Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...

MSSION: Prepare 3eport end Reoomenilotions Covering
the Q.uastermaBter Supply Operations in the
European Theator of Operations.
The General Foord wca established by General Orders 128,
f’eadquarters European Theater of Operatlona, 113 Army, dated
17 .Time 1945, aa amended by mnsral Orders 182, dated
7 .~u,.uisu~Cl9/+5and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1545,
Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to
prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, taotics ant:
ailministration employ4 by the Thtted Statas forces Jn the
Ruropean Theater.

n.L.,a.L.r%.A.L,. A .h -"
TABU? OF COtTEETTS
S"CT FAGE
.- Pnrt One: Introduction . ............ 6 ................... 1
Part Twcr General Quartermaster Supply. Transportation.
Labor and Supply of Other Than Us Army Fcrcae 4
Chapter 1: Classes of SupDlg........................ 4
Section 1 .''Jar qepartment Definitions ............ 4
Section 2 .Definitions Developed in the Euro-
pean Theater of' OperationEl ............ 5
Section 3 .European Theater of Operations
lkperience with Definitlons ........... 5
Secticn l+ .Conclusions and Secomnendations., ..... 9
RiblloRraphy ...................................... 10
Chapter 2: Levels of Supply......................... 11
Section 1.Existing Definitions., ................ 11
Section 2 .Determinetion of Levels ............... 12
Section 3 .3xperience in the European Theater .... 15
Section
!+
.Conclusions and Recommendations ....... 16
fliblioAraphy ...................................... 1U
Chapter 3:- Daily Telegram........................... 19
Section 1.Preocribed Use ........................ 19
Section 2 .Use in the European Thecte-r of
Operetions ............................ 19
Section 3 .Conolusions and Recommenfintionu....... 23
Bibliography...................................... 24
Chapter 4 : quartermaater Depot 3perations in Coinmunioatigns
Tone ......................... 25
Section 1.rlepot Systev ......................... 25
Section 2 .Requisiticning and Replenishient
Procedure within the Theator., ........ 29
Section 3 .Inventorying and Stock Accounting ..+ .. 31
Seotion 4 .Conclusions md Recomment ations ....... 32
Ribllo$raphy...................................... 33
Chapter 5: Quartormaster Transportation., ........... 31.
Section 1.quartermaster Wuok Company........... 34
Soobion 2 .Other Units........................... 36
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
SUSJYCT PAGE
Section 3 .Discussion..........................38
saction 4 . Conolusions and Recommenaations .....40
Biblio$raDhy .................................... 41
Chapter 6: Quarternaster Labor Service............ 42
wction 1 - nuartcrmaster Service Company .......42
Section 2 .Other Labor ......................... 4-1
"ection 3 .Conclusions snC Recommendations ..... 47
RjbltopraDL.. ....................................49
Choptor 7: 'upply end Service for US MYToroes
and 'iupg!y of Othtir Thnu ITS &my Forces 50
Section 1 .Sunply and scrvlces for Vnited Stat=
Air JrorcBs, European Theater of
Operntions..........................50
Section 2 .TJnnltcd States Navy., ................ 54
Section- j .Axmerican Rcd Cross.................. 55
Section 4 .Civil AffairB ....................... 57
saction 5 .suppl8 of hllisd Military Units..... 64
Taction 6 .Conclwions and Rcoo;.v.iandations ..... 63
PJ bliograpliy ....................................70
pax* mee: Class 1 sumlg...........................71
.--- Cliaptcr 8: sntlons................................71
4ectjan 1 .Types of Pations....................71
Section 2 .Operational Rations .................72
Clection 3 .Eulk nations ........................74
Scction /+ .Conclusions and Recommendations .....77
Qibliographir .................................... 77
Chrrpter 9 : Operating Frooedure . Proourenent
and ISSU...............................7~
owtion 1 .Gomunicutions Zone .................78
neation 2 .Field Forces ........................ 83
section 3 .Bakers and Cooks Sahool, Catering
Semioe ana Yess Teams., ............84
Section l+ .Conclusions ana Recommsndations.. ...86

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.TABTX OY CONmlTs (Conttd)
SWECT PAGE
Bibliography .................................... 88
Cheptsr 10: Operating Facilities. ................. 8Y
Section 1 - Refrigeration Units ................. 89
Section 2 - Raking and Ooffcc Roasting .......... 91
section 3 - nuartemaster Railhead Company.
(T/O & 9 10-197).................... 92
Suction 4 - Conclusions and Rscommondations ..... 94
Rlblioaraphy .................................... $7
?art TOW: Class 11 p-. supply ...................... 99
Chapter 11; q.uartermaster Class I T p: IV Operatiom.
Communications Zone............ 99
Faction 1 - Kission. Or#canizations en& Functions 99
Soction 2 - Determination of Requirencnts....... 100
Section 3 - Requisitioning Procedures........... 102
Section h - Control an8 Distribution............104
Section 5 - Conclusions and Recommendations.. ... 104
Riblionraphy....................................105
Ci-mpter 12: Class I T & IV Operatione, Tiold
903.088................................106
Section 1 - fl.partermastor. .%?.my Group........... 106
Section 2 - Class IJ. b IV Section. Quartermaster
Supply. Army ................. 106
Sectlon 3 - Operation of Army Class I1 & IV
Depots ..............................109
Section 4 - Conoluelons and Recozmendations.....111
Rib1io.raph.J .................................... 113
Chapter 13: quartermaster Depot COmpWY. .%j>ply.
(T/O L 110-227)......................114
Seation 1 - 1”lssion and Organization............ 114
Tection 2 - Employment in the European
Theater of Operations.. .............114
Bectlon 3 - Conclusion8 and Recommendations..... 116
BiblioRraphy ....................................118
iif.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)
SUBJECT PAGE
Chapter 14: Beech Maintenance Sets 2nd Beach
Follow-up Sets........................119
Section 1 .Chnractarlstics and Usa............. 119
Section 2 - Oneration...........................121
Section 3 .Conclusions and Recommendations ..... 1.22
Bibliography.................................... 123
Chapter 15: Clothing ond EqUiDiIlfXlt ................ 124
Section 1 - Allowmce and Yalntenance ...........124
Section 2 - Winter Clcthing ..................... 1-27
section 3 - ~oriclusionsand Recoruendetions ..... 129
Bibliography....................................170
Chapter 16: ‘7, uu^rtarrastor Bales Operations........131
Section 1.nuortermaster Selus Conpnny.
(T/O & E 10-157).................... 131
section 2 .~ llctsStore Operatious .............. 132
section 3 .~onclusionsana BeCOnJ?lt?UdCtfGns..... 173
Bibliography....................................134
Five: Class 111 Supply..........................1.35
Chcpter 17: Putroleurn, Oil nnd Lubricnnt
0per.i:iona ............................135
section 1 .Introduction ........................135
section 2 - Ekchwtics of Supply.................136
Section 3 - prinripol Functions of Or retiag
end Planning Agonci..a ...............143
section 4 - ~onclusionsand Recoamendntions., ... 146
Ribliography....................................148
chapter 18: Logistical Fcictcrs .................... 150
Conalusions nnd nrcoi ;lF..sndationa................. 155
Ribliogra.)hy ....................................1%
Cha?ter 19: Pasoline Supply Cofcpiny...............157
section 1 .Misflion. Organization :ind Function. . 157
ssotion 2 - Europmn Theoter of OperaLions
mpcrfence .......................... 158
section 3 - Conclusions and Hecomond.$tions. .... 160
Riblioeraph. ....................................151
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TABU OF COSTEVTS (Cont'd)
SUBJXT PAfZ
Ctapter 20: class TII (So1j.d Fuels) Operations.. i i; 162
Section 1- ~eneral..r.r.....................rl..
162
5ection 2 - Ogerations.. ......................... 163
9ection 3 - IConolusionE and Recomendationz.. .... 165
Bibliography ...................................... 167
mETDLcm :
1. 0,uartermaster Levels of Supi>ly, Zurogean Theater I
29 Vovember 1942 to 3 March 29b5
2. Letter, Eq 12th D,rol.,l Froup, file 400.312 (e-4
"U?) Bub : Requisitioning and !:ovencnt Of Supplzee,
2$ October 1gb/,
3, Form for 'lailg Telegrm
4. Letter, Iin, Seventh v9 ?my, fi1e.M lt00.213 OXJ
sub3 : nuarteraaster Ren,uiremnts, 7 Cctober 194.4
5. I"ettor, To, Seventh US !myJ file AG 400.213 nL7, .
subj: nuarternester Clem 111 Eequireiaents,
7 October 1944+
6. Letter, ZTq Cown"cntiol8 Zone RT0Us3A, Office
of the Chief ~uartermster,subj: lllssion of
Tho Charleroi Lle?ot; 4rea, '-)-lc3,2 kurch 19q.T.
7. Letter, Supreme qoadcunrtom, -41liod Xxped itionary
Porc8~1, subj: Allocation of Credits -
Civil Affaire Supnlies/Eltores - Operation
OIZRLORD - 7 plus 91 to D plus 120, doted
9 July l9/+4
a. Letter Suprovc I-Tcadquartcrs, Nlicd Zxpsditionasg
Forcm, subj: Ulocetion or Credits -
civil ?ffoirs Supplies/Rtoros - Oporetion
OERLORD, dRtod 19 Oc1,obur 191Jt
9. Lottor, xq scrpicos or T'iupvly, :TO .Office of
tho Chiof ?uart~r.r\astor, filo &,SOa? Fub, subj:
Coinposito Rattion for E.T.0,U.S.I. I 27 April
1943
10. Contants and P-llmranoos of Ration 4ccossory
Convoiileice Dackots I
11. Ovxissuo of Rations to 7.T3 trmy Forces
12I htloil Issue 'kporionoe on hropean Coiitinont
13
OraRnrzation of the British Irmy CatcPine; Corps
Published by the "rar Offios (S.T.) Octobor 19b2
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T.IBLX OF COTBTTS (Cont'd)
lk. List of I tsms to be Carrted in %del Stock
for Mvanoe Denots
15. ovorlay of' Major Pipslino Systams in tho
European Theater 62 Ogor=tions
16. Chaptor 3, ?uartermnstcr Servicc Referencc
Data, Volume I1 (Revised), Operationa-Plan-
ning 1January lql+l+,'publishad by Hq Soxvices
ol SQpDly, 3'110, 0-Vice of the Chief
0,uartcrmaater
17. Chaptcr 6, fiuarTerinaster 3ervioe liefcrcnce
Data, Volume I1 (Revised) Operatdons-Planning
1 January i944.,'pu'>lishad by He Services
of Supp1y, ETO, OffiCc of the Chief
n,uartermastQr-
18. Report of Class I11 Consmption Rates of
FoIV3g in Final Ldvanse to tho Rhine, prepared
by Suljrcme'Hoadq~~srters , illlied Expoditionary
Forces. 25 Ap3l 1945
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Prepared by:
R-E-S-T-R-I-0-T-E-D
THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATEI
APO 408
REPORT ON
QUARTEFMABTER SUPPLY OPERATIONS
Col Thad A. Broom, 016246, Chief, Quartermaster Section
Lt Col Raymond H. Tiffany, 020348, Quartermaster Section
Lt Col Dan L. Hiller, 0189278, Quartermaster Section
Lt Col Felix J. Gerace, 023954, Quartermaster Section
Lt Col Wilmer C, Landry, 020238, Quartermaster Section
Major Walter S. Kiebach, 0406256, Quartermaster Section
Najor Thomas D. Blackwell, 0405117, Quartermaster Section
Najor Arthur B. Johnston, 015773E8, Quartermaster Section
Captain Ernest C. Vincent, OlStM456, Quartermaster Section
PrZncipal Consultants :
Brig Gen ;mines W. Younger, 08335, USA, 12th Army Oroup
Quart erma ster
Brig Gen John B. FranBS, 021063, USA, Office of the
Theater Chlef Quar termaater
Brig Gen Robert M. Lee, 018483, USA, Deputy Commanding
General in Charge of Operations, 9th Air Force
col Charles N. Howze, 018506, @4C, Quartermaster, 9th
Air Force Service Command
col Albert 0. Duncan, 0120888, QMC, Office of the
Thester Chief Quar terms tar
Col Robert P. Ilollis, 015079, QIC, Office of the Theater
Chief Quartermaster
Col John M. Kenderdine, 0316467, QMC, Office, or tha
Theater Chief Quartermasbr
Lt Col Morris M. Bryan, 0410965, QMC, Office of the
Theater Chief Quar tormaster
Lt Go1 Ralph Y. Hower, 0920754, QlrlC, Office of the
Theater Chief Quartermaster
Lt Col William F, Schultz, 0265729, TC, Office of the
Chiof of Transportation
Lt Col Benjamin H. Evans, Jr., 0315369, WC, Quartermaster
Section, Fifteenth US Army
Major Jmee T. Catlin, 0366031, WC, Office of thc
Theater Chief Quartermaster
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1. Gcncrol.
PAQT ONE
INTRODUCTION
a. Tho purposc of this study is to yroscnt in concis0
but dotnilod form thc brocd phnsos oi? tho probloms
lacod by tho n,UQI%On"tor Scrvicc ill tho Buropccn Thcator
of Oporntions in tho porfommco of its suDply nission, End
tho orgmizntions, motlicds and proooduros tho ~,unrtmi"tor
Somrico ovolvod tc moot thoso probloms.
b. El tho prcpnratlon Of tkiS Study ClOSG coordinnticn
wc.s effcotca bctwocn the Quartcrunstc?r Boctf@n ol The
Gonornl Boer8 rnd tho Thentor Chiof n,u?.rtornclstar, 'Riontcr
Sorvico Forces, Europor?n Thw..tcr. In ordcr to aasiat Tho
Gcnorcl Bonrd, the Chiof Qu"crm*?stor projxrod a group 01
study melysos of vnrious phnscs of Qunrtomnstor supply
activitioa in tho Curopoon Thcatcr of Op-rations. The
StudiQS hnvo boon Cnro%lly fOllOWOd; CXgOt quOtcltiOnS VLPO
mdo where n7pmprlnto and propcr rnnotatisas mdo to thb
indiviAun1 studics in thc bibliogrrLphy. Tho following io n
list of dccumcnts mado nvailcblo by thc ChiLf nunrtomnstor
to tbo ounrtcmtstor Sooticn of Tho Goncrnl Board in tho
propnmtlan of this ropcrt:
(1) Critique of oucrtowsttr Fkwning for
Continontol Operations,
(2) ogorntionnl Study t?mbor 1 - Ddinitions
of n,u-rtcrmc.stor SUppliGS,
(3) Oporntional tltudy Nuribor 3 - Lovols of
SUPPlY *
(4.) Oporntioncl Study ITumbcr i- Qu?.rtrimastur
Logistical Datfl.
(5) Oporrtioncl Study Nunbor 5 - Quortwucstor
Supply Oporatioos in tho Comunicntions
Zono During Coribe.t.
(6) Oporntional Study nmbcr 8 - Manpowor in
Rclation bo Supply.
(7) Oporntionnl Study Numbor 9 - Roquisitioning
Procodurcs for 8upply of m. OvcrsGaa
Thontor fYom tho Zono OP the Intorlor.
(8) Oporc.tlono1 Study Nunbar 11 - USB cf Fbrsonncl
othor thin Unitod Statcs TIilitnry
in tho Eurogorn Thoator of Oporntions.
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(9) Oporotionnl Btudy Numbor 13 - Broad Phcscs
of Orgazizntion cnd Oaercticn for Supply.
2. Quartomastor OrRdnizntion for Supply in tho Europonn
Thontor of Operations.
n. Tho nission of tho qumtonastcr Scrvicr; in tho
Xuropom Thentor of Oporations was slmilhr to th-t of thc
?unrtcrr?stcr Corps.in tho Uiiitod Mxtos, ' Tho Chiof ?uortornastcr
wns chzrgod with tha procurment, storago cad issuc
of nll ~.u~.rtomastcr supplia

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3. gy"one. Tho planning of tho invasion of tlic
continont , ?ad the opcrations thet occuTrOa nftor D-Day, roquirGd
close coordinntion by tho Chiof qunrtemastcr with
othor stcffs md. scmiccs to ovorconc tho problem thnt ,?ram.
The prnblm of shipping the initial rcquironcnts 37
low priority Clrlss 11 supplics to thG continent cftclr D-D,?y
w.S P,VCFC"rG by tho devclopncnt of becch rlaintonnnco and
bcwh follow-u:? sots. Thorc waa c, cmtinucus problcii of
ri-.intn.iiinR stock lcvois in tho dCl3GtS. Xmy chmgos in
stock lovcls wcrc m.clc noccsszry by chrnging situr.tions,
'-"her:! w?.S P. constcnt sl1.oi-taGo ?f transportation which , p

R-E-9-1-R-T-C-T-EkTr
-PART TWO
----
GEENBRAL QtJARTE;XFIIASTEB SUPPLY, TRA.NEPORTILTION, LABOR
AND SUPPLY OF VPHER TI”US ARMY FORCES
-
B&4Pl?ER 1
OLASms OF SUPPLY
SECTION 1
WAR DEPARWNT IIEFINITIONS
5. Definitions in har Department Field Manuals.
a. The War Department has established five classes
of supply which apply to all Servicos. T ey are defined in
Field Manual 100-10 and are quoted below: P
‘Class I Supplies. Those articles whiich are
consumed at an approximately uniform daily rate
irrespective of combat operations or terrain
and which do not necessitate spcial adapta-
tion to meet individual requirements, such a8
rations and forace.
Clays I1 Supplies, Those authorized articles
not included in Class IV, for which allowances
are established by Tables of Basic Allcwanced,
Tables of Allo~vanceB, and Tables of Equipment.
Class 111 Supplies. Puels end lubrlonnts for
ell pur1,oses except aviation, inoludlng g:o$oline
for all vehicles, diQ8el oil and aoal.
Glass 111 (A) Supglies. kviation fuels and
lubricunts.
Class IV Supplies. Supplies and equipment
for which allowances are not prescrihed, or
which require speoial measures of control
and are hoc otherwioe classified, Normally
such supplies include fortifioation materiols,
construotion materials, aircraft and article8
of a Similar nntura.
chss IV (b) Supplies. Complete airplanes,
airplane aguigment and all spare pnrta and
supplies required to maintain the oomplete
airplane in oommrlssion.
Claas V Supplies. Amunition, pyrotechnics,
antitank minee and chemicals, It
b. The following Jarinitions for olassee of supply
are listea In Field Manuals 10-5 and 10-10:?13
Class 1 - No change from definition in Field
Manual 100-10,
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Class I - No change from definition in Field
Manuel 100-10.
Class I1 - Those authorized articles for whick:
allowances are established by Tables of Basio
Allowances and Tables of Allowncea, such as
clothing, gas masks, arms, trucks, radio sets,
tools, and instruments.
Class I11 - Engine fuels and lubricants, inoluding
gasoline for all vehicles and aircraft,
diesel oil, fuel oil, and coal.
Class IV - Those articles of supply which are
not covered in Tables of Basic Allowances and
demands for which are directly related to
operations contemplated or in progress (except
for articles in Classes Inand V), such
as fortification materials, construotioo
materials, and machinery.
class V - No change from definition in Field
Manual 100-10.
SECTION 2
DEFINITIONS IJEVELOPED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OB OPERATIONS.
6. Definiticns prescribed by the Chief Qua-temaster,
European "heater of Operations. The Quartermsstsr Service
Reference Data. Volume 11. Office of the Chief Quartermaster.
European Theat& of' Operations, dat8d 1 January-1944, gives
the following definitions for classes of supply.4
a. Class I - As stated in Field Manual 100-10, War
Deprtment, 15 November 1943.
b. Class I1 - Those supplies and equipment for
which allowances are established by Tables or Allowances,
Tables of Equipmeut and Ow Circular 1-18; namely, clothing
and equipage used by the individual and also organiza-
tional equipment such as heavy tentage, axes, field ranges,
and any other items to be used for the whole of the organization;
also items of an expendable natura such as soap,
stationery and brooms.
c. Class I11 - Petrol (Gasoline, oil and lubricants
ana solid fuels (coal, coke and wood).
d. Class IV - Miscellaneous articles of supply
such as post exchange items, special sales store supplies,
repair supplies and equipment, depot equipment or other
such supplies whichae not covered in documents establish-
ing Class I1 allowances and the demands for which are di-
rectly related to the operations contemplated or in progress.
e. Class V - Ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank
mines and chemicals. These are not supplied by the Quarter-
master Service.
SECFON ,a
FROE" THEAmR OF OPERA'I?ONS Em,R"CE WITH IIEFIKITIONS
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7, Class I Suppl&.
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
a. The First US "rmy carried and i sued solidi-
fied alcohol heat units as Class I supplies,? in contradhtion
to Circuler 23, tieadquarters European Theater of
Operations, listed tbs as an item of expendable
Class I1 su;? In the Third US Amy the Class I section
waa responsible for the issue of gratuitous post exchange
supplies, whersas the Class I1 and IV section was responsible
for the distribution of post exchange sales items.7
In the report for September 1944, the Third US Kcmy C'uarter-
master stated that h'e was iszuing gratuitous post exchange
items through Class I channels but that the stocks of those
item were stored in a Glass I1 and IV depot,
b. Due to inccr.sistenoies and misconceptions such
as these that &rose throuehout his experience in the European
'i'lieuter, the Chief buartermaster recommended the following
definition of Glass I supplies:9
Vlass I - subsistence rations, subsistence
ration accessories, &nu those items which
me distinctively necessary and exclusively
used in the hmdling and preparation of the
above products, such 8s bread sacks, solidi-
fled alcohol hQat units, ooifee bags, etc."
8. Class I1 and IV Suppllez.
a. Research failea to reveal any definition of
these two Classes of supply publjshed by any of the field
forces. However, the field forces were not always clearly
decided as to what exsctly was tbe difference betereen Class
I1 and IV items. One ,.my Luartermaster, on being
ashed to separate Class I1 end IV itoms an the daily tele-
gram, stated that ne can determine which are to be
Oluss I1 or IV itez:.8 This confusion results from the
existing deficltions of Class I1 and IV supply. Keavy
tentage is listed under Class I1 because its issue is provided
i'or ip Tables of Equipment. Tentnjie for housing
purposes, $oweyer, wa3 cmsidered by sme agencies as Class
JV supply.
b. Class I1 and IV Supplies were colc.bined and
made the responsibility of one sub-section both in the
Offices of the Army CLuartermasters and also in the Dffioe
of the Chief Guartcrmaster, European Theater of Operations.
Maximum levels of supply for these two classes wra prescribed
for the combined group in terms of days of supply.7
Reports of levels of sup1,lg on hand were made for %hecombined
group arid wera also given in days of sup@y.lO I;OWever,
sinao Class I1 supplies were procurd prirnariig orr
the basis of allOwdnC6S, and Class Iv sup-lies were procured
on the basis of speaific needs for planncd Operations, the
procurement of these two c.lasses required that each class
bs separated on requisitior-s to the Zone of the interior.
The lack of a clear distinction between the two clnsses made
such separation difficult, nut only at the higher levels buij
also among the conbot trcop, and caused further confusion
when opimons differed.
c. On the basis of tkee yoarstexperVence th~
CClef &,,,uartermster, European Theater of Operations, re-
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comended be following definitions of these two classes
of supply: B (1) "Class 11 8UPDlie3
''4, Th Esuipmant:
Individual or organizational clothiq
and equipment, allowances of which axe
covered by T/IC1s and T/A1s.
Exatemplea:
Clothing - shocs, overcoats, socks,
underwear.
EQIlipri"t - individunl equipment a8
authorized by T/E 21 - blankets,
web equipment, shelter halves;
organizational eguipaent as
authorized by T/O's and l'/E's -
field ranees, heavy tentage,
cots, G.I. cans, eto.
Q. Exmndablez:
Expandable supplies covered by allowances
coritained ir, official War Department
or Theuter publioations .
@x.aIzplw:
Oleaniug and preserving materials -
soap, broome, mops and brushes,
Orrice supplies - stationery, pencils,
paper clips, etc.
~~~, Spare P~ta:
Haintenunoe and repair parts, and
component parts for the sbove Class 11
item.
Exampies:
Field rawu p6rts; ham" and saws
which are oompoueuts of' oarpenter's
tool kit, QXC.
qmue of any Glass I1 Items in excess
of tho allowencea prescribed in T/Els
nnd T/A.'s or aocwnts coveriM expendable
supplies does aot change its
supply claasific~~tion.Such issues arc
known as Claso I1 issues in eXCI3BS of
authorized allownoes.
VChose items which are contclned in Th's
or other documnts menzioned in (I)A, 2
aud J above, but which ere used exolusively
iE the retail handling of basic products
of othcr olasses will not be considered
es Clasa 11, but will be oonsiderad
as ao item of the class iIl which its
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related item falls,
Example :
Gasoline cans 826 T/E equipment yet
they are used exclusively i n the
handling of' gasoline and are
therefore to be considered as a
Class I11 item.
(2) rrclass 'fv Supplies,
Phose articlcs of supply which are
not contafiiud in dccumsnts which establisl;
Class LI allownoes:
A. Officers, nurses and WAC offioi-rs
'Ci:stinctive items of olothing, oad
acccssories.
E. Iteirs procured spceif'ioally for
such &rsonr&l as merloan Red Cross, War
Correspondents, &ne sold t o such parsonnel,
C. Supplies firocured for spxific
projcFts for a nonrecurrirg operation;
exaples, ,merican fls~arm bands, nausba
bags, etc.
-G. Medal9 and ducoratjons.
L, Material handling e uipment items
which-we ~iotcantainud in l'h and, T/A
ellowttnces. '1
9. Class 111 Yu lies. The field forces in the iiuropean
T h e e ~ & ~ m & ~ ? ofollowed n s gonorally tho concepts
of higher headquarters in the definition or Class 111 supijliee;
The Shiof kuartermastcr, howevar, took excoption to
the existine; definition of 2lass I1 supply and statcd:q
TtGasclinu cans undor the iiar Department deflnitiori
arc. Class 31 itas; yet the yrocuruxent,
storage u d issue of gasolinz oh116 is dircctly relcted
to tho proouramcnt, Storago and issue of
gasolino. Gaaolino cans =E out 01 glaou in a
Class I1 depot, c a a Class TI dtrily train, or a
Class I1 ruGulsiticn. They am required nt ClasG
I11 dump and should bo included 810n.g with othor
items us00 in the rutail distribution of FOL uder
the olussificztion of Class III supplies, Examples:
Gcisoliae CL~R,.gasolinedl.aponsers, gasoline hose,
uto. 1'
He timrc ore recomanded that the Pollowine: dfifinition be
adopt a;pt
n3lnss III - Gasoilnf!, oil, lubricant8 and
solid fuels (ooal, ooke 8Pd VfoOd), Uld Suoh i tem
as arb distinutivoly necessary and exclusively
use4 in thu rotail handling o f tho above products.
Gxaqilcs: Gasoline cam, gaseline ciispensars, gesoiine
hose, at6.71
- 8 -
R-E-9 -T-R-I-G-T-R-D

10, Post Exchango Items. Regardingtho issue of post
exchange new and the establishment of ar, aaditional class
of supply for those items, the Chief Uuartcrmster stated:
I'One other difficulty has beeo the lack of a
clear cut golicy on the classification of articles
which are sold anC distributed through Army Exchange
facilities. This group of items could be
termed. as follows: Those items necessary to promote
morale and personal hygiene, which are pro-
cured by the Cuartermzster Service but which are
turned over in wholesale lots to the Army Exchange
Serviae, or to agencies such as the Kavy, Red
Cross, etc., for distribution and sales purposes.
These items have beensclassified both in this
Theeter and by the Zone of Interior in Glass I,
I1 and IV. There is no clear-cut official classi-
fication of these items. They presenG a special
probleln in that under sae circmtnnces they my
be issued as a daily or weekly ration, wPJle in
the majority of cases the items are distributed
througli sales facilities. They are procured,
stored and sold in buUc by the Luartermaster Service
to the Army Exchuiige. tinlike all other items
hwdled by this Service it is nut the responsibility
of the Luarterraster Service to insure their
delivery to the individual ccznsumer. For this
reason it is advistble to establish an additional
class of supply Isnorm as VX Itenis".
"The additional class of supplies should be
referred to simply as TX Items" aiid should be
defined as follows:
nnhose items , necessary to yromote moral e
and prsonal hygiene, whlch are proaured by
the Cuartermaster Service, but whioh are turnea
over in wholesale lots to the Army Exchange
Service or to other ageiicies slioh as the IL'avy,
Red dross, etc,, for distribution and scles
purposes. The sum items 1:" distributed gratuitously
b) the C,uarternas*uer Service retain
classification as a 'PX Iten'. 11
11. Concluslo-- Various inconslsteiicies and problems
arose throughovt-Ekii 1:uropean Theater of Operations, due to the
many interpretations of definitions of the olassea of supply.
12. Recomhiend~~Lc)q~. That appropriate aeencies of the
\/alar Department ennead pertinent kvar Department Field Uanuals
to standardize definitions far classes of supply in CoMormity
with the reaomndations submitted by the Chief (Luarterrcaster,
European Theater of Oprations. (Tar 7b, 80, 9 and 10).
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R-E43 -T-R -1-C-'P- E-D

1. m 100-10 (Fa).
2. Fld 10-5, 29 April 191;3.
R-E-S -%R-I-C-T-E -D
Bibliography
Chapter 1
3. l?M 10-10,2 Xarch 1942, Chaiige. i, 8 October 1942.
4. Qhf Service Reference Data, Vol 11, OCC#~TOUSA, 1 Jan 44.
5. SOP for Operation of Glass I Truckheads, First US
20 EOV 44.
6. LTOUSA Cir 23, 4. Ihr 44.
7. Kfter Action Report, Third 'is amy [QX Section).
6. 1st Ind. h00.312 (G-Li Sup) Hq 12th Army Group to CG,
Communicutiona Zone, 25 Deo 44 and '%emo for Hecord"
attached theretv by 12th Army Gsoup.
9. @: OprhtioiLal malysis Study ti, Subject: nDeflniCions
of Classes of Supply;' ~q BF,ETO, OIV~ (Rear) APO 687,
undate d1
10. Ltr Hq 12th &my Group, rile 400 (C-4 Sup) 13 Peb 45,
subjoot: "Levels of Supplyn, to CG. Communications Zone.
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R-E-4-T-R-I-C-T-E3

cwm 2
-XTKLS OF SUPPLY
SECTION 1
EjCISTLlTG ~3FImTIOm
13. Day of Supply. A day of sua2ly is thL ostimatcd
avorage oxgenaiturc of various itoms of supply per day in a
campaign, exprossod in quantitios of spocific itms, in
rcrunds per weapon, or in punas pcr man par day.1 In doaliw
with 0,uartLmastcr su>p,plias, the following dGtailcd dofinitions
wora amployod in tho EwoDoan Thoator of Oporationa:
a. Class I. A ration is thG food roquircd to subsist
oni man for onc day, A flay of sunply for on3 m n of
Clam I therefore was Sot at one ration.2
b. Class I1 & N. h dag of supply of Cle.38 XI
could not bo oomputd accurately, and was theroforc only
regarded as a unit of muasuro. Actual cxporionco shwod tho
cxponditures of various itorus to bo variable under campaign
coneitions. Class N itoms aro those roquircd fa' special
or .\articular typos of oporations, and roquirements variod
considerably as tho combat conditions changed. A day of
supply or Class I1 or N bannot be exprosso3 in ?ounds, but
must bo exyxased by itom. Days of sup>ly Wcro,computod
basod on tho '7ar nopartmcnt roplacomont factors, which avo
tho cxpootud avorago mor-all exponditwe of oach itom.&, 5
The allowances as authorizcd by those rsplaoomont factors,
convortod int pounas, providod a figuro of .85 pounds Dcr
man per day.17
c. Class 111. A day of supply of Class 111 was
bascd on cxpcrionco and consumption data coqilod throughout
tho*campaign, Tho figurc, oxyroased in pounds pGr man
por day, variod frbm 15.47 gounds por mar, por day to the
final flguro of 11.38 gounds por man >cr day, This figuro,
hO-NOVGI, was also rOgardGd as a unit of mcasuro. It was
not to bo considorad as on0 day's rcquironenh of any givon
command, but as an avorago d&y of Sup31 which woulG m ot requirements
ovor a eiven period of timo,T
14. Lcvols of S U I . A lovul of supply is tho luan-
tity CT suppliea hcmat a givm point; bnso, dofonso command,
8qartmont , thoatw of o,ioraticns, or similar aotivity,
measiirod in days of supply or in spccific guantitios of an
it0n.l Iovols aro proscribod by tho ldar DcDartnent for tho
thcatcr of opcratlnns, and by tlic thoatcr for the various
dopots, sections and amios. Lcvols a8 prescribad by tho
War Departmnt woro of throo pincipal typos: Minimum, Oporating
and Maximum ~OVclS.
15. lfinimum LOVO~B.
a. The minimum levo1 is tho quantity of su7plios
(in daya) nocdcd to maintain an everseas command priding re-
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R-E-S4-R-I-C-T-E-D
prescribe3 by the Var Departnent as being the stookage
necessary to provide for the replacement of the nomal supaly
rontine due to interruptions in transportation, enemy
aotJoc, and other unforeseen demds. The stookage of this
reserve in echelon provides for distribution and envisages
the asse-bly of adenuate supplies Lmediately behind coinbat
operetions to insure a aonstant flow in the event of an lnterrnption
In the nomal operatinR level.
b. The iinimum level is therefore governed by the
need to have levels spread frun the rear to forwar? areas,
and by the Quantities needed to iiaintain the supply pipe
line P'ratl ports md base depots to Pozward supTly install-
ations. The quantity In the suyply pipe line itself is
.governed by the length of the lines or commuttication and by
the transport an& handline fhcilities available. r'Jb.en the
pipe line is short, the field forces are supplied direct
frora base depots and levels are relatively easy to mintain.
ks the line lengthens, ana the time fnotor for dellvory increams,
Advance and Intwrmomte depots beoome neosssary. Kin.
&num* levels lnust be established and mintaimed at alldepts tin
order t9 mintaln a sufficient flow oT supplies to the field
foroes .O
16. Oparatinp Level. An ogerat!.ng level of supply~is
the quant~ty of supplies (in days) necessary to aintain an
overseas command duriQg the interval between recaipt of
shiprsents from the zone of interior.5 The operat ng level,
therefor%,is based on the frequency of sailings,lQ and on
the tirie reouired to wrfom the following:5
a. Initiate and forward a requisition to the Zone
of Interior,
b. Load and ship the supplies from the zone of
interior.
0. Unload Lhe supplies in the theater of operations.
(The number of days lnvolved from the initie.tlox of
the i:onuisitton to the receipt of the supplies in the thes-
ter is called the "order and ahippinp time1?$
17. lraximum Ieval. A maxi" level of supply is tne
maximum quantity of supply aermitted on 3and at my given
time in au overseas command, an& is th6 sum of the ninimum
and operating levels, expressed in terms of days of supply.5
18. Although naxhum, operating, and
minimum levels of supply were presoribea for the lhropean
5%-atar of Operations, all stocW of Qwrtermnstor supplies,
from the tlme of their arrival, were Considered to foru
part of a Siu@.Q leml. There was no physical segraplntion
of stock betiweex operating and ninimum love1 stocks. Depots
Woro not concerned with oporsting and milvrnun levels, but
were interested only in the total fiqurs, in assuring themselves
that requireQents For so nany days wcre availablo,
RGquisltions to the BOnQ of interior were based on so many
day6 of supply, and not on operating or minimum levels. ~ll
incoaiw %"crrnaster suplies formed one European Theater
stock pile, oontrolled and aistributed by the Chief Q,uartermastar,
Zlthoufih tho factors considered ir, the detQ2hIinotiOn
of tho rininwn and operating levels are essent5al to tho
final detomination of' the maxinzum level, tho suropem meater
of Operatione avoided confnsion and excessiv6 records by
confinin itself insofar as Quartermaster supplies were con-
cerned, &o only the one level.
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R-E-El-T-R-I -C-T-E-D

n-w-0- &-n-~ -U-I -a-u
SECTION 2
DETERFUNATION OF LZVEX.8
lg, Necessity for Establishing a Level.
a. A level of supply Is essential to provide protection
against interruption in*tha flow of supplioa. Convoys
are s w , delayed 02 lost, daily trains fail t o arrive
and truckg break down, Stoclc levels must be Inaintain-
ed in all echelons to provide continuous supply in spite of
suoh interruptions.
b. A level of supply is essential to provide proper
distribution. Every soldier, regardless of hi&position,
requires q,uartermastcr supplies every day, and in
order t o meet these dQm-dt3 thore must bG concentrntions of
stock at various ventage points throughout the area in
whlch'troops era located, Each item of olot:iing, in all
sizes, though not issued to every soldier every day, aust be
available in stock to meet the damands. Supplies flow
through many channals. Troops are widely disporsed, and the
problem in distribution throughout all ochelona soquiros
stock levels to met the deJminds when placed.
6. A level of supply is essential to meet unerpooted
dmands. Supplies aro repuisitionod fromtho zone of
interior basod on speoific plans n?d on astimates of noeds
end oonsumption YatQ8. Actual consimption of sup?lics in excess
of tho anticipated rate results in a foiluro to moet
damanas of tho anticipated roto results in a failure to nimt
domnds solely from tho supply stocks ordorod for oonsurflptioi
purposes. In April and Yay 194.5, the number of prisoncrs
of war taken by the United States forces was doublo the anti
oipated rate, Thore wore sevcral instanoes of largo soale
dostruction or supplies, necessitating imadiato roplaoe- .
"lt. Several factors cause unoxpectod dowds to be mde,
and stock lovols munt be sufficient at all tines to meot
such ron_uiremants.
20, SiZo Of the LOVOl.16
' a, In dotomining tho size of the bvol to be
carried, the froquency of'convoy arrivals must bo considored
Xach ship, or oaoh convoy, cannot oarry u balanced load of
a number of days supply of oach itm, and tho intorvnl Potwoen
oonvoy arrivals therefore cannot bo mathcjmatically
calculotod into thc dotormination of %?a l ~velto bo carried
Ilowcvcr,it is a factor for oonSideratSon duo to probablo intorruption
of convoy arrivals by suharino nnd bombing aotivitics
of tho onemy.
b. During tho eerly days of tho Europoan Theator
of Ogorations a poriod of 180 to 210 days wag roquircd from
the time of plaoing a roquisition on the zone OP fntorior
until supplios wcro rocoivcd. Tho ordor and shipping timo
was oonsiaorably roduooa to a poriod of 120 days in tho lattar
phases of the ce?ipaign, and spmially hndlod roqulsltions
roqIdircd even leas timu. Tho Sizo of tho IsvoL, thoro
fore, io reduced in proportJon to reduction in the order aqd
ehippine the,
c. nistribution problams also offoat thc Si20 of

R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-3 -D
lovcls, and spcoial problcms pcculiar to oooh class of Bupply
must be considered ssparately. In general;however, supplies
were distributed by means of the depot system. The larcat. the
flraa and tho proator tho dispcrsion of troops, the prrcatcr
tho numbor or dopots rcquirod. Tho cstablishment of additional
dogots to satiefy this distribution roquircmont waa
n 00118idCrF.tiCn in tho rucmcnded estebl3.shnont of my Snorcamd
thcatcr lcvcl. Tho lovol in each clopot is also depcndcnt
u3on the transportation facilitios aveilab1.e for
brinuing in stock, making intor-depot sizipmmcnts, end for
maintaining a propor stock lovol.
d. Tho principal problcms in tho distribution of
Class 7: supp1.i~~ involvod tho xrcontap.o of moh type ration
to bc cotismod, the ncoossity for maintaining ~3. balanced
diot, and tho supply of pc!rishablos. Tho nlllnCI'OU8 BiZQS
of clothfnpl itemxi ronuiruc? thc distribution anC maintailanoo
of balancod stocks of all sizes in aocordwco with
tariff tablcs, anc! othcr itcnis in Class I1 onc! IV, such RS
spnrc parte, prosoxtcd siniinr poculiar Froblcrts of stockago
and distribution.
o. Unexpootod demands on sup2lics affcct tho sizc
of tho lcvcl to bo oarricd. As mor6 axporionco was Gain&
In tho Suropoan Thoatcr of Operations roquirencnts nru mor0
noouratoly ostimatcd and. uncxpoctud dcman?.s docreased .
21. Levols as Proscribed.
a. Yerious lovols wcre proscribod for tlic Zuropom
Thoator of Oprations from thG tho of its inccption.
aosoriboa.levols for Clam I variod from 75 days on 29 Fovmbor
1942, to 50 days*on 3 ?larch 1945. Othor clacsos VRriod
botwoon 45 rind 90 days, with a 60 day 1r:vol a8 avcrago. Tho
Chiof ?uartorrmstor voluntarily cleotod to maintain n 60 day
1svol.of all classcs, and Q 45 day luvt11. of ?ost Rxclianffc
itom, until Naroh 1945, whon conformod to thcso prascribcd
by the "'ar ~,oi~,artLncnt.
1%
b. Tho."rar ncpertucnt proscribod tho thoator levols
to bo maintalncd, direotcd thnt thoy not ba axcooded, and
indicctod tho point at which inco n u plioc would bo included
fimt in the thoater Ic.vols?;f~~~BTho proscribod
lovols wcro subjoat to tho review and rooommcndations of tho
XuroDoon 7!hZ€itC Y Commander. ( AppGCdiX 1)
0; Tho Goinding Ccnernl, .&ropean Theater of
O~oratlena,nroscribed t he lovols to bc. rncilntainorl within
tho thoator. €IC recomixondad, In T'cbruary 1945, tho follow-
.nR lcvols In days to bo luaintainod within the thoatur; 10
-Class
Armp Rorvico
Area
Mvanco
Section
IntGmOdinto
Section
Base
Sootion
T 7 10 18 15
IT 15 15 20 10
SI1 (MT-90) 7 10 10 3
III (Nliod Products) 7 10 18 10
Iv 15 15 20 10
-u-
R-E-3-T-it-I-C-T-b-D

H-r: +"lL&l--mfi-u
The balance of theator stocks not included in tho Army Sorvioe
Jcea and Advance Section worc to bc divided betwocn the
Intomodiate and naso Sec%ions, but the lovols in those SOCtiona
were to be brought dcvm ns soon as prccticablo to the
levels preSCribGd.
a. The ronction to tho Thontcr Commder's recommondations
varied in tho field forces. Tlie Third US Iu?ny
desired to reduce tho Class I levo1 of thc Army Sorvlco
kre~from seven to five dnys in order to retain mobllity,
and at the eamc timo to inc ose the lavvL1 in thc Rdv-nco
Scotion from 10 to 15 dnys.ff Tho Pirst US kmy, howcvm,
desired to incronso tho Flmy Tervloe Aroa levo to 15 days
since thoro woru 15 days in tho ration cgclc,lh mc %id
US lrmy dcsirod thnt sxpondnblc in tho krmy Servicc :?roc
bo increased to a 30 day lovolJf(l wliilo tho First US .'.ray
dosirod ci 30 day love1 for a ll Clnss I1 and 1V supplies.
Each desired a hiqhor stock lcvcl in tho combat zono, OithGr
in tho tray Rcrvico 4rea or in tho Advnnoo Scctioii.
e. Tlic 12 h Army Group roComndm3,od a-sliqhtly
highor stoclc l ~ v ~ but l , the ~ Thonter Comnder, cn 12 March
1945 proscribod thnt the following lovsls be cstablisbod
nnd naintainod at the oarlicst practicnblc dnte:l?
Army
-ClOSS sorvico
-kea Section
AdViXlCQ
I: 7 10
I1 15 15
JII 7 10
Iv 15 15
He stated thet thoro was on obvious advmtage In hnvlng
uniform stoolc levels authorizod and maintninod in 4rmy Garvice
Areas and h tho Pdvanoe "oction, and thnt tho levols
presoribod werc set; to afford mnxinum suliyort to tho ardea
whilo still mnintnining their mobility. Xxooptioas to theso
lcvele wero authorlzod only on spscjfic Clam I1 .and N
itams noooesnry for opcrationnl roquircncnts, -md subjoot
to agreement botwoon the 12th Axmy Croup and the Comnuni-
cntlona Zone.
22. dncfinition. Basod upon oxporioncc throughout the
cmpaign, tho Chibf Quhrtamnstor rocomionded thnt-thc cxlst-
ing dofinitions of lcvols of supply be disrogcrdud, c.n that
only one lcvol b@ cstnblishsd rad defincd as follovm:l%
LOVCl Of SUPPLY - that DLlOUnt Of SUp?liOS IIOCOSs~ryto
bo stocked undcr.contrc1 of thc using agon-
cy (Thcnter, .-, Corps, oto. ,) to provide for rill
requiromonts for a given period of tjr.0 in tho
futuro. Its purposo is t o provido protection
agalnst intorrruption in the rogul-r flow of supplfos;
to provide for M own bnlmoad dlstrlbution;
and to provido n resGrvc t o ineet unoxpootod dcmnndd.
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R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
23. Ekproasion of LCVG~, of Supply. A level expressed
in days of supply should be R realistic forocnst of ?upply
roquirmnts, end should not bo basod on such factors as proaont
mpowor or rcplacomont factors olcno. A day of su-pqly
of Clnss I1 cannot bo oxpresnod as a wholo as cach itom
mst bo nnalyzad aepcratcly, pad tho us0 of c purcly roplacenant
factor levcl is inaccurnto duG to tho groat nuqbur OP
initial'issuos whichwere made. Tho uso of pmsont manpowor
fipwes, in coinputing days of auoply Tor all classcs, was
a150 inaccurntc ma .mapower wn$ subjoct to constcnt change,.
Othcr Tsctors, such as nn incorrect tariff of sizos on hind,
thc diffcront :ionus to bo scrvod to difforont cfitu&orii;-s of
parsonni.1, nnd fUbWG p1,nnncd ogorctions suoh ns thosc cclling
for tho omploy" of lnrgo nrmorcd forcos, must bo connidmcd
in co?:iputing dnvs of supply. Thc lcvcls of supply
woro thoreforc nnc.lyzod in E ronlistic fcroccst of require-.
mdnts which took 011 influoncing fr.ctors into considoration,
nnd th.0 lcvols w;ro exprossod, not.in tams of replacomant
factor cnd monpowor dnys of supply, but in n foro r.st of the
nmbor of dngs tho supplics vould probably inst. 18
24. @vels on Fand.
. a, The lcvcls down to nrmiea woro genorrilly maintoinod,
insof::r as priorities rad trensportation would pormit,
tovols v;ithj.n tho nimics, hOWCVGr, vzriod considornbly.
In Auguat i9&; thc Thirc! US .mny had on hnnd two dc.ys supply
of Clnss I, onc day of Class 111, and four days of Class
I1 nnd TV, while tho lovols of tba Firs6 ,"my woro rolntivo-
Ly high, In ncptemtcr 19&, thc Ninth ?my bocama oporcitlon-
nl with hiEh lovols, vhila thoso of the First and Third
Irmics wrc crtromoiy low. Thc disproportion bf3tWGGn the
lcvols .of tho various amios (Sradunlly dscrcc.scd a d im- ,
proved until by tho cnii of tho cm aign 6xccl.lcnt propcr-
tioucito dlstributlon w7.s cffeotcd.~~
b. Lovela throughout tho opcrntions in Southurn
Frrmce ware goncrnlly higher, P1:ins. cnllod for tho landing
of fivo d.nys su~plyevory thrco days, building up a two dny
ntook cnch ttw. Tho plcns wcro cnrricd out, but tho ex9sn-
dituro of 31csB I11 was honvior thnn :inticipatod. In Octobor
194L stock lovols in tho .Firray Borvicc .&Tor. woro cstnblishoa
at fivo d?.y.yc for Class I 2nd I11 r!nd 15 days for
Clnas I1 end IV. A l5-dcy ?.Lvcl or a11 cl.ossce was cetnblishod
for %?lo nLdvr.nce Roction, Thc shortncc of transportntion
lncilitics provontod tho octunl build-up of thoso
lcvcls in thc Eonvctrd c.rc?.s until January 1945, whon tho foriwrd
rilovomont of tho Seventh US Army and tflc First Fronch
.Rmy he.d slorvoa dovm.15
25. Conclusions.
0. Thnt tho Turopcnn The-tcr or Oporntions wns
only conccrnod with on6 lcvol oP supply. Thnt tho LWSQof
throe typos of levcls ceuses oonfusion cnd prcscn'ts m incorrect
pioturo of $hi. situation.
b. Thnt the computntion of days of mp"ly, bnsod
pwaly on rcplncomcnt factors and proncnt manpowor, is nooossarily
c.n incorroct figure.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
c: nrt lcvols must bo established to moot 211 raquirmonts,
stocked through -11 ochelone, and nL?int,dnod in
such bnlnncc and sizo r.s to moot requiremonts without impding
mobility.
26. Recommendations,
n,' That oxisting dofinitions of lwcla oP supply bo
diarogardod, ond thct only Onc lovcl be catahlishecl in ccnforrlity
with the definition as rocomcndod bjr the Chicf
fiunrtom.stor, Ruroncin Thontcr of OporcCions.
b. Thnt the conputction of day8 of supply, bzsul
on roplnconont fact,ors and prosont monpowcr, bz mended to
Include constecsz.tion of all roqulromonts, .
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R-E-S-'P-R-1-C-T-E-D
Bibliography
Chaptcr 2
1. Chaptcr 1, FM 100-10, Ficld Sorvico Regulations - Ab.
2. Adm Inst No. 9, 21 August 1944, 12th Army Group.
3. PVX QX 23281, Ogl905A Nov l+J+ from 12th Army Group.
4. A h Inst No 13j 27 August 19k4, 12th Army Group,
5. Part 111, ?M 38-205, lfArmy Supply Proccduroll, 15 May 1944.
6. Ltr, Hq ASF,'Wsh, D.C. , SPX 400 (16 ,Tun 44) OB-S-SPDDL-14,
19 June 1944, subj: "Adhorenac to Authorizod LoVOl6" .
7. LtP, WD Wsh, D.C., AG 400 (15 Nov 44.)OB-S-B3rI, 23 Nov
44, sad: qqLcvclsof Supply for Ovorsilae Aroa9, Dcportments,
Thoators, Bases".
8. Ltr, WD, Wash, D. C., AG 400 (21 Doc 44) B-S-E4, 29 Duo
44, subj: qbvols of Supply for Oversons Arons, %partmcnts,
Thoators and B860S".
9. TWX, EX-99501, G-4, C O ~Z, 02DQ30A Fob 45.
10. Ltr, Hq Third U3 Army, f41o AG 400 (Gon) GNMCD-3, 8 Fob
45, subj: 'rLovola of Supplyql.
11
'Dm CX e28, First ES &my, 08104OA Fob &5.
12. Ltr, Hq 12th Army Group to CG, Com 2, filo 400 (G-4 Sup)
13 Feb 44, subj: "Levels of Supplyfl.
13. WJg EX 19609, Hq BTOGSA, 121600A March 19C5.
1L. Periodic (WocXly) Q-4 Reports, 12th Army Group (Aug 44 -
May 1945).
History of Oontincntal Advanoo Section, Comunicntiona
15 Zona, ETQUSA, August 1944 - May 1945.
16. Oporational,Analysis Study No 3, undatoa, ItLovols of
SUPPlY", TSFET, TCC&
3.7 QM Oporational Analysis'Btudy no 4, undated, V'Quartormaator
Logistical Datal!, TSFET, TCQM.
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R-E&-T-R-I-C-T-3-D
CHAPTER 2
DAILY TELEGRAM
SECTION 1
PRESCRIBED USE
27. Definition. A Dally Telegram ie a messap dis-
patched da y p d visions, air force service command
and larger'hitbs reiquesting Class I and 111 supplies.f'It
Is the basis for the supply of these lasses from the Communications
Zone to the using unlta.16
28, Procedure.
a. Individual units submit dally ration requests
to their next hlgher headquarters. Divisions (for divisional
and attached troops] and corps (for corps troops only) con-
solidate unit requests and estimate their total ration requirements.
They then prepare the daily telegram, giving
the strength of the conmand, total rations required, and a
report on the status and requirements of Class I11 suppliee.1°
b. Corps and division daily telegrams are submitted
direct to army. Army prepares a consolidated army
telegram, based on the requirements of all subordinate units
including army troops, on stock levels on hand In army supply
points, and on estimated requirements for intended
operatlons. Army submits its telegram to the regulating
station, stating the mount of supplies deeired at each
auoply point, The regulating station notifles the appro-
priate Communications Zom depots whioh prepare an8 deliver
the ehlpents to tie designated arm supply pointe.10
c. In the event that there is no regulating sta-
tlon, divjsion and corps may submit their telegrams direct
to the army supply point, which in turn consolidates
and forwards st" to the army. The army may either submit
it8 telegram direct to the Communications Zone depot, or
'GO the depot through the Advance Section, Communications
Zone. 11
SECTION 2
USE IN THE EUROPEAN THEAm OF OPERATIONS
29. Procedure.
a. The preparation, routing, and use of the daily
telegram in the European Theater of Operations followed
generally the procedure prescribed by the War Department.
Class I and 1x1 supplles were procured by means of daily
tebgrams which included the strength of the command and
an outline of the Class 111 situation.2 The field armies
prescribed that divisions, for divlslon and attached troops;
oorps, for corps and attached trcope; and each unit of
army troops would submit daily telegram,? Telegrams were,
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TI-E-3-T-R-1-0 -'I-3-D

howevor, norlully subrlittec' to tho supgly points instoud
of dircct to urIqr.
h. r.ftur rcgulatinp stctionn wore establisho2, thc
Quartormoster subtaitted his d~ilytclcgrdm diroct to
tho reculotinp station. ':ith roforenoo to tho Turtiicr routiq
beyond tho ro[,ulotinG station snc? tho nhnncr in vhioh
s~~pplics mro nclturally ship2ed from tho domunicotions
Zona forrrurd to tho m~e8,thoro vas o [rddu~~l ovolution
to tho syf,tam whereby the rey,uletinf stution rcocived the
ddlg tolcrron fro51 tho eruios biid routod scme to jhc clo ot
ifhioh actudly mado shim" to thc fiold forcos. The
evolution of the crpcoss cms dlrooted to thr lassaniw of
thc interval bctnocn the tino tho amy subriittod the daily
telcgru dnd tho tfno su>,plios wcrc ectunllg dolivmWl, 12
Duriwe the only gbrt of tho coiri:) icn, cvm for Class 1
supplies, this intcrvd rrmgod fro i oipht to 15 iuys far
thc ariiios of the 12th xfliy Froup.7,c,$
0. Outlinocl balor, l o tho history of thc cvolution
of the iwoccdurt lor wopgrini rinE routinc, thc A,,Fly tclo-
Frem in Conuunicotioco Zono, Zui+opo;ln ThoutcjP of Oar~,itions:
(I) Durine July-Octobor 19&, tho daily telo-
[ran frori tho arrlios wna aubdttud diroct
to I:undquntcrs, :omnuniciitlone Sone. Tht:
crltical ougply situation pcvuiliny ut
tho tine woe thc bt.sin for adoptinp this
hithly controllod orocodurc. ClL>8sII
mqfplioo, in u0.clition to Clues I and
Class I11 su;i?lios, wcrc ordorcd c71soby
the trruios in tho ddly tologrun.li T:ourevcr,
instoed of cdllinG for such suo~~l~os
by iten, tho cull, in dcoordunco qiith
thc Ygsteri OP tonuipc ullocutionn arcscribotl
e t t tho tlim, wu5 w,dc lor J ccrtuin
nuibcr of tom dT Class I1 itcims.
Such 2 polioy prov~a incffootive. Tho
Chicf C$uarl.onulstor stntcA: ':my do,u,nrl
for Pun?ly must bi, liy itc 11 .nd not liy
ton. Pc,r::on.icl in thc Coruiunicutims
;hi ii must bc ~1~ncr: llg f'di1i.r xith tho
rcquironcnts in for\, r(i uroa::, yot novcr
tL thr, s?cclfio iiacds
(2) Durinr d?tUiltjGT 194.4, L duvico for f,cilitho
calla of tlit, tirciios for Clnss
Jlios vC.s doptcc? in Coniunic~tione
Zoni., Surolwun Tlw~torof 0:)orationb.
Class I1 Quortormstcr nanic lhintandncc
Sot tvus dram uti, listiny tho vc8rious
Class 11 itom dnd lctturinp them rdth An
olphuboSio&l system. Tho claily tclq raia
thcn roguostod a numbor of bs,sio moiltonmc.?
sct~, rilnuo cart .in itilma not nol>dcb,
plus o~rt~iii itom not listod In ddoounto
ousntitios. This TxrocLduro eliminutcd tho
dieudvuntofo of ordcrirq Cluas IJ FJA 7Am.os
by tons, but oinoc thi. duiLy toloprarl ifas
still routod direct frori thu ropul~tinl
stution to Xeadounrtezc, Coritiunicqtions 2 OWJ,
tho Systoiu WGD as hichlg controlled LIS
before. I.?
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R-E-S-T-I7 -I-C -T-IC -D
The system outlined above was predicated
on the Idea that the records in the OPfice
of the Chief Qusrtermaster, Comrounj cations
Zone, were sufficiently complete and upto-date
to enable the Quartermaster Supply
end Distribution Division to rscaive the
daily telegram from the armies and to
parcel out to the various Quartermaster
supply Installations the demands of the
armies. Such provea not to be the case
in frequent instances. Directions for
shipnent were sometines made by the Chief
Quartermaster on depots whose stock condl-
tions were insufficient for the shipAents
required. This was partioularly true in
Class I1 and IV sup~lies.l3,15 Adding
to the difficulties of the situation, shor-
tage of transportation did not permit
adequate stocking of forward depots from
port ar8as and, for the same reason, it
was also lmoossible to make inter-depot
shipment beeween forward depota .I3 Backorders
for Class I1 and IT items increased
to serious oroportions. The armies, in
order to be certain of suppl -requisitioned
back-ordered itms.Y3,3f By
December 194b the situation was so serious
that the 12th Army Croup caused an investigation
tc be made by Its own personnel
(See Appendix 2). Representatives from
the Army Service Forces in 'Vashington
visited the Comunications 'Cone Headquarters
to examine tho procedure.l4,15
In December 1944, the Class 11 section
wqs eliminated from the dally telegram on
the basis that a daily call was a too Prequent
requisition for Class I1 supplies,
back-orders being too numerous. The prpcedure
was also adopted whereby daily talsgrams
wore routed direct Prom the rogulating
station to depots previously desig-
nated by the Chief nuartarmaster 30 supply
each army. In addition, the Class I11
solid fuel section was eliminated from the
daily telegram, and it we8 also prescribed
that Cl8,ss IV end Post =change tens would
not be included on the telcgmm.:3
Throughout the remainder of the campaiqn,
the prooedure adopted in December 19l+,4for
the preparation and routinpl of the dailv
telegrai wagyetained anti isad in supplying
the armies.
d. Commmting on the procedure finally evolved
whereby the regulating station reoeivsd the daily telegram
and directed shipment from spec3.f ic depots oreviously deslgnated
by the Chief Quartermaster, the ideal ooncept of the
regulating station which would facilitate this procedure was
outlined b>v the Chief "unrternsster in a memorar?dum to The
Penrsal i3oerd Ssrvice Section, 17 November 1945!1p Rroa&
Phases of Organization and Cperation for Supply.
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R-3-6-T-R-J -G -T-E-D
"The teaching& of the US Army that the impetus
of supply shall be from the rear are sound. The connecting
link betweea the Cammunicatlons Zone and the Army or the Army
Group should be an improved regulating ste,tion. The mission
of the improved regulating station should be carefully rede-
fined and broadened. It should be the contact agenoy with
the b.rdes and the Army Groups. They need Pew troops. A
small staff having a knowledge cf all depots - knowing on
which depot to place requisitions and being intimately associated
with all phases of military transport, can, in my
opinion, best accomplish the mission. The improved rep-
lating station referred to by me herein must know at all
times the status of requiaitibns placed - the status of supplies
shipped, tht is, their location enroute, thsir time
Of delivery to the Armias and other troops forward, etc.
l'hs vqq&iting ststfon as outlined by me should serve direct-
ly under, and receive its command orders frob the Commanding
neneral, Communications ?one. Its technical fnformatlon
should come from the Deputy Chiefs of Service located at
the Headquarters, Communications 7Z~ne.9'
30. m.
a. There was no form presaribad for the daily telegram
by the War Department. Eaoh army devissd its own form
for the use of its suborahate units (Appendix 3 ). This
procedure wm generally satisfactory from the standpoint of
both the armies end the subordinete units, with the exccp-
ticn that the forme were changed from time to timt and varied
mong the ardes, thus causing oonfusion emong the units.
Some forms were clonr and simple, while others gave break-
downs by types of retions and listed reserve and maintenance
stocks. Others, Lcter in the campaign, listed by oatcgory
the personnel for whom rhtlons were roquired.
b. In calling for supplies from the Comunlcations
Zone, the Army Qmxtermaster utilized no standard form. The
Sevbnth IJR Arq vuortermastbr submitted his requests by
letter (Appendlaas I+ & 5). Since the Army quartermastor,
unlike the nuartsrmaster or supply of'ficer of his subordinace
units, is concerned with stocking a number of instnllatiohs
rather than a single unit aupply dunp, and alnce he muat
maintain a oertain level of' supplies in order to furnish
day to day requirements for immediate consumption, his daily
call for supplioa can not h6 reduced to R standard, simpli-
fied form suitable under all conditions.
31. Fditin The question of the authority or advisability
ofe&un$ications "one to edit the daily telegram
submitted by the field forces arose when the Communi-
cations Zonc requested thnt Class I1 and Tv SUpplieB be
separated on the dally telegram. The guartermaster, Third
Us Army, stated "It.would be difficult to explain the tao-
tical reason for which much of this equipment is required,
,, and the Commandiq General, 12th Army Group,
in a le ter to the Commanding General, Communications Zone,
stated: s
"Thls headquarters recognizes the fact that
you, 8s the supply agency for this theater,
must odopt measures which will insure an equi-
table distribution of the aveilable supplies
to all wmmands of the theater. This is accomplished,
insofar 8s the elements of this com-
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D
nand me concerned, if requisltlons for sup-
plies are kept within authorized allowances,
Under existing instruct ions of this heedquarters,
elements of the 12th Arm Group are not
permitted to requisition items in excess of
authorized allowances without priot approval
of this headquarters. Therefore, the editing
of requisitions by you is considered to be not
only unnecessary, but could VEW well develop
into procedure which would seriously limit the
prompt shipment of supplies. '1
It was decided that the Communications Zone did not hEve
authority to edit, and that the Army Quartermaster would
be limited, in his call for supplies only by his own judg-
ment, his estimate of the situation, and by any limitations
imposed by higher h6adquarters, based mainly on shortages
in supply stocks and transportation.
SECTION 3
GOhTLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
32. Conclusions.
a. That in a supply system featuring a oentral,
highly controlled supply procedure, the success of the daily
telegram in aupply operations from the Communications Zone
to the field forces demands an up-to-deite, aoourate stock
control system in the headquarters exercising central control.
b. When the situation permits of decentralization,
the greatest succe8s in scpply operations based on daily
telegrams is achieved whsn the supply organization provides
for a regulating station whose variqus sections are sufficiently
lnfbrmed on the looal eupply and transportation
situation to permit routing the dally telegram direct to
the supply lnstallation capable of shipping the supplies
raqbeatcd..
a. It is not practicable to ordctr nuertermastsr
Class I1 and TV supplies by means of thc daily telegram.
33. Recommendat ions.
a. That in future operations similar to the condi-
tions that existed in the European Theater of Operations, the
supply organization be so constituted as to provide for
routing the daily telegram direat from the regulating station
to the supply installation designated to make shipment.
b. That Class 11 and IV supplies not be included
in the daily telegram.

R-l2-S-T-R-I-G-T-I-D
Bibllogrnphy
Chap'ter 3
1, Paragraph 16, FM 10-10 (Quarteraester Field Manual).
2. Cynrtermastsr Service RefGrenCQ Dsta, Volume 11, OW,
ETOUSA, 1 January 1944.
3. AdministrQtive Stsnding Operating Procedure, Third US
Army.
4. Letter, Eq Ninth US Amx, 400 GNMW-3, 1 Bczmber 1944,
Rubjoct: Non-Shipment of Items Requested on Daily Tolegram.
5. 1st Indorsement, Hq 12th Army Group, file 400.312 (G-4
Sup), 25 Decambor 1944, to CG, Con 2, and "Memo for
9eoord" nttachsd thoreto,
6. After Actjon Report, QE" Section, Thiid US Army.
7. P-fter Action RCpoTt, n,N Section. 12th Army Group.
5. TW, CU-828, 081040A February 45, First US Army to 12th
Army Group.
9. Inclosure 110. 7, to Ltr Hq 12th Army Group, file 400,312
(a-4. Sup), 28 October,, 1944, Sub jact: *lRequlsitloningand
Movement of Supplies.
10. FII 100-10.
11. w 101-10.
12. Operational Study Number 13 V3road Phase of Organization
Rnd Operation for Supplyf1,Hq MFET, OTCQM, December lc5.
13.
Quartermaster Operational Analysis Study Number 5, l'Quuartermaster
Supply Operstions in the Communications Zone
during Gombat", Rq TSF':T, OTCQM, December 45.
14. After Action Report, Quartrrmaster Section, 12th Army
Croup, August 1944-Xay 1945.
15. Study Nmber 27, Mechonica of Supply in Fast Moving
>Siturtions, file 401/4, General Board, USm, APO 408.
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R-EFS -TbR-I-C-T-B-D
SECTIIlr 1
DEFGT LYSE71
34. Ceneral Ilission of the De?ot Swtem. In the Comunioationv
Zodi?,Tui?j&n Theater ; m o n s , the do lot
systcm was the leans by which e8ch soldier iras supplied
svery dag with ruartermster sii:>plies, regardless of his
position in the Thejter of Opcr-tions and his assigned
mission.
35. Classifioation of Depots.
a. Severe1 different interpr_ettltions of’ depot
olbRfiffioetions viere publinhed ia tho ,,urogJ;.i: The:..taP Of
@:)crctions by v:,risus epncie5. ?..oh charge in tominology
c:!uaed confusion and neoessit::ted a reeducztion of all
field. and staff personnel. Claesific.,tion uf depots and
degot teminol.o$y must be standadfzed cnd chfinees therein
kept to rn absolute ninimun.
b. The Y x i)egnrt.ment Piald Tbnunl 100-10 states:
“Cormunications Zono depots ore a180 designated as Aclvmoe, ,
Intermediate or Ease, dcpendonb upon tho Section in which.
l0c:ltod.”
0. Standing Operating Procedure Ilunber 7, Buropean
Theoter of pwation-J, 19 ::arch 1945 rive0 the follmtine:
dufiniticns:
“(1 Issue Depot. I, &pat norrmlly in un
aiivunoo section, assigned rcsponalhility
for storing suiplias within prescribed
levels and for iosuinr,- supalj?.s .. reqilirod
to neet the nods of:
(a) Arden and other troop and orpanlzations
in li dwignated SroG of tho
Combat Zone.
(b) Trocps rind organizations in e dasignatod
moa of tho Comiunioatlons
zone.
d-
(2) Fillor De ot. A depot, norrally in 8n
ntcrricd a e section, ac~signsd rosponsibility
for atorin6 tho principal portion
of theater sugp1:os within prescrlhcd
lcvols and for:
(a) Replsnishing supplios upon roguost
frcn Imue Dopots.
(b) Iosuiq- supplies to troops end organizations
in (I dcsigmtod ama of
the Comunic!itions Zone.
(a) Recaiving and. storing so??lics
- 25 -

R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-Z-D
reccived from local procurer" in
the area.
(3) BsseiDepot. A depot, nor:laIly in a base
sect on, ansignod rosponsibilitp for:
(a) Receiving, olascifyine, and storinc
supplios shippod frori porta or frori
local manufacturers ,
(b) Serving as a warohousc. to clctir ports
and for storage of excess thcatcr
atooks.
(0) Roplofiishing supplies of Pillcr Dcpota
upon direction of thc Chief of
Servico conezrned.
(d) Issuing supplios to troops and organizations
in a desippatod are@of
the Corununioations Zone.
*
(4.) Ice ,De ot. A dopot assigned rosponsibi-
(a) Centrally storing tho entiro Cormuuni-
cations Zono stock of selected items
and/or their components.
(b) Issulna suplioz1 upori request from
isistolletions and orgenizations .'I
d. Tho Thatlter terminology as prescribed above is
misleading from a Fuartormastcr standpoint, end tands to
falsoily imply thc mission of the v rious doppts. All
9,uutormster depot8 hem an issuo rospomibilitg. Bone
aapots nust ioauo in retail to troops in tlioir locality.
Furthernore, a base dcpot has tho aemo typo of niobion ac
a ftller dopot inasmuali as uuppliss in filltr dopots or0
roplonishod by shipments fro3 baso depoto. The '!sr Eepertmnt
tominology mora correctly dosignatas thri dopots.
Uov+over, the dcfinitiona as oontainnc in Fiola Iianual 100-10
should be mdo more spooiflo and a t thc 8x10 tirae rotain
tho neccsoary flosibility.
Q. Classifying LL dopot as a Keydopot ~EIScaused
oonfusien from a Cuarterimstor standpoint. Tb-e def inltion
states that a Key (tepot is rQRpOnSiblQt or storing the entire
stools of sslootod items - thb purposc boing to oonoentrato
thovo item whioh are required in ana11 quantities
such as flags, officers' inaiynio, etc. and those itsms which
might be oonsidorcd of o. sonsitivo nature and ousily pilfes-
able, such as ~ 0 " ~ olothing, s atc. The 0,uartonastcr
Scrvice doos not huvo H Sufficient number of itom requiring
this centralized atmago to nocoeuitato a depot with ehe
oxolusive niusloii of recovering, storing, a d isouint: onZy
thoso items. This boing tho cam, it was uacesa ry to give
a doublo olssslflcation - A goy depot and a fillor dopot,
etc. Furthernore, the classification of a f!cpot as a koy
depot mons nothing uiiless tho solected itom ?vhich ire to
bo oontrally stored there arc dcfinod. This points to tho
fact thst It is tho item which reauiros dofinition sild not
tho depot. Tho rnisoion Of OBCh dopot StlOUld Stotc the item3
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ReE-9-T-R-1- C-T-E-D

!vihic!i 610 to bo cxclusivcly rQcOiVOd, storcd and issued by
that insttllution.
f. Dept classifications for a Thcater of Dpcracions
which would bcot fulfill the roouiromcnts os" tho martcrmr;tor
Scrvioc aru:
Base Dopot. A Qopot nornallg at ar in tho
vicinity of (I port having tho res2onsibi-
litg for:
[a] Recoiviq, classifying and storin[: of
su?glics shipLxd froE ports.
(b) Roalonishine auEplicb of Intcrnediato
and Xdvnnce Dopotu.
(c) ~ssuingsupllics to troops and organizations
in a docienpted moa of thc
ComunicGtions Zone.
Intcrmodistc Dcpot. 1 depot fiOri,mlly in
an Intaruediatc SectIan assigned the
rosponsibility Tor storing thl: principal
portion of '?hater supplies within proscribed
levolG and for:
(a) Rcplcnishing slrpplica upon request
from IidVbnCO Depots.
(b) Issuing supplies to troops und organi-
zetions in a designated ure8 of the
Golltumications Zone,
Mvanco Ijcyot. A dapot nor!lelly in on
Mvance Sr,ction, aasi@od thc rosponsibi-
licv for storinr: sumlios within nrascribod
levels ?or ivbuin8 su~pl.ios
rcguirod to wet tho noods or:
(a) Psnios end othcr traops md orgeinizations
in a dasignatod arc3 of Chc
Conibot Zcno.
(b) Trco~so:ic? organizations in a dcslgnatod
ci~aof Lhc Coruuiiceticine
Zonc.
36. Nood for Port Dopots. :Ihonovr.r the trsnsportution
fricilitics for novin~, off locdcd siipplios frsii thc? port to
supijlg instullntions outside the port area aro ineufflciont
to Iccitp tk ports cloar, thcra is a noed for n port dopat.
P!ithout a port depot to invontorp off loac?cd stocks ut ~orts,
them 3tooIc3 cannot bc oonsidurcd svailoblc for wyglyina,
t!ic traops until thoy arc shl.ppcd to inland dopots, warchoused,
2nd invont oricd. Prior to this, them uninvontorica
stocks wem just so uany tons, and not' item w required
bv troops. In thc lurop3aii Thaetor of Opcrntions trdnopor-
&tion facilities WCrO searoe and tho ,?,unrtei?naster service,
to&:othcr wltli otlior sc-rvicos, wos givau R daily allocation
of so tons for rorward riovoncnt from port arcus to
inlalft dopots. At the lar&o port of Antworp (J-65951 thorc
\vas no port 0.apot to sogreento 3nd invcntory stooko that woro
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R 4-43-T-R-I -C -!S 4-D

off loudcd and awaiting shipwnt iniond. 'iith no knowlocigc
of tho compoaition of thcse oPf lo,ded stocks, tho lixited
tr-.naportation ?acSlitics woru often used to transport inlala
fron ports itor.rs thnt wcrc not ncoded at thc tine by the
ficld forem, while other itom for which n critical nocd
cxiotod wro left unideiitifiod ot tho port. In addition,
bulk shipriata of uninvontoriod tons of oup~lic~ from ports
to ialund depots ortcii i-esul:ed in undesirable dic tribution
of otoc1:a. 'Ihcn tr~nsport~tion is sliort, inter-ciopot ahipmilts
cannot be mide for tha purpose of rrdintributing stocks.
37. Ths %pot System in Dogth. As thc lino of comunications
longthenod, cnd it beccmc ncccvsury to suyply tho
ficld forcoo by formrd depots, thL sdootivo stocking of
forvard ciiid iriterrlediatc dcpots w3s begun. Fact noving
itons wrc sclLcted out of the msa of toncagc at thc baoa
dcpoG md worc .tockod in forirard clnd ir.tcrmc2isto depots.
Tho slow-moviny. bulk item romining; fit tho Lase depot aore
moved forvrard only as reguircd. Generally, interniedintu
dopots rsplonishod tho oclvanoc dopots and stockod certain
itcls thot tldvalicc depots did not stock. Howcvcr, it llrils not
until about Novcmher 191& that depot opcretions coescd to be
tlod. down to tho boachcn and thc intcrmodiato dqot systm
UBS set up.
38.
fl. In the European Theator of Oportitions tho gcncrftl
adxiinistrntion of depots waa govowed by the P,uortcr-
milter Depot Opcrationa Manuril. dated 1 Dcccnbcr 1943, and
by othcr storage puaphlc tz tlnrl uppopriato texts. €lowovo~,
oncli dcgot had 3 spocific and detailad I@iSSloi1 thnt oould
not bo set forth in publicfitions in gonerel tcrms. Coriscquontly,
a letter mission wuu propcrred for each dopot
explaining in sufriciciit dctoil crectly tho specific miskion
in each cuco. Thcsc lsttcr lnissions worc proparod by the
Chiuf Qm9ii;r:instor, so thdt the opcrflt!.oii of tha depot
could bo intcpetcd in ,tho antiro dopot ogntcni. Thosu lottcrs
YKWC simplc md briof and. provideti for Plcxibility in
tho opcrrtion of -the dopot, diid furnishcd esocntiel inTomtion
to thc depot corumndcr. (Appendix tlwibcr 6)
b. Exporicncc in thcr Curogenn Thcotcr of Oporationn
h:ie brought out ccrtain Essentials ro,rardinp dcpot misslons.
X'hc ndssion must bo pr3percd und pub,lished o:i tho thoatar
headquartcru LcvoI. It must bo Tloxiblc, siiqh, and. brief.
T ~ Qdorot eormmdcr must iae!! thc folloviii& Tawts:
TonnogcB to bo rccoivcA d,:ily by SOCLTCO.
Tomages by Class thot munt bc stored.
Troops to bu sc~cdon D rotuil basis and
those to bc 8orwB hy wholcsalo bulk
shipmmonts.
"hetiler tile dopot will. storo tho entire
2hoater stocks of n cc,rtain item.
He must be given the mans (basic nodcl
stock) by rvhich ha cdn oalnulutc, by item
the quantity of stock vhich is to bo
atorad.
- 28 -

SECTION 2
39. Contrzlizction or Docontmlizotion. In sulplying
ii-ld forwori tho Coi>?~~ona Zone the '3road policies
rcl::tin6: to prscuduros to bo uscd in roquisitionirq und ropiishing
oper-itions nrc dotmninod by ttc dograo of ocndxliced
oontrol exorcised by tho hichsr hcrrdquor'tcra . Vhcrc
thc suiply sittiation is critic31, centrsbizcd control is csssntirl.
::h2ro SU!.>ply conditions are nor" fnvorcblc, o
cnrtcin mount of dcocntrdizction is pornittod. In thr! Suro-
?can Thostrr of Oporotiors ci poiicy of proerosnivo deccntrnllzotion
of supply control was followed.
40. ProKrcso or Dccontmlizction.
n. PTior to 5 Dccenbor 1944, vvhcn Circular Lattor
.Xs. 97 vms pubiiohca ky thc Offioo JP tho Chiof Qu:~rtcrilc,s'l;cr,
hiEhly contrulizod oontrol of su?gly operiitions rms e fecturo
of tho 8?ufluortcrm:;tzr supply nystoii in tho Europoon Thonter of
Opcrstions. Thc Offico of th3 CLisf ::u: rtcrfiustcr rccoivod
through chomcls thc daily fe1cpu.l from the fiold forcoo nnd
collod on apccific dopots to mko dhipiwncnts. Owing thit:
timo nu??ly vias prgctioolly tiod to tho dopots near boaches
?.nd ports, 2nd tho field forcno '11cx-c sup2licd lrirgoly by
diroot ehipmont frca bum dopots through thc ,:idvouo.o Section
of the Cofiuiiunicotions Zailc. This ocntralizcd control in the
Offico of' tho Chicf C,usrtcrmater node it ncoossary to muintui:i
in that offico tho centrd stock rzcord filo of ~ 11
dopoto undcr thc Thc,ator C.u;.rtnrm;atcr's aontral so thut
only t;hJsc depots copoblit of m::klne shipmnte to tho advance
dapots ;.nd the field forocs ~foulclbo dirootod to m-kc suoh
shipracinta.
b. Aftcr 5 Docamtor 1944, L supply control co:isid-
crctbly dccontralizod frm th )t proviously 511 ol'fcct ivos proscribed.
The iriprovin( ouaply situation, lurgclly tho rosult
of tho:o?oning uf thc htiiorp (2-6595) port, meo tliis poseiblc.
Irl IjUDplginF the crdcs, tho d.iilJ tcloeran PIU~
routcd dirGOt fron tho rdgL\ln';;iiiy st;.tion to doiyts :vo-
viausly dusign;;tcd by tho Chiof QiirJrtermotcr to sii.>plg
s;>ccific ur .ian. The o&v:.nco depnto \:ern sup?liod C1::os T.
by irAtor:icliJtu &'lot8 aT. tho b.;Citl of C.3tinK;.iXIE aubr!ittoC
?miodic Ily by thc ..dva~:cc aoctloii. Chss 11 raouirc;lr,aits
for aGv.mcc dogsta wro obtoi-:cZ on roouinitlsn to she O Wicc
of tho Chicf 3,ucrtcr:ioster. Gil tho hzis of ostinrtas
whriittd to the Chisf ?unrtcrm.stcr, i.:it,cr!iadlntc dnpots
su:>ilicd Clnss 111 (ictrolou , oil, nd lubricants) to ua-
~31100dc:)ats. Thc flow of eUn7,?liJi? to intcrfilcdlato clowto
ims co;tzollcd by thu Chicf Qu;rtcri.ustcr :I iccordnnoc
vith c' 5mur 1 p l~nGra.,!.n. up 1 Dccoiihor 1944.
c. 01: 9 itobruory l9b5, Cusrtorrtcster Circulrir
Lo'ctcr 3,l4., YES gublialrcd ;?roscribinc Purthcr docont-
r.llzatiw cf supply conCro1. Iristcad of the Chiof cuortwriastcr
daslgnLting 3l;CCifiC dogats to sur;ply tho fiold
forocs, thc. 3dvc!lOo SOCtii!n \J:lS GhnrF,Cd vlth tho function
of nllocztine ::dvanco dsqots to tho supply of each psrticu1;r
:riiy. Evcn tk su]>);Ly of coritrollod itclas WE docc:itrslizud
to the v' riaus soctio:ls of thc Co!u,iL~nic,:tions
Z3ila. Thle dogrce of doceiitr3Limtic,n roprosontod thc
- 29 -
R-X-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-ES-T-R- I-ET-X-D
fiiici systm of oontrol In tho Coixiunicotions Zotlc .,nd it
fuctioned satisfactorily.
4.1. Lovonont Allowtion of Torui..gc.
ti. xtor tho roquisitionlcg proccduro end dopot roplonishont
system h3d bow estoblishod, tho prob1er.i involved
the i!lovi;mcnt of fIu?plios in order to fill thc roquisicions
,ad rcplocishncrit dee: nds , ".'ith -Lr:dwportntion critical,
'thCrQ shonld >e strict coxtrol of tonncgo ollscatians.
Durine the period June to October 191,4 cll toim:gc moveIicnts
were coi~trolled by ormies. Tho trmsportctim for tho nwo-
mont of rescrvos that accurmlutcd on thz bcnchcs wyns not zv-
:;iloblc. Evcntuolly transportation did bcccrb :ivailablc for
tLo gradu :1 novomcnt of r;upplios ti, ir.tamcdir,tc. ilopota.
';hen no st amy roquircments wuro baing mat frori intormodiotc
donots, il change VI.^ !'~(tc in the tonr,;gc o1locr:tion procodurc.
Thc 2roblon thcr. bocwe one of Lllocoticg. tonncge for tlio
luovonont frill ports forward, nd frorr ii:torradictrt depots
f 0rrrGl-d.
b. :Lllocations frou hrts to Inturiicdiete lhpatz.
Until 10 January 194.5 allocctions were made ctaily at rieetings
coiducted by the Assistant Chief of Stoff, G-4, Headqusrters
Comuriicatioiis Zone. The priiiclpdi f'ullacy In t,he method
cf allocating this toimc:ge was that G-4 allocitod the Qutrt-
eniaster Ysrvice so many trains for eech class of su:)ply.
The Quarterraster vas not allocated the trains far shipiients
of OlaSSeS a8 required. Cn 10 January 1945,
letter, subject: "Procedure fm Planr?int, Reception
Xovanent of 3u>ply, Equip! :ent arid Per8anne11' :>ublished by
Headquarters Comunications Zone .zlrovided a nore satisfactory
basus far the allocatiori of tonmpe. The followin&
is quotea on overall moverlent plans:
"(1) On or before the 23d of each month, the
Chief of Transportation vi11 subr,iit to
the loting Chief of Staff, G-4, Atterrtion;
Ports, 2oads dnd Bailronds
Branch, recomendatisns for.:
Allocatioa of' shiL7pin(2 t o pai*ts
showinp the number of & hip ,,rid nvorsfe
daily Loiinclge to be discharged,
by Olasv ar supply.
Vltn for Port clearonce and movement
sf euqlies to de,mt.s showing
ori;in, aver ge daily tormlge,
deEtinatiX and ty7e of transportdtlor!
for eoch class of supply.
Pler, for noverient of BU >plies from
de7ots to forward destinationn shsaing
origin, averace daily tonnage,
Cestinstion und type or trans2ort-
8tio:i for each class (if supply.
In the developmnt of plans for
Zovemnt, the Chiel of Transyxtatior.
will ciriifer directly vlth
supply services in deterninntion of
-. 30 -
R-Ea-T-R-I-C -%E- D

allocation of ships by name and nuiber
to ports and in the determination of
special requirements for movement of
supplies from ports to dspot~.~*
(illocatjons frm InternGdiate Depcts to Consum-
;..i$,~o!i;4;s. Class 1 alia supplies iiere handlcd on a
ci-y te eiram basis. The CoialerGlinf+ General. Ldvonce Sac- .
tiou, arranged for t!ie transportatis; of Clash I an; III-re-.
qr;ircnents from the advance depots in his area. Class I1 and
IV oiid Post Gxchango requirments we,-e h~iidled011 a oeriodic
requisitioning basis. The Coxunder of the Base Section in
whish the shipment originated was responsible for providirg
noaessdry trarisportotion in accorda:ice xith the provisions of
Circular Letter Bunber 1L, Office of tho Chief Qartomustcr,
9 February 1945.
42. Docunontation of Ship:~enta. Documentotion is the
process of mbr':ine ond recording shipntuts on various paper
docwnts for tile purposo or identifieition end control.
Since it is i,4~psssiblcto su2ply tcns of supplics to fill
specific denanda of the field, it is nocessary thit the tuna
be cor.vertc8 int? items. The spacific tons of cach item
should be hiO!qa. By inventoryirg, supplies are convertod
lron a tmragc to an itori basis. Proper documeatation provides
a nwns of rotainin& this identity while the aupplios
are in trmisit betwen tho depots or from Gho depots to the
con.siulii*g uyenciss.
43. Gcr.ora1. The hcnrt of 011 supgljr cporetions in a
Thcntor o m t i u n s is thc principle af Laowirlg Ivbt supplies
cro un ha~dand whoro thcy LTG located. Inventorying
is a periodic nctivity; stock accounting is i cocticuous
sctivity. The corMnc,tion f urnishod tho Chief Quartermistar
with itifarmation that ves csscntiol to hili i!i porfoming tho
following functions :
a. ;dvjsinG the I'hootur of Oporotions CollrnnCcr in
formulatiiz tagtical plans.
b. Distributiug stocks i:l tho Curopo-n Thoctsr of
O?crhtioas.
c. Advising pcrsonncl suoh as hrily ani1 Brny Group
Co:unandorn on comlitions acd locations.
44. ;lit;? Depoy. The mctiiods of imontorying and
stook cccouli ng efip oyed by Bcpots in the Xuropan Thoator
of Oporations fsllowod tho basic principles proscribod in
!.:a- Dap:irtrlont publications.
45. Reports to Ce.rtru1 Thootcr Rocords.
a. T'ho office of the CIdef Quartornostor mintairled
tho Ceutrol Thentcr record of Qmrternastor stocks. Stock
status reports wore siibmlttod p6riodlctrlly by Quortermstor
ciopots in thc Thoator of Opcro-ciono ucoardiug to the follow-
- 31 -

ing schedule:
R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-Z-D
Class 1 Cupplies - Weekly
Class I1 and ZV - 1st and 15th of the month
Class If1 - 1st and 15th or the month
More frequent reporting was found to place too great a burden
on the depot. Invento;ries tere normally reported by the
depots by item and quantity.
d. Reports to Other hqencies.
a* %lie the depot reported direct to the central
records of the Office Of the Clzief n,uartermaster, copies of
the stocks Status reports were also sent to the ?unrtemaster
of the interested section of the Gomunications Zone. It
was essential that the sectiOn 7uartermaster be kept informed
on the stock status in his own section.
b. In addition, there were certain item oi which
the stock position for the whole theater ahould be known
from time to time by all seotions of the Comunications Zone
and the armies. Lccordingly, special stock status reports
were from time to time disseminated by the OfPice of the Chief
Quartermaster to interested agencies.
SECTION 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMnaDnzlI~s
47. Conclusions.
a* The olassifioation of depots set forth in European
Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure No,
7, L9 March 19L+5aisnot suitable for nxartemster ma.
b. The port depot in the European Theater of Operations
was essontial'to efficient sup~ly operations in the
Communications Zone, and where it wa8 not established ef'ficioncy
of tho supply system suffered.
0, During combat cperetions, the field forccs reooive
increasingly efficient supply support when supply
stocks arc largo and control of supply is decentralized.
DocontralizaCion of control of supply cmn brj acoomplishad
~nlyvhon tho lines of oommunication and channols of supply
aro sufficiently well organized to warrant woh decentralization,
d, Regardless of the degree of daoentralized control
of supply operations, an up-to-date central stook
accounting systeni Is easential in the Offioe of the Chief
Quartormastar of the Theater of Operations.
48. Rooommendations.
a. That the classification of dcpots In tho Oommunications
'lone be redefined to lndicate thoir goncral fluzction
a8 base, intomediate, and advasoe depots, and that pertinont
War Department publications be amonded accordingly.
b, mat in oporations similar to those in the Euro-
- 32 -

!I-E-B-T-R- I-C-T-E-D
Theater, provision bo mde for tho establishment of
bmo dopots R t porta.
Bibliapaphy
Chapcor 4
1. Quortcrmstor Operbtianol fimly8i5 Sturiy liumbor Fivo,
dotod 1 !:o-mmbcr 1945, Mq OTCQJ:, TSETT.
- 33 -
R-E-S-1-R-I-C-T-3-D

49. Mission and Orfanization. The mission of the Quartermaster
Eruck oom>any, or trooptransport dompany, is tu
provide transportation for the haulin6 of carbo and for the
m0Ve"t of personnel by motor transport. It is a mobile,
flexible unit, and is orLanlzed into a company headquarters
and three operating ulatoons. Each platoon operates 16
trucks, two and one-hlf ton 6 x 6 oargo, with 16 trailers,
1-ton, 2 wheel, and each platoon has suffioient equipment to
perform liolited claintenanoe. The maintenance section, equip-
ped with complete second yhelon equipment, operates under
the company headquarters.
50. Allocation and Con-.
a. In the Communications Zone the TPanBpOrt€itiOn
Corps assumed camruand and operational control of the truck
oompanies.2 In the Combat Zone companies were allocated by
army pup to armies, and Brrcdes to subordinate QOrpB and
divisions, In some instances allocation or oorapanies was
made direct from Lamy group to division. The Army, Corps
and Division Quartermasters norually retained oyerational
oontrol over the companies, subject to the allocation and
dispatch control exercised by the G-4.3
b. Of the 464 Quarterblaster truck oomA,anies in
the European Theater of O;rerations, 170 were allocated to
the 12th Army Group. The troop basis for this allooation
was as follows:3
Type Unit Basis of Allocation Total Type Total
Number Cwi;*anies Units in 12th Companies
Army Group Allocated
Army Group Hqs 1 1 1
Army Hgs 1 4 4
Corps Hq6 2 11 22
Divisions 3 44 132
Additional for
new Armored
Division 1 11 11
Total 170
cy The 12th Army Group recommended an increase of
11 truck oompanies in the allocation based bn the fact that
each Armorsd division required, and had attached to it, two
truck companies throuehout the operation. These truok ampanies
were organic in the old-type Armored divisions,
During actual operations on the continent, however, the
total allocation of 170 companies was never assigned to the
group and serious motor t asportation shortaEes existed
throuoout the operati0n.t This sane shorta,e of truck com-
panies, compared with proposed allocation, was experienced
throughout the European Theater, Twelve oom:.anies were on
the continent by 18 June 1944 ana by the end of operations
May 19L5, there was a total o 164 companies assiqned to
unite in the 12th Army Group. 5
- 34 -
R-E-S-T-R-14 -T-E-D

R-E-8 -T-R -I-C -Td-D
auarterriaster 36 5-
Ordnance 2: F
-hiineor 11 4;
Lienal 3
Other 0 :d
5,
TermnimI
hll bervlces 19
Total lo@5
52. Cor Lrol .in8 Dis,mtch.
a. *ha quhrtermclster, 12th .".YJ.I:T Croup, coord1nn:od
rymrtornsstor transjortetion nettar:> botwen tho urddes cf
thp Proup, furniohad fldvicc on the distribution of traneportotion
units dnd furnished the b~flisuhan necessary for
soourinp bflditiondl transnortution unit:: fro i tho Coclnunlcations
LOSQ irhen nesded.14
h. The method of coiitrol . /.11 requeets for tmnsoo~.tationlmrc p.t'ooosaed
throwl. the C-4 for wovcl mc' to the "ruortercL-st-r

R-E-S-T-R-1-0-T-E-D
for dispatch.15 In addition to the d:,ily G.is?atch, can?aniea
were at t1rir;s dispatched ta Staff Sections or aubordlnbte
units on a wrianent hasis.
c; :i dally motor transqortstion uvitilabilitg re :,art
vias subnitteG by the Array Quarterrwster to tho G-L,, shouin:.
the status of 011 Quarternaster truckc of tho arfiw. 1~
weekly tOiUlr.ge-,2lilQ re+" was subrllittea edCh I:cnduy for
transmittal to the 12th ..my Group civin! t$e totdl tollu.,ye
hauled and rfilos trsvoled dUriu6 the F.reck.lo
d. In the First dnd Fifteenth US .miies tho r-&
Tranagortatioii Seotion exercised au:w~isory conti-ol crrly
over D,uartarmuter t'ransportition o.xir&tions.2,17 In the
Third US ..my, the G-4 Trans lortation Section, which vaa
staffed by B Eieadouartcra dd headnuartern dituchmnt,
P.uarterm8tor group, exercised o?oration coatrol over tho
Quartermaster truns:isrtation, wbilo tho :Lrr.vquartsrmatcr
maintained cuutml only over those units assigned to @.la%ermster
liork.9 In the Levanth US .,,imyall transportation
onerated directly undcr the Trtirts:~ortetinn Caotion, a sc2arate
speci 11staff soctisn ort,iir?ieod for that purposo.5
53. o=ti?n?.
a. Thoro ~YBSa o~umt~nt .!id coptinuoua silortuga
of trucks throuphout tho owr.;tions. l!ai,itunanco m y penorally
poor, tind qure ports at ti.mort h.d bo obtain.2
5. Duo to the shoi%uc,c of trhnstiortation, dnd
hasud u-pon road conditions, tho overloadinr of tho curgo
truoks ua to 100 :.ercont WRS authorizod. The condition of
thc roads one. terrain, and rostriotions due to operntions
limitad the USG of trailors, and uhen unod, loading HBS
rostriatctl ho rated capcity. 6,7 Driver treinlnr \JUS oftr:n
found lackiw , und nutllified driver rcglocmcnts wCT6 of tan
dlffioult to obtaig,( Those Cirivcrs actually ,~ssip~od wr'o
too ofton of a typo laclciw. in intolligcnce Fina 8onso OP
ros,ionsihiiity. Trainin[ co: .sistca of on-tho-job o:?crations.9,lO
e. In tho ogeration in Youthorn Fratice, Itallan
sorvicc unit geraorlnol waa oxtonslvcly usoc! to ibn tho
Quarternaoter truck corA2auios. 5
?any tnblo of organization and e0,di nC WQS a teluT,orsry
cxxdlent vcndinp ex>srImntation dnci d6vclopirnt+ AR a
ftnal orgaifLzetim it was a Trans ,ortutian C O ~ Scrmmny
('P/O E 3 55-37), vith seven offioora c.n? 1'73 onllut;t2d rid,
cc3sistinr oi tlfo !>l.toons tiith thruo soctlons crach, ..rid
rdth eipht trxks, 2$ ton, 6 x 6 em-ihibibn (coLionly cailoa
DU::''s), ?or soction. It wag ea entlellp u f- rbor C rLft
oomany ind o7Lr- tad grinoi*J-lly Jbh port battblioiis, Its
function lids tc transfer cargo fro91 shiyicie to shore
dui:m or boactas, Tihero pier fncilitios wro not tlvuiloblo.
Each cbrquny, ovcr D pcrioa of 24. hours, vas cagubla of
- 36 -
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
- 37 -
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
1 cur do tolu~cnt CA 10 t trucks ,l/l+-ton
1 truck d~tocluaent CD Y 1 truck, 1/4-ton
2 trucks,
3/4-tOn, ' C
4 truoks,
2,'*-ton, 6 x 6
cilrfo
57. Dincumion.

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
parts r:.SUltc!d in tho OpcrstloU of trucks :,ithoat j!ropGr
ropairij, thus ceusinc o::ccs!,ivc ::oar on otl,nr ?arts.
d. Tho Buartornastor 3battnlion, hobiic, h3edTuari;or3
(T/O t.C 10-5h),was lockin( in ~i uotor officx to gr.02crly
sup-rviso and coordinoto rlclinfonancs activitiocl in
truck companiw. Iicvfcvcr, d notor officw was ridded aftor
htmtilitics CebSod, (chaiigc; 2, T/O P 7 .l0-56, i-atud 2 :.uf'ust
1945).
0. Kiicrally, officar por:ionni;l in truck coli-1 riios
wrc! not sufficicntly troixd in riotor trans>ort;-:tion slid
ririiicipal ii:>?liad pxurnl1.y to cor& ian$~ pointfl within roeoh of tho using
units *
c, Truck com?anics em cjqi:ipod with thrcu tool
SC~S,sooond ocholon, nubor ona (.OOi*iOII) on tho hasis of
ono pcr plbtc7on, cind one Cool stt, wcond ec!iol.on, nwibzr
two (conuior!) for thc maiiitouonoi soction. ::c;ch oonyny is
also oquipDcC; rri,iih onc tmck, 3/4 ton, 4 : l+ llij3:)ons cilrriur,
and ono Cruak, ?$-ton, 6 x 6 cargo, rilth :finch, for uountiw
supx-str:mturc, hoi.et dnd tovir?;: Lor, for thc mintontlnoc
ecction. Tho rroc~ridochclon sot nunbur ono is dosimoc3
to bc usod by V.10 ruch$nicn onC 5~ tr8tlS.?"08 in a
3/4-ton k x IC uoaponu oarrior irith tho nocossary oils and
Brousos t o tdlx ourc of 15 trucks, "ith platoons trooel-
ing in diffaront diroctions, it is in:Jractioablc to p;ivo
iiro?cr maintznoncc to oech platoon. Zach pLtoon nhould
thoroforc bo onui!>pcd with B 3/l+-ton, 4 ;; 4 r'ioajmis carriol',
to adcquatoly :?crf orn mintononcc of vchiolas lihcn ollortltine
individually in convoy and to proporly :x~intaiii tho tools
assignod.
- 39 -

R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D
il. That Quuartcrrtcstcr octlvitics throughout tho
op:rction in the Zuroydn TJioatur wcro handica?>ad duc ta
CIU s1iorttq.t OT trann:mttttion both in ths Comunicc;tiolls
Zono and in th ~rnyareas.
b. That, in C::ncri:1, offiwrs, drivcrs und riochanics
wrl! inzd,f,flustcly trsixd, and th..t quallricd TGplaoacnt
ilarsoniiol wxo soldom uviiileblo.
0. Thrii; division Quortcrrnestors raquirs sufficicnt
organic traiisportatian under tlloir dircct control to ticconplish
thcir mission, one that oor;?s Quuortcrrastcrs roouiro
sufficiunt tranaportLtion to p"o closc supgort to corps
troops attt~clicd divis. ons. ,:.riy quartcrmgtcrs riust ILVO
snffioiont trnnoZortatlon at tbair disposal to irerq) do;~ots
ana siin:]l., point8 stockod und .Jrithin rcaoh of tho using mitt
59. ;:ocoiuiundations
8. TJiilt, boginnine )with tha activation of t?uclc
units, a imru ctiroful selection of both offioors, drivers
and mcohan3.cn bo raadz.
13. Thiit mor6 timo he pj,vcn to thc proper trainin(:
of offioors in motor maintcnonco and convoy opcrations;
drivure in :?rcvijntativc r.iuintcn$noc an6 clrivinp;; ,ncl nochonFc5
in notor +:n8 vchlclu rapoir.
0. That ro~ilaccimmt dopots contain miile drivers
and mrlhanics Froperly trainrtd in maintonanca and oprhtion
for rcplaccaant 3r euflmntklion purposcs.
(1. That oach truck corJ?nny hG oc.ui,la;ld itit11 t1;O
r.dd.iticr!al. trucks, 3/4-toP., 4 : I+ -.rc;apons ciirriors nith
vincti, to :JroviBL o. niintmoiicc truck for mch ?lotcon.
, Thjt Chs oopratc Quortorr~-.stcrcar platoon bo
nd OrgQlliZCd undcr (1 so?sr:rtc tcblc of wgarization
and evui?:icnt.
- 40 -
R-E-5-T-R-I-0-I-E-IJ

1. T/O L C 10-57
Eih1iopru:ihZ
Gllaptcr 5
2. Praliininary kJft Truck Comlisny (Trool) or 7' Fro03
Transport Company 10-57", 0%': -, Octobor 1945.
3. f'otcs on bcrvics Troops, Oraa Brmch, ('-4., 12th f,rrJy
Group, 1C July 1945.
0. ':cckly 0-4 Poriodio hpcrts,
1944-IW 1945.
5.
6.
7.
c.
9.
12th
,! rlw
Croup,
..uyuet

R-2-S-T-R- I-3-T-F D
CWG?’ECR 6
@. RidXd &Z. UEOR S.Il+VICES
S2CTZCII 1
$UARTJAASTuR Su2VVXLr- COtJ&E
60. Kission and 0rtanLzation.l The miseion of the auartermastar
garvice Com,bany {TjO & %, 10-67) is to provide milltary
personnel for ,enera1 labor and Tor the su,,ervision of
labor-when civilian-or ,gisonsr of war labor is-utilized. The
coapn? is orjanixed into a company heaaquarters and two oner-
Rth: platoons \tith n total atreu4th of four officers and 2.06
enlisted Icen. &oh plbtoon, with 80 laborers in acldltion to
platoon overhead, is capible of oleratin& indegendently and
~
has a rated capaoitg of handling 400 tons of su*>;liea eacu day.‘
61, Xciulament. Ortanixational ekuipnmant of the service
company is confinedL to the equi$nent necessary for the ahinistration
of the company and for the use an6 protection of the
individual soldieys. The major items of eiui:)ment are the
fallowing: 1
a. Trailer, 1-ton, two wheel, car60 1
b. Truak, 2-1/2 ton car-o 1
c. Truck, 3/4 ton weapons carrier 1
d. Truck, 1/4 tOA 1
The con:,an:- is cor,+letelj1 lockin& in mobilit: a and translortation
mat be furnished by hiaer head-unrters or by T;he unit
Lo diich the company is attached. Basnuoh as transidortation
IILS critical thuu,hout the campuLLns in the Xuroyean Theater
of Operations additicnel trucks Por the tiiovemnt oi the comptny
weie often difficult 60 obta5n.b It is believed that the oompanj.
would heve been able to ogerate mole efficiently if sufficient
trucks had been assigneh or-nnically to tho cm:any to
pernit tlie siiuttlirit of’ work details iron the cmp” bivouac
area to place of employment. A total of Pour tiyoks, P-1/2
ton caxLo, woulcl pravide one truck for trms.ortinL labor detailo
for each o-eratin& platoon end two for canpctnp headquarteis.
It Is also believed thet the ompany should be nuthorized
cue additional tl’uck, 1/4. ton. Jith f ~ orficerv ~ r assipe6
to the conp”, this auditional vehicle would be available
to the two platoon leaders for su-mvising and ohecking on labor
details,
62. Allocution.
a. The troop basio in the Zuro,san Theater of Operahions
povided Tor a total of 276 seivioe cokpanies, with lo3
allotted to the 12th Arm: Group. The basis for this aliotment
P~RBas follows:~~b
For eaoh crm:,, two companies - or a total of
ei@t conpaaios in the lour amles of the
12th Army Group.
For each corps, one corgany - or a total of 11
ompanies for the oorps in 12th &my Group
- 42 -
R-E-5-T-R-I-0-T-3-D

R-C-S-T-R-1-0 T-E-U
For each armored division, 1.5 cordiany - or a to-
tal of 17.5 companies for the I3 armored
divisions in tho 12th h y Group.
For each irsantry division, tvuo oonpnies - or
n totaZ of 64 companies lor the 32 inidintry
divisions in th6 12th Arlr;. Group.
b. At no time, howev~r, were 103 COinEbniea sssiknea
to the group. In Se,tember 1944, the 12th Amy Grcug hfla h total
of 30 service oampcnios, of which i9 were assiLaed to tno
First US Army, 14 to the Third US Army and five to the ldnth
US Army. It was COIlSiderQd that a mininun of 19 cor&pnibs for
each arniy was reguired for operations in libexted territory
and 25 for o$eratiana in Oefllany.4 Towards &he lbttav 3hRsas
of the Camkaim each of the three armies wllich croavcd thc;
Rhino River had ap-jroxioiataly 25 companies assi~nud.3
c. AllOaQtion of Quartermastar Service car~p”ms
within the 6th Amy Group was liriited. In the initial lending
in Southern France in &Lust 1944, the Seventh US Arw,r vJGs hondicappcd
in labor operations on the bencha due to the small nunber
of sorvioe companies available. Throuehout. this campaijn
tho Continental Advance Section and The Dolta Base Section of
the Southern Lines of Cammudoation dependea heairiiy on Italian
service units, prisoqer of w&r labor unittl, and, to e 1hiteU
degree, on civilian labor.12,14
63. Method of -mploynenti.
a. The Quarte,mastsr Service Corn$" was normallj
employed in thu guropean heater of Operations t o perfortu &Qnera1
labor and kuard duty, sopervise prisoners cnd prisoner of
war labor, and to suppLement or replace uopot suyply and railhead
cohlpanies in suppl;. oyerations.2
b. typical cxanple of the asoianment of service
companies was that of the First US Army on 7 liarch 194.5 with
a total of 21 companies available:6
(I) ~uartermsterdeDot oderations - 7
(2) One to each of threc corp~ - 3
(3 ) Cometery work - 2
(h) Solid fuel labor -1.
15) class I11 ogerations - 1
(6) Si,pal supply operations - c
(7) Ordnance depot operations - 4
(8) &&inoer depot ojerations - 2
At other t‘mes connanies were assimned to auUUcnt labor at
hospitals,+ operat; or supplement railheads ana trookheads,lO
and supplement personnel De Lravea registration companies for
field operatsons.
c. In the ComunLoations Zone serviou Collpanifis
were utalized primarily to buard and 6.tpperviue workin& prison-
ers of war. As oporationa ppocxessed dee&eP inside NrrJanY,
- 43 -
R-334-T-R-I 4-T-J!LD

R-Ea-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
the field forms found it im~ractlcablo to sdcure the area in
the rear of the army service areas. This additions1 security
nission was assianed to service coinpaniee. The company was
enyloysd to juard both tho supp1:- and semico installations
and the prisoners of war who wero lwploged therein. Prperience
indicated that under normal conditions the service company
could ade Uately kuard and supervise 1,500 working pisoners
of war.yl
d. In addition to beink attached for labor at yuartormastbr
depots, railheads or other ins8allations. (1 limited
number of companies WBM sttached to Ordnanca and lhgineer
SerViCQS for ceneral labor at ammunition and snhinoer depots.
Some oampanies wuro also attached tc prceido labor for hand-
ling sensitive items which for security reasons could not be
handlea by prisoners of wm or civilian labcr.2 In other
cases spooially qualified servioo companies mro used to supplement
or replaod depot and railhand companies in supply operations
8. Normlly within thb urmies, acrvice companies
werg controlled by the &my 2uarturmaster and assi~nod to Quartermastor
Battalions for administration and operations,839
Army sgecial staff sections in need cf labor placod their rcque$ts
with the &my Quartormastm. The Army Quartermastor
allocated servicu companies to tho staff sections Either dircotly
or through tho battalion to which the ConlpanLeS wertl
attached, The Quartermaster also as8i;ned sorvioe COmp4niea
to depots, railheads, and other army installations as requlred.
In each case, whether horkink for a "taff soction or an
installation, the service conpany okerated direocly under the
staff section or installation concerned. In one army whom
the service company commander was senior to the railhead officer,
OP to the officer comndinl: the &aa supply company to
which it was assienw3, the service company comnder norolally
assumLd ccntrol.5
SECTION 2
oTmx WBOR
a. Civilian and other indiLenous types of labor
were utilizad by tho Quartcrmasttr Corps to auuJnont military
labor in the European Theater of Oporations for tho following
principal rLasons:ll
(1) A shortaeo of' &uartsrmasfer Service units.
(2) Thu neoesaity fo? furnishinC supplius to
purscniiel othbr 'than United Status Ulftary,
such as: civiliaz: omployoes, prisoners of
war, and liborated manpower.
(3) The necessity for utillzinC incra8sin&ly
lar e numbors of Quartormastor sorvico campanics
to guard prisoncrs of war and survioe
installations.
b. The various categorioa of parsonncl used by tho
Quartormastor Uorps in thu Communioationa Zone and tho extant
- 44 -

R-X-7-T-X-I-C-T-E -D
tu wiiich each was mnloyad at Quartermstcr Installations at
tlrc ocssotion of hos%ilitios vrerti as foiiows:11
65. Civilian Labor.
CatOFor,v PLrodnt of Total
United Statos Uilitory 21 $
Ennomy Prisonas of Wnr k6 4‘.
Civilian Labor 26 $
Itnlian Sorvlco Units 6 $
Liborated Wnpowcr 1%
TOtd 100 6
a. On 26 1@1y19k4, iiaadqmrturs &ropeon fheatcr of
Oprations publiahcrd Stnndink Opdratlq Procoduru Numbor 29,
entitled ftProourwr”t, Utilizntion, cnd ACirdnistrction of Civllien
Labor in Libcrated or Ocouciod Countrlonw. Undur these
re~ulatiun8 tho Corps of En,inoors was Chm-Qd with procuring
oivilina lnbor for tho usiaC swvloos, cnd ostcblished rugiona1
labor offloas end local unploymunt officus throughout the
arca under control of tho United Status Forcos. k a usiny,
survlco, tho (lunrtdmaster Corps was ohorjcd with: 82
(1) UtiliainL civilian lcbor as much as praotiOQbl@undcr
conditions that provailud.
(2) DesiLnp.tInC Labor Adiuiniatratlve Officers
for closi&natad projuots or arm.
(3) Submlttln~ esthatcrs far civilian labor
roquirenonts.
(4) Requisitioning and ndministerine civilian
labat prsonnd.
b. Each laborir WLS initially clesslfiod ne unslcllldd,
oxcupt In unusual oiroumsi;anccm, with a tcntntive clessi-
ficatinn indicotad by the mgloymont offloe. Clnsaificntion
was $a& by tho usinL sorvlco aftor dmonstaatod skill on the
job.
c. Statio labor was that labor which renidod within
the area where tho work was parformcd and for which tho United
States FOrcQS assumed llmitcd responsibilitg for fetdlny,
clothing. and 6hdtGrinL. Liobile labor was that labor which
was or,anlzud Into mobile units undor military control, aubjoot
to bblng moved from placo to glacu, and fcm which tho
U11it6d Status Forces assumod responsibility for olothing , foodinL
rind sholtorinc.ll The bnsio mobile unit was tho mobile
hbor oompcny, whlob 0rlLinall;- conslated of fivd officurs and
23 onlistoa men with 300 laboiwrs. Later, urder cho EIilitary
Labor Sbrvico Administration the campan:- strenLth iffls changed
to four oifiours and four oniistod mtn with 250 laborors. The
company w e divided into threo platoons of four soctlons eaoh.
Esoh swation was capahle of operating lndcrpohdontlg, As the
qwrations protrussed lnt o armany, thl: oompanlos wcro largely

R-T-CT-R-1-GT-li!-D
conpostd of displaced persons of soveral naticnalities.6
66. Employment of Civilian Labor.
a, Thc Quartoranstw Corps, or othor usin, sdruioe,
prciarod roquisiticns for civilian labor end procosscrd tho individual
laborers. The usinc scrviou completed the individual
contracts, employment idzntificction cards, snd othor records,
and nssumLd coxtrol until thc work was oompletad.12
bl Civi3i:ns were CUD loyod by thc: Quuartumastcr
Corps in administrative caprcitfes such Clbrks, interpreters,
key tochnioluns cnd yrds. They wore nlsc emaloyed
ns laborers in depots, ropl r mstcllations, hotols, ieesses
and other installations. At the peak, agproximatoly 58,000
civilinns, incluaing British clurical pcrsonnol hired on a contract
basis, were om loyed by thG yuartdrmastcr Survica in the
Communications zone .P1
c. In the Southern France operation, civilian labor
was difficult to obtain. !Che Base Purchosin& Mont, a sugarat0
staff officvr, wcs charLad with the procuramtnt of oivilian
lcbor, and thc G,uart,rmnstcr Corps was again murely a usiq
c&ency. Although ralinnoc was plsccd mainly on Italian
sbrvice units and prisoners of war, tho Quartvrmastcr, Base
Soction, at one time cm_nloyed 15,000 civiliuns in the sklllcd,
unskilled and olLricol oatu&ories.l4
d. Civilian labor was normally not fls u~fioientas
prisonw of wnr labor, and the use of civilians usually moant
e. hi& rnto of pilforcge. They could be usod, howsvor, on projocta
wllare tho USG of pisonars of war wna either impractioal
or restricted by thu GQnEV& ConvLntiOn, and, in audition, they
roquirrtd no Luuords ,11
67. Military Labor Service. The ILilltary Labor Sorvioe
wns ustablishod latu in 1 44 ne a sgccial stcff section of
Hcadquartws, European Th:ater of Operations, for tho ovor-all
stnfl" coordination nnd suporvision of labor oryflnisations, exclusivu
or UnltGd 8tatus Yvrvico units and static civiliun labor.
It rucomrkindod ollocation, aWiuistration and prooodures
for the umploymcnt of Italian sorvioe units, .prisoner of war
work units, and for all othor formlly orLanized labor ulemcnts
utilizud by thf United Status Forces in the &r'opeM Theater
of Opclrotions. 1
68 Gonevu Conv~ntion.~*a~~ The Goneva Convontion of
1939 e0;or-e use of prisonor pf wnr labor, r.nd practically
rustrioted tho uac of prisoncors of wv to the Comiunicntions
Zoncr. Some of tho rostrictions fls prcvidod in tho convuntion
arc as follows:
p. They can not be uscd st inutnllflt2ons within 12
ruilus of' tht. nvarost orgnnizcd unurjy fCrOe.
b. They cfin not be usud forward of tho Communico-
tiona Zone at any establishmat which constitutod log-* objective
for hostilc cviation.
C. They can not be used to trnnsport matorial intendud
for cmbat units. This was normnlly interprcrtod to pornit
locding and unloading of nll mturiill excupt arms and ammunition,

69. Prisonorb of .Jar,
?-2-S -T-R-T -C -T-Z-D
a. ThL Provost Idmshal Was chorOLd with th,, gcncral
nbinistrztion of prisoxrs of war nnd with sup2lyinr prisonor
Of war labor to the uain; sorviccs as rquiriid. Prisoners wore
assiknod cithtr on a tmporary or permanent basis. If tsmpor-
nry, the Provost ldnrshal rotained cdninistrativa control while
tile usink scrvicc assumcd the rusponsitility of ~uardingand
aupcrvising thit prisonLrs durin' tht perioa of tmporcry assignuunt.
If ernanant, tht using service nssumd oonplcte rospon-
Sibilitg.lf
b. Early in 1945 prieonw of war labor survioe
units wtrd orgenizcd to repicoe losss6 of United Stetos units
caused by rtdeployment to the Pacific Thoctor of Opuratians.
Th6 units were dbsignctcd nocordin, to nationality and func-
tion such as: "Prisoner of :?akbor Compan (Ccrman) Qucrtern;sttr
Lnundry". In Ap-11 1945, 26 cmganfcs were cssiencd
to thd Qu$unrt~rmc:stcr Sfzviw in the Advance section of the
Scuthdrn Linos of Comunicntion.11
c. Thd first prisoners of wnr employed werd usud
3s labortrs in ciIitltori*s in STormmdy nnd as lnborers in baoh
supply dumps in Southern Brnnoe , Shortly thortr?fttr, they
wme used in salvaCe and 1f.undry pctivitios, wood cutting, and
in do ots. Later, prisoners of war were classifiod accordin&
to skflls. Tailors, cobblus, tinsmiths, :a&othvr skilled
ptrsonnel wcr@ crpnized into SGlVftge repair oampcmics. Porfcrmnncs
of' prisontr of warilabor was rwdioore when employed
in lerku groups, hut in general, prisoners of Mnr were suparior
to indigonous civilien labor in tlie quality of work produced.
Approxhately ll5,OOO prisonor of war were usod by the
Quartormastor Servioe nt tht peak of Operations in tho Commun-
ications Zona ,11
70. Italian Sorvice units.11
a. Italias pursomol wurc OPcanf26d into ten different
kinds or QuartormstLr Service units under stnndard Quartermaster
Tables of 0rLnnizP.tion. At the peak there were 50
oomgnni6s on duty in thu Euro oan Thuoter of Operitioaa and
they su plied ap roxirmtoly sfx >arcant of thb labor survioe
u1 the Bo"unics!ions zone for Qunrtcrwster operations.
b. Originally, some Italian Sorvlcu Units operated
under the supervision of Lhginter Ti!ohnicnl Suparvisory Hsgiwnts.
Othurs wore allocated diroct to the serviow. hcn the
Military Labor Survice was or,anized, thct abuncy suporvised
the Ittrlion Survicu Units.
0. In cenornl, Itnlian Sorvioe Units wiire found to
bo lass satisfactory than other type8 of labor in tho European
Theater of Operations. Their grentost efficlmcy was echiuved
in thtt receigt, storage, and issutt of gasoline nncl in laundry
nnd srtlvago oporations. Thdy were ratod et npproximately hdf
tho cnpucity of thu comparable United Stntca Military unit.

Q-%-S-T-R-f-C-T-3-D
at the cessation of hostilities mre than 75 percent of the
labor sorvice of the Quartermaster Corps in the Gomunica-
tiono Zone was performed by other than United States military
pasonnel. b. Thct thc rulativo efficiency of th, vmiou6:
[rou>s of labor _eorsorm.lvms na follosg:
(1) UnitLd Str.tcs military wits.
(2) EnenJ~prisonurs of wur.
(3) Civilion labor.
(4) Italian 3urvic.t. Units.
C. That thc ndvantnfos of tho uao of labor other ’han
U.S. military units outwoighed the disadvantages of its use.
8. Thr.t the &nrterrmstm Scrvico Corqcny is a Tlcxiblu
unit capablu of vnrioue operations, but completely lacking
uobility.
72. Rcoomendations.
n. That cdditiom-,l trnnsportatim bb assibnnud to
tho Qum%rmaatcr Survico Coupmy (T/O & E 10-67) to provide
at List ono truck, 2-1/2 ton ci.reo, for mch plctoon for
trnnsporting lobor dutails, at least on2 addiZ;Lond truok,
2-1/2 ton cargo, for company bcadquarters, on8 at hest onc
truck, 1/& ton, for the uae of the platoon lmders in chuokinL
and supervisink labor dotc.ils.
b. That pertinent doctrinca, techniquoa and Tables
of OrLaniaation nrid Equipment be amended by uppropriotecies
of th6 Wr Depurtmont.
- 48 -
R-E-8-T-R-I -0-T-E-D

L.
2,
R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
BiblioLrnphg
Chapter 6
3. Notos on Sorvico Troops, Oreanisation Branch, G-4, 12th
Army Group, 18 July 3.945.
4. War Dcipwtricxt Obsurvers RGport Nuubor 981, 22 May 1945.
5. VCJ Ddprtwcint Observers Rqort Hubx 773, 9 April 1945.
6. 'Vcr Utpnrtrient Observers Report Nuriber 975, 22 May 1945.
7. ;mr Dupcrtnont ObsGrvurs Rbport Number 7.58, 24 ?$arch 1945.
8. War Departriont Obsomwrs Rdport Xubur 934, 10 W.y 1945.
9. Jar Dajartiwnt Obssrvors Report I?um.ber 756, 27 March 1945.
10. :(firDsportnunt Observurs Rolort hiber 967, 10 Uap 1945.
11. QM OporetioAml Study iu'o. 11, Wst) of Pcr60nnul Otuer than
US llilitary in thu Eurojoan Theator".
12 * ETO, SOY Kuber 29,
md changes.
13
26 Eny 1944: Hondguartors, STOUSA,
Lytter, Hbadquarters, PTOUSA, f ilo AG 383.6 OpGA,
joct: "Prisoncr of War Labor", 21 SvL)twmbor1944. sub-
Hiat or? of Contincntal Advanoo Sootion, Gomumicat ions
Ronu. ATIIUSA. Aui_ust 1944 - May 1945,
- 49 -
R-l$CEI-T-F!- I-O-T-E-D

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D
ti. Wnrtarimster su,pply to the Uriitcd Dtotcs Air
Psrcos fol1waG thc sane gcncml prccofiuro QS suply t3
,',my Grouid ohd Service Forcos. Csmkndcrs sf Base 8cctiws
af Cornuiicatiann Gonc on the cwitincnt :and in the
TJoitod liinGdani v!erc rospor:slblc for thc auiply of all tho
3nitcd Stntcs forces assignuci ar within tho p?Eruphicol
moil, irrcspoctivo of whotha: sucb units wrc nir, jirmnd
or sorvico fnrcos. NL,rrally, tdr Fiirce units werc assicnod
specific depots far supply, CithGr in tho carviunicatims
Z:no i)r amy arqas. ?Tnrml roquisitirming ma supply proccdurcs
vorc followd in aocordanco with Instructlms issuod
by tho Corxmding Conorzl; BJudquclrtcrs , Europun Thc.1tcr
aP Oporutions.
b. Pri:r to D-Day it was docidod that no Air
F.rca urdts vsuld stoa!: ar carry any lovol ,df gucrtcriustcr
aupplics 3thcr thi.n ormrgoncy stacks of PatiiJnS, rril ..nd
lulriconts. Tho Cawxindinp GLnorcls df tho army mons :.nil
s af Cosc, IntcrLicC.icte and .wTJnCo sections
icatinns Zimo ncrc rcs:!onsiblo for thc supply
cf .%irBcrcc units locotea iiithin tlioir rcspcotivo nroas.
Diroctivcs i~suaGby ITondqucrtcrs, Euriipcan Thcator i1P
Ggarstians, proscribed th-t ths su:ply oeancios ooncornud
plnco su:iplios vithin 1~0rlilos tho nlr Borcc iwtnllntions
within thoir rcsgcctiva zi,lics. Thc serviac bcri
!$artormator uf tho Air FU~CL Scrvico Coruxnd wcs rzspm-
siblc fdr picking up the sujpliils 3t tho pc)ints dcsip3tca
by tha Supply cQncy.
7h. supply 0pcratisns.l
CI. pI',wliolLy, r:iti.cin issums wrc mido as dircctcd
by udp-clgri:,to Zuropcm ThesLcr nf Gyorctinns circulars
.nd oniondriunts, 1Znti;rns WOXT c,intrallc;d by tho opplic3tion
of tho dully mnu ;ttcndance figurcs. @porc!ti::nol ratij sns
~'{oruusod by tho Air FijrCo princi.plly c.8 n travol rctiw
by tho f,viutlrn truck coripnias ;.nd cir ooribct crows ::n
tho iiovo. Bpocial ullotr~imts of sholl ocgs, orangus,
povrdorcd riilk :ad ougur verc furnishcd ccribat crow during
.;ir oTcroticns an a nacossnry Liugrxcntntia., bath fro?i a
:iodic.:l :,n& ti mr.:lc stcndpoint. Spocir,l issuos i>f omdy
,..nd cui wcro uddo ;vail;!blc for use by cor.ibat crows on
10% niissians. A spocial box cf rich ollnaics w3s imufncturod
in Jtnglnnd for this purp..sc, but invcstig3tik.n rcvcalod
thrit oo;rb:.t croim pruforrod rcgulnr condy bzrs
ovnil:lblo tit post uxohmgos .
b, In roguisiticminc nutharisod su!?plioo the air
n 50 ..
R-E-9-T-R-I-0-T-E-n

R-E-S-T-R-I4 -T-E-D
bese Quarteri-ster dealt directly with assigned denots. Controlled
Itens, ar item In short sug?lg such as certein
itena i.f eeneral purpose equipnent, and itans in excess
nf outhorized alldwances, were requislticmsd thrswh the
~$mrter,?aster,Air Farce Service CO inad. The Milith Air
Vorce Service Calmand Quarterilaster appoved the recuisitis$n
where aDprapriate and fonm-de6 it tu the Quarter-
:mster, Otniriunicatims ZL.ne, f x final approval nnd weessarg
actiirn.
c. Cluss XI1 requirerients f )r each Air Pmce
statiam were 0.nt;;rlldated a d subriltted tk thr? nearest
depdt IJr amy suiply p int. Claso if1 (aviati n) requirerrcnts
tiere cnof reti.,n factt;rs during the
r.A crnservatlivi progran vas w Irked :Jut by the linth jLir
F;!rco with C~-~ImiderRble diffiouJ.ty because personnel
effected by different reducti,.n factms, a8 ne11 66 OKeiiptod
prsmnel, were eating in tho 6ar.e ~~,u~cliil~tod
.;om, m.ktne, It phynicel.ly I:zp.\ssibln tn differentiato bctwccn
sedciitsry and hard r:srlcern,
b. The Quartermetor parsr~ilnalin tho petorial
Wuaarfin (T/O 1-456Ri..of the a1k- servioe group .were
cinsfderod nwiorically suffioidnt, Earever, under the
idd tabla of organizatlnn for tho air .dOj)ot eroug, cnly
23 enlisted non and tw;, sfficors wero outhLirisod far the
quertermestor dopdt pl8tr.m. T!ila nurkber praved Insurfioiont
tc provido Ear pcak l?ado and to caro fm distrfhutitla
points vhlch harl t.) bo ostnblishcd et air depot
p:cups t,:j c,?pe with critical auggly situations.
c. BW-J~CQ tuan Querteraastcrc; at tirtoa 13%porianccd
uxtrenc di!’fioultioo dno to the fact that thay
end tho r.ir Pkrcu !hito vrhich they suppliod ~ G V Q in ~ rapid
succossl~%back and fmth through arqy 8108s and AaVanCu
;:ne intcrnodiato Soctims ;’fCzuuniehti us Z-m.:. In smo
ORSOD, tho sorvlco tusn Quortornastcr vkuld bo in ono ar.ly
arcs vrhflc the cicbat units ho served $;ab .j.?uruting In
c m the arca. This, tagother xjith the mvonont8 ixf tho
smios and 6i30ti .ns s~f Ca%aunicotiibne Zmc, resulted in
tho scrvico tear3 Quarto~-%e~otors riakin$; mny onntacts with
do.!c?ts and ,,thor Buartcrmstors. In this c,-,nnectL?n, they
lcarncid whcro supplics wore XJcatod ijn the ct.ntinont, and,
if sui>plicsv ~ronot ovaileblc! at mo placo they wiuld e3
t;i Flll;.thChcr dco. t. This rosuiltud in cmsidorablo c;?nfii8i;m
which c

a. Difficulties were enbountered, in socle army
areas, by mobile sales store pemonnal refusin to sell to
Air Force officers. Usually, this was straighfened out
when it was brought to the attention of the sales officer
by either the Air Foroe Service Command Quartermaster or
the Army Quartermaster. In some cases, Army Ground Force
peraonnel were favored over Air Force personnel. Notices
of the itinerary of army sales stores smethes were not
received by A ir Force unlts anti1 the store had left the
locality and, on other occasions, were not received at all.
This was primarily,due to low channels of communications.
Forceg. 9
76. Quartermaster Servioes for the United States Air
a. The methods and procedures for handling sal-
vage collection and salvage repair in the Arey Air Forces
were essentially the same aa that for other United States
Army forces. Air Force units were not normally responsible
fer the collection and segregation of Air Force salvage.
scrap which accumulated at Air Force stations was disposed
of as directed by the Communications Zone Section Commander
in whose area the Air Force unit was located. Preliminary
segregation and classif'ication was effeoted by the station
salvage officer who moved the salvage material to the
appropriate Quartermaster dump or salvage collecting point
as directed. Air Force installations maintainea a Salvage
and Conservatian officer who supervised salvage activities
with a view of conserving material as well as disposing of
it. Unserviceable Quartermaster individual and organiza-
tional clothing and equipment at Air Force installations
Was processed through assigned depots in the base section.
If replacement was required, the salvage items were turned
in to a depot and a requisition for replacement in kind
and quantity was Submitted.
b. The evacuation of Quartermaster salvage was
not normally a function of Air Force units. The Air Force
wae only responsible for forwarding salvage to base section
depotg or salvage oolleoting units, which in turn segregated
and classified the items for evacuation as directed
by that unit.
c. Salvage repair service for Army Air Force
units was furnished by salvage depots and Quartermaster
salvage repair units allocated by the Chief Quartermaster
to units near Air Force installations, The Salvage
officer at Air Force installations maintained facilities
within the station for minor repairs such as tent patch-
ing, but, in general, he secured replacements for unserviceable
items of Quartermaster equipment while the
salvage depots performed the necessary reclamation or
disposal. Clothing repair facilities were allocated by
base section headquarters and normally consisted of
quartermaster repair units or civilian agencies in
Allied countries.
.d. Quartermaster laundry service for A ir Force
units was normally secured through the Communications
Zone Section Quartermasters or, in the United
Kingdom, through base section Quartermasters.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

Air Psrcc units WQro nssigncd to Quartorpustor nsbilc
Lundrp installations in arny urec,s ;rr t,; civilian ~~gcncic3
lii Allied c(1untrics whore nwg rnoilitios \$or0 lirdted.
Tho Station C,uartarnasters at Nr Force bases were ro8pon-
siblr: for the osllection ;.IT laundry for all wits at
their stetions and for dolivery to the assignad laundry
installotian. 811 specification0 as t:, the method of
budline, quantity nf itOru3, etc., were followed, and the
wper wrk involved, asgeoially where civilian agsncias
wurc concernod, was processed throwh tho Btatisn Quart-
errmstor, Under rcciprocal bid agrcenont in Allied
ciuntrics, the civilian eguncy subnittod a bill f;;r scrvi003
ti tho l;tatiOn Quartcmsstur u:ir;n ci;mIglotiirn nf the
wrk. Tho f3tatI.m r?uartcrrmel;cr authenticated the vnuchcr
dnd forwarded it tcJ tho bas0 scctiia f:sr f ind auditing
and psyricnt.
e. Dath fslcilitioa were al1:cated ti) boac ROCtlclns
by tho CliFcl" Quartorrustor. Air Firrcc units wore
assi&ned to instullatl~~ns vithin thcir rosgirctivc 1p3aso
ae 0tions.
77. Discussi- a n .
a. Shm ropair and lcundry scrvicca often were.
nj;'c a-milablo trJ Air Porco units in army arcaa bccauso
thcsa eorvicos wre nurally placcd fur the cavenicnoc
i,f amios, prticularly to scrvo fratlinc divisiuns.
During the advancc into bemany, sorvico t~sriand air
dOpCt Quartorraastcrs arrarqcd lacally with civilian c.:ntractma
fsr laundry und sh;x ropsir, t-mk mer nd w?oratod
1:ocal loundrios d d shoo ropair shopa with civilian
labor ai, whore this ccjuld a:,t bti dmc, thoy sent the
shoos to be ropairod and lui&clry Co Belgim cr France,
s,xioti;los for distencsa sf somrul hundred niles.
b. Air Fcrm c~~~bot units nccuylod either
newly crnstructed. landing strips or airficlds taker ovcr
fram tho Gcmna which Yycro, in m-ist cases, dostmgcd
and wit,h(:Ut bethinp fucilitics, end in such CQSC~Sbathing
iecilities wore inpravisod.
78. Gravos Hoc'istration Sorvico.l0
a. Tlia nothoas, policies and procedures far
Gravos Rucistration Sorvice for the Unitod Status Lir
Fnrccs in Europc wore ossentislly tha sam as that pravidod
lor bmny Ground Bilrcos.
b. The Graves Rc-gistroticin Scrvicc in thc Unitod
Statss Air 7cJrcas in Euroio iporatod uneor tho Caixmnding
Gonorel, Noadquartors I: Air Paroe Gervico C3.a" This
sorvicc owsistod ,?f a Unltod Stetos Air Fnrcas in Europe
Grevos Cogistratiun L?fficc.r wiii: was liicatod in tho '&artcrnaatcr
Saction, IIcadquartors 1;: kir Borco Sorvico 0ar~r.1and.
Thoro was ulsa grcvidod a corimnd gavna 'z'oEistration
iifficcr far oach Quartcrmat3tor socti'm of all
rJaJrr subnrdinato csmnnas af Hcadp.iertors United States
?,ir Fnrcos in Curspc. qravos zogistraticn nffioers wre
also prijvidcd far scrvico p;roups, Etir dopt &?.;ups, scparata
grLrtips,end any unit nat scrvicoa by D Quar:ormster
aorvlcc toan. Numally, $uartormstcr officars
ytcrc) appoiJntod 6s grams rogistratirm CJfficcrS and aaswiGd
- 53 -
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K-E-S-T-Hcl-lj-y-g-D
this responsibility in addition to their other duties.
C. "'hen teeth occurred in the Vnited Xinpdom,
the deceased' 8 inadiate oomaendinr: offLcar pro4q2tlg
evacuated t5.e relains to the nearest siiit ..r;r ceinetery or
to an awroved c!.vilian unasrteker. If the remains were
.rtthin 50 niles of a hited Vxtes wilitery cei,letery they
vere nomally dispatched to that cemetery. 1.ooal Ixuials
were authorized in emerRencies when it was L3possible to
transport the remins to any one of the desipnated military
cemeteries. For euercencies, s.-laLl plots vere re-
served in various civilian cemeteries tb.rou,?::out the Viiittcd
LYn$.oii. In case of enermnoy burial In fi local cealutery,
tb.6 'merlcan crives Registration Tervioe wm '.?ro:ptly n.oti
fied in order that necessary action coulC be takeii,
d. "Wen death occurred on the continent in tlie
Zumpean Theater of C!?era.tions, the noma1 ncthod of evacuation
to estsblishsd id1itr.V ceizeteries was follovred iT
at all possible. The rsnains '''ere normlly transnorted to
the oenetery by unit transportetion.
e. The nethods, policies ancl. 7rooeCures followed
by Army Cround Forces on tha continent were nonmlly uaed
by the llnited States .?.ir,Forces in ZUTO?E in thu iflentirication
of deceassd ?ersonnal and the handlinm of personal
effccts.
f. k?erience indicated thAt all .ini"or:imtion of
my asslstnme in iaent3.f iaction of unlrnoam deceased shouid
be colleated in one ?lace by a saecicl researoh section
unaer th,e fi.d.jUtxnt noneral Gaflualty Seotion. Tho section
should. ~RVGaoaem to ;?rlssinc, Air Crew ?.c?orts*', 4djutant
Eeneral Casv.alty ':crninR rie.,ort locator car& , teeth charts,
finaernrints, clnd any other identifyinr mter5.al available.
79. AuJ&rJ>po-Sy>1..2 On 6 TTovc.iber 1S13, the
Joint LocTatioal teff' on ttee, "ropean Eiceter of
Operations, nuhlidied R su.)plg plan to novorn U9 Irmy
responsibility to U' ?'ami Borces in %rope, which str ted
"The Commanding General, Servloes of qupply, is responsible
for sumlyinfl to the US Maval forces In Europe
those itens which are COiLWn to the 4rqy mc' KaVy, and
which er6 aQproved for suoh 6u3 'ly in the tray cnd Naval
Porce8 in Turo?e'7. Under t'le ?inn the Chief quarternaster
was charged with supplyin0 Ltem of a ?"eraaster nature
as called for or tirected.
a. The ?Tavy prepared estimtes of its requirements
and sublttcd these from tine to tiine to the General
Purchasinf! Agent, The Peneral Purohasinr, .%en t furnished
the Chief Pluartermster with A lirt of t'-e Fava1 requiremente
pertainin- to tbe ?uar%er?aster seWJ.ce. The Chief
nuartemster ini'icated thereon which itenS would be .n-ooured
fpom the Inoy in the %ropean Thecter of QperatJons

R-E-S-?!-B-IC-T-E-D
bg' Cavy 3)moh. sing 8&noieS, and tho reminifie, itom \.rhich
vwuld be reyuisiticmed by the Navy froa thc Unitcd Statos
by nproval of the G-4 Socti;.n cf the
hosdnuartors af the am8 in which tho navy unit 1va6 a yrating,
and all raquisitions far o. ntrollcd iCms roquirod
tho a!iqraval iif thc Chiof Quartsrnastor. Class 111 requircrionts
in large quontitics nlea roquirod tha approval

For USQ in -&"can Xed Cross clubs)
theso itons wro c;.nfincc! tu 1;hc iq.redicllts,
oxccpt rdlng.ti, the currant ricmu LJr purchcsod
cxccsn itens ;.fsubsistunoc. Tho
c11ngewas 75 ocrnts per mti;n.
b. The Q2uai%CrmStCl' 1106 OUth?JriZOd t

84. Accruntinc Pracadurd. C;lLect~.cn frcn thc Red
CroSs far itens sirld ims the res?snsihil.ity i.f tIic hccnmtin&Divisian,
Offico sf thc Chior cpucrtcrrzstor. Druphnut
flour and bamk mtches and othor sirrilrr iteris of Rcd
Crdss prsperty Btcrca by the Quzrtowntcr wire ng t cntorc-d
,mtollios vith itcL-s sold. Gratuit\us issues t3 the Rod
Cross wro also placed tn separnto tollics. All tollion
fJr iteris issuod n o rcinbUrsf3ilcnt basis were fawsrdcd t a l
tho Acciunts Diviaix for c.)llecticn, All prapcrty hold
by thc Rod Crms in mmrandu receipt was records& in the Bnpply
Divisiun, Office df tho Chief &uertor mstcr, tct wh,u
all pertinent dobit ond crcdit tallics ware for. ordd.
85. Idisoia~nclnd Authvity
a. In a lottor to tho Sccrct?ry -3 "YIP, dstit 10
H,mnbcr 19k3, tho Prcsident )f tho Unitad St~tos fv-mlly
chargod the Anw with tho rGSj1 nsibility, until such ti m
9s oppr7priLto civilizn deuncios woro propcrod ttJasswo
it, If shi.pin@ and distributing aupplics far thr! rolicf
(2nd rohnbllitoticm f libbr,tcd o utrioe. Until that
ti-10, tho orrj had roccgnizcd its pctcnti, 1 rcsiv nsibiliti-a
frr o. certain a:i unt -f civil raliof tc:
(1) Prcvont civil unroat which \i. &le bndancor
lines cf c-xmuniootiims and ohnnncls f
supply, and
(2) Frevont dinoose which ieipht ondungcr
tr,ops.
Hcwwor, full rasponaibility hod mver bcun cloorly definocl.
In his lettor to tho Sooretary of 'hr, Lho Irosident stutitd:
".llthsugh athor bgonolos sf tho 0 wcm lent uro
preparing tbilselvos far thc wdrk th-t ikust he d no iu cmnoctiqm
with tho reliof und rohabilitoti in C llberatod
mms, it I8 mite apprrent if Pr3:Ipt rcsults [ire ti bo obtained
the Amy will hnvc tcJ usaurie tho ivitidl burdcn .>f
shipping rind di stributine raliJf supplios. This will m i t
mly bo tho cos0 in thL ovont thirt notivi. riilit,ry 3pcrctions
arc under way, but alss in tho ovcnt d t CIerilan
ool1,pso. I ciivisngo chat in the cvcnt nf' c Gcrum cullapso,
tho nocd Tor tho mny LAunclortckc thin w rk will
bo all tht rime appnrcnt.
T~wQ~.-I~c, I direct thrit y~u hovo tho hruy undortalro
the planning ncccssury to onoblct it t L 8 carry nut this
task to tho ana thit it shall he prcporud tc garforri this
functiin, pending such timo 2s civilion agcnclios iiust be
propored to carry .ut tbo lnngcr rungo progroii if roliof.
You m y t.iko this lottcr 08 riy uuthdty ta y-u ta
0011 upon 011 othor nguncios 3f the G vorinriont for such
plans and assfstmcu as you n.~y noad. F m a11 mttcrs ai'
policy that hcvc t-1be dctorninod in connocti n with this
work, mu will consult vvith the State Department
for anp politioal advice, and upon the Treasury
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R-E-q-T-?-I-C-T-&D
for such oconomic and fisoel direction as you m y nood."
b, This lottcr brought up the prcblom of roliof
RUpplios for thi Pcoplc of 3uropc and onvisagod prinarily
rilictf of thcso pboplo raiding in 1-iberated countrios.
%E thc militcry opcrutions progrossod, tho additional
oroblom arosb of furnishing, roliof to thosc .pcoplo of Allid
Netions who had bccn tmnsportcd into GG"~ for
B'.QVC labor cnd othcr purpo8os. Tho bnsio eupply mission
of Civil Affairs m y thoroforc b+ statcd as follmm:
(1) To provide suy;plius noccssarg for imcdiato
rcliof to the people of liborotod
comtrios.
(2) To provide thc cseuntinl supplics ncce-
ssary for tho hcalth and maintonanca of
dis?laccd'pcraons founa inside ammy
oomtrios, and also thosc supolics neccssary
for tho rcpotriation of thcse
pooplc bock to thcir native lands.
86. Rcsnonsibility.
a. To acoomplish the nruy's res~onsibility in tho
?urop=an Thcntcr, R Civil Mfaira section was orgmizod 011dor
tho (7-1, Hcsdquart:rs Turoponn ThC&tLrof Operations,
nnP onorntLd undcr and in77acccrdancc with tho oolicios an&
1-iroctivos Zssuod by thc ,>uropcanThcntor Caandor an6 by
the Sivi1 hffairs nivision in tho ''ar Wportmont. Civil
lffg.lre ims lcter givon penern1 stcff status by inclusion
on thc goncral stcff BS G-5. It oTGrutcd through fill echclons
down to and including divisions and through local
clctaclmcnts sot up in vnrious pats oh libcratd and OCCU-
?i&icountric,?, These Cictachmonta wcrc known as Civil 4ffairs
dctac)lrzLn6s rvhcn oporctina in libcrat6d countries and
as ?Tilitarj GovCrnmont dctocl"cints whcn oporeting in occuoivd
tcrritory. The 0-5 was chcrgtd with tho res7onsibility
fer planning and ostimnting roquircmonts ; ccordinktion
with thL sorvicos for procuroncnt, storago md issuu of tho
sunp1.i~~; coordinntion with nipopriatc. agcncias of tho
govormcnts of libcratud and occlipicd countries for*storaga
spaco and othor matters portnining to Civil .Vftlira, nnd
with tho local safoguurding and retril isms OP tho suyplios
to civillan rocinionts.
b, Tho mothods, policios QRd wocduros for
Civil Affairs surmly wom publishca by the Comn;ing Conornl,
Xuroponn Thcntur of Opcretions, as Sto-lding Opirating
l'rooodure ?hubor 28, dctcd 2 Juno 1944. In this, thc RUPply
objcctivo was statu3 ns fol-lows:
?'The priln'ry >bjcctivc of Civil 'dfnirs opcr. tiom
is tho cffoctivo oontrol of tho civilian gopulntion to prcvont
i t B intorfcrcnco with military o?Lr?tions and to aakc
thc naximufi iiao of local rosnurcos for tho bcnofit of thGS0
opcraticns. A corollary of this objoctivc is thL furnishing
of cortcin niniinun~suoplios to tho oivllinn -mpulotion to
GatabliSh ndcouqto stsnflnrds of vubl ic hbnlth end to DrLvCnt
thc civL1 ?onulntion from b arming a bur on upn thc A l l j l i t a v 4
Of thoscr mincmm suvplios tho ranximum mounts nrG to bc obt-inod
from inddgunous rosourcca, rnd nnly thG
- 58 -
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R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E -D
deficiency, if any, is t o be provided from stocks under
military control."
Under this procedure, and in accordance with instructions
iesued from time to time by Headquarters, European Theater
of Operations, the Quartermaster responsib ilities for Civil
Affairs were as follows:
87. Prior Planning.
Deterininaticn of Re uirements. No responsibility.
Reequiremh--~corr@uted by
higher authority and passed to the Chief
Quartermaster for procurement.
Proowement. A meohanlcal responsibility.
m - s were placed on the souroe as
designated by higher autliorities for the
quantities and items as designated by
those authorities.
Stora e Complete responsibility for all
d k f a i r s items of a Quartermaster
nature.
Distribution. Full' responsibility fcr dLstribution
to depots from ports and between
depots.
Issue. Bulk issue to Civil Affairs detach
merizs only. NO responsibility for retail
issue or distribution to the civil population.
a, Early In 1943 the Unlted States ana Great
Britain began a study of the problem for civilian supply in
liberated and occupied countries. The work W88 carried on
under an Inter-Allied Codttee known as the "Administration
of Territories of Europe" (A.T.E.). Ita object was to
study the problem of providing food, medical supplies, and
clothing for civilians in countries under Axis oooupation.
The a odttee agreed thht stock piles created for Civil Affairs
or relief purposes would be available for joint British
and American use, with no division between United States and
British responsibility, In their planning, the noamittee
members Used largely the American proposed basic ration for
Class I requirements, while for Class I1 and IVsequirements
they utilized the Erritish experience gtrined in handling relief
in bombed areas of the United Kingdom. krcm this they
determined the clothing, footwear, sanitary equipment and
emergenay feeding equipment that would probably be required.
No reference was made to factual information available In
the Office of the Chief Quartermster, and the requirements
a8 determined from British cxperlenoe alone were publishefi
by Supreme Headquartera in a catal0gue entitled "Catalogue
Civil Mfairs Stores and Suppliestt.
b, The roquiremente as estimated for food, 010thfng,
blankets and emergency feeding sets wore generally
satisfactQry. The requirements as estimated for sanltary
and expendable supplies, tents and cots were not satiufaotorg,
and in some cases the figures were lacking entirely,
As a result, the Quartermastar service was often called

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D
upon ts furnish mny zf those itons frnn rcgular arrly stock
to Cnl;qs for displcc-d pcrs. ;is. If sulipllcs vore nvr.ilc;ble,
this was ncit ~~hjoctioniblc, but it woa frequcntl’y ncccsscry
to nbteir? a osmmd decision W.n IkQdouartcrs, Zuroponn
Thoater ;if Opcfntisn, prim tcr thc issue :If ccrtnin 1tor.u
required for wlitory o:ierotiims. In a fow cssos civil
.UfairS stcck had to be issusd to met US i*r:iy raquiretienta,
and D. grwt clonl ?f ndninistrativc work HCS invnlvcd
in accmnting fI)r tho tronsncticns t,) cnnblc suhscqucnt
rctsanslor frm amy to Civil E,fI’airs std?k.
88. Raticns.
e. Tho principal ommdity suyplicd by tho Chicf
QUdrtCriluBtBr thr.q:h Civil Aff.?irS chnnncls 8US f .id.
Fliiur, fats L;nd ?nrbahydratcs fsirricd thu x i ji:r oc.rgoiicnCs.
Far tho rmst part, thc itom nerc ic?cnl;ici;l with thi.fia
fmnd in the nunus fcr pris:,ncrs {if war, civilian .Eab:,r,
mcl othwr sirdlar cntcgmlos iif pcrsi:.nnol au qlic:d by the
Quunrterrmstor. It was thorcr,.ro nocosscry t:) ostnbllsh
ad naintAn sopar:.ta mcdds, sogcrctc str-ck pile0 4’
supplies in dopsts, 2nd sepnrntc ou:>ply pr;lcoduros rijr
1acntici:l itms.
h. Initlolly, it wns noccaocry ta dovelnp n basic
rjticn ss o br.Sis Inr tho procurmicnt sf SUpplio6. The Civilian
flugply Bronoh, Intarn:..tL:);hl kid Divisi;n, !Ioadqunrtors,
Aniy Sorvloc Farom, LnshinEtcn, D.C., bcsod tho
rcquircaonts n thc follL.uingfnct.ws:
(1) Tho ration hod n nutrit1;n:l vzluo .?f at
lunst 2,000 c3L)ries.
(2) kll item :in tho Unitoil States sohodulc
were 3lrcadg in use by thz United Stntos
Arriy, in units :i.nS. c::ntaincrs ri~hiohGho
amy wrls nccust ,moB to hondlin(l.
(3) Initiul shi:nont vcs t::, IIG rixlo frsxi
rcguhr amy Stocks, a d incraaaod priduotim
ijf thCSB itons IJ .uld ni,t 22srupt
the rogulLrr flw amg ,.rdors.
(4) Quantities .!iitam wcro :Iv^iiloblc in the
United Stntos without l.ny scri,)us drain
in civi1i:;n supply in tho wuntry.
b. Tho 8tucliuS crf tfic j?int o

R-E-S-T-R-I-C -P-E-D
'-oisht Calvrics
_c_
PL ur 35.00 nunccs 1,515
);est 6: Vogctablo Stcw 2.45 65
Salt .50 --
L;; up, c?ohyclratcd 2.00 178
Pulsos 1'00 100
Cbocso .50 55
BAt3 - e 5 0 - 127
Toto1 21.75 rluriCcS 2,G40
Burploncntol Itm ::tight Calmi3s
1_1
$;ilk, avnpiratod 2.00 f75 ?orcent :-fthc t,.jt:.l.
d. This basic rctid was usotl inly 05 0 guide,
:,ne issue tvcs ii::t?c ..nly iif tt;m itcis ncoossnry In osrtain
acns tc supploiicnt civllicn stilclrs til briny tho roti;,n up
t:) tho prosoribac: st-;ndnrC. Substitution wss froquont,
p-;r%icuhrlyiu tho iiout c:r?ipon::nt of thc ri.tion. Thc
'Unitoil Kini;don substitutod mny itcins in :TdEir t? use up
thc l:;r50 Dtocks ,-.fccnnod no3t tk.t h.8. bcon Bt
In thc Unitcd 1;icgd':il in tho f Ira .if "Blockogo"
vnsi.,n 2:Cscrvc~'. All thoso canno6 m~ts,hi:wcver, hod bcon
packaged fn r oonrlf.rcSol uac al.:r, with rosult;int, tr$Iuhlo
nd difficulty in hmclling, ship>lng ..ml star .ei:in can-
tincntnl dc?i.ts, Tho corroroi:.l tygc gickxinc did nnt
st .nd. up which rcsultcf. in o~nsidornblc lC-ss. Tho Issue
dia, htwovor, carry ,'vcr the civil .;ff:.iru pdprxi until
shipcnts fr-n tho Unitod Stctc8, !iach~oi: tho sane ns
rcgulx nm~ysuylios, begun to nrrivo on tho o;,ntincnt in
sufficient quxitity.
89. Roquiroriwts.
cl. Roq,uirononts fi,r 011 sui!plics 1'Jcro cirnputocl
::nc! L-?pr:wo?L by thG G-5 Bcctic n, Sup" I:cadquurters,
Allioc? Expcditl .n:.ry F~!rocs, innsnuch cs rcpuircnonts wor'o
ci;:tl:I1 t . 2 bilth Ariorici,n ::nB British Ziince of Actbn. Tho
initk.1 roqulrcimnts for tho perird D-Dby to D plus 90 vore
ostinr.teC I nd fsninrc?od trr tho C,,nbinod Civil .':ffL~il-sCam.1ittco
in *.:::shirigtiin, D.C., for :,jlprovzl and nacasaory acti$m.
Rcquirorionts for lotor pericds ucro nct conputod until ,opcrc,tims
hxl c8?rlriencoflan tho .o. ntincnt, nnc! wcrc thon bosod
upirn rowrts na roc,utnonAati~as of tho fiold farcos.
b. Each 5r3y thrxqh miy '@,;up a d Caununicotions
z;.nc rop:rtcd tltcir rcspcctivc foroc sts df rcquiromnts for
tho f..urth, fifth :,nd sixth n nthe subsqquont t.?tho ai'nth
in rrhioh tho rt?i.rt was iir,~Is, TliU5, tho roquircr.icnts for '
the sixth ni'nth..vxrc tvico rcviscc? before finel dotorrlina-
ti

R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E -D
saruencc?, estirtted snd subnittea by Suprene Headqwrtors
tn thr; C8-mbinoC Civil Affcirs Crdiittce for apprav,il znr; ol-
L-1c~ticn .
91 Pr,curo:?cnt,
a. ''.'hen thc G-5, He2CqLVJrtor8, Euri gam Thoctcr 3f
Opcrr;tic.ns, rccciveil cqics fif thu clloc!ition lettcrs , copies
vroro fozwrdod td tlio Chicf Qu.,rk"mtor thrt.ugh tho G-L,,
Koidquartcrs, Emi poan Thector ;9 Opircitisns. The O-uzrtor-
ncstcr :liiinot icitiato procurmient on thesa lcttors, hswcver,
until instructod tc. dit 8:) by thc C-4.
b. F'i>r thcsc itcrls tu be pri:curac? in thc Vnitod
SCntos tho Cbiar '$xnrti.rmstcr pruporcd roquisiticns In the
nxxal mnnor .:ne folwarecc!. thorl t.1 th 1 ~ Ymk s ~ Port or
n dlhi,rkc,fi ..
u, ,which in turn forwcrclod than tc tho Tnbomot
I m L 1 Divisiijn, hrrq Serviac F rcas. The Internatiinnl
Divisi;.,n prnccsscd tho rcoulsitims and returnac! ciipics ti
the IJcw Y~rkPort .,f E!xbm-htii;n, which c&lleclthe supplios
f inwiird mi; .rmr?c shipxnt.
c. F.:r th:m itails trj bo prxurcd in tho United
I:hnCdsri, tho Chi.cE 9?xrtanas hr preporor? n roquisiticn an
:.: spocial. fl:rii;ad subnltted it to tho British 1'hr Office
f;.r zction. Tho special f(,mVLS sc propsrod JS tc cnnbla
thc !lcr Ot'fico rad thc Chicf O,uc..rtcrrastc:r t:) c( nsnlidate
oll tho hfc.rintim niicessnry an onc Ellnet. The Chiaf Quuortoriwatcr
listcd tho ulloontisn nuthority, on?. tho itons and
Sumtities ijf anch rcquiro2. Tho British War OfYiCu can-
plc'c~c!tho f . ~ i
by shi-wing the Gopat, pL~i30, itcn, typo of
packnee rind wci&hi;, on6 roturncd tho Torn tc tho Chief
r.unrtorrustor. Dnsot c,n tlic inf;?rrhti?n, coctoincd in the
ram, tho Chiif O,uortcrrnstor praporod &pi,t supply o.hipping
ZLota [DSSD)onC subriittcd It to the Offico of tho Chief if
Trmspmtntion. for action.
92. Shipnent of ,Supplfcs.
a.
All supplies shippoi! Trori thc UniteC States
wcro in p~clc3gosspccia1I.y mrked fdir Civil .Wfairs to rliffomntiatc
thCii frm ,ithor supplios. Tho rrtw Ywl: Ptat of
- 62 -
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

EmbarkatIan shipPcd the supplics bascd on pric;ritics ostob-
lishod by tho G--4, IIcndguartors, CQrLUUIIiCcitiCnB Zona, whvhi.
ales desi6notod, in cnnjunctim with tho Chiof Qu::rtcrmstor,
the ports of cntry :.nc:. tlzo n,uartcrrq.aetor .?en>ts ts be utilizer?
for stornge. The shcrtago oi’ shipping-space ant! the
oongosted ports of off loac‘hg prcvontcd the civil hffclirs
Supplle8 frou bciw ploceil In priority’!&” 36 the nee?. for
nilitary supplios was considorccl to bo nore urecnt. Consoquently,
but few Civil Afffdm ~u_n?lioswcrc rcaeivcc! ?.urin[t
tho first sir months of thc operation. Tic ;?ocuxntation
of supplies fron the United States wi?s thc rosponsibility
of tha depot of shipping origin.
b. Supplies shippc?. frori tho Uidto?. ??in(;clon vmru
31co spLcislly rizrkeCt, TJLCG-4, Ilndquartcrs, Cc.mnicr;tiona
EO;^ ellocatofi shipping ap~cofor Civil !:ffairs suip;bliaa,
m G the Supgly S..2tion of tho Civil Lffnirs Br ;,ch, 1k.Lquarters,
Co . uniotitions Zone, cstablishoc; pricritics af cor-
toln su~i~lics within tho allocution. ‘L’hhLse priorities wra
given to tho Chisf of h.?nsnortntion, an& us the supplies
were cclllcd forwart on dcpot Bup_nly s;,: ,pine da$: , wro
locded nnd stipao?. ooccrdingly. On about 15 Octobar 1944.,
tho systnri wc.s chongei. in thnt sug;;lics rvhiob cEp,rogatod
lese than a trainioca lot weFo shippet: frori thc British depots
conccrncc; in tho United KingBon to UAtcC Si;.tas al‘ by
clcpots for consoliCation into ono lmgo ship.nent.
93. Discrlbutlon.
a. iw supplics urrived at Q,d..rtonmster depots
norrial proooduro wcIs followc! in cccounting unC ro2orting
for Civil Axfairs sup$ios. Comonly wed ilcxs ivorc not
stored soparote fron Amy stocks. Itons pcpuliar t o Civil
Arfnlrs, or food itans bolow army stunLards, Were storcc‘,
scpnratoly. Scpurata recorile wru kept of tha reccipt,
starago and issua of all Civil 11.4; irs itons.
b. ISSUcS O f Civil AffoirS SUlIpliOS WePU mBo to
Civil Affairs dotaohnonts, basc motion, .ari:dos r:nd IJationol
Authorities (bweous or agcnoios cstoblishoZ by tbc cxiatin
f.lliod or libwatccl Govornlonts to nclniniatcr Civil AffcirS?.
All issuos wmo rmde on requisitions npprovai: by tho Chicf
Quiirtormstcr or on distribution r!.ir~tivis ionucr! by hin,
All lssuos wro mCo frori the c7apots unc!cr tbc RW~Coystcri
ns for rsculcr nrrly sugplios, with the cxooption thct two
axtro coplcs of tha tally-outs woro forwirc:.cd to the Chicf
q,ucrtorrigstor for trnnsnittal to tho 0-5,k‘i,Cquortcrs, COIInunications
Zono, for the rnintonanca of his rocords.
C. Rcquisitions wort! norrwlly subrdttuC. by tho
vcrious acancics to the 0-5, Eanclquarters, Corxmicstiona
Z,one, who sc~ccnod,oCitoO ona trCnsiiittaL? tho a:~provod
requisition to tho Uhief r?,uc:rformstitr through G-4, &adqunrtors,
Cotmunic::tions %one, The Chiof Quartarnmter actocl
only on rcauieitions cpprovocl by tho C-5 nnC Q-4. Upon a?provd,
thc CMcf Cu.Jrtorrastcr checkec! ovnilabillty of
Civil Affairs stocks, Lotcrr.inoc’. if the shipiont woulc~ be
within the approved tonnaga allocation, snc! elthor iSQUed ii
distribution directive to tho dopot conoerncd fcr shiprmnt
or opprovod tho requisition if pick-up wns to bo nor?.c 4t
tho dopot.
94. Discussion. Tho Chiof “,ucrtcrciastm had tho
R-E-6-T-R-I 4-T-E-D

osaonslbiilty of ostlxating font, clothing, tentaee, insccticidcs
ond othor shdlar type iten requirements for United
at,ites nilitary fOP2CS, Itclim servioc units, libcratcd
ilrnpwar units, civilian Lbor, cmry prisoners of war,
libcrntad AlioA prisonsrs of m.r, r:n2 other sinilcr cnte-
Corics or gorsorml. For thosc, Civil Affairs hod no rosgon-
sibility. Civil Affairs Zid hovmor, hnc the rosponsihi-
lity of ostimting rcqulrcnonts of the 8E:rio itons for
prJcticully tho Sam ty2o of porsonncl. The division of
responsibility vrns very ?.ifficult to :'raw, and tho rosulting
prooo[lurcs rmd circunstcncco cruntcd D spsten which ltokecl
flcxibilitjr both frOn n staff stundpoint and froi? fiold
opamtions. ':hiLC in a fuw msas it was nccossery to atilizi?
civil hffnirs stocks to wet U!iitocI St,:tcs I,rriy coixiitm-
ents cons-derable quantities of Ar.g sugplics wore issuoi:
to m G t Civil Affcirs ras?onsibilltics. This ma pnrtioul-
:nip truo In Xi0 su:xily of rliaplacofl. psrsons in Gorminy.
This pas clue$ not Only to unilorestilwtlon of rcquirononta
-an? to thc lotr priority of that class of sulyly, but to thc
inibility or difficulty In ostablishing thc ihontity of on
indlviaunl as D fiiSp1,locod porson or as on0 of the categories
for whlah the :mny was rospor.sIb1o.
95. CloOScs of Allitm'. I:illt3rp Units.
c.. W thc on?, of h-ostilitiss I.n I'zy 194.5, :.llioc:
ri:iU::a:uer LIS in?ici.tcc: bolow vi39 bc,iny suylioC by ths Ur.iteC
Status Forcos:
Fronoh I:ilitery (incluCinE.Iloslu~~a) 355,551
Continontt.1 hllioZ (libsrotecl mnpovwr) 79,617
Italicri oni; Salvogo Sorvico Wits 41,967
cI_
Tnt:1.l 477,155
b. On 3 Docncbcr 1944, Suprcmc H6ncl.quarters, A'+loil
3qcc:itionary Porcr;o, prosaribo?. cl.;oses of ~ lliut?ililitsrg
orpnizstiona bused upon thair formtion nnc? aquipriznt.
lIilitary and pnrn-rdlitary forccs woro Civifle(1 into
tilo Pollortin;, tyccs :
(1) Typo "A" f'orcos wcro tho80 refplcrly constitutoc?
tlrmd @-ounl! lorcov cctivatiid,
aquigpch, cnt; w?plic.L?in zooorclnnce vith
appvvcri rommxnt prograis nnc? 01)Gl'oti.ilg
un6.c~ thc Suyrciio ComanC;, idlid. SxzoCitionary.Forcos.
(2) Typo IW forcco woro thoso nilitciry units
roiscc! froi.1 libcratcc! mngotror snt'. oqui;)ncd,
in :iooordnnco with Coeibinoc? Chiofs
of Staff

R-E-S -T-R-I4 &%E -D
orrifjd forccs of liborated nation8 nnd not
eroupud unecr Typc trhrtand W' forces.
(4) Typo W1forccs includd 511 militury .In6
pra-nilitn-37 forces enrl. Lgoncies of libcrntod
nations not incluc'cd iR other cst-
cgorios.
c. On 15 Lpril 1945, tho Colxlonr?ing: G,\noro1, Xuro-
11s3nTheater of Operations, further clefinci; thcsc clasccs
as follows;
(1) Ty~uiiA:l rorccs wcrc rogularlg oonsti-
tutcc'. ar:iy ficlrl ;nC air forccs orconizd
ani. oquippod in nccorGanc: with
ap;>rovo? Coabincll Chiefs of Stsff re- m'inmnt
j7ropn:i aril! su1;3lic(? on .

R-E-S -T-R-I-c-T-E-D
established by the Chief Quartermaster with the exception
of those units operating in r;he 6th Army Group area which
fed the French-Moslem ration. Type rIBrI units operating
inside Germany were given a modified Post Exchange issue.
Those operating outside Germany were authorized no issue
of Post Exchange items.
C. Type "C" forces were supplied rations insofar
as availability permitted, from Cormunications Zone or =my
dumps when operating under direot United States command.
Type forces were supplied when specifically agreed up-
on between the government concerned and Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forbes. Type nD*t forces when supplied
were fed under the same procedure as for Type llEfI units in
training. During later stages of operations, types '*DtI and
fIC" units, operating under United States control, exoept
those of the 6th Army Group, were issued a special Conti-
nental Manu for nllied Forces operating with the United
States, Units in 6th amy Group were furnished the French-
Moslem ration. Eo Post Exohange items were authorized for
these units.
97. Class I11 Su lies. Supply of Glass I11 roducts was
furnished in the same'ianner a8 for United States gorces ta
Type SA1' units, operational type ftBII units, and type llC"
forces under direct command of a Udted States comander.
Type ltBrf units in training and type 'IDtv units were supplied
when specifically agreed upon between Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditioqary X'oroes, and the government concerned,
If supplied, the procedure and priority system established
for the supply of rations to type rrBtrunits i n training
were followed.
98. Class I1 and IV Supplies.
a. Initial issue of clothing and equlpment to
type "A" forces was as prescribed by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. The War Department established the polioies
with regard to replacement and maintenance of Type
forces operating with United States Forces. Units in the
approved French rearmament program established by the War
Department received combat maintenance on the sane basis
as United States Forces.
b. Initial issue of clothing and equipment; to
type tfBll forces was made by the Chief (.Luartermaster after
approval by Sujreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Poroes. Clothing and equipment required for maintenance
by type llBI1 forces were supplied by the British Far Offioe.
The supplies were held in the United Kingdom until called
forward by the Communications Zone. Responsibility for
Clasa I1 and IV supply of' these units was later placed
entirely on the British War Office. Type V" and riY
forces were given initial issuss of clothing and equipment
only when approved by Supreme Headquarters in accordance
with agreements between the governments concerned and the
Communications Zone, No replacement issues were authorized.
99. Owerations.
a. The definitions of the various types of units
- 66 -
R-E-8 -T-R-I-G-T-E-D

R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E-D
mro odoruato, as wcro thc doscz-ipticns of tho aoalcs on
vhich each gr,nor*jl t yw i:aa to bo su plicd. The grcatcst
difficulty meountcrod by tho Chidf Guartcrmestir in tho
sunply of those units, iiovwmr, was in obtaining thc: propcr
018: sifioation and 6tronp.th fieUroS of thc units involvcc?.
Thc Chicf Qumtcmastcr ststod that tho burden of mnpwcr
&tin. tos fcll ahost cntiroly on his officr., and that tho
i-portancc of thiE function was ncvcr fully re,ilizod by tho
staff of Ibadouartcra, ZuropLan Thcctor of Opirotions.
Prior to furxishine, suoglies tc LI unit, the Chiof QuartLrmstcr
mst know its oatugory cind its strcwth. Prior to
thc sul>ply of a numbor of units it was ossantiil thbt tho
Chiof Quartcrnastor roocivc information os to numbor, oat&
qorp and strcn@Ae far onouph in dvanco of issuo to 1wrmit
addcuate stockaeo of dogets to mcct the requiromonb.
as they arosr). Yct throughout most of tho opLrations in
the Cur0 wvn Theator thL Chicf Quartcmastcr 1189 furniskcd
noithcr tho strength of tho unit, the classification, nor
tha scalc of issuo until dircctivcs wrc roccivcd from
highor hoad?uartcro to mku thc issuus.
3. The ’lrCopartm-nt, lata in 19k.4, turmd
down a renuisition cubnittcd by thc Chicf Quartermustor
oovoring supplios noadod tc roploniah stocks issuod to
rion IJd pOr80lmC1, and directcd thtit tho rcquircments bo
resubmitted in project form, Thc Chief Quartctrmastor vJa8
unablc to comply as ho did not hevc tho nooesnary troop
strbngths and classifications on ?rhich to basc roquirrjncnts.
In tin cfrcrt to obtain thc information ma cstabllsh
a system for thc flw! O f that information in tho
fuwro, th Chief Qunrtcrmastor, in J&nuG ry 1945, notified
thc P-l+ Ecsdqusrtcrs, Comuniestions Zonc, of his dccd for
information, and submittod to him tho followinf chart
which includrd all tho information 0vsiJ.ablo to tho Chiof
Qunrtcrmastor on tho units to bo suyliad:
Closs of Supply StrenE*th known
Authorized Tor to tho 2uarter-
Cntcigorg Issue I’RStCr
(1) Liboratad !;anpowor
Type A All Clanacs, p.S Unknown
Typo R
( 090ratiGnRl)
?yp I3
(In-trainin&)
l’ypo c
I and III
Unl-Jlown
T and 111
Ihilcnocdn
Unknown
Unknown
Typo n unknown ITnknown
(2) bench Pw~onnel
Fioncor Com-
panios Unknown 22,030
Li&t Isfantry
Dattalions Unknown 5 3 200
Gnrdo E!obile
Gondarneiro Un.hown 3,000

Gondarniora Unknown
French Forces
of the Int-
crior. Un.knoim
(31 Dol.~iun7crsonncl.
Bclqi dl LIC,t
infantry units Unknown
Bclgiun Pusil-
ier Bottulions Unknoirn
c. On 16 E'cbruary 1945, tho informetion c7,esirod
illss still ihcking in the office of thc Chicf Quartormstor.
!IC thoref or0 vrotc to thc Corhnandiny Gmcrill, Connunications
Zone und rcquest,d thc follot,inf;:
Conploto clarification cf tht. Quartor-
master res?onsibility for the supply of
non US units.
Confirrmtlon that thc 2uartLrmstcr was
to takr: no dction in the prograii for rocquippinp
the Brcnch i.rmy.
IIonthly pcriodic troop projection six
iJonths in adv,nco.
That no cormitncnts of 2uartornoster supplioa
Bc nada dthout oonsultiny, thc Chiof
c\,uwtormaster to dctcrrrlnc if the supplius
rcquirod 6ro actuailg 011 hund 2nd chn bo
.,llocntod for a spocific purposo.
d. In u lcttcr on 5 Karch l%5, thc G-4, IIoadquartcrs,
Cormunications Zonc, notificd thu Ch-iof '\,uartor-
rwntcr thst thc ::ontrol Division, Comunicotioils Conc, w38
conductinp: t? Study to dctdrrninu which stGff scotion i*ould
bu rcszonsiblc for the ruonthly prcpnutlon of maripo~rcrsstirmtos.
Tho proviouo duy, hovdcver, thc G-4 ha& roquestcd
informtion by 6 IPrah 1945, as to the amount or clothiny.
tho Chicf \uortirrrmstar could furnis:~to alliaa IailitLry
units, indicdtlve of c. still inoduqustc coIioa'it of tho
woblm. Thc Chicf qunrtcnmstor rcpliad that hc could
suyply nothinc, :nd agsin roviotrcd his difficulties in obtoiniiq
a pr0pr.r basis for the supply of thesc units. Thc
situation WLS clurlficd to sono cxtcnt, but not coni>lztcly,
by thb turninntion of hostilitios in Europo.
c. aupplios uud cguipmont furnished to militbrg
'md gaa-nilit Jry forccs of libmcctcd countries woru tronaf'crrsd
in oocordunco vij th lond-loasc oocountlly procedures.
In sp'tc of l~ck of lnfomtion as to strone;ths and types
oi' units, militmy oncrstions worc not hindbrad throufrli
look of su3pliaa :is sufficiont stooks wrc on hand to fiU bdsic mods. T ~ Lissuc of tho Unitcd States uniforn, howovor,
to ather wilitary units, without boinc dyed or othorwiso
altcrod, had c distinctly dcteriorating cffcct on tho
morolo of thc: United States Soldier and lassaned his prido
in tho vrunrin8 of his own uniforn. Such IsSuOS would not
hovo boen nude hnd fncilitioa and tPm bocn aviilablo to
nrko tho ncccflsory oltcrotions.
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100. Conclusions.
a. Class I1 and IV supplies for the Air Forces
would.have been better controlled from an Air Force stand-
point, had issue been made through the air depot groups.
It would have been impractical for the Air Force to have
handled other classes, due to the wide dispereion and regularly
scheduled issue.
b. quartermaster sales store service to the Air
Forces would have been improved had the Air Force had at its
disposal mobile sales stores on the same basis as the armles
had them.
e. The lack of a sufficiently hitrh priority for
the movement of' Civil Affairs su?plies from the Zone of
Interior to the Xuropean Theater of Operations considerably
reduced the flow of such supplies from the Quartermaster
Corps to Civil Affairs aEencies in the European Theater of
Operations.
d. The outstandina difficulty of' supplying Allied
military units by the Qumtermaster Corps in the European
Theater OP Operations was the lack of timely irf0matiOn on
the dlanpower basis and the scales of issue for such groups Of
personnel. The actual supply operations involvLnq these units
were performed throueh Quartemster Corps channels and were
SatiSfaotory to the extent that overall ,nilitary operations
were not seriously pffected.
e. The division of responsibility between the
Quartermaster Corps and Civil Affairs for Civil Affairs
supply was sonetlmas difficult to draw, and resulted at times
in confusion and lack of officienoy.
101. Recommendations.
a. That in future operations the collection and
dissemination of information and the formulation of broad
plans for supply of Oth6F than Unitod States Amy Ground
Forces be made tho responsibility of one single oentral staff
wenoy
b. That consideration and study be given to the
feasibility of the Rir Forces drawing Class I1 &, D supplies
from the Cmunications Zone In bulk,' and storing and issuing
such supplies at Air Force depot groups,
c. That consideration be given to the oontrol of mobile
snlm stores by the fir lrorce for Air Force units, particularly
those at sone distance from the armies.
d. That in future operations, similrar,to those experlenced
in the European Theater of Operations, the Quartermaster
Corps be charged with responsibility for the supply,
includinR planning and estimating requirements, of all Quartermaster
items for all categories of personnel beinF supplied
by the 0.9. Army.
That the retail issue of auch supplies
for the relief' of civilians end displaced persons be made the
responsibility of Civil Affairs or similar agencies.
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R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
Bibliography
Chapter 7
1. Ltr, Hq United States Air Forces in Europe, subject:
ttQuartemaster Supply Operations in the Air Forcestl,
undated. *(4)
2. Supply Plan to Govern US Army Responsibility to US Maval
Forces in Europe, Joint Lpgistioal Staff Coimnittee,
European Theater of Operations, 6 Nov 43. *(5)
3. Vechuical Manual Number 3", Headquartere, Theater
Servioe Forces, European %eater, Office of the Theater
Chief quartermaster, 15 Ssp 45.
I+. "Continental Operating InstructionsTt, Office of the
Chief Quartormaster, European Theater of Operations,
19 Feb 45. *(6)
5. quartermaster Operational Analysis Study ITumber 12,
subject: Wivil Affairs Operations71,Office of the
Theater Chief Quartermaster, Theater Service Forces,
European Theater, Wovenbe? 1945. * (7)
6, ft0,wrtermaster Operational Analyais study Number 8"
subject: WMenpower in Relation to Supplyrt, Office o$ the
Chief Quartermaster, Theater SerViCQ Forces, European
Fhnater.
7. Administrative Memorandum Number 40, Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force,. 3 Dec 44.
. -
8. Lfr, WD, AG office, datcd 7 Jun 44,
9, Ltr, Rq US Air Forces in Europe, subject, "Service Operations
of the OJ~ Corps", undated, *(si
LO. Report on Graves Registration Services within the US
Air Forces in Europe, €Iq UWE, dated 25 Nov 45. '(9)
*NTumber in parentheses.is Catalog Nwnbcr.uSed in
Inventory of ?kiterial, QM Study No. logt (General
Supply), f ilo R LOl/ll.
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R-2-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-
PART THREf!l
_1__
---
olsss I E l s e
-= CHAPTER 8
BATIONS ___I
SECTION 1 -
TYPES OF WTIONS
102. 0 erational RationsB1 Oporational rations wuxe
issued un-dss whore the issue or use of a
bulk ration was impractical. There wore three principzl
typos of oporational rations :
a* Field Ration "0" was a cooked balanced ration
in cans. Each ration consisted of thrco cans of,prtparrd
mer.ts and vcgctablos, and three ~ ansof crackers, sugar and
solublo ocffee. As this ration was not porishablo, it was
suitable for use as a unit OX individual reservo ration,
b. Field Ration W1Consisto&of throe unito, each
containing on0 meal, packod iia a rectangular oortainer. Tkis
ration could be used to replace the C ration for special
purposes,
o, The 10-in-1 Ration was a composite ration.
Subsistence for 10 men for one day or for five man for two
days was included in tho packago. There were four separate
inner pnCkEgQS. Each package contained ccmponents of fivo
rations and oach sct of two djffercnt packages combinod to
make fivo comnlete rations. The LO-in-1 ration provided a
wido varioty of food in fivo diffcrcnt menus.
d. Other rations included.the*5-in-lJ which ma
similnr to tho 10-in-1, md tho 25-in-1, which conaistod
principnlly'of fruit juics, soup, and othQr Similar ration
supplomonts. Both rations wore mainly usud to supplmcnt
tho hospital rntion.
103. Bulk Ratioml Bulk rations were iasuod whonovor
possiblo in tho %jrcoan Thoatcr of Opcjrntions, and w0r0 of
tvm prbcipal typos :
a. Field Ration lfAfp, which correspondcd in goneral
to the ~QELCOFime garrison ration and was generally porish-
ablo. Boing perishable, it ms not auitable as a unit reservo
melon.
b. Field Rrticn "Bll, which was tho same ns fiald
rution A e2copt that nonpcri shnblo itm roplaccd tho pcrlshnblu
€toms, This ration was suitable for unit reserve purposes$
164. Supplemental Field Ration "DII. The D ration conrsisted
of- g melting point choc-
olata fortified with vitamin B-1. Originally, thls ration
was intended as n complete reserve ration, but was used
principolly in the Suropean 'Pheater as a supplement* to the
operctionol rttions. Thore were occasions, bowever when the
D ration was used and oonsumed 48 a reserve ration.2
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

SZCTION 2
105. Develoment .2 The developnient of tlie operational
ration wasii=aTly on a lokistical basis, Gild was intended
to povide sufficient food for a lkited iierioci.
It VJRS 1ii~hl.y iri2ortant that the ration be:
a, Zasy to ,"transpox%,
b. SimiAe to issue,
c. Coqact to carry.
These 1oListical considerations were hazflrdous, for the
character of the ration whs based on the size of the box
it had to fit, ani not on the needs of the soldier.
lQ6. p-?,C-->i;A-la>f.o~~.~ Tho nee& for a composite
packed ra ion becane eviuent i;!hen B considerable portion of
the Horth African Invasion Task Force vas suyplied fron the
Uaited i;inkdm (See ALi5endix 9). Several miLlioii 14-in-1
coilgosite rations wi?m procui-ed frai tile &ritish r,rry, but
were never populcr witl; the Unite

R-E-9 -T-R-I-C -T-E-D
at me sitting.& In the fall of 1944 however an ir~~iroved
type C ration becue ov~iLable Set.c&nl excelient iter,,. of
ffiatlt poducts mere substttuterd'for the stew type ~DQ&,S cf the
oriqinal ration. !L variety of OrclCker6 rsplaced the original
type C creckers. In nadition, uddltionol sclublb coffee and
inprtwd confecticns were provided.:!
3 09. Operational usc,
Q. Tho 10-in-1, K and C rations wcro widely u8ed
end woro aupplcrncnted whencvcr poseiblo by tba issue of
fresh bread, mcnt end coffeo. Tho D ration, though-never
popular, was at timcs uscd as a supplom~ntalration, as a
substitute for coffee or cocoa, or as an ewr&6ncy rcserva.
Tho 25-in-3 and 5-in-1 SUpplCUGntd rations wore uscd GXolusivoly
for hospitals during the oarly stcgos of oporations
on tho continent. Rosoarch and do-rolopmmt on all
typos of operational rations was contjnuous. Hoat Wit8
vmro prcvidod, spcclol bulletins on food preparRtlon and
USG woro issued, P%dtho tJ"PYP0D bar Was AWdifiCd, The
nutritional value nnii sccoptability of each tape ration
was improved considorably. Thti followlnq ohart shows tht,
changc in caloric oontent:Z
Ration -194.3 x!&
ories
10-in-1 3408 4644.
I I p 2756 2830
"C" 2685 3709
Average requirements pcr lnan per day: 4,000 cal-
b. Comments by tho various Civision and Corps
0,uartormastcre indicated their likes end dialikiis in type
operational rations, as follows:
Soventh Amrod Division.
sOporational rations wore used during the
cntire period (8August 1944 - 8 Reptombor
1944) Pad consistcd Of C'S, K'8 and 10-in
1's. Units et tintea would rofuao to acgoyt
C rntioiis, a8 t op statoa tho mcn rcfuSod
to cat thQll17.k
Gth Infantry nivision.
;1T$rpeS K and 10-in-lrations woro not in
many instancos issuod es rO~.UQStQdand type
C rations WClG substitutod tbcrcior. Thc
typo C rntion is not oonaidorod sntisfao-
tory for thG Infantry soldiorrf.7
th Infantry Division.
n tho fnst noving wP.riaro ncross Wranco,
thc 10-in-1 ration wit3 DIUCT~ prootical tylc
of ration duo to beinfl cornpact and mro
opeily prepared in Q short tino. The I(
ration ha6 been poforrcd by line aonpanics
of Infantry whcn in oontact with the
enemy and aspocLally during river croeflings
or on D jump-off. Tho pe.akagoe woro
oasily stuffod into n gcckot and this type
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D

ation could bo oonsumod with little or no
properation. The C ration has not bcen
gonorally desirod by troops of this divi-
sion and has been used only as a substituto
for X ration when they wOre hord to
obtain. Front line troops do hot liko tho
C rabion due to its packaging and troops
further in thc roar who can build a firc
to hoot the C ration generally can be fed
tho B ration.".a
(4) %-*or o.rorationa1 rations oonsist-
inE of C. D. IC and 10-in-1 vmro used oxclusiky
&tii 13 July 194.4 whon tho B typo was
brought to the oontinont, .horican troops
did n3t thrivo on operational rations
alone,. but on tho 10-in-1 ration no woight
was lost. It yms dotominod that thc C
ration wcs more praoticol for Armorcd clcmonts,
and tho K for Infantryytt.9
c. In addition to thu studios made in tho Zuropuan
Theator of Oporations, a War Dopartmont Equipment Reviow
Board whioh CbnVOnQd at Hoadqunrtors; !.my Ground Foroes,
%shington, D. C., on 19 August 19!+/+, mode a ccnplcte study
of all typos of rations. It recommondod that tho numbcr of
typos be dooreasod, and that tho conditions undcr which cnoh
was to be usoa definod mor0 olearly. It also rooonmondod
that the C and R rations bo combined, that tho weight and
volumo of packagod rations be roduood, end thnt accoptabil-
ity be primarily charaotoristio of all rntians.5 Tho rocom-
mcndations wero generally in accordance with ideas gathered
from experience in the European Theater.
SECTION 3
110. pield Ration "B"2
BTjLK RATIONS
a. The first 2merioan troops arrived in Northern
Ireland on 26 January 1942, and wera subeisted entirely on
British rations. These rations were later modified into
a British-Amcrican ration, and finally eliminated entirely.
Plans for tho invasion of the continent called for the in-
itial use of ogerational rations to be followod later by
the B ration and finally by the A ration when practicable.
The B ration was to equal the n ration in all respeots, with
the excootion that non-pbrishablo componentB'wore to be sub-
stituted for perishables. The B ration menu, which formed
tho basis for procnrement in the United States, had thrae
imnortant defeats :
(1) Stow'type meat made up @. perccnt of the
meat, poultzy and fish components.
fZ) Milk products wore insufficient.
(3j Thoro was froquent repotition of unpopular
components of tho then current
operational ration.
b. Efforts were made to corrcct tho defects or
to minimize their offeck, On-Dplus 32 the first B rations
Brrivea on the continent. on- B 'plu 39 eMpments
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R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
of frosh moat and buttor bLgan to arrim and a partial
convorsion to fiold ration A was nadG at that tinc.
111. Fiold Ration A.
a. Thc A ration was planncd to mu%thu smo
standards of tl-e garrison ration issucd in tho Unitd
Rtatos. Circular,Pumbor 13, Tr~adquartcr~, EurosLan Thontcr
of Oporations, gave tho following characturistios:2
(1) bcsh moats, dairv prducts, vogctabl&,
fruits and othm porishablus to bd usd
as much ae possihlo.
(2) To contain approximately 4,000 caloriw.
(3)
oquol or cxcood thc. rcconmcndcd diotary
allO~anO66.
(10 To succcssfully maintain thc health and
moralo of tho troops.
b. In ordcr to insuro propcr 'sroparetion and consorvation,
menus wcrc przparod and distributsd through Glass
I supply points as a guide to mass sorrzomnts. Eohools wLrc
ostablishod and inonu teams went into the fiild to instruct
in proper proparation. A coadiment kit was iSSUQd t o pro-
vido all messes with a basic stook of oofidimcnts, but it
was not until latc in tho oporations that propcr ana conploto
distribution was mde.2
c. Ration issue oxporionco in tho Europoan Tlicatcr
of Operations boginning with J~ly1944 indicatos that a high
proportion of typo A or 9 rntion was,consumod. Thc following
chart shows tho porccnta 81) of G,K, 10-in-1 and tiTe A or
B ration that *ere issuod:Z PAppondix 1.2)
-Date Typo A/B Typo C Typo I Type 10-in-1
June 1944 14 15 71
Soptembor 194L 58 18 10 1L,
Doccmbor 194.4 87 03 05 05
March 1945 88 04 05 03
Juno 1945 94 01 03 02
Boptcmbcr 1945 92 02 04 02
Considorinq thqoondition of the highways and thc railroads,
tho oftan inadoquato port facilitios, and tho difficulty in
maintaining a balancod ra$ion, tho consistont isauo of a
high poroontago of typo A or:B ration throughout thu war
was a i;romcrndous undertaking, Somo of tho suocoas nay be
attributod to tho V%&"od Coa-oodit Loading,r of rations
at tho Pow Yorlc Fort of Embarkation.~o
112. Ration Accosso Conveniencc.~ackots.2 Tho RAC
kite (Appendix TO) as thg w~rocallod, xadu Eobaooo, oanUy
and toilot artiolos availablo for issuo as Part of tho fidd
ration. This gratia issue was to continuo Until Post EKohongos
oould bo oponed. A composite pack of 200 balanoc-d
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D

R-E-S-T-R-X -C-T-E-D
rations Of tobacco, Candy and toilot articles was vory casy
to hnndlo and issuc. Sqmntc packs of thrco typcs: 200
tobaoco'rations, 100 oandg rations, and 800 tOilGt nrticlo
rations, caused coziplicntions in supply. 'Ilx initial allow-
EICG of om razor bladc pof man per wook was insufficient
subscqucntl.~ chengod to three blades per man per week.
113. Perishables.:! %be success of the A ration dependad
largely~e~cureqbnt of perishable item. The
3,unrtemaster Corps prOourr?d , received, stored. and issued
fresh neats and dairy products at cold storage plants, and
distributed fresh meats pnd dairy products in mobile reefer,
vans front btiee depot cold stores to su?'-~l-~ points, Local
proourenent of vegetables and fresh fruits wss aa8.e wherever
poasible, and shipments of all types of :>erishnbles
were mde from the Uiil.tm3. States. Transportation difficulties
and ths lack of proper refrigeratton facilities for
transport made it impoasible at times to issue perisheble
items to front line troops. %en proper facilities wen?
nv;vaj.lable, such issue was made.
1Ih. Dehydrated Ipooas,2 !"he use of dehydrated foods to
conserve shfppinfl space and to faoilitate distribution be-
came alr,ost es-:eiitial. Dehydrated foods wcre issued with .
both the field ration .A and the field ration B. In General,
dehydrated foods vere nQt popular, and ness sergeants and
coolcs wre not properly instructed in their use and proparation.
Dehydrated pctatoes e.sd vegetsbles reconstituted
feirly well, and t8he preparation of dehydrated egss improved
considerably. Dried whole milk yowder was fairly wul'.
accented, find 50 percent of the European Theater milk requireinents
ware renuisitLonad in that form.
1x5. Raticiis for othor than US Forces.2 AS the oporations
progressed tho ~.uartermast,erCorps.became more and
more'invclvod in feeding vrifioners of war, displaced psrsons,
civilian labor and otlier nationals. Originally, in
the interest of food conservation, the followinp: menus wcre
devised:
a. Allied Ilationals.
(1) Civilian embloyees
(2) Liberatad manpower
(3 1 French Expeditionary Force
(4) Italian Service units
(5) RussZan ?rationals
b. Enmy Frationale.
{ 1) ''lorking prisoners of war
(2 ] lJon-worldn$ prisoners of war
(j) Hospitallzcd prisoners of war
Each menu prescribed a d.lPferent, calorfc coritent. Thc sevoral
uenus, howover, Were nGwr issue&, as tho nunbor and
variety proved too difficult to handle, .A cnntinental allicd
mwu replaced the five menus for Allied Nationals,
while the other monus rQmainod in offoct.
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116. Conclusions
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D
SECTION 4
a. Of tho opcrotlonal rations, the 10-in-1 ration
VTQS tho most popular with tho soldior. It hztr n hipher caloric
content thnn any of thc othLr typo opcrationnl rations
and was used princinnlly as a modifiod R ration.
b. Tho% ration, though containing fcwcr calories
than the C ration, Wa8 mOrG acceptable to thc SolditiT. The
K ration ia pacltngod to ffiCili%QtD ccirrylng, distribution
and consumption.
c. The C ration is bulky and awkward to oarry and
normc.lly required hoating. ,Under oonditions it is
possible to hoat a C ration, tha 10-in-1 ration om normally
bo prepawd.
d. Wile thc oporational rations wcro Lsscntial
undor many circumstnnccs, ovory effort to issue thu A or B
ration me. IIL7de.
117, Recmcndations,
8. !?hat studies and rosearch into dohydrated
foods and oporational rations continue.
b. That tho recommendations of.tfio %r Dcpartment
?quipmont Review Ronrd , Fcadquartertr, lrmy Ground
POPOCS,be gonerally accepted, an3 thet a suitablo 0701ational
ration bo devcloped whioh will he nutritionally
aocoptablo and contain a Suf'fioient variety in meals,
whilo still combining the ni.2itary characteristics of n
flat, mini"weip,ht and nfinimum volume packag6.
BiblioRraphy
Chaptor 8
1. FM 100-10
2. US Amuy Subsistonce Exporienco in Xuropaan Th69t8r
dntpd 1 Novombar 1945. (Furnished for ffenoral Board use)
3* Ltr,.Fq Sever&$ US Army, 21 Apr 45, subj: "Operational
Rations". . (1).
4. AM Report No. 751, 23 Mar 45.
5. War Department Report of Board of Of'ricersrCdhvened to
Btudy theEquipment of the Pbet War Army, dtd 20 Jan 45.
6. Summary of qM Activltles, 7th m r o d Div for poriod 8
A X b4 - 8 flop 44. *(2) ,
7. After 4ction Report of @I, 30th Inf Div dtd 4 Oct 44. *(3)
8. Report of Opcrctions OT the 35th nJf Company during the
poriod 7 Jul 44 to 1Feb 45. *(4)
9, Opnwtion of XIX Corps - Normpdy Cmpaign (undated)
10. nTT Operational aslalysls No, 5 , ddted 1Nov 45, OrPCQ)d,TSFEP.
* Kumber in parentheses is Clatalog ?&."ex used in Inven-
tory 0" Material, Stcciy No. log, (Class I Supply),
rile ~~401/11
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-n
SECTION 1
G O I ~ I O I ~ T SZONE O ~
118, Oranization and Ws8ion.l The Chiof quartormaster,
Zuropcan Theater of Operatione, vas responsible
for the procuremant, storage and issuo of all goods to the
Unitad Cltates Forces and, when so diroctod by the Commanding
Conoral, Turopoan Theatcr of Opcrations, to acrsome1
OthGr than Unit& 4tates militan. In thc ?&??for-
mancc of this mission the following divisions of tho Office
of %he Chiof qmrtcrmastor wore principally cooccrnod:
a. Subsintonco Division.
b. Frocurcmont Division.
c, Storage and Distribution DivJsion.
Tho rrocuremant and storam and Distribution Division8
were concerned with all classcs of suivlios. Tho rosponsibilitics
of thc Subsistence Division were confined to
Class I Supplizs.
119. Mctions.1
a. The Subsietqnce Division was charped with the
following primary funotions:
(1) To secure by roquisltion all Cl4SS I
SUppliOS frm the United qtatos, from
the British, and fron othsr souroos
through tho Trocuremcint Division.
(2) To maintain balanoed stocks of Class I
supplios in dopots in accordmob with
proscribed levels, and to rocommcnd to
tho Storago and Distribution nivi9ion
tho distribution of Glass I sup?liCs to
aooomplish this purpose,
(3) To suprvise and assist in the efficient
uso of Class I supplios, including pro-
paration of monus and tho formulation of
m098 policies.
(fk)
To aovolop spooificationn for items procurd
in tho Unit& Kingdom.
b. Tha Trocurcmcnt Division waa charEod with
making all local purchases as rqucatod by thL Subsistemu
Division, and with chzclcine; al.1 requisitions on tho United
fitates to dotcmino whiah itoms wuo ~~OOWRblC from local
eourcos.
c. Tho Rtorapo and Distribution nivision was
charRoa in qcncrnl with furnishing toclinical nuidanoo for
thG opcration of tho dopote, ooordinating tho distfibution
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R-E-$ 4-R-I -C-T-E-D

of the supplies to the depots, and formulating plans for
the receipt, storage and issue of the supplies.
120.. Rrocurment.
a, Class I supplies were obtdined from the Zone
of Interior by requisftion and presrranged schedules of
shipments. These were nugzented by exploitation of local
re8ources in Allied and neutral countries, as well as
frac; cnptured supplios. The nnxinu procurement in the
United Kingdm, from late 19$2 until D-Day, amounted to
npproxiiwtely 30 pewent of requirenonts for the United
Stetes Foroes. This proourelrent wns based principally
on the ni?,l ration for consmption in England and mounted
to 38 staple items and 24 perishable Items. Procurelcent
in the United vingdom fcr Shipm6nt to the continent after
the invask was based on 10 staple items and fiV6 perishnble
item.4
b. Procurmnt in France and Belgiwl WES limited
prinoipally to fresh potatoes, VegetQbl6s and fruits.
Food processing and mnufacturing servioes were also ob-
tained in these countries for the production of items such
as yef.st and Spaghettj pcm raw mteriels furnished by
the United fitotes hrw. Other noutral or occupi d oountries
furnished oertnln items cf food as follows: 3
(1) Spain and Canary Islands - tomatoes,
onions, banenes, dried fruits, and fresh
citrus fruits.
(2) Denmark - butter, eggs, and carcass pork,
(3) Portugal - sardinos in brine, green
coffee, cocoa beans, and dried figs.
(4) Holland - potatoetl and onions,
(51 Norway - frozen cod fillets.
c. Lend-Lease waa employed in all the transactions
in tho UnitEd Kingdom, France, Belgiucl, and Luxumbourg
until the termination of Lend-Lesse, September 1945. The
United Stetca Commerciol Corporation, operating from the
Rtcte Department, dispatched special purchasing niseions
to the neutral countries of Spain, P6rtxt$cil and'tho Canary
Islands, cnd tho liberated countries of Eollgd, Denmark
and PTorway, to buy subsistence ond Oth6r commodities with
C ~ Qdirect purpose of keeping those supplios from lalling
into enow hsnds, end at the same time to supplsmcnt the
fTA" rations of the Unitsd States troops. Liai3on was maintained
by the Procurement Division Offjce of the Chief
Quertermastm, Rmop(~nn Theater, with the General Purchas-
ing Agents of the United States Gommwcicl Corporatlon,
in tho various countries.3
d. Proourement of subsistence itoms from the
United Kingdoffi wns effcoted on an allocation basis of all
ave.ilfible supplies in the Unitcd Kingdom, whereas in Franc6
cnd other liberetdd countries subsistence items were drawn
froa civil economg . sqppliaswhich were declared surplus
to oivilinn needs by the foodl ministries of the respective
countries.3
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121. Storage.
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
a. The storage of' perishnbles in the United
Kingdom wes handled almost entirely by the British Minietry
of Food and by commercial agedcies under its control. On
the continent there-was an extreme shortage of cold storage
facilities, particularly auring the early stages of
the invaslcn. This was due chiefly to the destructkn of
cold storage plants by enemy and Allied action, and tc
the inability to quickly rehabilitate the plants. Construction
and rehabilitatiGn was undertfiken as smn as
practicable but, until satisfactory facilities were obtain-
able, reefer vans hauled perishables direct from the ships
to the supply points. The use of reefer vans, however, due
to the long haul, was not satisfacto y for the proper care
and maintenance of perishable items. 5
b. As the operations progressed, more and great-
er facilities fcr cold storage became available. With
the liberation of Paris (S-0040) cold.stcrage capacity
became adequate for the first time.2
c. Since fresh fruits and vegetables obtained
from local sources were not normally received until ready
for issue, little or no storage was required. Fresh fruit
and vegetables rrom other sources were stored in clcsed
warehouses, when available and if made necessary by weatner
conditions. When closed storage was not available,the 'Yem
atyle stacks 14 feet by 20 feet, wlth tarpaulin covers,
were used.4,5 These stacks were generally the shape of
a storage tent and easily put together. In some instances
two or more of these stacks were joined together for better
storage or for heating when neoessary. After the invasion
was well under way, 90 percent of all perishables, other
than refrigerated perishables, were stored inside. The
Vrem stacks were used for the renaining ten percentV5
d. There wa6 a limited amount of spcilage aong
nonperishable items which were packed prior to late 1943.
hnoisture, in gome cases, detariorated the shipping carton
and caused cans to rust. Citrus juices Bometimes developed
pin holing from the inaide due to the aoticn of the oftrio
acid on the metal. There was also some lcos due to the
deterioration and loss cf paper labels from the cans. The
majority of thbse difficulties were corrected by the devel-
opment and use of a moisture proof carton. Also, a new
laminated asphalt craft bag was used for coffee, flour,
sugar, salt, and driofl vegetables. This type of bag practically
eliminated loss from stcrage and moisture. An
inside lacquered can for citrus juices cllminated loss from
pin holing, and the label defect was eliminate6 by pai ting
or stenciling the contents on the outside of the cans. 9
e. Approximately ten porcent of' the A or B
ration compononts such as coffoc, flour, sugar and dried
VGgEtableB were stored inside. All ogeraticnal rations,
and the reEainlng compononts of the bulk rations, were
stored outside in staoks and covered with tarpaulins. 5
122. Distributicn.
a, The inltial Class I supplies for the lnvasicn
of mope were brought in by ferry craft such as landing
craft. tank. and nmphiblous DUG'Ivs. After a sufficient
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number of trucks were ashoke they assisted the DUIPJ's in
establishing the first operational dumps. Five mobile
rbfrigcratiun companies, fully loaded with perishables
arrived on the continent In the middle of July 1944 and
wtre used frr direct delivery to the army supply pcints.
Th6 first railroad train fcr Class I supplies was used on
12 Awust 1944, and as operations progressed addlti nal
railroad ~tcck was utilized as it became flvailablea8
b. Class T supplies were distributed tc the
several armies, based upon requirements contained in the
daily telegram. The Chief Quartertwister desig"d the
dspct or Ctepots responsible for the supply of each artqt.
Tha daily telegrams were sent through the regulating stat!ons,
after their establishment, to the depots concernec.
The dopots procured the supplies and shipped thorn to the
armies, throyh tho regulating station, by means of the
daily train, These trains were BO loaded that they could
be broken down into six to ten sections, each section
cerrying a fully balanced number of rations to be diverted
to the various army supply points. Thjs system was not
always satisfactory as cars were loaded from several difrarent
points and asseabled into 8 single train when load-
ing was conplete. Cars sometimes ecame mixed anC caused
tho receipt of unbalanced rations. k
123. Control of Issue.
a. Effort6 were conttnuously mde to maintain
the ration issue within authorized allowances and $0 avoid
waste whenever possible. Army Quartermasters were required
to include in the daily telegram the number of rations
by type required, my augmentations uuthorizea, and the
amount of any excess stocks on hand. Inasmuch as it was
impracticable to make a head count during combat, the
morning repert strength was shown in lieu of the head
oount, and hrmy Pus-tormasters wePe required to jus ifg
requests for requirements in excess of that figure.k The
Chief C,mrternaster devised a ration return for Communications
Zone troops which inaluded the s m requirements.
~
This form was rcvised from time to time in accordance with
tlie situation, and was requlred of all units after cessa-
Lion of hostllitlea. 2 ~ 7
b. As a further precuation against the building
up by armies of stocks In excess of maintenanoe and re-
serve requirements, the Chloi ".srtermaster established
credits in the supplying depots againot whioh the armies
were authorized to draw. The credits were flexible and
could be increased at the discretion of the depot oomnder
upon request of the Army Quartermaster. This plan
was effective and rtduced the amount of supplies the armies
received against the doily telegram, while at the S ~ Q
time It allovded the depot stocks to build up.6
a. Operational rations were the only dveilable
ratiomfrom D-Day until 2 July 1946 when the first issue
of bread wfls made. During the first week in July fresh
meat and butter were added and by tho middle of July local
purohasine, added fresh potatoes Oarruta, turnips and
cabbage. on 10 July (D plus 321 191+/+the first ~~PII
ration
was issued and by D ylus 90 most of tho troops were subststed
on n rapidly improving "A" ration.* Diffioultios
were encountered during the latter part of July in main-
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R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-E -D
taining a balanced nB" ration in each supply point and
dump, The situation was relieved when the armies broke
out of Normandy and by necessity were required to use the
operational rations. Again, during the r3erman breakthrouqb
in the winter of 1944-1945, supplies and dally trains were
disrupted. The Third US Army arm "A" rations to meet 9C
peroent of its requirements at that time, but ths First
and Ninth W Armies, due to the disruption of the daily
train, were required to draw dweply into their reserve
stooks. These two armies subsisted, during the early stages,
exclusively on operational ratione. The large number of
prisoners captured aftm the armies crossed the Rhine cawed
another CritiCal shortage to exist. Operatlonnl rations were
lssued for initial use since oooklng equip" was not
available. After oookhg equipment was provided, the prisoaers
were rea according to tne prescri ed prisoner of
war menust This relieved the situation. B
dh Tine adoption of "balanced commodity loading"
ol ships et the New York port contributad more to feeding
of balanced rations than any other single faotor. This
eyetea of loading all components of the r*Artor IW ration,
in the oorrect proportion, in e. single ship ermitted the
entire load being assigned to any one depot,$
e. Due to the large numbee of unreported or inproperly
reported shortages or substitatlons ib 6ha rations
which ocmrrred at supply points and depots, the Chief
Quartermaster required a d'aily comprehensive report in
order that he bo kept informed and could Cake such cor-
reotive action as necessary.*
124. Over Issue?.
* a. Although the Quartermaster service made con-
tlnuous effort t o keep ratlon issues within authorized
allowances, there were several factors whioh contributed
to over issue:2
Division commanders wa-6 authrizod to
augment the rations for thoir troops
when in contact with the enemy.
Doops often consumed four operational
maals n day In lieu of three.
several categories of porsonnel, such
as prisoners of war, guides, interpreters,
drivers and hungy oivilians were often
fed by oombat troops. In many such
oases no rsports of the numbem fed were
made.
FooQ waste normally inoreased whon organ-
izations were on the move.
b. The number of rations 1ssuc.d divided by the
actual strength gives an index of over issue (Sac Appendix
11). The index of over issue by month in tho EL&opean
theater shows that the highest rate of over issue
ooourrea during periods of maximum operetj onal activity: 2

R-E-S-T-R-I-C 4-E-D
-rnaox Situat idn
June 1944 1.02 The greatest portion of the
troops were still in the United
Kingdom, and therefore subject
to control.
September 1944 1.32 The transfer of c great den1 of
Unlted Kingdom strength to the
continent plus the great opern-
fional activity of these months
raise% the over issue index to
its all time hi&.
February 1445 1.04 The comparatlve stability of the
fall and winter arc refleoted in
rapid drop in overissues from
its September peak.
April 194.5 1.20 The intense Botivity of the drive
into Germany is reflected by high
over issues.
SECTION 2
FIELD FORCES
L25. rnanization and Functions. The Arm Class T sections
norially operated 8s port of the Supsly DiVi8iOn,
Office of the .!amy Wartermaster. It was charged with the
technical supervision and coordination of Class I actiybties
within the army as directed by the Army Quartermastar. ,11
In the performance of its mission, the Class 1 section was
charged with the rollowing principal functiona:
a. Determine Class I requirements, and coordinate
tho proourmsnt, storage and distribution of Class I supplies
based upon the availability of transportation, levels
prescribed, and on the current milltery operational situa-
tian .l2
b. Recommend the distrlbution of Class I: supslies
within the 6rmy 08 to type and percentage of eroh type, thfl
source, the dally trsin shipments, and the resbrve stocks.
c Reoomond the location of railheeds, truckheads
and dumps.io
d. 9uperviss bakery production and cold storage
activit ie 8.12'
e, E!aintcln accurate reoords on consumption and
Class I supp1ies.10
f, Receive and consolidate unft ily telegrams
npd prepme and aubmlt the Army telegram. 1P
1-26. Operations.
a. Rations ware requested bV means or the daily
telegram sndljere shlppsd to nrmy supply points by the
dally train. The subordinate units normally submitted
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
their telegram to the issuing supply point b8 nowe in
ndVtInCe of drawin$.lOilb The supply point oonsolidnted
requests and Bubmittbd the total requirements to the .&my
Class I Section for tho preperotion of the army telsgran,.ll
b. Armlks normolly opernted ne main dump and e
iuinimum of one supply point per 00rpS.~3 mis was based
on the lwinOipl0 that a base rnilheed should be Sbt up to
handle 011 rations nnd to be responsible for providing
bolnnced rrtions in the forwcrd supply points. The ~OCEtion
of supply ooints was dictated by the tncttcnl ?&tun.tton
,nd availnbility of‘ trunsportation fnc€lities.
The primcry conaideration for the location of the roil-
herd or supply pofnt wos the neceesity for hLrd atLnding,
~t s6parPte entrance and exit, end a good roud net. The
selection and 1oc:tion of the army railhead was no& by
thc Army :ucrtermster. The selc=ctioi and recommendation
of thc locntion of tho edvence supply points wss normolly
loft to he Corps ?uartrrlrslstc7r nnd railhend officer con-
ctrnad
c, It w m found thst supply points could opcrr.te
nearer to the front lln s than was gznerolly Eilieved
possible or ndviscble.lz There %orenony times, howevcr,
when the tCCtiCRl situetion progreseed so rnpidly or the
transportation wn8 80 critiocil that the round-trip distance
between combat troops and army slipply points equalled 8s
muob RS 300 ailes. In such cnsus, odvunce aistributing
points, stocked with onerational rations only, were estoblishod
by Corps Quartermsters a8 ar a& 100 miles fopword
of the closest nrmy supply point.15
d, SupDly points we e normally oDfirated by -p.virtormaster
Railhead Comwnies.fl Quarterma&ter Bakery
companies supdied the- supply oints daily with the fresh
breed md coffee requireixeents.f3t1&
127. Issuss. Railhead oompanies were responsible for
making c o m and proper losuea, and for mintenonce of
accurate records pertaining therdto. Rations were issued
on tally-out forms, and codes or tally-outs, together with
corresponding ration rGturns, were submitted to the Army
nmrterlraster 6aoh day for record and comparison.l3 Rread
was noreally Issued with bulk rations on the basis of IC5
pounds pm 100 am, or as a aupplement to the operational
ration oti tha bosis of 30 pounds per 100 mea. Fresh OOffbe
w3s iss cd when ovoilable in lieu of canned or soluble
c0ffee,~4 The normal issue wGS baS6d upon eight pounds
pcr 100 ma. During cold wehther, end when there was a
short8ga of toe nnd cocoa, the isauo was raisod to 12
pound8 per 100 men.2 The regular oondiment issue was modo
in bulk at ten-day intervole. Ths issua vas ofton deluyed,
or missod entirely, duo to the rapid movemont of
troops, the opening nnd closing of supply goints, and the
ljmitcd tronsportntion rvoilnble to move the aupplies
foz”nGrd*l8
128. GrRanizatlon_,2 ~n attempt was made on the oon-
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R-E-$-T-R-I-c-T-E-D
tinent to develop a catering servioe which would train
oookke, bakers, mess sergeants and mess officere, pmtic-
ularlg in the preparation of new types of foods. This
plan did not progress very fa, though a need for such u
servico existed. In lieu of a catering service, K bakers
and cooks school and mess teems were csthbllshed. Each mess
team, compoaed of one officer, one dieticisn and eight enlisted
men (cocks, bakers and mess sergeants),went into the
field and rendered service to mang units desiring their
assistance in establishing messes. The mess teams were
avaiLab16 to hrmies, corps, divislcns and section commundere
on recuest, with priority t3 field forces. Frior
to D-Day, and whiie troops were in the Dnited Kingdom, model
messes were established by thc kugrtsrmristor Corps. Nuw
units were encouraged to visit trkse model establishonts
prior to opening mosses of their Own.
129. Functions and Operations of atlkers wd Cooks
Sohools &nd ?LESS Le=.
a. The Bakars and Jooks School, which originally
opened in Laland in Septlmber 1442, moved to Yranoe in
April 1945 whero it was mada a %uartermaster responsibi-
lity, and in September 1945 it rooved to a central location
in the erican ZoIie in Germany. The schools trained a
total of 6,163 stuaents in cooking and mess management,
who were drawn from all types of organizations and units
on the continent and In ingland.
b. In October 1944 six mess taws were set up
end trained, taking to the field after a 30-day course
of instruction in OOOking and mess mnagemcnt. The number
of teams wem doubled in JanuLry lgh5 and after VE-Day
increased to 23 mess t ms. These teams had, in general,
the following duties:l?
To assist an orgenleation comandcr in
supervision and operation of his mess.
To instruct and work with the mc1ss personnel
of an organization in their unit
kitchcns.
To cwsult with the mess officer on vha
glanning, superivision and inspection of
his ness.
'Po advise all mesa pcrsonnol rcgarding
the function of the several types of
ratione and most effective ways of utilizing
the typ IfAII and 'lBrt rations.
To assist all mess personnel on yroblams
of substitution and r;he necessity
for adherence to the nonthiy menu.
To instruct in the proper poparaclon
of dehydrated foods.
To acqcaint all mss peraorael with
recommendcd procedure for the efficient
care tlnd ojeraticn af standard field mQSS
equip".
130. DiBousSion. *
a. The moss team operation in the Luropcan

R -E-S-T -R-I -e -T-E-D
Theater was distinctly a success. In addition to their
normal function of instruction, mess teams took hold of
several major messing Jobs and carried them through to
success. Sone exonples are:
men supplying hot food to refnforceuonts
enroute by train became a problez, the
pilot models of the kitchen care were
designea and built by the ceasing organi-
zation, The troop train ffienu wes dcnonstrnted
in actual use by G ness team
which mde several troop train trips.
Mess tsoms did much of the pioneer work
in opening messas in the huge staging
ore23 in late Dscenber 1944, Januaryand
February 1945.
Xess tenns were called upon to solve
the almost inconceivable messing problems
encountered in receiving German
prisoners of war in temporary enclosures
with no equipment whutsoever.
After VE-Day eight teams were sent to
Germany to work with occupational force
organizatlons which hod heavy losees of
experienced Peas personnel as a result
of redeployment.
- suoaessful operation could have been improved
with more attontion devoted to straightening out
supply point operation as a part of the mess team function.
Ry the time they had worked a woak or ten days in en ares
R mess team commander should be able to form a sound
opinion as to the adouracy a4d completeness of the issues
of its supply point. The moss team commander's mission
could have been OXpmkd with benefit to inolude a bey
with the personnel of the supDly point. in oacharea covered,
amphesizing the importance of accurate issues and eapsc-
ielly instructing in the3ter issue polioy.
c. The establishment of a Catering Service along
the lines of. the Pritish Army system (See A.pDendix 15 ),
would certainly insure that n higher percentage of profossional
alvilian cooks entering the army would be directed
into messing work. Further, it would guarantee
thnt training effort would bc expended only on personnel
which would remnin in messing work. From the standpoint
gf COm"d, its implications would be that instead of
transfcrbing an unsatisfactory cook to guard duty, a
comndinig officer would request n replacsmant from the
Cntering Service pool and, upon his arrival, return the
unsatisfactory cook to the pool for retraining and renssignnont,
SECTION
CONCLUSIONS AND BECOIWNDA%IOWS
131. Conolusions.
a. The operoticg proaedure, procurecent and
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-P-D
issue of Class I supplies by tho Comunlcetlons Zona,
Xuropoan Theater, proved to be bnslcally sound end hi@y
practical in principle and in opsmtion.
b. Purchase of Silbsistancs Item in the
Unittd Kingdon, on the continent and from Indigenous sour-
CES relieved greater shipping facilities for other nssds
and gsve troops foods they otherwise could not hme hnd.
C. 'Yith the developat of the new typ packrglng
sod conning, many ran-days of labor ware saved end
loosca frol.i spoilage War6 reduced to B niniluum.
d. lless teams proved to be a help in organizatlons
fortunate enough to hove their services.
132. Poco~-mcndations.
n. Thnt packaging and conning rsthods be further
devolopsd.
b. That a Cctering Service be estcblished in
the subststenae Brflnch of the Offica of tho p:unrtarmnstsr
"anera1 and that it be developed along thc lines of tho
rritish systom.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliognaphy
Chepter 9
1. €,uartcrmaster Service Reference Datn Vol 11, Hecdquorters
Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations,
1 Jan 44.
2. US Arny Wubsistence Exppriences in the European
Thcatcr”, ‘Norld ’Nay TI, 1 Nov 45.
3. Ltr fr Hq TEFET, OTCQ!, dated 13 Deo 45, subj: WorL.ants
on quarternaster Supply Study, Chegter I1 - Opcrnting
Prooedurs, Procureaent and Issue”. *(7)
4. Technical Mahuol 43, Depot Operation Yanunl, Eq,
ETOUSA, O CW, Feb 45.
5. Interview with Col J. Eh Kenderdine, @IC, Chief of
Rtomge and Distribution Division, Office of Chiof
Quartermaster, Unitad ?totes Forces, Eurupean Theeter,
dated 3 NO 45. *(5)
6. Advance section Conmunicctions Zone Opernttonal History
of ?uartemaster (28 De0 43 to 28 Jun 45).
7. nuartermsater Operation Analysis (Study #3 Level of
Rupply), Hq Theater Service Forces, Iharopean Thiater,
Office of the Theeter Chief Quartermaster.
8. Annex **E@’ to European Theater of Operations, Standard
Operating Procedure No. 7, undated.
9. Quart~n”ater Operational Analysis, OCcl6 Study .P5,
1 NOV 45.
10. war Department Observers Report ,:‘930, 10 Ihy 45.
11. fitanding Operating Procedure, Qartarmaster Section,
Firtoenth US Army, dated 1 Sep 44.
12. war Department Cbsorvers Report f834, 15 Apr 45.
13. war Departnunt Observers Report 9773, 9 Apr 45.
14. War Department Observer6 Report ’058, 24 lbr 45.
15 Report of‘ 560th QJ’ Sdlhead Company, 17 @ct45.
16. V Arny Corps, After Actlon Report, 6 Jun 4L to 31 Dec 4k.
*(23)
17 * Quartermaster History within XIX Corps, 5 )fey 45.
18. Seventh Arlpi Quartermaster Information for G-4 Periodic
%port, for 7 Jan 45 and 7 Apr 45. *(6)
19 Continenta1,OperatFng Instruotlons, European Theater
of Operations, Office of tho Chief Quartermster,
19 Feb 45.
* Number in parentheses is Catalo Number used in Inventory
or Material, Study NO. 109, $Class I supply), file
R/401/11.
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SECTION 1
HEFRIGEWMON UNITS
L33. &artcrmastor Refrigeration Company (Bixod) T/O & E
10-217,
a. Organization and Mission, The company with an
aggregate of 142 enlisted men and five officers operated and
maintained Corps of Jhgineer refrigeration equipment and
civilian refrigerated storage p1ants.l It was organized into
three platoons: (1 headquarters platoon, a butchery pintoon
and a cold storage platoon with attached personnel Prom the
Veterinary Corps for mat inspection purposes.2 Under many
cordi ions it w;i8 not necessary to activate the butchery pln-
toon. P
b. Use. The capacity of the company was determined
by the particux situation, since the aveilable storage
ftlcilities governed the amount that it could handle. When
Engineer collapsible refrigeratton box s were used the comljany
served as mmy as 120,000 troops.! Under coilditions
dherein the company personnel acted in a supervieory capacity
and employed civilians end pri onera of war, approximtely
650,000 troops were oupgorted.3 This company wa~inot used
in the Combat Zone, but it did meet all expectations in
connection with the use of collaysible refrigeration boxes.3
c. lidointenanoe.' The Quartermaster responsi bilitg
in maintning refrigeration facilities was limited to the
repair of the refrigeration units coolim the mobile vans.
A11 oi' the reaainlng maintenance responsibilities were
divided among the other servicea. The responsibilities of
the Corps of Engiiaers, for example, inoluded:
(1) Repnir to existing cold storage nnd ice
facilities.
(2) Operation and mnfntenance of all statio
refrigeration plants.
In the European Theater of Operations Engineer personiel
were preoccupied with other activities which were basic in
advancing the war effort, hence their responsibilities were
aesumed by the using unit or other u,uartermc?ster agencies.
134. Quarteraaster Refrigeration Company (Mobile) T/O
& E 10-24.7,
n, Orgnhixntion and Mission. The Quurtekmster
1-frigeration Company (Uobile) was organized into three plntoons
of three sections eaoh. Each section and platoon was
capable of operating independently.5 The mission of the
company was to transport fresh meats and other perishables
from the advance depot or other point where fixed refrigeration
was provided to the division or army supply points.
When the turn around time between the loading point and the
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R-E 43-T-X-I-C -T-E-D
supply point was not longer than one day, one oompany was
considered oapa le of providing perishables to ah army of
nine divisione.9 To aocomplish this the oompany was equippd
xith 30 trucks, 4 to 5-t0n, tractors and 30 scmi-trailers, 10tw,
i: wncel, van-type, rbfrigeratfnR, on the bnsis of threa
per secticn end tne per pletoon ~~adquart~rs.5
b. 0 eration. The use of the Luartermaster Refrig-
eration hJUpani’efle) fell into three categories:
transportation of perishables, statio storage or a oonbination
of the two. rrhile the use as both static storage and
transportation of perishables was oonsidered the normal
employment, there were not always sufficient refrigerated
vans assigned to an army to permit this type of operations.
As a result, it was often necessary to transpurt the perish-
ables to a supply point and deposit the loads into any
available static storage or on the grouad, In such cases
the arrival of the refrigerated vans was tired for the late
afternoon of the day prior to isaue.8 dhen no cold storage
wa6 available at the supply point, the Fifteenth bS hrmy
adopted the system of hauling perishabies by cargo vehicles
from the fixed cold storage point to t e mobile rePrigera-
tion unit located at the supply point. 8
C. iide uac . The adequacy of this type company
Bepended i n v a r a the distance the vans were required to
move, rfhen fresh meat was dellvored to the area by Comnications
Zone facilities, the mobile company was generally
able to deliver the rations to the supply points. rghen the
companies went beyond tho army area to obtain the perishables,
it was frequently necessary to transfer supplies to ca go
trucks in the army mea for delivery to supply points.?
Additional vans oould have been utilized by each army.lo
d. Civilian Refrigeration Equf went, Wherever
possible, civilian eqapment was used to augment military
faoilities. The type operating wit available and the type
of personnel employed varied. In som lnstanoes operations
were conducted entirely by civilian personnel. Where facilities
were Bo located that a Quartermaster railhead or
truckhead could advantageously use them, huartermastor peraonnel
oparatej. then and employed prisoner of waz or civilian
Labor, if available, for augmentation. On other ocoaaions
personnel of tho i,uartermaster Refrlgeratfon Compang (Fixed)
were utilized, either for the co%plete operation of a civic -
lian installation or for the supervision of operations. Wintenan
e and repair became the responsibility of the using
unit.%
e, Discussion. Refrigeration facilities on the con-
tinent were not entirely satisractory. The lliobile refrig-
eration companies did an admirable job, but tho use of the
vane for static storage cannot be justified. The mohility
of the oompany must be utilized to the fullest extont by
hauling from static supply points to army supply points
delaying only for the maintenanoe of Yam. The orgsniza-
tion of the campany under Tables of Organization ahd Equipment
10-217 is entirely satisfactory. Such is not the case,
however, with the Refrigeration Company (Fixed), The bdtch-
ery platoon was dropped from the oom any. This left 45
mn in the company headquarters and men in a cold storage
platoon for the operation of a oold Storage plant. Suoh a
large plant failed ta materializa in northebn Lurope, but
many small plants wore locetod and utliized. It was necess-

R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
ary to break the fixed company into three or Pour detachments.
k more useful orgarxization in the Eiuropean Theater of OEerations
woula heve been 8. company of four officers with a head-
quarters of 15 to 20 men an8 three 32-man operating ~latoons.4
SECTION 2
BAKING AND COFFEE ROASTIPX
135. uartermster Bakery Company, Mobile (Spacial) Ti0
E io-ui'y.
a, Organization and The oonpany hus an
authorized strength of two officers and 82 enlisted mn and
consists of a company headquarters and one operating platoon.
The company headquarters supervised the operation and was
responsible for all administritive duties pertaining to the
company. Phe platoon, the basio oporating unit, was ooaposed
of a platoon headquarters and three sections. Its function
was to supply fresh bread and ooffda to troops in the Combat
Zone. The ocWee roasting section, tbe fourth section of
the oompany, consisted of six onlisted men with ooffoe roasting
equiwnt. This section was improvised aa part of
the Bakery Comgany in the European Theater of Operations
and the men taken from the headqUartErS seation.
b. 0 erations The speclal wartermaster Bakery
Company o p e r a t b i t i s h equipment, dl operating
equipment was trailer mounted. Wlth tko four prim movers,
four-ton cargo, to haul heavy equipment, and the eigh$
truoks, 24-tcn, oargo, to motorize the remaining equipment
and personnel, the company was completely mobile. ,hen in
operation the cargo veh.icles haule ingredients and the
finished product to supply points. f Having teohnioal equip-
ment which required the one platoon to operate QB 8 unit,
the oonpany lacked flexibility. It had to cea8e operations
completely when required to move, but when an army had
sufficient bakery oompanies to leap-frog one over the other,
this was not an objectional oharacteristic.1° Zorward
bakorias during the forward movement of an army augmented
the rear area bakeries, while the bakeries in tho mar moved
forward. This sytem required a min'rmun Of moving and reduced
the hours af production lost,iZ Normally, one bakery
compang WQS assigned to each supply point or two bakury
campanise to uachrailhead company in support of a corys.12
In one army, however, tho bakery oompanius were organized
into a bakery battalion una furnished b eed-and corfeo to
the supply points from a ocntral 1;oint.f3 ihis was th type
of operation mvisaged by lrarLopartment publications, 14
The coffee roasting and grinding equipment, trailer mounted,
Udlikb the bakery equipmnt, was of Umarioan manufacture,
When sufficient green ooFfeu. beans were availeblc fresh
cOfYee was furnished to t a SWB number of troops to whom
fresh bread was s~pyliad.~5
Ca acit me capacity of the oonpany dependod
on %hen w k *"each day it operatcd. The raoommended
production we8 based on two eight-hour shifts each
day, while the maxim production was based an three Light-
hour shifts each Say. The produotion per day was as
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
3mad C ompap 21,000 lbs. 30,000 lbs
Coffoe Company 3,200 lbs. 4,800 lbs
d. Kaintenanco. S_onre parts for three months maintciiancc
were furnished with the British oquipmcnt. In sddftion,
the companies wero bccked up with a tw6lve-months
were outhcrikod to perform first and second echelon mainten-
aace. Higher echelon maintenance repair was accomplished
by the Central Sclvege De ot or by field service tecms from
thr? Comunications. Zone.17
e. Liscussion, A lpurtermster Bnkery Gmpany
(T/O & E 10-1kmimericnn ovens and machinery, was originclly
intendcd for use in the European Thenter of Operations;
It was flexiblo but not mobile.18 It had twice the
nuniber of personnel as the special ooxpany and used 16 ovens
a8 corcpnrod with three ovens used by the special conpany.
The production capacity of tho two companies, however, dua
to the difference of equipmuat, was the 8ae. Upon arrival in
the buropLan Thsater of Op6rations eaoh Hmerican oquipped
company vms reorganized into two Bakery hmpanies (Mobile)
Spacial. None of the herican equipsea companies were used
wikh any of the Lirinies in the European Theeter of Opcrctions.’
Ong was usod in the Delta Base Section to furnish broad for
the redeployment center. The most valuable charaoteristic of
the special cGunrtermaster Bakery Company is its self-sufficiency
for transport. Possibly the most impressive fuatura of the
bakary Companies’ record on the coutinent wa8 an almost total
absence of major Froblens. The planning was evidently sound.
The imuu rate of roasted and ground coffae, however, wns
higher than planned. The normal lssus rate for two meals
daily is eight pounds par 100 ration^.^ During colt weather
it tvus necossnry to issue on the bcsis of 12 pounds per hundred
rbtions. This. load could not bo cnrrieil by the coffos
roasting equipnent , and oivilian roasting instullatioiis were
necessary to aaEist in meeting the demand.
SECTION 3
CJNRLRTERMASTER RAILHEAD COMPANY (T/O dc E 10-197)
136,Lisslon, The mlasion of the Quarteraaster Rflilhcad
Coinoony wumovi.de personnel to operat railheads,
truokheuds and navigation or beaohhea8s.4g Jt WELScharged
by thc War Department with the gjcoipt, issue and evccuation
or all quortermatcr suppliss. In the iuropean i’heater of
Operations, however, this unit W E normally confined to the
recoipt and distribution of Class 1 supplies.zO
137. Or anizatioo ‘The company is organiaed into a comlmny
heanqiA~~~~-;wo plRtOOnS, an aggregate .. b.*
of 173 enlisted men and Sour The platoon was
thb baeio operating unit and was nomnally divided into three
- 92 -

sections for convenience in staggering working hows and for
the purpo$$ of handling specific comodity classes of
supplies. Copananded by a lieutenant, tLe platoon has 74
enlisted men including one platoon sergeant, three seotion
leadsrs, three checkers and one storekeeper.21
138. Flexibilit , The organization of a railhead company
into platoons and se5tions gave the unit sufficient flexibility
tQestablish and Eaintain more than one distributing
point. .*hen movement was necessary one platoon continued
operation of the old supply point while the other platoon
opened a new supply point. This allowed tlie issue of the
reaaining supplies at the ola supply point while supplies WB~C
received and issued at the new location. The ttleap-frogfl
method of movement of Supply points was necessary in a fast
moving situation. 23
oui Sment. In addition to the normal organizational
egui;i%t f++~ he rai sad company was authorized sufficient
technical equipment to efficiently carry out its mission.
The pump, gasoline, dispensing, and the gasoline drums were
not used by the railhead company 88 the oombany did not
normally handle Class 111 s~p~lies.~ Material handling
equipment inoluded two hard trucks and two steel plates.
The steel plates were to be used as ramps between box cars
and warehouses. In the type of operateons encountered. in
the buropean Theater of OparationB the steel plates
not needed. Roller-type conveyors were a necessity.121&TeThe
office aachines consisted of tw3 typewriters and two coffiputing
machines, non-listing. It has been recommended that
the company be aUthOriZ6d two comguting machines, listing.
The listing typo machine is nee d in order to cheok the
accuracy of reports maintained. %&
140. Capacity. The railhead company, handling all
olassea of &arternaster supply, had a rated capacity of
70,000 men. The troop basis of the 12th Army oup was
one coqsny per 50,000 men for Class I supplies.y$ Normal
issues of a company were from 100,000 to 145,000 rations
daily, and under exoeptionai circumstances over one-quarter
of' a million rations a day were issued for short periods of
the, In the amy area it was found that one railhead
oompany handling Class I s pplies could support a f%yperl
corps of thrae divisions.28
141. Eb;;ity. The organic transportation of a Luarter-
master Hai lee bom2any is illsufficient evon for administrative
purposes, It was contemplated that addition 1
transportation wolrld. be mde availablo as required. 26) The
amount of transEortation necessary depended upon the type
of operations involvsq. For tho internal administration of
nt only a few additional trucks per platoon
~~~e"%%dfst However, in a fast moving situation whore the
supply point6 were located at great distances from the
army depots, additional transportation to the extent of et
least one Luarternaster Truck Company was normally made
available to ha railhead company before it could operate
si"ficicntly.~8 The lack of nobility is olearly indicated by
the fallowing coments from unit 4.uartcrnasters:
unite.. .,,Our ration trucks- took two days to mako- the trip
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R-E-3-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E -5-T-3-14-T-E -D
to aim$ truckheads and return to Class 1 breakdown aroatt.28
b. 4th &more8 Division: ,,Class I supply I.oints
during the dash to the Rhine werc at times newly 150 miles
behind our control point and approximately 200 dies behind
our forward elementslf.29
c. 83d Infantry Livision: ftnuring the drive to
the hlbe, Division wartermaster trucks oofitinue@ to haul
“Att rations from ”hen-Gladbach (P-0909) This involvcd
a distance of 20 milos extending to 1 0 mllcs, as the ,
division moved further into Germany”.%
142. O&arations, The railheaa coqmy normally issuud
rations to Lain$ unfts at tho suglly point. Oprations
were generally efficient and the organlzation adequate.
The platoon sergeant, or railheocl forem, su1;ervisad the
receipt, unloadiiig, issm and loading of tiiu su&pliea. The
chlof storokeeper in tlach rlatatn calculated the ,“roper
breakdown end was charged with the aocuraoy cf all reports
and inventories. Efficient checkers were essential as they
formed the contact between the comijany and the drflwing units
and were charged with making conplete and Lrober issues.
The laborers were utilizsdmin the loadiw, unloading and
wayehousing of supkllce. rhe tables of organizfltion and
equipment, however, do not krovide sufficient laborers for
all types of operations, and augmentation by cuartermaeter
Service Companies or prisoner of war labor was often neccessary.
It was at tises recomaended that the ratinga
of various olasscs of personnel, particularly storekeepers
and oheokere e made more commensurate with their reeponsi-
bilities .l9, ’22:
143. Liscussion. The function of the 6,uartermaster Railhead
Company in the-Iuroyean Theator of operations we8 the
rocoipt, storage and issue of Glass I supplies. It WRS wcll
suited for this funotionexcapt for tha laok of vehicles,
Thosv companies assigned to armios were ofton operating two
or moro supply points. Transportation avuilablc to this
company ima often insufficient for ir.ternal compenj adain-
istrotion. It is highly dosirable that tho officers selected
for warternaster Railhead Companies bt of superior ability.
Tho propr breakdown of rations, tho intelligaat substitution
of itoms, and a thorough broad-mindod knowlodRu of ourront
menu instructions rcquiro an ospocially wall-qunlifiud
offioer, The onlistud assistants in n roilhead coupmy must
also be well trainud. In the Luropeun Theater of Operations
thoy become speciallets as StGrekeeper.9, aheckors or clcrks.
144. COpClUSiDIlS.
a. artermster Refrigeration Units. The tech-
nical aquipmen?and personnel were sufficient to accoeplish
the designated mission. The transportation and distribution
of perishable item wes oarrled on with slight delays dependent
mostly upon the tactical situation.
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R-E-5-T-R-I 4-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D
b. QuarFmst;r BekeFy Cka&panies. The equipment
and personnel of t e kuar ermastsr erg-&@", Mobile
(T/O I E 10-147 S) aid not entirely prove adequate to accomplish
the deeignated mission.
(1) The Quarteraaster Xallhecd Corqany (T/O
and E of 10-597) in the European Theecter
of Operation8 did not handle all classes of
supbly, and it6 actual ca;racity for Class I
supbly escoeaed ita rated cazaclty.
(2) The prsonnei eniployed during oprations
developed into specialists in many instan-
OeS, and the responsibility and grado 0s
personnel wag not always comonsurate.
145. Reco"ondetionsI
a. Quarternaates Refri~eratiodUnits. That an
additional Quartermastdr Refrigeration Comyany, Mobile
(T/O & E 10-2lt7) be provided per army to allow for necosamy
statio storage and ppoper mobility.
b, ,Quartermaster Bakery CompanieB.
(1) That the bakery company be Organized into
two platoons in order to provide greater
flexibility, and that it be provided with
the British type equipmnt utilized by the
uartermster Bakery Oompang, Mobile,
9Spacial).
(2) That additional equipment be provided so
that the rated cascity of each platoon
will be raised to 20,000 pounds of bread
operatine on two eight-hour shifts.
(3) That one coffee grindirg and roasting section
be authorized per plhtoon with sufficient
mobile equipment tc furnish fresh ooffee
for the number of trtOp4 to whom fresh
bread is furnished.
0. Roilhead Compaqy (T/O & E 10-1971
(1) That the mission of the unit be limited to
the raosipt, storage and Issue of Glass 1
supplies with a rated oapacfty of handling
75,000 to 100,000 rations.
(2) That tho oompany be mde more mobile by the
authorization of sufficient PehiOlQS t o motorize
personnel and equipment.
(3) That tho equipment used to handle Class 111
supply be delsted from the Table OI Organization
and Equipment, end that labor-saving
and office machinery bs authoriacd,
(4) That one railhead forenan per platoon bo Buth-
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R-E-3-1'-R-I-C -T-E-D
orized to .supervise railhead opbrationo, and
that tho grade the checkers and atmekeepers
bo increased aorxensiwate with the responsibilities
or their jobs,
d, That pertinent dbatrines, techniques and Tables
of Orghrdzition and Bquiprdnt be amended by apFroGrihte agencies
(if the irar Department.

1. T/O & F: 10-217.
R-E-S-T-B-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliography
Chapter 10
2. I a temaster hervice Reference Data V01w.e 111 dtd 15 Dec 4:
l?d
3. Report, Office Chief Tlioater C,uarterr;lastor, subject: IV@artorraster
Refrigoration Cbrcpany (Fixed) T/O & E lO-2l7I1.
(Undat ea)
4. US Subsitence Exprience in burcgenn Theater of Operatids,
dtd 1 NOV 45.
5. 12th Army Grsup Study quartcrnlaste? Rafrigeratlon Ccmpany
(Mobile) T/O & E lO-ik7.
6, Tw 10-615, t~arternflster Ihndbook, Hefrigeratitn Company
(Mobile) T/O aC E 10-247.
7. T/O & E 10-247 dtd 25 Fob &.
8. Army Ground Ewces Regort Number 834. ‘(9)
9, hfter Aation,pE;yrt, headquarters Fifteenth US hrmy, Btd
31 Jul 45.
19. Ltr, Third US Army dtd 22 Sep 45, subject: tqIdeca cn Quartar
master Or~anizstionlt.. “(11)
11. T/O & E lO-l.47 S, Quartermaster Bakery Company, Mobile
(Special), dtd 2 Oct 43.
12. Amy Ground Forcos Xcgort Number 773 (First US ArmtF) dtd
9 Kpr 45, “(12)
13.
Arny Ground Forms Report Number 933 (Ninth US Army) dtd
10 m y ~ 5 . “(13)
14. FbI 10-10, paragraph 64, dtd 2 bkr 42. “(14)
15. 12th Army Grouy,, ‘He3crt m the kuarterinastcr Uakary 5ompany,
Mobile (Speoial) T/O &, E 10-147 3.
16. Ltr, lst US Arm Group, 1 Mar 44,.1st Ilia. garagraph a, file
AG 413 OPGD. ‘(15)
17. Office crr Chief ~$~artermtzster, T~oknio~l tilanual Numbor 1,
paragraph 21, dtd December 1944.
18. 12th Army Group, Pioel &ter*hction Report, paragraph 11,
Srrctiou In,paragraph il. (16)
19. Pwugraph 1, TM 10-379, raaxtcrLastor Handbook, Rnilhcad
Oomnyany, T/O & E: 10-197, dtd 4 N c ~439 ‘(17)
20.
i;;
Puragraph 8, Sectitn 111, paragraph II, 12th xrmg GrLup,
Final After Action Rqort, period 19 OOt 4j to 30 Apr 4&.
0 &E 10-197, ~uartermstcir Railhead Company, dial 17 Feb 45
21+
22 I gral,h 54, FM 10-10, (partermstcr Service in Theater
of Operations, dtd 1942.
- 97 -
R-E -S -T-R-T -C -‘P J3-n

23.
24
25.
26,
27
28
29.
30 *
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
12th xrmy Group, Field Sarvice and OprLtlons Report,
July 1945.
Report oP 560th b,uartermasser Railhead Cwnpny, dtd
17 Oot !+5. *(22)
Paragraph 17, TM 10-379, lLuartermaster hndbcok, Raill1et;e.d
Company, T/O & E 10497, dtd 4 Nov 63.
Bistory, 79th Infancry Lividon, dtd 7 Jun 45.
Operations of 4th Armored Division, dtd 12 Jua 45.
Quartermaster History, 8yd Infantry Division, priod
5 Apr to If; Oot 44,
* Number in parentheses is Gatalog Number used in Inventory
of Material, Q.4 Study No. 109, (Class I
Supply), file R 401/ll.
- 98 -
R-E-S-T-R-T -C-T-E-D

148. Ifission cnd 0r~nnniar..tbion.1 Tho chiof qumtcr-
mnetcr, Puropocn Thcctxr of Opcrctioiis, actod in n d.lc1
cnpncity n.8 tho Chief qunrtomnstor, EUropoc.n T!iclntor 01
Cporctions nnd r.3 n,u~.rtnrinc..stor, Communications Zono. If0
w?.a ch?rgod with tho ovorcll roaponslbility lo? the proouromont,
storr.go, distribution md issue of quutemc.stor
supplios to all troops in the Europonn Thw.'cor of OpoTatiOnS.
Tho rosponslbillty for Clnss.11 :ad nr suDnly we.s ploccd
with tho Supply, Proourorfiort , :md Storcac cnd Distribution
Divisions of tho Offico of the Chiof PLuauartonnnetcr. Th.e
Procurotxnt an& Storsgo Nsd Distribution Mvislons wrc
cojzcc"d vith c.11 cl::ssos of supply. ~ h oSupply Division
W'B concernod only with Glass TI and IV ana Post &cohang:Et
aupplies. It whs organized into the following fivd branches:
n, Salos Storo Branch.
b, Clothing cnd Equipment Rrcnoh.
c, Regnlnr Supplies Brmch,
a. Distribution Bmnoh.
0. Yost FLchnngo Eranch,
147, Functions.
7.. Tlic Supply Division, as a control cnd oncrating
c@ncy over Class I1 and TV md Post Exchmge sup$.ios, h.:d
tho follovhg funotione:
(1) lkde cstim.tos of roquirments.
(2) Propnrcd roquisitions uiL1ior on tbc United
3tP.tos or frorn'Brifisb SaurcuB.
(3) Studiod and rocom"od roplnoemcnt
foctors 03 Closs I1 ,md IT eupplios.
(4) l4r.lntninoa [i bnladeed stook of Clnss
I1 ma N suppli0dI
(5) R0Co"Gndcd to tho Storqp ane Dlstribu-
tion Division tho distribution of inconing
Clnss IT cn3. IV supljllos.
(6) Ryquisitionod salcs storu itms rrom tho
- 93 ..

n-&+'y-i(-I- C-T-3j-D
Unitcd States or by loccl procurmcnt.
(7) Arrmged for tho publicr.tion of Thoatsr
allownncos of Class I1 and IT sun llcs,
principclly for zxpendcblo items. E .
(8) Inmgurnted : systy of rationing for
3clos Rtoro itons.
d. Tho Procurement Division choc!tcd nl1 rcquisitions
on tho United States to determine which item could
bo procured locally, It orranged for t 3G local procuroiwnt
of' supplics nnd followed requisitions to insuuro production
r.nd dolivwy. It propnrcd cll~raports on atntns oT 8upplicr;s
procured in tho ?Jni!od ISngdon, and dctorminod vhat itvcI.5
of supply worc obtainnbla frcm 1oc~,1sources.
c. The storr.go ::nd Distribution Division furnishod
tcchniccl guiBrsca for the ogcratioii of depots,.
coorclinc-.tod tbc distribution of su2nlics to thc dqots,
l-lctcrmincd tho modo1 Btocks to be cnrriod, formul?.tad. plmS
for thc rccofpt, storngc i:nd issue of siiI)pliOs, and catcblishod
procedures for nll movanonts of suyplios pcrtc-ining
to tcsk forcc oporationu.
SXTION 2
DYTERIUNATTION OF EQ,UIXEMiNTS
143, Initic.1 ISSUC~ Troops nomlly crrivod in tho
ltwogonn ?hootor of Oporctions complctaly cquipped with prcsoribod
:?llc"os of clothing and oquipmcnt, wlth tho BXcoption
of cortnin items of ore;-!niz?.tioncl oquipmont . !:%en
now itoms ?.rrivcd on thi; continent rnd when units or roinlorcoments
?.rrl.vvod without prescribod itor!.is of clothing nI?d
oqulpfiant, it ms ncccssr.ry to stock items for initin1
issuo. Tho initinl issue factor wns oalculotcc! from tho
Rctu::l troo].l hnsis for tho firoponn Tlicatcr of OporotLonS
cad ma cxprcssed in r,u

R-E-S-T-B-T-C-T-I!-D
Thus il opt; mrckiccw, 7.vhich hpd on r.vcr::gc lcngth of lifo
of ono yorr, or nn cnnu4 roplaoomcnt of 100 !mooizt vhcn
dividcd by 12 montho givas ? foplpcomcjnt f7ctor of GI3
porccnt por month. Tho basic formula for tho dovolopmont
of tho roplnccmcnt foctor of ,-.n item wns r.s follows:
?umtitios issucd for rcgl-oumont
purposes durinR ono month - hlonthly pcrn,urntitios
in tho hinaa of troops - cuntzgc lnotor
c. The computation of tho formila prosantad ".-ip
difficulfios. 8bico it wcs imposgiblo to obt::in m ?.coilr-
?.to count of thc cxzct nwnbcr of an itun in tho b-adis of
troopB, tho number wns dorivod by multialying thc initi::l
issue fnctor by tho Europonn Thoctor of Oparations :lr-npcvror
figures. These mnnpowor figums wore not ?ccur?.to but tlic
mothod proved pcncr.-.lly sctisfcatory. In tho dotLrn:min?.tion
of tho nmber o l rcplccomunt issues mc.dci, tha .i;otal monthly
issuo or cn item hi:d to bo modifiod by catciu apglioublo
fF..ctors, suoh cs initicl issuos *inado, issuos to r.gL.nci;Y
othor thm Uiiitcd Rtctas Foims, and pur.ntitios raturnccl to
atook through snlvngc chnnnols. atill othor fcctors hild to
bc considorod in tho final derivation of tho ropl~ccomont
factor, r.nd tho fnctors ,?s mcthemntionlly dorivod wro
frequently nlterad, bascd on tho short supply of ?.n item
whioh failod to mct requiromcuts of tht: troops in tho flcld
and on the soceoncl. vnri?.tions which cnusod c. ch,m.jlAo in
roquiromdnts for itcms euch ns woolon unCGrwoar :ad wintcir
clothing.
d. Roplnccmcnt fnctors wcro ncvor oonsidLred
cmplotoly nccurnto p.nd. vrciro subJect to Coilstc.1it sti:dy end
chr.ne;c. They did, howovcr, rcprcscnt thz marago cnticipntod
roquirmnts over P. long puriod of tj.w c.nd scrmd
thoir purpose in the detcl-aj.nation of ovGr.-Cl raipc rc;cjui.romonts,
150. Tn.rifPs.lO A size tariff in n. ~chocluloor tr.blo
shoving thoavor?gc a,umtity 02 fllzes of m item rcc!uirod to
proporly lit P. givon numbor of men. ?ioim?.lly, %?.rifftr,bloa
oovm only thr, pcnulnr sizo8, or thoso nizos whichwill fit
tho myjority of individ.unls in tho nrmy. ,? supplcmLntnl
size tariff is ?. siinilnr tnb3.o but is coqfinod *to thc odd
nnd unpopular sizcls roqirirod for tflos~ ruon who omnot bo
fittod by the norrw.1 B~ZGtariff, Europoai "ho.?tcr of
Oporntions cxpcrienco indicntod that 93 F-rcsnt of thc tokT.1
roquiromonts worc) mot by thc; noiw.1 tnriff tnbls. Both
tsblos nro cordpntod and basod on records covciring lo.tlg
poriods of tinc, cnd wcro uoad in dotorlainin@; o;ao rquiromcnts
of clothing. Ccrtcin othw consiCcmtions, howw",
EuOh ct.8 tho sup-13-y diffioultium inVOlVCd in on oxccsaivo
numborpcf sizos .md tho possibility or f'cnsitility of coilbiniilg,
substituting, ond rcaucing tho numbor of sikos,
wero takon.intc nocount boforo tho siao rcqtilraacnts woro
dotormincd.
151. Stoolc L~velS.
a. Tho "hr Dopnrtmont proSCribOd i'rs thc initic.1
lovols of Class I1 and Tv supply in ljho Eurovonn Thc,-tcr
85 any minimum lmrol and 75 d::T mximum lovol of-,sui~l~,&
Tho 45-day dmiNuol love1 WtlS f,>Uldto bo iIi?,clBQLl?:~dU~to tho
difft(hilt1es and the factors involved in the di8tribktiw

(1. Tho ''r.-.r Dcg?rtn?c t cstnblishcd thrw yh7s-s of
SUrply POY. owraons thOP.%CTE:8
(1) .%utom?.ttFcoupply phcso, which coutinuod
uatil tnvontory oontrol ;?roco&vruswora
ostr.blisho2.
(2) Somi-nutom?tic su7nl.y pMeo, in nU.ch
cortcin sup?lics worG cutowtioally furnishod
bosd upon tho mrtoricl stntus
rcports, whilc othor suppliea were furnished
by thc ro6pomibJ.o ports of ewbnpkkction
br.sad tpon thar;tcr roquiromonts.
(3) The thjrd phr.66 pl?.coo thc overso~.o"amcnd
on r. full requisitioning bnsls, and
w.s ::uthorizdd only When lovole OP s?ipply
j.n tho thazter had boon StZbiliZGd cmd
control proceduros oatcblishud.
b. ?nu rutowtic supply phxw bo in thG Euro-
F'jm Ecrtcr of dLxxctlono .tn Jnnur,Zy lt)h2,Ecs unsctia-
T-otory to both t)lG MLW York port Of hbrrkction Ckld to the
chior q.mtcrmnstor. ~ u l luorrponsibility tor supply dit! not
lig xvitr tho 2uronitm 'Phoitor of Opxtions Co"ndor; 110
dii? lict h?vc CCnnplGtO hnowlodgo at all tims ns to the
stotua of incoming, supplios; rmi tho spoolnl roquirmonto
- 102 -
R-E-3 -T-R-I-C-T-X -D

R-E-S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D
dotorminod nnd directed by him, in addition to the nofor
bringing SuPPlies to tho propor lcvcls, forccd
syst m of roquisitldnlng rcgcrdlcss of uxistlng j.nstruo-
ti0ns.Z Tho cutmatic Supply phcsa wcs diacontinuGa in
OotobCr 1942 when the Chiof %mrtzmnstcr submittud. c qunrttcrly
.rcqii.LsitiOn bas& on tho somi-automatic phcso, which
oontinucd until P-Prfl 1945 when tho hroponn Thoc.tur of
Ogerntions entered the lust phnso of supply.
153, Rcnuisitlonin&: Puriodsaa Tho Chief Quortomasfmcxporimded
with monthly, aur-rtcrly , and semi-annual rqulsitions,
The nionthly system or rwuisitioning rcauirod
that n aomplctc reviow of the atoclc 1wel.a bc ma0 2.5 icr.st
once ovcry thirty dciys, nnd Insured r, Tositivo nsthod for
dGtooting orrorc tmd stock dcficicncicjs. It clso :lj.minc,ted
the necessity for a lcrge numbcr of intoritn roouisitions.
T ~ Camrtorly requisitlonlna proccduro , utilizinK ou.td.?tcd
inventories, forc-d thL ?uartcsmrstcr to suljxit numbroue
LntiorW rcquisitions to COTrCot doficioacies. Howcvor, the
stntic oonditlons that Gxlstcd prior to Ihfoh 1944 showcd
n quartarlg rovicw of itcms w.s sntisfnctmy.2 A rcquisition
Par n poriod longcr thnn a ouartcr of n :'car could
bo utilizcd only for supplios consued nt Q specific rate
roRnrdloss of tho situation nnd wm thorcfore not Iccsibltt
for the grcatcr portion of ~,ucrtc.rsk?.stcr Suplios nn9. equipmant.
Tho pl'inoipal aclvmtagi; gainod frou thc. @.uarierly
and scni-annual period mya,4 that it furnished the nauartor-
mcstor Canornl with a projocted foroonst of roquircmnts that
wm incorporr,tad into tho loiip, rmge procurmont ?lc\nning
program. The montiily period of requisitioning was found to
be tho nost sntisfnotory an6 feesibla when sunplics wore consued
at an unovon rate nncl tho stoclc position was not sccure?
- so3 -

R-E-S-T-R-I -C-T-E-D
porta of entry for tho smpplios, xid tho mp.smcmJnt
long tons to bo dollvuroa to orloh port, woro oom;?utcd End
notGd on ocoh rcquisition.
SECTION 4
CONTROL -i!TD DISTRIBUTION
155. Dlstrlbutlm Dirooti~ca.~
a. Distribution dirootivoci wcro prcpcred in thc
OffLco of tho Chiof qu?.rtommjtor, directing si-dzmcnt of
supplies cs indiontcd, cnii wcro bosod On stock lcvcls in the
vnrioua dopots and on tho roquirmonts sf the fiald forces
ns indlcatod in dnily toleerma, roquisitions, or in cjstimntes
of tho nituxtion. Tho diroctivcs wcro forw:.xdcd
directly to thc sbipplng depot8 through 'thc r.i>yopric?to
sootion"l,u~.r;rtcmr,stora, Copics wro fumishod to thd cor-eignoee,
nnd to thu c.pppmgribtc seotion ~,ur.rtGm.st~~s.
b. Tho iSsuiw3 dapot, b?so dopot cmpmy, or 0th-r
fi,u?rtcrm?etor i dt 0onoornc;d took thc nnccssnry acticr. to
prcpnre cnd. shi!, tho supplius 2s ccllcd for, m B cxtrcctod
unnw.llnblo itcms to tho Office of the Thcxtur Chiuf Wzrtormator
for dotormiuntion of nvailcbillty fmmot:lor s3uro~s.
Distribution Alroctivos wero roturnod d?.Sl?r by the issuing
depots to tho Chiof ?unqtcrmstor giving n ompkte roport
ne to tho nction tnkon fiurinR tho procodininr. 24 hours. rubsoquent
shipments wro roportua on other ooploe of tho
dlroctivoa furnlshcd for thct pwjmso.
156. Controlled ItmmsQ Itcma mre 6.csign:natod ns controlled
dthar hoc-uso tTq wor& in short rmn~ly,suit.ible
only for rastrlotod uso, non-st"Ird, or in cxporhicntnl
stagos OP aovolopwnt. Supply of oontrollcd itcas vms
dologcted to bnsc motion nunrtom?stora ir; 'Gho forn of
orodits, basod on csth-tos of' oontrollod iton roqui.rmcnts.
subittad by tho scction ~unrtum.atcr9.
. 104 -
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-F-E-D

159. Rcoocrlcnd:.ti~~ns,
R-24-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
?,.Th?t is lutwo oporntions, t:io cutmtic .
su?;ply ?hr.so qf supply opcrr,tions, if cnd :vhen utiliEcd,
bo nodiiiod to Rivo the Thc.?tcr Co=.slr!ndcr p,m.rti?.l ocntrol
?.nil cmploto informtion .?.s to tho str.tus of inilmdng
supplics. .In ovorse?6 thwtcr nust bo supplicd by ncns of
?raquuisition; cmplotc -.ntcm..tic supply shsuld not bo uOi1imd.
b. m.?.t during opcrctinns -. nonthly roquisition-
ing pcrlod bo used, but nftcr ccssctim of hositilitios c
gucrtcrly ronuisltioning poriod bo uuod.
c. Th-t ?, cantrnl cponcy bo dosign.?tc;d to conpllo
~.rai!mr.:ntcin r.ccur-.to .-ad curront mniowor figuros in r.
Thcr,tor of Opcr~.tionsin ordor to nolo cfficiunt1.y dotamlno
rcguircricnt a .
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
LO.
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R-E-S-T-R-I -C -P-I-D

-CBAPTER 12
CLAM I1 ANC fV OPERATIONS. FIELD FORCES
SECTION 1
GUARTERNIASTER, ARMY GROUT
160,Misslon. The mission of the &my Group was prlnarily
t a m The Quartermaster was mainly ooncernsd
with the overall planning and establl.shment of gclloies relating
to Quartermaster supply and with the neoeasory super-
vision to insure t at the plane and policies were followed
and carried There was nc Class I1 and IV section
as such in either army graup. The Supply Division, Quarter-
master Seqtion, in the 12th Army Grou , and the Quuartermas-
ter Sub-section, G-4. Section, in the 8th Army Group, performed
suoh Class I1 and IV functions as were ne~esssry.~,3
161. Tunctions.3 The Army Group Quartermaster kept hlmself
lnformea at all times on the status of Class XI and IV
supply. Pis principal functions wore:
a. To maintain olose contact with the Army Quar-
termasters and with the Quwtermastars of Comunlchtions
Zone and Advance Seotion, Communications Zone.
b. To prescribe or make reoommondotiona for thc
levels of supply to be maintained by the verious armies.
c. To insurs the proper maintenance of these pre-
soribed levels.
d. To make recommendations on the establishment
of priorities for issue of critical items and on the allaoation
of tonnage to the various armies.
e, To allocate c'yartermaster units to the Army
Quartermaster as required in the performance of his supply
mlssione.
f. To plan and estimate Quartarmests~ Glass I1
and 3 7 operational requirements.
g. To supervise the distribution of Quartermaster
suppliss,
The Quartermaster of the 12th Army Group exeroised control
over a wider scope of activities and responsibilities than
did the Quartermaster of the 6th Army Group, due mainly to
the difference between their organizations and to the wider
scope of the 12th Army Group itself. Their principal miadone
and functions were, however, relatively tha same. In
Class I1 end IV supply they were not eperational, but acted
in a OQOrdinating and .supervisory capacity only.
SECTION 2
CUSS If AND TV SECTION, QUARTERwL4STER SUPPLY, ARMY

B-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-E -D
162. Mission ad. Ornanization.4 The Quartermaster
Class X I cnd IV Sootion operated as B part of the APNY
Q.uuorter5aster Supply Division under the direct suparvision
of the Arffiy Quartermaatcr. It was charged with the overall
supply of ClriSs I1 and IV itcans to all troops under Amy
control. It had no Trcscribed tF.blG of orgclnization but
nornnlly consisted of two officers and eight enlisted r,en.
In the performnce of its supply functions, the section was
cherged with the following responsibilities:
a. Preparation of‘ 011Clcss 11 rJnd IV plans, repons
end corresgonhmca,
b. Maintenmce of authorized stook levels.
c. Preparation of estimtes for Closs If and IV
requircrentv.
d. Requisitioning of ars y requireffi6nts.
e. Qesponsible for the efficient operation of
t6c mry Class I1 and IV Depots.
f. Control snd nllocation of itens in oritioal
short supply.
g. Liaison with the Cormunioctions Ione, Advanoe
’;cotion, Communications Zono, Ar~vGroup, and subordinate
units of tho army on all Class I1 and IVmttcrs.
h. Control of Qunrtermstcr sales store operntions.
163, Methods of Operation.
o. In generul., it was the reEp0ndbility of the
Cormonding General, Comaitmicotions Zone, to push supplies
forward to the army by whntuvcr means of transportation vms
c,vailnbfe, based upon requirements DB estimated Dr raquisitiorGd
by the armies. Suppliea were stooked in srw depots,
maintained et proscribed levels and issued to using units
upan requisition. The Cless IT and IV Section wis responsible
Por mointsining P currant Class I1 and IV plnn to
ineot chrnging sltustions and for eoourately ostiL!fiting roquirsmuts
to fill the needs of using units.
b. During the initial stagw of the continentnl
operotion, all supplies were brought to the benches under
cofitrol of the pirat US Amy, Class I1 and IV supplios
were ahipned to the continant in beaoh mlntennnce Ond
bench follow-up sets, the composition snd planning of which
had been coordinotad by the Chid Q,uuartsrsastbr, Eur0pW.n
Theater of Oocrations, ond the ‘prtermcster, Firet US Army.
mhc suapliss were controlled Pnd issued by the Writernester,
First trr~Amy, until tho latter pert of July 19b4
whcn the Advance 9ectlon, Com,unicrtions Zone, arrived
tinct assumed control,-l T ~ EThird TIS Arriy prepared pre-scheduled
requisitions for supplies to be shipped to the continent,
broken down by days in t2CCOrdQnCe with t O m X E
allocat~ons.5 In Southern bonae, the Seventh US Arrq mintnined
control of beach supply operations until D plus 24,
when the Continentea Base Section of ComrwnioatJ.oas Zona
assumed control.6
164. Feauisitionina Prooadure. 7-
~ i . During bho early stnges of the continontnl

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
campaign, the ardGS JWq,UeSted ClQSS I1 and IV Supplies by
requisition. In September 19b4 the policy was chaoged,
Requlraments were included on the dally telegram, with no
formal requisition required. Some confusion resulted due
to the arrival of supplies in the army area without edvsnco
notice and in quantities which could not be checked against
the dally requests. Also some shipments were duplloated
due to failure of units to remove items from &€ly telegrcns
after the intiRl request. 7
b. In December 1944, due to the unsatisfaotory
results obtained, Class I1 and IV supplies were deieted from
the daily telegram. Requlsitions were submitted instead to
the Quartermaster, Advance Section, Communications Zorlo, for
roquireme nt s coverinE a t en-day period.
o, Early in 19C5 other changes were instltuted.
The nalntenance of the backlog record of items not available
was discontinued. Requisitions were submitted every 20 day8
ror requirements computed on a jo-aay basis. This assured
the .?rmy Quartermaster of et least a 10-day etook level Rt
all times. To sFn,plify and coordinate supply, a conference
was kald eaoh requisitioning period. Those attending inoluaeil
the 4rmy Class If and IV officer, supply offioers of
Csnmunications Zone depots and representatives of the Chief
Quartermster, European Theater ot Operations.
165. Stock Levels and Allocations,
a. The 12th ArmxvGroup authorized a 30-day level
of 01 8s I1 and IV suppliss for tho armies under ita control.8
The 6th Array Group authorized a 15-day level.9
Those levels were never constant due to the short supply
of m y items and to the necessity for increasing or deoroasing
the mount of stock on hand as the tactioal situation
progressed from statio to mobile and baok to statio.
b. Class I1 and IV supplies received a low pri-
ority on shippinp and Zronsportetion. This caused many items
to fell short of requiredlents, and the lack of supply dtaoipline
ariong all troops resulted in further shortages.
The Army Groupe, therefore, instituted the orocedure of’
allocating criticfll and controlled Items to the armies, based
on the missions and needs of en0h.l The srn5es in turn
aoptrblled issues to the u s i ~troops,
c. When transportation was short a system of control
by ~llocattngtonncge was introduced. This restriction
requirsd the .2p4 :uarternaster to submit his requirements
by tonnage, listinq the ftems bv class requJ.red, Due to
the low priority gtten to Claas’II and IV rqply and its
resultant low toonage allocation, n further shortage of’ this
class of supply developed.
8. In Cictober 19L4 the Seventh US Pxmy foresaw
the need for winter clothing and raised tho priority of Class
I1 and TV supply to e level equal to that of Class I and 111.11
In December 1944 the heavy combat losses s1.istained by the
Uni$ed States forcea, w3th the resultoh% urgent need to reequip
the units, caused a first priority to be given to
Class I1 and IV supp y. The neaessary shipmsnts were acoomplished
in ten days. 3

SECTION 3
WXRATIOM OF AFW CUSS I1 AND ZV DE-3
166. Mission. The &my Class I1 and IV depot, operated
by the Quartermaster depot oonipany, supply, under the direc-
tion and teohnical supervision of the army Class I1 and IV
Zfioer,L2 wns ohsrged with the responsibility of carrying
model stocks of supplies for a oertain nmber of troops for
a eiven period of tine; to supply, Either directly or through
distributing points, all troops assigned to tke depot for
supply; and to receive, store and iesue additional BUppliW
over and above model stock levels in order to fully utilize
all storage foclllties.l3 The normal delivery of Class I1
and IV supplies to the using units was elads at the Army
Class II and IV depot. Under unusual cjrcumstances, delivery
was ma e to units if transportation faoilities were
a~nllable.~4 During one phase of th6 Third US Army‘s operations,
sub-depots were cstsblished for the pmpose of receiving,
consolidating and forwarding to the main depot
unit requisitions for supplies. The supplieo were trucked
to the sub-dopots and issucd to the units at those points.
167. Location of the Depot.
a. The looation of Class II and IV depots p e
oented Q problem throughout the continental cmpaign. 5-
Factors considered in selecting a proper sitc included:l3
(1) Type of terrain, drainage and accassi-
bility.
(2) Sufficient amount of open find closed
storage,
(3) TransportRtion f’acilities, rail Rnd road.
(4) Security (dispersion and camouflage).
(5) Layout plans, to include aisles ond roudways.
b. Even should a Rite be found to meet a ll theae
conditions, it was still unsatisfactory IS tt was not withln
easy reach of the using units. The denot oompmy is not
mobile without the attmhnent of addit?onal trucks, and tho
low priority given to Class JI and IV eupplles Eade the move-
ment of the depot difficult under the best of ciroumstances.
During August and 98pteRber 19k.4, the round-trip distance
between the combat troogs and the %raydepots amounted to FIS
mucb as 360 uiles, and even then 50 perocnt of tbe unit trucks
dispatc d to the depots were wasted beoause of lnodeciuate
stockB,p3 In April 19C5, many arm depots were completely
out of reach of the units that hed crossed the Bine. The
units were utilizing their own avalluble transportation for
Class I, IT1 and B supplies and round trips to the depots
were as much as 500 miles.lb Bridge faoilities were also
lnedequste at this time. On 31 March 1945 the Quartermaster,
Beventh US Army, decided to move the army depot, starting
with the immediate novement by truck of certain critical
items. Transportation shortago, however, necessitated the
use of slower rcil facilltles and the move was not completed
until May, by which the the troops had mcved so far abeag
thnt even at Its new location the depot was out of reach.
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R-E-5-T-R-I- C-T-E -D

168. Depot Procedure.
R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
a. A strict systei? of stock control within the
aopot was essential in order to insure that Etocks were kept
r;t the propr levels to met the unit requirenents.17
sunplies received w~rc?ronptly tallied in, inoluding the
co:gl,etc description and quantity of QrCh iten receivctd.
~lisywere storod and ssgregoted by class. Particuloi. ntten-
tion wos given t o critical itom to arevent cny loss through
negligence cy inprows storcge.13 S!>ot-ohsck team wira used
in soix c:?ses to insure ci'rb nnd ncotness In tallying cutgoing
end inco.ning suppligs, and to rectify errors made in
notm~cloturonnd figures. 'f' .4 syste.1: of records, which reflcjcted
mounts on hmd, mounts due $n,nnd mounts ue out,
were ktpt ct nost deqots and included the fo1lowing:lq
Stock record cords.
Eaok-order cuds for sneciol iterrs only.
Faxima lad minimn levels to be naintained.
Daily renort of chAnge on master chart
for forwarding to the headquarters supply
ssction.
Credit register of contrclled item which
had been released to the units.
Reports of shortages subaitted to headquarters
supply section.
Stock recard adjustment chart.
b, Stock record cards were normally mnintained
in c mnner as explsinrd by Q Fifteenth Amur Depot Commanaer:le
"Stock record oards are filed by class nlphsbeti-
cally within each clajs. All crndlt vouchers are ooneolldated
on D daily mster voucher, which is a printed for&
listj~iqall items in the snmc order as they pre filed in
tho stock record cabintts. The business dcy runs from 0700
to 0700, Wunntitlea urs posted to the master voucher 8s
raquis'itiona 8rc3 fillcd. At the end of the business dag
totals ere txtended for eech iten and only the total is
postGd to tk stock rscord oord. This oDeratior. reduces
the nur;ber of 7crsonnal posting stock records, as the cards
ark posted only OnOe B day and the OOSthg to tho cards is
dc4a in a consocutlve manner. Stcck record cards never
fall behind issues by mre than twenty-four (24) hours.
The mmtcr vouchar is Given the voucher number of the last
credit voucher posted to it for reference purpose. This
sa.m fora is used to pr6pi.m the ten (10)day stock status
rcyorts and physic01 inventory reportsi1.
0. Physical inventories varied within each army,
but at laast one inventory per nonth was Mndatory, The
Qxwlx"ster of the Ninth ?EArmy prescribed that a permnent
inventory Section be established acpot aotivitios
roquired and thnt each tteu be physically Inventoried every
two wesks.13
169. Processing of Requisitions.
a. Each army required tlmt raquisitions be pro-
?brly propcred and oertifie?, and consolidated by the high-
- 110 -
B-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-Z-D
er headquarters of the rec,uisitioning unit. Requisitions
were edited at the aepot for the purpose of asoertaining
their correotness and that the items requested were authorize&.
The quantities of items were not questioned w-less
they appeared excessive, but they were reduced as depot
stocks required. The procedure fop submitting requisitions
and drawing supplies varied among the armies, No depot
schedules were established during the early mosths of operations
in the European Theater of Operations with the result
that when a stalemate was reached the depots were flooded
with requisitions.l6 In January 1945 the Third TTB Army
established 8 drawing schedule for its units, and other
armies adopted similar neaswes.5 Tho Ninth U3 Army required
thet requisitions be submitted 211 hours in advsnce
of drawing.19 Requisitions for controlled items were submitted
to the Army Quartermaster for approval, and requewts
for equipment in excess of authorized allowance and for
Class IV supplies were submitted through oommand channeln.
In the First US Army all requisitions of divisions required
the approval of the Army cuartermester, whereas smaller
units were allowed to draw direct. Normally, however, depots
were authorized to approve and process all rcquisitions
for equipment within authorized allowanoes. All otliar
requisitions required tho Dpproval of the Arm 9,uartermaster
or his representativee.
b. The variations in depot prooedures among the
armies often proved a handicap to the combat units. The
neoesstty for obtaininp the approval of the Army Quartermaster,
who was normally located at some distahce from the
depot caused n considerable delay. The Quartermaster of
the 35th Infantry Division stated:2* Yfn one Army, supplies
could be drawn daily, or as needed; in another, one
day each week was designated, In one arw the requisition
was submitted to the issuing depot and honored at that
point, while in another army it was.necessary to submit
the requisition to the Army Quartermaster for approval 48
hours prior to drawing time. This plan caused a delay in
replaoemant --It.
170. Conclusions.
STCTION lt
CONGLUSIONt3 AND FSCOMNBXDATIONS
a. That throughout operations in the European
Theater of Operations the taatl.ca1 situation normally dlo-
tatad a low priority for Class I1 and IV supply. This
priority, combined with the shortage of transportation,
was normally too low to permit efficlezt operation and to
insure ad6,qUato supply to the units when required. On those
oooasione when the taotical situation permitted or required
B higher Class XI and IV priority, the efficiency and speed
of supnly increased in propartion,
b. That different methods, procedures and sohedulas
rogarding requisitiuning and drawing of supplies
adopted by tho various srmies caused additiohal delay and
oonf'usion among the combat troops.
0. That the inclusson by axmy of Class TI and IV
. 111 -
9-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-1 -c -T-E+D
supplies on the daily telegraIn wae unsatisfactory, aRd
that the 20-day requisitioning period system, as finally
developed, proved effective.
d. That depot procedure, including recorcls and
stock control measures, WBS as efficient as could be expected
under the existing olroumstanoes.
171. Reoommendations.
a. That appropriate agencies of the !Per Department
give further study to the fsasibllity of prescribing
a standard procedure of army depot operatlona in regard to
methods, policies end ,scheduling of units. That the procedure
be so devised as to keep transportntlon, Qersonnel,
movement, delay, and confusion to a minimum, and that it
be published as a guide to mniy Cuartermstors.
b. That the mathod prescribed by the War Deportment
of calling forward Class I1 and IV supplies by the
armies by means of requisition be further developed to indude
the 20-day requisitioning period as outlined herain.
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Bibliography
Chaoter 12
1. 12th hay Group Quartermaster "Final After Action Report".
2. 6th krw Group G-4, trOffice Menorandm No. 13, -Standing
Operating Procedure", dated 1 brch 1945.
3. First DS Arw Group huartermaster, "Standing Operating
?rocedurel~, 6 June lY45.
4. Seventh US Army kuartermastor section Wperations".
5.
Third US &my, tLBi?ter Action Report1'.
6. Severith US himy Qmrtermustzr ftRocord of Events".
7. 12th Army Group b&artermaxter "Memorandum for Recorcl",
dated lY September 1944.
8. Chcnge 2, 24 IWVeLnbCr 1944 to Eioadquartera 12th Army Group
rlBtailding Operatine l'rooedurei', 18 October 1944.
9. Headquarters 6th wmy Group, "hdministrntive Instructions
x'o 519, dated 20 Kovember 1944.
10. Letter, Seventh Army ,u&rteraastor to Bsech Group Quartermaster,
subject: "Report of Inspeotio!Ilr, 26 nugust 1914.
11. Seventh I3 amy 0,uartermaater YPoimqe Bid for reriod
8-15 October 191+411.
12. Piftuenth US wmy Quarternaster Wlass II and IV After
Action Report", 31 July 1945.
13
Xinth US ~cqyuLi.artermster tistandard Operation procedures
KO. 7, Glass I1 and IV Suppiyft, 7 December 1944.
First US umy %tanding Operating Procedure for the
Quirtermas ter Depot w.
15- 30th Infantry DiviRion ''Kfter hetioil Report".
16. XZX Corps, I1,9ter Hction Reportfr.
3.7. %ai- Uepai-trrinl; Obsarvers tmwy Ground Forces Report No,
323, W-4 Yopic List", 9 January 1945.
18. War Degartnent Cbeervors Arnty Ground Forcos Report No.
923, *vQuUnrteruastzr Depot Company, Supply", 10 May 1945.
19. Ninth US Army, "Administrative lnstruotions No. 2",
4 January 1945.
20. 35th Infantry Civision, flute2 kction Reportit.

172. Mission. The Quartermaster depot oompany, 'supply,
is the amnative and teohnlcal udt for operating a
Quartermaster supply depot other than motor transport and
remount. It handles any partioular class of kuarter-
meter supply 68 required ty the oiroumstanoes. Is aperate8
as a unit in either the Cmunicaticns Zone or in the
combat zone. It is designed to operate as an indapondent
unit in oharge of H 3mtlll branoh dmot OP uncle: the control
of a headquarters tind headquarters hcm_naby, -uLuortermaster
base depot, fcr sub-depot operations at a .mjor huartermasmr
brhnch depct. It can operate as separate plat0 ns,
eaoh ElatOCn operating n soptlrhte kwt'tcmaster depot. P
173 a Organization.
a. The company is composed of E: company head-
quarters which perPcrm the noma1 administrative, aess,
and supply funotions for the company, and three operating
platoons. Each of the three platoons is orgenized into
two Sections: a depot headquarters section, coralsting of'
one offioer and 17 erJ1sted mea; and a storage section,
consisting of one officer and 33 enlisted men. The dopot
hoodquarters scotion furnishes the personnel required to
handle the clerioai work of the depot and mailitain the
depot utilities. ,he Storage seotion f~imish6speraonnel
for the receipt, storage, warehousing and issue of supplies.
Normally, the oolrpany is orgunized alont oonmoditp lines,
with eaoh platoon essigned to e partioular olaos or grouping
of eupp~ies.2
b. The tsblo of orgwization and equipment
out;horized orly tko niniu.m 6mo.ut of personnel, trarsportation,
and major i'cox3 of QgUigmc!lt, Thb o;cjOr itEll!S Of
office equipsent, including 7cnyting and duplicating
mchines, tyFWriCEr3, En? a 3CU yiind cepacity platform
scale, are nor,r=:ljr nv!:'icienk for dapot opere.tions, lke
company is no: r~;M.;e: c1.Q rid58 3ot have sufficient labor
0rganios.llg tc hanc.ir ~1.1thc de3ot sup lies. With its
normal caga-ity 'io sii?;,ly en2 mairitain f;10,000 moa under combet
cocdS:iona, t!.b atfschment of one t uck oompany and two
service companies is ncrmal1.v rc;uired. T
SECTION 2
EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN Q W R OF OPERA5?IONs
174.Communications Zone.
a, The advanae planning for the troop basis Of
depot supply companies in %uartermssteroperations on the
The need
continent raised several divergencies of opinion.
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R-E-S-T-R-I 4-T-E-D
for dispersion and the looations of the troops had to be
Considered a5 well 88 the rtted capacity of the company.
The actual requirments Were estimated higher than the the-
oretical r&te Tor the si26 O f the forces involved end it
was decided that 37 companies would be recuired t; reoeive
atore, and issue BartermaBter supplies for all general ani
guartarmster branch depots.
b. The company was normally utilized either by
assignment to u headqrlurters and headquarters ccmpeny, Luartermster
base depot, for sub-depot operations at a major
~uextermaster branch depot, or by placing the compmy in
ohfirge of an independent Uuartermastor depot, Cortrul m s
exercised by the Wartermaster, Communications Zone, either
direct, or through the advance, intermediate, or base sections
to which the companies were cssigncd. In operating Communionticns
Zone depots tho compunies ha dled Class 1, I1 and IO
eupplius for as many cs ~OO,OOOmen.E
175. Combat Zone.
a. Bn allocation of depot supplg ooixpenies to the
several amies, based on the rcted capacity of the om@ny,
would huvo given each army nn average of fivo companies. Instead,
6CCh army wa8 assigned two compcnles. That number
proved sufficient.
b. Employment of the comyaies varied to some extent
within the ardes, although in generel the methods of
employment missions, and functions were the some throughout.
The company was the bnse fur supply operetiom of the r.rrj
kuartcrmestc!r Service. It was used for the operation of the
oimy Class 11 and IV depots, and in some ca8es for the cperction
of Class 1 depots or dump$. Normclly, the aompany
operated as a unit, but there were ocoasions when it was
ntrcessnry to util.Lze individual platoons es separate operating
units. hlthough Lhe dopat supply conpay was lloFmelly
nssigncd to a &uai-tcrmustsr croup under army cofitrcl, th8
standing oporstrng procedures of the various crmies placed
the responsibility lor the efficient oparation of Glass I1
an8 TV depots on the &my Qunrtttrmcster Class I1 and IB
offioer. The kutk,-t.tclrra?ster goup cr bhttalion to which tbe
COI, cony WLS ossigrwd creroised ndm'nistrative control cnly.
Army rutaineci opori,tional control. 3 The company, operating
as e unit and handling only Lllcss 11 and Iv supplies, supplied
betweon 1.50,W0and 200,000 men. The kuartermaater
of the 12th lsmy Group rclcommendad that tho Capacity of tho
oompany for 0loc.s II and IV sup-dy be standerdized at
150,000 troGps.b
c. Th,: Firat CS m y normally operated one
Cluss 11 and 1~depot., utilizing o m depof, snpply CGmpUy
with ono or two sorvlco compnnics for labor. The second
dopot company opcrr ted Cluss I &I ots with two to four
scrvioo oompunida cttuohed for labor.? mira US &my
employed ir;s two ccmFonios for 31cLss11 and IV supply, each
operating n depot with one or two sorvlce companies attached.
During cns phose of tho operetions, however, the two oompanics
combincd to operate one d rct, but established subdepots
Et Cl~ssI suppiy points.[. The Seventh US Army
opsrcted only one Ulass I1 and. IV depot, with one service
company attnched.9 The Ninth US Army operated one Cless
11 mind IT depot, utilizing one ooffipny rrfth .me or t7m
service companies attucheci. When a second dopot oompany
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R-E-S-T-3-14 -T-E-D
was assigned, it w ~ semployed in operating n Class I atorngc
supply point, normally with three service cilmpanies ottnched.1°
The Nfteenth US Army employed OCE coqcny in the nporction
of twc Class I1 and IV ciepots,. with one servico ocmpnny ottachtld
to onch depot for lnbvr.
d. The toble of crgcinizetion pr;vidcs for the
attachment of one truck conipmiy to th6 uopot supply cnmp::ny
for operht1uns;but due to the low priority givon to Clnss I1
end IV supplies, the ormies were inclinsd ta allccstc all
cvailcble transpcrtution fcr tho mctvcment of troop cnd
other more vital chases of supply. Nbrmally, truck companics
were nct attached to depots, and difficulty waa experieiiced
by EL lack of transpoPtation when it became necessary to move
the depct. The b,uartermaster, Third US amy, statea: f t O ~
Class I1 situaticn would have been solved during the drive
across France and into Germany if the depot su2ply coaywnies
had been provided with trucks as a part of their regular
equipment, The inclusion c;f l+8 trucks in each nf the
above units will ffect a great improven!ent in Guarter-
master supply."
176 Me uac of Personnel and E ui ent. The organization
AFC&* c~mpaiiiwas ade~hat~Cti enable it -
to perform its mission.. DUQ to large scale supply
operations in Comxmications Zone, the activities of the
company when employed in the Communioaticns Zcnc were frequently
limited. In the ac.mbat zone its functlcjns were
diversified and many, The internal organization of the .
oompany was freqliently changed to meet existing cunditions,
but the most frequent and lasting ohange ms the assign-
ment of paokers as checkers, due to the heavy demand in
that line of work. A transportation section waa OlSO
organized in a Fifteenth kr depot t G mintain all records
on mail and truck shipments% l'hroughout the European
Theater of Operations it was found that depot personnel arrived
on the coritinent with insufficient trainin$ and there
was llttle time for training after arrival, Outstanding
deefioienoies inoluded lack of trained personnel to handle
the txansporbation problems and the problem of handling
peraonal affeots and baggee.13 The company had no organic
materials handlick equipment, but the Comflunications Zone
maintained a sufi'ioient stock in a certral bass depot from
which the armies ilrew their requiremeots.lb
SECTION 2.
COWCLUSIONS AND RfXCD!&EIQATIONS
177. COnClUSiOnB.
a. That the organization of the depot oompany,
supply, 'is adequate end flexible.
b, That the company was normally employed in
the Buropaan Theater or Operations tc handle Class I and
Class I1 and IV supplies.
c. That the cmpany has insufficient transportation
crganicaUy for normal routine recuiremnts in conneo-
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R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

tion with depot operationa.
178. Reoommendatlona,
R-E-8-T-R-I-C -3-E-D-
a. That the Quartermaster Bepot Company, mgp>y,
be rodeeignated w."noster depot supply cuapany.
b. That the rated capacity for handling Class I1
an& IV supplies be placed at l50,OOO troops.
c. That aciditional transportation be assigned
the company orgaLicaL2.y to eneble it to do normal dally
routine haullng in connection with depot operations.
a, That pertinent dootrines, techniques and Tables
of Organization and Erruipment be amende6 by appiropriatr
agencles'of the War Department.
- A17 -
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R-E-S-2-R-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliography
Ch&pter 13
1. lield l&inual 10-10, Quartermaster Service in Theater of
Oparatioss, 2 Xar 42.
2. Technical hCanutl1 10-230, Depot Company, Supply, 24 July 43.
3. Table of Orgerdzation and Equipment 10-227, 6 Sap 43. *(5)
4.
5.
Comnioatione Zone kuartermaster Report on 'lQuarterm3ster
Depot Sompany, Supj?lg".
Fifteenth US unw Quartermaster Wlass I1 and IV -4ftor
Action Report", 31 July 1945.
6. 12th army Group 4$mrtermaster 93"nul After Action Rcportll.
7. First Army ,ieekly &uartermoster Operntiona Report to 12th
Army Group.
6. Third Army Wpieklg &uarterm.stfx! Operatione Report to 12th
Army Group. (8)
9. War Department Observers Eoard Report 1 No. 834, 14 April
1945.
10. Ninth US Ariry kuartcrnaster Operations ReEcirt to 12th
Aru;y Oroul,, (undated). *(9)
11. Letter, Third US &PI Quartermster to the Theatsr Quartermaster,
22 Sspt 1945, subject:%ome Ideas on Quartermaster
orgsnizctione." *(IO)
12. War Dejwtizbnt Observers Arrry Ground Forces Report No.
923, "Qunrtornaater Dept Cci?pl;ny, Surply", 10 ~ @y1945)s(6)
13 M~coto PlYccenth US krroy Class II RC IV Officers, dated
15 August 19L5, subject: VuIzmnts on Training of DcGot
SuisLly Company.lf *(7)
14 - Letter, Ikadquartors Corurunichtions Zone, 16 March 1945,
subject:,tAllocntions end Requisition Procedure for
Materials Hcndling Equipent .
* Ktmblber in parentheses Ls Cotclog limber wed in
Inventory of Material, Study No. 103, (Class I1
& ly supply), file R 4o$E.
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R-E-S-T-8-I-C -T-E-D
CHAPTER 14
BEACH MAIFTENANCE SEFS AND BEACH FOLLOW-UP SETS
SECTION 1
CHARACTJ5?ISTT.CS AND USE
179. Bas1s.l In February 194k the Chief ~uartermest6r,
Eurogeon TTZXer of Operations, in planning for D-D~Y,
made arrangements with the Quartermaster, First iJnited
States Army, for the shipment to the continent of Class
I1 and IV supplies In sets which were to be amphibiously
paoked. The plan called for the shipment of the initial
supplies in sets that were to be skid-loaded, while the
follow-up supplies would be shipped in composite sets.
The inaintenmce during the early stages of tEo operation
was to consist of Quartermaster items essential to combet
and were to be gradually increassd in variety and quan-
tity as the operation progressed and the requirenents for
additional items arose. The plan was approved end placed
into operation.
180. Rescription and Composition.1
e. Skid-loading may be defined as a method of
loading in which the supplies are cratsd and mountad on
skids or runners, similar to thQse of e. sled, which enables
the load to be dragged or pulled over sandy terrain
with conrporative eese. The skids keep the supplies off
the ground, thereby ellmlnntin~ the possibility of dwge
from ground water.
b. Beaoh maintenance sets were composed of
selected quantities of sPsentiel Class II and IV supplies
loaded on akids, each set normally containing 23 skids,
These supplies were sesembled, loaded and shipped as a
cmposlta unit. Each set contalnad 75,000 man-days of
supply which we8 sogregstod, insofar a8 possible, like
oommodltles by skids. The londs were inaintalned on the
skids by tle utilization of open cratss built onto the
sklds. The supplies were safeguarded aqainst the elements
by tarpaulins over tho crates for additional protection.
?he beach mintenanoe set was therefore n composlte grouping
or essential supplies, loaded for fast movement and
segregated by commodities to fficilitote issue or Storage.
c. Foll.ow-up maintenance sets were similar to
ths beach maintenance sets, but were composed of a muoh
wlder selection of items. They were not skid-loaded, but
eaoh set contalned 450,000 man-days of supply.
181. Preparetion of Sets,
8, Approximately 61 beaoh maintenance sets were
assembled et five different depots in the United Kingdom
for delivery to the continent. The follow-up maintenance
sets were also asseinbled in the sbme depots. Supplies
were packed and shipped in oase lots if the difference
between the case lots and the amounts require&were less
than 10 percent either way.
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R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D
b. A typical skid contained the following items:
W.Pkgs. WEIGHT (lbs)
Trousers,wool,OD 420 7 850
Undorshirts,wool 400 4 325
Wspenders,bslt 140 2 160
Bag,canva$,field 50 1 103
Batter ies ,hand,
electric 180 2 3 50
Candles 450 1 75
special and _parfichutist clothing was included in every
fifth set. Pturses clothing was pecked on every 20th set,
and blank forms were on a single skid included in every
fifth set.
e. Skids were preFared for ond constructed under
the following specifications:
Average net wai.&t of skids 1,838.0 pounds
Cubags per skid
146.1 cubic feet
Wet weight per set 31,943.0 poun&
ship tons per set 84.0 ship tons
These skids were top-hcevy cnd were difficult to handle;
they should be designed so as to give o more balanced lo%d.2
d. Several problems were encountered in the assembling
and shipping of them sets, ana in view of the ahor-
toga of time, immediate steps had to be taken to insure
that the deadlines were met. The major problems inoluded:
The design, construction, loading Cnd
marking of the skids and crates; snd
assembly of the required sets.
Sagregstion of skids by set in the dspots.
Inspection of all ohases of the program.
Short supply of certain items.
Late arrival in the Unitsd Kingdom of
a few key itens from the United States.
Establishment of Driorities between the
skid loading program end the normal requirements
of supplies for other purposes.
Last minute rsquests from the Quartor-
master, Plrst US Army, for the inclusion
of naw or additional itoms in the sfits,
Throe depots were deslgnctsd to complete the construotiun
of all skid crates and tc deliver them to the loading
depots. qualified officcrs from the office of the Chid
Quartermaster were dispatched to the depots to aid, sup-
ervise an& coordinate the manufacturing, landing and assenbling
of the sets in the order of their out-loading sched-
ule. Oritiaal item were trucked fro& ports to depots
and from depot to depot to complete the sets in the order
of thoir calling up for shipment. Coordination WEB cffeotea
bstwesn divi ~On8 the Office of th6 Chief Qyartermaster
to establfsh pr or ties among the supplies.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
SECTION 2
OPEPATJON
182. Amphibious Packin . In addition to and simultaneouely
with the constru%lon of skid loads, preparations
were made for the amphibious pocking of Classes I, 11 and
Lv euppli6s for the period D plus 1b thmugh D plua 60.
Inspection of the facilities for off-loading and the storage
conditions on the continent immediately subsequent
to D-Day reeulted in the dealsion to amphibiously pack fll1
nuartermster supplies for t h e w through D plus 60,
placing a heavy additional burden on the Quartermaster personnel
and iacilities. Peaking and crating eohools had,
however, already been established, pnckiw and crating
supplies ware svailable, and 8 method of repsiri&q damaged
or unserviceable containers agreed upon and plflced in
effect. The containers were so constructed that they would
be able to withstand over-the-beooh-handling, momentary
Immersion, and at least 90 days of expoaed open storage
without breakage or damage to the contents.
183. Phasing of Maintenance Sets. The planned phasing
of the sets a8 desired by the Quartermaster, First US
Army, and the shipments e.s actually made coincided very
closely. Extremely rough weather in the early stages
of the operation resulted fn a delay in the shipping of
some of the seta as originally scheduled. Subsequent
shipments, however, rectlfiea this lag and the sets were
completely shipped by tha end of eaob period as plamed
for particular type of sets. The planned shipping sched-
ule for the beach maintenance ae s and the follow-up
maintenance sets was as follows..P
Beach Eainteance Sets.
E% No. of Sets I& No. of Sets
D plus 4
0 plus 5
D plus b
D plus 7
D plus 8
D plus 9
2
3
5
5
6
D plus 10
D plus 11
D plus 12
D plus 13
D plus 14
6
! 7
8
Follow-up Maintenanoe Seta.
Ex Na. of Sets m yo. of Sets
n plus 15
D plus 16
D plua 17
D QlU9 18
D plus 19
D plus 20
1
2
2
2
2
2
n plus 21
D plus 22
D plus 23
through D
plus 4.1
2
0
1 each day
184. Qesults,
a. The utilization of the maintenance sets for
shipping supplies across the beaohes was a oomplete succesa.
The contents were carefully selected by the Quartermaster,
First US Army, and the Chief Quartermester. The sets were
brought to the beaohes under the control of the Firat US
Arny lramedlately following the assaults. Issues wzre made
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
to the troops without fo$vial requisition or depot procedures,
Remining atooks eventually collected and proces6ed
into depots where they were augmented by the bulk shipments
that followed.3
b. In a report on the operation, the Commanding
General, First TJS Army, stated:&
"It has been previously stated, for the first
ten days the 9,uarteraaster Class I1 & IV sup- I
plies which arrived on the continent were in
the form of Beeoh Maintenance Bets. The possession
of these sets WRB quite adequate to
this end. No requisitions for any item contained
in these sets were turned away; on the
other hand, 00 lsr e surpluses accumulated
at any time, The ftems which they oontsined
were esRential rother than ornaments1 and the
factors were accurate. Considering the conservdtion
of aupnlies and tonnage which was
ePfeotaa by the use of these ssts, it is
considered that the& design was one of the
fhighllxhtsf of the entire operation".
c. The difficulties encountered through the declsion
to amphibiously pack all supplies for the period
through plus 90 were overcame by htilizing the faoilitiea
of all aepots in the C'nlted Kingdom on this work. Supplies
were aistributed among de-pots as required. Personnel of
depots not familiar with mphibioue packing were given
speoiel instruotions in wp.torproofing supplles. Close
liaison was maintainea throughout. The mission we5 acoomplishad,
with only s am11 amount of tonnage shipped to
tho oontinect without being amDhibioiisly paoked.
SECTION 3
COPTCUJSIONS AM) RECOMfENDATIONS
185, Conclusions .
a, That the use of beach maintennnae sets nn4
follow-uD maintenance sets in the aly stages of lending
operations on the continent and the amnhibious paolting of
all sunplies proved of definite value.
b. That no aaprecioble qunntities of supplies
hed to be shipped over to mqplement the sets.
186, Feoammendntions,
a. That beach mainteaohco and besoh folloW-up
sets be utilize& in tho early stages 2f Suture amphibious
operqtions.

R-E-S-T-2-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliography
Chapter 12c
1. Topic No. 37, Headquarters, Theater Service Forcea,
European Theater, Office of the Chief ?uartermaster,
subjeot: "Supply Planning for Continental Operntionsn.
(Inrormal Study for General Board Use.) *(20)
2, Fq TsFET, OTCQf, Ltr, subject: tfCommentsof Q!4 8Upply
studyvt, dsted 13 December 1945. *(27)
3. 12th Army Group Quartermeeter "Final After Actiou
neport", *( 21)
4. ?eport on Operations, First US Army, Annex 12-14,
Section 111, l,The Operations",
*Nunher in pcreptheses is Catalog Number used in
Inventory Of Matbl'ial, 91 Study NG. 109, (UlaSS
I1 & N Supply), file R &OI./ll.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

187. Allmances. The iqltial allowances of individual
and OrganiZational alothlng and equipent, as presoribed by
the War Department, are contained In appopkate tables of
organization and equipment, tables of basic allowanaes, and
table of equipment number 21.l The Canananding General, aro
ean Theater or OperatLons, authorized and published from
tine to time speoial aliowances, in addition to those presorib-
ed by the Uar Departmept, for troops in the European Theater
of Operations. Requests for additional Items, or for items
in excees of authorized allowanoes, were eubmitted through
oommand oharmeLs to the Colrmaa&inLGeneral, Communications
zone, for approval prior to issue.2
quacy of Allowanoes, The allowances a6 pesorib-
Department and as modiried in the i3uropean Theater
of 0 erations were generally adequate, .There was a need
for specfa1 it- required by speoial types of personnel suoh
as armored, airborne, and tank destroyer, and in addition, a
definite need for winter clothing. mny items of olothing and
equipment were in critical‘short supply at various thes due
to low priority. enemy aotion or to Laok of supply disaipline,
Some item were ooneietently in short supply, whioh indloated
either that the initial tqllowanoe wa8 too low or that produo-
tion or rei?eh facilities were inadequete. The most outstan&
ing oi these items were:3
Outfits, aookiq, one burner
Outfits, oookim& two burner
Outfits, aooking, 20-man
Field “34
Heater, water, immersion tyye
lkieess equipment, all tirpes
Tentage
Certaic items of combat aZothinG
“anter QlOthiq
Medessinc: equigment was often in short supply beaause bring
oambat operatione ults Were frequently split up into smaller
detaohments OP oombat groups. Organimtional allowances were
not adequate to permit the iesuanoe of this tne of equipment
to them detachments, Thia wa8 esgeoially notable among Mllitary
Polioe an8 similar unite whioh operated in small groups.4
Speoial and non-tariff sizes of olothing ~nbfootwear were ot’ten
dirrlault to cbtain in army areaa, althou there were eufi&-
oient stoaks oa the oontlnent. Units were u l t ~ t d author- l ~ ~
ized t o draw sgeoial and non-tarfif size olothisg ahd footwear
for storage in unit supply for issue as required.
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R-E-S-T-3-I-C-T-E-D
189. Classes of Clothing and Equipment.5 Clothi- and
equipment W88 classified in the European Theater of Operations
in tie order of serviceability into four categories as fallws:
a. Class A olothink and ec,uipment included all Iiew
items and thos- were sliEhtly used but not substantially
aistinguishable frm new.
b. Class B Included that which, althoueh not new or
Glass A, still-ed combat serviceabiiity.
0. Class C incluaed tb.& which could be made combat
servioeable by-ation and repair.
d. Class X included that which was usable but did
not kVe combamceability for extended field use, Clcthin&
aud equipment was segregated and issued by classes in
order t o Obtain the maximum use of supplies on hand.
190. Maintenanoe.3
a. It was the responsibility of each soldier to
maintain, bg normal care, the clothin& antl ekuipment issued to
him. Susply discipline extended through all echelons and
proper oare and miatenanoe was a command responsibility.
QUartenn"aQr laundry and repair units while not always easily
accessible to ombat troops, were avaiiable and provided
aleaningj and repair service.
b. Three salvage repair oompanies were normally
provided for eaoh army. They proved adequate for the repair
of shoes, although they did not meet expectations in the repair
of other types of Quartermaster ecpiptlent, Shoes were
tagged with the individual's name, rank, serial number and
organization to insure return to the original mer. Repair
of tentage and webbinE was abeguate, but laok of spare parts
and proper facilities seriously hlndered the proper mintenanoe
of items suoh as Inmereion type heaters, tYpwriters,
mea8 equipment, and on6 and two burner StOVeS.
191. Substitution and Elimination.
a. In order to increase production and ausply of
Quuflrtemstar item which proved more satlsfaatory ana essential
than the othcrs, a study was madu to eliminate as many
of tho lees satisfactory and non-cssantial items as gosslble.
Items considered for elinination wera those whioh, although
eliminated, would produce the least detriment to the success
of future opera ions. They were divided into the following
two categories: t
(1) !Phose itens wliioh would be non-essential
from a tochnical viewpoint.
(2) oarmanly used items which recorda revealed
to be in slight or decreased demandr
b. The matter of eliminating non-essential items
was of extreme importance to the owbat foross, It was appareat
to Suprome Headquarters, European Theatsr of Operations,
that oqntinued production and supply from the United States
of all items being used in the European Theater was bpractioablo,
and that in order to provide suffioient quantities of
__ . .
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R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
the moat needed itdms the eliminatiou of non-essential itas
waa necessary. The British Arm, for example, adopted tho basic
fundamental prlnci3ltrs of qimplicity and uniformity at
the beginning of thtr war. Consccuontly the British uniform
for all components of tho mmy, which consistd basioally of
only 11 itoms, remained unohanged throughout five and onchali
yeors of combat.
C. As a result of a study diructed by Supreme Huadquarters,
Eurogean Theater of Operatione, thu 6th and 12th
Army Groups mado tht; followinL recommbndations:
-Item 6th Arms Groug _I_ 12th Army Groq
Clothing, Bakera & Cooks Elhlnato Zliainato
Casa, Canvas Dispatch Eliminate Eliminate
Chinawaro Procurable locally No oolnment
Enamulwarer Procurablo looally No c mnt
Stove, cookini 2 burner Eliminate Retain
Dubbing, 4 oz c@n Is~ue2 oa can only Issuc 2 oz
oan only
Tent, Pyramidal Subatituto, Tent Retain
squad
Tent, Wall, mall Substitute, Tent Retaip
squad
Tent, Kitohen, Flyproof Substitute, Tent Retain
Squad
d. Surve;s were conducted throqhout the field
forces to furthor determine bossiblc sources of blinlnation
or substitution. The survey6 indicated the following:
(1) Poncho was desirable a8 6n issw item.7
(2) Lekgings were uneatisfflctorj. and disliked.
(3) Overcoat was often
(4) Combat boot with tk revarst! leathar aoaked
up water and was 00113.7
(5) Rainaoats were unaatiafeotory duo to lack
of uniformity in sizes and maturiale.9
(6) The cushion sola sock was in ereat denam3
since it was warm and conlfortablc and the
new type did not shrink vfhhun vrciehed.7
(7) Leather palmed glove did not last. Thc
glove shell, leethor with insert was fer
more satisfactory and recommbnded as a mb--
StitUtQ-7
(8) Pile jackat waa popular,
outer garments were not
resistant and water repellent.
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R-E -5-T-€3-I-C-T-E-D
e. A board of officers convened at Headquarters
Army Ground Forces, ',cshington, D.C., in August 1941, t o Stiicly
the equipmnt of the post war army. T is board considered
the fumy rsquirements in all theatera.50 Its Tindings were
benerhlljr similar t o those in th8 European Theater. The
bosrd reconiiended that outer clothing he developed which
would provide an adequate uniforn; for dres8, combat and rat-
igce, This uniform wt1s to conslst of a meximum of general
purpose farulents for issue to the greatest number af troops
possible. The board racomended further that researoh con-
tinue to iil.prove the type, quality snd characteristics of
clothing anu equipment,
,mCTION 2
WINTER CLOTHING~~
192.Problem Involved. During the three yeor period in
Europzan Theater of Operations efforts were cansjstently made
to dovelop a winter combat uniforrr, suitable for 6ll troops under
the clFmaLio conditions prevailing. Different types of uniforms,
incluaing 70 different basic items, vvere issued. The
suggly and aistribution problem was almost insurmountable.
dul,b3.y W ~ Ynot adequfite, and conbat troops were not aaequately
clothed for winter. The Jarmanding kneral, European Theater
of Operations, therefore called a conference on 29 Jsnuary 1945,
for the purpose of eliminating unsatisfactory items and de-
tarminine, upon a single winter combat uniforo. suitable for ell
oomponents. Representatives of the Jhief kuarterirmter, the
12th Army Group, the 6th amy Group, the ;uarterniaster Air
oerviae Gomano, the War Produotion Board, end other trgenoies
were preser.t at both Lhe initial conference and at the final
conference Iield in March 1945. The vErious items of uniforru
were discussed snd studied in detail, and ths final recomen-
dations adopted by the conferenoe are a3 followe:
a. Jaokets. Of the six different tyies of jackets
issued durin;s c hater of 19b!+-l+5, only two vwre reclomenbed
to be retained:
(1) Jacket, field wool - 1 per individual.
(2) Jacket, combst winter, with hood - 1 per
individual.
It was reccn.n*ended that the combat jaoket be modified to include
breast pockets, and that the outer fabric be Kade of'
tough, wind resistant an8 water repellent material.
b. Yrousers. Of the seven types OT trousers issued,
only two were reco;LLen8ed to be retained:
(1) Trousers, vool 18 oz - 2 par individual.
(2) Trousers, oonbat winter - 1 per individual.
It whs rocom;endea that the combat trouser be made tougher,
more kin6 resistnnt an6 water repellent, and thht it be ~r,od.ified
to include oargo pookets.
c. Underwear and Shirts- That woolen underwear
Elsd flannel sdrts were considered generally satisfactory.
It wan recouienaed, however, that all $bee garments be
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-'T-9-T-R-I -C -T-X-D
treated for shrinkage rssistanoe and that the wool content OT
the underwear be increased to a ininimm of 50 yercent. In
order to reduoe the problem of Suuply it was also i-ecm"mnded
Cat underwear be sized only as small, medium and laree.
d. Boad ear. That the cap, field, cotton, with
visor, be i'eta& all others be eliminated.
e. Gloves. That the alove, wool, leather palm,
%meunsatisfacFyTor use in the European Theater of OperatLons,
md that the mitten, trigcer finpar with insert, was
suitable far o~lya smll percentage of troops. It was therefore
recomended to eliminate all but t'ne rollowing three items:
owing:
(1) Glove, shell, leather - 1 per individual
(2) Glove, insert, wool - 2 per individual
(3) Glove, leather, henvy - 2 per truck driver
or individual performini;
'manual labor.
f. Footwear. Tht Footwear be limited to the foll-
(1) Roots, service combat
(ivoaified)
- 1 per individual
(2) Shoapaos or overshoes - 1 per individual
( 3) soclrs, wool, C~~.S~~.Oll - 3 per individual
sole.
(4)
Socks, wool, heavy or - 3 per individual
Y~001,Ski.
x, Overcoats aild-Raincoats. That a soldier in COR-
bat, clothad arrecucKiende3, woi.ilC! nit require an overcoat,
but would require Iro'cectinn from rain. Troops on furlougi,
and those eiiEaged on sentry duty or in sedentary activities,
rrould require adklitioual warmth. It was therefore recomendod
that, such issues be iwstricted to one nylon poncho an2 one
trcnohcoat per indiriidual.
h; Bwoater.. It was unanirnously agraad to retain
the sweatcr, hi& neck, and to issuo !t on the basj.3 of 0110
per individual.
i, Miscellaneous, That raiucel.laneous itom 3uch a8
trousur suspcnaors aiid-EZTlers be eliminated but that tho
sleepinR bag and two v?ool blankets per individual he Tetaincd.
193. Rasults. Tho adoption of. elm rucoinuended wintor uaiform
would provide a sultable uniform for troops in the
Rurqean and. otbcr theaters with aiiilller elimtiD conditions,
It would sirqlio su'gply and distribution, eliminate 21 itenis
currently issued, reduce tho nuber of roquired sizes by 59,
and re:ucz. thc nuuber of basic fabrics fra! ton to four. By
tho a8ditfon of a nacktio and a wool garrison cap, it could be
converted to a non-combat uniform which would measure up to a
high standard 02 military uppearanco. For spocinl opcratlons
01- tinusual conditions thc unlform mi@ roquiro additions, but
no ohangos, For ejrmple, snow caniouflago could bo quickly proridod
13jr tbc addition of trousers, parkas and mittens, over whit6.
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194. Conclusions.
R-E-94-R-I-C -T-E-D
SECTION 3
COXCLUSIONS AND REcOMbW3ATIONS
a. That the clothing and equipment, and allowances
were generally satisfactory, but there were too
many items to insure proper supply and distribution.
b. That there is 8 definite need for a basic
uniform and for continued research and development to
develop better and more adaptable clothing and equipment.
195. Recommendations.
a, That aUaSi0 combat, dress and fatigue uniform
be adopted for all components of the Army. The combat
uniform to consist of the followine:
Steel helmet, liner and cap, field,
cotton.
Combat aliirt and trousers (one light
wool oombinafioa and a heavier wool
fabric for cold weather. Same standard
color for both).
Combat boot s.
Underwear and socks of a high wool content
for winter; ootton for summer.
Muffler and highneck Sweater..
Overcoat of the trench coat type.
b. That research and develop” continue towardtr
the development of better and more adaptable clothing and
equipment,
c. That the recummendations mBe by the Board
of Officers convened at Heedquarters Army Ground Forces,
Vashington, D.C., in August 1944, to study the eQuipment
of the post war army be genarally aoaeptad.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Biblioeraphy
Chaptcr 15
1. AR 615-40, Sec I, Far la and b, Par 2.
2. Qh; Technical CLr Ltr, No. 19, 16 March 1.945. *(22.)
3. 12th Army Group SOP. *(23)
4. Kq TMET, OTCQ;, Ltr, subject: Qomcnts on qt: Supply
stuay~~,
aatLa 13 D ~ C45.
5.
Hq Com 2, dT0, TLchnical Kaiiual Uo. 2, Dec-%bor 1944.
6. SSgdP Cmittce vn Dolotion of lJon-$ssontial Itons.*j24)
7. AGGPReport PTO. 786, 7 ~pr45.
8. ,fD Observcrs Riport No. 677, 23 Feb L+5. *(25)
9. AGF Ruport Eo. 4E7, 2 Jan 45. *(2G)
10. Scvath US Army Quarttrnmstw Vonnage Bid for Puriod
8-15 Oct 4.b".
11. Lkjnorandum, subject : ".linter Uniformif, to the Quartermastdr
General t-b.ou&,hthe Sur&eon, 5uroyoan Thuatcr of
Opuratione, from thc; Chief Quartormastar, Iiwadquarters,
Communioations Zone, dat;ed 9 Kay 19b.5.
*Number in psrentheses is Catalog Number used in Inventory
of Malntorinl, GI SWdy No. 109, (Closs I1 &, IV
supply), file R 401/11.
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3-E-S-T-B-14-T -E-D
WARTERNASTER SALES 0,PERATTONS
SGTION 1
QUA~FRWSTER SALES COXPANY, T/O k E 10-152
196. Xission Prescribed and Actual. The Qusrtermster
seles company was designed to make available for sele to
officers only, certain-items of clothing and unlform
aocesories and to sell certain merchandise such a post
exchange items to both enlisted men and Actually,
it sola items of clothing and equipmeat to offioers,
nurses, officers cf the Vomen's Army Corps, civilians of
officer status, end authorized Allied officers. The distribution
and sale of p st exchange item were handled
thrcugh other ohnnnels.q Tho company operated both in
the combat zone and in the Conmunications Xoncs, establishiug
I: static store as ti base find dispatching mobile
stores to othw nreas.3
107. Orgtmiaatm.
a. The company is composed of R comFany headqmrters
and three operating platoons. EEoh platoon in
turn is organized into four operating sections. Tech
seotion is capable of 'ndependont action and has a Cap.olty
of 10,000 troops.i Its nobility Is restrioted to
the cne truck And trailer author1 ed for thc tronsyortation
OI both nersonnel and sto0k.t The company is flexible,
but tho momt of stmk thet cun La carriad is
limited and short of normal requirements.5
b. The ccxpnny headquortors narformed the usual
administrat,ive and housekeepinq functions for the company
as E Wholc, sunerviaod the sales activities end handled
the oroperty and noney accounts of the operating platoons
snd sections.3
198. Experience in the hbropean Theater 3f Operations.
o, Troop Easis. The troop basis for the mssignmnt
cP tke salgs company durinR Operations was two plntoons
Der army. During the initial phases of operation
on the continent sales companies ware not avciloble in
sufficient number for such an allocation, end front line
unitn inveyiobly reportod that no sales friOilitlb6 were
zvellable. Even le,ter, when sufficient numbcrs were
iivalleblo, it was found thnt the allocation was inad quste
ard that et least one company per army was required. 3
b. 0 erntion, In the oombat zone the rssponsibility
for t h b n t operotion of the Sales unlt rested
with the Army Class I1 and TV officer. Administretive control
WEB exercised by the bzttsllon or group to which the
unit was assigned. The general method Cf amploymcnt In
eaelI army, with the two platoons assign6d, was to establish
a static store operated by one plitoon, ana GO dlspntoh
a mobile store, operated by the remaining pletoon,
to the outlyinq units. This mobile unit, by utillaing the
transportation of both pletoons and therefore carrying a
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
larger stock than would otherwise have been poasible, visited
division, corps and army ereas. The platoon operating
the static store was ordinarily Installed in or near the
arq depot area, making sa 8s and Drocuring and storing
stock for the mobile unit.' The oporation within the
Communications Sone Was shiler, with the exception that
the majority of storos were more or less static, and that
in more permanont installations,, permanent or smi-permnent
stores were established, The CormKlnding gensrels
of secticns were authorized to establish and close snles
stores as- required upon approve1 of the Chief Q,uwtermnster.7
SECTION 2
SALES STORE OPEIULTIOlJS
199. Operating Units End Parsonnel. The c)uartermoster
seles company sns the nucleus for the OperfitiOn of sales
stores on the continent. Civilians were generally hired
6s clerks to assist in the operntion of the large statio
installations. Occsslonally, provisional sales units ware
orgenized within comhet units to augnent the c$artermeater
sales Store facilities. The 1st Infentry Division dcvaloped
an organization which mdu purchases from the army
seles store on a OOhSOl~dtIted diviaion order, and then
broke down tbc items to unit supply officrjrs for r snle
to the officers of their respective organizations. B
200. Sales ?rocedurvs and Accounti ,9 Sales procedure,
accountability,. and the appointment of2alc.8 off lcers are
covered in appropriato '&r Dcpertmsnt regulations. The
procedures in the European Theater of Operetions generally
followed these re@letions, and were mrther covered by
regulptions pu lisbad in circulcrs of the ruropean Theater
of oDerations.4 Sales offioers were anpointed, bondcd,
and made financially nccountable. The accounts were subject
to monthly cudit by the Sales Audit Division. Normal
prooedures were followed in sales inventories, daposits
of funds, end adjustment of accounts.
201. Procurement of Stocks.7 Pequisitions for sales
Storm itoms -#ere subdnitted to the Chief ?,uartsl.a&stor by
each section Qunrtermastor not leter thnn the 20th of each
month for the followin& month's requirements. The Quertermastor
of the Advance Saction included the requirements
of the armies in his requisitions. Based on thc above
requisitions, credits were astublished at the assignEd
depots in the form of credit letters issued to Section Quuertermsters
by the Chief Quartermster. At the end of tho
perlod unused credits were nutomatically cancelled.
202. Rationin .? Rationing gf sales store itens wos
set up aa-a meas$e to secure more equitnble distribution
of items in short supply. Ration curds were issued to
thuss eligible to make purchases. If, in thc judgment of
the Chief Pwrteraaster, the supply situation required,
he could increaae or decrecse the ration; make special
distribution of rationed items without reference to the
rp-tion card; suspend rationing on any prticiilar item or
Items; and clnssifg sales, varying th6 ration by type OS
purchases to secure D more equitable distribution of the
avail~able supply to all personnel authorized to purchese.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Beoause of limited transporteticn hcilitics on tho continent,
it WLLS extremely dlffL0ul.t to maintain balanaed
stooks in ull 7,uunrtermaster sales facilities. hies
Officers Could reduce the established rations oonsietent
with existing stooks to aohievs an equitable distribution
of supplies.
203. Prices.10 Thc gelling price or all item was at
oost plus- lxroent overhead. The price list of all
wles items was published by the Office of the Chief quusrtermster
frm t he to time, and all mioes listed inoludsd
the OVQrheQd.
204. dditional Servioes Rendered. 8916s stores 7uer6
normqlly tot set up to.rendar additional servioes such as
t61loring and shoe repair. Tailoring eervioe was smetimes
given in lnrge or statio installstions where oivillan labor
and fecilitia aermitte8. Shoe repeir servioa was also
given in some case6 by errangement with a nearby Salvage
repDir unit. Shoes were eooepted at the sales store, t ake
to the repair unit, md generally returned within a wsek.
PriCee cbarged were governed by appropriate War Dopartnent
Circularsa
205, conciusions.
SECTION 3
CONCLUSXCNS AND RECOB~aATfON3
a. That the sales company is a flexible and
oPiloient unit, but laoks the neoeesary transportation
to aarry the required amount of stook.
b. mhtlt its mission in the Zuropean Theater of
Operations was to operate as an offioePs a:.les store for
the eale of olothing and non-issuc equipment,
c. That the ellooation of two platoons per arniy
was Lnadequete.
206. Reoonmendations.
a. That the sales company be made more mobile
by ths organic assignment of additional t~anspcrtatian.
b. That provisions be made for tailoring and for
shoe remir servtce within the company.
c. Thst pertinent doatrlnes, teohniques and
Tebles of Ormnieation end Fpuipnent b6 amended by appropriete
agencies of the'%r 'Oeportment .
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11 PE! 10-5, QM Oaerotiona, 29 April 1943.
2. 12th Army Group Study, ttQuartermaster sales Compmyii. *(12)
3. Field Manuel 10-10 , Zuortsrmaster Service in Theater of
Operntions, 2 March 1945.
4. T/O & F: 10-157, 28 May 1943. *(13)
5.
aifteenth US Army Quartermaster t'Class 11 and TV AftQr
Action Report!', 31 July 1945.
6. L2th Army Group Quartermaster t'Fina1 After pction Report".
(14)
7. qi Technical Cir Ztr, Wo. 14, Hq Con ?one, ETO, O CW,
24 March 1945. *(11)
8. 1st Infantry nivision, "After Action Report". *(15)
9. Hq ETQIJSA Cir No. 16, 23 April 1915. *(16)
10. Office of the Flscal Ufrector, Ssles Audit Branch, ETO,
Ltr to all sales officers, BTOUSA, subjcot: ~Inllortermaster
Salas store hcoounts", 1 July 1944. *(17)
11. Ninth US euy flQuaPtormastor Salt6 store Operationst?. *(18)
* Number in perentheses La Catelog Wumbcr uprd in
Inventory of Material, QJl Study No. 109, (Glass I1
& IV Supply), file R LOl/ll.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
-
-PART FIX3
,uZASS I11 bXTX?LY
SECTION 1
INTROWOTI:ON
B. The Victul'i(ius strategy und tfictics of
.;~rldi r u I1 were Ltiacd cn, Lnd ciependent upon, obr
bbllity to subply Our mechanized forces GI. larid, sea
and tdr xith petrolem, oil f.ad LubrioGrits.
b. To provide the fuel rjctceesary to opereto
the vWt clzcurculcticn uf mecheniaecj transport, the oil
ir,austrg iu the Clnited Statas of imerica had to cxpand
ln size, kn~dedge and tecrvlique at an equal pace with
the mchmizction uo that a constant an0 deimidable supkly
of this ell ikportant product wauld ulways be .wailable
iii the quality mil quantities desired. It w w the e;jpliuatio:r
in tirue of war of the experience an6 n.:etbods davelopd
ia t h e ai peace by the oil induetry in the G.~IIU-
Pxtwe cmi xian3portation or ptrolauo: products that
nEl.5 €i
Great factor in r!.alcint it possible for lis to cruah
our eneales puickly ana with n prepnderaooe of uechauized
Ii?.@lt.
c. An Arn;y-%rvy Yetroleurn Board v!aq creesed
by the Joiii't J-hiefs af Ztalf in ;laahlr&tou to asaen:bla
3itish hird mierican reguifaiKents In every theater of
olerations and to nrrnn(,s for the fL;l?illnlen$ end aisptch
of these requirsnsnts. The +.rmy-Knvy Petroletn
Bo6l.d Ma 88 ito representativa an Ar@a FeZroleun; Offioer
, a1;;pointed by the Tteetgr Joei..under conoerned, In
emi; theator cf oporatiu.~.3
d. The following study is r3 review of the
mthoilr of distribution of petroleurr., uil did lubricants
to Iinitod BCete.9 Field ~OXCES in the Ewopeen
Theater of Oprations.
208. Dcfinitione.
a. jlh't;e -- a lory: term requirement report,
8hmlnL astinetea cdutixltities roquirvd to neet supply
aemtCia over t 6,lven puriod of tim.
b. Bulk -- Eny quantity ul product in a
ahgale container rhich would be too hehvy to banilie
by parsonnal withcut the aid of mechanical devices,
ncmma:lp any conntainer bavily mre tban 55 United States
gullons quantity,

c. Packaged -- any quantity of product in a
siil@;lecontainer which may be handled by parSOMel without
the use of meohanical devices, normally use6 in reforunce
to five gallon cans.
d. POL -- the British abbroviatlon for Petrol,
Oil tind Lubricants.
e, class I11 Products -- all petroleum and
solid fuel protluots, othcr than those which carry an
air forao specification.
f. Class 111 (A) Products -- all Petroleum
products whioh met air force apecifications, excluding
speoialty item for which the air forces is solely
rLsponsible. Itms consist mainly of aviation fuels
and lubricants.
g. Jorri-can -- A german type five-gallon
gtlsolint! can with clamp type cover with pouring Spout
mug onto can.
h. heri-can -- a five-gallon gasoline can
with screw-on cover and Which requires a nozzle, tube,
flexible, steel, to pour oontents from can into gasu-
line sanks.
i, Dacmtlng -- the process of dispensing
gasolino from bulk to packages.
j. filled products -- petroleum proaucts other
thw gasoline, such as oils, greases, and other lubricants,l
SECTION 2
mcHANIcs OF SUPPLY
209. Levels of S U I . Stock lovels were prescribed
for asmy servicR areas and for advance, internediate
and base seotions of the Commnications Zone, based
upon plannea oporatlons and the time required for replenishmnt.
Levels varied from time to time as the
operfition progressed. Xrmy Guartormsters, however,
attempted to insure et all tines that suffioient levels
were on hand in army areas, or immediately in rear in
the Advwe Seotion to mot planned or UeXpected requirements.
Operational supplies ae carried by the
individual units were limited by the number of ontainare
and the mount of transportation available, e
210, Requisition,
a. The original plan for the invasion of the
coiitinent caLled for the issue of Class I11 supplies to ugts
on requisition. This plan was found to be impractioablo.
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R-IS-.$-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
It vias dotormimd, however, thst the return of em$y c
fcr rofi1lii:g was essential. Tho can-for-calx rsouisit
,;mmcaure wns thorefme iilstituted to cL-::serve the !;UTI
f July i,limx the ddvailco Sectisr,
Cnwiur!ioctims ZOlib assmod c.int;*ol.
b. Effective 15 kuE;ust 19l+t+,resupply ;rf all i:asolino
:iroducts ts thc arrdes w s placed cn ir daily tclegrtln
begis.? Tnlcermns were SCiit to the P:ogt?luting station with
iiifarnation conies ts the advance Seetian Had to tho chief
Qua?2terLlastCr.~,2 The R.rr.dm at timos oxporiunccd diffl-
culty in sbtainiil& the qualtitics nrid types irf graducts
which vore callcd for in tho deily telepraris. It CES fncnt, xany truins wore broken mcl ShipWJitS oftcn
urrivcd pieconocll in the arny areas. Ir.atieaunte docuriuntatiirn
also added. to the ao~~fusioi?, and it vms oftos inpassible
for tho Amy Quartermaster to rocc!i.cilc his receipts
with his daily to1cgrai.i roquire:m,“nts.R 1,luch af this diffioulty
was i)vcrcar.m by roquisiti:ci;ig basrsd upcn noxirur.1
arid niriinuri quantities requirocl to mko up a cLmploto
train of Clew 111, thus olifi1lcutii~ brokon train lots
wliich were hard ti: cciitrcl.
211. ’,ioquirenmts.
8.. The Advance Sectim v7as su;iglied by dosicwtxl
,;ir:terriediato and trsso aoCti.cn aepots i.n.thc farward noas.
Tho 3hiGf Qusrtcrm6ster dcsicnutod ports for tho supply of
ii-.tcriiodiute and ~ L S Gdcyts.10 fjoctim Quclrter:t?stcrs
oetinntod ::.ad. subrdtted thoir rcquirenonts Lo the Chicf
Cpxrtcrixstcr i;n L: 30-dag basis vary 10 doys.11 Each
estiLz;tc gavc thr: final revised mtimte for the ocxt BUCcocdiric
10-duy p risd, a rcvised ostinK\to far the follxricy.
1C-dsy :>eriaid, a d c first estiru.te for thc lcat 10 days i)f
tho 30-duy period. 16 These cstirxtes o!mblad tha Chief
Quartorrustor t.? subiit requirad crstimtos to h1,yhcr hcadquarters
md provided a basis for na.‘:i!ig awLltblc sufficient
sup>lics to neat uiiy rcquircmnts.
b. The Erigixer Potrolouii, Oil arid Lubricsnt
Ermch of tho Southern Lirn of Cs?municnticnS handled the
wocureuGl?t, storcge, distributixi and is.~ucs;rf pctrulbun
groducts i;! Suuthorn Fruncc throuch February 1945.13
liftor tho arulprmtian of Gcuthsrii Liilc af Gtouad.catirw3
with the Co:kiuiiicb tioiio GoliC, those fulctid:?s were takoil
mer by tho Ca”:icatioiia Zoi!c rmd the smo divisim botwmi
Ei?~inccr mid Quortorricstor rcspoiisibilit existed as
iii tho 1Turthcr:i p&rt al” tho Buropeun Thonter,2g
c. Importstim of Fuel during tho initial staeos
af the nporatiiiii could Lot be plawud rioru thall ~i few days
in cdvorica, &ftcr n f irn f oothola waf! o8tabliahod, hawcver,
t,.nlrara crrivod on n rogular lO-d,,y schedulo. Lata:, the
Britiob ;kr Offico and Sugroi3e IImdpuartors blliad axgodi-
tiant;ry Forces colLborated i)JI tho procoduro for abtoiJ:ii2$
all >c;tr,:;leuli .?raducts. All co.iaon .X:tl’sloUli produots
wx*e 81etcil una cc.ntrallcd (;E the coatiwat by Sugronc
ticzdnuurtors, j’.lliod Tx],oaitim ry Farci:6, i?lltho bzsi:;
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R-E-S-T-R-J-C-T-E-D

of 8 rmithly Slat0 ca~~s~~lidutod by th-t hcndguartcrg.
3ulk getralcun ~IRScol.lcd fi)rrar&by ric8i.s of 10-dsy dcrmds
by Sup-m Iicpdquartors, hlliod 2xGzd:timi;ry Pqrc.zs,
whilo the pockarcd pri.dUOtS wrc calloS fnr,raM by tho
Garlnunicatizns Zir:io; The 10-day su!?ply *wri
t1irsuC;hout the oporatioi; as tho port situ!rti
in a position tJ perriit a 30-d~~ slntc tir be
orfaot.5
d. Prim- to D-Day tho Chiof Quorternaatcr hn8
aCcUr-;lUlet0b 0 hrge stack Jf psckLp,cd Pu.01~md J.ii3ric~r.bs
sufficient t? 1;10ut cmtirer.ts1 requlroi,ie:ito for u thrcoraor!th
perid. Those stocks vore hsld ii: t2o Unitcd 1Cir:g-
Cisi?, mid ware caLlGd fcrward by tho Chiof Quuorterrmstcr 9s
roguirod. Aftor D-Dug pockuCcd products VICIO shippod
direct frcmthe Uriitod States as called fsr by thc Chief
Qunrtorriastor ail noi1th3.y roquisitirpns. 5
0. Tho Slatirig proccduro of Suprmo Huadquortcrs
Allied Expodititx!&ry Porcos funishcd potr,lcun prsduct
requireimits far ono :iw.th bid inticipatod roquimnwts for
the lsllowiq three successive U3,iithS. Tho bulk quantities
shom on thc slate for tho IIGC~~I wora usca us 3
tho 10-day dcmxls to procure niid ship t,;.ikcor CB
The .?acl;ngod oatha tos, h-wcvcp, wrc used ~nly
hnd the Chief Quartern6stcr reqiiisit io:xod o mct onomit s
lrsm the Now YJrk Port cf Ccihsrl:ntiili, thrswh tho Arm
Pctrnlcun Office, or frciii Zho British-lYcr Officc throunh
the Coiieral Purchcsix figcnt.5
212. z4110cations.
n. Brori D-Day until Octaber 194.!1, nll t;iR:?qc
rwvomocts wro oi~.:trhllorl by thc Birst cind Third US ~2l'r.l~~
alnco the conplctc inf;!rri~ition a!.i thc roquirznw!ts aiid
avoilob lity of trs:i~port:~tiin110s 01: hmb mly ik thohoacli3,
rrnd storage arcas, ond thc ostiimtad btink car, tank truck,
r!nd bnrge lift ovailublc fiBrthe nilvcnoiltr, QuriiiF: the next
culoilclar nai:th. Tho Chief Quartorrunster ir. turr. fiiriiished
the 0-4 with n breakdom of tol:uogo shah5ng thc 0pprO::i-
mto amount noodca for daily -mixtoii~.nc.ea d the tirbxmt
Ileodcd far build-up of reserves. Thc Chiof C&Iurter;mstcr
0100 includod o prsposod grogrnn of Ou,pplylr,p tho Uuil:g

agencies, giving the method of transportation to be use
an8 the oatimted emergency tonnage requiring air lift.e2
c. Based 011 thcso estiriates, the 0-4, in conjmction
with the Ch.i€f of Transportation and the Chiefs
of Rcrvioos , propared and submitted to Comunicatiorx
Zono Seotions ard Chlcfs of Scrviccs tho approved WVQ!T%Lt
sch~c?ul~ for all classes duriw the next cnlender aonth,
Thl8 sygtom proved vcry sttisPuotory.~2
213. Distribution.
n. csrsolino supply we8 basod upon the thcory tlrt
lnrgo~volumcsor msoliuc should bo introd.uc6d at dotip-water
?or:Us, tronsported tliroup,h str~~togicallg looatsd pipolinos
to front Uno arcas, and distrfhutcd in tank cars, tank
truczs,. an*. containers to the usinR egoncios. 5
b. Initially, nL1 avoilablo bulk storage in EnglunA
m s plaoo5. undor control of tho British Futroleum
Bocrd. A11 stocks wrc hi16 by thc Rritish Petroleum Romd
anr: iasuod to t!;o United ::tatus on ruvorso lond-lease. The
avnilablo tanlcor flcot of Groat Rrltoin end tho Unitcd
Rtotos ms usod o build-lip dusirod stock lcvols preparatory
to thc invasion,! ma inj.tia1 assault forco carried fivr:
gallon conteinors came ovor tho bmohes, and on 23
Junc 194.1,,thi; first tonkar nrd.vod at a Ilommdy gort. .Yt
tiinos it was also noccssary to fly paclcoged fucl dircot to
tho continonb from tho Unitcd E'ingdom,
o. Bctnil distribution or dkliver7 of pasolino
WRS mdo cithcr from bulk storopo with the iropcr dispoiising
oqulpmcnt, or from dram, fiw or 55-za13on. RUB storage
was satisfactory on:'.y when Chr! location of ths using unit
was rolntively static and easily nocessiblc to tho bulk
storaRo site. ",'hilo bulk storage distribution invoivod
lass handlilu: and was morc eoonomicel, it was oxtromly
limited in flcxibility and was usGd primarily for Comani-
ontions Yono or rctir aroa troons. Rotail distribution in
55-~nllondrum vias never satisiflotcry dub to itfl wi@t
and :iulk, ana nlmyrr broueht corqlntnts from the using units
bocauso of thc difficulty in handlinp. 1X"rous cascs of
hornia lcrc rttributoi to tho usc of the 55-qallon drums,
nnd thcir usc was conacqricntly hcld t o. rinimum cxctipt in
tha :7outhorn Tdnc of Gowlunicntiono. z5
d. Rotail. distribution by mans of fivc callon
gnsolinc containors vms tlloroforc ahost mndatory, porticu-
larly in tho rorwnrcl co:tbnt arcas: Tho fivc gallon oontain-
ors RSC rolativoly light ill i:cielit, sm1.l in bulk, 8118 canpurP.tivcly
c?nsy'to handlo. Gnch vi.hiclc, cjrcogt tr.nlcs and
tank dcstrovors, ms oquipycd with spcicrl rac!;s to carry
oufficicnt msalino in fivo-~allcn containers to last Sor given
pcri0d.s of ti;:o, Bud distribution was madc by cxohiinging tho
empty cxis of o. unit for full cans. In addition, divinioii
Q,uc,rtoi-ma.stGrs wlro autl..oriaod cdditional cans for tho oporation
of distributing points. In ordci to s?cod rind. facilitntc
ciistribution to thc using units, it Wn13 originally ploencd
that rll aacknKin5 and dccnnt.inq from bulk to fivc-gallon oontc.incrs
bo Oonc by t3o Cmxmication.s Zone, Nld thct 0.11
Bnlivcrics o tinny supply points bo mdo in five-gcllon
contnincrs.3 Tho speod of thc farvrnrd movomont OS tho
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=:des, the time required for nev pipeline csnstructicn,
%he size af tho can population, thc oandition of railroads
and rail equipmnt, on6 tho docontin;- T cilities all
had an offcct an decanting operations, and it was often
necossar tc dallvor psolirro to khc army supyly paints
In bulk.% In such cases decanting was dono by the ur~~les.
e. In viovi of the fact that retail distribution
by five-gallon containors was the only netbad suitable for
csabat and othor units, a can gopulntian sufficient to
met tho nccds of such distribution vfas cssoaticl. Such
factors JS tho nuraber of troops, tho nubor of vehicles involvad,
typo of pLinned opcrettlons - pertlculurly t!;osa
calling for tho oaplsynimt of largo srriorod Tarccs, and %hi
rapid fomard iisrencnt of tho arilios, all hnd to bc csnsid-
ercd in deternining thc size af tho can 2opuldtIon. In a
fast novinr situation such as thc drive &cross Pranco it
was essential that full cans ba alwoys availablo when
nocdod, and additiand oms for naiiitennnco wcro afton roquired
by the coabnt units. il sufficient stock ha2 to bo
on hand ta elinln.,tc &lay caused by waiLlnF, Tor cans to
bo rGfillod 5r for bulk gasnlirio to bo dcczntod. ‘!ithwt
such a stock af oms on h;nd to supi?ort thc cmbat units,
thc drivc acrms Bruncc ciuld nilvor haw bcan rmdo. In
such a drivo, tho oasc ana rapidity of ecsclino dlstrl-
bution to tho using units nnd ‘to tho individual vohicles,
io of priiic csnsidcratlon. It ws ilrifinally ost-
imted thRt seven xJ.lllon cans w“. sup?nrt the ooil?at
forces throuphout tho operations in thc %uro>cen UeaCcr.
This included not only thu iiimliatc? rcqiiircaonts cf thc
grnics, ‘Jut also tho rcquiromnts or thk) Ssmunicotions
Zono troJps cnEclgcd in haulinC: to tho aimiils. Bofor~
hostilitics ccasod, thirty-Tivc nillisn cms wre iaportcd
to thc aontincnt, and to this was ddGd an indr;t?r-
ninablc nuiibor of copiured Gcriloa cons. In s3itc of this
largo nwibor, vhilc thoro was novcr a roal s.hortn{:c except
in isolatod instances, them was ncvor un ovor abundant
su.pply, and it Y ~ Sstill nocossary tn ricidly oiiforca
can di iplinc in order to naintain o sufflclcnt stcic!c ‘an
hand. $8
214. Pipulines.
a. i, linltcd mount r;f fuel was pwlped frcri the
Uiiitod 13ngdsr.i by undervrntcr pipelipcs . This opcrstion was
holm as Pluto (pigclino wder tho ocaan). Thoro wcro two
systorm: Banbl, whloh was a four lino systo:i that Irovad
of llttlo iuportanco duo to the enell qkmnttty c1olivi;rad
nnd tho cxpcnslvc Dpcraticnal trouble t?X:>C”xa; and hbo; a
15 Uno systcu DCPCWS the narrov nock of thj ZKqliuh Channol
which avemgcd, up to the cnd ~f hostilities, 27,000 barrcls
n day, The operational ccat of this systoa in mnpowor was
also cxcossive, and elttiough the systcn Va‘a D SucceES it
was oonsidorod th;t tho transilissim by bulk tanker delivery
wns for narc satisfaotory as lone na oir an2 naval sugciria-ity
axistod.
b. Tho ?ipclinc system was thc backbone of tho
aistribution systen an tho contlncnt. It pomittcd tho
tronsrzissim of gasoliuc bvcr torrain ti)c rwgcd for othcr
nenna sf transportstion, avoldod rood ctmgcstion wkcro road
capocity was lidtad and trarri,c heavy, ond corricd 50~solina
ovor vnryirq distnncoa whoro onony action mdu ;>tbor
mens of trnnsportotisn impracticable.
- l/+O -

c. The annr Systun !vas installed an tho continent
bopinning D plus 3 tu provido E bulk clistributicn systcn
durim tho initial poriod preceding tho capture of Chcrbiicrg
(0-1020). Facilities ~orcmstructcd ut Port en Uaasin
(T-70fk:) for unlahding soverol small tankcrs. Two six-inah
lines were providod for 1HT-80 gusolino and ane six-inch line
for aviation gasolino. Thoso pipolinos wore oxtondod to
dispensing points a t Etroham (T-7060), Caroritan (T-3000)
and La Forge (1-40GO).
d. Thu IIaior Syston (A.?pandix 15) miginatcd in
the Port of Chorbourg (0-1020) , with two six-inch IZT-80
psolino lines and ant six-inch aviation gasoline linc oxtonding
south through St. La (T-I+060) to Chslms-aurdI::monc
(Y-7050) . Frcr.i Chalons-su--lIarne, tr:n six-inch IIT-CO gasoline
lines axtendad to ThfanvilLo (U-8080),Fiancc, and irm
Thiclnvillc, ml? six-inch lino vias carriucl ccrms tho Ithinc
River inti; Germny, 8 total distzncc of t*ppro;rirwtoly 600
milos fron Chcrb;,ur&.
c.. The Narthern Systcn (Appendix15 ) startcd frm
tlis Port of Antwerp (U-7090), l?dciu;%. Ona eix-inch and
t-ro fourrinch MT-eO gasolina lines and tvc four-inch
ovitition gasolino lines war@ constructod to Ihastricht ~
(IC-5552), Hollmd. Tho three NT-00 gasolino lincs were
ccntiiiucd northooutward Trr.:.: i:c.astricht und acr3ss tho
Rhino RivGr to llescl (h-Z2l,.l],Gar~mny. Tho linear distanco
from fsitrrer? to :.:cso~ 5s lea nilcs.15
Tho St~JUthOrn SyStGrl arigintstod at lItw3cillCS
(T-'l+010), Frcincc;, kind was built ta sup9mt tho 6t:i Array
Group. Prom Karsoillos, one six-inch and i!no fcrur-inch lirio
was built narthard to La Porco (P-4080)ncur SfiarburE,
Oorr:ony. Iror:iLa FmcQ throe fsur-inch lines irere continuod
ticrass tho Rhinu at Frmknthal (Ii-l+505), Gcrany.
Tho linear diatoncc was 620 nilos. Tho systm consistcd
of 1,507 milos nf pipclinc, und tronsnittod 569,000,000
pallms of motor i;nd. sviotion gasiilinc Up to 15 Soptenbcr
i94.5 15
p. In additian t o thwc no.jor PipClinG SyStCI&s,
thoro wcre nuiorous smull pipclinc GpOratiaS on Chc corttincnt,
such os tho Rhino Rivor pipclinc crossing, Kehlon
fL-Oht(2) to Konigswintor (F-6232). IIorr~,gasi!lino was roceivod
by rail tank cars at lbhlon and pmped across tho
rlvor to o truck filling insto1lotion"iin tho autobahn
northueet of Konicswintor. This rclievcd tho Rcmgon
(1-4432) ontoon bridgos of o oansidcrablo sncunt of truck
traPric.d Thcrd -.&?re 3,600 xlllos i.rf pipollns laid ts thc
asst side of tho Rhihe Rivor up to cessation of hostilitics,
with a total capacity of l50,OOO barrels per day.15
h. Tank ctus wora usod ti, heul bulk easolinc
frmi soaport m6 pipolino tarninals to 3amunications Zone
ant! army' &canti= points, m for trnnsiar to tank t.rucko.21
Tank truoks hauled gasoline from bulk storoga tanks, aipoline
terrdnals, ana r.Jil tank cLm ta Comiunications Zone
or amy{ decanting points ilr fillin(F stations. Approxluatoly
3,000 rail tank cars and 1,055 tan!< truoks with a asaacity
of 2,000 or 750 gallons each wero us0d.~7
215. hocounting.

-
142 .

Suyxne Ticodguortcrs, .Uliod 2xmX.tionorg Porccs , ms
chnrsod with ccardinatin6. ond chtmllin thc supply :>f
pctrilloun prsducta to tho Bllicd Psrcos.fE Tho hrcn Pct-
rolauri Offioa was char@ with etcff r~3ponsibflit~ for the
ossrdinoticm of 31; mttors gcrtoiniq ta zdepustc su2.ply
far cll ~~urposca.l7It is thw oSv1~7u3th-t there was axi
swrl~pi>inenn8. duplicutim of fcactions and rcqmnsibiliticrs.
SECTIOU 3
217. iiroy-Novg ~otr.nleuLi acarP. 17 The krv-l~~vy Potrg-
1eU.i Bourd was thc fieoncy of the J;rlnt Chicfs of E:tuff uni.
was ohorgod with thG follming functisns rchting ta petri:loui
.>nA pCtr%JlCun products:
E.. Ihintnin doso comxlinntion md liciaor, botimn
thG Vur and Hnvy Dopnrtnents cnb vrizh tho Patrc'luun
fdrd.nis2rntisn for ?far.
b. Prepare md Llcintilin full inforrution una
stotus of petrolom and potrslouri products rmttors vith
whioh tho Var ,md ITnvy Dcportncnts vmre cmcorned.
c. Inourc ci~nrdinotlon, br,sed on ovcrcill Isgistical
plrclns, CJf prmuroriont, wcraous shigmnt, snd storngc
fin hrny snt! Invy.
rl. Efloct collcbcrotiun pc~trolourinattcrs
witli othor Unitod llntlcm sa diroctud by tho Joint Chicfn
of 3tcl-f.
c. 3orcoii and ct-nsolic7Qtc Arny and Navy rcguircrionts
and cocmlincto with tha Yt:.troloum AddninistiJtor for
Uar tho cqmcity of inCuvtry to prmidc the roqairorionts.
218, kruo Pctr;;lcun Officc. Tiie Area PoBroloun Offico
vrns En agoncy nf the i.rny-Biivg aoarci with Euprcne Hcndquarters,
Nliod EX3oditiiJnllr!l Parco, Cort:,fn rccclrds GI
roquLrorlonta and stocks were iwiiitainod rc:wrts propnrod
for thc ArEIy-ITQVy ?otrslcm Board. Technioul
.i.ni"ormtion af pctrolcuu/prmluota was disse:iinc%ab
thrmqh ohnnnclo. Tho Arzo Petrolouu Offioo wna divided
int,.r u Tochnioal Branch, a Planning and Rcquircnents
Branch, and a Stock und Bhippi~Rronch. It6 principal
funations woro :
u. Stuff rcsponsiblity for caorbinatim uf i:ll
rslttors ,wrtoininc to udequato suj>ply for cll p~rposcs,
b. Roprcsciit tho 1say-l:kvy Potrslourr Rorrd with
upgroprioto British ngonoics. Act .m len6.-lcoee and reverse
lond-lonoe os rcquircd.
c, Rcgrescnt the armd forcos os rOqUirQd in
&linistdng. nlliod potri:.lcuti na"YCora with coubinod
bi:.irds (?rcamittoes in Lcndm.
a. Combinate requeste by the Unitea Stotcs

g. Supcrvisc productlcn of gnsolinc and Water
cans at tho assanbly plant in tho Vnitcd 1;ingd:w.
h. Reproacnt tho Ghicf (luurtcjmaster Lind min-
tala liaism Tiith other solcvicos on Class I11 suppig mttorp.
221. Basc Bu0ticrlIS.l Base SQCtiiXI Quertc?rimstcrs w‘ICi’c
rcsgcnsiblc fbr thc subd~~ion of raquiromnts far tho op-
er2ti.m jf a11 grcund vc+hiclos, installati;~ns, 2nd rsr rdscol1snoi:ug
us08 within tho cnumnd. Thcy consslidstad
doyt ra;?c.rts and dcsignatad the suiiply pointg fm sorvicing
tr,:sps vithin thoir raspcctive areas.
222. Advance; Sectism. 21 The :~dvsnooSocticn Quartcr-
mstorg, in oeaopc.i7ati(.n snd csnjunctii,n :iith tha G-l, and
Tmnspiirttitifhulk at.:rego
facilitlos. Burqdics wcre un1;)ndcd frm vmscls,
traUapi;rtod hg ?ipclincs, iind stncd in bulk by tho En-
Fineor mrvico. Cuntc.dg passed ti. tha Qunrtcrnastcr whcn
tho gesalins supply oimpany gaoksgod tho product or crthcrwisa
asaulxd cmtral. Tho Ui::.itary Pipdllno sorvicc vraa
rus’\imsiSlc for thc c. netructinn .f hulk potroloun hond-
line anc? 8t:rage. fhcilitics undc-r the tCChniCQl suporvisiijn
of tho Chiuf: Engin::or, Simunicstii~nsZ: no.
22C. ih ntinciital Lavanoc Bcoti5ii. Aftcr 1 Ilsrch 1945,
tho Cmtinont,l Advance Bocti-i?: was an ogcrs.xtine agcncjr
i.f thc Ca”niaatic;ns Zum, Suriipcan Thoatsr ;i Oacrati:lns,
and 7‘108 cmtiguous ti\ tho owbat zmo. Its dssi;.n in
im.mdiatc sup,wrt end naihtcnancc .cf tho 6th hnry Grilup,
WQS to MCOIVO, stwc and mvo Icmara mtcrial snd supp-
lies as rcquirod.22 Its functions were sinilar tu thosc
of the’hdvanoo Ocoticn, Oa”nicatims 2, .ne. Prinr til
that tiw, tho Cmtinontdl ;;dvmco Sectifin porfnrned tho
Sac Su;rglg role fer tho Bituthf?l’ll LinD of CoiX.IlUliCQticm8.
During part rif tbis porisd tho Petroleum, Oil, End Lubricants
socti::n vma n sc.gerato soct1.m csmplotuly divnrccd
frail tho Quartomstor Ciirps. It controlled sufficiont
gasJlinc supply mapanios, sorvico csnpanies, and Ewinecr
Pipolinc conpanics to pcrforu its i.lisrriim,
- 145 -
8-E-R-T-R-I -C -T-E-D

The Quartermaster asswd cmtrol when the Contiiientcl .*dvmoe
Sectim moved forvard rind the Specj.al Petrf;leum Section
remained behind vith Delta Base Section. lfovever, the
Quartemaster was relieved of this function in January 194.5,
but assued cdntrol again in Llmrch 1945.vhen the Continental
Advance Section becorae an agency of the Corti“ioatiqms
Zone. 23
225,Southern Line sf Comunicatims. The aisoim of
the Petr7deun Branch, Engineer Sectlon, Southern Line of
Cumuniaations, was to slate the procurenent of Engineer
pipeline supplies for maintenanoe und c,nstructiJn 01 Pipeline
systems and terminal bulk installatinne , operote the
pipeline and buik storage iaoilities and deternine require-
ments. The Petroleum Eranah wfis charged with the procurement,
storbge, distribution. and issue of petrc :iroduots,
oonttiiners, laboratory su’Tplies and equipeat. Bm
226. Field Forqes. The respansibilitiea and functi~ns
of the various ochelans throuchaut the field forces ?rere in
penerul the same for Class IiI 3u ,ply as fur the sup:ilg of
other classes, The my grsu3 supervised distribution 9,nd
insured maintenance and proper stock 1ewl.s. It soreened
estimates and mde allocations 8s necessary and mintfiined
current study of logistical factars ond rates of cainsunption?&
The cmies estimRteC raquiremnts and effectod,
through noma1 channels by the maintenance of stock levels,
the supply of :ietrolew, oil, an6 lubricants tci all troops
within the arny area.25
227. Cijnclusicns,
n. That the supply of petroleun, oil tmd lubrioants
in the European Theater of Operations *.1u8 generally
adequate ana satisfactary, - except during September
and October 194$ wken stock level6 were ’ dangerously
ELOW.
b. That without n large flve-gsllan can populatlim
cn hand sufficient to meet tho requircmonte , prrticularlg
of fast moving ccnbat units an& c.!omunicatl;ms Zone trsogs
cmagcd in haullne troops uqd supplies in sup,i>rt af tho
armies, distributiou uf gasoltwJ probkb’ly would how failea,
viith a sorloua rosultant dotrimntB1 offoct on tho combat
opurations .
c. That aiatribution by f ive-gallow containers
was found to ba the only suitable method or distribution
In the European Theator, anC that in futuro oporatlons
aaroful stuciy must be given ts the win populotinn rcquircd
to austain and su:coart the units ongeged.
a. That accounting procedure thrroughaut tho
echelans was not stendaraizsd or rolnted.
e. Pluto (pipcline urldor tho ixosn) was maorately
aucoossful. Bulk tanker dolivary iJVCr a lurge body
’3-I-R-T-R-1 -C-?--$-D

~f mter is much mare ecmcnical Vuhm eir and naval suixri.;1:i;;y
ar1sts.
f. Pipclinos an tho continent were ver:' succcssfill
,-nd ahsclutolg necessary for ths su?gnrt iP inur large
fialii forces,
228, E\oc.,:lrwndetions.
e. Thet aoodmtinp, nrscedwnsbs stonderdizod.
5. Thtjt pigcliiio cunvtructicn end 3pcrpD tim 30
mado ano subject af Iouro and canstat rcscarch.
c. Thot tho nunbcr ;)f agemius charpd %lthClass
11: oporatlonz bo hmld to a miair.isw ti; av[.id cmfusim and
Buplicetim.
(1. Tht in futuc ngorsticnu omcful study be
given t3 thc sizo of the con poptilot9;m requlrod ta sustain
end support tho units c.xeycd, snd thi:t neor?saary ect.i;:n
Le tahn tc insure a aufficfent stack cef nontai. cry .In hand
thr.m&out' all cnholons.

1. ETO-SOP #3E, Cxitinental Supply Prc:cedurc for Pctrslom
Products and Related Ehndlinl: Equipmmt dated 19 ,L,uEust
1944 and 12 Jiino 19/+5.*(9)
2. ETO-SOP i’7, Sur, 1 Praoeduro an the Contirient aatod 2
February 1945 .a$6T
3, Ifemorandun; Quartornastcr Scctim to G-I+ Section, 12th
Amy Grsup, dated 6 Bcbrumy 19b5.*(37)
L. Advance Sectii;.i, C.rmw-icttions Lono Opw. tianal I!istcry
1943-45, imdatcd.*(22)
5. History of lrrsa Pctroloum Office, undatod.*(l6)
6. Rcplirt “Fiold Gervico L,:f‘l stlo@’, 12th Amy Grnup, G-4
Sccticn, undatoa.
7. First US brny Rcpnrt on Dpordtims, hnnox En. 14.*(43)
8. 12th Amy Group Final After Actl,n Rcp rt.*(32)
9. F.uartcrmauter SOP, 12th Arny Grmp. “(32)
10. Hq Cam 2, ETO, OC@l Circular Lcttcr y97, Praccduro for
distribution cd O,uartont.stcr Supplies t., p,r,iios, hdvanoc
Soctions and 3acti,m8, dated 5 Dcccribcr 19kL
11. Hq CLu Z, ZTO, OCPTI Circulhr Lottur ,:14, PruOGd.Ure fi,r
Distributim OP Quertcrnastcr Su?Tlics on tho Cnntinont ,
datod 9 Fobruurg 1945.*(11)
12. Eq ETOUSA, filo AG 400/1 OSD, Subjcct: Proocdurc for
Planning, Rcooption and I:nvenont of Supplies, Equiy”
and Bersmnal, datod 10 January 1945,
15
Histnry nf Southern Line of Caxmunicatimn, undatcd.
Hq 6th Amy Group Adminietrativo Instructions UP, 5 ,
dated 20 Bwc3bbcr 1944.
Enginoor Section, ETOUSA - History i,f POL Facilities,
unaatcd.* (15)
16. Bq Can Z, El%. OCQf Circultir Lottor NL. 52, Pmcodura
for Supply of Tuartormastor Itoms im tho Gmtincnt,
datwd 16 Septonbcr 194.11.
17. Joint Chiofs irf 3taff , fsr;ly-IJavy Potrolowr Board Chartor
dated 13 Octsbor 1943.
18. SFLTF Administrebiw bk” No. 25, IIsintcnanoa 3f the
Allied Expcdi-ticnarg Forccs in Petrolour3 Prsdu ts -
!kwtcrn Europoan Theater, dated 21 July 194k.*?l)
19* Hq ETO, QCW Circular Lottcr t32, Rcspmsibilities of
Quartorsster Sorvicc, 3POUSA, for Pucl, Lubriosntfi an8
Handling Equipnwnt, dated 22 July 1944.

20. Hq ZTOUSA, SOP $47, liil.itary Pipdino Service, 22 Scptombor
L944.*(10]
21. Cq Advance bectian, CUmuniCatinhS Z'me, SOP for Pctrol,
Oils ma Lubricants (POL)Supply, datcd 19 April 19C4,
22. Orcsnizafion of G,mtinontal Advance Socti m, Comunicatixis
Zone, ETO, aated 1 Fcbruary 1945.
2.3. Oqenizatiia, Bunctions and Opsr~tion of C&tincntal kdvanac
Bt,ction, Con Z, ETO, dated 1 Fubruury 1945.
24. Limo rrrm C-4, 6th Aruy Gr ,up to)AGF Qwrtmmastor Obsower,
27 M:Rrch 1945,
25. 110 6th Arng Fhup, G-L+ Seotiun Orfioe ?IOU Ea. 13, 1
iIarch 1945.*(30)
26. Quartcrnustcr SOP'S tX the firnlcs.*(42)
27. IIist2,rionl Data fr.n P & Y Diviniirn, OGCH Piloo.*(15)
20. C3,rmonts, Lcttcr, Thaatcr Chiof Quartomaster, 13 DQCCIIbor
194.5, to Thw G m " l Bl,ard.* (56)
29, 12th hrny Grcvp - C-lr Pcriudic Ropsrto.

LOC-1STIC.U FACTOW
229. Definition. Logistics is the art of plannin and
carrying o m i t n r y movement , evacuction and supp1y.f Tagiatical
factors, as discussed in this chapter, are t!,ose factors
dealing with the most important phase of sup_nly -- the
comautation of requirements.
230. Types of ZoRistical Factors.
'a. There are three methods of expressing petro-
leum, oil, and lubricant logistical factors for coqmtation
of large soale renuirements:
(1) Pounds per man per day.
(2) Gallons per .mn per day.
(3) mpresslon of reouirements of HT-80 gasoline
by either of t%se first two methods,
and recluirements of allied products as
percentages of ?!T-80,
b. There is easentiallg no differenoe in either
of the three metbods of expressing petrolem, oil and lubricant
logistical faotora. The use of "Pounds per LW per
day"*is desirable whon requirements are to be stated in
tons, and ",qallons per luau per day:' (greases excepted) is
desirable when requirements are to be expressed in total
gallons or barrels.
231. Eethods of Determinatim. There are.two gener-
ally accepted methods of detsmining petroI.eun, oil and
lubricant logistical factors:
a. The vehicular raethod , in which the average
daily reauirenents of any unit or nimber or units can be
determined by computing from experience the average numScr
of niles to be traveled daily by all ~6hhleSinvolvod,
nultipljjing the average nunbar of miles to be travclcd by
the total number of each type vehicle involved, and crithar
multiplying tho result VJ the avornge oonmnn?tlon rate (increased
by safety faotora) in Gallons pormllo for each
type vehicle (taken from Ff 9-2600) , or dividing thb result
by the averace consum2tqon .rate in :lilca por .pallon for
each typo mhicle involvcd. Norr~~lly, the total requirements
of msoline for potmr oqulo"t, coolcinq, hoatinc,
lightina: and other miscellaneous needs arG figurcd nt twenty
porcont of the gasoline reouiromcnts for the vehicles. The
total figure can be dlvid6.d 5y the irlachine records unit
etrenRth or by tho ration strmqth to ohtdn the rcauironats
in eallons mr 3811pr day. O i l and lubricants aro rlso
normally dotomined as percentaces of t_otalfuLl rquirementa.
rcrccntagea usually used are: .,nqinc oil - 34'. of
total fuel rcouirmcnts; gaar oil - J$ of'total ruol requirements:
and grease - 1.5$ of total fuel roauirmonts.
Appcndicas l6& 17 list thc roquirmonts for largo forcet?as
computed by tho Office of tho Chief ?uartcrmastor, 3uropean
Theater of Oiorations. This ncthod is flcxiblo and Is
- 150 - '
R E S T R I C T E D

R-E-S-T-R-I -C -T-E-D
applicablc to both mall units ana field foroea. Ono can
ooiuputa the 8mo.unt of gasoline needoa to mow unit vohioies
On0 mile, and tlluR Porecast ronuiramont8 from day to day by
multiplying the tlqallona roquircd pcr d.lo" for tho unit
by tho anticipated number of nibs to bo travclad. Corps
und largcr organizations find this method cumbcrsom baccutsc
of thc constant challgo in thc units assigned or attachod,
which affcctd thc numbor and typcjs ol vehicles, and because
tho avcracc daily,movonront.of units will vary from day to
day. This mothod, howcvor, js mandatary when no cxpcjsianoct
oonsrmption factors arc availabl0.2,3
b. Thc oxpcricncc consumption mto mthod involvcs
thc actcrr.aination of rates basod on thc total gallons or
pounds of pctrolcum, oil and lubricants consmud during UXtcndcd
oocrations of largo mssos of troops, diviaod by tho
total moohino records unit strcngth or tho ration strength
of all troops who ocnsunod those products. Thus, tho roquircmonts
gor man ?cr day aro dctcrriincd from actual cxp~rionoc.
"ken past cxpcrionco data Is not availablc , C11~vchicular
mcthod should bo usod un%ilthc oprations have procrcsscd
sufficiently for cxporienco consum:ltion ratl;s to bo
OONpilOd. nation strcngth data is ~ asil~ obtaincd and is
mom noourato for lar@ P~QRSOS of troops than nachinL rucords
strong@ data.
232. rlapninp Factors dcvplop.td by tha Area Pctroleum
M.
a. Prior to D-Day, rmuirc,ments wwa kesed upon
coabat anci non-oombat.logistica1 factors. Thas~factors reprcsontcd
consumption, oxolusivc of rsouiromclnt3 usod in
building up a rcsemo stoclc pile. Thc faotors woro:
Froduot U S Nan- combat Combat
?IT-80 Cal/man/day 0.4 l.bG
nmoi GRl/man/day 0.04. 0.27
Koroacno wf/man/day 0.005 0.005
TLlgino oils $ Of (bE-80r)ieSQl) 2. 3.
Fear Oils $ of (MT-80 Diosol) 0.5 1.
crcasos $ of ("80 T)loscl) 1. 1.5
Casol-ino {for of (IilT-~oM.osol) - 0.08
cooking)
The oonbat rcquirements wore 214. net tons of POL pcr day for
uaoh divisional slico of k0,000 poops, Tho non-combat roquiromonta
amounted to 50.6 nct bons for tho sama numbor of
troops,
b, Tust 'prior to D-Dcy, conparison vias modo with
factors dovoloncld and usad by Allied Poroen Wadquclrtcrs in
Italy. Rcauirencnts in Jtoly rcvcalcd n oonswption ram of
150 liquid 'tons VT-SO; 9.s dicscl mcl; 2.7$ korosono; and
2.9'4 cngino oils, 'Roar lubricants and groasus. Based upon
tkc abovcs figures, it wag agrcjd to plan rccuiremcnts for
thG instiax opcrations in thc Europcan Theater of Oporations
on n daily con9un tion rato of 153 not tons for caoh divisional
slice of &0,008 troom, of a ioh 79.0@ was 18-80 gosolino;
- 151 -
3-E- S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D

H-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
0, In Octobcr 1944, hmovtr, thG factors wore rovised
bosod upon actual oxpc-rionco in tho ?hropoaa Thuiltor
of Optrstions and upon tho devclopmcnt of accurcto records.
Pin00 OOnsumPtlOn had hen pector thm onticipatod, th dai-
ly roauircmcnts wGrc raisud to 217 nct tons while --- thr. --- nnn- --_-
ohnbfit ConsUWtiOn rat0 incrcasod 66 nct ions, a ~ .basGd
upon 0 aivisiCne.l slico of 40,000 troops. Tho nc.w rbquiro-
IUOUtS wcro broken down 0.8 follows:
TIT-80 1.700 US gcil/m/day
Unloaded fuol 0.002 I1
Koroscnc 0.003 If
%os01 fu0l 0.170 It
Rngino O i l 0.0561 I’ (3$ of fuc.1)
Gonr O i l O.O?.e? (1% Of fuol)
[*;Poaec 0.0250 Sbls/man/day (16‘3of fucl)
d. In Januery 1945 consm>tion rooords from D-Day
to inoludc 31 noooirbor 19b4 wGro avnilsble and at that tine
it w s dotcwnod thst ruquiromnts mro 192 net tons, based
upon tho BNRO €tivisional slicp.
233. Actunl Planning: Factors Usd by Field Foroes.
a. In plosnfng a daily consu$ilon figure for .
pOtrCl~um products, thoro woro two basic thoorlee, First,
thnt tho fl~uurashoul3 06 oxprcs-ad as a total Euantity
bascd upon tho nmbcr of oiorationsl milas por dey for all
YGhiclos invoLvod, end SSCOnd that tho fipyP.3 should bo exprossod
i-.s n hctor in ounds par nien par dayr! for all
troons involvod. It m ~ b o to 6 USG P factor of 15.4.788
pounds por mn por dey, as computoa bo tho Chi~fQmrtcrmastor.
This fi uro was ksad on 50 operational milos gcr
vchiolcr pcr day YLppcndix 17). Tho First US rigrood
with tho daily opcrationcllmilongo, but aonafdcrod the actual
vehicular oonsunption figurc to be grcctor thcn thet which
wm uaad in tho CMbf n,mrtLrmostcr’s calculctions, and
bcliovcd thnt a Ifborn1 safoty factor should also bo in-
~ludod. Tho ’First UR Army thoraforc cn1cul:tcd tho factcx
to bc approximtolg 24 pounds pcr mcn pur 9w. 54 of thc
12th ,!amy nroup oonpurrGd in thcr First UY -vta FGOO~ORdntions,
nnd tho 24 pounds por r3nn pcr day ff&tOr was adoptcd
nnd usca TOT approxhatoly two months nftcr D-Day. 5
b,. b3tcr oporctiona ComCnoud in tho EUrOpom “hmtor
of Oporr.tlons, studios wLro m.do on consmpticn rates to
Eovclog plnnnfng fnctors based upon oxporlonoc, It ms soon
rocognlaod thpt tho faotor prcviowly ncocptcd in tho oonputnCion
of tho’day of mpply for potroloum, oil nnB lubriognt
pr&uo*,s I nwcly, 24 pounds par nan pcr Cay, ms 01:coasivo,
an?. this figure wcs disoilrdtd in favor of tho fagtor
15.47, fis origina].lg P ~ O ~ O Sby C ~ tho ahid “11tWtCl’IXiStQr.
or L4s tho rapid advc.ncc, ?.cross tho Continent pro-
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+$-s-T-R-I-G-T-E-D

B-E-S-T-F+I-C-T-'E-D
gressod, additional experience facSual data was.accmulatcd
and compilod by tho Fotroloun and Fuola Section, Office of
the Chief'?mrtcmester, as of 31 Dcoeffihsr 194b.9 These
factors vwo basGd unon tho conswption of petrolom, oil
nnd lubricents frmi '6 JUaC 1944 to 31 Dcombcr 1944 by r.11
Unitod P.tp.tc8 Forces,.nnd as I? result ft emward rovision
of proviaus OstimFltos, particliLnrly In th6 casc of allied
products, IWclS LEldG.
d, !bo Conmanding CGncra1, 123 .Amy c;rou.p, lr.tLr
eubnitted to tho Co"nding Crofrcrnl, &ropean Thcnter 02 .
Oporntions, United Rtntos b.rr~,a roport on thc potrolcw,
oil nnd 1 brlcGnt consmption from 1.4up,wt 1944. to 28 Elibrunry
1945.tf ' mcso figuros wcrc -nnnlpzed ma ncw factorE
WC~Orscommendct! fcjr ostimtlnfl t!m ro;ulre2onts for fiold
f.orces. Rocormondod fnctors pcr mn per dsy wre:
-1ton Gcllons Founds
IT-80 1.0153 8.2526
Dicsol O i l ,0353 42773
Xagino Oils ,0234 ,2032
Qcar Oil .0028 .0025
Grcascs .0012 ,0123
Keroseno ,0051 ,0436
Thoee above figures WGrE bQSGd on ration strcngth and illcluded
a 20$ inorease for additional rnisoellanoous units.
Pnragraphe 6 & 7 of th 8 reGort or0 quotcd J.n oxplamtion Qf
thOEQ revised factors. 3
"6. A nurvoy of tho strength figuroe of tlw mjor
comw-3da indicates that thcro is normally n lnrge
perce.it.i@e of troops in ench sroo who am serviced
by n g1rr.m omand but whosc numcr!.cnl strunfitfitas
ztro not lncluclod in tho ::.ssignncd i:nd nttachcd
strength figurcj 02 thc br,sic com?.cd. TkIa aocountod
for additional stronTth (4ir Form, Communications
Zona troops, Allied trooy, oto.)
vnrios bctwon 20 nnr! 35 pcircont of thc bnsio
strength figllroe of th3 oonrmr?nd and pono'rnlly
oorrosgonds to the ratloc. strength. ,Bquricnoo
has provcn thnt tho factors, a8 ofltablishod in
tho 1.w.rtcmasta ~orviocBof wouco natn, onlling
for 15.47 pounds ?or mn p~?:dey md acnputad
on the notup.1 c.ssigned cnd nttcohsc? strcmgth, .
d3finitoly rosults in a surplus of ell POL itwas,
with thG cxcop-tion of koroson.0. .Thus, it-ia appnrcnt
tktt the factor is oxoessivo, I'lhGro&s, the
strongttii figuro is insuffizicnt. Thc two conponsating
wrors, howovcr havc hc.d the nct rcsult
of ostabllshing qwiltities in toma of doys of'
eupply on a mom or less workehlc hsie.
''7. TO cstPLhl18h thG Supply Of POL ItOIUS on
mor0 oxact basis and to provide unifcrdty
thmughout thG thontcr it is nrOpOSGd:
"a. Thnt now factors IJG cstcbllshd, bascd
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D

H-B-S-I'-H-L -G-18-E-JJ
upon actual cxporicncr. which will call for tho
propor proportion of all FOL itoms.
"b. That tho basis for applying such fac-
tors bc on tho ration strongth ratahathan on thc
aotual asaipnod and attached strungth of tiic command.
%, That tho ncw factors bo bascd on a high
avcraqc ueo of caoh product rathcr than thc oxact
avcrauga. On this basis, amios will bG adcqutc-
ly providcd for ovGr a pcriod of tirnc eltbough
i;hGrc may bo short poriods of oxtondcd action or
unusual activity in which tho actual consumption
will bc grcatcr than tho cornputcd day of sw?ply.
In planning for pcriods of abnormal activity,
allowances will naturally bo ma& for additional
quantitios.I7
234. Factors Finally Dovolopod.
a. Tho f$tnti8tiCS Scotion, Office of the Aasistant
Chicf of qtaff, G-4, Suprano Xiadquartms, +lid 3pcditionary
Forccs, compilcd,a ropcrt on conoumption fig- .
urce from 24. Fcbmry to 23 Itarch 1945 for tho First, Third,
and Winth US MOB, an3 trom 24 February 1945 to 21 IZarch
1945 Tor tho %VGrLtth US ?.my and tho First Frcnah ,UXW
(*.mondix 18),. This roport is in mrcommt with the factors
as iinally flovclopod.
b. Aftor mor ten months of exjxricrncc in supply
of forcos in thc Xurcpcan Tb-oatcr ugdcr combat conditions,
tho followinR factors wcrc mrkod out ae rc~irosontativr.of
tho roquiromcnts for fuol and lu ricw.ts for thG Zuropoan
Thoatcr undor combat conditione:B
IPT-80 1.43 Gallons/man/dny
Dicsol fucl .10 It
Ecrcscno .om I
"rhitc gasoline .002 11
PhT 10 onginc oil ,0069 n
SAX 30 onRinG oil ,0252 If
SAX 50 ongino oil ,0105 1)
RAE 90 guar o il .0122 tt
Greascs 0 and 1 ,0166 pounds/man/day
Groascs 2 and 3 0091 17
Groaso 4 .ooll I!
This represents about 177 toil# -pr divisional slioo of
40,000 mon or approximatclg 11.7 pounds pcr man por day.
0. Factors dOVClOpCd by tho offioo Of tho Chicf
%nrtcrmastcr varicd SawWhQt fro3 thosc Rbovo. The figuro
- 154 -
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

3-E-S-T-A-T-C-T-E-D
rccommondcd was 13.48 pounds pcr mnn por day, broken down
11s follocvs:ll
ZIT-80 12 00 pounds/man/day
OthGr fUOlS 1.00 n
Lubes -242
Total 13.4% I
Thc diacrLpnncg bctwcm thcsc factors r.nd those dcvdoncd
bv thu Area Petrolam Office nppnrently liLs in tho us0 of
di ffcrcdt oonsunption records RS wGll ?s difforont manpower
rigurcs.
23 5. Conclwions ,
R. That tb mcthods and proccdures of computing
loAisticnl f ectors wLro gsnerally sotisfnctory.
b. Tit tho fnctors as finally dcvelopcd and concnrrod
in by thc vnricus -goncibs concGrncd v&rC SntiSiWTtOIy.
236. €?ccom-wnc?,atlcb. That PGrtiiIGIlt aOCtrhCS, techniques
and ‘br Dooortmont publiccticns bo nmltndd. by approprIRt6
Pgoriclas of the ‘ror Dcpurtnont.
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliography
Chapter 18
1. Dictionarp of United Qtntas Anny T~rins,!IN 20-205, dtd
18 S a 44.
2. OtafT OPficor's Piold Ibnucl, Organization, TGchnicol
and LoRistical nata, m 101-10 oot 43.
3. nuartc-mastar Scrvicc.Rofcrcnco nata, (Section 111,
Chapter 3, Volume 111, Hq, SOS, CTQIJSA, dtd 1 Tcn 44.*(19)
4. stmdnrd ''ilitary VChiclcS, TI1 9-2800, dtd 6 "3r 43.
6. 12th ,2131~"roup Yinal ffitcr Action Papart, ChnFtcr 4,
26 rlul - 14 SCO 44. *(32)
7. J,tr, '.qs, 12th O..smy Croup to Commanc?ing Goncral, EMUZA
dtd 25, ?lor 45. *(bo)
8. Crea Totroloum DfPicc I:xporience Rqcrt, UndatQd. *(16)
10. Ccnsukytion Rates of U8 Forccs In the 71~11Advance to
the XhinG, PRmF, dt2 24 ADr 45 (TrepGrod by C;totisr;ics
Suction, (3-4niv.)
11, n,uartsrmstcr Oporational Analysis ?lo. 4, aubj: :'Quartormastor
Pounds par Ian ncr Dcy, noted, 17 movembor 1945.
*Number in parentheses I s Catalog IWabcr used in Inventor
or Phtori&l, ($ Study No. 109, (2lans 111
~uGply7,file R ~ ol/ll.
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R-B-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
CW'JXR 19
S%ICTION i
LISSIOi;, ORoBilIQTIOIJ AND FUNCTION
237. Ussion. The mission of the Gesglfse Sup;Lg' Company
is t o opermss I11 distributint and bulk reduotion points
for the supply and issue of gasoline, oil and lubricants to the
using forces. It was the operatink base of Class I11 suyply
in the European Theater of Operations, both in the Communications
Zone and in the Combat Eone.3 It operated ht beachheads,
truckheads, rpilheads, gipeline terminals, exid airfields. St
also establishea roadside fillin& stations .3
238. Orr.anization.1
a. The Gasoline Sup,dy Company is a flexible orLanization,
oomposed of a company liendquarters and tido operating
platoons. Each ylatoon can operate inaependently. A total of
56 laborers are provided for handline.
b. There are 21 truoks, 2A-toa oargo and trailers
arganio in the company for hauling gasoline a d allied proaucts..
The following teohnical equipment is organic to the coupany:
12 - extinauishers, fire, oarbon-dioxide, permanent
sl!ut-off 1.5 pounds
1 - oleaning equipaent, bun, gasoline, engine
driven
- tanks, colla&ble, 3,000 gallon capacity,
for r;et,rolew products
3200 - cans, gasoline, five gallons
4. - pumps, gasoline dispensikg, 100 gallons
per minute
4 - p~mp~, Eaooline dispensing, 30 gallons
per ninute
4 - pumps, barrel, kerosene or gasoline, with
hose and nozzle
8 - pumps, barrel, oil dispensing
Q. Experience proved the organic fire figlitiw equipment
to be inadequate, unless used imclediately at the start of
a fire. Once the Pire wa8 w ell started, the limit$ ran e and
core of effectiveness of the extinguisher rendered it reffitjively
useless, while the danger to using personnel was correspondingly
hlgh.5
239. Functions.
a. The col;rpany is desicned to handle all matters
pertahing to the receipt, storage and issue of' $aeoline and
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allied prodacts.2
P-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
b. The corspany normally issued Lasoline on a oan-
for-can exchange basis. It was res2onslble for the cleaning,
refillin&a and ta@nL of the empty cans. It received gasoline
in five-gallon cans or in bulk by pipeline or rail tank
cars. ,men it received &asolineIn bulk, the company was res-
FOnSlble for its reduction into five-gallon or 55-gaI.lon containers
suitable for issue. Retail distribution of gasoline
in 55-gallon drums was held to a mini" except in the Southern
Line of Communications where It was extensively used. Distributlon
by this method always elicited complaints I?" cammanders
and $uflrtermasters of combat units because of tho difficulty
in handlin; the full 55-gallon drum. The use of this
method resulted in numerous cases of hei-nia and it should not
be ornployed except as a last resort& The cmpany establish-
ed distributing points in such a manner as to facilitate receipt,
storage and issue, and take advantage of camouflage
and di8,Jersion. Distributint goints were normally located
within a convenient distance of the usin, units and of the
souroo of sugply from the next higher echelon.
0. Each operating platoon has the followink rated
daily oapaoity, assuming that the trips from railheads or
bulk redu tion points to issue pointo conwe an average of
one hour: f
Bulk reduction of 72,000 gallons of gasoline and
oleaning of 3000 five-gallon buns and 300 55-gallon drums
8. In the &noliean Theater of Operations, the aotual
cnpaoits of gasoline supv oompanies was considerably leas
than the re& capacity. lfi Lo additional labor attaolied,
and a normal trip the of two houra, the company could nornal-
ljr receive in bulk, reduce and issue e.Liproximately 50,000 &allons
per day. :nth one Quertermester service campany attaohed
for labor, and all reoeipts in five Lallon cans, the capao-
ity was raised to a maximun of pOO,~v30 eallons.
2110. Troop Basis and Control.
ah The Commandin, General, Comunicatione Zone,
allocated Gasoline Supyly Com;:anies to sections and base sections,
Communicatione Zone, and to Army Groups depending upon
their availability. The Army Group in turn allocated the companies
to the Armies on the basis that normally one oompany is
required to servioe armv troops and one coolpang to service a
typ3 corps, or that a total of five to eieht companies is required
for a field army.3
b. The ooa1,any was normally attached to a Quartermaster
Battalion for administration and technical oontrol.
The battalion in turn, was attached to a Quartermaster Group
that operated directly under tLe &arternraster of the Advance
or Base Seotions, Conununioations Zona, or under the Arqr Quartermaeter.
At times, functional control was eliminated from
tha Quartermaster Group and waa direct frou the Section or
m v Quartermaster to the company or ba%tai.ion.b
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241. Bulk Delivery and Reduction.
a. Delivery of bulk gasoline was normcllp msde by
pipe linc or rail tank cars. Delivery by air was exyerhsnted
with and. provc?d overwhelmingly successful, notably durint the
leriod 30 Xcirch to 14 b1by 1945 durin, which time an aggrecate
of 43,021 net tons were successfully delivered to thti First,
Third, Seventh and Rinth US Armies. This method has a distinct
disadvantage, pakticularly over loni loeiutic lines4
The delivery to the Bruieg just mentionod consumed almost half
as much gasoline as it delivered, expressed in terns of aviation
e;nd motor Lasoline roso~ctively.13 In some instances
tank trucks were usod to cai-ry the bulk Essoline beyond the
facilities of the pipe Uno or rail cars, ond required the
punpint: of the Lasolinc frm the tank cars to tho tank trucks.
This dns done by use of the 100 gallon pcr minute dispenser,
and later with a 350 gallon per minute llispsnsu mounted on a
trailer .7
b. Bulk reduction (decanting) was acoomplished at
all types of installations, althGueh normally this operation
was centered in the Communications zone.3 Tho four 100 gallon
per minute dispensers were utilized for this operation. Addi-:
tional dispensers were often mcessary to obtain additional
capcity. Large uzvitg dispensin; s2stems in lieu of power
dispensers were used only in an emerF_ency,sin06 experience
provod them too lieht for hLsa duty. They overheated repidly
and presented a fire hazard,83,10 The uesi@ of the 100 tallon
per minute dis,>cnsar proved a constant souroa of difficulty.
It is suspended fron ono ond only, and as the bearin@ became
worn the rotor habitually got off center and soorod the housin&,
necessituting excessive ra,airs. It was necessary to mass
produce 10CQlly spare cafltings for the rotor and to rebore the
housine to permit the opsration of the ovorsiscd casting. A
100 Callon per minuto dispnser dosiLned with %he rotor mountod
in a journal at each and would have buen more aatisfactory.13
c. For efficient bulk rdduction and issue it was
necessary to have largo numbers of five-&allon Gasoline cans
available. Tha allovranco of 3,200 cor~pqvwas insufficient,
and augneotation from theater stocks was thc rule.l3 In the
Communications zone, operations at pipa linc terminals required
frori eicht to ll+ five-gallorh oaas daily for each five-&allon
om issuod to usily units.
242. Packaged Recaipts. The dalivcry of kasoline in fiva-
gallon cans oliminated thL nccasity fer docanting and shplified
opurations. All rocaipts en beachheads were packaged.
There, distnnces wore short and rw$irQirAbnta were normally
smnll.5 Rcceipts were also ,ackn,ed when air lift WOS usad
for dolivery in enerbencius. Issue was mde in such cases diroct
from tho airfield or fron nearby distributing points.6
243. Operations.
a. Tha operation of tht. company oonformed in Lcnara1
with preseribcd prooedura. Aupentation in pcl'sonnel and
transpcrtation was normal, The roadside fillin&, stctions which
wore establishcd in many areas to serve individual vohioles
provod inadequate for larLe melo consumption. They were effective,
howavbr, in eliminating individual vahiolee from tho
traffio of distributix pointis and truckheads.
b. Accurate bookkeepinc was casuntiol in order to

R-E- S-T-R-14-T-E-U
mointfiin a balanced stock of pctrolem products End to kuep
higher headquartcrs informed 05 tho consumption rata cnd of
the status of supply at 811 simea.12 Thdu waru 110 standard
accounting forms, howt,vur, and each army prescrib~dits ovm.
The genaral inexperience of tho gw compaay yursonnul in ac-
counting procedure, coupled with the vsriations in procedure
among the armies, resulted at timus in coafusion ond general
inaccuracy of reoords.
c. Trans ortotion was short. Ths maxhum rated ccpccity
of the two pfatoons is 144,000 @llons. Tho 21 trucks,
two and one-half ton, ossiignod arc capablo of trnns;lorting
npproximatdy 16,000 gcllons, thc Pull 3 ,200 containtr allowance,
esch trip. Due to thu distmoas betwcon bulk wduction
points and truckhsnds or distributing points, End the thd Tuquired
to Lond nnd unload vehiclos ench trip Dormfilly consumed
two hours. In thu normal 10 hour &orking day, thoufore, an
tiVW&gQ of only E0,000 gallons could bo transported in orkcnic
vahiclQs without overloading.
244. Conclusions.
a. That thu rated capccity of tho Gasolind. Supply
Company was not attained due to S~OP~UE~ of personnel and
transportation.
b. That tho fire-fighting equipraaont Wac innclequate.
c. That tho 3O-g&llon-p6r-s~nutt &isdenser wns not
used due to its inedequzcy, snd tho nwiber of 100-~~illon-perminute
dispensers ofton provbd insuffioient. The design of
the 100-gallon-por-ninutu dispenser also proved inadequate.
245. Recommendations.
a. That tho mount of prsonnel and transportation
and the number of gosolinu d.rm8 be incruased ii1 sufficient
quantities to enGblo thc company to mebt its norm1 rcqdirementa.
b. That EL firo-fighting sootion, with suitable
eo_u.ipment, be included in each platoon.
c. That pertinent doctrines, tacliniques nnd Tables
of Or&.anization and dquipinmt be amended by nplpopririte agencies
of the Wnr I)opartmGnt.
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R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D
Bibliotraphy
Chaptcr 19
1. Qatod 21
2. ai 10-465, ;Luc.rt~..rrarister Bnndbook IIGosoline Supply
Company", datud 5;r.y 1943.
3. Study on Ogorntions of 4.: Grsolins Supply Compcnlcs,
brtliovd to hcve ori;inc:tod nt Hq ZTOUSA, undcLtud. *(l3)
b. Study on Oporntlous cf ;luc.rtcrmastu Gosolinu Sug?ly
Caipnny, Hq 12th hFd7 Group, undated. *(34).
5. First US Army Roport of Oyiratlons, Annex No. 14, 20
0ctobL.r 1943 to 1AuLust 1944. *(44).
6. Aftir Action SeEort, Third US Army, Quu.?rtewosttrr,
1 Aueust 1944 t o 9 Aky 1945. (Airil C;icrntions).
7. AGF Raport Bo. 830, dflted 9 April 1945. *(23 ) .
a. h:amo for record - Visit to Firat cnd Ninth Armies,
Re6dquorters Twelfth Army Group, Quuertermmter Section,
dcted 17 1:ovsmbcr 1944. *(35).
9. L;w~D C4 to Quartermastsr, FUSAG, dated 13 b;ny 1944.
*(41!.
10. Informal Report on Ilecenting Oporetlons from Thoator
Chief &uartormstm to tho Gonoral Board, undatod. *(55).
11. AGF Raprt 110. 981, dated 22 1;ny 191~5. *(29).
12. Oca1 Cir Lottor No. 10, HwaaoUortGr3 Seventh Amy,
dated 13 April 1945.
Cmients, LetterI Thootcr Chiof Quartornosttr, 13 DUO
45, to tho Goncroi Board. *(56).
* - Number in prcnthcsus 1s Catalog Numbvr used in
Invontory of Uaterial, 0;Study No. lo9 (Class
111 supply), File R 401j11.
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R-E- S-T-R- I-C-T-E-D
CHAPTER 20
CLASS In (SOLIDFUELS) OFEXATIOI.JS
SICTION 1
GXNEFAL
246. Source and Availability_.
8. The supply ~'fSolid fuels throughout opera-
tions in the mropean Theater was rarely adequate, The
suDplg of Coal immediately following the invasion of Normandy
was critLcal. Indigenous production in France,
Relgium and YOllsnd was approximately 50 percent of normal,
and there was an even greater reauction in the amount of
imported coal which, under norms1 c nditiom, hsd provided
one-third of civilian requirements.8 Coal was requisitioned
and supplied from the Uzited Kingdom. Limitations
on ship transport provented large scele im@orts from either
the TJnited Kingdom or the United Stntes. Accordingly, reqUb%iY3Ita
were met largely from local sources, A system
of priorities was established to insure that both military
and essential civilian requirements were fllled.7
b. The ahcrt supply of coal in the fall of 1944
forced the exploltation of wood resources of fiance. Readycut
wood 888 Durchased an8 cuttirlg r!ghts were secured in
forests in various Tarts of France. Results, however, were
not satisfactory. Transportation was short, and it waa
often found that the cut wood rllocated by the French waa
not available or that it could not be moved out when an
attempt was made to pick it up. Of the 104,722 cords of
cut wood allocated by the French government between 1 November
19 4 and 30 April 1945, only 18,888 cords were de-
livered. 8
c. Production of coal in Germany was negiigible
by 9 V:ay 1945. The overall military and civilian auropean
demand exceeded the supply. Stops were taken immediately
to reorganize the luines and resume production, but it was
neoesswy also to or anize production of fuel wood to supplement
coal supply. i!
247. Comparison of F~'ilels.6 For troop USE, the fuel
value of one cord of wood is considered the equlvalent of
one ton of bituminous coal. With wood cutting tools and
equipment normally available, production of one cord of
firewood normally requires three man days. The production
of on8 ton of coal normally requires one man day. In order
to obtain maximum fuel value of wood 8 seasoning period
of from six to eight months should be allcwed subsequent
to the felllng of the tree. Coal has full heating valus
as soon a8 mined. To transport a quantity Of Wood aqua1
ln fuel value to a quantity of coal requires more than
twice the traneportabion facilities. Thus, coal, in addition
to b6hg less bulky, more effioiect and easi6r to
handle than wood, is also preferable to wood from both
produotion and transportation atandpoints.
248. Alloflances. In order to oonserve coal and insure
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R-2-S-IF-R-I-C -T-E -D
its iasue for the essential requirements a system f - wjarities
and allowances was established as fo1lows:g
a. Hospitals - 12 pound6 per bed per day during
winter, f iVG pounds per bed per day during ather. seBisons.
b. Coffee Rcasters - 400 pounds per day per roaster.
e. space heatin?, cooking and hot water - four
pounds per man per day du&g mace' heatinpmn only.
During other seasons, one and one-halP pounds Der nhn per
day for cooking and hot water.
d. Engineer blacksmith forges - six -Jounds per
forse per day.
e. Others - static bakeries, bath units, laundries,
?ed cross, et- authorized by the Chlef Quartermaster.
Fuel wood was substituted for coal as necessary. Local pro-
ourement of solid fuels, except wood, was prohibited except
where specifically authorized.
249. Procedure. The su>ply of solid fuels was a Tu r
termaster function ana followed normal supply c1mnnels.I: ,g
The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Sup-
ply Division, was the overall controlling agency. It
soreened both military and civilJan requirements, and allo-
cated the fuele to the sepalate agencies based on priorities
and availability or the fuels.ls2 The Qu&r',erm&ster
Corps, based upon the allocation recelved, procured, stored
and Issued the fuels to the uainq forces based on the pri-
oiity and allowances established.
250. Requirements
SEOTION 2
O"TOP?S
a. Coal for the iriitlal invasion of the continent
w4s ship_ned from the Trdted Kingdom. Shipments were made
based upon estimates of requirements submitted by supreme
FTeadquarters, Alliea Ex editionary Forces, and approved by
the Eritish '!far Office.4 The init:.al estimate for the
United states military foroes WES mads by the First US Army
and submitted to the 21st Army Group for consolidation and
approval. by Supreme Headquarters. As the sjtuation grogeseed
the Chief Quartermaster reoeived the estimates from
the armies, air fcroeg, Kavy on shore, and section Quartermasters;
edited and oonsolldated the Pequirements; and submltted
the estimated total requirements for all United States
Forces to supreme Heaciquar$ers, Similar eatinates of requirements
by other Allied Forces were submitted for screenine
and approval to Supreme Eeadquarters.9
b. each estimate containod a statement of anticipated
fuel consmption during t'Ie calendar nonth, a consolidated
requisition for the following month, and an
estimate of fuel needs for the next sucoeeding month.9
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251. Responsibility.
R-E-ST-R-I-C-T-E-D
a. supreme Eeadquarterg maintained control throush-
out the operation. As the operations on the continent pro-
gressed and more countries were liberated or occupied,
Suprema Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, reorgan-
ized and decentralized control. It established, in each
country, a Solid Fuels Sub-Seotion composed of the military
and civilian representatives of governmen transportation,
and the coal mines or production A9 the sub-
sections were organized, the Allied Forces submitted tieir
estlmates of rue1 requirements within ench coun r scparately
to the sub-section of the country concerned.trg The subsection
operated directly under the Solid Fuels Section of
Supreme Headquarters, and was responsibls for:3
Alvising on all matters pertaining to indigenous
production ai solid fuels, and
for carrying out instructions of Supreme
Headquarters relative to Solid Fuels production.
Rcrsening essential civilian requirements.
Presentation of military solid fuels requireffients.
lreparation of proposed a.llocations for
approval.
Arrangement and coordination with appro-
priate civilian and military authorities
for the dlstribution of solid fuels within
the country to the normal divtribution
cor-tera, by railway, water or road.
Coordination of the movement and bistri-
bution of exported or imported solld fuels.
b. As ,he operating solid fuels aqency for the
United States military forces, the Chlsf '),uartermaster was
responsible for:4,8
Submitting estimates afl required and xe-
CeiVhg the allOOtitiGn8.
Coordinating with the Chief of Transportation,
Zuropean Thcater of Oporatlons,
for the shipment and delivery of coal from
continental point of origin r port to
destination for consumption. t?
Maintaining daily contact with the Britiah
Var Office for the implementing of the
agree& coal shipmGnt Drogran.
Accounting for all coal received from all
sources by all United Dtates forces, except
some coal procbed by the Goneral
%chasing Agsnt by diroct neg0tiati0n.l~
c. The Quartermasters of the field armies were
re8pOnsible for submitting sstiaates of fuel required, and
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R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D
for the procurenent, storage and issue of solid fuels to
subordinate unlts for both military and essential civilian
use.
252. Operations.
a. The Advance Seotion, Communications Zone, began
solid fuels operations on the oontinent when sacked coal
began to arrive early in July l9lJ+, and the first Advance
Secti n OOSl dump was eetablished In Cherbourg on 14 July
1944.q Deliveries of coal thrOUghOUt the operation failed
to meet the allocations establishcd by Supreme Headquarters,
dua princi ally to the shortage of production and trans-
portation.f2,13
b. Loce ocuremnt was at times instituted by
the field forces.iipCoal was procurd by requisition from
local Belgian and French mines efter approval of headquarters,
Advanoe Section, or Canmunioations Lone. At times,
when the situation was critical, representhtives from th
armfcs were stationed at the dries to expedite shi ment fo
coal was also prooured from captured snamg stocks.flt12.
0. Considering the entire period of operations on
the continent, a supply of coal was obtained barely adequate
to meet military requirements on drastically reduced standards.
The supply was always critical from D-Day until
April 1945, at H$ioh time small stoo!? piles were eOQUmUlated.
rlequirmasnts for essentfal civill3n use wero at the
minimum standard to sustain communities.
253. T)istribution.
a. Distribution to the using units was made on
the basis of the allowances eateblished by Supreme Head-
quarters, In the Third US Army, hOWtiVBr, It was necessery
to reduce the allowances in ,Tanuary 1945, from four pounds
per man to two pounds, and to request a decrease of1ppercent
in consumption by a?!r&y ana corps headquarters.
During the winter months of 1944-45 lasue of solid fuels
was made by the armies a8 received.20 It was impossible
to accumulate reserve stockpilee in the army areas until
later In 1945 when the weather bocame less severe.12
b. Dump distribution was normally maae either
at army coal dumps, whioh stocked only aolid fuels, or at
army Class IT1 sJppDly pints, which stocked solid futls in
addition to normal supplies. In either case, the dumps
were operated by Quartermaster service oompany personnel.
Using units drew dirsot from the dumps. At other times,
when the Army zone of Operations inoluded the coal mining
district of Germany, ardes sometimes issued direct from
the mines to the using units. martermester serviae coapany
personnel pwformed the administrative work at tho
minee and German ctvilians performed the labor.
254. Conclusions,
SECTION 3
COIJCLUSIONS AND RECOImNDATIOW
a. That for operational use oonl is greatly
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R-E-3-T-R-I -C-T-E-D
preferable to WOO& us fuel becnuse it minimiaos the transportation
problem and requires fewer mn-dLys of production.
b. That the suaply of fuel for military require-
ments t,v4r$~pbfained at the minimum standard. Supply for
essent€nl civilian requiremnts was at the extreme minimum
standard to suppcrt communities.
o. Thet transportation and coal production were
short of the established requirements.
d. That organization and nathods and procedures
used in the supply of solid fuels were generally suitable,
but that the military forces were dependent at all times
on ooncessions froIc governments of liberated countries for
an adequate supply of coal.
255. Recomendations.
a. That copl be used in preference to wood whenever
possible.
b. That 511 possible steps be taken in future
operations to plan and provide for produotion and shipment
of fuele to meet both military and civilian requirements.
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R-E-S-T -R-I-Cl -T-E -D
Pibliography
Chapter 20
i. .qclriinistrative !!em WC. L4, $HAET, dzted 2P Jan L5
(?SO ITT,h r 5). *(4)
2. innsx A, Adnioistrntive Kemo Wo. i+L+, SYAEF, dated
13 April 45. “(4)
3. :,&inlstretive !.0no No. 64, =Am, doted 28 Jsn 45
(sec TIT, Par 6). *(41
4. Addnietrotive Marc@ No. 44, WB,doted 28 Jan 45
(Sec 111, Qar 7). *(4!
5. 3” Tech Cir Ltr No. 16, Hq Com 2, dated 4 April 45.
*(1.2)
6. Infornfil Report to The Generel Boord, Quartorcaster
Slcss I11 C erations, Theater Chiai Quertermster,
undcted. *PI&)
7. Operational History, Advance Section, Cm“n1cotions
7flne 1943-1945 (Extrect fron Chapter VTI, Section 11)
*P2J
8. Administrative Memo No. 44, SHtXF, deted 28 Jen 45
(SFC IT, Par 9) *(4)
9. SOP No. dated 4 July 44 (Coal PrC -
oedure)
10. First TTS Army Report of Operations, 1 August 1944-
22 Pebruer 19115 (Annex No. 10, Guartermaster Section
?emrt). g(4j)
11. After Action Eeport, Third US Army, Quartermuster
@ectioc, 1 AWuBt 1’344 - 9 Mar 1945.
12. 4fter Action %port, Ninth UF, Amy, dated lh Dec 44.
13. Conferenoe with Captain VI. 14, Eunney, BAEF G-4.
Solid TueIs Sub-Section, 15 June 1945.
11,. Confsrence ;uIth Captain J. 8. Tolbert, Fifteenth US
Army, Solid ‘We16 Division, 17 Nov 1945.
15. Comments Letter, Theater Chiof Quartermaster, 13 Dec 45,
to The General Board. *( 56)
* Nunber in parentheses is Dotalop Nmber used 14
Inventory of bbteriels, Stud? No. 109, (Class
I11 supply), fila R 401/11.
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CL.qs.5 I
75
60
75
Ltr.dated 29 Hov 1942-37.D.,Sabj.
Levels of supply, Em.
Cable It-97113 dated 20 June 1943.
?able a-6493 dated 3 irec 1543.
bb Ltr. dated 20 Jan 1944-;il.D.,
75
subj. Levels of supply.
Ltr. dated 26 aril lYM-ii.D.,
subj . Levels of supply.
bo Ltr. dated 26 j.$ril 1944-W.D.
Subj- Levels of Supply.
60 Ltr. dated 23 ~ov1$4W,r.n.,
50
SSj. Levels 02 su;iply.
Ckljle 3iAIX-4b9ll dated 3 Larch
1945.
L tile levels shmn were dutliorxeo. for y'l'criJ5~, the Chief Quartermaster voluntarily elected to
utfii;e t k levels ~ shown beloui. Levels shmn reamed ii effect until I&reh l%5, at w15ch time
levois conl'ormed to those sho:dli above.
I
I1
III
E
P.x.

400.312 (C-4 SUD)
SUBJXT: Rewlsitioninr and ::oveiient of SuDplies,
28 Octobcr 19/d+
TO : comand l.ng General, Smmunicetions Tone, .'PO GG7,
1. ''rith the concurrence of your hea0.n-uarters, represea-
tatives of e-4 and the Spocial.9taff Sections of this heod-
quartcrs have followed throuph, fron the tine originated
until supplies vme delivered, rec;.u?.sitions which wcrc ?laced
by the First fray on 2G and 30 Septenher 191:.&. ,Illmpresentatives
i"w repyired to reyort on their observations while
on t?ie mission, tozet!icr vith any reco;moiidetionu t&y consitered
a-,yropriate.
2. rertinent cozicnts in the report- of these zepresen-
tatives have been extracted and ooiidensed pi13 are agpended
hereto as inclosures 1 t o 12 inclusive. In acdition iiovei'nunt
tables of truck and. rail Crans:>ortation aro likewise aplienfied
as inclosures lj t o 17, inclusive.
3. Prom th o'mervations of our representatives the
followinp conclu.sions are drawn:
a. The stock records of the Services in Treadquarters,
Coimimications Zone are and vrill yeain inaccurete un- .
ti1 proper cor.mwice.tione me established. The eutkority for
dli-eotinc shipments is centralized., and procedures aholitGd
by the services for thelr depots R ~ Bunifom.
b. me Service re?resentatives In the Po~-md.y Base.
section ?Teadque.rters nake many ChnnpS Ln the Slii??i)iw ortors,
releases, or r.equisitions sent dovm frcn Puis.
c. P.s Indicated in the observation Jf the 1:edical
and Pinnal representatives, the desi,qatioii of only one of
many de?ots for fillin,? roquisiti ons eliilinateo tyie :,ossibilitg
of obtaining all itert:is recuested on the requisitions
even If all are available in thc sevcral depots.
d. The faot that many aystam of docmentation exist
in the depots nelresmit a?Foar that no unifora procerlui'e has
been established. .?roper tally outs, end mybills for rail
and truck wou.ld ellainate nany errprs in shi:>mnts and vrould
assist in expeditinc delivarles. .lany shi,pionts reach tho
Amdes with no or little evidence as to I:.hst the itca3 me
supposed to be and the identifj.cfltioon :dth my particular
ahippinc ordm or Fequisition is iGlgrObnbl6, if not impossible,
Any snstmi, uniformly establf shed, ~711icbvould carry
tho identity of the rcquisitlcii number of the Arw, the item
shipped, end the .,roper destination would lilaterial1:r I~IXCOVB
the flow Of Sl?~pliQS.
e. The train symbols of asslnnsd. trains iluot be
aaintalned from point of oriqin to ultimate destinatiOn.
Further, standard trains should be formed in such rmnnor thct
they may be keyt intact fron origin to destination. This
would assist In an even flow of supply and. enable the accur
ate passin? of infomntion to be sent to the reglllatinCr,
station.
AP?m!DC: 2 of 3 pagas - 1 -

f. Lack of control of truck s!?lyaents an< delqvs,
in soxe iistmces renulted in fellures to receive s n ~ q
ahi:i.ients. 110 thorouc?l check could be xade at i>e Z?s along
t:ia rhiite Of lnolm COilL*OgS m

R-+~;-T-BI-+T-,+L)
within 24. hours of the shipped, all supplies shipped , requisitions
of the .!Jmy th& cfillod tor these supplies, nethod of
shiment, and if TracticaSlc, ex:?ectc& orrlval time,
e. h syten of comunication be estahlished which
will enable shiments to be ?roperly controlled , inforiytlon
fonvarvled grom>tly, an& oontrol of trains ct railheads Imgroved,
f. Eupplies beinc transferred fron truok to rail
be kept to3cther by claoses and Services.
e. r;u$ply ohlpents he given precedence, exce:2t for
hospitfll treins.
h. Information on supply ?olicies and. yrooeGures be
adequately Rnd promptly' communimted to all 6uborCinel;es that
handle su7ply s:iipients.
i, ".hen itom o.re not aveilable, Informstion be
furnished proqtly to the Amies whioh will enable them to
plan on the future availability or the iten.
finish,
j. Trains oarry the sea3 doslpqation frm start to
17 Inclosures (not included)
For the A%y Grou!, Cormander:
/s/ Raymond Otone Jr.
RAYNOIJD.STON2 Jli.
Colonel, AMI
Asat Adj Cen

HOW SENT TE1 S” ”_--
1. Xailhead (as of 2400) ^__-I-c
2, Reporting Unit _-I--
3. Total StrenLth for Rations , ________
4. List of Org~~ic units w/strength (inoluda in Item 31-
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13 -
14.
15
16.
17
18.
19 m
- ~ ~-
Llst of Attz.ciled Units w/stren&h (inclucle in Iten 3)-
-lDesi&nation of Eender Time Signed
AUTIIORI!UD TO BE
SENT W CLEAR
signature of Officer Signcture & Grade of
?ri ter
Incl No. 1, 602
Third uny, 1943.

SUBJJ~CT: ;uar termast er Re Guireuents ,
VOC/JLD/bq
7 October 191,4
TO : Co~mmendingGeneral, Continental dvance Section,
U. S. Lrmy, AFTdlITIOI?: Quartermaster.
1. Reference letter, this headr;ucirters, dated 30 Eeptember
194.4. file AG 400.213 Q.I,subjeat W,uarterxaster
Requ'iretieiitsTt, effecsive upon the receipt of this letter
the require~ents contained in the reference letter m e superseded
by those listed below and shi-nents baled on the
net7 recjuirer.ents are to begin on 15 October.
a. EPIliAL - For VI Corps & .iriny 'L'roops
J.
(1) Class I
Rations, Type nBtl 110,300. ea
Rations, Type ttlO-ln-lf' 59,000 en
Rations, Type 'ICq1 5,700 ea
Amy Pack E77 mses
Coffee 2,592 lbs
bXlk 6,474 cans
Sugar 6,474 lbs
Soap 17,550 1bs
Toilet Paper 3,510 rolls
itabrine 25,000 ea
Eialazorre 25,000 ea
f:osp, Sip,)lenent 700 cases
Vitamin Tcblets 70,000 ea
Sub Total Tonnage 375.7 L.T.
Brand baking ingredients
Flour 60,700 ibs
Yeast 910 lb8
S R l t 1,210 lbs
Sug&r 1,825 lbs
Lard substitute 1,625 ibs
t!ilk, d.rq, pwd, skim 1,210 lhS.
Sub botal tonnage 30 L.T.
Total Class I Tonnaie 405.7 L.T.
loo,$ IIBlI ration included Tor A ir Corps
strenkth of 15,000, plus.30;b build up.
(2) Glass 11 - Torweeme requirenents for Class
I1 @ SV from 15 Ootober l9ft.L to 21 October
1944 will be 325 toils ~ e day. r This
notes an increase ns to p-evious zecuii-ementa,
but it is iuperative to have above
tonnage so that initial issue of winter
clothing (Coxlbat) eild tenttihe { heevy) can
be move& into this nrea.
LUNTfILLE - For XV Gorp8
(1) Class I
Rations,
R8tiOUS,
TyL3e 'I3"
!i3778 'llo-kl-l'l
50,000
45,000 ea
ea

:'-&S-P-K-I-i-T-& u
Rations, TJT,e ~IC?! 9,000 ea
Aooy Pack 520 ctises
Coffee 2,160 lbs
hiilk 5,400 cans
Sujar 5,400 lbs
Soap 10,400 lbs
Toilet Paper 2,060 rolls
atabrine Tablets 17,000 es
IIalazone tablets 17,050 ea
IIosp Supplcunent 400 c6ses
Vit min tablet s 60,000 ea
Sub total toiiiihge 251.1 L.T.
Bread bekin& inbredients
Flour 36,000 lbs
Yeast 540 lbs
Selt 700 lbs
Sugar 1,080 1bs
Lc re, substitute 1,OGO lbs
Milk, dry, pvd, skin 7U0 ibs
Sub total toiffiage 18 L.T.
Totnl Class 1 toimage 269.1 L.T.
2. Request that supplies for each delivery pcint be
loeded as a separate shiifiieilt Qad that ench railroad car be
cLearly mrked rrith its destinttion.
9. The obove date &iven for shi2nents to begin is
based on rail COrmimicetioiiS being olened. In event they
are not you will be notified by cable.
DISTRIBUIPIOK:
-
3 0"
1 - iiG
1 - G-4
1 - Col Lmssey
1 - Oieretions
2 - Bile
For the Commondint General:

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
HZAD~U,QTERS SEVENTH AEE
A-)O 758 U.S. ARrf WC/JLD/bq
AG 400.217 Q! 7 Ootober 1944
3JBJECT: N.artermaster Cluss 111 Requlrements.
TC : Cowanding General Continental Advance Section,
rJ.7. Amy. Attention: Petroleum Officer.
1. Reference letter, this headquarters, dated 30 September
1944, f ile AG 400.213 1,Subject: "Quartermaster
Class I11 Requirements", effective upon the receipt of this
letter the requirements contalned in the reference letter
are superseded by those listed below and shipnents based
on the new requirements ere to begin 15 October,
a, PFTU
Gasoline, Y-PO 180,000 gals.
Diesel Fuel Cil 7,20G gals.
I'erosens 1,450 gals.
Engine Oil, SAT 10 700 gals.
Engine Oil, SIC? 30 3,800 Gals.
Pnqine Oil, SAX 50 600 gals.
Universal Gear Lub SAE 90 800 gals,
Grease, Ga ql 700 lbe.
cream, GP $2 400 lbs.
Grease, 3 ''3 200 lbs.
Grease, '13 $4 /+8 lbs.
Total Tonnage 650.6 L.T.
b. LLJNXVILLE
Gasoline, V-80 120,000 gals.
Diem*, Fuel Oil b,800 gala.
Kerosene 950 jals.
gn5ine Oil, 3LE 10 500 gals.
Engine Oil, SM 30 2,500 gals.
xngine Oil, 50 400 qal 8.
Universal Gear Lub S&E 90 600 gals.
Grease, G" 41 500 Ibs.
crease, GP $2 300 lbs.
crease, VP 'fg 150 lbs,
Grease, 1% 'il, 36 lbs,
Total Tonnage 43k.3 I.?.
NOTX: %e ebove tonneges inolude shipment of 370 tons x'
~~-80 in rail tank car9 dally es predioated ln CES
oable.
2. Dequest that all Easoline bB shipped by tank car
or it 5 qal IT,,$. containers. xo 55 gal ~.~UJUS of V-80 gas-
oline or any ,rerry cans me desired ih the Army Area.
5.hipment of Diesel me1 Oil in 55 gal drums is satisfaotory.
3. Supplies for each delivery nolnt to be loaded
a8 a oeparate shipment and eaoh oar to be marked Clearly
with its destinetion.
4. he above data given for shipents to be&n is
AI?P&tQIx 5 of 2 pages - 1 -

DIST31IBUT"ION:
3 - co"
1 - AG
1 - G-&
1 - Go1 Lasse?;
1 - Operotioiis
2 - iFile

Office of the Chief Quartermaster
AT0 6F7
WTPJSCT: Yission of the Charlero: Depot Area,
Ti! : The Quartermaster, Channel Base Sect'tcn, AFO 228,
11. S, Arm (Thru Cowanding General)
1. Enclosed is the mission for the Chmleroi Depot
Area, Q-lF3. You will note thnt the PX mission is being
shifted h"diately from Lille-Mons Depot, 6-185, t o Charleroi.
2. Charleroi will be the grincipal Base Depot on the
Continent for Class I supaliea, and in addition to backing
up present depots, It must be prerared to assist in naking
shi?ments to build up Advance Depots wtich rill be established
in the future to support the First, ITinth, Third and
gaventh Armies. The maximum storage mission of 240,000 long
tons of Class 1 m y never be reached. Porrever, stora:e capacity
to this extent auPt be held in readiness as Theater ?eserve
%ace to meet suoh fluctuating requuirenents as nay
arise.
3. The attached iaission io substantially tte same as
draft coqiea which have been discussed in detail with your
office qnd repreeentatives of the De?ot, botk at Chsrlerci
and in Paris. It is requested ttat you have tte Depot hi?"diately
prepare a cietailed ?1an to lmpleaent this ICission,
to inolude planned utilization and allooation of storage
space and planned method of handlinq :n acd out tonnages.
It Is further requested that the Depot and your office send
their key olanninf: officers to Paris at the earliest possible
date with this detailed !>lan rf operation to iron out any
difficulties.
/s/ aohn B. Franks
Briq. Gen. USA
for /t/ ROPEllT 2:. LITTIEJCEN
Yajor General, IJ.3.A.
Chief Quarterma st er.
1 Tncl: Kission of the ChQrlerOi Depot Area.
.six 6) conies to @artermster, Channel 3aae Section, APO 228
six 16) conies to Gomiandin,? Officer, 52nd 31 Base Denot,
AVO 228

MI36ION OF CEULQZlTEOI DEPOT AREA.
-TQW)----
I. Charleroi Depot area has two basic missions:
a. As a Ease end Internediate Dewt it will:
(1) Receive and store re~ervas of Class I supplies
and make shipments to kmies and
other Depots 8s requlred, Charlerol will
be the pincipal source of Class I for
initial stockage of Advence Depots to be
established in the near future.
(2) Receive and store a nortion ox the thea-
ter Class I11 Fackaqed DOL reserve and
make shipments forwar9 to Depots and
Arffiies as required.
(3) 8eceive and store reserves of sumes
for First and Ninth Armies and ADRZC
(north) and mke shipments as requirea.
b. As a Distribution bnot it will:
(1) Receive, store end distribute all classes
of sugply to trooqs in the Depot Xrea as
directed by the Sase Section Comnander;
and receive, store and distribute aviation
gas to Air Corps Units 8s designhCBd by
USSTAF.
2. a. The ebove basic nissions are smarided a8
fellows:
Class I - 45 days for 600,000
(Tluo ~I/C‘,OCCIL/T additional
Class I)
Class I1 - Retall only as djrected by
Ease Section Commander.
Clsss ITT - 9etail of MT e0 and Allied Produets
as directed by Dase
Bection Com”der.
~ u l kstorage and issue of
Aviation qas to Air Corps
Units as deslTnoted by USSKF”
rortion of theater reserves of
paakaqed POL (About 42,COO
L/T).
Class IY - ?eta11 only a9 directed by
Rase Seotlon Commnnder.
7% - L5 days for 650,000 (leas gratuitous
iss~e items)
~5 davs for 400,000 (all item)
Plue’ lg,OOO L/T additional FX
civil Affairs- Aoproxlmately 25,000 L/T
(Class 1)
b. men Advance Depot(s) are established to support
thc airst and :Tinth pm~les,the Class I ni8SiOn of
Charleroi will be reduced to l+5 days for 200,000 sen, for
troops in the Depot area. I!owever, all faoilities will be
retailed aa theater reserve mace for use as repuired.

&&&T-.]-I-C-T-&D
3. ??sthate of total tonnages to be stored and handled
to nccomnlish the above mission is as follcws:
Lonq Tons to be
Lon.: Ton6 to handled dally
be Stored (In and Out) (a)
Cless I 2/0,000 6,000
Class I1 AS directed by Base Section
Commander
ClSSS IIT M)L
Retail As directed by Bbse ?ection
Commander
Theater Reserves of
Packaged POL
Aviation Cas
TY
Civil Affairs sunplies
42,000
3,000
20,000
25,000
AB direoted by CCQK
1,000
PO0
1,500
(a) Tonneges to be hnndled reoresent
the I’dxinwr. tonnape %hat the
de-ot must be nrenared to k,anh?la.
Actual tonnage w i l l fluotuate
below these fjgures.
1. To assist in oaloulating items, weights and storage
snaoe, the foll0win.l; publloRtion8 of this offioe have been
distributed to all deyots:
Eaoio ?-ode1 Ytooks, dated 20 January 1945.
Inltial Issue and Replaoemnt Taotoro, daced
20 Tecer‘ber 1944.
“a0kin.l: and RtriToin.: Data, datetl 1 ;Tovepiber 19L4.
(::uaolerient to Q’ .Service Relerencc- Data, 7701 I1
Revised)
5. Vis nisoion is sat forth in detail in attached
Annex A.
1 Tncl. - Annex A

Class of Supply
--__-__-_I
CLASS I
iron-Perisnables -
45 days for 600,000
broken dom as
follows:
Backq for Liebe
DePot (includes
R>.C icits/gratuitous
issue rx)
Retail for
Depot Area
Additional Class I
Wssion
15 days for
1,000, om
45 days for
2N,000
Theater Reserve
space
to be used
as iiiected
by OCQM
14 days for
100,000
10 days far
Zoo, 000
AS airected
by Base SectionCommander.
__
Area Served
I_
First & 1Gint.h
Armies and
;miC (Worth)
As Lirected by
Base Section
Coimxder
Internecikte &
advance Liejots
Depot Area
Depot Area
Depot Area
Lo% Tons
to be
Stored
45,000
25,000
170,000
700
1,000
kll Class I
Non-Perishable%-.-
-~
6,000
75
250
Represents baiance of level not stored
by Lie~e(e179)for First 0 Ninth Arnies
and kDSEC(1Iorth). Ilorma3J.y shipments
ill be made to Liege Depot and not direct
to Armies. It is planned that
later this mission will be transferred
to Advance Depot(s) to be established
for support of First & IIinth Armies.
Distritution nission.
Clizrler o i will receive, sort,classify,
and make balanced and balancinL ship-
r,ients of Clsss I to Advince & Intermediate
Depots zs required. It w ill be
the principal source of initid stook-
age of Adnnce Uepots to be established
in the near future.
Distribution nission.
Distribution nlissioii. Represents local
procurement to mxi~mmextent.
Distribution i.ussion only as directed
by Base Section Commcier .
An". "x"-Fa&e 1

Class of Su>&
CLASS rII
Mission drea bervai
Lor& Tons
-Go be
stored
POL:
hT-@ Gas Lqd
f.llieti procucts
As directed bg
Base Section
CommsnCer.
Depot Area 5,000 1,000 Eistrib-ution mission. Tonn2;e to be
handled represents incominb bulk POL
receivec di decsmteci.
1
t-.
0'
I
Y
3
H
I
c2I
?
M
I
VI
I
The,t er ileserve s
Pachked POL
viat ti on cas
Soliu Fuels:
cod
As directed by
ccU!J
Bulk supply to A b Corps
Air corps units un;ts 65
in Depot Area desi6mted
by USSTAF
AS directec. ty Depot Area
Base Section
Conmcier
42,W0
3,@J:,
4,000
1,000
Torumbe to be storea:
30,000 L/T packz;;eu LT Kl
~2,000 LJT pec!chec: Allied protiucts
Aviation Gas Storage point nust be
preparec to receive a C issue up to
full capacity of present facilitiest.
y
G
5
H
n
e3
M
W
--
viooci (See Remrks)
CLASS IV
A5 directed by
Base Section
cormdnder
45 hys for First an8
850, a13 iiinth grnie
Supmidon oi wood-cuttin& activities t5
an& procurecient of X D O ~2s ana when
directed by the c&rmrmzster, Chdnnel
Base Section.

P o\ CIVIL AFPAF-S
I (ClSSS I)
C I
Uission
I+5 days for
400,~o
Thehter Xeserve
Space
for use as
directed by
CCW.
ZLLk shipments/issues
DI;TAILr;D IdISSION OF CHdUROI DEPOT 2&a (Q-183)
Long Tons
to be
Area Served Stored.
-l--
Depot Area Total FX
1 20,000
I
I
frou Forts to Charlsroi bj GCr&;.
Autnorized
agencies ir?
depot are&,
md to ~mies
art Eegats cs
reyuireu.
25,000 1,500 1 Does not include Class 111.
(a)
Toraahes to be lientiled represent the rlIa.xiimiz
tumase thLt the Gepot must be :repded to
hannle. j,ctuei tonni-.ja will fluctuate below
thest: iL&,WeS-

Allocation Letter No. 45
AD 400-1 (Civil) GE-AGL 9 July 194.4.
(SWP/G-5/SUp/2342/1
- Oseration OERLORD - D plus 91 t o D idus 120.
SUBmCT: AllOCatiOn of Credita - Civil Affairs Supplies/Stores
TO : Commander-in-Chief 21 lcrmy Grcup.
(Rear Headquarters!
1. Listed below fire additional items of Supplies/Stores
approvod by this headquarters for use by British and U.S. Forces
under your oommend in the period D plus 91 to D plus 120.
Net Weight Proourement
1TCI; Long Tons Re sponeibi1it;r
Biscuits 2902 UK
Vit Chocolate 660 UK
Salt 146 UK
Flour 4355 us
M&V 653 us
Saup 291 us
TOTAL 9007
2. Allocation of milk roquirements ifi under considera-
tion and will be the subjeot of a subsequent communication.
3. Details of' the allocations nade by this letter are
attaohed as Inclosure I. Sub-allocations between British and
U.S. Zones shown therein ma;' be varied as rquired to meet operotlonal
needs.
4. This letter is your authority for calli^ forward
the above items as operational needs tiay recuire.
5. All gertinent instructions oontained in Allocatibn
Letter No. 1, this headquarters, file AG 400-1 (Civil) GE-AOM,
dated 13 April 1944 will bo observed in connection with tho
dietribution of the Suyplies/Stores approved by this letter,
1 Inal: Technical data.
By cammand of General LISlUHO'3ER:
E. C. HCEl-It?;E
Oolonel, AGD
Aajutant General

1. Details of Supplies/Stores aiproved by
Allocation Letter Number 45 dated 9 July 1944
for use of 21 Army Group are:-
BZITISH ZOIE U.S. ZO1U Total Procue-
Im,I Net JeiLht Net ;leight Not 'v:eiEht msnt
tone Tons Lone Tonns Lon~Tons Rospon-
- sibility.
BlSCUitS 2743 159 2902 UK
Tit Chocolate 216 444 660 mc
Salt 138 8 146 UK
Flour 4116 239 4355 us
M & vf 517 36 653 us
soup 275 16 291 us
TOTALS: 8005 902 9007

SUBJECT: Allocation of Credits - Civil Affairs Su&plies/
Stores - U.S. Forcos - Operation OTLRLORD.
To : Commanding QBneral, Communication8 Zono, duropean
ThGater of Operations, U.S. Army,
1. The followinC supplles/etores of U.K. procuremont
souroe nro approved by this hoadquartors for use by U.S.
FOrCciS 8uriu, thc svriod D plus 91 to D plus 180, O,,eratlon
@TdRLORD:
_I Item Gross ,!eight, Lone Tons
Industrial Salt 200
2. This letter is your authority for calling forward
these supplies/atores as requirbd.
3. M1 pertinent instructions contained in Apgendlx "B-1
to Allocation Lettor l?o. US/l, this headquarters, SHAZB /Q-5
(Sup)/2342, datad 22 Au&urjti 194.4, will be obsertred.
For the Supreme Commander:
T. H. ULVIS,
Briydier General, USA
Adjutant General.

430 ?.qub
SUBJECT: Composite riation for C.T.O.U.S.I.
TO : The *~~.rtcrslaster.C-tsner~l,
0 StFeet S,",
%h?ngton, Deb.
27 April 1943
1. Waerisnoe in ITorth nJ'rioa has psoved a definite
need aurin? operatiom for a coqosita-packed ration to replaoo
the bttlk-gaokod m e W i ?ation.
2, Rsfereme ia aade to tfio following:
Exhibit A - Letter, Col. J.31.Sullive.n to rraj
GQn. Ehund B. Greqory, dated 17 Elnrch l.943,
with attachents.
Exhibit B - Letter, Obief ?.uar"ster
Hdqra. SOS .?TO to Chief Quarteiuaster
AFHQ, AT0 700 dated 31 January 1983,
subject: BubaIatencs Problains in Vorth Africa,
with re>li?sfrffii:
Lt. Col. RIA. Roas, Ora.
$1 N.P. Vllli€lm, Qm
Lt. Col:V;J, MacbaupUin, VrC
Cant. m.D. Pratt;o&C and
2nd Lt, E. 9alLard, VrC, joint
Exhibit 0 - rhotographs of Class I supplies
during North dfrioa cmipaign.
3, Tt 18 not desirable that de?endence be ?laced on
the r\ri%ish oom9osite ration (14 in 1) for futufe oprations.
"Chilo it was not woful in North li.frioc;ite nonus ;re poorly
adapted to :narioan tastes. ?!oreover, produotion cnpa-
City on this'tn!o ration will be strained to meet British
recluirenents .
4.. The !pyp 5-In-1 Ration is not satisfactory for use
over porids of several weeks, an6 in addition, is too
for Qff'iOfiQnt han8ling.
5, Difflcultiss in handlirlE and dlatributin8 the
'B' Ration emphasize the need for 8 composite-paolred US.
I?rmg ration. mia ration ahould have the followiap, oharacterietios:
8; Eaoh 0886 should oontnin twelve rations for one
basio monii. Variety Bhould be providod by offering five
aiiteront >onus. proper segregation aurinp; operations
foreign labor require8 simple cas0 aarkinc, f.0. BI-BZ-BJ-
I34 and 13-5.
-b, It should bQ IlUtritiOnallY Rdetluabe*

R-A-S- T-R-I-c-T-E-D
de Except for powdared whole ml~,powdered whole
eggs and fa”ClYstals, dehydrated and concentrated fooas
nust be oxoluded. This is necessary booausa this ration 1.dll
be used in operation whore there’will not be tiRe or oaportunity,
first to purify mtor wd, seoond, to rooonstitutc dohydrated
item. Cross Wight should not oxceed 75 lbs, Five
proposed menus for R 12-in-1 conposite-paoircd rs.tion cre attachQd
as Exhibit ‘T”.
BI A Can OPQner, mntohes, cigarettes, mtor 3uyifioation
element md latrine ;>apes should bc included.
-f . Eaoh oaso must contain three hating units.
These w ill yovide enouzh hoating units to su7oly weil .~I.oU~~S
soparated from their coolciny; facilltios.
8. Casos should bo of seaeonod t!’.nbor, battcnsd and
suitably strappod.
6. It is planned to us0 the proposcd 12-in-1 rctlon in
opcrntions aftor tho initial assault phcsa. Its U ~ G:rill
continuo inacfinitoly in the forward areas to vrhioh distri-
bution of bulk rations is diffioult; troops in tho r6-ir ?mas
~dll bo sup~iliod with Type ::Btf Ra.tion in biilk as early as
praoticablo.
7. It is propoacd to ;>rovido a 40 day suiyily of coqosite
rations for 600,000 trooys, inolusivc of a mstsgo foctor.
Total. roqulromonls Rro ostimatod et 24,000,000 retions,
8. In rccowition of tho gros89nR nood, rv oifio6 hos
dcmlopod a 12-in-1 cmposite-paoked ration usinn cayoncnts
or tho ppo TF.” Ration aid offerin(: five ncnus. Lack of a2prcpriato
items paokod in small containsrs‘will lMt this
offort to rot Tiorc thm 3,OOO,OOO rations, Difficultios have
been cncountaroti 01: those points:
a. Cortain basic itens Faclrod in containor3 ovcraim
for %he purposo havz haZ. to bc included (oX€ic~>lOS:
Bacon in 12 lb. cans; arid o:gs iii 5 lb cans; proswfcd
buttor in 5 Yo cans) , This has inoreased thd groas WiiW
of tho omqosito pack wid v d l l unc‘oiibtedly rosult iil Sua3
waste,
b. CasillrP, zmtcrialo a10 In VGY s:’ort SUY~Y in
tho Unitor Kingdom.
0, Labor for bu.i.Xing 0886s and p.lCl:lnp, thm is
also in sfiort supply.
d. m1a avsraKz age of invontorics is on2 y ~ and r
it is q,uostlonable that the assmiblinp, of lW30 gmtitios
Of oon~oaits-paoksshould bo Rttoupted from any cXCGl)t the
nowest stom.

undor authority of lettor datcd 3 Ap?il 1943, from ?onbark
to Co"a6.ing C-onoral, SOS'ETO, Subjeot: Tditing pooeduro
fo? ?cquIaitions fron D.K., for Lnolusion of tki6 typo.
mol: (4)
Xxhibit A
:7 B) Plot inClUdGd in. hppcndiocs.
11 fI n
W I7 I1
R. 14. I.ImJOHN
Brig. Gcnoral, n;fC
Chi. cf n,L\ur t omastor

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-TLE-D
.L5 120
,005 4
.08 54
io15 12
28
40000
16
2
b000
Cendy, hard - p1:ts 1 4-00
GWI, chcwfng - sticlc I
1 400

June 'k4
July
Auqust
September
October
llovenber
Mcenber
January '45
lebrua Ty
IBrch
Apr i1
hlay
June
July
Auqust
Sectember
Average
IJR Army
strength in
the Theater
1,601,892
1,725I 000
1,P50,50@
1,'35,000
2,132,000
2,407,010
2,659,000
2,780,500
2,899,000
2,999,000
3,064,500
3,061 ,500
2,st?:!,4LO
2,670,e32
2,279,221
1,c33 .wn
Averege
Da Ily
Rations
Issued
Average daily
:-umber of
Rations Issued
Fer Kan Per Dax,
1,636,750 1.02
~ 3 , 7 5 0 1.15
2,3861517 1-28
2,636,368 1.32
2,550,162 1.19
21721,197 1.13
2,&?e3,e18 1.08
3,038 553 1-09
3,031,972 1.04
3,366,966 1.12
3,706,te9 1.20
3,550,342 1.15
3,151,352 1 .C9
2,762,632 1.03
2 392,7?2 1.04
2 .Ot2,700 1.12

- Date
June (6th-)Oth),1944
July
Al.l,"USt
se?tenber
October
ITovember
Deoeizber
Jenuary, 1945
February
?:arch
Type A/B
-
57 %
52 5
58 k
79 %
Be sg
87 %
91 $
91 %
FP
7h k
e7 %
Type 10-in-1
71 7
28 $
20 d
14 P
09 $p
04 $
05 $
64 %
03 %
03 $
11 $
07 $
ITO'OTZ: Issue 3n the Southern Line of Conmunlcations is
included in sbove percenta&es from 1 April 1945 onwar&.
Percentage of tvne rations iesued in the fol'hl-
01, SOLOC aea ;"nious"to tint date are sliowa belovr:
15 Aufyst 1944 -
31 I!arcb 1945

1. The Army Catering Corps is a coi,batant corps coa-
posed of personnel, as described in paragraph 2(b), for
the purpose of providing the Army with;-
(a) advisers and instructors who are experts in
oatering End cooking.
(b) efficient N.C.O. and cook 1,ersonael for units
The incorporation of catering experts and qualified
oooks into one corps controls their posting and
ensures distribution, throughout the Army, to the best ad-
vantage.
Prior to the outbreak of the Ka-n a number of
expert caterers were brought into the Armg direct to fill
key positions as Catering Advisers. On the comencen;ent of
hostilities the expansion of the Army neoessitated their
Eugmentation in greatly increased numbers and Officers Pmergenoy
Reserve Commissions were initially uanted caterers
with qualifications as set out in paragraph 9 to fill appointments
as Catering Advisers or Specialist Xessing Officers.
Similarly the personnel to fill vacancies as cookery
instructors were enlisted direct from the Catering industry
and after a few weeks military training were appointed War-
rant Officer Class 11, Staff- Sergeant Instructor of Cookery.
All vacancies now occurring both for officers and
for men, are filled by promotion within the corps.
Cooks now receive the normal military training
as Civen to all arms of the service, after whioh they are
sent on cooks' courses.
2. The organization include8 :-
(a) Establishment -Para
War Offiae Catering Branoh, S.T.!+..,.,. 3
Wax Office Personnel Branch A.G.lC(c).. 4
Army Caterin Corps Trainlng Centre
(Adlershot?. ......................... 24
Schools of Cookery (Iiome and Overseas). 25
Messing Officers Training Centres.. ,,.. 26
A.C.C. Reoord ond Pay Office
(Edinburgh).......................... 4
(b) Personnel
command Catering Advisers. ............. 6
Catering kavisers........,.........,... 7
A.C.C. Specialist 'hssing Officers..... 12
Supervising Officers, Emereency Cookery
Training Centres.....,....,...... 14
Chief Instruotors (Officers). .......... 17
Warrant Offioers and fi.C.0. Cookery .
Instructors at E.C.'?.Cs... ........... 16
Travelling Cookery Instruotors......... 18
APl'ENDIX 13 of 12 pages - 1 -

R-$4- T-R-I-C-T-8-D
'svatrant Officers) *
Staff Serjeants
Ser jeants Serving as
Corporfils cooks with
Privht e s Units.. .............. 20
S.T.4. is a Dranoh of the Uirectorote of Supplies
ana Transport. As the technioal brnnch it selects all
specialist personnel and is responsible for all training
in catering and oooking.
4. THE WAR OFFICE I.EFSONNEL BF?GXiA.G,l!+(cL
A.G.lk(o) is the ersonnel branch, under the
Direotor of Organization wiiah OOEtrClS SostlQs, ;.roaotion,
pay, etc., through:-
The Officer I/c A.C.C. Record8
The Regimental Paymaster, A.C.C.
5. m.
The ranks of ti.C'.C. Officers in the senior appointmnts
are:-
-
War Office Oversea.
Deputy bireator
Assistant Director
Bputy Assistant
Director
Steff qaptain
Chief lnspector
op Training
-Colonel
-Lt Colonel
-
-I& j or
-Captaifi
-Lt Oolonel
F!fic?~-%-~2
G.H.q,
Army E.L.
L Of G,€.I.L,
Divisional
H.L.
Com:i3 Lazsriu:, Kdviser -!:a jor
Oateriug AdViSov (Commnd $001) -2a;tain
6. Coman$-;htedni, kd-

&pproxl.mtely with that Of C.s.liS. in the Gomend carrying
only bo the extent that some c.S.1)~. subsist too Any units
for one G.A., while SIQalhrC.S.DS maj- be ErcuFed under one
:.A. is allotted one clerk.
At horLe it has been fomd in practice that this
netiiod is better than attachment to Districts, heas, Divisions
or brleados for the followin6 reasons:-
(a) Eoonomiaally there is an obvious savinG in
tice, petrol und travelling exsenses,
(b) Improvement in efficiency by closer udherence
to Directorate policy.
(0) The state of' messing and the cook situation
of newly inooming units is at once ascertained; urgent
requirements can be met and close supervision civen and
maintained in baoklvard units.
(dl Continuous touch is kept with all bnlts through
their Messing Officers or representative who must visit tte
Supbly UeLot at least onoe a week.
(e) The close prosimitg to Units allows ample time
to visit early and late meals. t It
(f) Improved knowledge of local resources of
mrket produce.
8. Cuterink, Advisers Overseas
In order to meet operational requirements Ceter-
inL xuvieers are appointed to:-
G.h.L,. (Oklef catorin6 idviser)
Army 11.C'.
Divisional H.L.
L of C Areas
9. The Qualiriccitiogs of E Caterig JraViSer
A Cateriq Adviser'e techniool qualfficktions mSt
take precedenoe over his military qualifications. He must
In fact have served an apprertioeship in the oaterine Profeusion,
oommenoiq, in the kitchen and then graaUati43
through the var1ou.s branches to n recognized position of
responsibility. No other ohoioe of prsomel Will satisfy
tho demand for organization and decision which Will be
tlrust upon him a t a moments notice, To appoint 83 hterins
Advisers men who are Very keen on messi~",'%now
good foodtf, or who are more sympathetic catering 'Well
wisherscl is disast.rous.
The moat likely types are obtained from IDOW OW^^
Caterers and Hoteliers who have rtrcoenized executive Or
administrative organizine ability such as:-
Catering rhnagers from large firm] ~ b \ - 1io oervioes, Hailway Companies
'kYiiF;hen
Hotel :,Imagers
) ezleri-
Banqueting :&nagere
) ence
- 3 -

10. -duties of a Ceterinp; Adviser.
The duties of a Catering iidviser my be ~~~mr.arized
us fo1lcws:-
I
a) Visits to Units
b) Relations with Con!nt;iw Cfficers and Dnits
Collaboration vrith Unit Ileasirg: Officers
(:I Liaison with Supply Officers R1:d N.A.C.F.1.
representatives
Tralnlw of Gooks
Assistance to Bone Guards, Cadets, Feedim of
Troops in transit, et Railway Laltene do Repas, and emergency
cil-tlian catering arrangemnts.
(a) Visits t o Units
Visits to units bear no semblance to an inepec-
tion. The Catering gives the units the benefit of his
exkert advice on all technical questions apperthinine to
catering, thereby advising the unit how to bring about a
satisfaotory high standard of caterin$. Reports are kept
down to the barest minja" all. that is required by the
Gutericg Adviser is to complete one copy of the roport form
which is kept in his office for his inforn,ation aid for the
necessary fffollowup" visits.
The details of the retort form are tgbulated
on a very sircplet preoiae re:,ort form which enables the
InsMctily Officers to see at a glanoe the general state of
meusing and the degree of urgency of such question of Fereo;mel,
engineer, ordnanoe and otter requirercents ao have
been brought to the notice of knit Commmders. A copy of
the precise report is forwarded woeklg to the Command Oater-
ing adviser for information.
(b) &lttions with-C~manbioR Offiaers and h i t E
The Catering &viser:-
(i) Gives exrert advise on fautters pertainine
to catering
(ii) Assists formations and units with
instruct1on end demonstration either
by hi~seli ox through the medium of a
travelling instructor.
(lil) Assists with all questions dealing with
cooks an2 their suitability for Ironotion
course8.
(iv) Ynsures, in collaboration with the
C'fficer l/c A.C.G. Reoords, that formations
and units are supplied "11th a full
establishment of effloient K'.G.Os. end
cooks,
(u) Assists Corcmendiog Offioors on questions
rolative to ineffioient cooks.
(0) Collaboration with Unit Idessim Officer
Tho Catering Adviser!"
(i) fio16s periotiical conferences for all
- 4 -

:&$sing Officers at which toric31
questions are disoussed and yractioai
dsmoastrations are Liven.
(ii) hnsures that the ration is used to the
best aovanta,e and that ail waste is
eliminated.
(ill) Advises on the best .mans of spen~in~:
the ration cash alloihnca.
(iv) hdVlSeS on rtethods to be effiluoyed in
obtaining the best reslllts by fin
efficient use of all cooking apphrhtus
with sgecial em,nLasis on ec0nGrT 01 fuel.
(v) Gives izactical aavice on tho construc-
tion oi. improvised fielo cookiq, approtus
and on ;bas Tin Coohery.
vi) When occasion arises, in conjunction with
the hbssix Officer, may be oallea upon
to arrawe for hot mais to be supllitld
to troops in transit at Railwy iiElltos
de R6paS.
(a) Liaison with Supply Offioers and N.A.A.F.I.
Representatives
The Catering ,iuviser:-
(I)Effects continuous lioison bothwen the
four yhrties whose callaboretion is
essential to good masing, nwly the
Yu&ply Officer, N. A, A, F. I. rrjpresentotive,
:desbl~Offioer and hfmeeli,
(ii) In conjunction with those officers ho
couvenes regular muotiiLLs for urlt Meso-
1% Ofricers at Comt.n2 Yupply besots
which are mtPe as interesting BR yossible
by pructlcal 6emonstrLtious. For example
with the asslstanoe of a bugervielng
Travelling InsLruotor, instruction is
Given in Fropxrim, cooklwj cni serving,
new iter:s or food introuucsd lntc tho
rction scale. The uvailaWl1ty of sup
plies and coinpiletion of Bill8 of Fere
are uiscussea an6 atttntion is drown to
A.C.13. huvilig tl bearin& on cctorlx etc.
(e) Trainlnl: of Gooks
The Catcriny k3vieer: -
(i)Is ,responsible for the efficient rwlninc
of Emergency Cookery Troining Centres
and enewe6 that the syllabus of training
is aclhered to, throqh the medium of
the Supervising Officers of E.C.T.CS.
(ii)Is expeoted to taka a keen Interest in
the welfare, pay, prornotion and upgrading
of Cooks.
(f) Assistance to Homs Guuds. Cadet_q~,troops in
transit and "Blitz" feeding
The Cateriq A6viaer:-
- 5 -

11. Trarisport
(i) Must be available if required to help
Home Guard Gnits in all matters rela-
ting to catering and to assist in the
training of their cooks,
(ii) Assist Cadet Force Camps anG Cadet Units
who seek advice on oatering or training
of cooks.
(iii) In the event of a "Blitz", helps in prc-
viding such emergency catering arranee-
ments a6 may be required by the civil
authorities.
It will be seen from para, 10 above that the main
Lutg of a Catering Auviser is t o be "out ana aboKtfl among
his units and for that reason ho must be mobile and trans-
port must be made available.
12. Specialist Messing Officers
(8) Full time Speoialist Kessing Officers are appointed
Lo Training Units Where the establishment exceeds
1,000, The Officers filling these appoiritments are catering
experts. \,here the establishments exceaii 1500 the rank of
Captain is authorized and for units over 1,000 and under
1,500 the rank of the Messing Officer is that of a Lieutenant.
(b) The special conditions attaching to the
appointments of tlese officers are as undor:-
(i) Their services 3re utilized wholly in
connection with unit mossing and they
are not utilized for other normel regi-
mentni duties.
(ii) To compensate for this specielist service,
rations are unucrdrawn by the unit to
the extent of 2f in every 100, subject
to the unit being under reasonable ocn-
tralized conctitions of cooMng and messin&.
13. The kualifications of a Specialiet Xessing Officer
The qualifications are the same as for a Catering
Adviser. In practice the Catering hdvigers are selectad
from the iJessir4 Officers who show initiative and organizing
ability.
The duties of a Speoialist Officer
(a) To provide shroughout the week 4 adequate
meals a day, including a supper mal scrvod at a time which
Suits the troops evenil- habits and not before 19.00 hours.
For thosc who go out in the evening there must also be a
supber available on .their rcturn between 21,OO hours and
22.00 hours.
(b) To prepare the indents for both R.A.S.C. and
N.w.A.F.1, portions of the ration and to supervise their
reoeption, welght checking and distribution and URintain
all requisite books or aooounts.
- 6 -

R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-O
(c) To ensure a wise and properly balanced
expenditure of the Ration Cash Allowtlncti.
(d) To arrange a weekly Bill of Fare, oompiled
so that the tastes of the men, as ascertained at the bn's
&deesinge (which are held weekly) are provided for in the
produotion of a groporly balanced diet.
(u) To ensure thet duty rostera am prepared
and posted for a11 personnel employed on mssing duties,,
and to be responsible for the organization, work, discipline,
and cleanliness of tho L.C.OS., cooks an8 mess
orderlies.
(f) To suporvise the preparation and oooking of
the food, adjusting the timine to the prescribei meal
hOWS
(g) To supervise tho serving of mals and to prevent,
by careful distribution, any tendency to waste due
to badijr served portions, caruless cutting up of bread,
or inconsideratc tabla manners.
(h] To make all arrangaments for early und late
mods lor guards and parties arriving, aopsrting or on
speaial uuties.
(1) To provide all personnel, undortakiog journeys
by road or rail with adequate liavtrsack rations,
(J) To see that all oookhouses, storm, diniw
rooma and premises used for messing art kept scrupulously
clsan and the equipment properly maintained.
(k) To ensuru the conservation and tho segregation
of all By-Produots and to inspect bins and swill area daily
bofore Oontactor removos contents.
(1) To maintain tf;s cookhouse porsonnel up to
full eetablishmont in numbers add ronks, not forgetting
understuiiies and learner cooks.
(m) To keog himssll up to date regarding ail
orders relating to tho training, uHradirw, pay and promotion
of cooks and to watch that relovant entries are ma6e
in tho soldier'e pay book.
(n) To maintain oonstnnt liaison with his local
Supply Offlaer, N.L.A.F.I. MEuiagoq Catering kdvissr, P.A.D.
0.S. and D.C.R.E,
(0) To effect an underbawal of 24% conplete
rations providing the unit Is reasonably aentrally messed,
U. supervisiuq Offiosrs of EmorRenoy Cookery Traiqinn
Cdntres
These Ofiicers are sclocted Prom highly qualified
oivilinn chefs who havo had lzmy expericnco a6 oookery
Instructors. In praotice it is found that eaoh Officer is
Bblo to supervise six Emergency Cookery Training Centres
(para, 15) each training 60 soldier cooks or kg h.T.3,
cooks. Their rank is Lieutenant (Qr,Mr.).
- 7 -

R-.E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
15. Emergency Cookery Training - Centres (Home and
hbroad)
(a) Trainiw Men
Establishment Of 4 A.C.C. cooke,,
instructors (1W.0 1 s/sjt., 2 sjts)
Period of training - i’weeks
Nmbers undqr training - 60.
E.C.T.Cs. functian to produce trained unit cooke.
Those reaching the required standard aro transferred to
the A.C.C. Those bQlOVJ k.d.C. standard remain RS regimental
cooks, but aro eligible for test later for transfer to A.C.G.
Incluaing 0.T.S. (para. (b) below) there are
up to 100 E.C.T.Cs in Commands at hcm,
E.C.T.Cs are attached to units large enough
to give each centre 400-600 ratiocs to cook. In moat
cases, units to which 3.C.T.Cs are attached arci able to
give up some or their cooks and so help the man-power situation.
Eaoh cLntre trains 60 students for D weeks in 4
cltlssg8, the intake beiiy arranged so that 15 atudents
comb in avery fortnight and corresponding number are posted
out. E.C.T.Cs are easy to open or closc down. The follow-
ing are used:-
(I)11 oookhouse containing a fixed range or facllities
for preparation of food,
(ii) A cookhouse containing gortablrr cup equipmont
auoh ae Bluff ranges,Triplex ranges, Boyer
stoves etc.
(iii) Field kitchen where every type of improvised
oveu &nd kettle tr6nCh is oonstructed by
students who am roquired to cook food in
the oven they have built.
Among thu types apparotus constructed are tho
Aillershot ovens, oil-drkm oven, kettle tronch and special
stress is laid on the oil and water method of firing.
E.C.T.Cs, are usually housed in Nissen huts, one
of whioh is sot aside for ldoture purposos.
Follows closely the arrangements for men,
exce t that there are 3 instructors training 48 students
for weeks. There aro 3 alhsses and the fortnight intake
and output is 16. x.C.C. and A.T.S. instructors are enployed.
16. Warrant Offioare and N.C.C. Cookery InstructDrS
for E.C.T.Cs (Para.15)
Originally selootcd as dcscribbd in para 1.
Vace.noies noir fillscl by promotion from within the corps.
17. chief Instructors (Of‘ficers)
At tho large traidng ostabllshmcnts the Chief
hStrUCt0r (and deputies are specially seleckd officers

R-E-S-T-R-Y-C-T-&D
with civilian qualifioations as caterers and instructors.
Those for Messing Officers Trainine Centres are soloctcd
from the best of the Suporvising Offioers (para 14) having
partioular regard to their ability 8s lectures and
teaohers.
1El. Supervising Travellinn Instructors (S.T&)
'these trsvelling cookery instructors are exotrptionally
good ail around chufs who have proved their cater-
ing and organizing abilities as cookory Instructors at
B.C.T,Cs. from which thoy arb specially sclccted. Their
duties in Comands, under thc direction of the C.C.A. are
to help nowly formed or backward units in their messing
arrangements End in this connection to domnstratc tho
oorrect methods of i\rmy cooking and catering to unit cooks,
S.T,Is. usually stay several days with om unit before passing
on the noxt. iill Marrunt Offioors Glass SI.
They are allotted to each Gomand Pool and oycr-
ato from C.S.Ds. unilor tho llpcolrt catwing Advisor (para.7).
19. Flexibility of the Arqy Caterlag ilorDs
b point to note in the organization of the h,G,C.
is its flexibility.
Any emergenoy can be met by a "switchingrf of
poreonnel. For sxumple a party of advisory oxparts can bo
made up by a contribution from Command Pcol~ of Gatering
Advisers and Supervising Travolling Instructors. This
prty, with tho addition of workin& teams of student oooks
from x.c.T.0~. under thoir own instructors oan bo expandod
to organize the feuding of an expuditionary force in
transit or a 'tblitzedft populatiou.
The Cisemination of informfitlor for thr, special
guidance of the A.C.C. Offioors is effeotcid by the issue
gtlriodically of Catering Circulars.
20. Army Gatering Gorgs cooks sclrviiq with unit.?
War establishments of all units show A,G.C, personnel
as trattachedtr. Cook personnel coiisist or: -
Uarrant Officers (Class 11) Cooks
Staff Serjoant cocks
Sorjeant Looks
Corporal Cooks
Private
A.C.C. Standard must bo reaohod bufore unit Cooks
Bre transferrcd to the A.C,C.
21. A.T.5. Cooks
Tho training of A.T.S. oooks is controllod by
6.T.4. This service is thore olosaly linkod with the Army
Catering Corps.
Training, classification, promotion, otc., we
bsed on A.C.C, design end all instruction is given in
- 9 -
R-E-S-T-R-I4-T-E-D

R-G-S-T-R-1-C -T-E-I)
A.J.G. controlled cookery training astablisbnts,
22' %Spital Cooks (R.A.M.C. c0"itmGnt)
Hoapital Cooks (R.A.Y.C. and V.A.D.) is a nora
ArnW Idedical Corps commitment but tho octual trainirg, in
hospital cookery is undertakan at the Army Catering Corps
Trclinine Centra, hdlershot ,
Catmi% Adviser test hospital oooks prior to
upgradii:g and iiromotion.
23. Rogimmtal Butchers
Thorc are two types of butchers:-
Royal Army Service Corps trbdclsmon butchers.
lab! Regimnttil (Ron-tradesmen) butchers.
All QXCCpt the srcallest unit a m allowed a
(regimntal) non-trhhasman butcher. This t:iSa of unit
porsonnel ia tr~iin~cl unaar A.C.C. Lrrangemonts controlled
by S.T.L.
-24. The hrmy htoring Corps Training Centre, Adlershot
(a) This modern establisholrnt (a pru-war concep
tion, comiAoted ,in 1940) is tho hoadqiarters of the Army
Cotoring Corps, It is modelled on the most practical lines
to ensure that students roccive up to date instruction in
cookery in all its branchcs.
The A,C.C. Training Cwntre consists of:-
(a) hodquartors
Instructional Croup
Administrative Battalion cottsisting of -
En. H.(L. Aclministratfvo Coy,
u. Branch Iioldlng Coy.
2 Studtnt Joys.
ThL principal ay&ointments arc:-
Commendant - Colonel
O.C. hdun. En.- Lt Oolonol
CNef Xnstruotor - Major
(b) Tho avorage strongth of tho whole Cantrd
2,200 mado up os un6er:-
620 Studcnts (including 70 Officcrs, 150
A.T.S. 1
180 Instructional and AWnistrative &iff.
700 Holding ar.d &waiting draft.
Instructors permanently detaehed to
con" E.C.'?.Cs. (pra 161
(c) Tho building occupies an area of 10,000 Waft
and is equipped with tho lateet types of' ccokinB OquiPmnt
fuullsd by gas, steam and solid fuel. The arrangomcnt Of
- 10 .
R-&S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

RE-S-T-R-$-C-T-E-D
the building ia cmofully pi?&ed to faCilitctQ tho e~ep
rolotion of work, aonuoncing Vdth tho roooptibn of tho
bulk goods into tho rnin storrgo room -nd hiatribution
ChGi'lCo irlt0 vnrious l?.rduS, pcStry MOL19 2nd kitchew
tho 1.crgor of whioh cro on tho ground floor,
&in dotails of tho .U.y-Out X'G under:-
Ground Floor - 5 oonpl~t~ ltitchcn dcportunts -
kitchen - ltrdor - 3 Dining hclle
sor-tin@;500, 400 cnd 60, pcetry,
Officors and Sorjor.nts !Iesscs,
Mninistmtion Orfioos
Ihin Leoturo Hr.11 sorting 250
fittod with doqonstrntion 8-8
ovens nnd appmrtus r.nd oinwtogrnph
Equipimt ,
Vcgatrblo prG?rmtion rooms.
Rntlon cnd utonsll stores.
Ref rigoration ohmbcrs.
Cooking cyparctus r.nd equip" .
consisting of nodorn 000.1, GFS,
stcrn rnd olcctric.1 nppnratua.
First Floor - 10 Solf oontainctl kitchcn - clcss
room GCOh COUplOtolg fitted.
6 Lccturo room.
Studcnts ohr.nging room providod
with hot nnd cold xter,
Wnsb bneins nnd individual lookers,
Adninistration Ofi'i06@md stores.
Outbuilding - Fully oquippod lcitohon and Borvice
-
supplying 700=ty hdl,
hole - 2 largo fully oquippod kitohone,
lardors and p,m%rlcs.
Field Kitchen- Contching all typw of fiold
Cookor8 rind Ovcne such CE Blufi
range8 , Lldorflhot ovona, onnp
bollors cnd enr.ll cqul~I2ont,
Inprovisod r.ppar?.ts, drun ovons,
kettlo trenohcs hot plctas cnd
lnrgor dugout dtohors for
dosort w.rfr.ro, *.:1 appcrrhns .
opcratod by wood, cod, ooko,
sr.wduSt diosol oil, OrudQ Oil,
nn8 Wp.&o oil taa wntir.
(d) hcporimontal work, Now idons on aoolCW
nppnratus doaigns nro onoourcgcd. Now invrjr.tions, oovoring
all typos of cooklrig r.pporatus, and oquipmont, nro twtd
for tho Mr Offloo.
(0) Bosonroh work, Cooking tests rro oarriod mt
for tho Offloo in con unction with S.T.6. (SupplP
Rmnch) and tho Ninistry if Food.
(f) Trainin Tho mnin types of Coursos of In-,
struation inold'
Commanding orficors' (Inoluding ,I,T.S,~
Course on Nossing
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-I!

Rogimntal iiessing Officers' Cohrsc (including
A.T.S. )
€&gu.icr mmy Cooks' Zourses (for post war
pwposes)
Sorjuants Cook&' Zourse (Men anti A.T.S.)
Corporal Cooks' Course (ivIon rind A.T,S- )
Cooks' Grading Coursc: (Mcn :lnd A.T.S. )
Iiospital Cooks Sou.rsc ( ~.A,X.C., V,X.D.
and A,T.S. )
Officers ;.le~sCooks' Course (KECI~and 1i.T.S)
Regimenta1 autc hers c oursc .
Ytudcmts under training cook fron 5,000 to 7,000
ratioiis daily for neighbouring static forffiatiolls. Fcod is
convbyed hot from the Cciritro in insulated contrtincrs or
coolred in tho unit cookhouses bg7 students, from advanced
c1assc.s, unticr their instructors.
25. Army Schools of Cookery.
Schools of Cookery arc designed to train iorge
numbers t it one the, as distinct from thi "sausage machine"
output of 15 ctv2ry fortnight at an E.C.T.C. (para.15) ivhich
can be uitr-Lchod t o an cstablishaont giving primry militxy
tmirling to ftiiitakcsfffrom civil lifc.
Thcr lerger tiii: numbur undcr training, tho larger
t hr, building rbquircd and adminiBtrativc sta?f nccessury.
Army Schools of iookory arc opuroting as under:-
Micldlc bust School or Cookery
London School of Cookory
26. Ikssing Officers' Training Ckntres
Thu c;st;lbli.shmont of a 1,Iossing Officers' Training
Centrt: includes:-
A Commtlndaut - Major
ChiLf Instructor - Lt. Ldm
Instructor - L.0, Class I1
Thorc i m ; 40 Ofricers undcr traiiiing at one tine
on COU~SOSof 10 d:qs duration, for thi: IgGssing; Officers'
coursb, or 2 days for FI ComanLing Officers Coursu.
This typt; of Ccntm, pi&rili Cosignird for the
training OF ri:glmcntal messing Officers in units whose
strt:rigth is 1,009 (units of 1,000 End ovcr haw an A.C.C.
Spuciulist Kessing OfY'icur) is operated in 3 Home Cormnands.
Mussing Of'ficers in otliur Commands arc trnined at thc *
A.C.C. Tr::ining Centre.
27, Trailling in Cotering and Cookin&. (Not iricludod
26. Syllabus of trt>ining_ (Not included)
29. Rctus of.* (Not included)
30. Thc hrmy Catcrj.ng Gorp Rcgimcntal Associction
(Not included)
Thc War Office (S.T.) .
October, 1942.
- 12 -

Belt, web Waist
cap, Piale, cotton, OD OT OT
Cap wool, knit
Coat, mackinaw
Drawers, cotton, short short
Drawers, wool
cloves, leatrier, heavy
GlOV.30, wool, OD, leuther pallii
Handkerchiefs
Headbands, liner, helmet, M-1
Jackets, field, OD or
Jackets, fidG, la-113
Jackots, herringbone twill
Laces, leggings
Laces, shoe
Le&bmS, C2JlVa8
Id”,helmet, fibre
lieckbmds, liner, hehaat, hi-1
Overshoes, Arctic
Raincoats, synthetic, OD
Shirts, flannel
Shoerr, sarvice or boots, camtrat
socl~s,wool, cusldon sole
socks, wool, likht
socks, wool, eld
Smater, hiLh neck
‘L’rousers, herrixbone twill
Trousers, rvool serge
Untier8hirt, Cotton
Uncershirt, wool
1mwlR SuPPLm5:
-ORCxNlZATIGNAL &JJJ.F’hl+T:
Axe, choyp~,s-le bit
Bucket, general purpose, &&I,.
Y qt.
Cans, cornyated, *alv.
Cans, water, 5 gallon
Cwtahers, round, insulated,
w/inaerta
Haater, water mersion typ
Lantern, gasoline
Lantern, kerosene
Outxit, cooking, 1-burner
Outfit, coolfj~~~, 2-burner
Outfat, cook-, Xrnan
Picks, railroad
Zan~e, field, la-37, Pack” fl~lt
Ranhe field, U-37, Pack W I
Shwais, round ,,yneral
purpose, Jhhclfzint
E~UIFACI! :
Ma&, canvas, fie16
Bag, canvas, water, aterilizin&
Ea&, cmrying, arm0
6%, carryin&, rocket
Ea&, sleepink, wool
Delt, im6aeine, BAR
Belt, cartri%e, cal. .30 dismountec
Blanket, 17001, OD
Can, meat
Canteen, M-1910
Carrier, pichttwk, intrenchkg
Case, sle.eep- bat, water repellent
Cover, canteen
cup, canteen
pork, u-26
W e , L-26
Pack, field. odat (Haversack and
Carrior, pack ~dll be issued
until exhausted)
Piclaaattwk, intrenchh&
Pins, tent, shelter, wood
Pocket mswzine, carbine, Gal. 30
pole, tent, single section (Pole,
tent, shelter half will be
issued until. exhausted)
Carrier, shovel, intrenching
Pouch, first aid packet
Shovel, intrenching
Spoons, K-26
Strap, chrryiw., general purpose
Suspenders, belt, M-1736
Tag, itientification
Tent, shelter half
Toitel, bath
r31PENDkBI.E:
Broom, corn
Brushee, sanitary, 17“
Brush, ecrubbing
Candles
Calcium, hypochloride, ampUhB
Crmyound, yerralcidal rinee, 3.3
Insecticide, powder, body, 2 ob cat
Imeoticide, spray, DDT
Dubbin
Handles, mop, 5LT
Lime, c;hl.orinated
Matches, safety
Mop, cotton
P~per,toilet, 1,ooO sheet rp
Powrim, scouring
Prophylactic 5, chemical
ProphylactiCs, mechanical
Sprayers, hqdd
Soap, laundry
Tablets hdia5011e
wool, &el

~oolsets, carpenter
~001sets, carpenters & wheelrkht
Typewriters, portable dnZ no-portable
Wta, fire for rhw-3, field, ht-37
OFFICIZ SUPPLE&:
I-----
Envelopes
Fluid, duplicstiw, apirit process
Ink, mimeoyaph, 1 lb. can
I&, writ-, fluid
Paper, bond
Paper, carbon
pcper, carbon ciuplicrt-, spirit proceaa
Paper, manifold
Psper, mheogreph
Paper, master copy
paper, pint&, offset
pencils, lea6
stencils, waxless, dry

Galpsition of GclLona ~ e r
Fames (Per Gent I h De? Day
of Total)

Office of the Chief Qunrtereicister
Quartermster Service Reference Data
VOUJIE I1 (Revised)
OPWIONS-P"G 1 JANUARY 1944
--
Chapter 6
PER MAN PER MY FIGURhlY - POL PRODUCTS
(Conbat Conditions)
&llone (US) Poundsiinolud-
--- ill& ooatainer)
l.iT gasoline 80 0cTGiGi-
(Including Pkwered Equipmect ) 1.48 128 03
Diesel Fuel .27 2.12
(Includin&Poiiered Squipx" :
for vehicles)
Total me1 IiicluGiiig Gasoline 1.75 14 I 15
for Poimred Equii-nt ~ ___L___l______..__I_
&is for Cookine and Heating .08 -65
Total Fuel Includint gas for
oooking and Beating 1.83 ll+.OO
- -.....- --
&cine O i l so525 .454----
Gear Oil -0175 ,151
Kerosene .0049 042
----
Total Oil ,0749 ,647
Crease - PoXnds ---- .u31r--
Grease - Converted to Gsls ,0032 -----
TOTAL POL l.pasl--i33-RT-
Gallons !'Per man der day" very irith the il&e-up of the total
troop strength depciidiiig on the :Jroportion of Yield, Air and
SOS Forces. The above fi[,ures are reoomisiided for uw when
these proportions are not known.

POUHJ P a h.4X 12.873 3-L-649 7.762 11.763 12.964 7.527 10.689 f ll.381
'KIT& EIV bAYS jj2 371 i 329 1,050 379 2 5 1,644
?OI.S/r3IV/LIi.Y 1513.923 1 155.202 I 83-757 129.310 126.617 93.260 U4.544. I 123.974