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Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:

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thus mirror larger divisions within the mujahidin. Jam’iat‐e Islami became the only<br />

Sunni mujahidin party to include a high proportion of non‐Pashtun members, while<br />

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb‐e Islami was formed from the core membership of the<br />

Muslim Youth. Hekmatyar’s following was generally younger, more politically radical<br />

and more willing to take sometimes foolish risks in the early days of the mujahidin<br />

movement. 70 It should be no surprise that Rabbani and Hekmatyar’s efforts to lay claim<br />

to the legacy of Professor Niazi have produced a group of sources for Western scholars,<br />

which emphasize Niazi’s importance to the development of the mujahidin movement in<br />

Afghanistan.<br />

Niazi has an important role to play in any history of the mujahidin, but his group at<br />

Kabul University was not the only politically active Islamic organization in Afghanistan<br />

in the late 1960s. The primary sources abound with stories of clandestine meetings of<br />

activists where leaders such as Yunus Khalis, sometimes joined by the Sufi leader<br />

Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, 71 would discuss Islam, socialism and politics with teachers,<br />

professionals and young people. 72 Sibghatullah Mujaddidi would eventually go on to<br />

create his own mujahidin political party by mobilizing his contacts in Afghan Sufi<br />

networks. 73 Certainly, some of the gatherings attended by Khalis and Mujaddidi took<br />

place at Kabul University, however these kinds of informal groups also met in Kunduz,<br />

Nangarhar and many other locations. 74<br />

Even while they were distinct from the Kabul Islamists to some extent, their purpose<br />

appears to have been the same: to awaken the population to socialism’s threat to their<br />

way of life, to give attendees useful rhetorical tools to help combat leftists in their<br />

schools and towns and, as the movements developed, to help organize and connect the<br />

70 This is especially apparent in Hekmatyar’s involvement in the disastrous 1975 attempt to stage a coup<br />

d’état in Afghanistan.<br />

71 Mujaddidi was already an internationally recognized leader of a Sufi order, and later became the leader<br />

of the Jebha‐ye Nejat‐e Milli, one of the seven Sunni mujahidin political parties.<br />

72 Muhammad (2007), 26.<br />

73 For further discussion of Mujaddidi’s family and its influence on the early directions taken by the<br />

Islamic resistance movements in Afghanistan, see Olivier Roy. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. 2nd.<br />

Translated by Gwydir St. First Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 47. Ibrahim<br />

Mujaddidi was closely involved in the development of the Khuddam al‐Furqan organization as well. See<br />

Ruttig (2010), 6; and Ruttig (2006), 8.<br />

74 Muhammad (2007), 26–27. By the early 1970s it appears that Mujaddidi was no longer welcome at<br />

meetings at which Hekmatyar and some of the other Islamists were holding court.<br />

15

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