Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:
Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:
Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:
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I heard something incredible from Yunis Khales … during a meeting […] He<br />
said to Abu Abdallah [Bin Ladin], in his thickly accented but proficient Arabic,<br />
“I have nothing but myself, and it is very dear to me. However, you are more<br />
precious to me, and your well‐being is more important than my own. You are<br />
our guest, and no one can get to you. If anything happens with the Taleban, tell<br />
me. Though there is little I can do after they reach you, I will do all I can.” 178<br />
At first glance this text can be seen as proof that Yunus Khalis was making an<br />
extraordinary offer of protection to <strong>Usama</strong> <strong>bin</strong> Ladin, which might support an assertion<br />
that the relationship between the two men was close enough to extend into ideological<br />
or operational cooperation. However, cultural and historical clues about the context of<br />
the conversation and signals in Khalis’s wording argue against such a clear‐cut<br />
interpretation.<br />
The Context of Bin <strong>Ladin’s</strong> Stay with Khalis in 1996<br />
When the aforementioned conversation occurred, Bin Ladin had recently arrived in<br />
Nangarhar as an exile from Sudan. It is worth asking at the outset why he chose<br />
Jalalabad as his safe haven instead of returning to the camps al‐Qa`ida maintained near<br />
Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Zhawara facility in Khost Province. 179 The most likely answer is<br />
that by the time Bin Ladin was under pressure to flee Sudan, Haqqani’s territory in<br />
Paktia and Khost had come under Taliban control. 180 Since the al‐Qa`ida leader was<br />
initially uncertain whether the Taliban were friends or foes, 181 he chose to relocate to<br />
Nangarhar where his contacts were still operating outside the Taliban’s authority.<br />
However, Nangarhar would not remain outside the Taliban’s reach much longer.<br />
Although Khalis apparently extended his aegis to Bin Ladin in the above quotation by<br />
al‐Suri, Khalis also stated that “there is little I can do after they reach you.” 182 By 1996 it<br />
is questionable whether Khalis was in a position to defend the al‐Qa`ida leader against<br />
178 Scheuer (2011), 106.<br />
179 Brown and Rassler (2012).<br />
180 The Taliban took Loya Paktia in early 1995, over a year before Bin Ladin left Sudan for Jalalabad.<br />
181 Omar <strong>bin</strong> Laden, 159; Linschoten and Kuehn, 139–140; Brown and Rassler, 101.<br />
182 Scheuer (2011), 106.<br />
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