Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:

Yunus Khalis’s Relationship with Mullah Omar and the Taliban
Claims about Khalis’s relationship with Mullah Omar are frequently discussed as part
of a larger argument about Usama bin Ladin, 283 and yet there is no solid evidence
linking the three men together organizationally. After the Soviet‐Afghan War, Khalis’s
former commanders took divergent paths. Some of them would become leaders in the
Taliban movement, while others such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, ‘Abd al‐Qadir and
Engineer Mahmud became powerful provincial‐level leaders. These latter individuals
faced a difficult transition in 1995 and 1996 when the Taliban moved north and east out
of Kandahar. Some of them, like Jalaluddin Haqqani, decided to work with the Taliban
in the hope of maintaining some degree of autonomy. 284 In Nangarhar there was a much
more varied reaction to the Taliban’s approach.
‘Abd al‐Qadir left for Pakistan when it became clear that the Taliban would enter his
province, but Engineer Mahmud and other former Hizb‐e Islami (Khalis) commanders
remained and attempted to find a middle path between fighting the Taliban and
surrendering the province. 285 By this time, the imperfect systems that were put in place
by the Eastern Shura for controlling and preventing violence in Nangarhar were falling
apart, and Engineer Mahmud, Haji Saz Nur and many others were killed in the chaotic
final days before the Taliban took complete control of the province. 286
Khalis’s position on the Taliban was complex and appears to have wavered between
tentative support, disassociation and open criticism. In one conversation in the early
days of the Taliban movement, Khalis even congratulated Mullah Omar for his good
work. 287 Khalis apparently did not hold this sanguine opinion for very long, and he was
able to have a more neutral relationship with the Taliban partly because he was not
directly contesting their growing authority as they marched into the east. His former
commanders were in an entirely different position, and so Khalis’s advice to Engineer
283 For typical examples of this treatment see Weaver (2005); Van Dyk (2006); Lynch, 23; Scheuer (2006),
165; Dressler and Jan (2011).
284 Muhammad (2007), 86–87.
285 Ibid., 97–99. Engineer Mahmud ignored Khalis’s advice to “wait and see” as the Taliban approached
Nangarhar, and took charge of the remaining mujahidin/Eastern Shura forces in Jalalabad.
286 Ibid., 98–101.
287 Ibid., 84. At a meeting during Eid in Kandahar, Khalis says to Mullah Omar “You have begun a good
project, but don’t disarm the mujahidin …”
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