Facing the Heat Barrier - NASA's History Office
Facing the Heat Barrier - NASA's History Office
Facing the Heat Barrier - NASA's History Office
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<strong>Facing</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Heat</strong> <strong>Barrier</strong>: A <strong>History</strong> of Hypersonics<br />
terous. The Teapot Committee drew on findings by Augenstein’s group at Rand,<br />
which endorsed a 1,500-pound warhead and a three-mile miss distance. The formal<br />
Teapot report, issued in February 1954, declared “<strong>the</strong> military requirement” on miss<br />
distance “should be relaxed from <strong>the</strong> present 1,500 feet to at least two, and probably<br />
three, nautical miles.” Moreover, “<strong>the</strong> warhead weight might be reduced as far<br />
as 1,500 pounds, <strong>the</strong> precise figure to be determined after <strong>the</strong> Castle tests and by<br />
missile systems optimization.” 17<br />
The latter recommendation invoked Operation Castle, a series of H-bomb tests<br />
that began a few weeks later. The Mike shot of 1952 had used liquid deuterium,<br />
a form of liquid hydrogen. It existed at temperatures close to absolute zero and<br />
demanded much care in handling. But <strong>the</strong> Castle series was to test devices that used<br />
lithium deuteride, a dry powder that resembled salt. The Mike approach had been<br />
chosen because it simplified <strong>the</strong> weapons physics, but a dry bomb using lithium<br />
promised to be far more practical.<br />
The first such bomb was detonated on 1 March as Castle Bravo. It produced 15<br />
megatons, as its fireball expanded to almost four miles in diameter. O<strong>the</strong>r Castle<br />
H-bombs performed similarly, as Castle Romeo went to 11 megatons and Castle<br />
Yankee, a variant of Romeo, reached 13.5 megatons. “I was on a ship that was 30<br />
miles away,” <strong>the</strong> physicist Marshall Rosenbluth recalls about Bravo, “and we had this<br />
horrible white stuff raining out on us.” It was radioactive fallout that had condensed<br />
from vaporized coral. “It was pretty frightening. There was a huge fireball with<br />
<strong>the</strong>se turbulent rolls going in and out. The thing was glowing. It looked to me like a<br />
diseased brain.” Clearly, though, bombs of <strong>the</strong> lithium type could be as powerful as<br />
anyone wished—and <strong>the</strong>se test bombs were readily weaponizable. 18<br />
The Castle results, strongly complementing <strong>the</strong> Rand and Teapot reports,<br />
cleared <strong>the</strong> way for action. Within <strong>the</strong> Pentagon, Gardner took <strong>the</strong> lead in pushing<br />
for Atlas. On 11 March he met with Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott and with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Chief of Staff, General Nathan Twining. He proposed a sped-up program that<br />
would nearly double <strong>the</strong> Fiscal Year (FY) 1955 Atlas budget and would have <strong>the</strong> first<br />
missiles ready to launch as early as 1958. General Thomas White, <strong>the</strong> Vice Chief of<br />
Staff, weighed in with his own endorsement later that week, and Talbott responded<br />
by directing Twining to accelerate Atlas immediately.<br />
White carried <strong>the</strong> ball to <strong>the</strong> Air Staff, which held responsibility for recommending<br />
approval of new programs. He told its members that “ballistic missiles were<br />
here to stay, and <strong>the</strong> Air Staff had better realize this fact and get on with it.” Then<br />
on 14 May, having secured concurrence from <strong>the</strong> Secretary of Defense, White gave<br />
Atlas <strong>the</strong> highest Air Force development priority and directed its acceleration “to<br />
<strong>the</strong> maximum extent that technology would allow.” Gardner declared that White’s<br />
order meant “<strong>the</strong> maximum effort possible with no limitation as to funding.” 19<br />
This was a remarkable turnaround for a program that at <strong>the</strong> moment lacked<br />
even a proper design. Many weapon concepts have gone as far as <strong>the</strong> prototype<br />
28<br />
Nose Cones and Re-entry<br />
stage without winning approval, but Atlas gained its priority at a time when <strong>the</strong><br />
accepted configuration still was <strong>the</strong> 440,000-pound, five-engine concept of 1953.<br />
Air Force officials still had to establish a formal liaison with <strong>the</strong> AEC to win access<br />
to information on projected warhead designs. Within <strong>the</strong> AEC, lightweight bombs<br />
still were well in <strong>the</strong> future. A specialized device, tested in <strong>the</strong> recent series as Castle<br />
Nectar, delivered 1.69 megatons but weighed 6,520 pounds. This was four times<br />
<strong>the</strong> warhead weight proposed for Atlas.<br />
But in October <strong>the</strong> AEC agreed that it could develop warheads weighing 1,500<br />
to 1,700 pounds, with a yield of one megaton. This opened <strong>the</strong> door to a new Atlas<br />
design having only three engines. It measured 75 feet long and 10 feet in diameter,<br />
with a weight of 240,000 pounds—and its miss distance could be as great as five miles.<br />
This took note of <strong>the</strong> increased yield of <strong>the</strong> warhead and fur<strong>the</strong>r eased <strong>the</strong> problem of<br />
guidance. The new configuration won Air Force approval in December. 20<br />
Approaching <strong>the</strong> Nose Cone<br />
An important attribute of a nose cone was its shape, and engineers were reducing<br />
drag to a minimum by crafting high-speed airplanes that displayed <strong>the</strong> ultimate<br />
in needle-nose streamlining. The X-3 research aircraft, designed for Mach 2, had a<br />
long and slender nose that resembled a church steeple. Atlas went even fur<strong>the</strong>r, with<br />
an early concept having a front that resembled a flagpole. This faired into a long and<br />
slender cone that could accommodate <strong>the</strong> warhead. 21<br />
This intuitive approach fell by <strong>the</strong> wayside in 1953, as <strong>the</strong> NACA-Ames aerodynamicists<br />
H. Julian Allen and Alfred Eggers carried through an elegant analysis<br />
of <strong>the</strong> motion and heating of a re-entering nose cone. This work showed that <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were masters of <strong>the</strong> simplifying assumption. To make such assumptions successfully<br />
represents a high art, for <strong>the</strong> resulting solutions must capture <strong>the</strong> most essential<br />
aspects of <strong>the</strong> pertinent physics while preserving ma<strong>the</strong>matical tractability. Their<br />
paper stands to this day as a landmark. Quite probably, it is <strong>the</strong> single most important<br />
paper ever written in <strong>the</strong> field of hypersonics.<br />
They calculated total heat input to a re-entry vehicle, seeking shapes that would<br />
minimize this. That part of <strong>the</strong> analysis enabled <strong>the</strong>m to critique <strong>the</strong> assertion that<br />
a slender and sharply-pointed shape was best. For a lightweight nose cone, which<br />
would slow significantly in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere due to drag, <strong>the</strong>y found a surprising<br />
result: <strong>the</strong> best shape, minimizing <strong>the</strong> total heat input, was blunt ra<strong>the</strong>r than sharp.<br />
The next issue involved <strong>the</strong> maximum rate of heat transfer when averaged over<br />
an entire vehicle. To reduce this peak heating rate to a minimum, a nose cone of<br />
realistic weight might be ei<strong>the</strong>r very sharp or very blunt. Missiles of intermediate<br />
slenderness gave considerably higher peak heating rates and “were definitely to be<br />
avoided.”<br />
29