Vo.4-Moshirnia-Final

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2013 / Valuing Speech and OSINT in the Face of Judicial Deference 396 and cassettes, including the last statement of one of the hijackers, an al- Qaeda documentary about “the new crusades” and a video of the beheading of Daniel Pearl. Fouda later published a book, Masterminds of Terror, which was of enormous help to the U.S. intelligence community. 54 Both Mohammed and AlShibh were later apprehended by U.S. forces. 2. Parsing Foreign Diction The FBIS also had a long string of successes based on careful analysis of foreign dispatches, correctly predicting the Sino-Soviet split, 55 the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, 56 and the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. 57 Predicting the Sino-Soviet Split. Western observers assumed that the relative friendship of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would be long lasting, due to geo-political concerns and shared ideologies. 58 However, following the death of Stalin, the relationship deteriorated, with China criticizing Soviet proxies and the Soviets doing likewise. The two countries openly argued at the 22 nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. 59 <strong>Final</strong>ly, in 1962 the two countries broke relations in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 60 The wider American intelligence community did not recognize any such split until 1963, when the PRC published The Chinese Communist Party’s Proposal Concerning 54 Amicus Intelligence Brief, supra note 43, at 13 n 20. See generally YOSRI FOUDA & NICK FIELDING, MASTERMINDS OF TERROR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MOST DEVASTATING TERRORIST ATTACK THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN (2004). 55 Harold P. Ford, Calling the Sino-Soviet Split, CIA STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE (1998–1999), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html. 56 J. Niles Riddel, Deputy Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Remarks at the First International Symposium – “National Security and National Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions” (Dec. 2, 1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/fbis/riddel.html. 57 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO], OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE READER 56–58 (2002); Riddel, supra note 56. 58 Ford, supra note 55. 59 RODERICK MACFARQUHAR, THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE COMING OF THE CATACLYSM 1961–1966 128–29 (1997). 60 ALFRED D. LOW, THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLEMICS 131–35 (1976).
397 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4 the General Line of the International Communist Movement, 61 to which the USSR replied with an Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 62 announcing formal ideological breaks between the respective Communist systems. 63 By 1964, Mao asserted that the USSR had been the victim of a counter-revolution reintroducing capitalism. The FBIS predicted this split at least seven years before the mainline intelligence agencies realized what had occurred. 64 In April 1956, FBIS noted that a Beijing People's Daily article had attacked the USSR’s “cult of the individual” and certain “important mistakes” Stalin had made. 65 The article criticized the USSR’s eagerness to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, lack of preparedness before World War II, neglect of the agricultural sector, mishandling of the Yugoslav break with the Commitern, and, most notably, the crude implementation of policies in China. 66 At the same time, the article hailed Mao as “our great leader” and the true, all-out defender of “the theories of Marxism-Leninism.” 67 The FBIS continued to point out that Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet history, including land grabs by the then Russian Empire and mistreatment of the Chinese Communist Party counseled a future split. Tellingly, as late as 1963 the heads of the American intelligence community refused to recognize an imminent split. 68 While the American Intelligence community accepted the reality of a Sino-Soviet split after 1963, American foreign 61 The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963, available at http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-sovietsplit/cpc/proposal.htm. 62 Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to all Party Organizations, to all Communists of the Soviet Union, available at http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-sovietsplit/cpsu/openletter.htm. 63 Ford, supra note 55. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 See Summary Record of 516th meeting of the National Security Council, 31 July 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. XXII, China, at 373. (“[Director of Central Intelligence] McCone added that, although the differences between the Russians and the Chinese are very great, he did not think they were very deep or that a final break between the two powers would occur.”).
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