Vo.4-Moshirnia-Final
Vo.4-Moshirnia-Final
Vo.4-Moshirnia-Final
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409 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4<br />
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such<br />
action.” 129 In Brandenburg, the Court held that a KKK rally, in which<br />
hooded figures brandished weapons, shouted “Bury the niggers” and<br />
promised “revengeance [sic] . . . [against] our President, our Congress,<br />
[and] our Supreme Court,” was “mere advocacy.” 130 First Amendment<br />
protections require the implementation of Brandenburg’s narrow definition of<br />
incitement. 131<br />
Typically, a court would employ a Brandenburg analysis for the crime<br />
of solicitation or incitement, which differentiates protected advocacy from<br />
proscribable incitement. However, the presiding military judge in Bahlul<br />
conducted neither a Brandenburg analysis, nor offered a Brandenburg limiting<br />
instruction requiring the advocacy be delivered to specific individuals who<br />
are likely to act, 132 or that there be an unambiguous causal link between the<br />
advocacy and violence that has already occurred. 133 Indeed, the judge failed<br />
to provide a limiting instruction of any kind in relation to the solicitation<br />
charge. 134<br />
On November 3, 2008, the commission returned a verdict of guilty<br />
on all charges, except on one overt act alleged in Counts I and III. 135 On<br />
129 Id.<br />
130 Id. at 447 n.1; id. at 449. Subsequent cases have clarified the Brandenburg standard: the<br />
speaker must address specific individuals, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–109 (1973)<br />
and must actually authorize the violence to be held liable. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne<br />
Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 930 (1982).<br />
131 Cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (discussing<br />
the true threats doctrine and defining true threat for purposes of legal prosecution); Planned<br />
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058,<br />
1079–80, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that “Wanted” posters and listing of<br />
abortion doctors' home and work addresses went “well beyond the political message” that<br />
“abortionists are killers who deserve death” and were true threats that suggested message<br />
“You're Wanted or You're Guilty; You'll be shot or killed” in light of the prior murders of<br />
physicians who appeared on Wanted posters).<br />
132 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973).<br />
133 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982).<br />
134 Bahlul Reply, supra note 100, at *19. While the record is unclear as to whether counsel for<br />
Al-Bahlul requested any limiting instruction, such a request is unnecessary when limiting<br />
instructions are constitutionally required. The presiding military judge has an “independent<br />
duty to determine and deliver appropriate instructions.” United States v. Westmoreland, 31<br />
M.J. 160, 164 (C.M.A. 1990).<br />
135 Bahlul Reply, supra note 100, at *4.