter of fact it
emerged as a reaction to the Sikh and Hindu militant organisations. It was at a nascent
stage in 1946. Its Chief Organiser Major Khurshid Anwar was planning to open its
branches in different areas in late 1946. According to The Eastern Times, in an
interview on 27 July Major Khurshid expressed his desire to plant branches of the
Guards in different cities of the Punjab. 136 Their mission was to eliminate the
pervasive horrors of the Sikhs from the Muslim minds. According to the Police
reports, the Sialkot branch demanded the National Guards to have thikri pehra
(patrolling) at night in the rural areas. 137 On the other hand, the Sikhs were preparing
to fight the Muslims. They were getting training of gatka and use of other weapons
before the partition. 138

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In December 1946, Hazara district once again witnessed a shocking incident
of the Muslim-Sikh riots. The Muslims of the Tribal Areas attacked the non-Muslim
population of the Hazara district. The non-Muslim inquiry committee consisting of
Yogi Ram Nath Shastri, Comrade Malik Raj and Baba Amar Singh visited different
refugee areas. They were told that the League leaders had been violently calling for
the revenge of the Muslim killings in Bihar and Calcutta which resulted in the attacks
by the tribesmen. 139 The Governor reported in February 1947 that the communal
situation could not be improved under the serious and deep-rooted ill-feelings. The
communal violence was creeping speedily into the daily life of the region. The
disturbances in Hazara district bordering the Punjab automatically enhanced the fears
of the Sikhs, the victims of Muslim attacks. The administration attempted to prevent
the violence spreading into the Punjab, but the refugees could not be stopped from
telling the stories of atrocities perpetrated to them. The Sikh and Hindu papers gave
prominence to the news of the Hazara incidents and blamed the League leaders for
their provocative speeches. These clashes led to a serious fissure in the hope of the
Muslim-Sikh understanding. 140
The polarised situation undermined traditional Muslim-Sikh amity in the
Punjab’s rural areas. According to Major Abdul Rasheed Chaudhri, Baba Labh Singh
was a capacious man and had respect among all the communities of Jullundur. Once
he himself visited the League office and apologised for the insult of the Muslim girls
by the Sikh and Hindu boys. But he was attacked by the Muslims and wounded to
death which the Sikhs presented as a pre-planned murder. 141
Performance of the Governor
The Punjab Governor was unable to stem the tide of violence. The largely
Indianised civil service was by this stage almost totally polarised on communal lines.

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The Police and local officials could not be relied upon to take firm action against the
violators of law and order. This state of affairs was revealed in Jenkins’ report of
August 1946:
The political situation is something very different from a routine law and order problem.
To handle it competently the Ministry would have to live down its own past weaknesses
and deal firmly not only with the Muslims but with its own followers, who have run riot
for months. This would be a difficult task in any conditions; in the Punjab now the
conditions are most unfavourable. The sympathies of Muslim officials (including about
70 per cent of the Police) are mainly with the Muslim League; and the British officials
are most reluctant to be drawn into a communal struggle on behalf of the Congress. 142
Jinnah and Nehru said that the rioters be arrested or even gunned down at the spot but
the Governor did not have sufficient resources to take drastic action against the
culprits. Evan Jenkins wrote to the Viceroy that the arrests of the Akali leaders might
infuriate the Sikhs, which would further the consternation and go beyond control. 143
Mountbatten was more concerned with the All-India situation than with the
deteriorating situation in the Punjab. Only an influx of British forces could have
prevented violence in the circumstances of administrative collapse in the face of
communal polarisation. This was politically impossible. The British thus had to race
against time to depart before the situation collapsed. Nevertheless, it is surprising that
the Viceroy was satisfied with what the Governor Punjab was briefing him. The
British had dealt with such a difficult situation a few years ago in the agitation of
1923, all the communities were at agitation and the authorities arrested some Sikh
leaders and restored law and order. The Intelligence Bureau reported that “the arrest
of the Akalis has not stirred them as deeply as the agitators would desire.” 144 Plausible
empirical evidence was available to the British Governor and Viceroy that only
enforcement of laws could avoid the bad situation but as they were close to their
departure from India they did not want to involve themselves too deeply.

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On 6 October 1946, the League joined the Interim Government and the
Muslim Ministers introduced strict control and policies about finances which
convinced the Congress that a complete parting of ways was the best future course of
action. Lord Wavell analysed that the Congress was seeking power and not serious in
dialogue with the League as it wished the British to leave the country and let it deal
with the minorities and the Princes through bribery, blackmail, coercion or even
force. 145 As a last resort, Clement Attlee invited the Indian representatives, the
Congress and League (2 each) and one Sikh to London to maintain the geographical
integrity of India. During 3-6 December 1946, Nehru, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan
and Baldev Singh gathered in London and the British authorities tried to bring all the
major parties to agree with the Cabinet Mission Plan but in vain.
Sir Winston Churchill passed a message to Baldev Singh for further stay to
exert more pressure on the Sikh position and the safeguards but he leaked it out to
Nehru who himself drafted and sent a statement to the British. In this statement, he
cleared that the Sikhs were with the Congress and sought nothing from the British. 146
The Punjab Governor had already indicated to it after a meeting with Giani Kartar in a
letter to Sir John Colville on 5 December 1946 that Baldev Singh had got the status of
a ‘special man’ of the Congress leadership and went to London without the Akali
permission. 147 By this, Baldev Singh tried to win over the Congress leadership which
was a continuation of the pro-Congress policy of the Akalis but this incident was a u-
turn from the traditional pro-British policy. Baldev Singh dismayingly played a
devious role with his community because they desperately needed the British
sympathy in the political decisions but his repudiation of Churchill’s offer under the
influence of Nehru revealed the reality of the Akali failure. It also reveals that the
Akali Dal lacked party discipline as their top leader joined the London parleys

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without the party’s permission. Was Baldev Singh representing the Congress or the
Akali Dal in the London conference? This state of affairs displayed the miserable
condition of the Sikh politics.
League’s Agitation
The Punjab government declared on 24 January 1947 the RSSS and the
Muslim League National Guards as illegal organisations under the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act of 1908. This action was based on their dangerous activities and
threat to the regional peace. The action against the two organisations authorised the
Police to search their offices, which caused considerable unrest and resentment among
the Muslims. The League leaders resisted the searches at Lahore and the Police
arrested them. This deliberate but instigated defiance followed arrests under the
Punjab Public Safety Act. The arrested League leaders considered the raid on the
Muslim League National Guards as an attack on the League as a party. They
demanded cancellation of the Punjab Public Safety Act and the government orders of
banning the Muslim League National Guards. The League conveyed it to its masses as
an effort to downgrade the party. According to Ian Talbot, the government got no
benefit from these arrests and released them on 27 January under the conciliatory
influence of the Punjab Governor. 148
Tiwana could not face the fury of the Muslims after banning the Muslim
League National Guards under the Punjab Public Safety Act originally drafted and
later utilized by the Governor. The Sikhs and Hindus perceived that the League was
trying to establish the Muslim rule through agitation. Hartal (strike) was a major tool
used by the League, which paralysed the social activities in many cities of the
province. 149 The ban was lifted on 28 January 1947 150 but the agitation continued to

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topple the coalition government and the protesters showed no change in their attitude
and went on defying the law. The League leaders were again arrested on the morning
of 29 January and sent to jail. 151 Huge demonstrations took place during the next three
days. The Police officers including one SP were injured. The Governor reported that
the absence of interference from outside the province could improve the communal
situation. Master Tara Singh supported the government action and squarely
condemned the League. The Congress was also with the coalition government.
Furthermore, the Hindus were gloating that the RSSS had been reinstated, by the
League’s agitation. 152 The Punjab Premier was quite scared of the fury of the League
agitators and kept on changing his residence during the nights to save his life. 153
According to the Governor’s report, the League’s agitation started on 24
January and the workers from Sindh and Delhi also joined but not in large number. It
did not disturb the political situation of the other provinces but severely affected the
Punjab government and its districts. Only the middle classes responded to the
League’s call. The Sikhs were gravely disturbed in the current political situation. The
Hindus in general and Sikhs in particular felt ominously insecure because of the
agitation. On 12 February 1947, in a second statement, Master Tara Singh declared
the League agitation as communal which was being carried out with the purpose of
taking over the Punjab. He called that the Sikhs must be prepared “to face the Muslim
League onslaught.” He emphasised the dire need of the “Akal Fauj” reminding them
the prowess of this volunteer organisation. 154 The Akali Dal expressed its opinion that
the Punjab originally belonged to the Sikhs, therefore they had a legal right to demand
it. 155 The Governor reported that the Sikh leadership expressed it publicly that the
Sikh army was being trained to be used against the League aggression. All the Sikhs
were supposed to swear that they would be ready to sacrifice their life and property

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for the Sikh panth. The League’s agitation undoubtedly attracted the separatist
Muslims but “failed to command the active support of the great majority of the
Muslim middle classes.” 156 The ‘separatist Muslims’ as termed by the Governor was
not a small group of the Muslims but was a majority who had supported the League in
the elections and were still backing it and its plans enthusiastically. The next segment
of the Governor’s report showed contradiction with the first report in which he had
acknowledged that the League’s agitation was a show of the middle classes while in
the next report he said that the League failed to engage the middle classes. The Police
reports revealed that the League continued its propaganda in the rural areas to win
over the public opinion against Tiwana government’s action. They in January 1947
hired some paid workers to activate the Muslims and Achhoots (untouchables). In
February, the Eid-i-Milad 157 was taken as an opportunity to propagate the League’s
message. In Sialkot, approximately 6,000 protesters attacked the Jail on 21 February
in which 11 Police officers were wounded. The insecurity prevailed everywhere and
the Hindus started migration to Jammu State. It was also reported in April that
burning the wheat fields “usually the property of Muslims, has been reported from
Jullundur, Sialkot and Amritsar districts.” 158
Muslim League’s Position
Jinnah, in a press statement maintained that the National Guards was not a
military organisation and that no warning had been issued by the government about its
involvement in illegal activities. 159 The Working Committee of the League at Karachi
on 1 February 1947 passed a resolution in which the leaders expressed grave concern
over the dangerous situation in the Punjab wherein the Muslims including men and
women were courting arrest against the curtailment of their civil liberties by the

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provincial ministry. The resolution also decried the government ban on the Muslim
League National Guards which ignited the Muslim feelings everywhere. The Punjab
Safety Act was promulgated with a wrong perception and deeply affected the
condition of civil liberties. Significantly the Muslims were the main target of the ban
and “restrictions on fundamental civil rights and normal political activity.” 160 The
Committee advised the Muslims “to maintain a perfectly non-violent, disciplined,
firm and dignified attitude in their protest against repression, coercion and
suppression of democratic freedom in the province.” 161
The Governor reported that there was no communal disturbance and the
League agitation had no adverse effects on the communal situation because it was
related mainly to the law and order issue. On the other hand, the provincial leaders of
all the political parties made the utmost endeavour to abstain from the activities,
which could embitter the communal relations. The agitation, however caused anxiety
and increased the fears of the communities. 162 Jinnah explained in Karachi on 21
February that it was wrong that they were indulging in toppling the Punjab ministry
by force or unlawful activities. Referring to the statement of the Punjab Premier that
the League should challenge the Ministry within the Assembly Jinnah said that the
ministerial group had never allowed the criticism in the Assembly. Ever since the
coalition ministry emerged in March 1946, the Assembly had been in session only
once for a few days. The ruling group being small majority was apprehended by the
League. He urged to restore law and order by following true constitutional methods.
He appealed to the Punjabi Muslims particularly the youth to maintain the movement
as non-violent and not to involve themselves in any communal conflict or clash. He
also advised the Muslims to ensure unity and discipline which would help them in
their struggle. 163

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The Unionists had been working in the coalition government with the British
help but when they later decided to transfer the power to the Indian communities it
adversely affected the coalition ministry of the Punjab. The statement of 20 February
by the British Prime Minister proved a shocking blow and convinced Tiwana to resign
on 2 March 1947. 164 The Governor reported that Tiwana had retreated due to the
reasons of the His Majesty’s Government’s pronouncement of the 20 February and
the League agitation. He also wrote that Tiwana had told him that “the outlook for
Mamdot was very bleak” and in case of the Sikh and Hindu refusal to support the
League, his duty was to impose the Governor’s rule. The Governor also pointed out
that the League’s coalition ministry with the Sikhs would result in a serious trouble.
But he further expressed that he and his officials would be uneasy if Iftikhar Mamdot
succeeded in making the ministry even with the support of the Sikhs and Hindus. 165
The Governor further reported to the Viceroy that the League celebrated the day of
the Tiwana’s resignation as a marvellous victory. The Budget session of the Assembly
was postponed and on the failure of the League’s formation of the Ministry the
Governor Rule was imposed under section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935
on 5 March 1947. 166 It is notable point that the British Governor was opposing the
democratic mechanism of the change in the Assembly.
To H. N. Mitra, the Governor expressed the circumstances in which he had to
proclaim the ‘Governor rule’ in the Punjab for a short period and said that the
imposition of section 93 had become inevitable after the resignation of the Punjab
Ministry. He reiterated his responsibilities and pledge that his major duty would be to
restore law and order. But the same day the people of Lahore witnessed 17 dead
bodies and 89 injured. 167 He took over to eliminate riots but his apologetic attitude to
arrest the violent leaders indicated that he was merely keen to establish his personal

331
authority in the province. Another aspect of the proclamation of section 93 was that
the Sikhs did not show any resentment on the termination of a democratic government
but they condemned the League agitation. Perhaps the dissolution of the
representative government fulfilled Master Tara Singh’s desire in which he had
announced that section 93 would be preferable to the Sikhs rather than the Muslim
rule. Nevertheless, Tiwana’s resignation increased the Sikh apprehensions and proved
a challenge to “the patience of the Sikhs.” Master Tara Singh told The New York
Times that a civil war could not be avoided after this incident because the Muslims
desired to rule over the Punjab while the Sikhs could not “trust the Muslims under any
circumstances.” The Sikhs possessed an ability to push the Muslims out of the eastern
Punjab but would not stop there and would “drive them out of Punjab entirely.” He
further informed that they had started organising “the volunteer army as a reaction to
the Muslim League’s agitation.” 168 Master Tara had disclosed the Sikh plan to occupy
the whole of Punjab which was to start a massacre of the Muslims.
The Governor called a joint meeting with the Congress, Panthic and League
leaders in the Punjab Assembly building to ponder over the situation. The parties
reached an agreement of all the parties’ government in the province 169 which was a
revolutionary achievement. Ram Narayan Kumar writes that Master Tara Singh and
Bhim Sen Sachar led a furious procession in Lahore on the same day which aimed to
pressurise the Governor not to allow making of the League ministry. The leaders
made objectionable speeches while Master Tara Singh waved the sword and shouted,
“Pakistan Murdabad.” He also tore the League flag into pieces which started
communal riots in Lahore, Amritsar and then throughout the Punjab. 170 Sangat Singh
repudiates this and writes that Master Tara Singh said cut kay dengey apni jan, par
nahin dengey Pakistan (we will sacrifice our lives but will not allow making of

332
Pakistan). To him, such words were not offensive but showed an irresponsible attitude
of the Akali leader. 171 Actually, waving a kirpan or even a hand in front of the furious
Muslims was an open challenge as stated by Ahmad Saeed Kirmani, an MLA. He told
in an interview to the researcher that considering it a challenge Master was about to
be attacked by the angry Muslim mob but he, along with other Muslim leaders, took
him away. 172 No doubt it started a new chapter of riots in Lahore, Amritsar and other
cities of the Punjab. The Hindustan Times warned that the Sikhs were better trained
than the Muslims and were assisted by the RSSS. 173
On 4 March 1947, the Governor invited Nawab Mamdot to form a new
ministry. The League Assembly members gathered in the Assembly Chamber and
elected Nawab Mamdot as leader and Shaukat Hayat as Deputy Leader. Bhim Sen
Sachar warned the Governor on the League government while Sardar Swaran Singh
talked to Sachar about the future planning. Master Tara Singh cleared the Akali
position by stating that there was no possibility of the League-Akali patch-up. On the
other hand, Muzaffar Qizalbash and Tiwana stated that they would side with the
Muslim demand for self-determination. On 5 March, Nawab Mamdot said that his
party did not intend to rule over any minority but wanted Sikh co-operation to serve
the province. But the Congress and Sikhs in a meeting at Lahore on 10 March
declared that no obligation could convince them to support the League in the
ministry-making process. On 11 March Feroz Khan Noon while talking to the press at
Lahore said that the League should have a conference with the Sikhs to find a solution
of the problem because the Sikhs would be nobody in the eastern Punjab. He
suggested to the Sikhs to have Punjab as an independent state “allied to neither
Akhand Hindustan nor to Pakistan.” He also talked to ensure them lingual rights,
separate public service commission, educational grants and other concessions. He

333
clearly said, if majority of the Sikh areas desired to join the Sikh state, they would not
be resisted. 174 Baldev Singh however refused to support the League in the making of a
Ministry in the Punjab. 175 He suggested to Abell that the Punjab should be divided
into the Muslim and non-Muslim provinces within Group B. No option was available
to opt out of the Group B until the period of 10 years. On the Abell’s query about the
boundary particularly Lahore, Baldev Singh declared that it should be included in the
non-Muslim province. Lord Wavell knew very well that the Muslims could not accept
it. 176
No serious move was initiated to end the Muslim-Sikh tension. Nevertheless, a
platform as a Peace Committee in March 1947 attracted the attention of the Punjabi
communities. The eminent names in the Peace Committee included Nawab Mamdot,
Feroz Noon, Mumtaz Daultana, Iftekharuddin, Shaukat Hayat, Master Tara Singh,
Bhim Sen Sachar, Singha (the Speaker), Sardar Swaran Singh, Gopi Chand Bhargava
and Gibbon (an Anglo-Indian MLA). The Governor was quite satisfied on the co-
working of the Muslim-Sikh leaders but on the other hand was doubtful about Master
Tara Singh whether he would join the Committee or not. 177 Nawab Mamdot, Feroz
Noon and Mumtaz Daultana saw the Governor on 12 March 1947 and complained
against the Sikhs who seemed lukewarm in the Peace Committee while other
communities had joined it. They assured the Governor that the League was always
ready to work for the peace and tranquillity of the region. 178 Master Tara Singh
alleged that the League was playing two-faced game and wanted to betray the
minorities. 179 It was reported that riots spread from Lahore, Amritsar and other cities
to the rural Punjab. Rawalpindi was severely hit by such riots wherein 1046 persons
had been killed up till 15 March 1947. On 21 March, Mamdot invited Master Tara

334
Singh to form “a true and genuine peace committee” 180 but Master Tara did not
respond with the same zeal.
The League had to tackle some problems in the ministry making process such as
pulling 10 more members and persuading the Governor for re-invitation to form
ministry. On 1 April, Bhim Sen Sachar said that the League commanded no majority
in the Assembly. He commented on Raja Ghazanfar’s offer for the minorities’
inclusion in the ministry that the real problem was that no Sikh or Hindu could
consent to work with the League. 181 The Sikhs and Hindus were definitely pushing the
province into a chaos. They knew that the League had brought the Unionist Party
down and now they would have to work with them. Even new elections would have
revised the same results therefore it was not a sane policy to isolate the League in the
Punjab when it was continuously assuring the minority rights and expressing the
willingness to work with the Sikhs and Hindus.
On 3 April Mumtaz Daultana rightly responded to Bhim Sen Sachar that the
League as a major party of the Assembly had a right to form the ministry. It was also
ready to negotiate with other parties and if all this was not democratic then Sachar
should suggest an alternative course of action. He also challenged Sachar to form the
ministry with the help of Unionists if they could. But if the parties were unable to
conclude a settlement to form government then the elections should be held again but
talking of section 93 was not a correct solution. Sardar Swaran Singh and Sardar Ujjal
Singh replied that new elections were not possible in such a sensitive communal
environment. They alleged that the League never tried to create confidence among the
minorities and did not condemn the killers of innocent Sikhs and Hindus at
Rawalpindi. 182 On 15 April, Sardar Swaran Singh, leader Panthic Assembly party, and
Lala Bhim Sen Sachar, leader Congress Assembly party, issued a joint statement in

335
which they suggested to divide the Punjab into two parts with an utmost endeavour to
separate the League majority areas:
The only way to end the present tragic stalemate and to restore confidence among the
minorities in the Punjab and to have the province from further devastation and
destruction is to divide the Punjab in such a way that the maximum number of Hindus,
Sikhs, Harijans, Christians and other non-League sections of the Punjabis should feel
secure. 183
Jinnah, according to the sources, had tacitly indicated towards the acceptance of the
partition of the Punjab in April. 184
Rawalpindi Riots
The Muslim-Sikh relations remained tense and the mutual understanding
could not be reached in the newly emerged situation in the British Punjab. Pothohar
and other northern districts had been communally sensitive throughout the colonial
era. The anti-Muslim riots in different cities of India excited the Muslims of the
Punjab particularly the Rawalpindi region which was already at the simmering point
due to the local Muslim-Sikh rivalry. The serious disorder started in Lahore on 4
March when the Hindu and Sikh students attacked the Police near the District Courts
“and the first police casualties occurred.” The same day communal clashes started
along with incidents of stabbing and arson. The riots engulfed Amritsar and Multan
by 6 March with considerable damage to life and property. Reports from these towns
further affected the rural areas and other parts of the province and resulted in
bloodshed and burning of property. The most hit by this insensate fury was the
Rawalpindi Division which was predominantly the Muslim area. Rawalpindi and
Attock districts experienced heavy casualties with more than 1,036 were killed and
1,110 injured. The Governor reported that “None of the political parties of the major
communities can escape blame for what has happened.” 185 But as a matter of fact, the

336
Punjab Assembly incident in which Master Tara infuriated the Muslims fuelled the
communal situation in Lahore and Amritsar and so on to the other areas of the Punjab
particularly the Pothohar region. 186
The other Muslim majority areas of the Punjab were under constant threat of
the Sikh attacks at any time. On the other hand, the armed Sikhs and Hindus gathered
in the village Gurdwaras which gave credence to these rumours. In other areas, the
Sikh-Hindu processions chanted anti-Pakistan slogans like jo mangeyga Pakistan, us
ko milega Qabrastan (whoever demand for Pakistan, will be sent to the graveyard). 187
According to the Governor’s report, the non-Muslim papers held the League’s
agitation as the origin of the Muslim-Sikh trouble while the Muslim newspapers
asserted that the rival leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh had ignited the
bonfire. 188 According to Mitra, the riots permeated in Amritsar and other cities
including Rawalpindi. It is noteworthy that people from rural areas set villages and
city mohallas to fire. Approximately sixty persons were killed in Taxila and major
portion of Murree (Rawalpindi) was burned down. Jenkins visited all these affected
areas. 189 Prabodh Chandra 190 considered the Rawalpindi massacre as an inhuman
action:
Men have behaved lower than beasts in the Punjab. They have disgraced the fair
name of this great and historic land. Men taking the name of the Muslim League
stalk triumphant, revelling in the orgy of destruction, loot, plunder, wreckage,
murder, rape, abduction and forcible conversions. All this is the result of the
aggressive ideology of Pakistan. This is a foretaste of Pakistan. 191
Many Sikhs were forced to accept Islam as an alternative to a cruel end of life. 192 The
Rawalpindi clash extinguished any hope of the Muslim-Sikh agreement and of a
united Punjab becoming part of Pakistan. In July, when Giani Kartar placed the
demand for Nankana Sahib before the Viceroy, he mentioned the Rawalpindi riots as
the empirical evidence that the Sikhs could not survive in Pakistan. To him, the Sikhs

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did not desire to experience any more killing in future. 193 The Governor shed light on
the Punjab situation and said that the Rawalpindi riots had upset the peace of the
Punjab and, Sikhs in retaliation were preparing to take revenge from the Muslims.
They were constantly in touch with the Sikh States’ rulers. Giani Kartar wished to
achieve the Sikh state. According to Intelligence Reports, they would wait until the
British departed from India. The Muslim-Sikh clash had made any chance of friendly
developments between the two communities almost impossible. 194 The elections of
1946 were contested in a bitter atmosphere and different communities put many cities
of India in chaos. The League’s agitation of January and February embittered the
feelings of other communities and defied the power of authority. However, the Sikhs
and Hindus did not lag behind the Leaguers and increased the tension through their
inflammatory speeches. The immediate cause of the trouble which began in Lahore
however was the irresponsible attitude of the Sikhs and Hindus:
Hindu and Sikh public meeting which was held on the night of the 3 rd of March, at which
there was dangerous and truculent talk, and to statements by the Sikh leaders that they
were determined to fight Pakistan, and would oppose the formation of a Muslim League
Government at all costs. The harsh attitude thus displayed has been maintained and such
overtures as there have been from the League have been rejected, including one which
offered the Sikhs five seats in a Cabinet of eleven. Inter community political negotiation
has virtually been broken off and there is no doubt that Sikh and Hindu favour is now
strongly in support of a division of the Punjab. 195
Eleven MLAs (Central) 196 of the Sikh and Hindu communities from the Punjab in a
letter appealed to Nehru to forward their feelings and decision to the Viceroy and
HMG that the poignant happenings in the north-western region of the Punjab had
severely shaken the Sikh and Hindu confidence. They considered partition of the
Punjab as the best solution to the vexed issue of the Punjab. 197 The communal riots
upset the Sikhs and Master Tara Singh cried out that the Police had played a partial
and biased role in the Rawalpindi killings. They supported the brutes who butchered

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the innocent people and his own relatives. He alleged that the Sikhs had been forcibly
converted and their women had been abducted by the Muslims. He stated on 31
March 1947 that the imposition of Section 93 would be better than the League
government. He also demanded arrest of the Muslims involved in the Rawalpindi
carnage. 198
The Congress in a resolution suggested the partition of the Punjab as a
solution to the problem. The Muslim press cried out and rejected the proposed
partition of the Punjab by the Hindus and Sikhs. 199 To Kapur Singh, the Muslims were
involved in the violence but as a reaction to the Sikh activities. Responsibility goes to
the violent strategy of the Akali Dal who intimidated and provoked the Muslims by
their speeches, statements and preparations on military lines along with the Hindus in
the urban and rural areas. Sardar Kapur rightly indicates in his book to the instigating
activities of the Hindus and Sikhs which caused killings in the Pothohar region and
said that no option was left for the Muslims except ventilating their fears through
attacks on the Sikhs in Rawalpindi. 200
The weak performance of the Governor also fuelled the situation. He was
manifestly opposed to take any action against the provocation of the Sikh leaders. He
found them right in their activities after the Muslim violence in the north-west
region. 201 Every incident had a reason and the authorities were supposed to cope with
the deteriorating situation of the law and order. But the Governor considered right,
what the Sikhs were doing against the Muslims, on the grounds that the Sikhs had lost
lives in the Rawalpindi massacre and the revenge was inevitable. In fact, the
Governor did nothing against the violent activities of the Sikhs even before the
Rawalpindi turmoil. And after this poignant incident, the Sikh leaders including
Sardar Baldev Singh, Sardar Bhag Singh Advocate from Gurdaspur and Teja Singh

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Hall continued igniting the Sikh feelings against the Muslims through publishing
propaganda. The leaders appealed for a big financial support (Rs. 50 lakhs) to help the
refugees and families of the deceased in the Pothohar region. They maintained that
they had to fight Pakistan for the sake of the panth. They instigated their followers by
pungent sentences such as “The souls of all these innocent women are crying for
help.” They asked Sikhs to peep into their hearts and seek blood of Guru Gobind
Singh. 202 On the other hand, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan, MLA, and Vice-President of the
Punjab League repudiated the claim that League’s agitation caused the disturbances.
He said that the League’s Civil Disobedience Movement remained in progress for 34
days without any communal activity. It was the Akali leaders particularly Master Tara
Singh who after the resignation of the Punjab Premier promoted the communal
disturbances through his inflammatory speeches. 203 Master Tara toured Calcutta on 25
March 1947 and said that no Muslim-dominated government in the Punjab would be
acceptable for the Sikhs. He received cheques of Rs. 5000 and 100,000 from the
Hindus and Punjabis of Calcutta. Lala Karamchand Thappar donated Rs. 100,000 as
first instalment and the Master was allowed to spend Rs. 50,000 wherever he
desired. 204
New Avenue of Settlement
The election results produced a new hope for the Muslim-Sikh settlement but
this opportunity could not be availed properly. The League being the single largest
Assembly party was pushed to the opposition benches by the joint struggle of the
hostile forces but the ‘un-natural coalition’ could not sustain for long and was soon
replaced by the Governor rule. The League was again engaged in the ministry making
activities which revived the chance of the Muslim-Sikh rapprochement. Evan Jenkins

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and Nawab Mamdot met on 29 April but concluded nothing. The League was trying
its level best to win the Sikh sympathy and other minority members but the Sikh
leadership did not show any inclination towards it. On 24 April Sardar Mangal Singh,
MLA (Central) and Director of the Ludhiana Council of Action and Anti-Pakistan
Front, reiterated the belief advising the Sikhs and Hindus that their interests were the
same so they should struggle jointly. He also warned the Sikhs not to negotiate with
the League. Master Tara Singh in a press statement on 1 May disclosed that he was
sure that India was going to be partitioned into Hindustan and Pakistan, which would
necessitate the division of the Punjab with regional ministries within a month. 205
The Punjab League leaders assured Jinnah at Delhi that they, like him, were
determined to resist the division of the Punjab. 206 On 5 May Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
Khan met the Viceroy and alleged that the latter had passed orders to the Governor to
keep the League away from the government-making process under the threats by the
Sikhs. The Viceroy replied that he was doing all for the betterment of the Punjab. The
immediate formation of the League ministry might infuriate the Sikhs which could
end their chances to come to the League fold. 207 The British were constantly trying to
keep the League away from the Punjab Ministry as an official policy. On 6 July the
Punjab Governor’s Secretary wrote to the PSV and said that the League should not be
permitted to have the Punjab Ministry because it would disturb the process of transfer
of power and cause an irritation to the Sikhs. 208
Qalb-i-Abid opines that Jenkins could influence the Sikhs and other parties to
come to term with the League for the sake of the province but he played an anti-
League role in all the developments. He further argues that it was a setback to the
Unionist Party when Tiwana despite having few seats was put into the Premier’s
office because it further damaged the Premier’s position. 209 Actually, the Governor’s

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drive to bring the minorities to the League fold meant that he should have ‘influenced’
the parties to come to term with the League as he had been doing for the Unionist
Party. It was undemocratic to pressurise the political groups to support the League.
However, under the specific circumstances (as he did during the war period), if he had
convinced the Sikhs to be friendly with the League for the sake of the provincial
peace and integrity it would have been beneficial. Nevertheless, he did nothing to
bridge the communal difference nor gave any other solution. The Governor’s rule, to
him, was the best solution to the political polarisation in the province.
Ian Talbot is of the view that Tiwana tried his best to bridge the differences of the
League and the minorities 210 but as a matter of fact, he said a lot but did nothing
practically. As an inexperienced politician, he was confused about how to pull his
colleagues together. He expressed his grief over the remarks of the son of Ibrahim
Barq in which the latter had blamed him for resisting the Muslim state to emerge. He
told Sardar Swaran Singh:
When Khizr later retold this incident to Swaran Singh, he added that Barq was a
‘nonentity’ before he had made him a minister, now even his son was so influenced by
the League that was personally blaming me for coming in the way of Pakistan. 211
On 3 January 1947, the Statesman highlighted the news that the Sikhs would soon
move a proposal for a Hindu-Sikh Sub-province up to Lahore. The other areas would
include the districts of Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Karnal, Ambala, Simla, Kangra,
Ferozepore, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Lahore and Gurdaspur. A
separate legislature, cabinet and administration were suggested under a common
Governor or President. Giani Kartar assured that the scheme would be approved by
the Akali Dal and then they would try to get the consent of the Congress. Giani Kartar
necessitating the partition of the Punjab quoted Ireland as an example “where in 1911

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the boundaries of Ulster were revised and the three Catholic counties excluded from
its area, were joined to the Catholic south.” 212
On 8 January The Hindustan Times took into account Giani Kartar’s proposal
of the Hindu-Sikh Province consisting of non-Muslim majority districts and Lahore
and Gurdaspur on the Ireland model. The Hindu Jats and Sikhs had natural
compatibility while 19 per cent Sikhs, 43 per cent Hindus and 38 per cent Muslims
would make a balanced blend of population. 213 This proposal was not a solution
acceptable to anyone particularly the Muslims as the Hindu-Sikh unity could ruin
their integrity. The Sikhs too were not safe under such supposed arrangement of the
balanced population as the Muslim-Hindu political alliance could wreck the meagre
community of the Sikhs. Nevertheless, the paper further added that the Punjab should
be divided into three provinces which might have the following proportion:
1. Districts of Ambala, Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Karnal, Simla and Kangra
Population
Hindus
Muslims
Sikhs
56.0 Lakhs
39.4 Lakhs
22%
2.5 Lakhs
Muslim Majority Districts of the Punjab
Muslims 75%
3. Districts of Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar and Gurdaspur.
Balanced Population
Total
Muslims
Sikhs
Hindus
Source: The Hindustan Times, 9 January 1947.
71.0 Lakhs
30.2 Lakhs
21.5 Lakhs
16.3 Lakhs
By this proposal, the paper asked for three Punjab provinces:
1. Punjab with the Muslim majority,
2. Punjab with the Hindu majority and
3. Punjab with a balanced population.

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Interestingly, none of these provinces contained majority of the Sikhs. The Hindu
newspaper wrote, if the Sikhs demanded their own Province within the Punjab, then a
Hindu Jat Province would be a due right of the eastern parts where the Sikhs
constituted no effective strength. Giani Kartar conceded the Hindu Jat province for
the creation of a Sikh province, a truncated and mutilated Punjab. But even then his
voice could not impress upon the others. The Sikhs according to the Governor’s report
were not happy about the Hindu demand for a Jat Province because it ignored their
interests completely. 214
The agitation in the Punjab motivated the Sikhs to look for a separate Sikh-
Hindu State including the Muslim minority areas and the Sikh States. It was
considered on 30 January by the Panthic Prithinidhi Board which formed a sub-
committee with the responsibility to look into it in full detail. The Sikh leaders
publicly resented the Congress which consistently gave nothing except paper
assurances. They decided to move this demand in the Constituent Assembly to “defeat
the Pakistan plan with their own resources.” 215
In a meeting between Giani Kartar and Jenkins, the Sikh leader asked for the
partition of the Punjab within the Group B. Jenkins repeated his creed that the divided
Punjab would ruin the Punjabis. He also expressed his feelings that Hindu Jats of
Ambala Division would not join the Sikh state rather they wished to have the Jat State
with considerable areas or whole of Meerut Division (UP) plus a big part of the
Ambala Division. Giani Kartar accepted the Jat State if the Hindu Jats asked for it. He
demanded the rest of “Karnal, and Hissar, the whole or the greater part of Ambala and
the whole of Simla to be included in the Sikh State.” 216 He asked for Montgomery
while Nankana Sahib with its suburbs should be declared as a “free city.” He also
consented to the Federation of Punjab with limited powers. He declared to have the

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Punjab Kingdom back to the Sikh masters. He further floated an idea ‘as a top Akali
leader’ that let the Sikhs and Muslims decide the destiny of the Punjab themselves
through a fight. He told that the Sikhs would take action after the British left because
they did not want to disturb the British by starting a war in their presence. 217
On the other hand, Sardar Swaran Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh in April 1947
stated that they were prepared to talk to the League on the basis of the partition of the
Punjab if the Provincial League could get a free hand from the central command. 218
The Governor suggested to the Viceroy that if the Congress and the League failed to
arrive at any solution about the Punjab, then the Punjab leaders should be given a free
hand to decide the fate of the province. 219 Therefore, Sardar Swaran Singh and Bhim
Sen Sachar reaffirmed their pledge not to accept the League government in the Punjab.
They proposed to the Viceroy that the Punjab should be partitioned into two or three
zones with separate administrations and Ministries under one Governor. 220
The Governor threw light on the Sikh intentions that the harvest season did not
distract the Sikhs who continued enlisting volunteers. The Sikh propaganda was
adding much more to maintain the anti-Muslim temper inflamed:
The Sikh leaders deny that they have any retaliatory offensive intentions and their
constant exhortation to their followers is to be prepared to defend themselves in all
circumstances against Muslim aggression. They may be sincere in this but the evidence
of their wholehearted endeavour is disturbing, and indicates that the Sikhs are
convinced that sooner or later they will have to fight to secure or to protect what they
dream to be their rights. Recently, as a new factor, the Nihang Sikhs have been coming
more to the fore and there has been increasing conversion of both Sikhs and Hindus to
the Nihang sect. The Nihangs have the reputation of being militant and in some places
the parade of their strength has frightened Muslims into shifting elsewhere. 221
Evan Jenkins passed remarks on 16 April that the Sikhs were “the most difficult
people in India.” 222 While the Governor made them more intricate with the passage of
time. The RSSS continued its activities in different parts of the Punjab like Multan
and Dera Ghazi Khan while at Sirsa they advised the co-religionists to get arms to

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fight the Muslims. The Akal Saina (Sikh military wing) demonstrated objectionable
actions in Ambala Cantonment, Karnal, and other cities. The militant organisations
had gripped whole of the Punjab. A new organisation, Shahidi Dal, under Jathedar
Mohan Singh at Amritsar was formed. The SGPC Fauji Guard consisted of 750 Sikhs
mostly retired from the military, Akali and INA, was another Sikh platform to take
part in the ensuing fight. 223
The Akali Dal passed a resolution on 16 April, which summarised the future
plan of the Sikh community. The Akali leadership expressed grave concern over the
Rawalpindi massacre and demanded partition of the Punjab as the only way to get out
of the communal tangle. They called the Muslim community of Rawalpindi ‘the
Pakistani Muslims’ and felt pleasure that Hindus and Sikhs as nationalists were the
Akali force. A boundary commission was necessitated and it was demanded that the
criteria of the demarcation should be the population, landed property, land revenue
and the historical heritage. They also asked for exchange of the population and
property. 224
On 18 April, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar and Baldev Singh talked to the
Viceroy about the Punjab issue and offered that Sikhs would abdicate their objections
against the Cabinet Mission Proposals if their rights were fully addressed in the
Punjab. They presented a formula in which they offered 40 per cent seats to the
Muslims, 30 per cent to the Sikhs and 30 per cent to the Hindus but it was not
encouraged by the Viceroy. They also asked to clear the situation so that the Sikhs
might bargain either with Congress or the League. 225 Again the Sikhs were repeating
their old demands to end the Muslim majority status in the Punjab by suggesting 40
per cent for them and 60 per cent representation for the non-Muslims. It was not a
balanced arrangement rather entirely imbalanced and unjust proposal for the Muslims

346
of the Punjab. The Akalis throughout the history and lately on 16 April had clearly
expressed that the Hindus and Sikhs were united against the Muslims, then how could
such a formula resolve the Punjab problem. Rather the Hindu-Sikh unity and the anti-
Muslim demands convinced the other Muslims to favour the League standpoint. The
Akali leaders stood for the right of veto in the Grouping and Master Tara Singh and
Giani Kartar changed their plan as alternative and outlined that certain areas claimed
by the Sikhs should be attached to the Patiala and Faridkot States which would work
as a Sikh Confederacy. 226
J. Thompson, Resident on Special Duty, testified on 23 April 1947 that the
Raja of Faridkot confirmed that Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar wanted a Sikh
Confederation consisting of Patiala and Faridkot States and a Sikh Republic
“predominantly Sikh areas of the Southern Punjab.” The rest of the States could link
up with any of the States in the Confederation. Many Sikh States might give consent
to side with the plan. 227 The Secretary of State for India on 9 May made it clear that
the Sikh demands were not based on the solid and acceptable facts:
I suppose the basic fact of the situation is that the Sikhs have an exaggerated idea of
their proper status in the future set-up. No doubt this is due partly to their historical
position as the rulers of the Punjab, partly to the rather flattering treatment they have
received from us as one of the great martial races of India, and partly to the fact that
they consider that they have contributed out of population to their numbers to the
economic wealth of the Punjab. on the other hand, they are a community numbering
only some 6 millions out of nearly 400 millions and in the Punjab itself they number
only 4 millions among 28 millions. On any democratic basis, therefore, they must
definitely be regarded as a minority (and not even as a “major” community). 228
The Secretary of State further observed that the Sikhs nowhere possessed a majority
in any district so the Sikh state could not be assured to them. They were consulted for
their choice to opt either for India or Pakistan but they demanded Sikhistan without a
realistic appraisal of the actual facts. 229

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The Sikhs pinned many hopes upon the Boundary Commission Award and the
Congress leadership but according to the Governor, the Akali Dal was determined to
win a free sovereign Sikh state with the Chenab and Jamna as its borders. It called “on
all Sikhs to fight for this ideal under the flag of the Dal.” 230
Sikhs and Congress
The pro-Congress Sikh character motivated the British to know the original
Sikh position in the Congress circles as the trivial skirmishes between the Sikhs and
the Congress leadership had been reported from time to time. V. P. Menon briefed
George Abell through a letter about the Sikh status among the Congress in discernible
manner. He wrote that the Congress gave paramount importance to the Sikh co-
operation. A considerable section of the Sikhs had been with it throughout the
political history of the Punjab. The Hindus of the Punjab were strong with the help of
the Sikhs. Menon further argued that the Congress passed in 1929 the resolution to
secure the Sikh approval in the communal decisions. 231 I. D. Scott remarked that “The
Sikhs in fact are the Congress card of re-entry into the North-Western group.” 232 On
the other hand, as the Punjab Governor reported about another aspect of the Punjab
politics, Sikhs were perturbed by the fact that the Hindus greatly outnumbered in the
new Punjab which would put the Sikhs into a state of allegiance to Hindustan. They
were being deprived of the gain which they expected from Khalistan. The report
further portrayed that such a fear among the Sikhs did not affect their relations with
the Hindus. 233
The Sikh press supported the Sikh recruitment in the Akal Fauj while the
Muslim papers protested against the violent moves of the Sikhs. The Governor
reported that the Muslim-Sikh relations particularly in Amritsar were critical where a

348
Sikh policeman was killed. All this was due to the withdrawal of the ban from the
RSSS and National Guards because their activities would be openly observed after
lifting of the ban. 234 The Muslim-Sikh tension was surprising for the Secretary of
State for India. He wrote on 9 May 1947 that mutual understanding between the
communities would pay both with everlasting benefits but peace was becoming more
difficult day by day:
What the situation really calls for is a settlement between the Muslims and the Sikhs.
Their interests are not necessarily irreconcilable and indeed have a good deal in common,
as appears from the fact that they have worked together for many years under the
Unionist party system in the Punjab. In this way the Sikhs would avoid being split up
(which is their major interest) and the Muslims would get a larger and more valuable
Pakistan. But I fear the recent bloodletting had done much to destroy any chance of
this... 235
The situation deteriorated and the Muslims of the eastern parts of the Punjab at the
last scene as Khushwant Singh writes were put at the mercy of the RSSS and Sikh
militants because the “Muslim Police were disbanded.” 236
Tiwana writes in a note that in the early 1947, all the communities had been
clear about the expected partition, which moved all to prepare themselves to face
violence. The Sikhs retired from the army of Kalra (Khizr’s village) had started
preparations for defence. He also writes that in March, Rawalpindi riots made the
western Sikhs furious who now concentrated on the defence of their families and the
revenge of the Sikh killings. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar had a secret meeting
in a hotel at Lahore in which senior officers participated under the leadership of Sant
Parkash Singh who later became the Inspector-General of Police of the Indian Punjab.
It was decided in the meeting that the revenge of the Sikh killings would be taken by
killing Muslims of the Eastern Punjab but Sant Parkash Singh opposed the idea on the
ground that it could increase the killings. But this advice infuriated the Sikhs because
Master Tara Singh had already repeated such suggestions in different meetings.

349
Tiwana analysed that Sikh migrations were made due to three factors, mass killing of
the Sikhs in the Rawalpindi region, interception of Mudie’s letter (to Jinnah in which
he had instructed the Sikhs to migrate to the eastern areas) by Sant Parkash Singh
which convinced the Sikhs that they should not rely on official help and protection,
and the plan for the invasion of the west Punjab and to capture it by force with the
help of the Indian army and the Sikh States. The Sikhs were optimistic about
establishing the Sikh rule in all the western and eastern areas of the Punjab. 237 The
Sikh dream to capture the Muslim Punjab by force was like groping in the dark
because of the ground realities pertaining to the Muslim majority and Congress’ past
track record. On 25 April 1947, the Maharaja of Nabha clearly told that the Sikhs
would fight with the Muslims as a revenge for the past sufferings. 238 The Sikh plan to
capture the Punjab went to the background as the skirmishes with the Muslims busied
them.
Amritsar again was hit by the communal riots during the early March 1947
and the Governor had to deploy two British Battalions to revive life in the city after a
vast use of arms and fire. The forces were also assigned the duty to disarm the
population. Rawalpindi was reported to have been caught by the clashes with 25
deaths and hundreds of injured people. The communal riots continued in the areas of
Sialkot and Jullundur. 239 In March, Master Tara Singh declared that the Sikhs were
ready for the partition of the Punjab. 240 Tiwana met the Governor on 24 March and
said that Mamdot should get Sikh and other minorities’ favour. He also uttered that
the Muslim leaders were aware of the difficult situation “but none of them is anxious
to face Jinnah.” The same day, Giani Kartar in a meeting with the Governor made it
clear that Sikhs would never tolerate the League ministry in the Punjab. 241 The

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Governor reported that the Muslims attacked the Sikhs and Hindus. He also expressed
complete satisfaction over the Police performance during these riots. 242
On 1 April 1947, the Governor sent a report to the Viceroy that the Sikhs
would make trouble for the mastery of the Punjab considering it their kingdom. “They
may postpone action until we have gone, but Gyani Kartar Singh is a hothead, and a
spark might be touched off at any time.” 243 The Punjab Governor reported that the
Sikhs were arming themselves for a violent drive. Nevertheless, he believed that they
would not attack before June 1948 but on the other hand could not retain control over
the activities of their lieutenants. He also reported that Hinds as usual were with the
Sikhs. 244 Master Tara Singh in his lengthy statement at Amritsar held the League
responsible for the carnage of NWFP and the Punjab and warned them that Sikhs had
lost patience. The provincial administration should control the Leaguers otherwise the
Sikhs would deal with them by themselves. 245 Master Tara Singh being a top Sikh
leader presented no new idea or proposal but continued raising ravings at this critical
stage. He met the Governor on 19 May and alleged that the Police were equally
involved in the riots from the Muslim side. He also explained that the Muslims would
slaughter the Sikhs if they joined Pakistan. Jenkins disclosed the character of the
politicians and told that Tara-like leaders were responsible for all the disorder and
killings. 246
Master Tara Singh appealed to the Governor to do something for the Sikhs
who plainly refused to do anything and said that HMG was the authority which could
solve the issue. Jenkins told that within 48 hours two attacks in Rajgarh and
Rasulgarh had been launched by the Sikhs and if they continued killing as a revenge
of Rawalpindi incident then the Muslims would also react and the killings would not
stop. During the discussion Master Tara Singh could not help concealing his violent

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strategy and said that they would deal with the Muslims after the British left. Jenkins
warned and advised Master Tara Singh to control his emotions in issuing violent
statements. He gave his analysis of the Sikh leadership, “it is lamentable that at this
juncture the affairs of the Punjab should be so largely in the hands of this eccentric
old man.” 247 Giani Kartar in a meeting with Jenkins warned that the Sikhs would not
accept the decision of the Boundary Commission and they would fight with a
bellicose strategy. They would kill the officials, damage the railway lines and
telegraphic system, explode the headworks etc. The Sikhs would set in action
immediately after the departure of the British. 248 Giani had already expressed such
warnings before the Governor as on 1 April 1947 the Governor reported to the
Viceroy that the Sikhs could launch a war at any time. 249 Giani Kartar maintained that
Gandhi and Patel had consented to concede the Sikh state which would work as a
buffer-state between Pakistan and Hindustan. The Jat districts would be detached and
merged into the UP. 250 Who assured Giani Kartar that Gandhi and Patel were behind
the Sikh state? Giani cannot be expected to bluff about it while there was no public
statement by the Congress leaders in favour of the buffer-state. The real political
game was being played behind the scene. The Congress leaders were tutoring the
Sikhs with fabulous dreams and the Sikh leaders were completely ready to trust them.
Communal Disturbance
The appointment of Tiwana as the Premier was the starting point of the fresh
violence. To Qalb-i-Abid, Jenkins should have secured cooperation of other parties
particularly the largest party before putting Tiwana in the Premier office, 251 which
could create harmony between Muslim and Sikh political parties. However, the
political activities and violent actions had been going on simultaneously in the Punjab.

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On 9 May, clashes broke out in Amritsar and resulted in great disorder and trouble in
other parts of the province. The Intelligence Report put its responsibility on the all-
India political situation. According to the report, an attack was made on a child’s
funeral resulting in the loss of one Hindu and six Sikh lives. The deteriorating
situation of Amritsar affected the atmosphere of Lahore. Since March, over 200
people had been killed in Amritsar while in Lahore during the same period, 110
people had lost their lives. Thousands of the people were injured in these incidents.
The Sikhs and Hindus were using arms and explosive devices to kill the Muslims as
the Governor reported:
In the most recent disturbances the temper of the people has been noticeably worse
than it was on earlier occasions and their determination greater. There has been an
increase in the use of fire arms and in Lahore acts of incendiarism have been many.
Crude bombs have also continued in use, particularly in Amritsar. Ignoring a large
number of relatively unimportant incendiary devices in which chemicals were used,
thirty three cases had been registered under the Explosive Substances Act in the
province by the end of the first week of May. In one of these the explosive was
sufficiently powerful to wreck the premises which were the place of manufacture,
but in all others ingredients which are not difficult to obtain have been utilised for
the production of missiles of a crude character. In most of the cases, both in Amritsar
and elsewhere, Sikhs and Hindus have been the owners or makers of bombs. 252
The Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy that the Sikhs had become
dangerous while the Boundary Commission was deputed to save the Punjab from the
Sikh terrorism. 253 After the 3rd June Plan, the possibility for peace in the Punjab
became doubtful. Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar and Udham Singh Nagoke were
reported to be furious because their names had not been included among the leaders
who had made a joint peace appeal while it included the names of Nawab Mamdot,
Lala Bhim Sain Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh. It left the impression that the top
Akali leaders had a plan contrary to that appeal. The Governor opined that the Sikh
community could not be pacified after an intensive propaganda “that the Panth is in

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danger until a final solution satisfactory to the Sikhs, is arrived at concerning the
disputed territories.” 254
The Punjab Assembly was divided on Muslim and non-Muslim basis and
decided partition of the Punjab. Sikhs as usual supported the Hindu members and put
their lot in favour of the United India and partition of the Punjab. Nehru, Gandhi and
Congress accepted the partition of India 255 which was a victory for the League but
with the condition of splitting the Punjab.
On 4 June, the Congress, League and Sikhs had accepted the 3rd June Plan
with reservations. The Sikhs were pleased over the partition of the Punjab but
expressed concern about the details. They demanded the river Chenab as the boundary.
The Viceroy in his broadcast said that the final boundaries would be decided by a
Boundary Commission. 256 The Muslim press suggested the Sutlej River as the
dividing line in retaliation to the Sikh demand for Chenab to be the boundary. 257
Some Muslim intelligentsia suggested Jinnah to deploy some people who could deal
with the Sikhs because their demand for the areas was very dangerous. 258 The All-
India Congress Committee regretted the prevailing situation and decided to accept the
secession of some areas of India. 259 Gandhi tried to misinterpret the 3rd June Plan and
stated that “the word “fair play” did not exist in any Hindustani dialect” but the
Viceroy made it clear that the Congress, by doing so, would give an opportunity to
Jinnah for projecting the dishonest intention and deal of the Congress before the
international observers. The agreement decided mutually must be honoured. 260 Lord
Mountbatten had already warned Gandhi not to make such utterances at his prayer
meetings which were actually provocative and anti-Muslim and could convince the
“unintelligent people” to go against the Muslims. Jinnah also pointed out that

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Gandhi’s intention might be good but the line expressed through his statements was
very much wrong. 261
The Akali leaders realised that their insistence on the partition had “gravely
damaged the solidarity of the Panth” therefore they laid stress on the demand for a
Sikh sovereign state. They decided not to claim the Ambala Division and stand for the
area of the canal colonies. The Working Committee of the SAD rejected the 3rd June
Plan putting all the failures on the shoulders of the politically incompetent Akali
leaders. The Governor reported that anyway the Sikhs would continue pursuing their
case before the Boundary Commission. The real problem would occur when the
Award would not fulfil the Sikh aspirations. The report indicated towards the
Congress’ tilt to placate the Sikhs. The Congress, contrary to its prior policy, seemed
ready to amalgamate the Ambala, Rohilkhand, Meerut and Saharanpur divisions and
consent to a sovereign state under the Indian Union, which would work as a buffer
state between Pakistan and India. On the other hand, the League countered such an
offer by claiming Ambala and Jullundur divisions as the part of Pakistan. The
Working Committee decided to hold a ‘protest day’ on 8 July in the Punjab. 262 The
Sikhs were urged upon to have negotiations with the Muslims to secure their identity.
But on 23 June the Sikh members voted for the partition of the province which upset
Jinnah who expressed the grievous concern and foretold that the Sikhs would repent
one day but it would be too late. 263
The 3rd June Plan brought a change and the major demands such as Pakistan
and the partition of the Punjab were conceded which lessened the bitterness between
the Muslims and Sikhs. Both were engaged to venture for the boundaries, protection
from violence and further prospects in the coming political set-up. For this purpose,
Giani Kartar placed his demands before Lord Mountbatten such as weightage in the

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new legislature and separate electorates for the Sikhs. He urged that being protectors
of the minorities, he and the Governor had constitutional responsibility to grant some
concessions to the Sikhs in the East Punjab. He in a letter, asked the Viceroy to use
his “good offices with the Congress to give adequate weightage to the Sikhs in the
new constitution in the Eastern Punjab.” 264 He also demanded separate Sikh voting on
any communal issue affecting the Sikhs in the provincial and central legislatures.
Since the Sikhs numbered more than the Christians therefore they too should be given
representation in the legislature of UP. 265 The Akali leader had now started quoting
the Christians to further the Sikh claims. But Lord Mountbatten made it clear to Giani
Kartar and Sardar Baldev that after 15 August he would have no effective position
and so far as the weightage was concerned, Maulana Azad had assured that he would
talk about it to the minorities. The Akali leaders requested the Viceroy to help them in
the new structure as he could do it effectively before 15 August. In this regard, Giani
Kartar maintained that the Sikhs should be given due weightage or the Hindi-speaking
areas be detached from the Punjabi-speaking portion. He also claimed more seats in
the Constituent Assembly. Mountbatten agreed to write to Nehru on the suggested
Sikh demands. 266
According to Penderel Moon, the possibility of the Muslim-Sikh agreement
was over as Giani Kartar and Baldev Singh in their interview on 31 June talked about
concessions from the Indian government and not the Pakistani government which
clearly showed their intention to join India. They also asked to cut the “poor Punjab”
into three bits 267 which showed that the Sikhs would opt for India and not Pakistan.
Pursuing the Viceroy’s promise, the Sikhs through a letter asked for political identity
by demanding one minister in the central cabinet, six per cent representation in both
the Houses of India, the existing proportion of Sikhs in the Army and constitutional

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protection on the issues affecting the Sikhs. They also asked for representation in the
legislatures of Delhi, UP, and Western Bengal while they desired to have either
Governor or Premier of the East Punjab from the Sikh community. 268 All this
indicates that the Sikhs had decided to go to the Indian Union. On 4 July, Lord
Mountbatten through a letter 269 conveyed the Sikh demands to Nehru but on 7 July he
flatly refused to give the separate electorates and weightage to the Sikhs or any other
community in free India. 270 This event is noteworthy in the perspective of the two
points: firstly, Mountbatten, a British asked for separate electorates for the Sikhs,
which was not taken as a concession for the Muslims by the British in 1909 which
was attributed to the ‘divide and rule’ but the same by the Sikhs and then Mountbatten
were not projected as the British conspiracy secondly, the Sikhs should have been
clear on the rude reply of Nehru towards their demands which should have awakened
them but nothing could move them away from following the Congress on the political
route.
The territorial split ultimately placated the Muslims and the Sikhs for the time
being. Now, they could talk peacefully as ‘foreign delegates.’ Bhim Sen Sachar,
Swaran Singh and Nawab Mamdot had a meeting in a frank mood on 25 June 1947. 271
But the fear of violence was still there. The Governor informed the Viceroy that
Nawab Mamdot had written 2 letters in which he demanded the transfer of the non-
Muslim officers from the headworks due to the expected Sikh attacks. 272
After the Sikh decision in favour of the Hindus, the League did not press the
Sikhs with a new offer. 273 On 11 August Jinnah announced the vision for the future in
which he assured all the minorities in Pakistan would enjoy the religious freedom. It
was a great occasion when the League leader fulfilled his promise which he had
incessantly been making to the Sikhs and Hindus and the latter had been considering

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as a political tactic. This was a clear constitutional base, vision and policy regarding
the rights of minorities in Pakistan.
Jinnah and Sikhs
The Punjab question was very important and complicated which could be
resolved through the Muslim-Sikh understanding. Jinnah though over-burdened by the
all-India politics, strove his best to triumph over the Sikhs. Major Short 274 writes that
Jinnah was keen to win over the Sikhs and had been busy “behind the scenes for some
months” to take them into confidence. He had in mind the special arrangements in the
municipalities or “local self-governing district.” 275 Mr. Sarup and Sardar Amar Singh,
President and Secretary of the All-India Sikh Students’ Federation met Jinnah and
talked on the Azad Sikh State. He agreed to the idea of the Sikh homeland but asked
for the areas to be included in this state. He also expressed his desire to do anything to
have a Muslim-Sikh settlement. 276 The Hindustan Times projected this meeting and
the League leader’s statement that Jinnah had accepted the Sikhs as a nation and the
demand for Khalistan but he wanted to know the boundaries of this state. 277 The
Inqelab in its Editorial expressed surprise on Jinnah’s statement regarding Khalistan
and wrote that due to the lack of majority, the Sikhs could not be justified to have a
Sikh state. There were 37 lakh Sikhs (13%) in the Punjab while there were 70 lakh
Muslims (17%) in UP but they did not make a demand for a Muslim state. The paper
opined that the Sikhs had ruled over the Punjab for a few years, while the Muslims
had ruled for 600 years. Therefore, Jinnah should not have accepted the demand for a
Sikh state. 278 Actually, Jinnah conceded the Sikh demand but asked about its location.
The proposed central areas by the Sikh leadership could not be acceptable to the
League. The central districts of the Punjab claimed by the Sikhs were the top priority

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of the Muslims. It seems that Jinnah wanted the Sikhs to realise that they had no
majority areas and lacked unity within their community.
In an interview with the Viceroy, Jinnah enunciated that he was keen to have
good relations with the Sikhs. 279 For the time being, the Sikh leadership had realised
the true intentions of the League leadership. Master Tara Singh appreciated Jinnah’s
leadership and the commitment to his mission. He repudiated the allegation that
Jinnah was a British agent 280 which was quoted by a newspaper with reference to
Master Tara Singh.
Jinnah was receiving the public feedback from time to time pertaining to the
political and communal on-goings. On 3 March, Aziz Hindi from Raipur (CP) wrote
that the Sikhs needed special attention and might be induced to have independent
status of the five Sikh States in Pakistan. He urged upon the need to employ some
League leaders to approach the Sikh leaders including the Princes of the Sikh
States. 281 On 26 April, the Viceroy noted that Jinnah had been assured by Giani Kartar
through a messenger that if Jinnah conceded the Sikh state, they would be ready to
join Pakistan. Jinnah was entirely glad that the Sikhs personally liked and trusted him.
He declared that he would back up the Sikhs in any “unfair action against the Sikhs”
by the Muslims. 282 He met the Viceroy on 4 May and consented to talk to the
Maharaja of Patiala on the partition and Eric Mieville was assigned the duty to keep
in touch with the two leaders. 283 The Maharaja of Patiala and Jinnah met in May 1947
and nucleus of the discussion was the Sikh state. The Muslim press expressed
pleasure on the possible patch-up with the Sikhs and the League’s demand for a
corridor on which the Sikh and Hindu press commented that “such a concession
would pave the way for a perpetual civil war.” 284 The Maharaja in a letter briefed the
Viceroy about the meeting with Jinnah and his unflinching faith in the partition of

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India therefore he stressed that the Sikhs too had a right to demand the partition of the
Punjab and, after experiencing the carnage at Rawalpindi, they were not ready to
believe in what they were being offered by the League leadership in Pakistan. The
factual condition of the Sikhs convinced them to have their own independent state. 285
Master Tara Singh on 4 May talked to the Allied Press of India and said that
Jinnah wished to secure the integrity of the Sikh community, but he was “not anxious
to maintain their independence.” He also warned the Sikhs not to be used by the
Congress because it did not favour the Sikh homeland. He said that if Jinnah was a
friend of the Sikhs, he should change his hypocritical strategy. 286 The League circles
raised a lot of hue and cry on the derogatory remarks made by the Akali leader about
Jinnah. Feroz Noon talked to press on 6 May and deplored the Sikh apathy towards
the League and said that “the more we try to win them over the more their leaders
push the Panth into the Congress lap.” 287 He condemned Master Tara and declared
that they would not surrender even one inch of the province. He suggested the areas of
the Sikh state as Ambala and Jullundur Division plus Amritsar district and ridiculed
the Sikh leadership for not giving the details for their demand. 288 On 7 May, Baldev
Singh in a letter briefed the Viceroy about the parleys with Jinnah and told that as
suggested by the Viceroy he was glad that Jinnah was very keen to have settlement
with the Sikhs. For this reason, he had many opportunities to talk to him but he was
dejected by Jinnah’s desire to pull all the Sikhs into Pakistan:
He, however, means business and is not prepared to come to terms with us unless he can
first rope the Sikhs in his Pakistan under Muslim domination. This shall not be the Sikhs
will in no circumstances agree to any discussion with Mr. Jinnah on the basis of being
included in Pakistan. 289
Baldev Singh had nothing to discuss with the League leader as he flatly refused to
honour the standpoint of Jinnah. He too could float some alternatives or new idea
acceptable to Jinnah but without arguing he derived what he wanted to project. He, on

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2 June commenting on the draft statement of the Viceroy said that the statement
showed a clear-cut decision to divide the Sikh population. He clarified to the Viceroy
that they expected nothing good from the League leaders who had been making
tirades that Pakistan would follow the Islamic principles. The current riots in the
western Punjab had made it easy for them to decide not to live under the Muslim
domination despite whatever security they promised to provide. He thanked Lord
Mountbatten for the acceptance of the Sikh demand for the partition of the Punjab into
two provinces. He opposed the interim ministries in the Punjab but if necessary the
east Punjab should comprise Ambala and Jullundur Divisions and the districts of
Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur as the temporary arrangements till the decision of the
Boundary Commission. He showed willingness to revert to the Statement of 16 May
if they were given the same rights on the communal issues as given to the Hindus and
Muslims. 290
Jinnah on 23 May observed in an interview with Doon Campbell, Reuter’s
correspondent, that in case of the partition, the Sikhs would suffer greatly. On the
question of the minorities, he responded that their rights would be protected in
Pakistan and they would benefit from all the safeguards. Baldev Singh said on 26 May
that Jinnah should not be worried about the Sikhs rather he must take care of the
Muslims left in Hindustan. 291 Jinnah exerted a lot to secure the Sikh support but he
could not root out the basic factors of the Muslim-Sikh enmity. The Secretary of State
for India argued that the League was not in the good books of the Sikhs because
Jinnah had “an unduly rigid attitude,” on the other hand, the Sikh demands also were
impracticable as they stood for the right of veto at the provincial and national levels as
given to the Muslims in the Cabinet Mission’s arrangements which was impossible. 292
After the 3rd June Plan, Jinnah met the Maharaja of Patiala, Yadvinder Singh and

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offered him a Sikh state and a Sikh army in Pakistan but he refused to accept the
offer. 293 K. H. Khurshid, Jinnah’s Private Secretary, writes that Jinnah placed a pen
and a pad before the Sikh leaders and asked them to write down their demands 294 but
even then he could not win over the Sikhs. Gurmit Singh is of the opinion that the
Sikh leadership always seemed frightened of Pakistan and never demonstrated a cool
consideration to a compromise with the League as suggested by the British. Jinnah
showed willingness to accede the Sikh demands but it could not move the Sikhs from
their position. Sardar Hukam Singh, a Sikh scholar, considers such concessions as
‘Jinnah’s temptations’ and writes that in discussions with the Sikhs, he insisted on the
departments of defence, foreign relations and communication as the federal
departments. Master Tara Singh along with other Sikh leaders feared that after the
passing of power into Jinnah’s hands, the Sikhs would “be absolutely at the mercy of
the Muslim majority.” Therefore, they demanded the right of secession, which Jinnah
rejected. 295 Jinnah’s refusal to accede this demand meant that he was sincere in his
commitment with the Sikhs. Otherwise, he could promise to give what the Sikhs
demanded and later go back on his promise. Once the Sikhs joined Pakistan, no
remedy would be left for them to opt out of it. But Jinnah did believe in fair-play in
politics therefore he agreed to the only what he could do. The issue could be further
discussed to meet the Sikh demands but the Sikh leaders rejected the League’s
goodwill gesture.
Mehr Chand, the former Chief Justice of India, writes in his book Looking
Back that Jinnah offered the Maharaja of Patiala a Sikh state but he rejected it just to
save his state, power and status. 296 Satya M. Rai writes that Jinnah offered that Patiala
State along with the areas from Panipat to Ravi River could be merged as an
independent Sikh state but Master Tara Singh turned it down. 297 According to Sardar

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Kapur Singh, Jinnah met his friend, Sardar Bahadur Sir Sobha Singh in Delhi and said
that the Sikhs had not done a correct thing by surrendering their right to rule but the
Sardar boasted that they had done right in trusting the Hindus. Jinnah replied that the
Sikhs had experienced the Hindu as ‘slave’ but they would come to senses when they
faced the Hindu as ‘master.’ Then the Sikh slaves would have to deal with their Hindu
masters. 298 According to Sardar Hardit Singh Malik, the Sikhs could secure a separate
state as Jinnah was prepared to accept it. He writes that Jinnah in 1946 met the leaders
including himself, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar, and the Maharaja Patiala at Delhi.
He consented to concede the Sikh demands by sharing the example of the Egyptian
Prime Minister, Saad Zaghlol Pasha (1859-1927). By placing a pen and a paper on the
table, he assured them that he would accept whatever they had written. 299 In reply to
Jinnah, Sardar Hardit confesses, he requested Sir Usha Nath Sen, a journalist friend,
to publish a false lead in the newspaper as a counterblast which was done and the next
day The Statesman had a main lead that Pakistan at any cost was not acceptable to the
Sikhs. 300
The Sikh leadership played a very deplorable role but on the other hand, the
League leaders also did not float any attractive ideas to impress upon them. The
Governor reported that the League’s position in the Muslim-Sikh matters remained
confined mainly to the argument that the Sikh interests would be severely damaged by
the partition of the province and would divide them into pieces. Therefore, they could
not persuade the Sikhs to change their mood. The recent communal happenings drove
them even further apart. 301 Sardar Swaran Singh in a meeting with the Governor on 31
May handed over a letter from Master Tara Singh in which it was disclosed that the
Muslim policemen had planned to kill him but Jenkins did not trust such rumours. 302

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The British officials wanted to see Sikhs in Pakistan according to A. S.
Narang. 303 P. Moon wrote in June 1947 to Sujan Singh that the time of decision had
come and the Sikhs should definitely side with their Muslim brothers for securing
their proper place in Pakistan. Moon recommended earnestly to the Sikhs that they
should have a “Samjhota” (compromise) with the League. “A boundary line could
hardly be farther west than the Beas” which could perish the Sikh community
dividing them into two minorities, he believed. He also suggested that they could
secure a separate Sikh unit with the rights as Sindh or any other unit would enjoy.
They might gain the status of a privileged minority in the Punjab and at the national
level as well. If Pakistan remained Dominion of the British Commonwealth, it would
further help the Sikhs in securing their rights effectively. “Don’t let the opportunity
slip.” Moon asked Sujan Singh to arrange meeting on 12, 13 or 23 June with the top
Sikh leadership so that he might convince them to follow that line. 304
On 7 May 1947, Kartar Singh and Ujjal Singh met the Governor and asked
him to consider ‘economic assets’ as criteria of the partition. They also suggested that
Lahore Division and Lyallpur and Montgomery districts should be declared as a
common area. Sardar Kartar Singh even pushed an idea of declaring Punjab as a free
state with special safeguards for the Sikhs. He also challenged that the plebiscite
should be arranged for the poor Muslims of the Gurdaspur district which would surely
support the Sikhs. 305 The issue regarding the poor Muslims’ support as asserted by the
Giani shows an awesome dominance of the Sikhs over the poor Muslims in
Gurdaspur district. In any case, it was merely a raving otherwise a minority never
feels hilarity under the dominance of the rival people. The Akali terror might work in
this regard but the Muslims were well aware of the political realities. They could
never go against the League as they had proved in the elections. Gurdaspur was not a

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point of focus as compared to Lahore, Montgomery, Sheikhupura, and Lyallpur
because district Gurdaspur was officially a Muslim majority area. On 9 March 1947,
an article was published in the Hindustan Times showing Gurdaspur as a non-Muslim
majority area which was questioned and the P.S.V. clarified that according the Census
of 1941 these were the Muslim majority areas. 306
Boundary Commission
At the Partition Council on 27 June, the parties agreed on two Boundary
Commissions under Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s chairmanship. 307 On 22 April 1947, Lord
Ismay (C.V.S.), Baldev Singh (Defence Minister), Eric Mieville (Principal Secretary),
G. E. B. Abell (P.S.V.) and Lt. Col. V. F. Erskine Crum (Conference Secretary) had a
meeting in which Baldev Singh pointed out that in many cases the Sikhs held huge
properties in the Muslim majority areas. Lord Ismay evaluated the principle for
partition that “a democratic decision could only be taken on head of population and
not on any considerations of land-owning.” 308 On 30 April, Ismay reported about a
meeting with Sardar Harnam Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh who had said that the
property and Sikh shrines should be considered as criteria of the partition of the
Punjab. They also presented the issue of Lahore as a matter of life and death for the
Sikhs otherwise they “would far sooner all die fighting.” Ismay retaliated that in case
of the Sikh violence the Viceroy might use all forces at his disposal against them. The
Sikh leaders also suggested that the Lahore Division might be put under a joint
council until the decision of the boundary commission and the transfer of
population. 309
The British knew the Punjab question very well and that the problematic areas
were the districts of the Lahore Divisions only. These were the Muslim majority areas

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but the Sikhs had their sacred Gurdwaras, big lands and business in the canal colony
districts. The irrigation system was another irritation but except Amritsar all five
districts should go to the Muslim Punjab. It was reiterated that the Punjab should
never be divided so they ought to work for its integrity. It was also suggested that
only the Punjabis should solely be given the right to decide their future without
pressure from the central command of the parties. 310 Baldev Singh in his letter to the
Viceroy on 17 May threw light on the amended draft announcement and said that all
the changes had been made to placate the League. The Sikh interests were totally
ignored. The Defence Minster suggested that the factors of property and land revenue
should also be included in the draft announcement. In case of the east Punjab Ministry,
he demanded the inclusion of Ambala and Jullundur Divisions and Lahore, Gurdaspur
and Amritsar districts. Nehru had already asked to consider the Sikh version in the
draft announcement on 16 May particularly the Gurdaspur district. The Viceroy
replied to Nehru but without mentioning about the Sikh position and Gurdaspur. 311 On
17 May 1947, during the working for the draft announcement the document clearly
projected Gurdaspur as a Muslim majority area. 312 On 2 July, Baldev Singh wrote to
the Viceroy that Lahore, Sheikhupura and Gurdaspur were a focus of dispute so all of
them should not be handed over to the Muslims until the final boundaries were
announced. 313 On 10 July, the Governor told the Viceroy that Giani Kartar threatened
to wage war if the decision of the Boundary Commission went against the Sikh
interests. Jenkins depicted the feelings of the Muslims and the Sikhs in his analysis
that one community asked for Montgomery and Chenab River as the boundary while
the Muslims expected Pakistan up to Ambala. Everyone was ready to fight a war.
Giani Kartar called for the right of the Sikh homeland and during the course of
dialogue he also expressed reservations about the Boundary Commission. 314 On 19

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July 1947, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in an interview stated that the Sikhs had no right
to threaten the Boundary Commission. 315
In a meeting with Jenkins, Giani Kartar confirmed the information that the
Sikhs would turn to violence against the Muslims if the Punjab Boundary
Commission’s decision was not satisfactory for the Sikhs. 316 Gurdaspur and
Ferozepore were mainly presented as disputed areas by different writers but real state
of population was as follows:
Tehsil Muslims Non-Muslims Sikhs
Gurdaspur 171,498 157,321 76,695
Batala 209,277 170,776 116,413
Pathankot 59,548 93,586 7,580
Shakargarh 149,600
141,905 20,573
Total
589,923
Source: MS-210/10, Tiwana Papers.
563,588
221,261
The table clearly shows majority of the Muslims in three Tehsils of district Gurdaspur
including Gurdaspur, Batala and Shakargarh.
Ferozepore district presented Tehsil-wise population as follows:
Tehsil Muslims Non-Muslims Sikhs
Ferozepore 160,371 129,91 70,782
Zira 137,586 73,233 50,209
Moga 66,855 212,908 181,454
Mukatsar 115,350
154,229
106,270
Fazilka 161,286 211,343 70,771
Total
Source: MS-210/10, Tiwana Papers.
641,286 781,628 479,486
The figures mentioned in the above table clearly confirm that the Muslims were
overwhelmingly majority in Ferozepore and Zira. In November 1967, Evan Jenkins

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wrote that the dividing line of Gurdaspur was politically right while Abbott was of the
opinion that “the GURDASPUR TEHSIL and some parts of the BATALA TEHSIL
(to include Qadian) might reasonably have been awarded to Pakistan.” 317
The Governor of the Punjab reported to the Viceroy on 30 April 1947 that the
partition of the Punjab was not possible because it would not be an agreed solution
and the territorial re-demarcation would please neither Sikhs nor Muslims. The reason
behind this was the diverse territorial claims by the parties concerned. The Muslims
would not hand over Amritsar that had a slight non-Muslim majority. On the other
hand, the Sikhs expected to have the cis-Ravi districts of the Lahore division and the
Montgomery district of the Multan division and even the Sheikhupura district. 318 But
Mountbatten was sure that Maharaja of Patiala and Congress had accepted the
partition and even Jinnah had indicated towards it. According to Mountbatten, Jinnah
was issuing statement against the partition of Punjab just to counter the Sikh and
Congress leaders. 319 Jinnah’s consent had already been in the air since April 1947
when he showed his readiness to partition the Punjab. Jinnah showed his consent to
the Viceroy “to detach the Ambala Division from the Punjab.” 320 Baldev Singh on 1
May wrote that India was being partitioned on Jinnah’s insistence but the Sikhs
avowed not to live under the Muslim domination and demanded for the partition of
the province. Jullundur and Ambala Divisions along with the districts of Lahore and
Gurdaspur should be a part of the eastern zone. 321 The same day, some prominent
Sikh and Hindu leaders presented a memorandum through Lord Ismay to the Viceroy
with signatures of 11 MLAs. They reasserted the stand that the census of 1941 did not
present the true population of the Punjab as Kashmiri, Pathan, Baloch and other
Muslims entered the Punjab during winter which increased abundantly the proportion
of the Muslims. They placed the following demands:

• Punjab be partitioned,
• A Boundary Commission be made,
• Partition should be based on property,
• Lyallpur and Montgomery should be included in the eastern province,
• Population should be allowed to migrate. 322
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They demanded that two cabinets of the east and west Punjabs be declared i.e., first
Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions as Muslim while Ambala, Jullundur and Lahore
Divisions as non-Muslim Punjab. 323 On 8 May, Baldev Singh asked Mountbatten to
divide the Punjab according to the location of the Gurdwaras and property owned by
the Sikhs but he replied that he was helpless to do this due to the international
disparagement on the violation of the Muslim majority. 324 The Hindu and Sikh leaders
demanded that Montgomery and Lyallpur be given to the non-Muslims, later on they
consented to give Multan Division to the Muslims (Montgomery and Lyallpur both
were the districts of the Multan Divisions).
Another memorandum by Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Harnam Singh was
initiated for the safeguard of the minorities. They demanded special political
arrangements in other provinces and the centre while the Punjab was suggested to be
divided into two sub-provinces with separate legislatures. Common issues were
suggested to be dealt with a joint legislature but the matters relating to one community
would be decided by their own voting. 325 The suggestion almost was a synonym of the
Azad Punjab scheme and could not obtain attention by the major parties. On 2 May, I.
D. Scott briefed the Viceroy that a non-Muslim Tehsil could be detached from the
Gurdaspur and handed over to the east Punjab. He also suggested that the position
should be cleared to Baldev Singh right then otherwise, the Sikhs might be dejected at
a later stage. 326 It became possible until 5 May when the Viceroy informed Baldev

369
Singh that the two Assemblies would decide the Punjab issue, either partition or unity.
He also addressed the Sikh demand on the principle of ‘other factors’ and wrote:
You will realise that it is not possible for me, either in equity or morally, to adopt
any other criterion for this immediate purpose than demarcation by Muslim majority
and non-Muslim majority areas. 327
Jenkins 328 reported that Sardar Swaran Singh, Harnam Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar
met him and Sardar Harnam reported that he had found a clue in the discussion with
Lord Ismay that the Cabinet Mission Plan was no more applicable as a solution and
India was going to be divided on the basis of the majority of population. Lord Ismay
was told that the Sikhs would not accept this formula but he referred them to see the
Governor of Punjab for further discussion. Sardar Harnam alleged that the census
report of 1941 was a doubtful document but Jenkins replied that anyway it was the
best tool to decide about the minority and majority communities. Sardar Harnam
further argued that Tehsil Narowal (Sialkot) was a non-Muslim majority area but
Jenkins immediately repudiated this claim. Bhim Sen Sachar and the two Sikh leaders
suggested that the Punjab could be partitioned into three parts e.g. Multan and
Rawalpindi Divisions as Muslim State, Ambala and Jullundur as non-Muslim State
and the Lahore Division as a Central State under a joint control of the Hindu, Muslims
and Sikhs. A boundary commission would decide later the territorial adjustment of the
Lahore Division. The Governor necessitated a coalition government and
administrative zones for this purpose. At the end, the Sardars requested the Governor
not to put the Sikhs under the Muslim oppression. Jenkins expressed his observation
that partition of the Punjab and transfer of population were not practicable and a
workable solution of the communal problem. He commented on the meeting that they
had unreasonable claims but he valued “the idea of the third Central State, ridiculous
though it is.” 329 The ‘unreasonable’ demands of the Sikh and Hindu leaders could not

370
impress upon the Governor. The demands contained contradictions. They suggested a
joint council in the proposed Central State, but at the same time the Sikh leaders also
requested that they were not ready to work in the League government. Jenkins
ridiculed the third state but it could be a useful idea because until the decision of the
boundary commission, the parties and administration might have enough time which
could avoid the massive killings during the hasty migration. But Jenkins could see
from the beginning that the British had enough time up till June 1948 and personally
he was against the partition of the Punjab. Moreover, the transfer of population, to
him, was not a practicable solution while the Sikhs seemed not ready to work with the
Leaguers.
On 7 May, Mumtaz Daultana tried to convince the Sikhs that the partition
would make them ineffective in both the countries. Therefore, it would be better for
them to side with the League. He also pointed out that some poignant incidents had
made them blind and reactionary therefore they were not making decisions
independently. 330
The Congress selected M. C. Setalvad, Sardar Harnam Singh represented the
Sikh Assembly Party, and the League appointed Sir Zafarullah Khan to present the
arguments before the Punjab Boundary Commission which consisted of Justice
Mohammad Munir, Justice Din Muhammad, Justice Teja Singh and Mehr Chand
Mahajan. 331 The eventual agreement on criteria for the partition was announced by the
Viceroy on 30 June which included the Muslim majority and contiguous areas and
other factors as insisted by the Sikhs. Sir Cyril Radcliffe landed in India on 8 July. On
22 July, the Viceroy got joint assurance from the Partition Council that the decision
about boundaries would be the final and nobody would protest against it. Instead of
engaging into arguments from the Sikh, Congress and League’s representatives,

371
Radcliffe mainly depended on the records provided to him. 332 On 20 July in a meeting
of the Punjab Partition Committee, 333 Mumtaz Daultana raised a point against the
confusion made by the Sikh leadership and said that the League had accepted in
principle what the Boundary Commission would decide but the Sikhs still were busy
in creating confusion that they would not accept the unfavourable award. Such
propaganda could influence the minds of the decision-makers. Sardar Swaran Singh
cleared that the Sikhs had already approved all the decisions and would keep their
word regarding decision by the Boundary Commission. This pleased the Viceroy who
got further approval for his decision to deploy military in certain areas of the
Punjab. 334
The Sikh representative Harnam Singh placed his arguments before the
Boundary Commission in which he reiterated the story of the Sikh history, the
importance of the religious shrines, economic propositions and Muslim-Sikh enmity,
while Sir Zafarullah Khan repudiated the Sikh stand regarding persecution of the
Gurus at the hands of the Muslim rulers. He told the Commission that Sikhs did not
allow the Muslims to say Azan and their mosques were demolished. The council
demanded division of Pathankot and the boundary up to the Beas River touching
many deep eastern Punjab heartlands. Justice Sardar Teja Singh asked the nature of
the Muslim-Sikh relations but Sir Zafarullah Khan said that he was not arguing to
persuade the Sikhs to reconsider their decision on the partition of the Punjab rather he
was advocating that the Muslim rulers were entirely innocent and the Sikh killing was
an administrative measure by the government. 335 Christopher Beaumont 336 played
pro-Hindu role in the on-goings. 337 The Sikh representative focused on the ‘other
factors’ to gain central and canal colony areas. All the Justices agreed with the

372
communitarian outlook of the representatives. These findings were conveyed to
Radcliffe between 3 and 6 August.
According to Lucy Chester, Radcliffe placed his decision in front of the
Viceroy on 12 August but Mountbatten deliberately did not declare it until 17
August. 338 Alan Campbell-Johnson is of the opinion that Lord Mountbatten did not
want to destroy the celebrations of the independence by declaring the Award which
could not be agreed anyway. 339 Ultimately, after the disagreement of the advocates,
Radcliffe undertook to present the Boundary Award himself 340 which he did on 17
August 1947 depriving Pakistan of many Muslim majority areas adjacent to its
boundaries. Gurdaspur, Batala (Gurdaspur district), Tehsil Ajnala (Amritsar), Zira and
Ferozepore including Jullundur and Nakodar Tehsils were handed over to India. Lucy
Chester 341 is of the opinion that the Commission’s tight schedule and inability of any
survey made a good decision impossible. 342 But this excuse seems futile when the
criterion of the ‘notional boundary’ was violated and Pakistan was denied the Muslim
majority areas of different districts. According to Sharifal Mujahid, the Muslim state
was robbed of approximately 23000 square miles of fertile areas. 343
The Muslims were majority in Ferozepore (55.25%), Zira (65.26%),
Gurdaspur (52.16%), Batala (55.07%), Nakodar Tehsil (59.41%), Ajnala Tehsil
(59.46%) and Jullundur Tehsil (51.50%) but these areas were handed over to the
Indian Punjab. Satya M Rai writes that all such Muslim majority areas of district
Gurdaspur were given to the Indian Punjab just to provide them a link with
Kashmir. 344 Even Radcliffe changed his decision about Ferozepore in favour of
Pakistan. 345 Durga Das and Gurmit Singh are of the opinion that Jinnah had given
word to Louis Mountbatten to accept him as the Governor-General of Pakistan but
later on, he did not keep his promise, which resulted in a furious change in the Punjab

373
boundaries against Pakistan. 346 Lucy Chester writes that the “circumstantial evidence
indicates that Mountbatten may well have influenced the final shape of the boundary
award.” 347 This shows that Mountbatten was keen in his personal grandeur. The
“ambitious Mountbatten” did the worst in a shortcut in the division of the Punjab
without sensing its repercussions. 348 Opponents of Mountbatten see his desire to
become a joint Governor-General of India and Pakistan, as evidence for his greed for
power. In reality he was more concerned with maintaining close ties between the two
dominions, after independence, especially with regard to common defence
arrangements. His joint office would assist this process. To Stanley Wolpert, Lord
Mountbatten informed about Nehru’s request in this regard but did not get the final
approval from the British cabinet for this idea to govern the two countries 349 while
Allan Campbell-Johnson writes about how Lord Ismay secured consent of the British
Prime Minister Attlee, Sir Winston Churchill, and other prominent political leaders. 350
The boundary issue was a constant stress for the Punjabi communities
particularly the Sikhs and Hindus who were very nervous 351 while the authorities were
also under the burden of the administrative tasks. It was their duty to cope with the
explosive situation expected after the declaration of the Boundary Commission Award.
For this reason, Abbott asked George Abell to inform him about the decisions made
by the Boundary Commission relating to the central districts of the Punjab so that they
would be able to make sufficient administrative arrangements 352 although the
administrative authorities had failed completely to grasp violence in Lahore and
Amritsar. 353 It arouses suspicions that a member of the Viceroy’s staff was keen about
such secret information because the Viceroy could be alleged to influence the
boundary position in the Punjab. Anyway, the situation and expected disorder as
Abbott’s letter depicts, required some administrative decisions prior to the

374
announcement. But the impartiality and integrity of the Viceroy’s office and the
British was also important which was to ensure the high morality of the British nation.
It could help the ‘honourable return’ from the Subcontinent. The Viceroy had already
adopted the desired course i.e., the consultation with the stakeholders. If it was
necessary to be informed to cope with the expected disorder it could be discussed and
agreed with the Indian leaders. On the other hand, the action against disorder was a
provincial matter and the Governor could deal with it effectively under section 93.
Giani Kartar presented a new demand about Nankana area to the Viceroy
through his Private Secretary on 26 July. According to the pamphlet, Nankana on the
basis of being the birthplace of Guru Nanak Dev and other factors was demanded to
be included in the East Punjab. Muslims, the writer said, were historically the enemies
of the Sikhs so it would be insulting if Nankana Sahib was attached to Pakistan. 354
According to the Governor’s report, the Muslims were elated on the achievement of
Pakistan while the Sikhs and Hindus were very depressed and did not wish to leave
Lahore. “They are very puzzled and unhappy, and do not quite know what to do.” 355
In another report, the Governor wrote about his meeting with Giani Kartar
who had an entirely different thought about the Sikh politics. He expressed that the
Sikh politicians were confused because Giani Kartar was not ready to accept an ‘ant-
Sikh’ decision of the Boundary Commission while the other Akali leadership had
promised to accept any decision. The Governor questioned Giani Kartar about his
position whereas Sardar Baldev in the presence of Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Rajindra
Prasad and Patel had showed willingness to accept the decision made by the
Boundary Commission. Giani Kartar replied that Baldev Singh had no authority to
decide the fate of Sikhs. On this purely defiant response, the Governor asserted that
the Sikhs would have to come to the same line if the two dominions had been

375
accepted by the two major parties. To the Governor, Nankana Sahib as in the past,
would retain its religious status in Pakistan because Jinnah had assured the religious
rights of the minorities. Giani Kartar took another line and suggested that the non-
Punjabi speaking districts should be separated and given to UP or a new province and
the Sikh majority be secured in the east Punjab. The Sikh States would follow the
scheme. Giani in the end, started weeping and requested for something to be done for
the small community of Sikhs. Jenkins commenting on the Sikh politics said that
Master Tara Singh had made the Sikh question very confused and complex. To him,
the best solution was to separate the non-Punjabi speaking districts and allow the rest
of Punjab to be included in Pakistan. 356 The report admits the moral stature of Jinnah
who always kept his words. The Governor was sure of the protection of the minority
rights in Pakistan if Jinnah had assured it. As far as the Sikhs were concerned, the
leadership crisis had confused the situation regarding the Sikh position. Giani Kartar
had been critical of Baldev Singh which again indicated the disunity among the Sikh
leaders.
The leadership crisis can be observed through the briefing given to the
Viceroy about the Sikh leaders in which it was told that Master Tara Singh was a
retired headmaster who was emotional and had vague ideas; Giani Kartar was an
Akali boss who could speak English fairly well but he preferred talking in Punjabi and
Baldev Singh was the Defence Minister but was known for his wealth only. 357 This
was the political profile of the Akali leadership.
On 31 May 1947, Swaran Singh confessed that his community was ready to
fight the Muslims and for the purpose they had collected Rs. 2.5 lakh. 358 Due to
Muslim complaints against the Sikh plans, Governor opined that they were doing all
this as a defensive measure although he was being updated about the violent activities

of the parties and organisations. This chimed with a police report in May that the
Akali leaders were touring the cities to be sure about the preparations for war. Ishar
Singh Majhail visited Sialkot and its rural areas in which the Akali activists were
recruiting hundreds of volunteers in the Shahidi Jatha. 359 Until May, approximately
70/80 thousand people from Lahore and Amritsar had migrated to Multan, Gurdaspur,
Kangra, Hoshiarpur, and Sialkot. The Police report reveals that the wealthy Muslim
families of Amritsar had migrated while labouring classes of Sialkot and Gujranwala
were “on the verge of starvation” and “the labour elements will either turn to crime or
take to general lawlessness.” 360 Giani Kartar warned that the Sikhs would fight if the
Award went against the Sikh interests. Ian Talbot is of the view that such ravings
definitely “added substance to Muslim claims that the Sikhs were planning a major
attack on the Muslim population of east Punjab” 361
376
Confusion prevailed because of the Sikhs’ inflammatory utterances against the
Muslims. Such violent activities could be blocked by the implementation of the laws
but Abell briefed the Viceroy in the light of the information conveyed by Jenkins that
the arrest of the Sikh leaders responsible for provoking the communal sentiments
would worsen the situation instead of diluting it. 362 Again on 9 August, Jenkins
reiterated that though Master Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders were involved in the
subversive activities but he himself, Trivedi and Mudie agreed on the point that the
Sikh arrests would not be fruitful. This problematic job, they believed, should be put
on the shoulders of the new governments. Jenkins admitted that attacks in the villages
and elsewhere could be traced to Master Tara Singh and his followers but their arrests
along-with the decision of the Boundary Commission’s Award would accelerate the
Sikh violence tremendously. He also expressed the complications in the Sikh arrests,
such as, which part (east or west) of the divided Punjab would deal with such arrests

377
after the partition. If the Sikh leaders were put into the jails of the west Punjab, what
would happen after the partition? While their detention in the eastern Punjab jails
would further the trouble. He also showed helplessness in arresting the Sikh leaders
who mostly resided in the holy places like the Golden Temple. 363 This was another
expediency presented by the Governor, otherwise he, through the legal action, could
compel the leaders not to aggravate the situation. Jenkins wanted to confine the role
of the imperial administration merely to the duty of the transfer of power. A limited
role like this could not bring peace and harmony to the bleeding region. He was
however aware that he no longer had the power to uphold this responsibility. This
point could not of course be openly acknowledged. According to Philip Ziegler,
Jinnah informed Sir George Cunningham that Lord Mountbatten had promised to
arrest the Sikh leaders immediately after the announcement of the Award but he did
nothing to restrict the Sikhs. 364
The Punjab was buffeted both by grass root rivalries and by the communal
polarisation elsewhere in India. The realisation that the British would soon depart
undermined the Unionist Party which had been so closely connected with the
administration. The Unionist position was first shattered by the rise of the League and
its triumph in the 1946 elections. The deprivation and depression fuelled the
communal strife in the Punjab. According to Richard V. Weekes, extremists mostly
included the ex-army men and under this provocation “many Sikhs joined private
communal armies.” 365 The Sikh response to the Unionist Government’s resignation
further inflamed the situation. The Sikh leadership made such tirades and statements
which moved the Muslims to prepare to counter a sudden attack by the Sikhs.
Referring to the riots in Bihar, the Viceroy and H. Dow, Governor Bihar, were
conforming to the point that “the widespread communal tension in the country is due

378
to the hostile and irresponsible utterances of the political leaders.” 366 It shows that the
Sikh leadership’s violent injunctions were responsible for all the communal outbursts.
They continued violent speeches with the plan to occupy the Punjab forcibly after the
British departure. They had no solid demands based on logical arguments to impress
upon the political leaders of other communities. Violence replaced compromise as a
course of action. The Rawalpindi massacre in which the huge Sikh and Hindu
casualties occurred ended all possibilities of Sikh decision in favour of Pakistan. The
League leaders were still expecting Sikh cooperation with a view that Pakistan would
be far better for them than India but the riots testified the Sikh horrors that they would
not be able to survive in Pakistan founded on the basis of Islam.
The Boundary Award placed on 12 August by Radcliffe was kept secret by
Mountbatten and was later perceived as an endeavour to make unfair changes in the
Award. 367 The Viceroy’s delay might be a precautionary measure as the reports were
constantly exposing the plan of the Sikh military action against the Muslims and
suggested not revealing the exact boundaries before the transfer of power. But again it
becomes a weak argument on the different grounds, particularly the consent of the
League, Congress and the Sikh party. Another problem persisted that the provincial
administrative machinery did not take any stern administrative action against the
illegal activities of the political leaders. This reflected its collapse as a result of the
impact of World War Two. The services were now largely Indianised with the result
that they displayed communal bias. No official or policeman was willing to take
action against the co-religionists, not only because of his partisan attitude, but because
he feared the repercussions when the British left. Not only in the Punjab, but
elsewhere in India, since the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, the local
administration of law and order had fallen under political influence and pressure.

379
Finally the bare violation of the principle of the notional boundary confirmed the
partiality of the British and its representatives. Louis Mountbatten did not bestow
upon the Sikhs what they had demanded but snatched what the Muslims deserved.
Even then, the Muslims had won their homeland while the Akali leadership secured
nothing for their community. It infuriated the Sikhs who under depression of losing
economic, political, religious, social, geographical and historical benefits inflicted
barbarity on the Muslims. To Ian Talbot, the cities with the splendid grandeur like
Lahore and Amritsar were set to fire. 368
Master Tara Singh was determined to take revenge for the 2,000 Sikh lives
lost in the Rawalpindi massacre. He planned to produce bombs with a pledge to attack
the trains going from India to Pakistan, destroy the canal headworks, and even to kill
Jinnah during the independence celebrations on 15 August. 369 Mountbatten consulted
the leaders on the arrest of the responsible people but Nehru rejected it while Jinnah
approved stern action against the troublemakers. The communal clashes broke out
later and “the Sikhs were ready and organised...had mobile headquarters, military
uniforms, messenger and signalling system, and no shortage of weaponry...The Sikh
Jathas (armed bands) were armed with light-machine guns, hand grenades, tommy
guns and mortars.” 370 Major-General Rees reported that the Sikhs started the violence
as planned in the second week of the ill-fated August. The massacre was planned and
blind. Master Tara Singh was the man who was injecting hatred and violence in the
minds of the Sikh leaders sitting in the holy place, the Golden Temple. Mosley writes
that the Granthi was reading the sweet text of the Granth Sahib teaching the people
about peace, love and harmony while Master Tara Singh 100 yards away from this
book was assigning the Sikh Jathas the duty to massacre the Muslims 371 who were the
main target of the killing gangs. These people had been friends in the past. The

380
dormant religion had risen at this critical juncture and soon overrode the cultural and
traditional fraternity. The main cause was the spreading of religious propaganda by
the political leaders. Jenkins pointed out in a note that the Sikhs published pamphlets
and distributed into the rural areas of Sheikhupura, which caused a furious tension. 372
When the religion was confined to the religious places particularly in the rural areas,
the social inter-dependence and cultural bounds overrode the communal environment.
As it came out of the trench with full force, it proved a great loss to the peace of the
rural areas. According to General F. Tuker, the police administration of the east
Punjab had collapsed totally in the last months and proved useless as no case against
the killers was registered by them. 373
The riots of the Pothohar and other north-western areas proved havoc to the
Muslim-Sikh relations and ended any possibility to attract the Sikhs to put their lot on
the League side. Violence not only engulfed thousands of human lives, property and
honour but also ruined the cultural bonds and then territorial unity of the Punjab. The
Sikhs were serious to capture the Punjab by force but this plan was frustrated by the
communal riots in the north-western parts. The root cause behind this problem was
the violent strategy of the Sikh leadership. It could be coped with the legal action but
the Governor limitised the British role to transfer of power. The Boundary Award
affected Pakistan but this distribution was a continuity of the pro-Sikh policy by the
British. On the other hand, this compensation could not gratify the Sikhs who turned
violent and inflicted barbarity on the Muslims during the migrations.
------------

Chapter Four
Notes
1 Letter from Khizr Tiwana to Iftekhar Hussain Mamdot on 8 March 1946, MS210/10, Tiwana
Papers.
2Letter
from Iftekhar Hussain Mamdot to Khizr Tiwana on 9 March 1946, Ibid.
3
“Discreditable Tactics,” Editorial, The Eastern Times (Lahore) 12 March 1946.
4
Daily Inqelab (Lahore) 3 March 1946.
5
Ibid.. 4-8 February 1946.
6
The Eastern Times, 13 March 1946.
7
Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Muslim-Sikh Relationship (1921-47), A Brief Survey,” Journal of the
Pakistan Historical Society 39, Part III (July 1991): 274.
8
Memorial from A. M. Khan Leghari to Secretary of State for India in 1946, file no. F. 1120,
QAP.
Ibid.
9 MS210/18, Tiwana Papers.
10 Letter from Sir Feroz Noon to Muhammad Nawaz Khan, 19 February 1946, MS-210/10,
11 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s statement, MS210/13, Ibid.
12 FR, Mach 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
13 Major-General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of
India (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 28.
14 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom 1 st ed. (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1967), 129-30.
15 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, 1946, file S-414, para. 176.
16 Letter from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India on 6 August 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
17 Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India (Richmond:
381
Curzon Press, 1996), 152.
18 rd
As quoted by Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan 3 ed.
(Islamabad: NIHCR, QAU, 2007), 51-52.
19
Memorial from A. M. Khan Leghari.
20
Viceroy’s Impressions in his Correspondence with the Provincial Governors in Letter from
the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 6 August 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
21
Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution and
Present Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 138.
22 rd
H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan 3 ed. (London:
Hutchinson & Co., 1970), 271; also see Iftikhar Malik, “Pluralism, Partition and
Punjabisation: Politics of Muslim Identity in the British Punjab,” International Journal of
Punjab Studies 5 (January-June 1998): I18-19.
23
Inqelab, 23 March 1946.
24
FR, Mach 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
25
FR, June 1946, Ibid.
26 nd
Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History 2 ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996), 233.
27
AB Rajput, The Constituent Assembly (Lahore: Lion Press, 1946), 132-133.
28
FR, July 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
29
FR, August 1946, Ibid.
30
Tan Yong Tai and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London:
Routledge, 2000), 111-12.
31
Secret Police Abstract, 1946, file S-414, para. 213.
32
Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 25 March 1946; see also IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet Mission:
Sikhs.
33
Letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 7 February, 1946, IOR:
L/PO/6/114.
34
“Viability of Pakistan,” Cabinet Directive, Chequers Meeting, Parliamentary Statements,
Mission Objects, IOR: L/P&J/10/21, Cabinet Mission Papers.
35
Major Short’s Comments on the Sikh question on 18 February 1946, IOR: Mss. Eur. F.
189/9, Major Short Collection.

36 Letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 3 March 1946, IOR: L/PO/6/114.
37 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India on 7 March 1946. Ibid.
382
38
Prime Minister’s Speech, Ibid.
39
Secret Meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy, the Cabinet Delegation, and the
Provincial Governors on 28 March 1946. IOR: L/P&J/10/25, Cabinet Delegation, Interviews.
40
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 139-40.
41
Note on Interview between the Cabinet Delegation and Mr. Gandhi on 3 April 1946,
IOR:L/P&J/10/25, Cabinet Delegation, Interviews.
42
Ibid.
43
MA Jinnah, Interview with the Delegation on 4 April 1946, Ibid.
44
Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Viceroy and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah on 4
April 1946. Ibid.
45
Record of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Viceroy and Baldev Singh, Punjab Minister,
5 April 1946. Ibid.
46 Meeting between the Cabinet Delegation, H.E. the Viceroy and Hon’ble Lt. Col. Malik Sir
Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana, KCSI, OBE, Premier of the Punjab, at 4 pm on Friday, 5 April 1946, Ibid;
see also Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1999),180-181.
47 Meeting between Khizr Tiwana and the Viceroy on 3 May 1947, MB1/D260.
48 Record of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Viceroy and Representatives of the Sikh
community, 5 April 1946. IOR:L/P&J/10/25, Cabinet Delegation, Interviews.
49 “The Problem of Sikhs,” Editorial, The Eastern Times, 13 June 1946.
50 IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet Mission: Sikhs.
51 S. V. Desika Char, ed., The Constitutional History of India, 1757-1947 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 96.
52 Secret Police Abstract, 1946, para. 281, 297.
53 Speech of Sardar Kapur Singh in the Lok Sabha on 6 September 1966 in Satya M. Rai,
Punjab Heroic Tradition, 1900-1947 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1978), 171.
54 AS Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej: The Akali Politics (Lahore: Republican Books, 1987), 69.
55 Secret Police Abstract 1946, para. 297.
56 Letter of Master Tara Singh to Pethick Lawrence on 25 May 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/33,
Cabinet Mission: Sikhs.
57 Letter of Pethick Lawrence to Master Tara Singh on 1 June 1946, File 20, Cabinet Mission
Papers in QAP.
58 FR second half of May 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
59 See detail in The Eastern Times, 19-7 June 1946.
60 Record of Interview of the Cabinet Delegation and HE the Viceroy with Master Tara Singh
and Sardar Baldev Singh Representing the Sikh Community on 6 June 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/33,
Cabinet Mission: Sikhs.
61 Letter from Pethick Lawrence to Master Tara Singh on 1 June 1946, Ibid.
62 Letter from Pethick Lawrence to Baldev Singh on 1 June 1946, Ibid.
63
FR, June 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
64
Qalb-i-Abid, “The Muslim-Sikh Relationship,” 277.
65
Times of India (Bombay), 12 June 1946; see also Text of Resolution passed by the
Shiromani Akali Dal at its Conference on 10 June 1946, MB1/D288 (1).
66
Letter from Kalwant Singh Virk to Jinnah on 26 September 1946, File. 930, QAP.
67
Hindustan Time, (New Delhi) 23 June 1946.
68
Telegram from Punjab Governor to Viceroy on 17 June 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet
Mission: Sikhs.
69
Sardar Baldev Singh, Interview with Governor on 28 June 1946, Ibid.
70
Note of Interview between GEB Abell (PSV) with Sardar Baldev Singh, Punjab Minister, on
10 August 1946, MB1/D288 (9).
71 Daily Ranjit (Lahore) 31 December 1946.
72 Letter from Baldev Singh to Sir Pethick on May 26 1946; see also Letter from Jenkins to
Wavell on 27 May 1946, L/LP/10/33.
73 Letter from Governor of Punjab to Viceroy on 29 May 1946. Ibid.
74 “The Sikh Threats” Editorial, The Eastern Times, 29 May 1946.
75 Letter from Evan Jenkins to Lord Wavell on 27 May 1946, L/LP/10/33.

76 Note by Major Short on 5 June 1946, Ibid..
77 Sir Penderel Moon on 29 June 1946, Mss Eur F 189/1, Papers of Sir P. Moon (Microfilm).
78 Viceroy’s Impressions in his Correspondence with the Provincial Governors in Letter from
the Viceroy to the Secretary of State on 6 August 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
79 Letter from CR Attlee to Sardar Baldev Singh on 7 August 1946, MB1/D288.
80 A. B. Rajput, The Constituent Assembly, 138; see also The Hindustan Times, 15 August
1946.
383
81
The Hindustan times and Statesman (New Delhi) 17 and 19 August 1946.
82
The Hindustan Times, 21 and 25 December 1946.
83
Master Tara Singh’s statement under ‘Nationality by Religion’ in New Delhi dated 22
October 1946, Information Department, New Delhi, L/PJ/10/33.
84
Ibid.
85
Letter from Abell to Menon on 5 September 1946, MB1D288.
86
Letters from Abell to Menon on 6 September 1946 and from Viceroy to Governor Punjab on
9 September 1946, Ibid.
87
Nia Zamana, (Bombay), 23 June 1946.
88
Secret Police Abstract, 1946, para. 267.
89
FR, July 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
90
“The elections resulted in the return of fifteen Muslim Leaguers, one Muslim and two Hindu
Unionists, five Congressmen, and one member of the Hindu Mahasabha who was a Congress
nominee.” FR, July 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
91
Sardar Swaran Singh was born in 1907 in Shankar district Jallandhar. He entered the Punjab
Assembly after winning the elections of 1937. He came to the forefront during the last years of the
partitioning phase.
92
Letter from the Governor to Viceroy on 14 September, 1946, L/PJ/10/33.
93 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972),
247-48.
94M.
H. A. Isphahani, Quaid-e-Azam-As I Knew Him (Karachi: Forward Publication Trust,
1966), 221.
95
P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, 249.
96
Satya M. Rai, Punjab Heroic Tradition, 167.
97
Nehru’s Press Statement on “India Wins Freedom,” The Tribune (Ambala) 8 February 1959
as quoted in Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), 27.
98
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 232.
99
Kailash Chander Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications,
1974), 229n; Darbara Singh, The Punjab Tragedy (Amritsar: Steno Press, 1949), 32; see also Ganda
Singh, “A Diary of the Partition,” Journal of History XXXVII, nos. 109-111 (1959): 206 (205-232);
see also Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1987), 153.
100
See, The Tribune and The Eastern Times, 11 April, 13 and 31 August 1946.
101
Letter from Jenkins to Wavell on 14 September 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
102
Intelligence Report by P. E. S. Finny (Deputy Director (A)) on 18 September 1946,
MB1/D288.
103
Ibid.
104
Sir Stafford Cripps’ Statement in Debate in the House of Commons on 12 December 1946,
IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet Mission: Sikhs.
105
Statement of Master Tara Singh, Telegram No. A; 37800/1, Information Department, India
Office, From the Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, dated 18 December 1946; see also Daily Ranjit,
18 December 1946.
106
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 147.
107 Daily Ranjit, 17 December 1946.
108 See details, H. N. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register: An Annual Digest of Public
Affairs, 1919-1947 vol. I1, 1946 (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), 182-188.
109 The Muslim League leaders made the full use of all such atrocities in obtaining the
sympathy of the Muslim masses. Begum Tasadduq Hussain during the speech in Patiala State showed
the torn and blood-spotted clothes of the dead Muslims of Bihar. Justice Syed Jamil Hussain Rizvi,

384
“Taqseem-i-Punjab aur Patiala,” in Sardar Ali Ahmad Khan, ed., Hindustan se Pakistan, Part I (Lahore:
Istaqlal Publications, 1979), 152.
110
P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, 249; see also Anita Inder Singh, The origins of the
Partition, 249.
111
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 216-217.
112
Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 234.
113
Viceroy’s Impressions in his Correspondence with the Provincial Governors in Letter from
the Viceroy to the Secretary of State on 6 August 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
114
Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 149.
115
The Times of India, 25 October 1946.
116
Sharif-al-Mujahid, “Communal Riots,” in Mahmood Hussain, et al., eds., A History of the
Freedom Movement, vol. IV, part II (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), 151.
117
Ibid.
118
Letter from Jenkins to Wavell on 14 September 1946, File No. 1024, QAP.
119
Letter from Punjab Premier to Sir John Bennett, IGP, Punjab in 1946, MS-210/18, Tiwana
Papers.
120Anita
Inder Singh, The origins of the Partition of India, 249.
121
FR, First half of March 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
122
Daily Inqelab, 18 March 1946.
123
Anita Inder Singh, The origins of the Partition of India, 153.
124
FR, Second half of March and Second half of April 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
125
According to the details, Hira Singh from Sultanabad district Hyderabad, Sindh, propertied
650 acres of land in Makhi Dhand but his land was confiscated so that it could be awarded to the
soldiers. Later on the Sindh government decided to give this land to the Punjabi and Sindhi Muslims
which was an act of injustice. 16 May 1946, File-930, QAP.
126
Letter from Hira Singh to the Congress leader in the Sindh Assembly on 25 April 1946, Ibid.
127
Secret Police Abstract, 1946, file S-414, para. 253.
128 FR, May 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
129 FR, June 1946, Ibid.
130 Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, 82.
131 Secret Police Abstract, 1946, file S-414, para 267.
132 FR, July 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
133 FR, September 1946 and October 1946, Ibid.
134 FR, November 1946, Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 “National Guards Chief’s Appeal to Mussalmans,” The Eastern Times, 28 July 1946.
137 Secret Police Abstract, 1947, para. 414.
138 Ch. Muhammad Hanif Awan Advocate was basically from Muradpur district Hoshiarpur
where he was born in 1923. Sibtul Hasan Zaigham, “Tehrik-i-Pakistan ke aik karkun ki kahani,” Nawai-Waqt
(Lahore), 23 October 2004.
139 Daily Ranjit, 24 December 1946.
140 Report by the Punjab Governor to the Viceroy, 3 February 1947, L/PJ/5/250, Information
Department, India Office, New Delhi.
141 Major Abdul Rasheed, “Jalandhar, Qiamat key din, Qiamat ki Ratein,” in Sardar Ali,
Hindustan se Pakistan, part I, 223.
142 Letter from Jenkins to Wavell on 31 August 1946, L/PJ/5/249.
143 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 5 th ed. (London: Robert Hale &
Company, 1972), 152.
144 Intelligence Bureau Report, 26 September 1923, IOR: L/P&J/12/170.
145 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 235.
146 Ibid., 235-36; see also Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 1993), 114-115.
147 Letter from Jenkins to Sir J. Colville on 5 December 1946 in Henry Hayes, ed., The Sikh
Question in India (London: Helms Publishing, n.d.), 80.
148 Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, 153-58.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.

152 FR, January, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
153 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947
(New Delhi: Manohar publishers, 1999), 187-188.
154 FR, February, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
385
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Birthday of Holy Prophet Muhammad PBUH
158 Secret Police Abstract, 1947, file S-415, paras. 38, 80, 111, 265, 285.
159 Jinnah’s press statement MS-210/A812/4 (part I), Tiwana Papers.
160 Resolution passed by the Working Committee of the League at Karachi on 1 February 1947,
Information Department, India Office, New Delhi, 3 February 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
161 Resolution of the League’s Working Committee on 1 February 1947, MS-210/A812/4 (part
I), Tiwana Papers.
162 Information Department, India Office, New Delhi, 3 February 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
163 Ibid.
164 Tiwana consulted his friends who suggested to him that it would be better for him to resign
so that the League could form ministry. Wayne Wilcox and Aislie T. Embree. The Reminiscences of Sir
Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (Maple, Ontario: Oriental Publishers, 2004), 175.
165 Letter from Jenkins to Wavell on 3 March 1947, MB1/D259.
166 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
167 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1947), 225.
168 Gulati, Akali Past and Present, 231n. Darbara Singh, The Punjab Tragedy, 32; see also
Robin Jeffrey, “The Punjab Boundary Force, August 1947,” Modern Asian Studies, 8, 4 (1974): 494.
169 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 239.
170 Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 156-57; see also Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to
Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1961), 376; Wayne Wilcox, Reminiscences of Zafarullah Khan¸ 177.
171 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 239; see also Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Sube di Gatha
(Gurmukhi) (Sarhind: Lokgit Parkashan, 1992), 121 (99n).
172 Ahmad Saeed Kirmani, MLA, interview by the researcher, tape recording, Lahore, 15 July
2003.
173 The Hindustan Times, 5 March 1947.
174 Feroz Khan Noon’s Press statement on11 March 1947, MS-210/A812/4 (part I), Tiwana
Papers.
175Letter
from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India on 6 March 1947, MB1/D259.
176
Letter from Viceroy to the Governor on 6 March 1947, Ibid.
177
Letter from Jenkins to the Viceroy on 7 March 1947, Ibid.
178
Meeting of Nawab Mamdot, Feroz Noon and Mumtaz Daultana with the Governor on 12
March 1947, MS-210/A812/4, Tiwana Papers.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid.
181
Ibid.
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
186
See more details, Raja Adnan Razzaq, “Rise and Growth of All-India Muslim League in
Rawalpindi: 1940-1947” (M.Phil. thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2004).
187
The Sikhs in Action, 8-9 and passim.
188
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
189
Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I (1947), 227-228.
190
Secretary (Complaints Section), The Punjab Riot Sufferers’ Relief Committee, Lahore.
191
Prabodh Chandra, Rape of Rawalpindi (Delhi: National Printing Works, n.d.), 1.
192
Ibid., 45.
193
The Hindu-Sikh Case For Nankana Sahib Tract by Giani Kartar Singh, MB1/D262.
194
Notes by the Governor of the Punjab on Sikh Organisations on 1 April 1947, MB1/D289.
195
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.

196 Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Raizada Hans Raj, Diwan Chaman Lal, Sardar Mangal Singh,
Sardar Sampuran Singh, Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, SB Capt. Harindra Singh, SB Sir Sobha Singh
(MCS), Ch. Sri Chand, Sir Buta Singh (MCS), and Ft. Lt. Rup Chand (MCS).
197 Letter from the Hindu-Sikh MLAs to Jawaharlal Nehru on 2 April 1947, MB1/D259.
198 Statement by Master Tara Singh on 31 March 1947, MS-210/A812/4 (part II), Tiwana
386
Papers.
199Report
on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
200
Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi, 125-26.
201
Letter from Evan Jenkins to Lord Mountbatten on 9 April 1947, MB1/D289.
202
Two Gurmukhi Pamphlets, April 1947, Ibid.
203
Enclosure 2 to No. 249 on 27 March 1947 in Z. H. Zaidi, ed., Jinnah Papers, 20 February-2
June 1947, vol. I, part I (Islamabad: National Archives of Pakistan, 1993), 429-30.
204
MS-210/A812/4, Tiwana Papers.
205
Press statement by Master Tara Singh on 1 May 1947, Ibid.
206
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of May 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
207
Letter from the Viceroy to Evan Jenkins on 2 May 1947, MB1/D260.
208
Governor’s Secretary wrote to the PSV on 6 July 1947, Ibid.
209 Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Punjab Administration and Unionist-Muslim League Relations,” paper
delivered at the International Conference on the Punjab, Punjab University, Lahore, 31 December 2008.
210 Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana, 159.
211
Ibid., 160.
212
Statesman, 4 January 1947 in MB1/D288.
213
The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 8 January 1947, Ibid.
214
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of May 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
215
FR, February 1947, Ibid.
216
Note by Evan Jenkins on the Meeting with Giani Kartar Singh on 10 April 1947,
MB1/D289.
217 Ibid.
218 MS-210/A812/4, Part II, Tiwana Papers.
219 Notes of an Interview between the Governor of the Punjab and Lord Ismay on 1 April 1947,
MB1/D259.
220 Letter from Sardar Swaran Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar to the Viceroy on 21 April 1947,
MB1/D260.
221 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of April, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
222 The Sikh Position by Evan Jenkins on 16 April 1947, MB1/D290.
223 FR, April 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
224 Copy of the Resolution No. IX adopted by the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali
Dal, Amritsar on 16 April 1947, MB1/D259.The Partition was to disturb 1.68 million Sikhs of the
western part and 3.85 million Muslims of the eastern part of the Punjab. A. B. Rajput, Muslim League,
Yesterday and Today (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1948), 213.
225 Extract from the discussion between the Viceroy and Master Tara Singh, Sardar Baldev
Singh and Giani Kartar Singh on 18 April 1947, MB1/D259.
226 MB1/D290.
227 Ibid.
228 Extract from Private and Secret Letter from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy
on 9 May 1947, MB1/D290.
229 Ibid.
230 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of June 1947, L/PJ/5/250; see also
about the Chenab boundary as a Sikh demand in a Letter from Master Tara, Baldev and Swaran Singh
to the British Prime Minister and Sir Cripps on 8 May 1947, IOR: L/PJ/7/12252.
231 Letter from Menon to George Abell on 29 March 1947, MB1/D289.
232 Note by ID Scott on 30 March 1947, Ibid.
233 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of April, 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
234 FR, second half of February 1947, Ibid.
235 Extract from Private and Secret Letter from the Secretary of State for India to His
Excellency the Viceroy on 9 May 1947, MB1/D290.

236
Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs: 1839-1964 vol. II (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), 281.
237
Note on Sikh Migration to East Punjab by Khizr Tiwana in early 1947, MS-210/9, Tiwana
387
Papers.
238Extract
from a Note of an interview of the Governor with the Maharaja of Nabha on 25
April 1947, MB1/D290; see also Satya M. Rai, Punjab Heroic Tradition, 171.
239
Letter from Jenkins to the Viceroy on 7 March 1947, MB1/D259.
240
Hindustan Times, 16 March 1947.
241
Letter from Jenkins to the Viceroy on 24 March 1947, MB1/D259.
242
Ibid.
243
Notes of an Interview between the Governor of the Punjab and Lord Ismay on 1 April 1947,
Ibid.
244
Extract from Governor’s Fortnightly Report dated 30 April 1947, MB1/D260.
245
Master Tara Singh’s statement, Ibid.
246
Meeting of Master Tara Singh with Evan Jenkins on 19 May 1947, MB1/D261.
247
Ibid.
248
10 July 1947, MB1/D262.
249
Notes of an Interview between the Governor of the Punjab and Lord Ismay on 1 April 1947,
MB1/D259.
250 10 July 1947, MB1/D262.
251 Qalb-i-Abid, “Punjab Administration and Unionist-Muslim League Relations.”
252 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of May 1947, L/PJ/5/250. See also
Athar Nadeem trans., Taqsim-i-Punjab ka Khufia Record (Urdu) (Lahore: Matbu’at Shaoor, 1996), 309.
253 Extract from Private and Secret Letter dated the 9 th May 1947 from the Secretary of State
for India to the Viceroy, MB1/D290.
254 FR, June 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
255 Satya M. Rai, Punjab Heroic Tradition, 171 Sardar Patel stated that the Muslims of
Pakistan would soon appeal to rejoin India. Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 245.
256 MS-210/4, Tiwana Papers.
257 FR, L/PJ/5/250; see also Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty,
22 March-15 August 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2003), passim.
258 Letter from I. H. Qureshi to MA Jinnah on 6 August 1947, file-416, QAP.
259 Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, MB1/D311.
260 Extract from the Viceroy’s 48 th Staff Meeting on 28 June 1947, Ibid.
261 Meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian Leaders, 2 nd Day at New Delhi on 3 June 1947, Ibid.
262 Report on second half of June 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
263 Isphahani, Quaid-e-Azam-As I Knew Him, 219.
264
Letter from Kartar Singh to the Viceroy on 13 June 1947, MB1/D290.
265
Ibid.
266
Record of Interview with Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh on 30 June 1947,
Ibid.
267
Note by GEB Abell 2 July 1947, Ibid.; see also Mss Eur F230/31, Moon Collection.
268
Notes of GEB Abell on Interviews of Two Sikh Leaders on 30 June 1947, Note by Giani
Kartar Singh, MB1/D290.
269
One copy was also sent to Jinnah.
270
Letters from Lord Mountbatten to Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru on 4 July and Nehru’s
Reply on 7 July 1947, MB1/D290; see also Latif Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten
(Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1986), 117.
271
Letter from Evan Jenkins to the Viceroy on 25 June 1947, MB1/D262.
272
Evan Jenkins also smelled that MA Jinnah wished one party rule in Pakistan. He planned to
summon the Assembly once a year to pass the budget. Such efforts were being considered to save the
split in the party. On the other hand, Feroz Noon had got signatures of 53 MLAs out of 60 to challenge
the choice of Jinnah., Ibid.
273
Latif Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten, 116.
274
Major Short remained engaged in the Sikh affairs from time to time but in 1947 he came to
India as a paid guest of Mountbatten and Sikhs. See details, Latif Sherwani, The Partition of India and
Mountbatten, 118-119.

388
275 Note by Major Short on 18 February 1946. IOR: Mss. Eur. F. 189/9, Major Short Collection.
276 The Dawn (Delhi) 22 March 1946; see also IOR: L/P&J/10/33, Cabinet Mission: Sikhs.
277 The Hindustan Times, 22 March 1946.
278 “Azad Sikh State aur Quaid-i-Azam,” Daily Inqelab, 24 March 1946; see also Gurmit Singh,
Failures of the Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha Institute of Religious Studies, 1981), 41.
279 Extract from Note of Interview between the Viceroy and Mr. MA Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
Khan on 13 October 1946, MB1/D288.
280 Extract from the Confidential Report in the Punjab for the first half of October 1946, Ibid;
see also Statement of Master Tara Singh, Pb. I:80, Shamsul Hasan Collection.
281 Letter from Aziz Hindi to MA Jinnah on 3 March 1947 in Z. H. Zaidi, ed., Jinnah Papers,
vol. I, part I, 171-172.
282 Extract from Note of an Interview with Jinnah on 26 April 1947, MB1/D290.
283 Jinnah’s meeting with Viceroy on 4 July 1947, MB1/D260.
284 FR for the second half of May 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
285 Letter from Maharaja of Patiala to the Viceroy on 18 May 1947, MB1/D308.
286 Master Tara’s statement to API on 4 May 1947, MS-210/4, Tiwana Papers.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 Letter from Sardar Baldev Singh to the Viceroy on 7 May 1947, MB1/D260.
290 Letter from Baldev Singh to the Viceroy on 2 June 1947, MB1/D311.
291 Sardar Baldev Singh’s statement on 26 May 1947, MS-210/4, Tiwana Papers.
292 Extract from Private and Secret Letter from the Secretary of State for India to His
Excellency the Viceroy on 9 May 1947, MB1/D290.
293 Yavandra Singh, “I Remember Mr. Jinnah’s Offer of Sikh State,” The Tribune (Ambala),
19 July 1959.
294 K. H. Khurshid, “The Quaid and the Sikhs-A Prophecy Fulfilled,” The Pakistan Times
(Lahore), 7 March 1985.
295 Gurmit Singh, Failures of the Akali Leadership, 32-33.
296 Quoted in Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi,130n.
297 Satya M. Rai, Punjab Heroic Tradition, 171.
298 Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi, 144-145n.
299 Zaghlol Pasha signed the demands without giving a look to what was presented by the Copt
leader for the Christian minority.
300 Patwant Singh, The Sikhs (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1999), 206-207.
301 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of May 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
302 Latif Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten, 113.
303 Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej, 71.
304 Letter from Sir P. Moon to Master Sujan Singh in June 1947, MSS EUR F230/31, Papers of
Sir Penderel Moon; also see Dr. Kirpal Singh, ed., Select Documents on Partition of Punjab-1947,
India and Pakistan, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal-India and Punjab-Pakistan (Delhi: National Book
Shop, 1991), 103-104.
305 Meeting of Kartar Singh and Ujjal Singh with Evan Jenkins on 7 May 1947, MB1/D260.
306 The total population of Gurdaspur district was 1,153,511 including 589,923 Muslims and
563,588 non-Muslims and 221,261 Sikhs. Another map of the Punjab sketched with pencil was found
in the Mountbatten Papers which shows Gurdaspur as Muslim majority district. MB1/D259; see also
the Population figures according to Census of 1941, No. 336, in Z. H. Zaidi, ed., Jinnah Papers, 20
February-2 June 1947 vol. II, 638-651; To Muhammad Waseem, Gurdaspur according to the Second
Schedule of the India Independence Act was a part of Pakistan. Quoted in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal
Singh, ed., Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 205.
307 Sir Cyril Radcliffe had sound establishment background. He had been Director-General of
the British Ministry of Information during the war. He was given 5 weeks to do the gigantic job of the
demarcation. Lucy Chester, “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary,” The
American Diplomacy 7:1 (February 2002): 7.
308 Notes of a Meeting held by C.V.S. on 22 April 1947, MB1/D260.
309 Ismay’s report to Viceroy about a meeting with Sardar Harnam Singh and Sardar Ujjal
Singh on 30 April 1947, Ibid.
310 “The Punjab Problem,” MB1/D259.

311
Viceroy’s reply to Nehru in May 1947, MB1/D260.
312Annex to V.C.P. 54 (Viceroy’s Conference Paper No 54) for the Revised Draft
Announcement on 17 May 1947, MB1/D307.
313
Letter from Baldev Singh to Nehru on 2 July 1947, MB1/D262.
314
Letter from Evan Jenkins to the Viceroy on 10 July 1947, Ibid.
315
Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) July 20, 1947.
316
Giani Kartar’s statement in a meeting with Evan Jenkins, MS-210/9, Tiwana Papers.
317
Letter from Evan Jenkins to Professor Michel (Coventry) on 27 November 1967, K-34,
Mountbatten Papers. Hartley Archives, Southampton University.
318
Extract from Fortnightly Report on 30 April 1947, MB1/D260.
319
Telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India and the Governor Punjab on
5 May 1947, Ibid.
320
Viceroy’s remarks, MS-210/4, Tiwana Papers.
321
Letter from Baldev Singh t o Viceroy on 1 May 1947, MB1/D260.
322
Memorandum presented by the Sikh and Congress Leaders to the Viceroy on 1 May 1947,
Ibid.
389
323
Ibid.
324
Viceroy’s Personal Reports, (Report no. 6) on 8 May 1947 quoted in Larry Collins and
Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight: Mountbatten and the Partition of India (Colombo: Peoples
Publishing House, 1982), 126.
325
Memorandum on Minorities by Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Harnam Singh in May 1947,
MB1/D260.
326
I. D. Scott’s briefing to the Viceroy on 2 May 1947, Ibid.
327
Letter from Viceroy to Baldev Singh on 5 May 1947, Ibid.
328
Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins remained the Punjab Governor from 8 April 1946 to 15 August
1947.
329
Report of Evan Jenkins to the Viceroy on 2 May 1947, MB1/D260.
330
Mumtaz Daultana’s statement on 7 May 1947, MS-210/4, Tiwana Papers.
331
The Partition of the Punjab, vol. II (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993), I.
332
Ibid, vol. I, 33-217.
333
The Viceroy, Governor, Abell, Zahid Hussain, Mumtaz Daultana, Dr. Gopi Chand
Bhargava and Sardar Swaran Singh participated.
334
Meeting of the Punjab Partition Committee on 20 July 1947, MB1/D262.
335
Arguments by Harnam Singh and Sir Zafarullah Khan in The Partition of the Punjab, vol. I,
343-346. 336An ICS officer and private secretary to Radcliffe
337 Muhammad Munir, “Days to Remember,” The Pakistan Times, 22 June 1964.
338 Lucy Chester, “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary,” 9.
339 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 151; see also Philip Ziegler,
Mountbatten: The Official Biography, 417.
340 Ibid.
341 She is a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University and a Ph.D. scholar in History at Yale University.
342 Lucy Chester, “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary,” 8.
343 Sharif-al-Mujahid, “The Radcliffe Award,” Dawn, 23 March 1976; see also Latif Ahmad
Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten, 171.
344
Latif Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten, 171. Kirpal Singh, Partition of
Punjab, 76.
345
Statement by Justice Din Muhammad in Dawn Karachi on 25 April 1958.
346
Gurmit Singh, Failure of Akali Leadership, 68.
347
Lucy Chester, “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary,” 10.
348
Patwant Singh, The Sikhs, 210-211.
349 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 333.
350 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 131-136.
351 Letter from the Punjab Governor to the Viceroy on 14 July 1947, MB1/D262.
352 Letter from Abbott to GEB Abell on 16 July 1947, Ibid.

390
353
Athar Nadeem, Taqsim-i-Punjab ka Khufia Record, 305.
354
The Hindu-Sikh Case For Nankana Sahib Tract, MB1/D262.
355
The Governor’s Report to the Viceroy on 30 July 1947, Ibid; see also Dr. Muhammad
Azam Chaudhri, Tehrik-i-Pakistan mein Punjab ka Kirdar (Urdu) (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1996),
440.
356
Extract from the Report No. 698 dated 30 July 1947, MB1/D262.
357
Evan Jenkins’ Note on 10 April 1947, MB1/D289.
358
Interview of Evan Jenkins with Swaran Singh on 31 May 1947, IOR: R/3/1/176.
359
Secret Police Abstract, 1947, para. 363.
360
Ibid., para. 405.
361
Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), 232.
362
Note by GEB Abell on 21 July 1947, Ibid.
363
Letter from Evan Jenkins to Mountbatten on 9 August 1947, MB1/D290.
364
Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985), 417.
365
Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation (Princeton, NJ: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), 89-90.
366 Impressions in his Correspondence with the Provincial Governors in Letter from the
Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 6 August 1946, file No. 1024, QAP.
367 By the decision, 38 per cent area and 45 per cent population were given to the East Punjab.
Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. IV (Lahore: Book Traders, 1972), 531.
368 Ian Talbot, Divided Cities: Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), passim.
369 Extract from Private and Secret Letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 8
August 1947, MB1/D271; see also, Viceroy’s Personal Reports, No. 16 on 9 August 1947 quoted in
Larry Collins, Freedom at Midnight, 172-173.
370 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 116.
371 Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1961), 235.
372 Athar Nadeem, Taqsim-i-Punjab ka Khufia Record, 451.
373 Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1950), 481-484.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The Muslim-Sikh hostility was more deep-rooted than the hostility between
Hindus and Muslims because the Sikh religion evolved during the Muslim rule while
the Hindu-Muslim heroes were neither contemporary nor of the same region. Gurus
whom Sikhs consider as their ‘prophets’ were persecuted by the Mughal rulers which
drew a hard-line between the two communities. The historians attribute the starting
point of the Muslim-Sikh conflict to the murder of Guru Arjun Dev and afterwards the
religio-political policy followed under the two swords (miri-piri) by Guru Hargobind.
Actually, the Muslim-Sikh conflict dates back to the arrest and persecution of Guru
Nanak Dev by the Muslims like Mir Mughal and Ibrahim Lodhi. However, the
historians failed to see that Guru Nanak Dev till then had not emerged as a prominent
figure in the society and the number of his followers was too little to affect the
communitarian relationship in the Punjab. The common Muslims had no hatred for
the Sikhs because the ruling Mughals did not enjoy religious but dominantly a
political status. While to Sikhs, persecution of their Gurus was a ‘religious issue,’ this
could never be overlooked as their religious heroes were either tortured or killed by
the Muslim rulers because this was considered as desecration of the Sikh religion
which could not be offset by any means. Therefore, the Muslim-Sikh enmity existed
in the Sikh minds and literature though it all remained confined to the religious places
till the communal political ideology took hold in the late colonial era.

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Though the Muslims and Sikhs of the rural areas were well aware of the bitter
religious past however both the communities had been living a friendly and peaceful
life on the basis of the cultural affinity to some extent, 1 communitarian dominance
and social interdependence. 2 The religions were contained to the religious places such
as Mosques and Gurdwaras. The saintly heritage of co-existence, regional traditions
of mutual cooperation and joint farming and business, folk and element of revenge
steered them to the way of harmony. According to Fauja Singh, the ancient times
testified that “the people of the Punjab were never so rigid or orthodox about the
Hindu religion.” 3 It may be concluded that the tradition of communitarian harmony
had been an outstanding feature of the Punjabi culture as we find no evidence of
persecution of the first Muslims converted from Hinduism to Islam or Hinduism to
Sikhism by the majority community. The rural Punjab maintained this cultural norm
until the stormy wave of the communal politics. 4 The urban areas infected with
communal tension under the awareness of the religious enmity, political neuroses,
publishing activities, party conferences and meetings produced an unfriendly
atmosphere which could be blocked with an effective campaign to revive the mutual
understanding but no serious move was initiated to bridge the differences of the
Muslims and Sikhs.
The Indian communities organized themselves on the religious bases to
struggle for the political rights. The ‘divide and rule’ phenomenon projected by many
was a mode to blackmail the British and to defame and discourage the minority
leadership in the struggle for their rights. As a matter of fact, ‘divide and rule’ policy
had no place in the Indian politics as no document of the India Office Record or any
other collection has yet been presented to hint on the British official policy to provoke
communal riots and chaos. Such a policy is useful in a battlefield where an enemy

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tries to divide the strength of the rival. It is useful for the commanders but not the
rulers. A peaceful Punjab could serve the imperialist British better than a region under
communal strife. The Muslims were granted separate electorates in 1909 and this was
projected as the British policy to divide and rule. Contrarily, the same right given to
the Sikhs in 1919 was never attributed to the British conspiracy.
The Sikhs floated very weak demands from the very outset of the working of
the political institutions in the British Punjab. The demand for 33 per cent
representation for the Sikhs as compared to the Muslim share in the Hindu majority
provinces was not a well-worked demand because by reducing the seats, the Muslims
would be downed to an ineffective minority in the Punjab. Regarding the issue of
representation in the Muslim minority provinces, the Sikh stand was also very weak
and could not be compared with the Punjab. The Muslim-Hindu adjustment in the
other provinces was possible but in the Punjab the presence of another community,
the Sikhs had made the situation very complex. It can be observed that, despite
enough weightage being given to the Muslims in UP the status of non-Muslim
majority was not being disturbed but by according to the Sikh demand in the Punjab
the Muslim majority would be converted into an ineffective minority. The result of
meeting the Sikh demands would be as follows:
Sikh Demand 33%
Hindu Seats 24%
Total Non-Muslim Seats 57%
Muslims Remain 43%

394
The two Lahore Resolutions have had a great significance in the Sikh history.
The first Lahore resolution of 1929 initiated by the Congress was to please the Sikhs
and the Lahore Resolution of 1940 initiated by the League was to please the Muslims
which severely disturbed the Sikh community. They seem quoting both the
resolutions from time to time in the subsequent years. Both impacted gravely on the
Sikh politics. Despite betrayal of this pledge, the Congress took advantage from the
resolution of 1929 while the Resolution of 1940 widened the gulf between the
Muslims and Sikhs who opposed the idea of Pakistan tooth and nail. They considered
no option which could put them under the Muslim rule.
Anti-League Sikh Politics
The Punjab politics of the 1940s revolved around the All-India Muslim
League and the Shiromani Akali Dal therefore the main question was to create a
friendly atmosphere which could pave the way for understanding between the two
parties. Nevertheless, the agreement became impossible as the League had no direct
interaction with the Sikhs because it had been keeping itself away from the regional
politics until which created and maintained a distance between the League and Akali
Dal. On the other hand, being in the coalition government with the Unionist Muslims,
the Sikhs did not need to deal with the League at the party level while they joined the
national politics very late. The League was struggling for the Muslim rights and never
tried to disturb the Unionist-Sikh alliance. This definitely let the Punjab coalition
ministries continue successfully. The nominal representation of the League in the
Punjab Legislative Council or Assembly was another factor, which did not help both
the communities to come closer. Opposition or government, the League possessed no

395
effective role in the provincial body and before the passage of the Lahore Resolution
of 1940, it floated no specific programme which required the Muslim masses’ support
in the Punjab. The Pakistan idea was floated by the League which changed the
political panorama of the Punjab and hit the Sikh politics tremendously. The Pakistan
scheme was already in the air before 1940 and the Akalis passed an anti-Pakistan
resolution even before the Pakistan Resolution was presented on 23 March 1940. 5
Some Sikhs demanded a Sikh state while some opposed it however all the groups
resented the Pakistan scheme except the Communist Sikhs who by their ideology
accepted the right of self-determination for all the communities. However, they
floated no solid alternative plan to meet the stormy wave of the communalism.
Consequently, the Muslim Communists practically worked for Pakistan and the Sikh
and Hindu Communists favoured united India.
The failure of the 1942 Cripps Mission paved the way for the Sikandar-Baldev
Singh Pact and the Congress tilt towards the League. By signing this pact with the
Unionist Party, the Akalis lost the moral stand of being independent from external
influence. They were already in the Congress camp and by making this pact they
confessed the influence of the British and the government on the Sikh politics. They
had incessantly been propagating against the Unionist government in the name of
religion but secured nothing against the Muslim domination in the Punjab which was
the central point of the Akali manifesto. Instead, this pact made them a part of the
Muslim raj which was a practical politics. Master Tara Singh was aware of what he
had done therefore he continued a verbal war against the Unionist Muslims to avoid
any embarrassing situation by his own community. In November 1944, Durlab Singh
in a letter to Gandhi disclosed the Congress high command’s involvement in the
Sikandar-Baldev Pact. Gandhi replied that he knew nothing about the Congress’

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consent to this settlement. 6 This pact was a poor performance on the part of Sikhs
because they had been pursued and influenced by the British and the Unionists.
Before this pact, they could place such demands which could prove a milestone in the
Sikh history. But they seemed satisfied with the trivialities. Moreover, a wavering
stand in favour and against the Unionists’ was not a healthy sign as far as the
principled-leadership was concerned.
The Sikhs applied the same policy in the NWFP and got a ministry in the
coalition government with the League. The League-Akali coalition government in the
NWFP in 1943-44 was a big achievement for communal harmony. This patch-up
upset the Hindu and Sikh extremists. The Akali-League alliance was a revolutionary
step and a unique incident of the Muslim-Sikh history which could serve the
communities as a model for their future planning to achieve political harmony. It
could have been replicated in the Punjab as well but the Akali leadership proved too
weak against its internal forces and the Hindu pressure to continue this strategy.
Why British Wanted to Decide before Quitting?
The British had decided to quit India but after settling the communal issue,
which had been a central and pestering issue. Numerous reasons are quoted in this
regard particularly the ‘winning return’ from the Subcontinent. According to this, the
British wanted to project that they could still rule over the Subcontinent but they
themselves had decided to depart. They were not being forced by the external and
internal elements to leave the country rather the transfer of power was their own
decision and they had opted for an ‘honourable return.’ The communal tangle was one
of the major issues, which forced the British to stay in India. The Hindu majority in
India and the Muslim majority in the Punjab could enslave the minority community.

397
Therefore, considering it their moral duty, the British undertook to solve the
communal problem before leaving India. The British-Hindu problem was not a matter
of importance because after the British, the Hindus were supposed to be the ruling
community in India therefore, the real problem was the minority issue between the
Muslims and Hindus in India and then Muslims and the Sikhs in the Punjab.
The political tussle between the major parties created a culture of conflict
instead of dialogical rationale particularly in the Punjab. The Muslim-Sikh relations
could have been settled within a general atmosphere of cooperation. The British
provided several opportunities to the Indian leaders to arrive at some agreed
constitutional settlement but they failed to achieve this. In 1942, on the failure of the
Cripps Mission, Wavell remarked that the “failure was hardly surprising since Indian
leaders were not in agreement among themselves.” 7
In 1977, Lord Mountbatten repeated his assertion that the territorial
arrangements made under the Cabinet Mission Plan were better than the truncated
Pakistan. 8 But the difference between ‘independence’ and ‘servitude’ under a cruel
majority is quite obvious. The acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by the League
is a much debated incident. Some scholars view that by accepting the Plan, the
League had abandoned the Pakistan ideal. As a matter of fact, by accepting the Plan,
the League projected its reconciliatory character at the international level. It had also
narrowed down the Congress’ influence to a few departments and obtained integrity
of the Muslim areas that could lead ultimately to Pakistan. It is not right to deduce (as
many writers did) that the League had abandoned the ideal of Pakistan by accepting
this Plan, however, it does throw light on the prudence and sagacity of Jinnah as
leadership has to take different positions during the course of a struggle. Advancing at
some time and withdrawing at another may be a political strategy which depicts the

398
wisdom of a leader. Jinnah was one person who could correctly weigh the pros and
cons of accepting this plan and the later events proved the veracity of this contention.
Idea of Sikh State
The slogan Raj karey ga Khalsa 9 reveals that the enthusiasm created by Guru
Gobind Singh, the last Guru, was retained by the Akalis. It was their basic right to
struggle for the political power but it turned violent when they pledged ‘none would
survive’ (Aaki rahey na koe). The Sikh leadership was serious about a Sikh state but
they depended on other forces. The Sikh press in 1923 had demanded a Sikh state 10
even before Lala Lajpat Rai’s suggestion for partition in 1924. On 12 November 1931
in the RTC, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh suggested re-demarcation
of the Punjab “whereby they wanted Rawalpindi and Multan divisions minus Lyallpur
and Montgomery districts, to be separated from the rest of the Punjab.” 11 They
proposed that these Muslim majority areas be separated as a new province or
amalgamated with the NWFP. It was the first occasion when the Sikh leadership
formally revived the idea of getting rid of the Muslim domination and to have a Sikh
state. Amazingly, it was initiated by the pro-Unionist Sikhs 12 and later undertaken by
Master Tara Singh who handed over this partition plan to Gandhi who was to place
these demands as a Sikh representative in the RTC. This struggle continued but with a
weak argument and strategy.
Shahid Hamid 13 concludes in his book that the “Sikhs lacked political
wisdom.” 14 This perception was a continuity of the ideas of some high ranking
Britishers. 15 Nevertheless, it does not stand against the test of ground realities because
the Sikhs had crossed many hurdles wisely and had won a respectable status in the

399
society. Nevertheless, their leadership could not launch a well-worked strategy that
could result in an acceptable solution to their problems particularly the separate state.
The Akali leadership remained active to obtain Azad Punjab and suggested to
re-demarcate the Punjab boundaries. They suggested that the Muslim majority areas
adjacent to the NWFP should be merged into this province while the rest of the areas
should be declared as Azad Punjab with a balanced proportion of three communities.
This suggestion had a big flaw and was very risky. It could enslave them for ever in
the case of Hindu-Muslim unity. In case of Hindu-Muslim agreement, the Sikhs
would have to face an overwhelming majority instead of 51 per cent in the existing
arrangement. The Muslim-Hindu patch-up was likely to be reached at because both
the communities had direct interaction at the national level and in other provinces of
India. Therefore, the Azad Punjab scheme was not the best option to address the Sikh
grievances but the Akalis kept on pressing it during the period of the freedom
struggle.
Sensing their weak numerical position in all the districts, they raised their
voice for the Sikh state not on the basis of numerical strength but on the basis of their
political, military, financial, agricultural and religious importance. The demand was
not astonishing because it fitted in with the region’s historical traditions. According to
the empirical evidence, in many cases the prominent ruling communities in the
Subcontinent and the Punjab had never been in a majority in the areas under their
possession. The Muslims, Sikhs and the British had no majority to justify their rule if
population was the sole criterion. Furthermore, the Princely States in the Punjab were
a proof that creation of states was not a new phenomenon. The Sikhs too could have
their own state as the British addressed this question at the time of the Cripps Mission
and Cabinet Mission but due to the disagreement of the Sikh leaders, non-consultation

400
to the stakeholders i.e., the League and Congress and weak role of the Akali
leadership they could not secure it.
The Sikhs planned to impose the Sikh rule by occupying the Punjab by force
in the 1940s but the circumstances did not favour them to materialize their religio-
dynastic desire. The training, weapons and Hindu funds became useless for this plan
while all this proved useful in the massacre of the Muslims. Many think that the Sikh
demand for Sikhistan was presented to counterblast the Pakistan scheme but as a
matter of fact, they as a religious community never surrendered their right to rule over
the Punjab throughout the British rule. They were serious in their attempt to establish
a Sikh state. Mountbatten Papers also testify that the Maharaja of Patiala and other
Sikhs had planned to attack and occupying Lahore, Montgomery and Lyallpur. 16 They
had collected weapons from NWFP and Tribal Areas and trained their community to
wage a war after the British departure to capture the whole of Punjab. They were also
sure of their success because they had the assurance of the Hindus and the Sikh states
to back them up in this onslaught against the Muslims. But the earlier events like the
Rawalpindi incidents pushed them to a defensive position and busied them in the
migration issues and the revenge.
Ousting the League in 1946
K. C. Yadav opines that results of the elections 1946 paved the way for the
partition. 17 The analysis of Yadav is partly acceptable because the League tried a lot
to win over the Sikhs in the making of the ministry. The election results had amply
cleared the future political scene of the Punjab. Observing the true picture of the
political scenario, the Sikhs should have realized that their next partner in the
Assembly would be the League and not the Unionist Party. According to democratic

401
principles, a political party should be ready to survive with other political parties but
the Sikhs refused to accept the League’s mandate and challenged that they would
never let the single largest party enjoy the right to make the government. The Sikhs
could not understand the wind of change. It was the most unjust political decision
when 10 Unionist Muslim members were in the government whereas 78 League
members had been pushed to the opposition benches. 18 The Muslim masses construed
the anti-League coalition in the Punjab as a conspiracy against the Muslims as a
whole which increased the sympathy for the League.
The anti-League forces’ strategy to oust the majority party from the power was
not a good move and it could produce dangerous results. By the democratic norms,
the results endowed the top office to the majority party which should have gone to the
League but this right was denied. The next majority party was the Congress and then
the Akalis but the minority party, the Unionist was crowned in the Punjab which set in
a wrong political tradition in the regional history. It was also a continuity of the
tradition that a non-Muslim could never become Premier of the Punjab. The new
arrangements also showed the political rapacity of Tiwana, the Sikhs and Congress
leadership and it exposed the anti-League forces which intended to knock it down at
any cost. The partition of the Punjab and killing could have been averted if anyone of
the political actors had not become a part of the conspiracy against the League after
the elections of 1946 because by forming ministry with the League, a communal
patch-up in the Punjab was possible which might have delayed the separatist
movements.
The Unionist government was a weak coalition of the Congressmen, Unionists
and Sikhs which could not survive for a long time. A coalition government could be
formed if the parties belonged to the same nation or religion. Contrary to this, the

402
political parties in the Unionist cabinets had been the Akalis, Congressite and non-
Congressite Hindus. All the parties had different religious affiliations and political
agenda for their respective communities or groups. All these communities were
opponents of each other religiously and ideologically and had been rivals in the past.
A coalition government based on such problematic elements could not be stable and
ultimately had to collapse. Harold Laski is of the view that coalition governments are
always weak in the democratic system. A majority party can form an effective
government which is durable and in a position to use immense power as an assertive
democratic government. 19 Another writer Maurice Duverger opines in his book
Political Parties (1951) that “Multipartism weakens the government in a
parliamentary regime…A programme of government action is therefore possible only
for a very short period, for limited objectives, and very lukewarm measures…” 20 Hans
Daalder expresses the same conclusion that coalition government can’t be stable and
assertive. 21 Therefore, the arrangement under the Unionist Party was a makeshift
arrangement which could never survive against a popular movement.
British Injustices with the Punjab
In 1860, Lord Canning formulated a policy to protect the rights of the landed
aristocracy 22 whereas all the factions of the Punjab should have been treated alike
without discrimination by the British. But they introduced numerous reforms which
resulted in the political tussle between Muslim and Sikh communities. They did not
treat the Punjab generously. They introduced such administrative and political
reforms which generated non-constructive traditions and negative psychological
impact on different social classes. For instance, they did not allocate agricultural land
to the manual class (the Kamis) in the Canal colony districts which not only left them

403
behind the other classes but also put them into the agony of a lower social status. The
farming was not such a technical work which they could not do. They could be
absorbed permanently in the mainstream of the society and the British could do that
which was otherwise not possible in the existing social set-up. They had eliminated
many other social vices such as infanticide and sati from the region and they could
compensate the low classes by allotting them agricultural land. But unluckily they
continued humiliating the low castes and disallowed them to join the army, police and
other specific government institutions.
The British took decades in conferring the right of legislation upon the Punjab
Council as compared to Bombay and Madras. 23 They did not separate judiciary from
the administration which continued after 1947 and the Deputy Commissioner enjoyed
judicial, financial and administrative powers. Another tradition which proved anti-
democratic norm was the induction of the military officers into the civil
administration. The British at the outset of the rule in the Punjab deployed numerous
military officers along with the civil bureaucracy which increased the military
influence in the civil and political domains. The ICS officers were appointed judges in
the highest court of the province.
The franchise was very limited which might be justified due to illiteracy but
on what grounds the other institutions were blocked to work independently if the best
career officers were available to run the affairs? The British who were the pioneers
and originators of such institutions introduced inappropriate policies which generated
very poor traditions (the region is still paying a heavy toll for it). Another affecting
tradition was the limited voting right. After annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the first
general elections were held in 1936-37 which means that after 88 years the British
government gave an opportunity to the provincial leaders to go to the people for the

404
political mandate. Unluckily, the franchise was so limited that it seems preposterous
to call this event ‘general elections’ of 1936-37 as only 3 per cent of the total
population of the Punjab was entitled to cast their vote. It was extended in the
elections of 1946 from 3 to 12 per cent only. 24 The next British measure pernicious to
the future of the Punjab was the support to the Unionist Party (by the British
Governor) which was composed of the feudal aristocracy. They utilized all the
institutions and resources to rejuvenate the Unionist influence. All such measures
resulted in an unbearable loss to the Punjab which the region is still suffering.
The ruling Unionists in the Punjab did not try to ascertain the root cause of the
Muslim-Sikh trouble. Religion was the deep-seated factor impeding the Muslim-Sikh
understanding therefore it should have been addressed properly on sound grounds but
the British and the Unionists were not keen to address this question. They secured the
Sikh cooperation in the Assembly with the pledge that religion would not be touched
in the discussion. Such makeshift arrangements and avoidance of the inevitabilities
could not provide solid base for good Muslim-Sikh relations in the future. All along
the Sikh leadership had been crying against the Muslim domination but the Unionists
paid little heed to such religious and political grievances. The Sikhs could have been
convinced that in any case the Sikhs would have to be under the domination of the
majority community even if their demand for the Azad Punjab or Sikh state had been
met. The Sikhs’ numerical, sub-national position and the traditional social bonds
could widely be projected and presented with well-worked arguments to take them
into confidence. A constant persuasion might have convinced them to ponder over the
prevalent grave situation. The services of the traditional groups in the Muslim and
Sikh communities could be utilized but unluckily it was not done.

Punjab under Central Command
405
The provincial politics remained usually under the central command, which
did not let the regional leadership decide the regional affairs independently. Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, kept all the developments relating to the
Punjab politics under his own control. When Dr. Gopi Chand tried to work out a
compromise between the Congress and the SAD under the direction of Sardar Patel,
Azad insisted that no conciliation should be concluded without his permission. 25 An
assertive command of the League and the Congress over the Punjabi leadership
remained a prominent and permanent feature of the political history. The central
command obstructed the Punjabi command in resolving the dispute of their own
accord. The same was reported to Lord Mountbatten that the central commands did
not allow the provincial leaders to decide freely about the provincial matters. 26
Zafarullah Khan was of the same opinion that Nawab Mamdot unable to be assertive
in the Punjab affairs, mostly depended on his advisors and central leadership. 27 It
seems a permanent feature that the Punjabi politicians never took a defiant or an
independent course and played a subservient role in the politics.
The political developments at national level always affected the regional set-
up because the provincial actors were subordinate to the centre under the existing
system. Despite the vast powers, the provincial Governor could only draft proposals
derived from the parties’ standpoints but the real decision-making power was vested
in the hands of the Viceroy. Under such arrangements, the provincial authority was
playing a role of an enforcing agency of the decisions made by the centre. The
political parties at provincial and national levels possessed the same character. The
Punjabi leadership of the regional parties was supposed to follow what the central
commands had decided. Furthermore, the provincial parties like the Unionist or Akali

406
Dal were most of the time restricted to the Governor while the League and the
Congress had direct contact with the decision-making authority, the Viceroy. This
privileged position of the central leadership placed the provincial parties at a
subordinate position, which blocked them to be assertive in the outstanding issues of
the region. In the freedom movement, the provincial political and governmental actors
were consulted for their stand, position and opinion. These consultations were
conveyed to the Viceroy because the decision was to be made by the central
authorities. The Sikh leadership could not comprehend this simple situation. They
continuously pursued the Punjab Governor to secure his sympathy.
The political history of the Punjab witnesses that the region underwent a
leadership crisis throughout the British history. It could not produce leadership of the
national level. The Punjabi leaders were confined to their personal gains and never
looked beyond the Punjab boundaries. The Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities of
this area had the same disadvantage. In August 1944, Giani Kartar Singh called the
Sikhs as ‘beggars’ and explained that beggars could not be choosers. Interestingly, the
man appointed as the Governor of the Punjab at the crucial stage was also a person of
regional calibre. Evan Jenkins tried to work in the Punjab even-handedly 28 but as a
matter of fact he too possessed and lacked the same qualities which the Punjabi
leadership did. As a matter of policy, the Viceroy needed a good coordinating man
and quick in reporting about the on-goings in the Punjab, 29 which Jenkins performed
very efficiently. But the Punjab needed a courageous and innovative administrative
leadership which could maintain law and order without any fear. The British
government had coped with the deteriorating situation of the Punjab in the past by
arresting the Punjabi leaders on the anti-government or anti-war speeches 30 but at this
critical juncture the administration was ignoring all the ravings and threats of the Sikh

407
leaders even in the Governor’s office. The Unionists experienced the same fiasco. The
top Unionist leadership was too confused to find any way out to maintain their
influence. In 1943, Chhotu Ram tried to unite the Jats and Rajputs which indicates
that he was not finding any way-out to counter the League. Despite his sincere efforts,
he could not dominate the new trends of the Punjab politics. Jenkins was keen to
establish the Governor rule in the province and for this he opposed the Sikh-League
alliance for the Punjab ministry, 31 which was the only solution to end the political
deadlock.
Jenkins was a good career officer but his role as a Governor is much criticized.
The British at the end of the World War II were not in a position to deploy the British
troops in the troubled areas. To Robin Jeffrey, the Indian Army in 1947 did not
possess high morale and efficiency. 32 Although Lord Mountbatten had assured the
parties that no disturbance could occur in his presence. He projected himself as a
soldier and promised to use the army and tanks against the slightest trouble 33 but all
assurances proved false. The Punjab was under the most formidable terrorism as
according to Tanwar the insurance company refused to register any policy from 5
March 1947 onwards. 34 The strategy to focus on the transfer of power to the locals as
soon as possible affected the performance of the Governor and other administrative
machinery. Under such pressures, he did not take stern action against the violent
speeches and activities of the Sikhs. He confined his role just to send reports to the
Viceroy about the expected violence by the Sikhs and meetings with the leaders. He
demonstrated nothing impressive as a good administrator at the time when the Punjab
desperately needed some bold measures. He did not try to implement the existing laws
strictly which could bridle the violent groups. He talked much of the punishment and
arrests of the culprits responsible for the communal disturbances but practically did

408
nothing. He shared with Nehru that he intended to hang the persons involved in the
cases of dacoity, rape, kidnapping, arson, etc., 35 but practically he did not dare to
arrest the Sikh leaders and presented lame excuses to the Viceroy in this regard. He
wrote that the Sikh arrests might displease Jinnah and provoke the Sikh masses which
could go uncontrolled. It is amazing that the Governor was not treating all the
political segments equally as an impartial observer and administrator. For instance, if
the Sikh masses could react furiously on the Sikh arrests, the reaction by the Muslims
on the arrests of March 1947 (direct action) and during the agitation should have been
taken in the same perspective. But Jenkins was treating the Sikhs with deep sympathy
though this favouritism could yield nothing to them.
Master Tara Singh was expected to demonstrate a high level of political
acumen to face the competent and constitutionalist leadership of the League to secure
the best interests of his community. According to Stephen R. Covey, a leader ought to
possess some specific characteristics such as Self-Recognition, Destination and
Response-Ability, 36 which the Akali leadership lacked. He adopted a very weak
strategy to deal with every political and communal crisis. According to the
Intelligence reports, the top Sikh leadership was involved in smuggling of weapons
from the NWFP and fund-collection from the Hindus. On the other hand, he himself
issued a written statement in favour of Jinnah when a newspaper accused Jinnah of
accepting money from the British. 37 Leadership of the landed aristocracy was mainly
of conservative style, loyalist and satisfied with what status they had in the British
Punjab. Master Tara Singh belonged to the middle class while a big faction of the
Akalis belonged to the castes of a humble background. Only the religious importance
and the Gurdwara funds could boost the Akali status in the society. To meet such
ends, the Akalis did not spare even the Sikh landed aristocracy who had played a key

409
role in the progress of the Sikh community. They were engaged to defame eminent
families. By this, they lost support of a benign and kind faction of the community.
Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sunder Singh Majithia were humiliated by the Akalis.
On the other hand, the rival leadership, Jinnah of the League possessed a
stable economic and educational position. He always maintained relationship with
most of the Indian Muslim leadership irrespective of their political affiliation. He had
no inferiority complex against influential families. He never seemed submissive and
apologetic in front of any leader of any community. Contrary to the Akali policy, he
gave full respect to the landed aristocratic Muslim families and tried to secure their
support. He had no fear that his leadership might be jeopardized in the presence of
traditional leaders. He, with his political vision, tried to seek their support within strict
party discipline. Jinnah set his goal in the perspective of ground realities and then
never compromised on it while the Akalis betrayed their own philosophy and
manifesto throughout the British raj. For example, the Akalis were anti-League and
never showed a soft corner for them but in the very critical phase of the freedom
struggle they compromised and accepted working in the coalition government with
the League in the NWFP. Previously, they had concluded a pact with the Unionist
Muslims while they considered the Muslims as the assassins of their Gurus.
Rajagopalachari offered the League to have a Muslim Prime Minister in India but this
and other temptations could not move Jinnah away from the real point of struggle for
his community. It also reveals that Jinnah was not a power-seeker but a liberator of
the Muslim nation. He was gifted with sagacity, farsightedness and conviction who
believed in constitutional ways to table his demands and action to force the rival
political forces to come to terms. He did not like to approach the rivals with folded
hands but put his contention forward with sound arguments in a bold and honourable

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way while the Sikh leadership adopted submissive strategy in political parleys. Master
Tara Singh himself admitted in his book that the Muslims won Pakistan not with the
kindness of the Hindus but with the power and conviction. 38 He further depicts the
helplessness of the Sikh leadership that they “always went with folded hands to
Gandhiji.” 39 Jinnah was a pacifist while the Sikh leadership believed in violent actions
to meet their political ends. On deteriorating condition of the communal peace, he
suggested to the Punjab Governor to shoot the troublemaker at the spot to maintain
communal peace. On the other hand, the top Sikh leadership was involved in
smuggling of arms and openly advocating violence against the Muslims. One of the
evidences is that a “Minister of the Punjab government admitted in 1979 that he had
killed a Muslim during the partition riots.” 40
Though the Congress failed in its objectives, nevertheless it should be
acknowledged that it had a well-worked policy in the Subcontinent. It had catered
from every strata of the Hindu life. Gandhi covered spiritual and religious area, Nehru
politics, Hindu Mahasabha intimidating politics, Madan Mohan Malviya was among
the donors, Achari in charge of intrigues and so on. A group of the Hindus was
performing a placating role. An effective group was working for the Congress in the
bureaucracy and other government circles while it had very strong lobby in the Sikhs
as well. In fact, the Congress always tried to bring the League in its fold by political
temptations but could not succeed. Sardar Kapur Singh indicates towards such an
event and writes that in 1942, Giani Sher Singh met him in Lahore and told that
during the Lucknow Conference which he attended as a Sikh representative, Pandit
Madan Mohan Malviya privately informed him that the Sikhs should not be worried
regarding the Congress’ tilt towards the Muslims; once the British departed from
India, they would see how they dealt with the Muslims. 41 The Congress could not

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succeed in its tricky politics in the case of the League while the Sikh leadership
blindly followed the Congress. Therefore, the leadership was the main difference
between Muslims and Sikhs in handling the political intricacies.
Master Tara Singh played a very weak role during this critical phase. His
confused ideas and strategy damaged the Sikh community. He lacked political vision
and at different times seemed to be a secessionist, integrationist, violent strategist,
pacifist, nationalist and communalist. Although, he remained involved in the politics
but in the critical days mainly the Jat leaders were put to the forefront while Giani
Kartar, another Jat, remained busy mainly in discussions with the Governor. Sardar
Baldev Singh had never been a great politician as Giani Kartar had challenged his
decisions in 1947 while Sardar Swaran Singh was just 30 when he entered the Punjab
Legislative Assembly after the elections of 1937. It was the second occasion in the
Sikh history when Jat leaders got a decision-making position in the Sikh affairs. The
caliber of the Sikh leadership may be observed in the light of Sangat Singh’s analysis
who writes that the Sikh leadership did not match that of the Congress. Master Tara
Singh was a simple graduate 42 with a confused policy towards the Congress and
British. He followed the myth that Sikhism was there to protect Hinduism. Giani
Kartar who was said to be the brain of the Akali party was less educated while
Harnam Singh was a lawyer of a municipal committee level and “a Congress-pet.” 43
Baldev Singh was prominent only due to his wealth and financial support to the Akali
Dal. All of them had little know-how about the manipulations of the national and
international politics. 44 He was elected unopposed in 1937 but never spoke up in any
session of the Assembly. 45 After the partition, Baldev Singh sought pardon for his

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numerous follies which suffocated the possibility of a Sikh state and enslaved the
Sikhs to the Hindus forever. 46
Master Tara Singh believed that the Sikhs could achieve by fighting what they
would lose through discussion. The Sikhs faced numerous shocks due to the
leadership-crisis. The whole of leadership was a hostage of the Congress, as Narayan
Kumar writes that the British did their utmost endeavor to convince the Sikhs through
attractive proposals to side with Pakistan but the Akali leaders were “cajoled and
coaxed by Nehru.” They continued believing that the Congress leadership would
avoid partition of India. 47 Later on Master Tara Singh expressed that if he had known
about the examples of Palestine or others he would have demanded something alike:
The reason for our not pressing the demand for a Sikh State was our ignorance of history
and world politics. None of us had known that a community can have a state of its own in
spite of its being a minority in that area. Jewish State ‘Israel’ is one such example. I came
to know about it in 1949 when I was in Almora prison. 48
In response to a question by press in July 1945 on the minority position of the Sikhs
in the central districts, Master Tara Singh replied that “he was basing his demand on
the analogy of Palestine, which had been declared a Jewish National Home even
though the Jews formed only ten per cent of the population.” 49 He also admitted that
he was told that Pravda (Russian Newspaper) had indicated towards this injustice to
the Sikhs. 50 It is noteworthy that Sangat Singh himself writes in his book on page 223
that Master Tara Singh had quoted the example of Israel in pursuance of the Sikh
State but in the same book on page 241 51 he quotes the Sikh ignorance of the
international knowledge with references to Jaswant Singh and Gurmit Singh. Master
Tara Singh had quoted these examples in the conferences while Cripps had hinted
towards the Soviet Model but even then the Akali leader himself presented a lame
excuse in 1949 falsifying the historical facts.

Sikhs and Jinnah
413
The Sikhs maintained the myth that the Muslims were their real enemies
whom the League in particular was representing. But they could quote nothing wrong
committed by Jinnah in the past. Yet they were behaving as if Jinnah and all the
Leaguers were extremists and staunch followers of Emperor Aurangzeb. If the slogan
of Islam by the League was a cause of their repugnance, then they should have been
equally conscious against the Unionist Muslims who were raising the same slogans in
the elections of 1946. Most of the writers believe that Jinnah endeavoured his most to
win over the Sikhs by floating very reasonable offers. However, many Sikh writers
opine that Jinnah’s refusal to concede the right to secede from Pakistan proved major
deadlock between the two parties and this convinced the leadership not to trust Jinnah.
Jinnah’s refusal showed his moral integrity and fair play in the politics. He could have
promised the Sikhs and betrayed them later on because once they were roped in, they
could do nothing. But he was a person who could not make false promises.
Furthermore, no writer can present empirical evidence where Sikhs were given word
by Jinnah and not fulfilled. Contrary to this, the Sikhs were being betrayed time and
again by the Congress by not honouring the Ravi pledge of 1929 but they remained
with the Congress.
So biased are the writers that Hukam Singh quotes Zafarnama in the case of
the League but totally ignores entirely the insulting comments about the Gurus and
Granth Sahib by the Arya Samajists. Even Gandhi never accepted Sikhism as a
separate religion and Sikhs as a nation and peaceful community. Still they harboured
no malice against them. The Congress leadership continued ignoring the Sikhs but the

414
Sikhs continued following them blindly. In 1947 Nehru rejected the concessions
requested by the Sikhs through Lord Mountbatten while Jinnah was ready to accept
every demand except the right of secession.
The request for Sikh demands by Lord Mountbatten and their rejection by
Nehru clarifies that the divide and rule theory was not applied to this situation. Lord
Mountbatten tried to influence the Congress leadership for special concessions for the
Sikhs including weightage and separate electorates in India. Nehru turned all this
down on the plea that the Indian communities would have equal status in future
because they had suffered a lot by conceding separate electorates to the Muslims in
the past and they did not want to repeat this example. Surprisingly, the Congressite
leader did not attribute this letter written by an ‘imperialist’ to the British policy of
Divide and Rule. The Congress’ request to Lord Mountbatten and other British
officers to continue their duty in India 52 testifies that the British were not enemies of
the Congress. Through this request, the Congress leadership had accepted their
authority as sincere masters in British India otherwise no one could tolerate an enemy
for a single moment in the motherland which had been freed by sacrificing life and
material. This step reduced the stature of the Congress as an anti-British party. The
stay of Lord Mountbatten in India after the partition ensured the British prestige at the
international level and their claim about fair-play and honest governance in the
Subcontinent as its ‘worst enemy’ trusted and requested Lord Mountbatten to remain
in India as the Governor-General in August 1947. It indicated that the British ruled
over India in a friendly way and existed in an honourable way by their choice. On the
other hand, Jinnah was declared the first Governor-General of Pakistan which
“considerably upset the Hindu and Sikh press.” 53

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On 11 August 1947, Jinnah announced what he had been assuring the Sikhs
and Hindus about the minority rights since 1940. He said that all the minorities would
have a complete religious freedom in Pakistan. This was the state policy or vision of
the emerging Muslim state. Some writers object that it was a reversal of the Two-
Nation theory but actually he was setting basic principles to address the fears of the
minorities existing in Pakistan after the independence. This revolutionary speech
outlined the future vision pertaining to the status of the minorities. Every movement
emerges in specific circumstances but remodels it according to the changed situation.
A movement may be confined to a specific objective in the beginning but the success
opens up new avenues. It is modified according to the new challenges which may
vary from the initial objectives. Jinnah gave a clear state policy regarding the
minorities to the new government. There was a great difference between the situation
prior to 14 August 1947 and after. Before 14 August, the Muslims were being ruled
while after 14 August they were going to be a ruling nation. The new proportion of
the population, area, political parties and changed status of the communities required
an entirely new constitutional, administrative, political, economic and social set-up.
The domain of the Muslim-Sikh relationship required a new policy and re-
consideration in the perspective of the new conditions. Therefore, the new
arrangements and change in the League policy according to the circumstances were
imperative to absorb the minorities in the mainstream of the national flow. The
Congress also acted similarly and when in 1954 Master Tara Singh reminded Nehru
of his pledge the latter replied that he had to see the scenario in the perspective of the
changed circumstances. 54
The administrative authorities seemed helpless in curbing violent activities in
the Punjab. Wherever the British interests were involved the authorities took stern

416
action, even against the anti-British speeches but no action was taken in the area of
the communal violence. During the 2 nd half of December 1940, the provincial
authorities registered 28 cases against the political leaders under the Defence of India
Act 55 but they did not show the same efficiency against the leaders who had been
incessantly promoting communal violence. The policy of expediency was
encouraging hooliganism in the region which was pushing the Punjab gradually into
chaos and disaster. It was a legal and moral duty of the authorities to check the
leaders who were causing a serious blow to the law and order situation but they
seemed to be a victim of expediency throughout the period under-study. They were
losing the administrative grip over the militants in the Punjab. The Akali Sena, Hindu
Mahasabha, and other militant offshoots were advising their communities for action
against the Muslims in the name of protection. Even Gurdwaras, the sacred places,
were involved in imparting military training in the name of self-defence. It also shows
that the people had lost confidence in the provincial law-enforcement agencies. These
activities present a somber picture of the law and order, which further paved the way
for violent activities. The historical realities of communalism did not allow the union
of all the communities living in Punjab as a single political unit. In the wake of the
Pakistan scheme and the hostile behaviour of the Sikhs extended to the Muslims in
general and the Leaguers in particular, all the chances of reconciliation vanished. It
was a grave reality that both the communities were getting to the point where they
could not share the same territory. The Sikhs stood for their own homeland on the
basis of being a separate nation but they did not fulfill the political definition of a
nation. To Yadav, if the Muslims had no majority in the northwest, “then the demand
for separate Pakistan would not have been raised at all.” 56 Therefore, the Sikhs lacked
what the Muslims had in demanding a sovereign state.

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The Sikh massacre took place in the north-western parts of the Punjab such as
Hazara and Rawalpindi. The killing in the Pothohar region as Ishtiaq Ahmad writes,
was a fresh wound in the late 1940s which made the Muslim-Sikh settlement
impossible in the Punjab. 57 Master Tara Singh who became Sikh at the age of 14
declared the Muslim massacre because of his mother’s killing in his village of
Rawalpindi district. 58 The Pothohar region remained sensitive in the area of
communal problem. Even before the Pakistan Resolution was concluded, this region
had continually been experiencing communal clashes on the traditional conflicting
issues. The killing of the Sikhs and Hindus in these areas finally convinced the Sikhs
that they could not survive in the Muslim state.
Territorial Decisions
Many historians are of the view that the partitioning decisions relating to the
Punjab boundaries were the working and analysis of Sir Radcliffe. 59 Much has been
talked of Radcliffe’s plan to fly over the boundary line in the Punjab, the map in
Ismay’s office and Jinnah’s grievances about the boundary line between the two
Punjabs. Soon after his arrival, which ‘line’ Sir Radcliffe wanted to visit? 60 It creates
doubt and convinces that Radcliffe had a dictated version of the partition plan with the
consent of Lord Mountbatten. 61 On the other hand, when the historians write that
changes in the Punjab boundaries were made ‘at the last moment’ by Lord
Mountbatten as Justice Din Muhammad tells, 62 it contradicts the previous stand
because by this, the historians will have to accept that Sir Radcliffe had done justice
regarding the boundaries but it was Mountbatten who played an unfair role and
concluded pro-Indian changes in the Award. In any case, it is an agreed point that the
decision on the Punjab boundaries was not a just decision. The question arises, who is

418
responsible for the unfair distribution of the areas? Radcliffe, Mountbatten, or both?
What induced the actors to do this? Some are of the opinion that Mountbatten did all
in return to the Congress’ offer for the Indian Governor-Generalship and punished
Jinnah who did not surrender the same office for him as Sardar Hukam Singh writes
that Jinnah befooled Lord Mountbatten on the idea of a joint Governor-Generalship of
India and Pakistan and lost the areas of Gurdaspur and Ferozepore “which were sure
to be included in Pakistan.” 63 Ch. Zafarullah wrote that Mountbatten secured the
future British interests through an agreement with the Congress and did injustice to
Pakistan. 64 If, for the time being, it is accepted that Mountbatten became reactionary
on the loss of the prestigious office, what was there to induce Radcliffe? The study
has concluded, there was nothing to induce him. In fact, the initial gestures and later
working of Radcliffe made his position doubtful. Concluding, the Viceregal office
might have some secret part to play regarding the Punjab boundaries not only because
of the Congress’ offer and punishing Jinnah only but, also for some other reasons.
The process adopted for the working of the Boundary Commission was not
sound. It seems that the stakeholders were in a hurry in getting rid of the agonizing
job of the partition. The recommendations by the Judges to Radcliffe at Simla
depicted their respective communitarian standpoints. All the Judges placed the
judgments on the communal lines and none of them gave any importance to the
contention of the rival community. Therefore, Radcliffe after the traditional
disagreement on the recommendations by the communitarian representatives got an
opportunity to assert his own understanding what he had conceived from the record
provided by the Viceroy. The contradictory points of the local Judges enabled the
British to do according to their own policy. Radcliffe was not an independent
conciliator but he had to follow the records and direction given by the British

419
government and its representatives in India. Therefore, neither Radcliffe nor
Mountbatten made any addition or change in the Award rather the boundary decision
was a redrafting of the British workout of February 1946, which they had done as a
last resort (contingency plan) before sending the Cabinet Delegation to India.
According to the suggestion of the Viceroy, in case of insistence for Pakistan, the
Muslims had to be given their majority areas minus Gurdaspur and Amritsar (See
APPENDIX-6).
The British always endeavoured to compensate the Sikhs who had been a
tenacious and reliable support for the British. The Cripps Mission and Cabinet
Delegation provided them opportunity to present their demands, but they remained
busy in trivialities and could not forward a workable demand. Scattered population,
weak leadership and internal disunity of the Sikhs undermined their hopes. The
British response was to try to convince them that the better option for them was to
join Pakistan with undivided Punjab. When they failed to do this and the Sikhs sided
with the Hindus, they tried to compensate them by giving maximum areas which
could be justified later, on logical grounds. Therefore, it seems that the British had left
only two options for Radcliffe to follow:
1. If there was an understanding between the Muslims and Sikhs on the territorial
adjustments, the British would be satisfied because not only the Sikhs but all
the communities would have come to an agreement.
2. In case of disagreement, which was quite likely to happen, the British would
implement their own worked out plan.
After failing to convince the Sikhs to join Pakistan, the British implemented their own
plan worked out by the British Cabinet in February 1946. Radcliffe revised the same
draft and submitted it as Award in August 1947. One can find no remarkable
difference between their draft of 7 February 1946 by Wavell 65 and the Boundary

420
Commission Award. Mountbatten and Radcliffe were projected as leading actors at
the scene and all the unjust decisions regarding the Punjab boundaries were attributed
to them but the fact is that these decisions were a part of the British policy to
compensate the Sikh community whether it was acceptable to them or not. The British
knew that they could not give to the Sikhs what they had been claiming. Even then,
they were determined to do what they could for them. Ignoring the principle of the
notional boundary, they awarded the Muslim majority areas to the Sikhs.
The League leadership prior to the first general elections in the Punjab did not
exert pressure to bring the Sikhs into the League fold. Jinnah never opposed the Sikh
interests rather he supported the Sikh struggle for the Gurdwara reforms. Mostly
engaged in the all India politics, he could not address the Sikhs properly as the
Congress did. The Congress leadership from bottom to top was constantly cooperating
with the Sikhs and had succeeded in creating an effective group within the Sikh
community. The Congress had an edge over the League by having the same parental
stock and social norms and practices. Except the concept of oneness of God, a Sikh
was a Hindu in other practices. Cow had no sacred place in the Sikh religion but the
followers of Sikhism showed more fervour than the Hindus in the cow-protection.
Patwant Singh writes:
Sikhs did not see Hindus as an alien people, but a people from whom they had sprung,
to whom they had married their sons and daughters, with whom they had shared their
agonies and ecstasies, whose friendship had been a part of their experience of growing
up, as it had been for generations before them. 66
There was a difference between League-Sikh and Congress-Sikh relations. The
League had to make efforts to bring the Sikhs to their side but contrarily they were
under the influence of the Congress and Hindus could attract them without any
exertion. The League was to detach them from the Hindu religion and culture by

421
erasing the bitterness inflicted by the Mughal rulers. A very long process was required
to win over the Sikhs.
Issue of Guarantee
The Sikh question had become too complex to be solved by the local leaders.
The United Nations had emerged in 1945 but the Indian communities particularly the
Sikhs did not show any intention to approach the newly created international
institution and involve this agency for the surety or guarantee on any agreement. The
British intended to involve the United Nations to settle the complex issue of the
territorial demarcation but Nehru rejected the idea. He feared unnecessary delay in the
partition due to the procedural complexities. 67 In 1973, Sardar Hukam Singh wrote
that the United Nations could not have solved the Sikh problems in Pakistan because
it could not help many countries in crisis such as, Egypt, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. He further wrote:
…the representatives of various countries, talk, talk and go on talking tirelessly without
achieving anything concrete, as the attitudes are shaped and talking prompted only by
self-interest and never by merits of the issue involved. 68
The Akali leadership neither believed in the British nor the League. Nevertheless,
they were supposed to have trust in someone and in fact they ultimately decided in
favour of the Congress. They should have pondered over the concessions being
presented to them by the League. The UN at that time was not perceived as
ineffective as quoted by Hukam Singh in 1970s. The interference of the UN in the
Sikh question was to guarantee the Sikh rights but their leadership did not call for
such international agency. It is still not sure whether the UN could have done

422
anything about it but similarities could have been found in other parts of the world to
solve the Sikh problems.
Sikh Option: Pakistan, India or Khalistan?
The Sikhs opted for India in 1947 for many reasons. They had religious and
social compatibility with the Hindus while the Muslims were considered as the killers
of their Gurus. India was a huge country as compared to Pakistan wherein they might
have better economic opportunities. Their religious heritage like Gurdwara Rakab
Ganj and Sisganj were in Delhi. The Sikh community was scattered from Delhi to
Rajasthan and other parts of India and by joining Pakistan they could be deprived of
all these religious places and the co-religionists while they were sure to have Nankana
Sahib and Lahore included in the East Punjab. Moreover, they were running their
business in the Indian cities; like Baldev Singh’s business was concentrated at Delhi.
The Sikhs had commercial activities in many big cities of India. Besides, the
overwhelming Muslim majority in Pakistan would have proved dangerous under the
communitarian influence and many of them could convert to Islam as a big number of
the Sikh Jats had already converted from Sikhism to Islam in the past. 69 The Congress
leadership had been in contact with them throughout the history. Nehru’s mother
Swarup Rani was a Punjabi and Sikhs had regards for her. 70 The Sikhs were naturally
under their influence. The League had no working relationship with the Sikhs and
Jinnah alone could do nothing because he was terribly busy in the all-Indian affairs.
The lack of the Muslim-Sikh interaction and very strong relationship of the Congress
with the Sikhs played a vital role in the Sikh decision. For the above reasons, they left
approximately two hundred sacred places in Pakistan 71 related to their Gurus, ruling
elites and other celebrities.

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No decision could serve the Sikhs as the best model due to the specific
circumstances such as the scattered population, sacred places, business and
agricultural lands along with negligible human strength. The Sikhs by opting for
Pakistan could lose the majority area of the east Punjab 72 and sacred places, business
and religious fellows of the Indian areas. By joining India, they were relatively safe as
the ancestral stock of the Hindus and Sikhs was similar and both had no bitterness on
the social issues. But by this decision, they had to surrender several sacred places,
cities and agricultural lands in Pakistan. They had to live under a big majority of the
Hindus whose extremist elements were an incessant danger for their independent
existence. The Azad Punjab and Sikh-Hindu Province were also not a good
alternative.
Despite these positive and negative facts, Sikhs had three options before them
on the eve of the partition, Pakistan, India or Khalistan. The Akali leadership was
confused as to which option was the best. The Sikh decision of joining Pakistan
would have been the second best option while the best option was the creation of
Khalistan or Sikhistan. They could have migration of the population to integrate their
strength on any modality. They could survive honourably as a separate political entity
by merging the other Sikh Princely States. Khalistan was expected to have fertile
lands, forests and rivers which could force the neighbouring countries to have
favourable treaties with it. But all this was possible with the consent of the
stakeholders because this could enable them to have free movement to their sacred
places along with an open access to the markets in India and Pakistan. Therefore, the
Akali leadership was required to have a political understanding with the League and
other parties as an independent party. The Sikh state was possible if the Sikh
leadership had played the communal role in the politics with one voice from the

424
beginning, away from the Congress and Hinduised agenda. They should not have
demanded anything on the numerical basis but on the principle of ‘other factors’
which they adopted very late and for the specific purpose. Their earlier demands had
been on historical basis but they had been demanding the communal privileges as the
Indian nationalists which damaged their cause severely.
Communal Clashes
The Punjab bore severe and ferocious blows in the name of communalism.
The non-Muslims tried to hold the League responsible for provoking communal riots
but as a matter of fact the Muslims particularly the Leaguers had to suffer a lot at the
hands of the non-Muslim extremists. The Muslim National Guards are blamed for a
lot of killing without ascertaining the reality. For example, Gurbachan Singh Talib
writes that the Muslim National Guards did not accept their link with the League but
they were a secret military wing of the League. They recruited males and females
secretly and trained them how to use lathi, knife and spear. 73 The assertion that the
National Guards was a secret military wing of the League is very strange. How could
it be a secret when its flag was similar to the League’s, its leaders were the League
members and the ban on the Guards was defied and rejected by the League which
resulted in major happenings in the province? Interestingly, all such similarities have
been pointed out by the same writer in the same book. The writer quoted no evidence
that any group of the League leaders was there behind these training activities.
Furthermore, no one can prove that the Muslim women were allowed by their
males to go outside their houses for training purposes. Due to the cultural and
religious restrictions it was impossible that the women could be engaged in training
side by side the men. The League as a matter of fact never disowned the National

425
Guards but at the same time the League leadership had never provoked anti-Sikh
sentiments and violent activities. Jinnah always condemned violence and killing. He
also recommended drastic action to Evan Jenkins against the rioters of any
community. Moreover, the culture of lathi or physical training was initiated by the
Hindus and Sikhs in India and Punjab in particular.
The basis of the Muslim-Sikh understanding was already in a fragile condition
therefore the anti-Muslim activities of the Akalis destroyed peace of the region. Their
violent speeches, collection of weapons and physical training started a new chapter of
an uncertain and pernicious future for the Punjab. Minor social incidents were
communally polarised and friends started converting into enemies. Fraternity, love,
peace and non-violence were declared absurd and sign of timidity. Fratricide became
religious duty. The communal clashes elsewhere in India further undermined Muslim-
Sikh relations in the Punjab. Poverty, rapacity and deprivation added fuel to injury.
The wealthy families of the rural areas were attacked by the people who mostly came
of the poor classes and humble background. The eastern parts of the Punjab inflicted
death on the Muslims while the Sikhs and Hindus in other areas became victim of the
Muslim wrath in return under the hostage theory. 74
Some of the writers do believe that Mountbatten’s hurry in changing the date
of the transfer of power and lethargy towards any mutual communal settlement caused
too high death toll for the Punjabis. 75 He further delayed the announcement of the
decision handed over by Sir Radcliffe. It does not mean that Lord Mountbatten
deliberately desired the mass killing of the Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus by delaying
the announcement of the Award but it is again fact that the delay resulted in what he
did not want although he was sure on the basis of the secret reports that the partition
would result in bloodshed. At the same time, he was reported that the killing would

426
take place on the part of the Sikhs on the ground of the unfavorable Award. He was
briefed by the Governor of the Punjab that the delay of the publication of the Award
could delay the Sikh action against the Muslims which would minimize the killing
therefore, Lord Mountbatten delayed publicizing the Award.
Fratricidal Attacks
Violence breeds more violence and the physical confrontation by the Sikhs
damaged the Sikh community because an ideological victory is more profound and
eternal than the physical victory. They could utilize Guru Nanak Dev’s teachings in
the time of crisis 76 but they preferred the retrograde agenda that frustrated the good
days of the panth. The line between the Punjabs was unacceptable to them because it
had deprived them of the fertile canal colony lands. They lost the holiest Gurdwaras
like Nankana Sahib and Punja Sahib. S. R. Soni writes that the oft-repeated claim for
Vatican status of Nankana Sahib was a matter of great concern. 77 Padmasha writes
that no religion advocates violence and cruelty and “Islam certainly does not.” The
political reasons must be a pushing force behind any incident. 78 Therefore, the loss of
the material and political heritage was a potent factor which motivated many of the
Sikhs to ruin the people who ruined their economy, land, property, life and religion.
If there were some enmities in the rural areas definitely these were created by
the external factors. Even on the eve of the partition, attacks for looting the Muslim
and non-Muslims were mostly managed by the non-martial castes of the Punjab. In
many cases, Jats had never been part of the plundering and looting of the grieved
migrants. Though they had changed religions, even then they were connected to each
other as relatives. 79 In many cases, the Muslims who had to pay debts to the rich Sikhs
planned the attacks and wanted to get rid of the Sikhs only for the material benefits.

427
According to Professor Khizar Virk, Sardar Labh Singh who met him through Haq
Nawaz Tiwana after the partition, complained that the Muslim Virk relatives had not
given them cover and shelter in the bad days otherwise they were desirous to stay in
Pakistan even as Muslims. The messenger sent by the Muslim Virks had informed
that the Muslim Virks were coming to slaughter them. Therefore, they decided to
move immediately to India. Khizar Virk recalled that they got worried due to no-
response from the Sikh relatives and visited the village of Sardar Mangal Singh who
had already fled to India. It revealed the conspiracy of the middlemen (a Kami) who
had not conveyed the correct message either to the Muslim or Sikh Virks. 80
The martial races never let their sons adopt the profession of Imam masjad
which paved the way for the manual castes to occupy the religious domain. 81 On the
other hand, the Sikhs got huge conversions from choorhas who became active in the
Akali politics. Such groups in the Muslim and Sikh communities played an extremist
role in the domain of the Muslim-Sikh relations particularly during the partitioning
phase. The killing of 1947 was not a new phenomenon but a continuity of the
Muslim-Sikh rivalry. Hari Ram Gupta writes that the low caste people living for
centuries under the higher classes and governments became warriors. 82 Such people
behaved similarly during the partitioning era.
Jat, Rajput and other martial castes in the west Punjab areas helped their
caste-fellows and others and escorted them to the safe areas. In the east Punjab, the
Akali and Nihang Sikhs, mainly from the lowest castes inflicted barbarity on the poor
Muslims. 83 The Jat Sikhs helped the Muslims particularly the wealthy or landholding
Muslim families who had been at good terms with each other throughout the
history. 84 The families having good relations with the Sikhs did not kill or motivate
anyone to kill the Sikhs or Hindus in the western Punjab. They, in the most cases,

428
escorted the friends who were departing with them for good. According to Javed
Haider Syed, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was sympathetic towards the non-Muslims
and ordered the Police for their security. Because of him, not a single Hindu was
injured in Pind Dadan Khan, district Jhelum. 85 It is noteworthy that the death figure
could be hundred times higher if the killing was planned and patronized by the
influential families of the martial castes in the villages of the western Punjab.

Chapter Five
Notes
429
1 Despite a sense of compatibility of the Punjabi culture, the Sikhs and Muslims had a
difference in some specific domains such as, food, dress, pardah, male hair style, turban style, female
folk songs on wedding, diction of symbolism in poetry, diction in writing and poetry, etc.
2 The theory has been adapted and implemented on the social set-up of the Punjab which
means that dependence on other community prevents violence in the society. Originally the Complex
Interdependence Theory of Joseph Nye and Keohane assumes that the prevailing interdependence
prevents the use of military forces. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence
(Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1977), 25-35.
3 Fauja Singh, History of the Punjab: Muslim Period, vol. III (Patiala: Department of Punjab
Historical Studies Punjabi University, 1972), 323.
4 Even in the current scenario of terrorism, the rural Punjab is immune to all the sectarian and
terrorist activities because of its traditional co-existence and practical aloofness from the urban politics.
5 The Akalis condemned the idea of Pakistan on 10-11 February 1940. See Secret Police
Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 73.
6 Letter from Durlab to Gandhi on 12 November and then Gandhi to Durlab Singh on 14
November 1944 in H. N. Mitra ed., The Indian Annual Register: An Annual Digest of Public Affairs,
1919-1947 vol. I1, 1944 (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), 221-22.
7 John Connell, Wavell, Supreme Commander, 1941-43 (London: Collins, 1969), 218.
8 Letter from Mountbatten to J. S. Pratt (University of Warwick) on 14 November 1977, K-
137A, Mountbatten Papers.
9 Raj karey ga Khalsa, aaki rahey na koe
Khwar hoey sabh milenge bache sarn jo hoey
(“The Khalsa shall rule, no hostile refractory shall exist; Frustrated, they shall all submit, and those,
who come in for shelter, shall be protected,” Gurmit Singh, Failures of the Akali Leadership (Sirsa:
Usha Institute of Religious Studies, 1981), 23-24. See for detail, Ganda Singh, “The Raj Karega
Khalsa Couplet,” Punjab Past and Present VII, part I (April 1973): 173-175.
10 Extract from weekly Report of the Director, Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department,
Government of India, Simla, 17 October 1923, IOR: L/P&J/12/170.
11 Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India’s
Partition, 1928-40 (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 74-75.
12 Tara Singh of Moga (1888-1956), a judge of Patiala High Court from 1930-1940 represented
the Sikhs in the first Round Table Conference. Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh had
been in the Unionist governments who suggested re-demarcation or partition of the Punjab.
13 Major-General Shahid Hamid had been Private Secretary to Field-Martial Sir Claude
Auchinleck from 1946 to 1947.
14 Major-General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, A Personal Record of the Partition of
India (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 28.
15
The Sikhs “have been rather spoilt in the past, that they have no political sense, and an
exaggerated idea of their own abilities and importance.” Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell, The Viceroy’s
Journal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973), 288.
16
MB1/D290. Lord Wavell also indicated towards it and wrote that the Sikhs did not forget the
Sikh rule over the Punjab. See, Penderel Moon, Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, 288.
17
K. C. Yadav, “The Partition of India: A Study of the Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1849-
1947,” The Punjab Past and Present XVII-I (April 1983): 137.
18
See, The Sikhs in Action, (Lahore: Punjab Government, 1975), 1.
19
Harold Laski in Lawrence C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 8-9.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Dushka Saiyid, Muslim Women of the British Punjab, From Seclusion to Politics
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 19.

430
23
Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis: An Analytical Study (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co.,
1985), 29.
24
Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in Punjab 1920-1947 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of
Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1981), 15-19.
25
Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of November 1945, L/PJ/5/248.
26
Comments on B. N. Rau’s Plan for Regional Administration of the Punjab, March 1947,
MB1/D259.
27
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Tehdis-e-Naimat (Urdu) (Lahore: Packages Ltd., 1971), 522.
28
Hugh Tinker, Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997),
250.
29 Extract from Personal & Confidential Letter from Lord Wavell to Mr. Amery on 16 July
1945 IOR: L/PO/8/37.
30 Many were arrested on anti-government speeches. See Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence,
1945, file S-413, para. 107.
31 Letter from Jenkins to Wavell on 3 March 1947, MB1/D259.
32 Robin Jeffrey, “The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947,”
Modern Asian Studies, 8, 4 (1974): 493.
33 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1967), 170-171.
34 The Standard General Insurance announced it through newspapers on 20 March 1947.
Raghuvendra Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and Other Opinions
(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 143.
35 Nehru met Jenkins on 14 March 1947, Lionel Carter, ed, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last
Viceroyalty, 22 March-15 August 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2003), 245-
47.
36 Stephen R. Covey, Principle-Centered Leadership (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992),
177.
37 Written Statement by Master Tara Singh, Pb. I:80, Shamsul Hasan collection.
38 Master Tara Singh, Panthic Nazarya (Urdu) (Amritsar: Panthic Tact Society, n.d.), passim.
39 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I1 (1944), 210-15.
40 Robin Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India? 2 nd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
1994), 25.
41 Sardar Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi, 125.
42 Tara Singh was a headmaster, a government employee who under the rules was not allowed
to involve in the politics. The suitable profession for such activities was the legal profession as we find
the main bulk of the Indian leadership belonged to this field.
43 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 2 nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996), 247-248.
44 Ibid.
45 Biographical Note, Abell to Laithwaite on 10 July 1942, 125/91, Linlithgow Collection.
46 Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi, 113.
47 Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle, Origin, Evolution and Present
Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 154.
48 Jaswant Singh, Autobiography of Master Tara Singh, 197 in Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History,
241; see also Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, 64-65, 106.
49 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1I (1945), 136; see also Verinder Grover, ed., The
Story of Punjab: Yesterday and Today (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), 539.
50 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 241.
51 Also discussed by Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, 64-65,
52 The Congress invited not only Mountbatten but also Sir John Colville and Sir Archibald Nye
in July 1947 to continue as the Governors of Bombay and Madras respectively after the transfer of
power. See, Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 5 th ed. (London: Robert Hale &
Company, 1972), 129.
53 FR, the first half of July 1947, L/PJ/5/250.
54 Kapur Singh, Sachi Sakhi, 245.
55 File starts from 13 January 1941 to 10 January 1942, L/PJ/5/244
56 Yadav, “The Partition of India,” 143.

431
57 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, ed., Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition
of the Subcontinent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 162.
58 Sirdar Shaukat Hyat Khan, The Nation That Lost Its Soul (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1995),
162.
59 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments put forth before the Punjab
Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved,” in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, eds., Region and
Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 153-154.
60 Zafarullah Khan, Tehdis-e-Naimat, 527-29. For details, see Sir Zafarullah Khan “The
Partition,” in Ahmad Salim, ed., Lahore 1947 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003), 264-278;
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and others, Dr. Muhammad Azam Chaudhri, Tehrik-i-Pakistan mein Punjab
ka Kirdar (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1996), 443-445.
61 A. Aziz, Discovery of Pakistan (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1964), 358.
62 The Pakistan Times, 25 April 1958; see also A. Aziz, Discovery of Pakistan, 358-362;
Sardar Hukam Singh writes that The Radcliffe Award was delayed for two days and at the last moment
Mountbatten changed it in favour of India. Gurmit Singh, Failure of the Akali Leadership, 68; Kirpal
Singh also believes that the Award was modified before the announcement. See, Kirpal Singh,
“Partition of the Punjab and the Sikhs,” in Amrik Singh, The Partition in Retrospect, 56.
63 Gurmit Singh, Failure of the Akali Leadership, 68.
64 Zafarullah Khan, Tehdis-e-Naimat, 527-29.
65 See details, Letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, Bangalore, Dated 7th
February, 1946, IOR: L/PO/6/114; also see Appendix 9.
66 Patwant Singh, The Sikhs (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1999), 213.
67 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 124.
68 Gurmit Singh, Failure of Akali Leadership, 67.
69 My own ancestors were Sikhs but Sardar Lakha Singh and Sardar Chahal Singh embraced
Islam. Not only this, all the Muslim Jats come originally of the Sikh lineage.
70 See details, Prof. Harbans Singh, Nehru Family and the Sikhs (Delhi: B.R. Publishing
Corporation, 1984), 4 and passim.
71 For more information, see Khan Muhammad Waliullah Khan, Sikh Shrines in West Pakistan
(n.p.: Department of Archeology, Government of Pakistan, 1962).
72 They ultimately lost all this and the East Punjab was further divided after 1947 into the East
Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and federally administered cities.
73 Gurbachan Singh Talib, Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947
(New Delhi: Voice of India, 1950), 20.
74 ‘Hostage interpretation’ was originally initiated by Dr. Rasul Bukhsh Rais, an eminent
Pakistani political scientist, in the perspective of the Indian atrocities to the Kashmiri Muslims. This
explanation has been adapted and used in the study. According to this interpretation, a minority though
pacifist becomes target of the majority in retaliation on the basis of the religious affiliation. The
Muslim minority in the eastern part of the Punjab was attacked by the majority community (Sikhs and
Hindus) for the reason that the Muslims (majority in west Punjab) had killed their co-religionists
(Sikhs) who were in a minority. The Muslims attacked the Sikhs in the west Punjab on the assumption
that Sikhs were killing the Muslims (minority) in the east Punjab areas.
75 Dr. Massarrat Abid, “Mountbatten and the Communal Violence in the Punjab,” Paper
delivered at the International Conference on History, Politics and Society: The Punjab, Punjab
University, Lahore, 31 December 2008.
76 The Sikhs could also remember the kindness of the Muslim rulers at the political level and
good relations at the bottom level particularly in the rural Punjab. See details, Giani Wahid Hussain,
Sikhon Muslmanon kay Khushgawar Ta’aloqat (Qadian: Maktaba Basharat-i-Rahmania, n.d.), passim.
77 K. C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 14.
78 Dr. Padmasha, Indian National Congress and the Muslims, 1928-1947 (New Delhi and
Allahabad: Rajesh Publications, 1979), 7.
79 Ch. Ahmad Ali Bhullar, interview by the researcher on 28 November 2003; Sardar Ajmer
Singh, interview by the researcher on 1 April 2008 at Guru Singh Saba Gurdwara Reading, UK; and
Ch. Khadim Husain Chahal, Interview by the researcher on 15 April 2006 at Alipur Chak 6, District
Kasur.
80 Prof. Khizar Hayat Virk, Interview by the researcher on 10 August 2003 at Lahore.

432
81
In the village set-up, maulvis used to go from door to door for bread which could not be
appreciated by the farming classes. Consequently, they never sent their sons to the mosques for such an
occupation.
82
Hari Ram Gupta, Later Mughal History of the Punjab, 1707-1793 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1976), 42.
83
Zainab Bibi w/o Boorhey Khan along with her husband was killed by a Choorha. The local
Sikhs abused and beat him for this brutality. According to Mushtaq Singh Mushtaq, no Muslim was
murdered in the two-three surrounding villages. Mushtaq Singh Mushtaq s/o Zaildar Sunder Singh
Ahluwalia, Jat by caste, Village Sendhawali, p/s Shahkot District Jallandhar, interview by the
researcher on 6-7 September 2008 at Sussex, London.
84
Ajmer Singh Sidhu, interview by the researcher. Such findings are an outcome of the field
survey from the western Punjab area. The situation of the eastern Punjab may be different as most of
the Muslims were massacred by the Sikh Jats of Barnala. The Sikh Jats were brainwashed by the
political leaders. The Muslims converted to Sikhism but they still adopt the Muslim names. Ali Singh
Gill, Barnala, mail on 23 November 2008 (ali.gill82@gmail.com). The Akali leaders like Giani Kartar
Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh and Sardar Swaran Singh were Jats and played a key role in the politics
during the partitioning period but they showed no soft corner for the Muslims. Even then it is yet to be
explored what attitude Baldev Singh and Swaran Singh had adopted towards the Muslims living in
their own areas.
85
Javed Haider Syed, “Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan-A Political Biography” (M.Phil. thesis,
Quaid-i-Azam University, 1985), 214.

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Quaid-i-Azam University, 2001.
Razzaq, Raja Adnan. “Rise and Growth of All-India Muslim League in Rawalpindi:
1940-1947.” M.Phil. thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2004.
Syed, Javed Haider. “Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan-A Political Biography.” M.Phil.
thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1985.
Walia, Jaspreet. “Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 1920-47.” Ph.D. diss., Guru
Nanak Dev University, 2005.
WEBSITES
Chester, Lucy. “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary.” The
American Diplomacy 7:1 (February 2002): 1-17. Website,
http://www.colorado.edu /history/chester/, 8/11/2009.
http://theprg.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/Akhtar-coventry-presentation2.doc
http://www.dilgeer.com/sadal.htm, 31-12-2003.

http//www.sikhspectrum.com /092002/Toronto.htm
http://www.uwex.edu/ics/stream/session.cfm?eid=11900&sid=16502.
493
Puri, Harish, K. “The Scheduled Castes in the Sikh Community-A Historical
Perspective,” Economic & Political Weekly (June 2003): Website,
http://theprg.co.uk/ 2009/06/02/harish-k-puri, 8/11/2009.
Singh, Atamjit. “The Language Divide in Punjab.” http://www.punjabilokcom/misc/
education/languag edivide5.htm, 24/12/2003.
NEWSPAPERS
Akali. Amritsar.
Dawn. Karachi.
Hindustan. Lucknow.
Hindustan Times. New Delhi
Inqelab. Lahore.
Nawa-i-Waqt. Lahore.
Paisa Akhbar. Lahore.
Ranjit, Lahore.
Statesman. New Delhi.
The Civil and Military Gazette. Lahore.
The Dawn. Delhi.
The Eastern Times. Lahore.
The Pakistan Times. Lahore.
The Times of India. Bombay.
The Tribune, Lahore.
WEEKLY MAGAZINES
Paisa Akhbar. Lahore.
Munadi. Delhi.
Nia Zamana (Bombay).
People’s War. (Bombay).
Qaumi Jang. (Bombay).
CONFERENCE PAPERS
Abid, Dr. Massarrat. “Mountbatten and the Communal Violence in the Punjab.” Paper
delivered at the International Conference on History, Politics and Society: The
Punjab, at Punjab University, Lahore, 31 December 2008.
Abid, Dr. S. Qalb-i-. “Punjab Administration and Unionist-Muslim League
Relations.” Paper delivered at the International Conference on History,
Politics and Society: The Punjab, at Punjab University, Lahore, 31 December
2008.

Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. “Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Pre-Partition Punjab.” Paper
delivered at the WUN South Asian Virtual Seminar Series, University of
Southampton, UK, 6 May 2008.
________. “Voice from the Rural Punjab: Muslim-Sikh Relations in the British
Punjab, 1940-47.” Paper delivered at the Punjab Research Group Conference,
Coventry University, UK, 29 June 2008.
494
________. “Guru Nanak Dev and Muslim-Sikh Relations in the Punjab.” Paper
delivered at the International Conference on History, Politics and Society: The
Punjab, Punjab University, Lahore, 30 December 2008.
INTERVIEWS
Ahmad Saeed Kimani, MLA, 15 July 2003, Lahore.
Ch. Ahmad Ali Bhullar, 28 November 2003 at Alipur, Kasur.
Ch. Khadim Husain Chahal, 15 April 2006 at Alipur Kasur
Comrade Bishan Singh, October 2004, Delhi.
Dr. Mazhar Mehmood Sherani, Sheikhupura, 12 June 2005 at GC University Lahore.
Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 14 October 2009, LUMS, Lahore.
Rehmat Bibi, 21 February 2004 at Feroz Wattuan.
Mushtaq Singh Mushtaq, Sendhawali, p/s Shahkot, Jallandhar, Interview on 6-7
September 2008 at London.
Professor Khizer Hayat Virk, Nankana Sahib, 10 August 2003 at Lahore.
Sardar Ajmer Singh Sidhu, Kundal, Tehsil Abohar, District Ferozepore, interview on
1 April 2008 at Guru Singh Saba Gurdwara Reading, UK.
------------------------------------

APPENDIX-1
INDIAN ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE.
(SECOND SESSION).
The attached Memorandum is circulated at the request of Sardar Ujjal Singh and
Sardar Sampuran Singh.
Secretariat-General,
St. James’s Palace, S.W.L.
12 th November, 1931.
SIKHS and the NEW CONSTITUTION for INDIA
The Sikhs are an important and distinct community, mainly concentrated in the
Punjab, of which they were the rulers until 1849. Sikhism recognizes no caste and
strictly enjoins upon those who profess it to treat all human beings as equal. In
religious ideals and social practices they are as different from the Hindus as the
Muslims are.
The Simon Commission states: “Sikhism remained a pacific cult until the
political tyranny of the Mussulmans and the social tyranny of the Hindus converted it
into a military creed. It is a striking circumstance that this small community
contributed no less than eighty thousand men” (actually, 89,000 combatant recruits, in
addition to 30,000 already serving when war broke out) “to serve in the Great War–a
larger proportion tan any other community in India.”
The Sikhs play a great part in the economic and civic life of the country. In the
Punjab, with three million population (13 per cent of the whole), the Sikhs pay 25 per
cent of the land revenue and 40 per cent of the land revenue and water rates combined,
the main source of the provincial exchequer. They maintain at their own expense over
400 schools and three colleges, open to all communities and class without distinction.
They have got a large number of holy shrines which are the centres of Sikh culture
and tradition.
The Sikhs claim that their interests should be adequately and effectively
protected in the future constitution. On account of their unrivalled position in the
Punjab–historical, political and economic–they claim 30 per cent, representation in
the provincial legislature. This demand is not unreasonable when it is remembered
that the Muslim minority in the United Provinces with a corresponding population are
enjoying 31 per cent. At the last Round Table Conference, in a spirit of
accommodation, we came down to 24 per cent. The Muslims wherever they are a
minority claim weightage. In the Punjab they claim to have their majority ensured by
statute. The Simon Report observes: “It would be unfair that Muslims should retain
the very considerable weightage they now enjoy in the six provinces and that there
should at the same time be imposed in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition a definite
Moslem majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the
electorate.” Moreover, the Muslims demand for this majority is made on a basis of
separate electorates, which means that the other two communities could not even
influence the permanent majority, chosen as it would be constituents swayed by none
but communal motives and aims. It is a denial of the fundamental rights of a
community that it should be put in a position which allowed of no peaceful method of
appeal against a government that proved itself incompetent or partisan, especially if

434
that government was so constituted as to stereotype and perpetrate religious
differences which go back to bitter memories. In view of the claim of the President of
the last Al-India Muslim Conference, we believe that to write the garrison province of
India into the Constitution as an unalterably Muslim province would be to make the
dismemberment of India inevitable. That claim, it will be remembered, was that there
should be a “consolidated North–West State, within or without the British Empire,”
consisting of the Punjab, North–West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. We
cannot accept a constitution which relegates us for all time to the position of an
ineffective opposition.
If the Muslims refuse to accept in this province, where they are in a slight
majority in population (56 per cent), anything but their present demand of a reserved
majority, we ask for a territorial re-arrangement which would take from the Punjab
the Rawal Pindi and Multan divisions (excluding Lyallpur and Montgomery districts).
These divisions are overwhelmingly Muslim, as well s racially akin to the North–
West Frontier Province; their inclusion in the Punjab is a recent thing, due to conquest
by Ranjit Singh. These overwhelmingly Muslim districts, with a population of seven
millions, can either form a separate province which will give the Muslims another
majority province, or be amalgamated with North–West Frontier. This re-arrangement
would leave a Punjab of about sixteen millions in which no single community would
have an absolute majority and each community would be obliged to conciliate the
others. If this solution also is unacceptable to our Muslim brethren we should prefer
no change from the present constitution in the Punjab.
A counter proposal of partition of the Punjab has emanated from Sir Geoffrey
Corbett, which is open to serious economic and racial objections and which is based
upon an absolute misunderstanding of the Sikh position. The main object of any
scheme of territorial redistribution should be to satisfy the conflicting claims of the
Muslims and the Sikhs in the Punjab. But this scheme seeks to increase still further
the Muslim majority by the separation of Ambala division from the Punjab and
thereby places the Sikhs in a far worse position than any in which they would find
themselves in the existing Punjab. It is therefore entirely unacceptable to the Sikhs.
We summarise below the unanimous demands of the Sikhs community for
which any scheme of new constitution should make provision before it can be
accepted by the Sikhs.
THE SIKHS AND THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
PUNJAB
1. The Sikhs are anxious to secure a National government and are therefore
opposed to any communal majority by status or any reservation of seats by law for a
majority community.
2. The Sikhs occupy an unrivalled position in the Punjab as is reflected by their
sacrifices in the defence of India, and in national movements and their stake in the
province, and therefore demand 30 per cent representation in the Punjab Legislature
and Administration.
3. In the Punjab Cabinet and the Public Service Commission the Sikh community
should have a one-third share.
4. If no agreement is reached on the above basis, the boundaries of the Punjab
may be so altered by transferring predominantly Mohommadan areas to the Frontier
Province so as to produce a communal balance. In this reconstituted Punjab there
should be joint electorates, with no reservation of seats.

435
5. If neither of the above alternatives is acceptable, the Punjab may be
administered by the newly constituted responsible Central Government till mutual
agreement on the communal question is arrived at.
6. Punjabi should be the official language of the province should be optional with
the Sikhs and others to us Gurmukhi script if they so desire.
CENTRAL
7. The Sikhs should be given 5 percent of the total number of seats reserved for
British India in each of the upper and lower houses.
8. There should always be at least one Sikh in the Central Cabinet.
9. In case an Army Council is constituted the Sikhs should be adequately
represented on it.
10. The Sikhs have always had a special connection with the army and therefore
the same proportion of Sikhs should be maintained in the army as before the war.
11. The Sikhs should have effective representation in the all-India services and
should be represented on Central Public Service Commission.
12. All residuary powers should vest in the Central Government.
13. The Central Government should have special specified powers to protect
minorities.
OTHER PROVINCES.
14. The Sikhs should have the same weightage in other Provinces as is accorded
to other minorities.
GENERAL.
15. The provincial and Central Government should declare religious neutrality and
while maintaining existing religious endowments should not create new ones.
16. The State should provide for teaching of Gurmukhi script where as certain
fixed number of scholars is forthcoming.
17. Any safeguards guaranteed in the constitution for the Sikhs should not be
rescinded or modified without their express consent.
UJJAL SINGH,
SAMPURAN SINGH.
Source: File-15, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad.

APPENDIX-2
436
Letter of the Muslims of Raja Jang (now district Kasur) to the Governor-
General
To
The Secretary,
To His Excellency the Governor-General-,
in-Council, for India,
Rai Sina, New Delhi.
M E M O R I A L
The last Memorial for exempting poor Muslims of Raja Jang from Punitive Police
Tax act Raja Jang.
-- -- --
Respected Sir,
In continuation to our numerous previous humble Memorials and petitions, Your
Humble Memorial most submissively approach, one more, to your Noble
Graciousness with the following grievances as under:
1. It is quite well known facts to all world that for the last some centuries, the
poor helpless Muslims of Raja Jang have awfully been most mercilessly
treated, murdered, looted and their daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers have
fiercelessly [fearlessly] been taken up as slaves by the thickly populated
majority of the Sikhs of Illaqas Raja Jang. Even in the time of the British
brilliant benign Government this entire lawlessness and intolerable
highhandedness of the Sikhs had been going on, and extended still high way of
in the religious affairs too. Viz. the poor Muslims had not even been permitted
to attend their mosques, religious or…..to……[illegible].
2. That being entirely fed up by the intolerable circumstances and open Zulms
aforesaid hardships and highhandedness of the Sikhs, the poor harmless and
helpless as well, Muslims of Raja Jang were compelled to have an ‘Azan’
agitation on the pure lawful and peaceful religious bases in 1937. In this
peaceful demand of ‘Azan’ the Sikh made eight continuous forcible and
entirely unlawful raids on the poor helpless Muslims, which resulted two (law
abiding Muslim) murders and hundred of helpless poor Muslims were
seriously wounded by Dangs, Spears, Kirpans aree, pistols and Chhavies. In
proof of which the registered Police cases record can speak well for the same.
Besides that the Sikhs Highhandedness stepped forward more seriously on
various other ways, that they forcibly stopped even the Muslim women and
children in their going out for the call of their nature and their cattle were also
not allowed to go out for grazing. At last the Police was also compelled to
come forward for maintenance of law ad orders. The Police also met some
severe oppositions and assaults by the hands of Sikhs. At last the S.D.O.
Kasur, K.B. Sheikh Fazal Ilahi, B.Y. Ali Khan Additional Superintendent of
Police Kasur, S. Santokh Singh, D.S.P. Kasur, and Haji Mumtaz Ahmad S.I.
Lulliani Police Station made their reports to the authorities concerned and to
the Punjab Government; and strongly proposed that unless a strong punitive
Police Chauki was not appointed at Raja Jang on mere assaulters, Sikh
expenses, the lawlessness of the Sikhs would not be ended or managed in any
other way, and the helpless poor Muslims of Raja Jang must be exempted
from the payment of the funds, in question. On this the Government accepted

437
and appointed the Punitive Police Chauki there from March 1939. The
Tehsildar of Kasur also declared this announcement of the Government that
the poor Muslims were exempted from the above tax. The Punjab Assembly
Members also satisfied Muslims that they were significantly exempted by the
Government.
4. [3]. But the Sikhs moved the Shiromani Sikh Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee of Amritsar and all their Sikh Members of the Punjab Assembly
and also after making a serious agitation in various ways gave a registered
notice to the Government that unless the poor Muslims would not be joint with
them in paying the tax, they would alone not pay the tax in question. Thus the
Sikhs compelled the Government to accept their resolution.
5. That on this the S.D.O. of Kasur S. Balwant Singh Nalwa modified the
Scheme in such a peculiar way and levied the tax on the whole inhabitants of
Raja Jang in such a way, that the poor Muslims have been joined to pay 2/3 rd
and Sikhs 1/3 rd only in the Tax amount. Now there are many Muslims who
pay from Rs. 150/- Rs. 50/-, Rs. 40/-/-Rs. 30/-/, Rs. 20/-/- and Rs. 10/-/respectively
while they are great hard up penniless and starving and cannot as
a matter of fact afford anything on account of their poverty.
6. That the Tehsildar Kasur has now a days been busy in collecting the tax from
the Penniless and harmless innocent Muslims who were unfortunately fell a
victim of the highly intolerable extra highhandedness of the unlawful assaults
of Sikh Community of Raja Jang, who are all in all totally bigoted
Congressmen and active workers of the Congress forward Block, while the
poor Muslims are unfortunately stand staunch loyalist to the benign British
Government.
This under the most painful circumstances, the penniless strict law abiding
helpless loyal Muslims have only one alternative open to them viz. either we
may close our ancient homes and leave for good and seek out some where else
and appeal there for redressing utmost intolerable lawful grievances before
any other available door of the benevolent in India and abroad. It is our last
Memorial. Earnestly praying that Your graciousness will be good enough to
see your usual gracious way in enquiring into the matter and exempting us
from the payment of the Punitive Tax, which we don’t deserve to be made.
For this a set of kindness we shall ever pray for your long life and
prosperity.
Note: The annexed Mehzarnama containing the thumb impressions of the Muslim
population of Raja Jang are 432 in number, are submitted for your kind perusal. With
profound respect,
We beg to remain,
Sir,
Your most obedient servants,
Enclosure: Maulvi Abdul Haq s/o Sh: Farzand Ali r/o Raja
Jang, District Lahore.
Maulvi Jamal Din s/o Maulvi Fateh Din Imam
Masjid… Ch. Siraj Din s/o Fazal Din of Raja
Jang
The page no. 2? of Roznama
‘INQALAB’ dated 27 th April 1940…attached.
Dtd. 26.4.40
Copy forwarded to:-

1. Prime Minister to Government Punjab, Lahore.
2. His Excellency the Governor, Punjab, Lahore.
3. Mr. Mohd. Ali Jinnah, President All India Muslim League, Bombay.
4. Deputy Commissioner, Lahore
5. ………………………………
Signatures of the four Muslims
Source: File- 1098, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad.
438

APPENDIX-3
439
From the US President for Mr. Harry Hopkins. Message for Prime Minister on
12 April 1942.
Kindly give the following message immediately to the Former Naval Person: every
effort must be made by us to prevent a break-down.
(Quote) I hope most earnestly that you may be able to postpone the departure from
India of Cripps until one more effort has finally been made to prevent a break-down
of the negotiations.
I regret to say that I am unable to agree with the point of view contained in your
message to me, that public opinion in the United States believes that negotiations have
broken down on general broad issues. Here the general impression is quite the
contrary. The feeling is held almost universally that the dead lock has been due to the
English Government’s unwillingness to concede the right of self-government to the
Indians notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust to the competent
British authorities technical military and naval defence control. It is impossible for
American public opinion to understand … if there is willingness on the part of the
British Government to permit the component parts of India to secede after the war
from the British Empire, it is unwilling to permit them to enjoy during the war what is
tantamount to self-government.
I feel that I am compelled to place before you this issue very frankly, and I know you
will understand my reasons for doing this. Should the current negotiations be allowed
to collapse because of the issue as presented to the people of America and should
India subsequently be invaded successfully by Japan with attendant serious defeats of
a military or naval character for our side, it would be hard to over-estimate the
prejudicial reaction on American public opinion. Would it not be possible, therefore,
for you to have Cripps’ departure postponed on the ground that you personally
transmitted instructions to him to make a final effort to find a common ground of
understanding? According to my reading, an agreement appeared very near last
Thursday night. If you could authorise him to say that he was personally empowered
by you to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that both sides
would make minor concessions, it appears to me that an agreement might be yet
found.
As I expressed to you in an earlier message, I still feel that if the component groups in
India could be given now the opportunity to set up a Nationalist Government in
essence similar to our own form of Government under the Articles of Confederation
with the understanding that following the termination of a period of trial and error
they would be enabled then to determine upon their own form of constitution and to
determine, as you have promised them already, their future relationship with the
British Empire probably a solution could be found. If you were to make such an effort
and if Cripps were still unable then? to find an agreement, at least you would on that
issue have public opinion in the United States be satisfied that the British Government
had made a fair and real offer to the Indian people and that the responsibility for such
failure must be placed clearly, not upon the British Government, but upon the Indian
people.
Source: FO/954/12A/0/427. Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

APPENDIX-4
Extracts
440
Harbans Singh, Gainda Singh and Nirmal Singh, absconders in the Kiratpur case,
were arrested in the Amritsar district at the end of 1942 and interrogated. The
statements of Harbans Singh and Nirmal Singh revealed that the Kiratpur gang had
the backing of the Akali leaders who had financed the gang in its arms smuggling
activities. Further interrogation and enquiries have shown that from 1935 onwards
Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Udham Singh Nagoke, Isher Singh Majhail,
Jathedar Mohan Singh, Sohan Singh Jalal Usman and other prominent Akalis had
been rapidly discussing the desirability of collecting arms. These discussions were
originally held in the interest of the defence of the Sikh community against Muslim
oppression but by 1940 with the deterioration in the war situation had developed into
plans for the seizure of the Punjab. The individual efforts of Akalis to collect arms
met with no success though Nirmal Singh had been smuggling arms from the Frontier
in fairly large quantities from 1937 onwards. In 1940 smuggling on a large scale
started and continued until the end of 1942 by which time the Kiratpur gang had been
broken up and most of the extremist Akali leaders had been arrested. During this
period Master Tara Singh gave Giani Harbans Singh about Rs. 8,700 with which 20
rifles, 8 revolvers, 3,650 rounds of ammunition and 80 sticks of dynamite were
procured from the Frontier and, after approval by Udham Singh Nagoke, were kept by
members or contacts of the Kiratpur gang. Apart from these main transactions a
further 9 rifles, 11 revolvers and unknown quantity of ammunition was purchased for
about Rs. 2,000 supplied from Akali sources during this period. All these arms were
purchased from Sikh arms dealers in Tribal Territory through contacts at Punja Sahib
Gurdwara. Enquiries are still in progress to ascertain where these arms have been
stored.
5. Arms smugglers the enquiries referred to above have also revealed the names
of a large number of arms smugglers and their contacts in the NWFP, the Ludhiana
and Lyallpur districts of the Punjab and Faridkot State. In January 1944, 9 rifles with
30 rounds of ammunition were found in a room occupied by one Amar Das, son of
Thulu Ram, of Ziadha, Mardan district, in Rawalpindi city. Amar Das was not present
at the time and is now reported to be living in Kaya Kabbal, Tribal Territory. On 14 th
March 1944 Gurdev Singh, son of Khazan Singh, of Khana, P.S. Jarba, Patiala State,
a contact of Kisan workers in the state, arrested at Cambellpur railway station
carrying component parts of three 303 rifles and 199,303 cartridges which he was
smuggling from the NWFP to the Patiala State. His interrogation revealed that his
brother No. 14500 L/N Hari Singh, Bugler Hari Singh, son of Bishan Singh, of
Durbah, Patiala State, Havildar Ujagar Singh of Patiala State and Benarsa a milk
vendor, all of the 10/11 the Punjab Regiment, Nowshera, had been concerned in the
smuggling of arms from the Frontier, and were supplying them to Sant Indar Singh
Kullaran, Jind State, Mahant of Jandsar Gurdwara and through him to dacoits in the
State.
Source: “Review of Terrorist Situation in the Punjab, 1 October 1943 to 31 March
1944,” Supplement to the Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 1944, para 4,
NIHCR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

441
APPENDIX-5
Memorial from A. M. Khan Leghari, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana, to
the Right Honourable Lord Pathick [Pethick] Lawrence, Secretary of State for
India.
May it please Your Lordship,
Some 9 months ago the Commissioner Jullundur wrote a secret D.O. letter to
all Deputy Commissioners in his Division asking whether they would continue in
service after the war. I replied that it would all depend on the terms and conditions of
service. Unfortunately, since then there has been a terrible deterioration in the
conditions of service, so much so that it has become almost impossible for an Indian
Deputy Commissioner at least owing to improper pressure from Ministers, to carry on
his duties in a conscientious, honest and honourable manner in accordance with his
covenant. It is necessary to bring this state of affairs to the notice of the Viceroy and
the Secretary of State for India, as there is some reason to believe that high official
quarters in the Punjab are either powerless to remedy this state of affairs or unwilling
to do so. Hence this memorial which I had expected to present personally to the
Secretary of State on my leave next year in England, but the presentation of which the
Cabinet Mission to India has made possible here in India. It is hoped that action will
be taken to check the abuses mentioned in the ensuing paragraphs so that it may be
possible to maintain the high traditions on which the foundations of the Civil Service
in India are laid.
2. The basic principle of the British Conception of the Permanent Civil Services,
as opposed to the American Conception of temporary services which go out with a
change in the head of the State, is that the services are forbidden to take part in
politics. This condition is embodied in the Covenant, which every member of the
I.C.S. has to sign, and also in the Government Servants Conduct Rules’ 1935. It is an
important duty of the Governors, since the Government of India Act 1919 took effect,
to see that Ministers do not abuse their position so as to force Government servants to
help any political parties. This duty appears to have been discharged properly until
1944. But since the spring of that year the position appears to have steadily undergone
a change. It was in April 1944 that Mr. Jinnah in an effort to have a Muslim League
Ministry in the Punjab, caused a split between the Muslim Leaguers and the Unionists.
Sardar Shaukat Hayat was dismissed and in his place Sir Jamal Khan Leghari (the
father of the memorialist/petitioner and Major Ashiq Hussain Qureshi were sworn in
as Ministers. I was naturally overjoyed at my father’s….[illegible]. The
Commissioner Jullundur Division visited District headquarters including Ludhiana
and made a speech on the constitutional position to all the gazetted officers, the
impression given by which was that if any Muslim officials did not see eye to eye
with the action taken by the Governor, it was open to them to resign their service.
3. Ludhiana being midway between Lahore and Simla, Ministers almost
invariably broke their journey to and from Simla during the summer here. In
particular Malik Khizar Hayat Khan (the Hon’ble Premier) and the late Sir Chhotu
Ram (Hon’ble Minister Revenue) visited Ludhiana that summer a number of times. I
had taken over my first officiating chance as Deputy Commissioner on 31-3-44 at
Ludhiana and on the first visit of the two Hon’ble Ministers after the split, they
explained to me the details which led to Sardar Shaukat Hayat’s dismissal and said the
H.E. the Governor was anxious for the Muslim League to be reduced to impotence
and was keen that Deputy Commissioners should give every help in putting new life
into the Zamindara League, so that the Muslim League should not be able to gain
influence in the rural area. They asked whether the Commissioner had lectured to us

442
about our duty in the critical times and said that H.E. the Governor had called all the
Commissioners and asked them to go round to District headquarters and impress upon
district officers the necessity of minimizing Muslim League influence in the interest
of the war effort. I was asked to take a hand in organizing a Zamindara League in the
district and also in collecting funds for it.
4. The second visit of the Hon’ble Premier and the late Sir Chhotu Ram to
Ludhiana was when I invited them to attend a National War Front Durbar on
44. At this Durbar a purse for investment of over rupees/cover in war loans
and another Rs. 40,000/- in Defence bonds for the starting of a District scholarship for
sons of serving soldiers out of the annual income, were presented to the Premier.
After the Durbar, Sir Chhotu Ram told me that it would have been much more
gratifying to him if I had also got a purse for the Zamindara League presented and
quoted the example of S. Iqbal Singh Deputy Commissioner Montgomery who had
only recently presented a purse of Rs. 65,000/- for this organization by a levy of a rate
per square/among other methods. I replied that this was against Government Servants’
Conduct Rules; but was told that I should not fear anything on this account. I then
said that my personal position had make??? it awkward, (for me as owing to my father
having accepted a Ministry after the split, there was already sufficient propaganda and
for me to have a hand in the collection of funds for the Zamindara League would lead
to abuses being showered on me also, as well as to agitation against me in this my
first chance as a Deputy Commissioner). But Sir Chhotu said that I should be bold and
no harm would come. I agreed to give what ever help I lawfully could and told Sir
Chhotu that I could convey his and the Premier’s wishes to the Tahsildars and ask
them to help in the collection of funds for the Zamindara League in the same manner
as they collected for the Red Cross or War Funds. But I agreed to do so on the
condition, that a proper constitution was framed for the Zamindara League in which
life-members, patrons and annual subscriptions etc. were provided, so that instead of
direct collection people may be encouraged to become members, life-members,
patrons etc. of the Zamindara League and official receipts may be given by the
District Zamindara League Treasurer to prevent embezzlement and defalcations. This
was agreed to by Sir Chhotu, who considered it a far better method than that being
adopted in other districts, as the collection of funds would not only help financially,
but add to the membership and in the event of Press propaganda or Assembly
questions, it could be shown that people had voluntarily joined the popular Zamindara
League organization.
5. So far as I remember, Sir Chhotu met me again on his way up country and said
that the next time he and the Premier visited Ludhiana, they would expect the
presentation of a substantial purse, at a Zamindara League meeting and that I should
get going so as not to disappoint them, as they had great expectations from me, as I
was like a nephew since my father was their colleague. I replied that it was impossible
for me to start collections for the reasons explained before, until a proper constitution
of the Zamindara League had been framed and the Hon’ble Mian Abdul Haye
(Hon’ble Minister of Education from Ludhiana) was sent to start a Zamindara League
and appoint office bearers. He promised to do both.
6. The next time I met the Premier and the Hon’ble Minister Revenue was when
I attended the National War Front and Zamindara League Durbar at Jullundur on 7-7-
44 on receipt of a message from the Premier that I should be there. At this Durbar a
purse of Rs. 50000/-, collected through official agency, was presented to the Premier.
The Deputy Commissioner and other officials attended this Durbar. The
Commissioner did not attend, but I understood that he did not raise objection to the

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Deputy Commissioner’s attending. After the Durbar both the Premier and Sir Chhotu
praised Pir Ahsan-ud-Din as the first Deputy Commissioner in Jullundur Division to
have presented a purse for the Zamindara League and impressed on me that it would
be a bad thing if I sent them empty handed on their next visit. They said that they
expected at least Rs. 50,000/- from Ludhiana district. I again reminded them of the
pre-requisites already agreed to by Sir Chhotu and said that although Pir Ahsan-ud-
Din might have been able to raise funds for the Zamindara League without adverse
propaganda, I could not do so until a Zamindara League was functioning in the
District under a proper constitution. I also said that I will get into trouble if the H.E.
the Governor were to know of [?] my participation in this. Sir Chhotu replied that H.E.
the Governor was already in the know and was in whole treated agreement with the
movement. Some English Deputy Commissioners, he added, had objected to the
Zamindara League collections having an adverse effect on the War Fund collections,
but he had satisfied the Governor that this was not the case and that as it was
imperative for the tranquillity of the Province to smash the Muslim League,
substantial funds would have to be collected. Pir Ahsan-ud-Din, Deputy
Commissioner Jullundur on enquiry said that he had sounded Commissioner
Jullundur, who had raised no objection to the idea. However on my insistence Sir
Chhotu promised to send me a draft constitution of the Zamindara League which
owing to tremendous preoccupations he had not had the time to draft before and also
to get Mian Abdul Haye to come to Ludhiana to appoint Office Bearers of the District
Zamindara League.
7. The Hon’ble Mian Abdul Haye visited Ludhiana in July and asked me to
convene a meeting at my house of all the leading zamindars for the election of the
District Zamindara League office bearers on the 19 th . He insisted that I should be
present also. I said the time given me was short, but as I was holding a District Board
meeting that very day, I would ask the members District Board to see the Hon’ble
Minister of Education at the Rest House after the meeting. I also suggested that in
view of [?]. Mian Abdul Haye held a meeting and appointed office bearers to the
Zamindara League. Then he sent for me at the Rest House, while the meeting was still
on and introduced me to the members and the new office bearers. This was adversary
commented upon in an article in the Daily Zamindar signed by Muhammad Shafi,
Gurbachan Singh Advocate and Sardar Dasondha Singh among others, who claimed
to be members of the real Zamindara League, as against the Zamindara League set up
by officials. The Hon’ble Mian Abdul Haye told the Tahsildar, Ludhiana, in my
presence later on that he should go all out to collect funds for the Zamindara League
and that good work in this direction would be rewarded by promotion to selection
grade or to Extra Assistant Commissionership. Sir Chhotu also on one of his visits
saw S. Amarsarjit Singh Chief of Malaudh (now Sardar Bahadur) and promised him
Honorary Magistracy, title of “Sardar Bahadur” and water from the Sirhind Canal for
certain lands of his (which he was keen on bringing under perennial water supply)
provided he made a handsome donation to Zamindara League Funds. He also asked
me to go on with Zamindara League Funds as Lyallpur had given Rs.1, 25,000/-,
Multan Rs. 3, 85,000/- and other districts considerable sums towards Zamindara
League. I enquired how such large sums had been collected. He replied that
(resourceful Deputy Commissioners did not have much difficulty in collecting
money), as money was abundant owing to inflation. He suggested that I should levy
contributions for the Zamindara League all favours, which could not be claimed as
right by any one and were in fact a patronage of the party in power e.g. gun licences,
cotton cloth licences and for recommendations and favours in Civil Supplies matters

444
etc. etc. Again Sir Chhotu telephoned to me about the progress of affairs and I told
him that I was still waiting for the Zamindara League constitution. At last on 19 th
September I received a typed copy of a draft constitution of the Zamindara League
with a covering letter that printed copies would be made available as soon as they
were printed. A few days later I received about a dozen printed copies of the
Zamindara League constitution for distribution. 4 th October, 1944, was then fixed for
National War Front and Zamindara League Durbar to be held at Jagraon at which a
purse would be presented to the Hon’ble the Premier and (feverish activity was set
foot) to collect as much as possible during the sho [short] period of a fortnight. Sardar
Amarsarjit Singh donated Rs10, 000/- and became a Patron of the Zamindara League
(in return for which his first two demands were met subsequently, but the last demand
(for water) was not met, as Sir Chhotu died prematurely. Messages were received that
the sum originally expected (of Rs. 5?0, 000/- at Jullundur) from Ludhiana district for
the Zamindara League would not suffice as the Premier and the Hon’ble Minister
Revenue had been receiving over Rs 1,00,000/- from most districts, including Rs 1,25,
000/- from Mr. Ala-ud-Din Arshad, Deputy Commissioner Hisar–a neighbouring
district in their Durbars subsequent to Jullundur. These wishes of Hon’ble Minister
Revenue and Premier were passed on to Tahsildars and Civil Supplies Officer. The
Ministerial party comprising of the Premier, Hon’ble Minister Revenue and the
Hon’ble Minister Education arrived on 3-10-1944. I was called in the evening by the
Hon’ble Minister Education to the Rest House. He told me that Tahsildar Ludhiana
had informed him that Rs. 43, 000/- had been collected and as they were all coming
from Rohtak (Sir Chhotu’s District), where they were presented with a purse of Rs. 50,
000/-, he considered it a question of honour that Rs. 50, 000/- should be announced so
that the prestige of his district may be equally high in the eyes of the Ministry. He
suggested that the balance be borrowed from some money lender to be paid back
when it was collected. I said that I had no objection to President Zamindara League
presenting Rs. 50, 000/- but it was for the Hon’ble Minister Education to arrange for
the borrowing of Rs. 7, 000/- odd which was uncollected. The Hon’ble Minister of
Education again promised Extra Assistant Commissionership to Tahsildar Ludhiana if
he did good work in this direction. (Later Tahsildar’s role was called for Extra
Assistant commissionership, but I recommended him only for selection grade as his
English was poor and this was granted to him). On 4 th October a sum of Rs. 50, 000/was
accordingly presented to the Premier, Hon’ble Minister Revenue and Hon’ble
Minister Education at the Durbar at Jagraon, out of which the Civil Supplies Officer
had collected Rs. 6, 000/- odd from Civil Supplies licences I got the money refunded
to some people, who had complained of undue pressure.
8. The above detailed account shows the way (three Hon’ble Ministers including
the Premier put utmost) pressure on me to become the agent for collection of party
funds (for them). I was also made to understand by the Hon’ble Premier in September
on my visit to Simla that my reversion for a short period was under consideration and
the question was being considered whether to revert me or a P.C.S. Deputy
Commissioner. Some time after the purse presentation ceremony, I was told that I
would not be reverted. I was able to withstand this tremendous pressure, as I knew
that my father being in the Ministry there was not much chance of victimization. It
may suffice to mention the case of Diwan Sukh Anand, Deputy Commissioner
Sheikhupura who had collected some Rs. 65, 000/- but announced Rs.1,00, 000/- and
presented this sum as a purse for the Zamindara League. He was not able to find any
money lender to advance Rs. 35, 000/- to make up the deficiency without security and
consequently used his position as Chairman Cooperative Union Sheikhupura to

445
advance the loan without proper sanction or security, and against the Union rules,
from Cooperative funds. As the money was not collected for about a year afterwards,
the matter came to light in the Audit, but the Registrar hushed it up and asked the
Deputy Commissioner by a D.O. letter to pay up the sum at once, otherwise he would
get into trouble and bring the Ministry into disgrace also.
9. It may be questioned why, I did not bring these matters directly to the
knowledge of the Governor. My answer to this is that from the assurances of the
Hon’ble Ministers that the Governor was in the know and approved of their actions,
corroborated as it was by the general hue and cry in the province against the
collection of Zamindara League fund through official agency–there had been
questions even in the Central Assembly on the matter –, it was quite evident that the
matter was in the knowledge of the Governor. Moreover, it was commonly talked of
in official circles that the only reason why Mr. McKelvie I.C.S. on return from leave
ex-India had been appointed Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hissar, was that the
Ministry wished to give Mr. Ala-ud-Din Arshad the Deputy Commissioner of Hissar
the satisfaction of presenting the purse of Rs.1, 25,000/-, which he had got collected
through strenuous efforts, personally. Mr. McKelvie remained Additional Deputy
Commissioner for ten days until the ceremony was over at the Zamindara League
Durbar at Hissar, after which he took charge from Ala-ud-din Arshad. I, therefore, felt
that it would only make me unpopular if I raised my voice against these exactions by
official agency in the interest of party funds, and would not result in good.
10. I do not think it is necessary for me to give details of the various visits by the
Hon’ble Premier and the Ministers between October 1944 and the summer of 1945. It
will suffice to state that during these visits I was asked to put into the Zamindara
League organization and I was told that the purse presented in October should be
considered as a first contribution only and that efforts should be made to raise further
funds so that the organization may be strong enough and rich enough to fight out the
next Assembly elections. However, the situation changed after the defeat of Germany
in May and changed still further on the defeat of Japan in August 1945. Shortly after
the defeat of Japan a rumour went round the Secretariat that a list of Muslims Indian
Civil Servants was being prepared under the following three headings:-
(I) Deputy Commissioners who were staunch Unionist and whose loyalty
was not questioned by the Unionist Ministry.
(II) Deputy Commissioners who were neutral.
(III) Deputy Commissioners who had Muslim League leanings.
I learnt that my name was on the border line between class (I) and class (II).
The Hon’ble the Premier one day called me and told me that it had been decided to
post me to Montgomery district from 23 rd September 1945 on which date S. Iqbal
Singh, Montgomery’s Deputy Commissioner, would be retiring. I protested that I had
only been at Ludhiana for a year and a half and that it would not be in the interest of
service for me to change over now that I had mastered the problems of the district. I
pleaded that I could be of far greater use at Ludhiana than at Montgomery. The
Premier told me that at Ludhiana there was only one Muslim seat while at
Montgomery, where I had already spent some time as an Assistant Commissioner and
knew the prominent personalities, there were four seats, which it was imperative for
me to win for the Unionist Party. I protested that it would not be possible for me to
take active part in politics in view of my covenant and Government Servants Conduct
Rules. But the Premier argued that it would not be necessary for me to exert myself
very much because Montgomery was a colony area and the very fact that my father
was a Minister in the Unionist Government, would, without my doing much, induce

446
the people to vote for the Unionists so as to win my favour. I then wrote to the
Commissioner asking his advice and he agreed with me that I was doing very well at
Ludhiana and should not be moved. I then told my father that it was against my
conscience and the principles on which I had joined the Indian Civil Service for me to
be a party to interference in the ensuing elections and implored him to save me from
being posted at Montgomery, where my position would be awkward. He spoke to the
Premier on this subject and told me that the Premier had said that he would try and
see if he could do without me at Montgomery. Later on my father telephoned Mr.
Bhanot, the Chief Secretary, and asked him if the proposal to send me to Montgomery
had been given up. He replied that it was still under consideration. Later on I learnt
with relief that Mr. P. M. Ismail, I.C.S. had been sent to Montgomery.
11. This escape was a temporary relief, for as soon as it was decided to hold new
elections at an early date, the Premier made it plain to me that I would have to secure
the Ludhiana Muhammaden Rural seat for the Unionist Party. He asked me to
organize the Zamindara League in the district and said that he would be willing to pay
whatever sum I deemed fit to spend on engaging propagandists and putting life into
the movement. He consulted me as to the best candidate for the grant of Unionist
ticket and I told him that the best candidate was Lieut. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan.
He told me to recommend him for the grant of two units under the landed gentry
grants (four rectangles each rectangle worth Rs. 40, 000/-), so as to act as a bait for
him as well as to help him spend lavishly to secure the seat. The Premier told me that
he would grant as many rectangles as I recommended in the interest of the political
campaign and told me to recommend only such people as were standing as Unionist
or Akali candidates or were likely to help the return of candidates of these two parties.
As Lt. K. S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan had the best services to his credit in the district, I
recommended him for the grant of 4 rectangles as desired by the Premier, and
intended to speak to Mr. Macleod about the reason for my recommendation for so
large a parcel of land. I was apprehensive that unless I gave the reasons for
recommending this grant, Mr. Macleod might consider that I was a communalist
favouring a Muslim notable of the district. However, before I could have the
opportunity of speaking to Mr. Macleod, the district was visited by unprecedented
rains and floods in the course of which 35 [inches] of rain fell in the middle of
September 1945 within ten days. This attracted Sir James Anderson the Financial
Commissioner (Revenue to Ludhiana and during the week he spent in the district I
had an opportunity of having a heart to heart talk with him and expressing my
difficulties as a District Officer. He listened to me very patiently, but when I asked
him whether I should help the Unionist party as the Premier was keen I should do, he
did not give a definite reply. Finally on 12 th October I drove him all round the district
to inspect the flood damage and on learning that Lt. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan was
wavering and had been asked by Sir Firoz Khan Noon with whom his family was on
very cordial terms to accept Muslim League ticket, I put a direct question to Sir James
Anderson. I told him that which ever ticket Lt. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan took, he
would succeed and that unless I put pressure on him he would go over to the Muslim
League, as all his Rajput brother-hood were ardent Muslim Leaguers and I had only
been able to induce him to join the Zamindara League as President, pleading that this
was essential in the interest of war efforts of the district. I also told Sir James that
when I had communicated to Lt. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan that the Premier would
be sanctioning 4 rectangles of land to him, the Rai Sahib had replied that if he would
join the Zamindara League, it would not be an account of the land grant, but on a
question of principle and that, he said, his loyalty and faith were not a commodity for

447
sale. I told Sir James that this statement of his was ominous and unless I (acted
immediately) and) put pressure on the Rai Sahib that he would lose his honorary
Magistracy and other (well-earned) rewards, he was sure to go over to the Muslim
League, thereby causing a loss of one seat in Unionist ranks. Sir James then told me
that he would be retiring in April and was glad that he did not have to stay on in India
to face these difficult problems. He advised me that looking upon it as a Punjabi he
would, if he were in my position, go all out to help the Unionists and prevent Lt. K. S.
Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan’s defection to the Muslim League. He said that after all the
Province was faced with too stupendous problems in the post-war period and apart
from anything else nearly one million demobilized soldiers would have to be resettled
and for this it was essential to have a stable Ministry and not only a stable
Ministry but a non-communal Ministry. He pleaded that the Unionist party was the
only party which could form a stable and non-communal Ministry in the Punjab and
consequently we would be doing our duty if we helped it to regain power and bring
about stability in the province.) I said that, (illegible) but I did not know whether, in
view of the covenant and the Government Servants Conduct Rules, it would be proper
for me to act on this advice. Sir James then promised on his return to Lahore to speak
to the Governor and said that if the Governor’s advice was against interference, he
would write to me not to take part in politics; but if the Governor’s opinion was that I
should help the Unionist party in the elections, he would not communicate with me as
in such an eventuality the less said the better. I did not hear from Sir James Anderson
for a number of days after this and unfortunately on 13 th October 1945 Lt. K. S. Rai
Iqbal Ahmad Khan was induced by his kinsmen at a meeting to declare that he would
stand for the Muslim League ticket, and had decided not to stand on the Zamindara
League ticket any more. This was rather a blow to me and feeling that I could still
prevail upon Lt. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan to change his mind again, I telephoned
to Sir James Anderson on from Deputy Commissioner Jullundur’ residence, where I
had gone on a special invitation from the Hon’ble the Premier who was visiting that
district. After consulting Sir James Anderson about the flood relief measures and
more especially the possibility of a fodder famine in the district, I questioned Sir
James if he had seen the Governor about the question I had put to him. Sir James
replied that he had not had the opportunity of seeing the Governor but had had talks in
certain other high quarters and they had assured him that I could go right ahead. He
said that he would be seeing the Governor in a day or two and if His Excellency was
against it, he would let me know and if he did not do so than I should take it that it
was O.K. I did not hear any further from Sir James Anderson and the frequent visits
of the Hon’ble Premier and Ministers and their endeavour to utilize me to their
political advantage convinced me that all this was being done with the consent of the
Governor.
12. I was called to Lahore by the Hon’ble Premier on 23 rd November, 1945, to
discuss the grants of land case for war services. The Premier said that he would give
extra rewards to such candidates as were standing for the Unionist or the Akali Party
and for this reason one extra rectangle was given to Sardar Shamsher Singh, the Akali
candidate from Ludhiana district, although his services to the administration were not
more than any one else. The Premier was adamant that no land was to be given to K.S.
Rai Muhammad Iqbal Ahmad Khan because he has joined the Muslim League,
although his was far and away, the best record among the Muslim candidates. It was
with difficulty later that I was able to persuade the Premier to grant him one rectangle
of land, so that the allegations in other districts that the names of deserving Muslim
Leaguers had been crossed out from the list of land grants should not be levelled

448
against him as far as Ludhiana District was concerned. After the elections the Premier
ordered that S.S. Sardar Joginder Singh’s land grant should be cancelled if it had not
already been announced to him and that he should not be granted Honorary
Magisterial powers for which he had been trained because of his opposition to the
Akali candidate for Tahsil Jagraon. This despite the fact that S.S. Sardar Joginder
Singh’s record of service was one of the best among the Sikhs of his Tahsil.
I think it was on this visit that I learnt at the Secretariat that all the Muslim
I.C.S. Deputy Commissioners in Class (III) mentioned in paragraph 10 above had
been offered to be sent on a lecture tour to the Middle East for 4 months. These
included Mr. Zafarul Ahsan, Mr. Abdur Rahim and Pir Ahsan-ud-din, of these Mr.
Zafarul Ahsan accepted the offer while Mr. Rahim taking the hint proceeded on leave
lest he should be accused of interference in elections on the side of the Muslim
League. I was sorry that I had not been given the same offer as it would have saved
me from being placed in a very awkward position.
13. In the course of visits the Premier told me that although the Government of
India had decided to wind up the National War Front organization, he had decided to
convert it into a National Home Front organization round which the Zamindara
League would be organized. He asked me to hold frequent National Home Front
meetings and he would see to it that immediately after his men went about to the
Lambardars Zaildars and other influential persons which had gathered at the Home
Front meeting, while I was still there, to do their best for the Zamindara League. He
also promised to send Mian Abdul Haye to address some meetings. Accordingly Mian
Sahib sent me a telephonic message on to arrange a Zamindara League meeting for
him in one of the Muslim areas. I made these arrangements and convened a meeting at
Dhanansu on ???? . Later on Mian Sahib telephoned to me that my presence would
be necessary at the meeting. I protested that I would get into trouble if I attended the
Zamindara League meeting. He said that I should convert it to National Home Front
meeting and this would incidentally have the advantage that Government loudspeakers
and other arrangements could be made without cost to the party. A meeting
ostensibly under the National Home Front was arranged, but to my utter surprise Mian
Sahib made an electioneering speech there in which after recounting the various
benefits conferred on the people by the Unionist Ministry, he proclaimed that he had
not come there for any personal self-seeking object, but to beg the zamindars who had
gathered there for votes for the Unionist party, which had done unique service for
them. I decided that I would not attend any more National Home Front meetings of
this nature. On this visit Mian Abdul Haye told me that he was not standing for
election owing to ill-health and in the course of conversation informed me that the
Governor had promised to Malik Khizar Hayat Khan that he would be called to form
the next Ministry.
14. It was after this that owing to the date for elections coming nearer, visits from
the Hon’ble the Primer and Ministers became more frequent at each of which we were
asked to do our best for the Unionist and Akali candidates. The Premier said that K.S.
Iqbal Ahmad Khan should be told that he would not get a single rectangle of land nor
the title of “Than Bahadur” of which he was so keen unless he came back to the
Zamindara Unionist League. He also consulted me about the best man for the
Unionist ticket in the event of Lt. K. S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Kan not returning to the
Unionist fold and questioned me about the chances of Maulvi Muhammad Shafi Gujar
B.A. LLB who had hitherto been the President of the District Muslim League. I
informed him that Maulvi Muhammad Shafi was a very able organizer and had done a
great deal to build up the Muslim League organization in the district, but I doubt it

449
whether he would come back. The Premier told me that he had learnt from a reliable
source that Maulvi Muhammad Shafi was willing to stand on the Unionist ticket and
that I should approach him. I consequently enquired from him and he expressed his
willingness and was granted the Unionist ticket after Muslim League had granted its
ticket to Lt. K.S. Rai Iqbal Ahmad Khan.
15. I advised the Premier that the Zamindara League organization was practically
moribund at least so far as Ludhiana District was concerned and that he should
appoint some paid propagandists and organizers. I also advised him that the method
being followed by Unionists of contacting Zaildars and influential zamindars at the
Rest House or at the Deputy Commissioners’ residence, wherever they happen to be
staying, was not one which would secure them votes and suggested that they should
hold meetings in the villages and come into direct contact with the public. The
Premier said that this they had planned to do but they were conserving their energies
for the last month or 3 weeks before the elections, as if they started this propaganda
before they would soon get worn out and tired.
16. The Premier also asked me as to the best candidate for the Eastern Town
Muhammaden Constituency for which Mian Abdul Haye had refused to stand. I
suggested that Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf who had been defeated by Mian Abdul
Haye at the last elections would perhaps be the best candidate. Accordingly Khawaja
Muhammad Yusaf was induced to put in his nomination paper for this seat as against
Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (Muslim League) and Master Taj-ud-Din (Ahrar). On the
morning of 17 th January at about 8.45 A.M. I received an urgent telephone from the
Hon’ble Sardar Baldev Singh, Minister of Development, stating that the night before
on his way from Ambala to Lahore he had met Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf and had
been informed that Khawaja would only stand on the Unionist ticket if the party paid
him Rs. 25,000/- towards the expenses and induced the Ahrar candidate to withdraw,
as the fight against Sardar Shaukat Hayat would be very stiff. Since Sardar Baldev
Singh was unable to give this assurance Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf had said that he
would withdraw his nomination papers. Sardar Baldev Singh said that on his way
from Ludhiana to Lahore he had met Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar the leader of the
Ahrar Party and had secured his promise to make Master Taj-ud-Din Ahrar candidate
sit down in favour of Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf. He asked me to inform Khawaja
Muhammad Yusaf accordingly and to ask him not to withdraw his nomination papers
pending negotiations with the Unionist Party. I at once sent for Khawaja Muhammad
Yusaf who arrived at about 10 A.M. and told me that he had just sent Maulvi Aziz-ur-
Rehman his agent for withdrawing the nomination papers on to Ambala where the
withdrawal was to take place. He said that the only course now for me was to
telephone to Mr. B.S. Grewal, Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, and ask him to prevent
his agent from withdrawing the nomination papers and that he would also send a man
by the next train or by car if necessary to see that the papers were not withdrawn. I
telephoned to Mr. Grewal accordingly. At about 12 noon Mr. Grewal telephoned and
said that Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman was not willing to listen to reason and was bent on
withdrawing the nomination papers. I then had to tell Mr. Grewal certain details
which he could put to Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman to show that the request being made
originated from Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf and this pacified the agent and Khawaja
Muhammad Yusaf’s papers were not withdrawn. Later on, however, Master Taj-ud-
Din, the Ahrar candidate, refused to sit down and Khawaja Muhammad Yusaf
withdrew in his favour before the date of polling. I was extremely sorry to have to act
in this manner which strictly speaking is against the Government Servants Conduct
Rules, but I was left no option as I felt that if I did not carry out these instructions I

450
would be branded as the enemy of the Unionists and probably shunted out from
Ludhiana.
17. After this the Premier saw me two or three times and on each occasion
impressed upon me the extreme necessity of defeating Sardar Shaukat Hayat, as the
Governor who had dismissed him from Ministership, considered it a point of honour
that the Sardar should be defeated and be divorced from the political life of the
province. I pleaded that although it was possible for me to influence voters through
the zaildars and the village official agency unobtrusively, but any step taken by me to
help Sardar Shaukat Hayat’s opponents would be immediately known in the city and I
would bring on an immense volume of propaganda against me for interfering with
elections. The Premier told me not to mind this. The Premier also told me that Maulvi
Habib-ur-Rahman, the Ludhiana Ahrar Leader, had complained to him that the City
Inspector of Ludhiana was siding with the Muslim League and asked me to report for
his transfer. I replied that although I and the Superintendent of Police were intensely
vigilant but we both were of the opinion that this information was entirely wrong.
However, if the Premier felt that there was any truth in it as incharge of the Police
portfolio he could at once get the Inspector transferred.
18. On his next visit the Premier asked me that his information was that I had not
done much for the defeat of Sardar Shaukat Hayat and asked me to instruct all Mir
Mohallas in the city through the Police to secure votes for the Ahrar candidate. I
spoke to Sardar Gurdial Singh, Superintendent of Police Ludhiana and he said that
strict orders of Government have been received that officers were not to take part in
politics and would be dismissed if they did so. But even if this were to have no force,
he would on a question of principle and for the future of India not like to get his
Police to take any part in politics.
19. The Hon’ble premier visited Ludhiana next in the middle of January when he
had his lunch with me and told me that I had still not done much for the defeat of
Sardar Shaukat Hayat and had not issued instructions to the Mir Mohallas and
influential people to secure votes against Sardar Shaukat Hayat. I replied that the
Superintendent of Police said that he was precluded from doing so in view of the
Government instructions on the subject issued recently. The Premier said that these
instructions were issued on paper only because of the intense propaganda which the
Muslim League was making on the subject of official interference in the elections and
that we should take no notice of them. He said that I should tell the Superintendent of
Police to consult his Inspector General over the matter. With regard to his suggestion
that I should ask all the leading residents of the different Mohallas (blocks) in the city,
I pleaded that he should not wish me to indulge in this, as the fact of my having
canvassed for votes against Sardar Shaukat Hayat would not remain a secret and I
would make an inveterate enemy of him throughout his life. I suggested that he
should sent [send] the Hon’ble Mian Abdul Haye, Minister of Education, along to
Ludhiana which was his home town and through him something could be done. He
promised to do so, but Mian Abdul Haye never came and escaped on a tour of Madras
and Bombay at the critical time. The Premier again insisted that it was a question of
honour to defeat Sardar Shaukat Hayat and the Governor was personally interested in
it. Just before the Premier was about to leave Maulvi Habib-ur-Rahman, the Ludhiana
Ahrar Leader, came along and the Premier told him that he had issued complete
instructions to me on the subject of election campaign against Sardar Shaukat Hayat
and that the Maulvi should send me a list of all the influential persons, who were loyal
to Government and who could be of use to him so that I could twist their tails and ask

451
them to vote for Master Taj-ud-Din and against Sardar Shaukat Hayat. A day or two
after this I received a detailed list anonymously, which is attached in original.
20. On the day after the Premier’s visit I saw the Superintendent of Police and
conveyed to him the Premier’s instructions and also that if he had any qualms of
conscience he should consult his Inspector General. He said that quite apart from my
message Mr. Chandra, the new officiating Commissioner Jullundur Division had also
taken him aside at the dinner party given by me in his honour and told him that he had
a special message for him from the Hon’ble the Premier that no stone should be left
unturned to defeat Sardar Shaukat Hayat. He said that he would per-force have to
twist the tail of city Inspector Ludhiana and ask him to get the Mir Mohallas to
canvass actively for Master Taj-ud-Din the Ahrar candidate.
21. About this time Ch. Ram Singh of the Punjab Police, who had been
Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, up to October 1945 visited Ludhiana to give
evidence in one of the Courts. He called on me and I asked him about the state of
political parties in Sargodha. Ch. Ram Singh said that the Premier had specially
selected him for Sargodha during the election period and that I could take it in writing
from him that 3 out of the 4 Muslims seats would go to our Party (meaning the
Unionist) and possibly the 4 th also. He said that after the elections he had been
promised being confirmed as Superintendent of Police and promoted to the Imperial
Police Service. Incidentally I may mention that in September 1945 Ch. Ram Singh
had before his transfer told me that if I could only wink at it every Muslim League
meeting would end in a pandemonium and it would be impossible for that
organization to hold any meeting or to influence the electorate. I asked him how this
could be done and he told me that he could easily do so by asking his subordinates to
introduce hooliganism to break up every such meeting. I told him that this would be
most unconstitutional (and that I could not tolerate such interference in politics in my
district.
22. I think I have said enough about the kind of intense pressure which under
cover of the Governor’s approval has been exerted on me and other Deputy
Commissioners. (As I have already stated, I have been fortunate that my father Sir
Jamal Khan Leghari was in the Ministry and consequently I could have the moral
courage to resist it. But I know it for a fact that other Deputy Commissioners who
have not this backing and depend upon the Indian Civil Service for their livelihood
have not been able to withstand it. I have already mentioned how Mr. Chandra
officiating Commissioner Jullundur Division bore the special message of the Premier
for an all out drive against Sardar Shaukat Hayat, to Sardar Gurdial Singh
Superintendent of Police. Mr. Chandra, the Premier had assured me, was “his man”.
The impression I got from Mr. Chandra’s visit to Ludhiana from 14 th to 18 th January
was that he would like me to side with the Unionist in the elections. I told him that I
would do everything to see that the election was a balanced one and that he should
rest assured that so far as Ludhiana district was concerned no official interference
would be allowed, but if any were exercised, it would be on the side of the Unionists
and the Akali party. It was on this visit that Mr. Chandra told me that I had been
rather foolish in recommending Lt. K.S. Iqbal Ahmad Khan for the title of “Khan
Bahadur”, since he betrayed the Unionist and had taken the Muslim League ticket. I
said that I had made the recommendation as I considered myself the representative of
the King and as such I could not overlook the foremost claims of the Rai Sahib, on
grounds of services rendered during the war, to the title. I said that it was open to the
Ministry to overlook the claims on political grounds, but I did not see why it should
be considered improper of me to make recommendations according to merits. Mr.

452
Chandra said that this sort of thing only irritates the Ministry against one and as such
in my interest he was not forwarding the name. Mr. Chandra’s interest was also
shown by his visit on 6.2.1946 by car all the way to Ludhiana for ten minutes with the
message from the Premier that official interference on the side of Muslim League in
the elections should cease at once, which I interpreted as meaning that I was not
taking a sufficient interest on the side of the Unionist and the Akali party.
23. It will be clear from the foregoing, how difficult it has become for an officer to
do his duty conscientiously without dishonouring the oath and the pledge, taken when
signing the Covenant. I know that there is tremendous dissatisfaction at this form of
“prostitution of the Civil Service in the Punjab” against which there appears to have
been no safeguard recently in view of the fact that officials in high quarters (including
apparently the Governor) are said to be interested in the success of the Unionist Party
and the defeat of the Muslim League. (The position of the Deputy Commissioners of
districts from the provincial Civil Service cadre is even more shocking and some of
them have openly bragged to me, thinking that being the son of a Unionist Minister, I
would be pleased at it, that they have actively been helping the Unionist Party and
have been canvassing for votes not only from the Zaildars and notables of the rural
area, but also from National Home Front platforms). I consider that this state of affairs
requires immediate remedying (as the members of the Provincial Civil Service would
have no safeguard if the alleged alliance between the Government and the Unionist
Party exist) and feel that it is all the more important why these facts should be brought
to the notice of the Secretary of State who is our final protecting authority so that he
may grant us protection from this sordid lowering of the high principles on which our
services are based and from our being forced to (play the dishonourable part of
becoming minions of the dominant political party of the day). It would not be out of
place to point out here the well-known fact that for the last 3 odd years the vacancies
in the selection grades of Provincial Civil Service Officers and the confirmation of the
Deputy Commissioners have been held up among the P.C.S., it is generally believed,
for the reason that their loyalty to the existing Ministry may be proved through their
collections of funds for political parties’ and help in elections.
24.
25. I hope that in view of the frank exposition of the facts this memorial/petition
will be kept secret and that if there is any doubt as to the accuracy of the facts stated, I
will be given and opportunity to substantiate them, so that these grievances may be
removed forth with and the burden of heavy work on district officers prevented from
being made even more difficult to bear owing to the unpleasant state of affairs which
has come about in the Punjab during the last two years. (It is most important that
officers should be saved from selling their conscience and principles of service in
return for a salary which has reduced, owing to inflation, to one-third in purchasing
power to what it is on paper.
26. It is not for me to suggest the details by which these safeguards against
improper interference of this nature are to be enforced. However, I feel that if in the
instrument of instructions to Governors it were provided that Governors should on
proof of undue influence on Government servants of this nature, remove the Minister
from membership of the Legislative Assembly and prohibit him from seeking reelection
for a period of 5 years, it may do the trick. This is at present the normal way
of dealing with members or Presidents of local bodies under the Municipal and
District Board Acts in cases where they abuse their position of trust
Source: File- 1120, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan.

APPENDIX-6
453
Inward Telegram
Allotted to Political Department
From Viceroy
To Secretary of State for India
Dated: Bangalore, 00.30 hours, 7th February, 1 946
-----------
Immediate
No. 23 SC. TOP SECRET
Superintendent Series.
If compelled to indicate demarcation of genuinely Moslem areas I recommend that we
should include:
(a) Sind, North West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan and Rawalpindi,
Multan and Lahore divisions of Punjab less Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts.
(b) Bengal…….....
2. In the Punjab the only Moslem majority district that would not go into Pakistan
under this demarcation is Gurdaspur (51 per cent Moslem), Gurdaspur must go with
Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay
out of Pakistan. But for this case for importance of Amritsar, demarcation in the
Punjab could have been on divisional boundaries. Fact that much of Lahore district is
irrigated from upper Bari Doab canal with headworks in Gurdaspur district is
awkward but there is no solution that avoids all such difficulties.
3. Greatest difficulty is position of Sikhs with their homelands and sacred places on
both sides of border. This problem is one which no version of Pakistan can solve.
4. The population figures that follow are thousands. The Punjab including Punjab
States has a Sikh population of 5,116. Of these under proposed scheme 1,461 will be
in Pakistan and rest in Hindustan. Of those in Pakistan a substantial number are in
districts which under any arrangements are bound to be in Pakistan, e.g. Rawalpindi
(64) and colony districts of Lyallpur (263) and Montgomery (175).
5. We should make it clear in any announcement that this is only an indication of
areas to which in H.M.G.’s view the Moslems can advance a reasonable claim;
modifications in boundary might be negotiated and no doubt the interests of Sikhs in
particular would be carefully considered in such negotiations. Some such saving
clause is indicated by importance of preventing immediate violence by Sikhs……...
Source: IOR: L/PO/6/114, British Library, London.

APPENDIX-7
Letter from Pethick Lawrence to Master Tara Singh on 1 June 1946.
Dear Master Tara Singh,
Thank you for your letter of 25 th May.
454
The anxieties of the Sikhs were kept prominently in mind when we were drafting the
Cabinet Mission’s statement and I can certainly claim that of the various alternatives
open to us the best one from the Sikh point of view was chosen. You will, I am sure,
admit that if India had been divided into two sovereign states, or if the Punjab had
been partitioned, either of these decisions would have been far less acceptable to the
Sikhs than the one which was actually reached.
I have considered carefully the detailed points you raise at the end of your letter. I fear
the Mission cannot issue any addition to, or interpretation of, the Statement. There is,
however, no intention whatever to prejudice the position of the Sikhs in the Punjab or
in the North-West Group, nor do I think their position has been prejudiced, for it is
inconceivable that either the Constituent Assembly or any future Government of the
Punjab will overlook the special place in the Province of the Sikhs. The estimate of
the importance of your community would never depend on the number of seats that
you held in the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy has told me that he will be glad,
in view of the anxieties you have expressed on behalf of your community, to discuss
the position of the Sikhs specially with the leaders of the main parties when the
Constituent Assembly as been formed; he hopes he may be able to persuade them if
persuasion is needed, that the interests of the Sikhs should on no account be
overlooked.
If you and Sardar Baldev Singh would care to see the Cabinet Mission and the
Viceroy in the first week of June, we shall be glad to see you.
Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Pethick-Lawrence
Source: L/PJ/10/33, Cabinet Mission and Sikhs, British Library, London

APPENDIX-8
455
Secret
Record of Interview of the Cabinet Delegation and HE the Viceroy with Master
Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh Representing the Sikh Community on
Thursday, 6 th June, at 4 p.m.
Master Tara Singh said that there was much alarm among the Sikhs over the
Statement which the Cabinet Delegation had issued. The Sikhs were hopelessly in a
minority in Group B where they had only four seats out of a total 36.
His Excellency the Viceroy said tat this was the population ratio. It would not help the
Sikhs if they had had two or three more seats as they would still have been in a
minority. He did not think that it was possible for an important minority like the Sikhs
to be overlooked of their interests left unconsidered. Mr. Jinnah was sympathetic to
the position of the Sikhs and the Viceroy thought that he had no intention whatever of
doing the Sikhs an injury.
Master Tara Singh said that there might be no intention but that none the less it might
happen. He referred to recent elections for the Lahore Corporation as a result of which
the Sikhs had a fear. Sardar Baldev Singh said that what had happened in Lahore was
that there had been an equality of votes in the election of the Mayor and in accordance
with the rules a decision had been taken by toss. A Muslim League Mayor had been
appointed. When it came to the election of Committees there was again an equality of
votes and the Muslim League Mayor had a casting vote. He had exercised this to
appoint Committees which had no representatives of the Hindus, the Sikhs or the
Indian Christians. Master Tara Singh’s view was that under the Delegation’s
proposals there was no safeguard for the Sikhs against this kind of thing.
The Viceroy said that the Delegation might have given to the Sikhs the same right as
the Muslims have in the Union Constituent Assembly, namely, that no important
communal issue affecting the Sikhs should be decided without a majority of Sikhs
voting in its favour. Sir S. Cripps said that if the Delegation had done this for the
Sikhs they would have had to have done it for everyone else. There was no provision
for double communal voting in the Section Constituent Assemblies. If there had been
it would have had to have been given to Hindus, Depressed Classes and others. He
thought the Sikhs were in a strong position. Although they were a small party both

456
sides would be anxious to get their support. Master Tara Singh observed that the
Sikhs were not in the position of being the balancing party.
Sardar Baldev Singh asked what would happen if the Sikh walked out of the Group
Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy said that the Group would have to proceed to
frame a constitution without the Sikhs and the First Lord observed that this would be
a most mistaken thing for the Sikhs to do. He referred to the Delegation’s Statement
of the 25 th May in which they had said that H.M.G. would take the necessary steps in
Parliament for effect to be given to the new constitution subject to their being satisfied
that due provision had been made for minority protection. Sardar Baldev Singh said,
would H.M.G. decline to give effect to any constitution to which the Sikhs raised
objection. He was told that this was asking for a complete veto and was quite
unacceptable.
The Viceroy emphasised that the Sikhs could do no greater harm to their interests than
to support agitation now. It was the duty of the Sikh leaders to explain to their
followers the damage that agitation would do their interests. Agitation would certainly
not be allowed and it would alienate the Muslims and would also lose for the Sikhs
the sympathy and good offices of the British Government. Mr. Alexander said that the
Sikhs would have representatives on the Constituent Assembly who could speak for
them. They would also have representation on the Advisory Committee on Minorities.
Sardar Baldev Singh observed that he had been told that the report of the Advisory
Committee would not be mandatory. The Viceroy said that this was so but that it
would be very difficult for the Assembly to disregard the recommendations. Sardar
Baldev Singh asked whether the Sikhs could put up a request in the Group B
Constituent Assembly for a decision that matters affecting the Sikhs should only be
decided by a vote which included a majority of Sikh representatives. Sir S. Cripps
said there was nothing to prevent this or to prevent Group B from deciding on that
procedure if the majority were in favour of it. Sardar Baldev Singh asked whether the
Delegation would put this point to Mr. Jinnah. His Excellency the Viceroy said that he
might mention it to Mr, Jinnah.
Sir S. Cripps said that he thought that the Delegation had given the best advice they
could to the Sikhs. The most fatal thing the Sikhs could do to their own interests
would be to give trouble. They should wait and see what happened in the Constituent
Assembly. Agitation at this stage would put the Muslim League against them and it
would spoil any chance of the Viceroy being able to use his influence successfully on

457
their behalf. Master Tara Singh observed that the future of the Sikhs appeared to be
dark. The Viceroy said that he would certainly do all he could to help the Sikhs whom
he had known in the Army on and off for 40 years. He thought their fears were
exaggerated. They should rely rather on their quality than on numbers and he felt sure
that no one could neglect the position of the Sikhs in the Punjab in framing a
constitution for that Province.
Source: IOR: /PJ/10/33, Cabinet Mission and Sikhs, British Library, London.

Top Secret
C.D.I. (1)
APPENDIX-9
458
CABINET DELEGATION TO INDIA
VIALBILITY OF PAKISTAN
I circulate for consideration and discussion, notes by my Office on the
economic, defence and finance aspects of this subject.
P.-L.
India Office,
13 th February, 1946
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1- ECONOMIC ASPECT OF PAKISTAN
1- Advocates of Pakistan indulge in a good deal of loose argument and wishful
thinking on the economic aspect of the idea or indeed in many cases they seem
to close their eyes to it altogether. It is idle to believe that the political
advantages of separating one part of India from another can be realized
without detriment to the economic advantages of a united India. There is
bound to be an economic price to pay for the satisfaction of the Moslem
demand for political independence and the questions which must be
considered are, what that price will be, whether it is so heavy as to create an
impossible situation, or whether is one the paying which will do no more than
prejudice in some degree the general welfare of the population and stand in the
way of measures to raise their standard of living and increase their prosperity.
The history of Central Europe during the last 30 years serves as an object
lesson of the sort of thing that Pakistan involves. Before 1914 Central Europe
was comparatively well organized from the economic point of view. The
calamitous results of the 1919 settlement show what can result from the
sacrifice of economic to political consideration. The inclusion of Calcutta in
Pakistan would probably prove to be an even greater source of friction than
any feature of the 1919 settlement in Europe. In estimating the consequences
of establishing a Pakistan regime, however, it must be borne in mind that
comparisons should be made, not as between a Moslem State and the India
which exists to-day but rather with the Hindu majority State in which the
Moslems would otherwise be included.
2- In order that this elusive subject may examine it is necessary to make certain
assumption. In the first place one must assume that there will be at least two
Pakistan areas, namely (1) in the North-West of India, an area consisting of
the Punjab (or most of the Punjab), the North-West Frontier Province, Sind
and Baluchistan, and (2) in the East of India, Bengal (or most of Bengal) and
Assam. (There is a part of Assam which would not qualify for Pakistan on the
strength of the Moslem majority of the population but its geographical
position may necessitate its inclusion in Eastern Pakistan). Secondly, one
assumes that the three divisions of India thus constituted will stand on their
own legs and that there will be no Federal Union, however loose. There would
probably be a national link between Eastern and Western Pakistan but this

459
could hardly possess any reality from the economic point of view. Thirdly, one
assumes that large-scale transfers of population are ruled out as impracticable.
3- The first and most obvious effect of Pakistan would be the increase of
overhead expenses resulting from distribution of the present centrally
organized establishments and services. This, coupled with the obstacles and
hindrances to rational and efficient economic activities which rebound to
result from the disruption of India’s economic unity, will mean that the
already lamentably deficient resources available in India for welfare measures
will become even more limited and the development of social services must
inevitably be restricted if indeed they do not have to be reduced even below
their present level. An important economic consequence of Pakistan will
undoubtedly be the disruption of what has hitherto been one of the largest and
most notable areas of free trade in the world. The present system under which
the economic policy of India can be planned as a whole will be replaced by a
system under which the policies of the separate parts will go their own course
and will set up a condition of competition and antagonism. This seems
specially regrettable both from the external and from the internal aspect at a
time when the liberalization and expansion of trade claim so much attention.
The establishment of new Customs Administrations will be a matter of some
practical importance. The cost will increase very considerably because land
and river boundaries require a much larger preventive staff than a sea
boundary. Experience proves that customs barriers of this sort inevitably place
restrictions on and set up hindrances to the development of trade. Leaving
aside for the moment the special question of Calcutta, both North Western and
Eastern Pakistan are likely to be predominantly agricultural areas. North
Western Pakistan at any rate must therefore be expected to pursue in fiscal
matters a policy which favours agriculture as against industrialization or will
seek to set up and protect its own industries. It certainly will not be willing to
pay a share of the price for greatly expanded industrialization in Hindu India
except in return for large concessions. Pakistan will almost certainly seek to
establish new industries in so far as this may serve the purpose of converting
its own products into the requirements of its own people. Thus raw cotton
grown in the Punjab and Sind is likely to be manufactured into cotton piece
goods by these new industries instead of obtaining their requirements form the
textile canters established elsewhere by Hindu industrialists. As regards other
commodities, North-West. India is at present a valuable market for the sugar
industry of the United Provinces and Bihar; Pakistan would undoubtedly
prefer to import the much cheaper produce of Java. The position in regard to
wheat is precisely opposite since in normal times North-West India looks to
markets in other parts of the Northern part of India for the sale of its surplus
production of wheat and before the war it was dependent for this upon a
preventive import duty levied upon wheat imported from abroad, more
particularly from Australia. Special considerations arise in the case of jute and
these will be referred to later. In regard to fuel there is a balanced situation,
Pakistan having the oil at Attock and Digboi, and Hindu India most of the coal.
4- The question whether Calcutta should be included in Eastern Pakistan is one
which raises some very serious issues. If Calcutta is not so included Eastern
Pakistan will obviously be a very poor thing and Pakistan as a whole will be
heavily unbalanced as between agriculture on the one hand, and industry,
commerce and finance on the other. It is for that reason, no doubt, that the

460
Moslems, though not taking up an intransigent attitude with regard to the
Hindu areas in the West of Bengal, include Calcutta in their ideas for eastern
Pakistan in spite of the facts that they are far from having a majority of the
population of Calcutta and their stake in its economic activities is even smaller.
While the Moslem claim has to Calcutta is even smaller. While the Moslem
claim to Calcutta is thus seen to be very weak, the Hindu claim has to take
account of the size and importance of the European interests. The future of the
European business community is difficulty to predict, but on the question of
Calcutta it is most unlikely that they would favour its inclusion in Eastern
Pakistan. If on the other hand Calcutta were excluded from Eastern Pakistan,
the jute industry situated there would be separated from the source of supply
of most of its material and a particular complication would be created on
account of the export duty levied on jute and jute goods. The proceeds of this
duty at present form an important item of revenue not only to the Government
of India but also to the jute producing Provinces. If some agreement is not
reached between Pakistan and Hindustan a proportion of the total jute crop
will be burdened with export duties imposed by both states no matter whether
exported overseas or to some destination within India. Into whichever State
Calcutta were to fall arrangements would be necessary to ensure that goods
imported through Calcutta into the State not including it were subjected to
customs duties to the account of State and not to the account of the State of
which Calcutta formed part. If such an arrangement were not made and if
Calcutta were included in Eastern Pakistan the tendency, which would exist in
any event, for Hindu India to take its imports from Bombay instead of Calcutta
would be accordingly accentuated, with resultant ill-effects on the prosperity
of Calcutta. It is of course probable that if Calcutta is included in Pakistan,
partition will be followed by the immigration to Hindustan of those business
houses whose interests are centred in Hindustan. Difficulties arising from
double income tax would, no doubt, accelerate this movement.
5- A large part of the present prosperity enjoyed by the Punjab, as compared with
most of the other Provinces, is dependent on her predominance in the Army
and in the amount of military expenditure in the Punjab other than the pay and
pensions of personnel of the Indian Army whose homes are in North-West
India. The population of the North-Western Provinces is less than 10% of that
of the whole of India, but at the time the war broke out the Punjabis formed
considerably more than 50% of the Indian Army. If, in future, inhabitants of
North Western Pakistan find as much remunerative employment in military
service as they have in the past it must be assumed that it will be entirely at the
expense of the are to which they belong and not largely at the expense of the
rest of India. The question whether Hindu India will assume its proportionate
share of the liability for the military pensions which mean so much to the
Punjab is, of course, one which needs to be dealt with in any financial
appreciation of the practicability of Pakistan.
6- Fortunately, no difficulty of a crucial nature seems likely to arise in
connection with the distribution of vital supplies of water. The area fed by the
Indus system will lie almost entirely within the Pakistan area; if one includes
within Pakistan the two Moslem States of Khairpur and Bahawalpur, only
Bikaner which relies to an important extent upon irrigation derived from the
Indus system, will be left outside. On the other hand considerable irrigation
works are required to provide for the needs of the Punjab. This can only be

461
done by means of further large expenditure on capital works on the Indus in
Sind but it is doubtful whether these developments can be carried out without
the credit and good will of a Central Government. Irrigation developments in
Bengal are likely similarly to be handicapped
7- The economic development of India is clearly dependent on the services
which have in the past met the economic requirements of the whole of India,
regardless of he boundaries between Provinces and States. The main example
is, of course, the railways but others are posts and telegraphs, banking and
currency, commercial law, etc. In all these cases the sub-division of India will
grievously hamper further progress unless an atmosphere of general good will
and commonsense and community of interest is maintained. On the other hand
in the absence of such and atmosphere, they can be productive of endless
friction and discord. Examples of both situations are not far to seek in the
recent history of Europe. The division of India will be born in bitter
antagonism and it will certainly be rash to assume that this will not be
reflected in the efforts necessary to regulate the machinery of communications
and of economic intercourse between the Pakistan States and the rest of India.
The effect of the partition on the development of Civil Aviation in India is
difficult to foresee but its is clear that growth will be hampered if the
important airport of Karachi is separated from the main part of India as well,
possibly, as that of Calcutta.
8- It is hard to resist the conclusion that taking all these considerations into
account the splitting up of India will be the reverse of beneficial so far as the
livelihood of the people is concerned. In a country where the standard of living
is so low and the population figures are so constantly increasing, this is a
factor which cannot be neglected. No doubt the weight of the economic
arguments against Pakistan, if they are realized by those concerned, will cause
them to turn their minds to some form of federal arrangement with Hindu
India, but, unfortunately, the fact that Pakistan, when soberly and realistically
examined, is found to be a very unattractive proposition, will place the
Moslems in a very disadvantageous position for making satisfactory terms
with Hindu India for a Federal Union. Thus they will find themselves on the
horns of a dilemma, either a cramped and exiguous existence in Pakistan or a
precarious and subordinate relationship with the Hindus in Federal India. If,
however, the present States will come into existence, which seems incapable
of doing justice to the economic requirements of their peoples.
2. THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN
1- It is assumed that Pakistan would consist of two parts
(a) Western Pakistan, consisting of Baluchistan, Sind, North-West Frontier
Province and that part of the Punjab which lies west of the River Sutleg as far
north as exclusive Ferozepore, thence due north as far as the River Beas near
Kakkar and thence following the line of the River Beas.
(b) Eastern Pakistan consisting of those parts of Assam and Bengal which lie
east of the River Brahmputra as far south as Rajbari thence due south to the Bay
of Bengal.
The actual boundaries are not of great importance………… is of importance is
that Pakistan:
(i) Includes no manufacturing or industrial areas of importance other
than the Digboi and Attock oilfields.

462
(ii) Has no ports of importance except Karachi in the west. In the east,
Chittagong is a very indifferent port, served only by a metre gauge
railway.
(iii) Has no important rail centres except Lahore in the west, which has
direct lines to Karachi as well as to Peshawar and to Delhi and
Hindustan. In the east, the railway system centres on Calcutta,
which is in Hindustan. All the railways in Eastern Pakistan are
metre gauge, and are connected with Chittagong. The rivers
Brahmputra and Meghna form an alternative means of
communication from Dibrugarh to the sea.
(iv) Has no connection between the eastern and western portions except
by sea round Ceylon, a two or three weeks’ voyage, as long as no
hostile power has command of the Indian Ocean, or by rail through
Hindustan as long as Hindustan will grant facilities.
2- Commitments. The military commitments of Western and Eastern Pakistan
differ so greatly that they are best considered separately.
3- Western Pakistan.
(a) Armed forces are required for
Aid to the civil power
Control of the tribes on the North-West frontier
Defence against Afghanistan
Defence against Russia or a Russian aided Persia.
(b) Aid to the civil power
Large centres of population where military garrisons have been maintained in
the past are
Lahore
Multan
Rawalpindi
Peshawar
The two last named are likely to be military stations in any case and would not,
therefore, require a special allotment of internal security troops. Multan is 237
miles from Lahore and would need a garrison unless a squadron of transport
aircraft and a landing ground at Multan were maintained. Intercommunal trouble
is unlikely to decrease with the creation of Pakistan.
The presence of the two large cities of Ferozepore and Amritsar in Hindustan,
so close to the frontier near Lahore, would be an added reason for keeping a
considerable due to inter-communal disturbances in the adjacent territories of
Hindustan.
Three or four battalions would be required for this internal security
commitment, either concentrated at Lahore, if transport aircraft and a landing
ground at Multan were available, or with one battalion detached at Multan if they
were not. This commitment could be reduced by an equivalent increase in armed
police.
(c) Tribes of North-west Frontier
Although a Mussalman government in Pakistan might be expected to
lead to a decrease of trouble from their co-religionists of the North-West
Frontier tribes, the economic factor makes any real improvement of the
situation on those grounds alone unlikely in practice. It would not, therefore,
be reasonable to expect any reduction of the armed forces on the frontier to be
possible until after a general disarming of the tribes. The equivalent of some

463
three divisions, including a reserve division, plus a minimum of two Air Force
squadrons for Army co-operation and ground attack and one bomber squadron
must be considered necessary, in addition to the present Frontier Militia
numbering some 10,000 men.
(d) Afghanistan
One armoured and three infantry divisions and one armoured Brigade with
some ten Air Force squadrons, including fighter bomber and transport aircraft, are
probably the minimum forces necessary to resist Afghan aggression and bring a war
with Afghanistan to a successful conclusion by the occupation of either Kabul or
Kandhar, or possibly both.
These would be additional to the forces needed for aid to the civil power and
control of the tribes. One further division as a general reserve is also desirable.
(e) Afghanistan, aided and abetted by Russia
The war potential of Russia is so immense compared to that of Pakistan that an
estimate of the forces which would be needed by the latter to defeat aggression by
Afghanistan aided by Russia is profitless. No defence would be possible unless
Pakistan could count on the active assistance of powerful allies. Even with such allies,
able to maintain command of sea communications in the Indian Ocean, the strategical
position of Pakistan opposed to Russia with bases prepared in Afghanistan and /or
Persia would, however, be bad: Karachi, here one link with the outside world, is
exposed to air attack and even to invasion from the air, as also is the singly line of
railway between Karachi and Multan which is the sole means of communication
between Karachi and the Punjab, running through Pakistan territory throughout.
Lahore, the most important rail centre, is also within effective bombing range of
Afghan/Persian airfields. Western Pakistan in fact lacks the depth necessary to enable
the main bases to be located out of effective range of enemy bombers. This factor
assumes even more importance when the obstacle to the efficient functioning of radar
caused by the mountains of the North-west Frontier is taken into consideration.
Thus, even with powerful allies, Western Pakistan could not be defended
without the co-operation of Hindustan to provide alternative lines of communication
from Bombay into Pakistan and also bases for the Pakistan armed forces outside
effective bombing range of the hostile air forces. On the other hand, it would be
suicidal for Hindustan to refuse such assistance, or in fact not to come into active
alliance with Pakistan, because, with Pakistan defeated and hostile bases prepared
therein, the defence of Hindustan from the north-west would be an impossibility
without armed forces as large and efficient as those which could be deployed against
her.
4- Eastern Pakistan
(a) The military commitments of Eastern Pakistan are:
In aid of the civil power
Tribal control of the North-east Frontier
Defence against China
It is assumed that there is insufficient clash of interests between Pakistan and
Burma to make war between the two countries a likely contingency, even if one or
both seceded from the British Commonwealth.
(b) Aid to the civil power
A battalion each at Digboi, Silchar, Dacca and Chittagong would probably be
necessary, or a force of three battalions held centrally with a permanent
detachment at Dacca. These troops could be replaced by an equivalent number of
armed police.

464
(c) Tribal control
Five battalions of Assam Rifles have been necessary for this purpose in the
past, and it may be assumed that the same will be necessary in the future.
(d) War with China
Although not nearly so powerful as Russia, China in the future may become an
adversary no to be despised. Eastern Pakistan suffers from a lack of
communications and no industries other than tea and the Digboi oilfields. Because
of the mountains on the northern and eastern boundaries, the only suitable lines of
fighter protection are forward in Burma or back approximately on the lines of
River Brahmputra. Eastern Pakistan in isolation is, in fact, indefensible against a
powerful enemy. Alliance with Hindustan is essential and with Burma most
desirable. This would seem to be equally desirable for both the other countries
concerned particularly Hindustan. Eastern Pakistan in hostile hands would be
serious menace to Calcutta and the industrial areas of Bengal and Bihar.
Any Pakistan forces needed in Eastern Pakistan must be additional to those
needed in Western Pakistan for aid to the civil power, control of the tribes and
defence against Afghanistan, since any reduction of forces in Western Pakistan to
meet a threat from the east might be seized upon by the tribesmen and possibly
Afghanistan as an opportunity for loot and aggrandisement.
5- Forces required
Excluding any threat from Russia or China, the armed forces which
Pakistan would need are therefore:-
1 armoured division
6 infantry divisions
1 armoured brigade
12 battalions
12 squadrons Air Force
with one extra infantry division desirable as a general reserve.
Allowing 40,000 men per gross division, this would entail an army of about
330,000 of whom some 40% might be reservists. An active army of some
215,000, roughly the pre-war strength of the Army in India, would be needed
at an estimated cost of about 40 to 45 crores. The air force would cost between
5 and 10 crores in addition, making a total defence budget of some 50 crores
without any allowance for a navy, which could not in any case be large
enough to be effective. Without the division in general reserve, a reduction of
some 25,000 men and 5 crores in cost might be made.
6- Manpower
Taking 9% of the male population between the ages of 17 and 28 as the
recruitable manpower of the country without unduly affecting its civil life, the
Mussalman manpower available in Western and Eastern Pakistan is
Western Pakistan
Punjabi Mussalmans 1,087,000
Pathans 65,000
Others 25,000 .
1,177,000
Eastern Pakistan
Bengali Mussalmans 750,000
Assamese 80,000
830,000

465
The Eastern Pakistan manpower must, however, be discounted. The
experience of two world wars has shown that Bengalis and Assamese do not make
good soldiers. The 60,000 Bengali Mussalmans enlisted in this war have
practically all been enlisted in military labour, while only about 3,000 Assamese
Mussalmans have enlisted. The inhabitants of Sind and Baluchistan in Western
Pakistan have been omitted form the list of potential manpower as they, even
more than the Bengalis and Assamese, do not take to an Army life.
From the point of view of available manpower, however the Punjab and Noth-
West Frontier Province can provide more than sufficient to meet the needs of the
Army. The Punjabi Mussalmans and Pathans are, unfortunately, backward
educationally and it is more than doubtful whether the needs of the Army for
technicians could be met without a large scale scheme of boys’ training which
would be expensive and would take some years to bear fruit. Nor could Pakistan
produce at present anything like sufficient educated youths to provide the officers
necessary for such a large army. Assistance from the United Kingdom would
almost certainly be necessary for some years to come in the provision of officers
and technicians.
`This shortage of officers and technicians would affect the air force even more
seriously than the army. It is doubtful if very much more than one squadron’s
worth of personnel in the Royal Indian Air Force today comes from Pakistan. The
formation of a Pakistan air force would be slow and laborious business.
7- Equipment
The almost complete lack of industries in Pakistan is militarily as serious as
the shortage of officer material and technicians. Practically everything needed for
the clothing and equipment of the armed forces would have to be imported, either
from Hindustan or from the United Kingdom or America, and would cost annually
somewhere between 17 and 25 crores, (in other words, between 35% and 50% of
the Defence budget) which would have to be offset by a similar value of exports.
These imports could, of course, only reach Pakistan as long as the sea routes were
open and either Karachi and Chittagong still able to carry on business or, if
Hindustan were agreeable to grant right of way for Pakistan arms and equipment
through her ports and on her railways.
8- Summary
(a) Western and Eastern Pakistan are separate entities with different
defence problems.
(b) Excluding attack by a major power, Pakistan would need the following
armed forces for aid to the civil power, control of the tribes on the northwest
and north-east frontiers and defence against Afghanistan:-
1 armoured division
6 infantry divisions
1 armoured brigade
12 battalions
12 squadrons air force
with one extra division desirable as a general reserve.
This would mean any army of 360,000 men, but, if 40% be taken to be
reservists, the standing army in peacetime would need to be about 215,000, or
190,000 without the reserve division.
This would entail a defence budget of some 50 crores, or 45 crores without the
reserve division.

466
(c) There is sufficient suitable manpower to provide an army of this size,
but there will be a serious shortage of officers and technicians. Assistance
from the United Kingdom will be necessary in these respects.
(d) Practically all arms and equipment would have to be imported, to the
values of between 17 and 25 crores annually, representing 35% to 50%
of the Defence Budget.
(e) Without strong allies, neither Western or Eastern Pakistan could be
defended against Russia or China respectively. In addition to having
strong allies, it would be necessary for Hindustan to be either an active
ally or benevolently neutral, to offset the serious strategical
weaknesses in the position of Pakistan. It would be in the interests of
Hindustan to render active aid to Pakistan, as if either Western or
Eastern Pakistan were occupied by a potentially hostile power the
defence of Hindustan would be most seriously jeopardized.
3. FINANCIAL PROSPECT OF PAKISTAN
Until some expert body with clear guidance as to the boundaries of Pakistan
has investigated the question in India, any figures can be put forward only with the
utmost reserve. Even such a body would be confronted with formidable problems of
estimation. We ourselves can at present form only a rough provisional opinion, based
on readily available material, in the light of our general acquaintance with the
conditions of Indian finance and with the similar, though much less difficult,
problems which attended the introduction of the 1935 Act.
The principal difficulties are as follows:
(1) Pakistan may apparently mean anything from about one-third of British India,
including the Calcutta region (which is extremely important from the revenue
point of view), to something only about half the size and possessing few
industrial or trading centres.
(2) It is difficult enough to estimate the true origins of present central revenues
according to existing Provincial boundaries. It is more difficult to estimate the
effect of carving off portions of the existing provinces, and it is still more
difficult to forecast what will happen when the different areas become
separate sovereign states.
(3) How the economic situation in India will settle down after the war (price
levels, national income etc) and at what rate economic development will
proceed, are highly speculative matters.
It needs no elaborate investigation to discover that the central question is how to
finance defence, since the greater part of the Government of India’s budget has
always been devoted to that object. The practical problem is thus to arrive at a figure
representing the margin of finance available over and above what is required to
maintain at approximately the accustomed standard all Government services other
than defence.
Pages 91-98 and Appendix IV of Part III of Sir Coupland’s report contain material
lifted bodily from a memorandum prepared by an experienced official of he
Government of India. So far as Eastern Pakistan is concerned the author threw in his
hand. So far as Western Pakistan is concerned he came to the conclusion that
assuming the present provinces of Punjab, Sind, North West Frontier and British
Baluchistan were included in their entirety, taking account only of revenue and
expenditure now classed as “central” and allowing nothing for the effects of the war
except upon the public debt, Western Pakistan would have been able, on the basis of
1938-39 figures, to maintain the existing standards or administration and to spend

467
about Rs.3 crores on defence. Allowing something for possible improvements or
revenues etc. he raised this figure to Rs.8 crores.
The same technique (Which, broadly speaking, is about as convincing as any such
extemporization can be) Matthai, who has considerable experience of Government
statistics. He confirms Coupland’s basic figure of Rs.3 crores, so far as Western
Pakistan is concerned, and calculates that Eastern Pakistan, constituted on a
Provincial basis (i.e. including the whole of Bengal and Assam) would, in similar
circumstances, have had Rs.11 crores to spend on defence, allowing nothing for
possible enhancements of revenue. He then reduces these figures on a crude
population basis ( a rather risky proceeding) to what they might be if Pakistan
included only contiguous districts with Muslim majorities, arriving at a possible
defence expenditure of Rs. 2 and half crores for Western Pakistan, and Rs. 6 and half
crores for Eastern Pakistan, again without allowing for enhanced revenue. Thus for
Pakistan as a whole he estimates Rs. 14 crores available for defence on a Provincial
basis, and Rs. 9 crores on a District basis.
It is, however, certain that a really determined Pakistan Government, with the full
backing of public opinion, content with little or no progress in its social and economic
services and using all the weapons in the Central and Provincial fiscal armouries,
could have raised substantially more than this, and even after allowing for some
possible optimism in Matthai’s estimates for Eastern Pakistan, defence expenditure of
the order of Rs. 25-30 crores on a Provincial basis, and Rs. 15-20 crores on a District
basis, cannot be considered altogether impossible.
If this judgment be accepted – and it must be emphasized that it has only been
reached by building on the existing statistics an extremely heavy superstructure of
inference and guesswork – it means that Pakistan could have supported just over half
the pre-war defence expenditure of the Government of India on a Provincial basis, and
about one-third on a District basis. The latter basis is, of course, nearer to probability
than the former
It is useless to try to pursue speculation in terms of figures into the post-war
period. All that can safely be suggested is that the cost of the same amount of defence
would probably be found not to have increased so much as the ability of the ‘areas
concerned to bear it. In any event all figures would naturally be nominally higher by,
say 50-100% in consequence of change in the purchasing power of money.
Source: L/POJ/10/21, Cabinet Mission Papers, Cabinet Directive, Chequers Meeting
Parliamentary Statements.

APPENDIX-10
468
Master Tara Singh’s Press Statement about MA Jinnah
The Modern Review of Calcutta quotes a Nationalist Muslim paper “Hakikat” and
says that I stated some where that Mr. Jinnah was getting money from Muslim states
& other places with the help of the Government for pressing Pakistan demand. This is
absolutely false. I said nothing of the Government & I know nothing of the matter. In
fact, it is not possible for me to believe that a gentleman of Mr. Jinnah’s position &
character can be capable of such meanness.
Tara Singh
(Master)
Source: Pb. I:80, Shamsul Hasan collection, National Archives of Pakistan.

APPENDIX-11
469
SECRET
No. 694
10 th July 1947.
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I think Your Excellency may be interested in the enclosed record of a conversation I
have just had with Giani Kartar Singh. The Giani was extremely frank about the
intentions of the Sikhs, and what he said confirms my view that they mean to make
trouble if the decision based on the Boundary Commission’s report is not to their
liking, or if the new Governments are set up before the decision is given. According
to a recent Press report, Baldev Singh is taking the same line in public, which seems
odd in view of his acceptance of the plan.
2. My personal view is that the boundary problem cannot be solved in any rational
way, and that the only solution which will give the two new Provinces a peaceful start
will be one negotiated by the Parties- in other words a settlement out of court. I
believe that there is quite a lot in the claim of the Sikhs- and for that matter of other
residents of the Eastern Punjab – for a share in the canal colonies, and the Giani’s idea
that the Montgomery district should be allotted to the East is by no means as
ridiculous as it sounds. The district, if so allotted, could be “recolonized” so as to
concentrate the non-Muslims there and to transfer Muslims to Lyallpur, which is
agriculturally on the whole a better proposition. But with the Sikh demanding the
Chenab as the Western boundary and the Muslims hoping to stretch their tentacles as
far east as Ambala, and everyone behaving as though they had just been at war and
were going to have a new war within a few weeks. I see little hope of any solution of
this kind.
Yours Sincerely,
Sd. E. M. Jenkins
(Enclosure to Viceroy on 10 th July 1947)
Discussion between Jenkins and Giani Kartar Singh
SECRET
Giani Kartar Singh came to see me today at 4.45 p.m. at his request. He was to have
come at 3 p.m., but he seems to have had some trouble with his car driving in from
Nankana Sahib.
2. He said that he had come to see me about the Indian Independence Bill and the
Boundary Commission. This Bill made it clear that if orders were not passed on the
recommendations of the Boundary Commission by 15 th August, two new
Governments would be set up on the basis of the “notional” boundary. The Sikhs did
not believe that fresh orders about the Boundary would be enforced after 15 th August,
and wanted to know that the enforcement arrangements would be. The Sikhs would
not accept the “notional” boundary even provisionally, and if an attempt were made to
set up two new Governments on the basis of this boundary on 15 th August, the Sikhs
would refuse to join the Government of the East Punjab and would refuse also to have
anything to do with the Union Government of India. They would have to take other
measures.
3. Proceeding the Giani said that there must be an exchange of population on a large
scale. Were the British ready to enforce this? He doubted if they were, and if no
regard was paid to Sikhs solidarity, a fight was inevitable. The British had said for

470
years that they intended to protect the minorities, and what had happened now was a
clear breach of faith by the British.
4. I said I thought it certain that the Boundary Commission’s recommendations as
accepted by the Governor-General would be enforced after 14 th August. The
enforcement would necessarily be by the two Dominion Governments, whose
representatives had, I understood, pledged themselves to accept the final orders. I
realised that the Sikhs were dissatisfied, but when independence came to any country,
some classes which had formerly regarded themselves as protected inevitably suffered.
For example, I well remembered the complaints of the loyalists in Southern Ireland
when Eire became a Dominion. At the same time I felt that the Sikhs had themselves
to blame for their present position. The Giani had himself insisted on partition, and
Sardar Baldev Singh had accepted the plan.
5. The Giani at once countered with an account of Sardar Baldev Singh’s attitude
during the negotiations. He said that he had urged S. Baldev Singh to publish the
letter in which he had communicated his acceptance of the Plan to the Viceroy. Sardar
Baldev Singh had made it perfectly clear on behalf of the Sikhs that he was merely
accepting the principle of the Plan, and that there could be no partition based on
population alone. The Sikhs were entitled to a homeland just as much as the Muslims
and the Hindus.
6. The Giani then elaborated the Sikh claim. He said that they must have at least one
canal system; they must also have Nankana Sahib; finally they arrangements must be
such as to bring three-quarters or at least two-thirds of the Sikh population into the
Eastern Punjab. An exchange of population on a large scale was essential – he thought
that at least 400000 Sikhs should be moved to the East and 400000 Muslims to the
West (later in the conversation he said that the number of Sikhs would be 500000 or
600000 and the number of Muslims about one million. Property as well as population
should be taken into account in the exchange, and the Sikhs are on the whole better
off than the Muslims). The Giani asserted that unless it was recognised by H.M.G.,
the Viceroy and the Party Leaders that the fate of the Sikhs was a vital issue in the
proceedings for the transfer of power, there would be trouble.
7. I asked how the Giani proposed to effect his large transfer of population, and what
he meant by “one canal system”. Did he mean in concrete terms that if the Sikhs got a
part of the Montgomery district, from which Muslims could be transferred to Lyallpur
and to which Sikhs could transferred from Lyallpur, the Sikhs would be content? The
Giani said that the Sikhs would be content with the whole of the Montgomery district
and Nankana Sahib, and that if this could be effected, the exchange of population
would be more or less automatic. On my pointing out that the inclusion of Nankana
Sahib in the Eastern Punjab would be an extremely difficult operation, he gave me a
long and rather involved account of the communal distribution of population in parts
of the Lyallpur and Sheikhupura districts, and said that the transfer of Nankana Sahib
to the Eastern Punjab was practicable.
8. I thought it was time to mention the Boundary Commission again, and said these
matters would be dealt with by the Commission. Surely four Punjabi High Court
Judges and one eminent Englishman could be expected to take a reasonable view on
any properly stated claim. The Giani said that the Judges were not Judges, but
Advocates; and that the Sikhs expected no justice from the Commission.
9. I then reverted to the somewhat minatory remarks of the Giani about the attitude of
the Sikhs should the new Governments be established on the basis of the “notional”
boundary. I asked exactly what he meant by “other measures”. The Giani replied that
the Sikhs would be obliged to fight. I retorted that this would be very foolish and

471
enquired how they expected to fight against trained troops. The Giani said in quite a
matter of fact way that the Sikhs realised that they would be in a bad position and
would have to fight on revolutionary line – by murdering officials, cutting railway
lines and telegraph lines, destroying canal headworks, and so no. I reiterated that this
seemed to me a very foolish policy, to which the Giani retorted that if Britain were
invaded, he had no doubt that feelings would be much the same as his.
10. I enquired when the fight would begin. The Giani said that protests would
continue from now on. The Sikhs felt that it would be useless to wait for two or three
years before taking violent action, and the execution of their plan would start with the
departure of the British.
11. I pointed out that violent action would hardly endear the Sikhs to the Congress,
with whom the Panthic Party was now allied. The Giani replied that he had never
trusted and did not now trust the Congress. Rather illogically he added that Mahatma
Gandhi and Sardar Patel had been sympathetic to the establishment of a Sikh
homeland with the Jat districts separated and joined to the U.P. For such a homeland
the Sikhs must have a reasonable boundary in the west and their population mainly
concentrated east of that boundary. He saw the final Sikh State as a kind of Bufferstate
between Pakistan and the Union of India.
12. I said that the real solution was a reasonable settlement between the
representatives of the future Governments of the West and East Punjab. I asked
whether such a settlement was quite out of question (I have always felt that the
boundary problem is really a political problem which can be settled on “out of court”).
The Giani said that there was no one among the Muslims big enough to take a
decision that might seem detrimental to the Muslim community. Personally he
thought any discussion with a view to a settlement quite useless. The Sikhs would not
abate their claim, and the Muslims would go on hoping to secure territory as far east
as Ambala. The Muslims were now putting out some conciliatory propaganda but
their intention was that of a sportsman who is careful not to disturb the birds he
intends to shoot. He believed that the Muslims would try to make the Sikhs in the
Western Punjab feel secure and would then set about them in earnest.
13. Finally, the Giani appealed to me to do all that I could to help the Sikhs during a
period of great trial. Having served in the Punjab for so many years, would not wish
to abandon it to misery and bloodshed; but there would be misery and bloodshed if
the boundary problem were not suitably solved.
14. The Giani was matter of fact and quit throughout out conversation, but wept when
he made his final appeal. This is the nearest thing to an ultimatum yet given on behalf
of the Sikhs. They are undoubtedly very puzzled and unhappy, but I see no reason to
suppose that they have lost the nuisance value which they have possessed throughout
the centuries.
Sd. E. M. Jenkins
10.7.47
Source: MB1/D262, Hartley Archives, University of Southampton, UK

APPENDIX-12
[Pamphlet Publicised by Sikhs]
UTHO VAGAR NA HASHAR HO GA PHIR KABHI
DAURO ZAMANA CHAAL QIAMAT KI CHAL GIYA
472
NOW OR NEVER
1. Do you want to live as respectable citizens?
2. Do you want that you should be given the right to worship in your own way?
3. Do you want that you should not be looked down and your progress barred
simply because you like a particular fashion of living?
4 Do you realize your duty towards the PANTH THEN?
5. You must know that WE have got to fight OUR life and death struggle are
long?
6. You must know that every Sikh Family may have to send AT LEAST one
male member to fight against the “PAKSITAN HUNS”, who are out to
establish the “SULLA” raj of barbarism on the HOLY HOMELAND OF THE
KHALSA.
7. But for the present the call of your VETERAN LEADERS is to render
MONITORY help only.
8. Rupees fifty lakhs are required to carry out successfully the tough task ahead
of us.
9. Have you responded to the leaders’ appeal?
10. If not you are surely lacking in your duty.
11. Stop all luxuries; cut down necessities and make a decision that you would do
all to surpass the target figure.
12. Make collections from all around you and send them
To:
PANTH RATTAN MASTER TARA SINGH
C/O THE SIKH MISSIONERY COLLEGE,
AMRITSAR.
OR
HON. SARDAR BALDEV SINGH THE DEFENCE MINISTER
1, BHAGWAN DASS ROAD, NEW DELHI:
Note: Make the Hindus realize that their cause is common with the Sikh, make them
also realize their duty.
Source: File- 1260, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, National Archives of Pakistan.

MOUNTBATTEN and his STAFF
APPENDIX-13
473
Louis Mountbatten, Viceroy of India (24 March-14 August 1947)
George Edmond Brackenbury Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India
(24 March-14 August 1947)
Sir Eric Charles Mieville, Principal Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24 March-20
August 1947).
Walter Henry John Christie, Joint Private Secretary to Viceroy of India (24 March-
14 August 1947).
Captain Ronald Vernon Brockman, Personal Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24
March-14 August 1947 and Acting Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India from 2 to
30 May 1947).
Lieut. Col. Vernon Forbes Erskine Crum, Conference Secretary to the Viceroy of
India (24 March 1947-20 June 1948).
Col. Douglas Hendrie Currie, Military Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24 March
1947-20 June 1948).
Major M. J. Gilliat, Deputy Military Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24 March
1947-20 June 1948).
General Hastings Lionel Ismay, first Baron Ismay, Chief of the Viceroy of India’s
Staff (24 March-30 November 1947).
Commander George Harry Nicholls, Deputy Principal Secretary to the Viceroy of
India (24 March-14 August 1947).
Ian Dixon Scott, Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24 March-14
August 1947).
Charles Peter Scott, Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India (24 March-14
August 1947).
Source: Hartley Archives, University of Southampton, UK. Also available on
http://www.archives.lib.soton.ac.uk/mbindex424.shtml