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Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”:

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the conclusions that can be drawn about Khalis’s relationship with Bin Ladin based on<br />

these interactions in 1996 are far from obvious.<br />

In the absence of more easily accessible information about al‐Qa`ida’s activities in<br />

Nangarhar, Khalis’s role as a host attracts much attention. It is difficult to evaluate<br />

assertions about the critical importance of <strong>Usama</strong> <strong>bin</strong> <strong>Ladin’s</strong> relationship with Yunus<br />

Khalis, but two recently released interviews from sources close to Bin Ladin and the<br />

wealth of material in the Khalis biographies add important new layers to our<br />

understanding of the surprising connections between the relative calm in parts of<br />

eastern Afghanistan in the 1990s and the spread of al‐Qa`ida to those regions. 155 The<br />

results tend to de‐emphasize the operational importance of Yunus Khalis as an al‐<br />

Qa`ida facilitator while dramatically underlining the significance of provincial‐level<br />

commanders to the growth of Bin <strong>Ladin’s</strong> organization in 1996.<br />

Unfortunately, the provincial level leaders such as Engineer Mahmud and Haji Saz Nur<br />

who figure prominently in numerous primary sources156 about al‐Qa`ida in Nangarhar<br />

are still relatively poorly studied in the West. Their obscurity may help to explain the<br />

proliferation of a set of historical traditions linking Bin <strong>Ladin’s</strong> arrival in Jalalabad and<br />

the expansion of his organization in Afghanistan to his relationship with the well‐<br />

known mujahidin leader Yunus Khalis. The first step in this analysis will be to examine<br />

the most commonly cited components of the received wisdom about Yunus Khalis’s<br />

connections to <strong>Usama</strong> <strong>bin</strong> Ladin and, by extension, to Mullah Omar.<br />

In general, these historical traditions focus on the arrival of the al‐Qa`ida leadership in<br />

Nangarhar in 1996, and the organization’s eventual establishment of relations with the<br />

155 The two new al‐Qa`ida sources are the recently released transcript of an Ayman al‐Zawahiri interview,<br />

and the text of Anand Gopal’s interview with Sheikh Muhammad Omar ‘Abd al‐Rahman. See al‐<br />

Zawahiri (2012), and Muhammad (2012). The two most important Khalis biographies are Muhammad<br />

(2007); and Ahmadzai. Nangyal’s brief work on Khalis and the excerpt from Khalis’s autobiography are<br />

also of related interest, even though they mostly deal with theoretical political issues. See Nangyal 1989,<br />

146–159.<br />

156 See Muhammad (2007), 202; Omar <strong>bin</strong> Laden, 149–153; Wahid Muzhda. Afghanistan During the Five<br />

Years of Taliban Rule. (Tehran: Nashreney, 2003), 31; Wahid Muzhda. ʺ8 AM Afghanistan (8 Subh).ʺ How<br />

Did Bin Ladin Return to Afghanistan? (October 16, 2012).<br />

http://www.8am.af/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28004:1391‐07‐24‐15‐22‐<br />

22&catid=3:2008‐10‐31‐09‐37‐07&Itemid=554; Linschoten and Kuehn, 135; Bergen, 158. Abu Jandal writing<br />

in this last Bergen citation names only Engineer Mahmud as central to the arrival of Bin Ladin.<br />

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