The Maine bugle ... campaign; 1-5 Jan. 1894-Oct. 1898 - Maine.gov

A MAN FROM MAINE. 33
Butler requested Weitzel and C omstock, who had reported
the condition of things on shore, to return, examine the ground,
and decide if an assault were possible. " To me," he said, " it
does not look possible, but I am unwilling to give it up."
These two officers reported against the assault.
General Butler says, " I sent to him [Admiral Porter] and
asked what could be done. He sent me word that he had not
an hour's ammunition, and that he must go into Beaufort to
replenish his ships."— Report of Committee on the Conduct of
the War.
In causing the withdrawal of the troops Butler acted under
the advice of two engineer officers, than whom no more skilled
and learned members of their profession then held commissions
in the United States army.
" I went back to General Butler," says Weitzel, " and told
him I considered it would be murder to order an attack >
i that
work with that force. I understood Colonel CoiT!i;tock to agrcP
with me perfectly, and General Butler has ^ince said he did. I
am fulh' satisfied, from all I have hoard since; fr m the result
of the second attack and everything else,—I am fully satisfied
that I did my duty there."—See Report of Committee on the
Conduct of the W^ar.
" The failure of the expedition," says General Butler, " was
owing to the delay of the navy in Beaufort, the exploding of
the powder-boat before the troops got there to take advantage
of the effect of it, whatever it was, the refusal of Admiral Por-
ter to run by the fort, and the failure of the bombardment to
silence the fire of the fort on the land-front. ... I believe
m)' withdrawal from F"ort Fisher to face the calumny which has
rolled its waves over me, and which I calmly looked in the face
when I made my decision to withdraw my troops, was the best
and bravest act of my life."
One Hundred and Forty-second New York, gallantly crawled through the broken
palisade and carried oft the flag, doing what. two or more men could not have done
without observation. The angle of the work hid him from the sharpshooters on the
front, who behind traverses were watching for an advance."—See Col. Lamb's article
in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. IV., p. 646.