ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

?'"EE GETlEIwL BOD
bite6 States Forces, Emoueen Theater
"The Ge.2era.l 3mrd tma established by Gsncrnl Orders UE,
fieadquarters Euroae.rr Theater oi G-pcratione, US Am?, Gaf;ed17
Jmc 1345, as mended 'J" General Orders 182, datcd 7 AufisC 1945
a d Geaeral Ortera 312 Aa:ed 20 l'ovenber 1945, Eeaclqxorters
Lir2tc-d States Forces, lhropa,nr, ThcaLer, to prepare a frrctwl
mapsia of the strategy, tactics, and adziinistrstion cmploye.3
57 the Unite& States forces ia tta Euifopeen Pb.ealsr."
study ?o. 128.

LOGISIICAt m D-UP IN !PBE BRITISU ISLES
Prepmed by:
Major General Royal E. Lord, USA
Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Polliver, QiC
Captain Irnest A. S~OVA,CAC
Plrst Lieutenant John E. Qitbert, AGD.

1 SCOPE
--____ RES T R I --_-
C T E D
PULE OF CONTKJTS
2. Devclo-pccl; or' URitcd Stp'xs Oiyanimticn ir the '4
3ril;ish Ielcs
7. British ProcUeJcn;. 15
6. Sp.cial. Sup$ies aad Equioacnt 2cquii-d for ella 18
Operation (Paoco)
9. Shipping W.it Equipcnt to tho Sritisi: Isles 21
1C. Suply of Pcti01eu.i Products 23
11, Documentation ~~-11:liarkin2 of ~cr11i;sfroa the 25
Unit& 5:aLce
12. Zoning of PACBl'iLksh IBles to Feoilitatc SuuTlT 26
De1ivcrT.r
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34
38
2

Tilie :iepir has aa it8 ~ q o s ctile e-a&, 4ii& vex iiiwcrtant in
the developmnt of the 3ritM; Isles an an iavaslon base .u? Lhc SOS.
Dct.ail5 and hiskorical detn are included o~lyto bfie extcnt ncces6e.w
$0 orovi-dc r? bnckgroimd for Chc c~:clusions reached. Suck data hew been
sutriaed largely fi-om lnforAia8:on accxulateb ani studies bcill~,piqared
by thc Ziatoricd Section of Hcrrdounrtei-8. TheatEr Ssrrice Borcef. 3"
!?hs..ater. Thcse studlea ahoul6 -0, ref~rredto fa:- F rllore co?>letc
uiiderstaodi>x of logistical activities lr! the Si-ltiah ISLEE.

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TE2 BRITISH ISLm
3.. Establishmnt md Devclonaert of Phcoter Hs&.r;urters. iIce.dquarters,
United States Aced Forcca in the British Islcs USdFaI 'IRE or mized
in Londo:: 0'1 6 Jmuery 19&2. It rmlrrccd tho Sprcial ~ bscrm~ GPOUI) TSPOBS),
1Liicli Laad bccn organizcd in iiqv 1941 as part of the U;?itcd Statcs %bossy
staff, ad irhioh, unon lihc enbry of tfic Unitcd StRtcs into tllc war had
divorced itself from Ync EU3a60g FSLScconc hc UnitEd Stc.;es military Sedaxartcrs
i:i thc Britisk Isles.
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b. 'Mlc it WBB deeirdole th;t each Genei.e.1 P ~ ZSneciPl Steff Section
have a separate, long-rw.ge. ~ ~ I U and G polic: I ~ ~ group, mc!~officers a6
could be pared for such P scction ceeded the co17sl;& cdvice md guidencc of
a11 !cey eat 8peciRliad. oificerr ia their eztire staff section rxxii %ore tha?
the:? needed contact with ulaanin; staffs outsidc the SOS. '??.is 'ma pnrticu-
1arl:r true of the Spccinl Staff Sectiocs.
C. Travel facilities &tween London vn.d chclternm 1°C inadEou?.tC
and, for the dost pnrt, Cirie-coxu-.iing. 'Fire corr"iceClo3s wcrp elso indequite.
Constant personal 1ia:sos 5etI.wc;l the two offices vas igracticrl.
e. Substantiai1:r zow pcrsolliie.1 viae reociree to ogaratc the Iii,-dcurtei-s
in two cc!ialor?s.
E. Action nabtern werc oltcu &clayed becmse of th frewnt neoessity
of concurreace fro;! both cc:ielons of e. staff secti0.1 .-nd !;>Efranuent
nbscncc of ';>le Ciiief of Section fxox ihe ccllclor, required io teke thk action.
'i'hc interm.1 orgenizntion cf SOS (1acI.ding tile Zase Sections), the
extent Bo vhich it duplice.ted, oi- ."A bU:illccicd by, Ljic shff of &-xdquertcrs
SO, ;:id mproprip.fe C0~c~usi0r.9 md rccommdetiona es to oreaiisatioil
nre':Ue eKnjcct of c scparete stdy and e n "ob ritlii. t>c scope of tbis
docuieat3. It is desirable to ;loint out here, howvcr, tlmt t~isslinine.tion
of sepmcte Spcial Staff Sections ox tho llieator erd 50s levels ns Gescri'ued
in previous par~-n;~hs, end. Ole ~molntxiif~f the Co:i:ie:diTe; Goa-
ereJ, 5CS as G-L, 3uropcar !?he.aa$cr of Operatiox ir 8LaiLiofi- to Lis othar
duties, vere befinite iqrovemnts ic overall efficieno>--.
5. Conclusiox. Splitti% an SO5 t:rpe Eeedqu~.l'ters info tvo or ilore
eckslons docrcasbs its efficj.eriq+*to..mchan extcnt e.8 rlnost irraricrbly to
offset axr d~vantn~cs.

R-E-S-T-3-14-T-E-D

(-& -3 1 .n- I-b -x-!i-iJ
and t o use the area for $lie acco:.i-,odntioa of the nlsjoritg of t3e Uzited
States Forces. These forces, in turn, !,ere respoisible for T,rotectii?g
the 8.1" a&?.lnbt iiivp,sion e;ld raids.
The Second 30Lm Key Plm, 25 July 15442, vas 'based 02 ar. overall
Wited States build-up for l,lb7,COO, with the invasion datc renainiili;
uchangod. It gave further details In lire vith the basic decisions
of tie first Plan. Included in it tiex provisions for receiving 120
stii~1oeLsper zoiith of supj1lics fox Urited States Foreas, om-fourth
of v1iicl.i vas estiiated to be vehicles end tiio-t!d&s of vlcich ''rere es-
Wanted to require coverea storqc. To hondls ti;fSToR??5t t& ports,
the United States 1698 to supj1e:ient British dock labor r.itfi sixteen
port Wtnliorrs c d eight servicc battaliom, It m e anticipnted t-ht
the 3ritisli rail systc; vould have tu provide 300 passenger end ba;:~age
trains per ~.1oilthand sixty frei&t trails per dey.
POOLIlrG OF BXXSH - A.ZSIC& LOGISTIC& F3SCL;RCES

R-E-S- T-R- I-C- T-ErD
IiI R co:qn~ol:lise, the Transportrtion Corps contwlled all zovexeents
b;l those ~X'BRS of tiic EritisL Isles Irliero United Statcs iorczs were the
8o::iimr.f uscrs. British personnel i.rerc assismed os aa3ordinr.tr.s i: such
meas, with UriLed States persor?llel Uci:ig asaiged as sxbordinetcs ii?
PTC.-.G 4icre the Sritish were tllc principal users,
a. Tiic foll.o-4>

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21. _Gonclusione.
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22. Procurenmt Oiijectisas. Initizl ?lam ti?. cot sisunli~eextcilai~eproourenent
of supdics in tlie 3ritish Isles. '?:;is orlnclple
was sjecifically ststed in :'o-fe:.iUiurr 1941 by the j0ii:C Any ami ?:flT
&sic war plans RS follows: "Tile United States forces sil.1, e.5 fe.r c?s
pxcticablc, drew their logititice1 supnozt (eujmly ~xdr.eicte;lAi:ce) fron
sources outsiAe tile 3ritid: Isles. SubJect 20 this nrinciple, hotfever,
the >ilitary bfisis, rq?air facilities end sugpliea of either nation l.dll
be nt the dimosal of tie :lilitprF forces of the other as rcouired f or
tlic successful prosecutior. of t 'e xserlll, ~ius,in setting up tlie penera1
Purclmsiag 30ext. in the 9ril;ieh Isles it *!as Colt t,ii&tIts fwictioiis
nould Consist princlpdly of tilainin2 2nd prepareti028 for procdreient
on tile contiaent,2
This iritial plcn of li:.iitsd p-ocure:.id, :::the Sritish Isles
?res changed in t~€Bwxier of 1942 for t?m basic reas03s:

R-E-S-T-R-1-C -T-E-D
d. Duriix tlia pariod iro3 1 J we l9b2 to 30 June l9iL', 315 of
all United Ste.tes supplics in the 3uropp.m Theater cme fro.:. aritish
BourcBs. Of the total United Stotea Arw tonnage aesenblecl ir 2.e 3rltish
Isles Sp D-Day, 39'; had been procured fron tix 3ritlah.
ConsiLerabla difficultjr VAS experienced in hadling, storing,
Aild effecblva1;J uti1isi::G certain Sritidi3rocured supplies becouse of
tkbtr dissiailar xrl:kqs ?r?3 iiifcrior pfickaging strzdards. ;ia?~of the
coztairera hed to 5e reinforced by Uuited StAtes dc?ots before ~hini~~fi
oould :,e iide t o Mricn in 1942 and 1913. 3y the tise tlie invasion into
Franco vas .rounl;ad ii: 194.4, considarable iqrovexn!; had bee: imde; however,
thc *.raste or' Sritish suy~liasbecause of differeiib md inferior
gackagi;lt; as& :mrki.X was sti1.l qite mixtantiel.
zG. Goncluaiona.
e. Corrplcxities of foreiQi procurexnl; or. n lnrge scde are
SUC:I Lint control s!io\;lG. >c vested iu R strong, cer.kral ?;occi-eucxb
q;cncy fuctionixl; on tl!e 0oacre.l or Special Staff level of Either SOS
or Tliac.l;er Eandquarters, Ha egpropPiate. Tie desira5ilif;r of en& an
agency Ius beer. prove3 in 30th Varlc? Vars I md I!.
3. Yoreign procurelect of mqplfes and muipxn'; for use unCer
operational conditions tcuds to 'se unsatief~ctor;-for F. large percentage
of itma becmae of inferior and dlssi!dlar qulity, pRckc&w-, narkixa,
uoertrintiea of scheduled deliveries, ant bifflcnlties of repairini; and
:mintahlag the ecd 1ter.b.
C. !$hap. large .foreign orocurement progr'sma ard db8i'Fdole
tn oom'cction ri:h active Operation6, cOUeful consideration
should 'UE &vci: to the ac\visn>ility of i)rovicli~ suitable pckiw
end :.ilarki,q SU-JQ~~CB ziud EqUipileIt fuon lillited Stntcs swrcea, 01- of
IzcluiiW such item in tho ;irocm:llent nrograi~OB a spci,il project.
b. Predeterniimtian of A i~ethodof evaluation .?:ad pricing is
esseaticrl 'uaforc e. forbig: p-ocure:.mnt prot;ra-i is ixitiated. If tllis is
not Gone, differences \rill Frise ~Ciich,aside fro1 zoiietary conaideratiws,
vi11 result in unfortunate disclgreerleUt6 ad ill-feelhg even on
the hidest levels. Thet such results did not occur to q.'aerious extant
ia the 3ritish IE~EG
*+as a tri'nats to British integrity ai?.close
3ritis:i-A-icrice.n cooperatlor.;;,
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BESTBICPED
SCl’ION 8
SPplCIdL SUPPLIBS &I9 EQUIPHEITI! mREn
FOR TIC& OPERATIOZT (PROCO)
27. Background. During 1942 and early 1$3, all Items required
to Wet mjor operational needs rwere rpecified first by COSSAC knd
later by G-b of Eeadquartors, ETO, Their eqerlenco 13 atteqtinp to
compile a complete list of items, and Lhe defioi- br-t to
light by the mounting of a portion of the African nyeration iron the
Sritish Isles led to the conclusion that only the Special Staff Sections
Of 505 ~oaaesssd adequate technical an2 detailed hnovledge to calculate ,
coaj-jlete requirements.
28. Baais of CRLculaEions. Theiefore in June 1943, -hen the “ar
Department direcked the European Theater to 6Ubmit requirements far
major Class IV items end for Class I1 Items above T/U mG T/E for the
remainder of 1943 and 19N1, it was decided to &e evaila3le to the
50s Supply Serrices &e.eouate taotical and logistical infomation to pcrnit
them to calculate their own requlremsnts. Separate reaidrements
for U~OOJIUIIOII items were to he submitted ’by thk &tr Force.
The tactical and logidtical basis for nalculating thse reoulrsments,
based partly on asmmtions and partly on information availabls
from EWOPRIU Theater Headqusrters. and COSSAC, was published 02
24. June 1gL’ by Hadquarters 505, in a concise seven-pege doauPciht vhlch
CW~Eto be one of the more important factors in placing logisticel planning
Rnz preparetions on e. firm b8sls2. htndmental facts contained in
the document vcre suhjitted to end aqproved by tlie Ynr Department ths
providing a con!” basis for submitting and sdlting requlrementsf.
It i s worthy to aota that this document included wimt prqved
to be, with one or two exceptions, the minim acceptable information
upon vhl& intelligenot, long-range planning could be basad. It included:
a. Troop basis by mjor 1;Wes of units, e&., divisions,
classified as Infantry, Aruored and Airborne.
b. Rate of t.roop build-up on the Contlnont e.nd rato of troop
iaflou: to the United xiqdom.
c. b?urabcr and characteriatica of Lines of Comuicotions, inalading
an eStimft6 of tho notor transport requireaents.
8. .Jumber of major and minor poth to be rehabilitated.
e. Estimate of nirfield oonstruction recuirod and munber of
plazles t0 be supported on the Continent for the first three months.
f. hthoriaed levels of Supply on ths DohtInent.
g. EstimatB of enemy dfDOlitiOn of porta, bridges, rail equip-
ment, and signal communications, expresaad In percentages.

RESTRICTED
It was found poselble to fuipish the above Information in general
terms without divulging the spccific geographical locntion or the
qeciflc date of the operation.
The document omitted irfonation and asau$ptions on two factors
which later proved to be of consideraole iqorbce:
a. Xn evaluatio2 of necessary swly responaibllities for
the civilian population. Zhis omission nay have been inevitable, as
determimtion rf such rebponsibillty ma not forthcoming from higher
levels until a much lehr &ate.
b. Bn evaluation of tho eupply implications of mounting tki
opcration fron the British Isles.
During July end August 19&3,the coaptation of specie1 re-
quiments wce complotcd by Supoly Services in the fon of projects, each
limited to a spcciflc Item or eroup of items and each containing c coilplete
justiflcntloa. Eeyirenents fo? likc items were consoliGated by
the Service having promemcnt reponoibllity in the United Statc6.
Thesc projects, a6 supplemented end mended from time to time, f0rmCd
the besls for all special supply requirements for the entire operation.
They were referred to as flPROC0 Projeots", both in the Suropean Theater
cnd in thc UnPtod States.
3. &e of Surcial projects. %hare developed a signifloant diff0IEnCe
h Ouinion betrtcen the War Dmartment and the Eurorwan Theater
e6 to tile pripcr scope cf thsse Iong-iange eatime.tes.
The SOS, Europeen "heater h d prepared prcjeots on the ~ssmption
that thcy should Include all Itens of supuly for iqhlch the estiua-
ted necd would be aubatmtially greater than the nornal coubet u-s
factors. The Suropean l'beater realized th@tcombat factors, thc ocels
On which the 'Iar Departnent was estinatiry procurement, did not t&e
into considcration csrtdn peculiarities of thc cantaplated operation
in kropo such es ship-sinkince between the Sritish Isles and France.
Therefore, chc initial projccts submitted bjr the SOS, Eurqeen Theater
in July and August1943 h d Included nsny cormon items (c.g., rations)
as vel1 88 special items md snjor equipment.
E%?Ver Dcpartnent, on the other hand, had iatendcd their dirrective
to cdL for spccid requirements of ncjor itms only, and in
Septmbor 1943 it propoeeZ. tllat dl projects co-Jeering excess issue of
nomil itcma be rithdrarm by the European Thcater and subnlttcd by
normal rcquisitiming procedure. 4
There followcd an exfitCqeof cnbles in wkich the 'Yar DepmL
mcnt agreed thRt projects alrerrdjr gubrdtted would 'sc processed, but
epecified that additioznl projects would not include excess roouireacnte
of common iterns.5
However, in Ootobor 1943, the Var Departnent recoueldercd its
previous daclsions and t-pproved the we of PROCO projects for all rcquiremcnts,
including comon items, in xcess of nomal supply as had
beenlnitially recamended by 50s. Z"O.& This deolejon permitted thc
immediate editihg and prochasainp, of the projects by tho Zone of Interior
4.
5.
6.

BE S T 9 1 C TED
zml established the sinla aid logical basis that all operational rcquireuuts
In excess of norid, initid issue FAc0mbe.t fe.ctors ctculd
.E sub~itted in thc fon of special projects. It dso fomed tho basis
which, conbinmi wit'? distinctive mrklags, facilitated the easy segreention
e& proper issue of special supplies, especially paclcchged sup-
~ l i ~ in s , tho Europcm Theater.
33. Requirements Followi.lp Initial Projects. Subsequently, dirkotF-"-es
'rere issued by SOS, ET0 calling for thc subaission of projects
for 1911.5. Flexibility end re.pid proaessing was aided 57 the "er Depwtncnt's
dclogating of mtlrority to tho New York Port to approvc dccreeses
an& reasonablc increases to pmjecte having VPX Dspertoent approval in
yrinciplc. Thc entirc nroccdure for editiag, processing c.nd so forth of
PB@CO projects wao euilimFizcd in a direotivc pub1ie:icd by the New York
Port in Novcnber 19437.
31. Considcration of Britisli Procurcaent. No deductions were' nade
fron P-wc@projects for SU3plicS t o be urOOWod fron 3ritish rescurcea.
Estirxted quentities tlim&& to be procurable nerei indioatEd in th projcct
md lntcr cancelled Y9ien dcllveries fron the British wre dcfinitcly
aseurcd. Tills proved to be a desirable precaution ns British ebility
to produce YP.~, in certairr instnnces, affected by bonbings md other
ud orcseeable circwstrooe6.
32. Daficicncies of PEOCO Projects. Perhaps tihe aost serious deficimc?
i.?rcquirsmciits 86 subnittad Uirough P-%cO projects was that
they did not roflect during 1943 the specific dcsires of major fieid
comiande scherhled to t&e ?art in the invasion, especially during Its
6arly oteges. This was inevitable because those oomnds vera not available
in the Europe- Thecter until the end of 1943.
Theoreticnlly, requirenenta wtmibted by the Supply Service6
covered requirements of those co.wnds. Actually sliortages dib occur,
principally for two reaions: first;, 6uply Ser-vlces could not In ell
insfences anticipate the detpile of the tactical plus to the extent
that the Arq Headquarters involved could: and secondly, Army comenders,
given oonsiderdole leevrkv in implementing Oacticd plane, hed individual
aethods of operfitiiig whl& resulted lr. special reauirements.
a. Ifithholding supplies until using units were in operation cn
the Continent.
b. Issuing supqlies in the British Isles to the specific organizations
that had initiated projeots, only as supplies shiPPed under
their project number arrived.
c. Placing td,1 P"20 ~u~mlies in a comon pool to be issued on
established priorities to organizations having approved project 6, re-
E-?l'Kless of whether their specific euwlies hcd errlved.
7-%? Section, Bew Yo& Port of Embarkation, "Standing Opereting pl'ocedure
I4e"andum 1To. 711, 15 Xovember 1945.
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The last method was decided updn end the 7ariOUE major commands
and organizations were given a creciit and e priority on the central pool
to %he estent of prcjec'ts sui~mitted'OF Llem or nroject EUPglieS ellocated
to them. This urocedure elso Droved Cesirable becauae eoepnent that lies
issued in the Sritish Isles could be checked for pornpletenese and workability
by using units before they deoarted for the Continent.
34. Conclusions.
8. Division of responaibilifiee between a 3ectster of Operr.tions
and the !!ar Deprtment for asking basic estimntes for loa~range procuvement
or production should be clearly defined. ?hi6 responsibility
should normally be placed on the Theater es soon AS its staff I s sufficiently
organinad, the VN' Department retaining the regorsibility for
eveLuatlng the requirements to insure against both onissions end excessive
requiresents.
b. Supply equipment reauirements should al:iays be cdcdntcd
on the Special Staff level. Efforts to celculete long-range requirements
on D Gsnersl 5teff level result in importent omissions be-
ce.use of the large numbfir of itsss involt-ed and the detniled technical
kilotfledge required.
C. In long-range euFply forecasts it i s necessary to include
-11 ItComQon it8mE" os tiell as major br.its of aquipoent. Difficulties
Of increasing production of 1'comon item" (e.g. cmned vegetables,
properlr peckaged) often cause those items to require as much tine for
production as do ne,jor item of eouipment.
d. To insure rrlequate supDly, tacticd plnna ea well -8 89
evaluetion of the sitwtion to be encauntered mst b6 sade nvailable to
both Genera and Special SteSf Sections on the Theater cnd SOS:levePB,
as rapidly e.6 thssr are c?eveloTed in tentative fam.
a. The submission of supply requirenent, in excess of noimal
rates, T/Ets :nd T/9Als shmld be in the form of special. nwhred projects.
Requirements for common items should 'de coneolddated by the pro-
curing service. Thiu prooe&,ire ha5 proven highly auccensful in melntaining
A clear picture of thr SII>J>ly status, and ?)hen ca.bined rith specid
markings, in providing a simple meane of controlling storege segragation
and issue.
f. Supply planning nuat; include Ithe rk.limtion that army COIFmnnders
under combat conditions mat be given suplias ud equipment in
bhfltever qupmtities they desire within the resources of the Commnicatlons
Zone. Methods of operation Teouliar to indi;ridd e m com9ndei.6 require
the use of different item of supply md equipment to verying cxtents.
Tnerefore, vhencver army comr.ders and their staffs ere avsilable,
they should be csreful1;y consultcd on long-rea4e SUpplY and equipment
plnnning.
SECT1033 2
SHIPPING UI?IIc EQIJIPbmT ID 'i" 3RIPIsh' I s
35. The Problem wp.8 to et T/E equipsent into the :"le Of unite
ee soon after thoir ariiv&t in the British Isles e6 possible in order
to enable them to become &ministratively self-supporting>rrdd t o rcm
e thcir training, or, in the cane of service ~niLs,their functions.
hftl bier 1945, BI attempt I~EB d e to Accomplish this by having units
cret8 tlieir o,.,n equipment md rtforce markfl it 'oef0i.e they left the United
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R B S T R I C T E D
States. The plan assume& that shipping the equipment at or before' the
departure of the unit rrould get it to the Sritisli Isles subste.ntlally
e,t the sane time as the unit. Thls shipping procedure proved vary uneatisfactow.
Units usually dic? not get tlioir eauipmcnt until at least
30 days aftw their arrivml in the British Isles: frequently not for Bo
to 120 dW6, And often not et all. This resulted principnlly from four
factors:
a. Equiplent !!as not shipped sufficiaiily ir. 8dvmce of the unite.
b. large pcrcentege of troope "crc tressportad in fast liners,
capehle df corrylne practically no cargo, while their equipment was carriad
in slorr convopa.
c. Locating thc eouipment when i2 did crrive (freouently at p.
different port) r.nd getting it to the unit proved c difficult and timeconeuning
under-tnking, impeded by difflcul.tles of trensportation end
other clrcmatcnces existing in the British Islee..
d. Eouipmcnt pnokcd 'or uits HEIE often insecurely crnted and
hdljt mrked.
35. The Solution, es far AB the Eucopean Theater WE^ concerned, Icy
in one of two alternatives. First, bving the U2tE ship their eqdpmeut
nufficiently in dvcnce to insure its tinel:' arrival overseas. The
'kr Department vao uneble to concur in this solution becwse it meant
dcnriviw units of equipment required for trniniw, and trocause of frcquent
ohenees of T /T,I~2.d troops siiippiiig lists. The gcnerd status
Of Supplics *'as a furtliei- compllcption, eepecielly awing 1$2 and R
port of lgb3, as it did not pawit the iesucrcce of full equignent to
Uita in the United Staces until imcdiataly prior'to their depprturc
for oversene.
Thc second, ant more desirable solution, ifas to have units turn
in their equ1pmer.t in the Wited States rad drav now eouipment upon arl'ivcl
Overaee.6. mis fiolutlon had several definite Advatitagea:
8. Units c.iould be assured of comDleCc cq"iy"t iruncdiately
uDon nrrival.
b. Units would leave old aquipment in the United Stctes to be
usod for trRining other unite ;nb would get new equlpiaent oversens, ea
cxOhb%e that would reduce ovesscaa mainten".
d. Equipment -.auld come faCtorppeGkod md mrlccd, thorebp
eubsteetially redccing chipping &wage end losses. Also, there vfould be
a considcrPblc saving in pccki~atad cre.tlng materiel by elirainzting the
necessity for re-paekix used equipment'thmt vas 601% overseaa.
The aeoond solution WLE placed in qparntion during :hy 1943.
It could not be concurred in earlier by the VW DOpRrtmeiit, despite
the reconmandntion of thc suropean Theater, because In P. period of short
supply, it required extra equipment to fill the supply pipeline and t o
provfde minim InitiQ issue 6todC6 overseas. :men it was plaeed in
operation, however, it solved to e, most satisfectory extent the problem
of promptly and propcrly equipping mits mriviw in tho British Isles.
37. Oocclusions.
0. Units should be shippd over6eaB with their minimum addnistrntive
And houselceepixg equipment (e.g., coaking facilities) accompanying
them on the SRDC ship.

. It is sssectial that A unit a full equipment be actu2lly
,vailable to it idthin a veek or two of its arrival overseas. mie can
bc eccoqlishi in oile of three WEIYWS:
(1) Load it In the seme s.,ip vith the unit; or in P ship
i3 the sme convoy, accompanied by representatives of thE unit who vJill
stay with tho equipment unit1 It is actuclly delivered.
(2) Ship it with represcntetives of the unit, to arrive
E week or tvo before the unlt itself.
(3) Have the unit turn in its equipent in the Zone of
1n:erior tuml draw new equipnent at its oversees dostinatlor,. This
p-ocedure lizs proveii by far the most sztiafuctory find, in the 10%run,
the uost ecosoosictL.
SZCTIOX 10
SUPPSY OF P3"ROLFITi P?.ODUCTS
38. Inter-Ulifd Petrolcu kencies. To understand the rcsponsibilitias
a d Pctivities of SOS in the field of Petroleum, Oil, ?ad Lu5ricants
(POL), it is necessmy to rev~eivbriefly the Inter-Allid petrolew
a~encies involved.
The Petrolcum Administration for Ve.r WP-s R joint duerican a d
3ritish agency concerned vith the eqloitetion, production, and rsfining
bf petrCieum prOdUCdS on R globuler basis for American md British requiroidcnta,
both nilitcr:, m&civllim. It w s e. civilian ogencg on n governmcntd
lovel.
Thc ArAny-llav;r Petrolem Board, locttcd in 'kshington, \ma e.
idilitwY organization convernca vith the procurement, allocotion, And
distribution of 911 POL pro&v.cts for RU &lied cmed forces. It WRB
in the ncturr of an opeiatiix weeny for thc Joint Chicfs of Staff Rlld
rcported directly to them.
Specie1 comitteca locetcd in "eshlngton riid London werc reaponsible
for allocr ting aviation petroleurn products within thair apecific
geograpliical sph6res. The 7Cshi:lgton connittee rras known as the
Avic.tion Petroleum Products kllocr.tion Conmittee (APPhC) end the London
COlmiittee ae tne Aviation petroleui products k "n BESigIVaEIlt Committee
(APFAC).
SKXEF he.d joint British- Ameri6r.n POL scctiOnE in both E4
Nld 05. The 0-4 section 'J~Mconcerned with combine& ALlericrn aad
Slrltiah uilitary requircmcntsl thG ti-5 section with aonbined civilan
rcquirements.
aaaumed Ohc rasponsibility of lrDeterairinfi~ olicy
On POL nattera, aaproving POL plans fma the lox-term vlewpaint, and.
allocating prhducts cs neoesaery" in ttle BTO'.
39. U.S. kenciea G_oncerned vith the Kandliw of ?ctrolew. Products.
The hxea Petroleum Office was rasponaijle for representing the Uaited
States in tho paropefin Thee.:er on all POL nrrttere, and for coordinatine
911 nction involving sore Lhan one united States agency. OrgcJliecd an
A Theater lovel, it iras the noi-md chmel between the mropem Theater
O f bpcrations snd the Amy-Yavy Petrolem 30ard ir. 'ashington. After
mqv interveiling che.nge.9 of policy, the Comnnding General, SOS, vcs
appointed Area petroleum Officor on 27 May 1343, an Petroleum - -~ -
1, ZTO SOP #I., 16 JW 1944.
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T~XE-D
- 23 -

BE 6 1 F. I C T E D
Service vas established within the SOS2, absorbiq tLe Area Petroleum
Off ice.
The activities of tlib &e& petrolem SerPico were cvwlappcd
to a significant extent by the POL section lster established in &A,
w: Better coordination \PBB finally effected d er the &en Petto
r01eu.m Officer.
The Chief Qertcmater, Sob, w s respo:isijle foi- the idmd
receipt, storage, and i&sucof all POL itrns except those fed directly
to installrtloae by POL pipelines, and uncomon ariation ?roducts! The
'&artemater Servico was r.l.80 reeuonsible for reconumbing the ?hnsing
into the TheRter of ell POX supplies. Since the 3ritish Erere hadling
all bulk gaeolinc, tho POL activities of tho Qarternaster Service in
the Britiah Isles were, for Lhc noat writ, linited to preparing & consolidating
POL requiremants (including tkoac for :he Continental opera-
tiion), etoogpiling pnoka~cdWL vrodv.otr, for the invpsion, end techmically
Bupervising retidl distribution. ,
Also bec~.usa of the BritlBh hmd3ling of 5ulk POL in the Uni-
ted Kingdom, the Engineer end Ormsportation Services vere not particularly
active in their POL reeponsibilitier of construction old tirnnport.
Imolved rdth the Lend-Lasso aapects of the petrolmu question
wre other United Stntes cgmcies including the Navy (conoerned with
t&er aovements and control), the Unitod Sbates Enbcosy Petroleum AttAchC
(represcnting the SBate Dapartncnt, the Petrolem Adninistrfition
for War, and tIhe Bmrd of Eoononic 'knfnre), the Harrinen ;9saion, a b
the General Purchasing Agent,
40. , The beretion of the Petroleun Suppl:? S:den *is6 ao:Jevhnt
corqliceted bjr tho numar of United States agonciai involved. This
co;l?lexity was to a Ear& extent tlic reeult of their >el% at tinea R
Q-4 staff both on the 60s a b tho Thceter level. Hed thcre been onlr
one GL?,md that on R Thea'jer level, it would have been feasible for
it, toge:hor with the Cparterwester bervice, to hovo absorbEd the work
of the Area PetroLBuu Office.
me actue.1 efficiencg of petrolem suprly in bhrr British J e l ~
was dependent, of course, h-galy on the British, who wen responsible
for the entire bulk handling. The British bid a gond job; thrafore
the qply of petrolew wn8 vary aatiefectory,
From a planning ?olnt of vim thoro waa coiieiderable &plication
between the C$.extenmater Senice, the SOS @, md the &en Petrol-
Office. A concreto divieion of reepousibilitg was nevcr decided
upon. . This duplication WEB gonowhat Juatifioblc, however, as it provided
detailed double-ohccks on planning for one of the iiiost vital war ccmoditios.
To some extent it imfi neccsaai'y bcoause of the m y serdcea thet
were to be involved in acco:.iplishing petroloug 61ply on the Continent,
A significant British action, during the SimilGr Of 1$3, which
made tho joint aupaly of nctrnlem ppoducts fcnsible in the British Isles,
NRB the st&tdardlaal;icn of all 3rltiSh petrolnu ?roducta, S O e p t tllosc
Of tho RAF, and the yoduction of their nunbcr frm 342 toll&
It i8 neccsecry to voint out that the expcricnoe:in tho Sritish
1818~did not, because of the lnrgc part played by the Bdtiatl.
furnish 8 baeie for QValmting the arcper division of responsibility and
Contro~ of POL 8qply flow ketqcen the 605 0-4, %he ~rter;lle.SCBr
&XTiCe, and the Enginccr and Tr~eportRtion Services. Later, On thha
2. @a933, ETO, 27 !lay 1943.
R-&6-f-X-I-C-I-IE-D
- 24 -

BE ST BI C TED
Continent, this division of resphneibillty came to be a major oroblen
a d oae that VBB to be cheaged n&fhi ti1m befoke &I efficient Drocdwe
WPB deviBed.
41. I $O.nc~l.l8iOlX.
a. Where allied foicce opemtc in n comon area usipg comon
ports or 1inPS of CoLwuicntion, it is dcalrable to den standardization
arA cmmn use of petrolcuil aroducts. This is particularly iqortrL:
for pro6ucts requlrin(; 'bulk storage.
b. There is IO justifimtion for having ilore Thheeter of SO5
stcff r&ncies icvolved in t:ic supply sad dlstrihtion of potrolem products,
tirar. of other types of suplies.
k. Difficultlee of thc Orinid System. ?hen the mo begma receivilx
sU?PlICB frou the V;lited Statea in 1942, the syetea of docunentetlon
nr?s imdesuntc to pamit the deterxination of arrpply.destimtion before
&pa wcrc uulozded. %e systeu of docuncntction veried betweeii Supply
Services in thc Zona of the Interior. :kmifests end other dete.ilcd
1ondir.e dntn weye frequentl;J not received in Chc Britiah Isles until after
&lip hrd nrrivcd. Eve:! when they did arrive on tix, cargo doscriptions
narc oft=: ir. such general term PB to -Ace p1arU:ing for di6-
tribution kn proper depts Prrpossible. Entries on the nenifest such a6
DIOOO boxos of Qwrterxnstar Class f Buppliesfl were not uncosmon.
The sitlwtion YAB further co;lplicptod by FC inedequnts description
of contents on supply contelncrs. A large proportion of the:J bore
no r.le&ings nt oll.
The dlfficultics Lhat resulted at ports n?lc: Cepote a8 vel1 a8
the ex'ire. burdon ,pk.ced on bhe trrnsportntion eysten of the Eritish Isles
is described in detsil under the heading of Sortlx Shade (Section 19,
Che.pter 6).
l'hcsc difficulties, iylus the fact thot the 3ritiah trmsnorte-
$103 aystcu w s unnblc to hent3J.e rupplies fro3 the anticipated miof
ly Vnitcd Stetca cprgo 6hip6 per tLontlr, end et thc sme tin6 continue
to :love the 1mge tonnrgcs of inter-depot-shiprents resulting largely
fro:. irrpropcr dom-xntction cad narkiilp, uede AC i;l?roved procc&ure a
:.lost pressing bbjsctive.
k3, Yrolution of EI Pew System of Docunent6l;ioc. Tho SO$ in the
ciiitcd Strtcs took prospt action to develog.aore 6etnileb mif*eats tlmd
to EffCCt etendcrdisatian of docuentetion arlong its Various supoly eervicce.
Action IVFB plao trlioa to iqsove and ctandRrdize the Ymrking of
CoLtelncrs. By the niddlo of 1943 the quality of docunenbation And zerkix
hd subebrw.tinllg inprove$.
as latc as ~ >ICfirst qumter of 1943, Oilla LIS$ of the rcanifests
aUd B illa of Lnding vcrc being received five or wre days before the arrival
of the 6!1iQr And 2L5 Were not received at all. EOveVBr, during
1. Study ent$$led IITi;io RacEipt of knifeeta fSAd/Dr Bills of Lndi&'
jrepared bp Progress Division, 605, Y.6, 6 mril 1943. besad on 99
SllipE arriving in U.K. brtween 1 Jemry hd 3 tierob 1943.
R&S-T-&I-C-T-E-D
- 25 -

RE STRI C ?ED
the .ionths of April 1943, go$ irere received five or Liore ~EYSAhcad of
aiiip2, an8 in lkY g$. ThcWSaftor, delays in receiving domentation
censcd to be e. scrlv~sprobleu.
Gut of toe efforts to develrp a better syste.1 of ading and
docuzicntation,, the ASF, %r Departxnt, developed 8 comlex procedure
knom as the nUgls Systenn. osed of two principal parts. The
first pmt, put into effect iftlz:h?$j, provided a unifom code far
-mrklng requisi tions and shipping orders to correspxl with &amkings011
cargo. ?he orocedurc idantified Oonaignor, Service, Glees o Sqply,and
rcauisition or shipniv order nwioer (c.g. SOXO-OXLI-D~8l).f It wan
of considerable rralae to the SDS, Wl’O when copies of the requieitions or
shipping orders carx to be dispatched proqtly fro.1 the Ualtd States
cud could be aatched vith the ship sanifeats.
me second principd pert of the Vgly %ete:incalled for a
procedure to tie in the ilarking vitk the cargo t o the extent thpt the
pertiel S1:ipnent of a requisition could be iCentified by the cddition of
a? n2proprite suffix to the :~mkingsprovided for tiic first per0 of this
systea. Although for e. tix the European Thenter coatlned to press the
Dapertxnt for its ndoption, this pmcedura cw.8 x-Er developed in
:lore then o m or two tost depbta in the United Sta:es, because of its
CO..IPlcxicy.
By the and of 1943 the syste~of docmenting end rnrking in
thc VaitCd Stc.tes hnd inproved ec nu& that sqjplios could be hendled
nith reesoaeble efficiewy in the British Islsa. However, the problon
was ao corqlex thct it defied a couplcte solution.
44.. ~o~elusions.
a. 3Docu”ntion land -.iwking of supplies for overaeFs ship
xnt fro2 tho Zone of tho Interior should be stmdaxdired for all Services.
b. BRC~contniner should be rwked with et least the fallowing
Iiifar~etfor: Consignor, Service, Class of Supply md requisition end/or
s1:lmirq: order nwbcr. It is ~lsodesirable to includa e ilorking showing
Chc nu-iJer of dlip.icots being .Me cigd.net erch requisition or shioping
order cad identiming each sspnrate shipucnt.
c. Adequate, detc.ilcd informtion on ship loadings, ct lenst
fivc dnys bcfore ship e-rrivels, l a reouircd to perlit dktcrginetion of
inhand destinetion of supplies. This m s t include dotrils os to Servica,
Claaa of $iip~ly, comodity by iteo, end l‘heatar reauisition nunber.
45. Probleu. The nrrivd of 150 United States AKW cargo shipS
per math In the British Isles van enticipfited for lrte 1943 and 19u.
Britieh milways were oonaidcred une.ble to Mdle this inerewed cargo
VJithGut a plen for its receipt rnL distribution AiCh vfould dininioh
2. study entitled fl?Tii.io ‘md Receipt of Manifests nnd/or Bills of fndingn
prcpclred by Chief of Tiwarportation, SOS, IZO, 7 tie2 1943.
3. Ltr, Hq SOS, 14 Ju?e 1943, Su3j.ct: Ugly 6ysi;eu of iiafxing nnd Forwarding
Bupplies.
RJ-S-f-%I-C-T-E-D
- 26 -

naterially the long hauls clnd the croetr-hRnls that had pceviouely characterized
the hanndling of United Strtes Amy cargo.
lc6. Solution. !%e pertid solutions afforded by better docunentekion
(discussed in SGCtiOn 11, above) and by the estctbliahlng of
sorting shed (discussed in Section 19, Chapter 6) were not sufficient.
In R letter of April 1943, 608, Bd0,proposed to ’fmhlngton that
the Unitcd Kingdon be divided into two zones, the pmts hi each to be
rated on their eapaoity to receive suppli 8, and thet ships :Je laded
in tile unittea States for a epecifio mm.f A t1Ar.d zone, lortherx Itelwd,
vas subsequently Erlded to the syeten. %!his plpa :r3E imiediatelr
approved by ASF, Wasbingtoii, vith the reservation that it could rtot be
followed in the United States in thae ineCancee where it oould prevent
the nost econonioal uee of ships or delay the SlLipilent of T/&4 aquipnent,
The zoning 9yste:i succeeded in mterially roducing the emunt
of internal trensportation required in the Brltieh Isles per shipload
of United States eupplics.
47, Conclusion. Plma for shipiiing supslies fron the Zone of Interior
should provide for the loading of eech ship for e. specific &one
of diachmrrge or, if Conditione pemit, for a specific port.

RESTRICTED
SEcTIOX 13
PLAI31ING OP 50s TROOP BASIS *
48. Overdl Plmnin@ Seeis. The developnent of the $05 troop basis
fol.lowd closely the development ,Of the overall troop besie as disoussed
in sone detnil in Section 1 and 3, Chapter 2, above. In that discuseion
were reviewed the changing plcns for operatiore to he mmpted from the
British Isles and tllB resulting changes in troop bmie. Each change In
OVCrCdl troop basis necessitated a complete recalculation of service
troq reoui reaent s,
rXl& the early prt of 1942, requests for SOS personnel for
the Ttienter w8i.e besed antirely on the &dainistrRtive supuort of the
nubar- of groupd nnd p1r foice personnel to be phased in for protection
of the 3ritish Isles end the opening of the air offenaive.
During the 8u"r of 1942, the fimt reasonably complete troop
bpsis was established, based on pUma for invading the Continent in the
spriw of 1943, with an initial force of L,lk7,000Unitkd Statee troops.
l!?iis plm 'in6 cancelled by the invasion of North Africe. in november
1942,
In the autum of 1943, the SO5 troop requirement8 were recelculatcd
r.8 3 result of the decision of the Qpebec Conference to launch
the invnsion in 1944 with 1,L60,000U.S. troops. 3ut the recdculatian
we6 soon inval.i&atd when the pre-invasion troup basis was chenged wain
la Jenury 1944, a second tiiue in Februnry, and Q tlitrd tiue in bhrChl.
49. Difficulfies in X-raluAtIna the Problem. ,%ere !"e numerous
difficulties which tended bo hinder the intelligenb:.plaming of en RCcurate
SQS troop besis. nose difficulties asre generally the result of
incxporience on the part of the staff involved in the cnlculations, and.
of e. lock of apecific infomation as to future operrtions.
Unit1 the middle of 1943, the information furnished foi C~CU-
1BtiIq the SOS troop bmis !r89 incomplete, giving littb more than the
totd of troogs to be supported and raking acmt mention of ttie type of
operation. There :'m also 00me initial lack of underatanding between
the !lnr Deparfnent and ths Tha&ter with recard to Theatsr personnd needs
end the types of troops thph rould be evailnble from the -United States.
Until the latter part of 1943, when the First U.S. AIW oatabli6hed
hesdqudters in %and, no precedent hed Seen sct for cdculating
the nunbar of service troops required for asai@nmt to the Rrnies,
Rnd e.I.Tly requirements were :nothing more then gUessoe. NO reOOgniZcd #AT
Dopartacnt publications offered oven R thecreticnl solution to the problon;
they mcrcly stated tbJ nuoh requirements would vary under diiferenlj
circunstmcss. Realiaticnlly speaking, this memt thut coch erw
stc.ff had thc prerogativc of ~skingfor $.$hatit wanted. After the First
U.S. Amy nde its re+iromonts known in late 1943, a precedent HRS established
WhGch served as R guide for estimting and editing the requircments
of othar armies. 'phc mtter ~e.8never complstely aebpled
holwmr, end the division of service troops between the Bield Forcae
end the SOS continued to be a p int of difference throughout the OperAtion.
* See elso Stub Yo 9,1tService Troop Basle".

RESTRICTED
Most of the planning and persome1 officsrs engeged in the
troop calculations had never seen the service dnits in operation, even
-der maeuver conditions in tha United States. In fact, w v types of
SOS units he.& not been in existence long enough to have been thoroughly
tested.
One difficulty peculiw to the situation 1w.s the fmt that the
SOS would have to support n split operction - part in the United Kingdom
ad part on the Oontinent. Becmse of this, the service troop require-
ment wfls larger then it voould othcrwise have bean, but tlrere was no pre-
cedent to aid in determining the extent of tb.t difference.
Another difficulty was the problem of troop reauirementa for
mounting bhe invasion. Since this 1vas B. type of nounting never before
undertaken, little In the wey of crystallized detailed plaza vere evolved
until too leta to change substentidly the SO5 troop basis. merafore,
the troop bnais did not include speciol requirenents for mantine;
the opero tion2.
A further planning problen was the sizeable reeponaibility for
guarding SOS installatione on the Continent. The principle was eetablioked
that Field Forcce would guard the linee of cmwnication and
provlde aree security where SOS installationa were estnbliahed. Eight
infantry regiments were included in the SOS troop besis to orovide
guards for the installations theasdves, but these troops Warn-never
nade available3. Thareforcl, this responslbility and the designation
of personnel to meet it was a problem which ma never iolved duriw the
operations on the Continent,
A similar difficulty In plmning was the lack of infcrnetion
concerning the emcunt of civilian and POW .labor tht would be avail-
able and could be effectively utilieed on the Continent, plus the at%
tendant personnel problsu of providing guards for the POVls. Consaquently,
as was later learned by experience, too many l akr unite were
requested at the expenae of depriving the operation of additional
6killed personnel.
!XI. Calcule.ting the SOS Troop Basis. The 505 troon basis, for
the most Dart, was calculated by the fllliefs of Services on a 6trdght
mathemeti& basis end was editid in the same rJRMer by the &OS General
Staff Section. This nethod of ooloulating the SOS troop basis involved.
little noxwU8n diSnding the rated oapaaitg of a given unit into the
manpower, nunber of vollicles, and so on, to be supported. The only infornrrticn
published by tho 'fer Department on mit ct.p.pacitfe8 (contained
In tbe T/O1s) VJPS inconplote, and later proved to be h"Ur&te in nany
inetences.
Overall opnroval of the troop basis vas clwrged. to ZTO G3
UcCpt for n short pcriod when it ifas charged to &TO C-5 (Plms). Within
the SOS, troop rcquirmente werc consoldiated and sditcd by C-4 I until
Novcnbor 1942, vhan thcy Bcccd the iesponslbility of 01 SOS, In June
1943, 0-4 rcm-led nost of its fomcr responsibilitios, leaving wit11 0-1
thc nutlrority ovor troop aatinptcd covering headquarters instellations
and the ddnlnistretlve Scrvlces, such ne Cldcm, BinenCe, Provost tfrshal,
and Specie1 Sorvicss.
-~
1. Ki8toricnl Section, !Xj~'%f, mpply end Troop Build-up in the United
EingdonN .
2. IBS, Scrvice Troopa Brmch to Sxec Officer, a,"SA, Woject:
%TO Service Troop Suild-up For Operation "RDn, dated 3 Jul 45.
3. Hq, Cora 2. "Co~icatione !&one dotivities in hpport of the European
cmwienn.
- 29 -

51. Conclusions.
a. Service troou requirements cannot becalculated or edited
solely on a mathematical basis. Requirements are largely dependcnt
updn factors mch as t b type of operation, number of POli end other
foreign personnel expected to be supported, local facilities available
(such as housing, rods, indigenous labor), end the nunber and charmterlstics
of lines of coumnicatlon and installations.
b. Directives calling for troop requirement estimates mat
contain B complete planning basis in addition to overall menpower figures&
SZCTIOU 14
PEASING OF SOS PWSOIUEL IiFM PES BRITISII ISLES
52. General. The desirability of uhasing SOS units into an overseas
tiheater in advance of, and at a greeter ratc than, the Field Forces
and A ir Forces to be eupportd tma a principle long recognieed by the
War Department. QeneralPerehlng had urged it in Vorld ?Tar I, and the
Conmanding General, SO6, ETOUU in lforld Var I1 repeatedly recomended
that the movement of serfiae troops into the theater not be delayed1.
53. Factors DBteminiw Phasing. ?he la& of servioe units in the
United States, the shortage of shipping, and other more urgent objcc-
tives In the British 1111~8nade it imponsible to phase SOS troops lnto
the theater on a high priority basis. %ginning with the arrival of
United States Boxes in Jcrnuary 1942, there was the necessity of assiatlng
in the protection of tha British Isles, especially Ireland, agsinst
the threat of Oarwan invasion or raids. Almost iimediately, in addition,
it was desirable to conoentrate on the hunching of B United Staths air
off enaive .
Brltlsh authorities were anxious for the United States to scad
to the British Ides unite trnd equipment to further those objectivss.
Oonsequently they d e available (io the United States Forces the m8xlmum
possible number of civilinn personnel, and evan Briti6h nllitar7 peraonnel,
to perform aeryice funotion for the Air Porces and Field Forces.
British agencies krned over or cbnatructed nost of the Installations,
both housing an& supply, required by the United States Forcea. Considerablc
British civilian facillhike$, such as bakeries, laundrlea and
certain types of repair ond maintenance worIc,wers uade available for
EeTviC6 functions. Comodltiee - for instance, freeh neate end gaB01im-
'Mere distributed on A wholesde basis by Lhe Sritieh for the United
Str.tea Forces.
As EL result of this aasistance. it wad possiblc to rcterd
grcatly the phasing of SOS troops into the Theater. mu., in June 19k.
SOS etrength WELS lese than 44 of total Thcnter strength. Just prior to
thc invnsion of Forth Africa, in Ootober, this percentage ha8 increased
to 1%. AS the drth African not only drained off meh Of tho Wpower
ftocuuulsted in the United Xingdoil, but also took priority on shipments
throughout the irrintcr months, the SO6 troop strength showed no
appreciable increase until June 1943, at which tiae its total increased
aufficiantlg to neke it 225 of thc Theater Itrcingth. A year later, on
D-Day, this percentegc had inorcnecd to 29%.)?
2. Letter from lfajor General J.C.B. Lae to the Secretary of 'hr, Subject:
nBOLERO/SIOKLE Build-Ups, dated 22 July 1943.
RE-S-l'-R I-C-I-E-D
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R E S Z B I CTED
9. Results of Slow Phasinq. TMe retarded phkaing of sentice unita
Into the Zheater .de it neceashry for the 50s to use all of them for the
performance of it8 prinary miasion. The subatantid ambers that Were
ultimtely to be assigzed to the mien could not be released by So6
until the last poeaible date 3~fo& they were to enbark for Brace. AB
labe as April 1944, an effort to release subetantial au3ers to. the Ardes
for training purposes was found to be iupmctical. Ben at a later
date when large numbers wore assigned t o the RT~ICS,noet of them conthud
to be employed 3y the SOS.
One of the most significant results of slow phasing of 605
units vas the lack of troop6 for mounting the operation. This developed
into an aatual requireiaent of ~appmorimately 61,000 troops. SO5 could
not entirely ueet this requirenent. As ntrny SOS troops as possible were
assigned to the Job. :.%ere bhe need did not correaoond to the type of
unit available, the unit was usad regardless. The maximw number of
civilian parsonnel irere obtained. The resulting defici ncy of eluost
10,000 troop8 had to be mat by the use of field Porcea.~ To LKtve handled
tliis pa-ticular peak load by the temporary us8 of Field Force personnel
schcriulcd for phasing to the Oontincnt in later stages may hev& been the
best esd nost economical solution In any event. Nevertheless, it did
not have thE concurrencc of the Pield Porcee.
55. Conclusions.
a. Conaidcrablc crnphesia should be placed on the necessity for
ihhasing service units into a theater of operations and into advance bosea
vithin the theater on a higher priority than coabbat Unite. '?his pfaX?iiitS
proper prepwe.tion of fagilities to support the conbet units and a more
efficicrt Mld-up of supply reserves. Combet unita meanwhile can be
tre.irad as effectively in tbe Zona of the Interior.
b. When sarvico troops ofinnot bs phased into advance baa88 on
R higher prloritjr than combat units, consideration muat be given to the
aecoaeity of those service units, nonually integral parts of the Field
Forces, being assigned to the $05 for the preparation of facilitlas and
t'ne stockpiling of rcaerves. This procedure, followed by nooessity in
tho Britieh I~lee, had the dieadvantage of aepriving many EerViCC Units
of adequate trclining with FiEld Forces.
SICIIOi? 15
TU?IiIiTG OF SOS PERSOW
56, Status of Trainiq Upon Arrival in the E"3. &.thou nost SOS
units arrivcd in tha British Isles reasonably wcll trained to perfom
thcir prinrrry nission, their period of training in thc Udtcd StP.tcg had
vnricd from thrce to thirteen wealca, and fraquently had been of the mini-
I~LIlewth of tiac, They lacked
qualifications of bclng able to
pCrfOn1 effectively under Active operational COnditiOnE. Thaao trnining
dcficioncies, ro&Ilisedin advance both in the Wtod SttttCs Ond in the
EVJ, hhd been accepted c.8 inovitnblo becrmse of tho necessity of Using
the personnel in the British Islea at the earliest possible b tC.
RS,S-T-R-I-C-T-E4
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R E S T R I C T B D
The greatest heficiency found among; SO6 troops upgn their arrival
in the European Theaterws the lack of proflclenoy in individual defense
meaeuree. This defic$ency, for the most part, had resulted from
the xiiniwun training perltod.,available in the United States and the deoision
there to place emphasis on teahniaerl proficiency during thc time
available, Conssquently maskemanship, hasty field fortifications, defense
egafnit chemical attack, land mines and booby traps, and other 88pects
of military training bf the individual soldier had baon largely
neglected.
57. Traininn in the United Kintzdom. Beoause thera were so few SO5
troops for tho job tc be done, it proved exceedingly difficult to find
time to give then adequate .training in the British Isles. For the nost
part, theso troops "3 putting in e long hard work-day at depots and
other supply inetallations, Xn many instancoo it wes oonaintently necewry
for them to work nore than the normal numker of hours, Bedquarters,
SOS and its Chiefs of Services and Base Section Commanaarn speolfied end
attempted to execute training prograns whioh recogniied this sifuatlon
and placed heavy emphasia upon on-the-job training.
But onathe-job training. excellent for increasing technical officiencg,
accouplishcd little totiards cverconhg the lack of proficiency
in individual defense measurea. Heedquartere 608 recogniped and directed
emphr.eis on this problem as e,?rly as 1942 by Bpeci ying that all
servicecpcrsonnelr be trained for combat as infentrymen1. But by May.
this training deficiency had not been corrected to a setinfacb8zT extent.
Scchnical proficiancy, emphasized during the tf'eining period
in the United States, deveioped further through on-the-)ob training in
the British Isles, Ssrvlce schooln were &so exailable to trein key
inaivuduala, Technical profioiency of iervice troops, aa R whole, came
to be satisfactory. Moat cf the exocptiona were duo to the necessity
of consiatently using certedn unitm in the British Isles for other than
their primexy idasion.
Menwavers providsd opportunities for overall training t o such
emall numbore of service units a8 could be spesed from their normal functions.
Particiastion of Sos units was further limitcd by the high prior-
ity given to Fieid Force unit5 in the few nenauvers permitted by COnditiona
in the British Ielsa.
Rceponsibility for directing overall trnining of earvice units
was charged to f3-3 SOS. !fithin the basic directives published by 0 3
thc Baso Section Comanders WerB responsible for developing acd ccrrrying
aut both tc?ChniCF.l and tactical training. The Chiefs of Special Staff
Sections of bndquwters SOS worked Hith 0-3 in developing the overall
progran. They Ktso found it neocseary to ronaer aubetantial assiatance
to tho Snsc Section Staffs in preparing cerrylw out detailed technloel
trdning program.
58. Conolnsiona.
a. The use of service troopa for other t11m their normnl funotiOAl
invmiably results in rapid deterioration of skill nnd proficiency
in the unitla nbility to porfom its prinery funotions and often has a
bnd. cffect on morale.
b. On-the-job training, Eupplewonted by a small auount of formdl.
instruction, is tho beet practical eolutioa to the problem of trainix
noet types of wrvice units in an active theetor of operations, but
1. Hq SOS, ET0 Training iI&qorandurn No. 9, 9 IToPsnber 1542.
RE-S-%%I- C-T-E-D
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BESl'BI CTED
SEGTIOF i6
USE OF NON-rr/O msom
. 59. "I T/O persome1 in large nuubers were required in fhs Sfltib
Isles for headquerters nud for mny other activities, such 81 depot
staffs and inspection tm" men after the War Dopartncnt began publishing
.Q large variety of new T/o's and ce1lUe.r m/oia in '943, tbre
were nany activitie8 that Could be staffed ncre efficiently by non-
T/O personnel.
Because of difficulties in control end edninistration of now
~/opersonne1,Hendquarters SOS Attenptad to kaq thcir nuher to a aidm.
Whila this wag logical, it tended to develop a situation in
it YBS easier for inetaJ.lat1ona and other amy egcmcias to obtain
entire unit than the snnller nuiber of no=I/o pekeomel proper4 Wmeed
between officers and enlisted aen that would have act the rapuire-
nsnt equally RE well, or evcn bettef. !hilo this did not develop into
8 serious problem in Lhe Briticlh Isles, it bid afford e note of w d q
egainst the excessive limitation of nong/O personnel.
In Decenber 1942, SOS non-l/O personnel requirenenti were ee-
thated 8t 1775 officers, l&warrant offlcers, and 6030 enlisted nen
for the operktion of Headquarters, SOS and other organisetlons end instal
latlona in the ET0 not providkd for by approved tables of organirstion.
On 1 Narch 1943, the non-T/O erscnnel allotnent on the E O ~ Iapproosd I
by the War DQpartnent for 222 officers, 185 warrmt officers, and 6775
enlisted mcn. Sub-nllotncnto to the SOS totalled 1905 officers, 149
warrant officers, and 5942 eritietixi men, and since this vas not a tentative
allotment, promotions 09 nonq/O pereonnel were resuned for the
first time in nearly nine months1.
@. Conalusions.
a. T ~ Quse of non3/0 peruonnel is, under WY cmmtenceu,
far more sffioient than the use of T ~ Ounits or Y/O cclluler units.
b. 'PO limit unduly the number of nond/O personnel available
to a theater result8 in the inefficient substitution of T/O anits.

RESTRICTED
although they vorked as an infegrtll part of Britiah industries and
utilities1 Also, menY British CiVl1ianB were employed By Amsrican
agencies other than the Army, such as the American Red Cross, which
used 20,438 persons, of whom 9,221 were volunteers,
Of those British laborers working direetly for the United States
Forces, amy Were Of aa inefficient oategory, haviq been, of necessity,
obtzined from among groups ineligible for the draft or eqloyment in easential
indUStry. l!heir efficiency bras not much m0"e than half of a
British or American military unit doing the sane work. This fact vas
reeliaed by both the British Is& Office and the United States Lrmy authorities.
Yet, without the help Of these civilians the SOS job in the
United Kingdom would have been impoaaible.
62. Italian Service Labor. Some considerable relief of the labor
shortage was provided by the introduction of Italian Service llnits into
the United Kingdom in June 1944 There were 7629 auch personnel in the
British Isles by September l9&*. These units had been OrganlBed by the
>lediterranean Theater. Many types of SOS units in addition to labor
companien were organized, each with its small c ake of United States
Army personnel t o coumand and supervise. The Har bpartment declared
that Italian Service units could be substituted far the s me type Amy
service unit on a one-for-one basis with very little loss in efficiency,
anh furthermore, it gave auth rity to inactive Brmy units at the 881116
rate they were thus relieved. 9
However, because of languege difficultice and because it was
cousidered undesirable to have them Italian units performing a type Of
vork that was higher than, or on the sane level with, that of baaic
United States &my unite, nost Italian personnel vere utilized purely
as labor: As labovers they proved to be more efficient than Uniited
States soldiers arrd considerably more efficient tkm a comparabba number
of the type of British civilian labooors mailable. In everyother
reopect, however, their organizations were rated at half the capacity
of omparable United States Army units, and were generally leas satisfaotory.
63. ~onalusions.
a, In the absenoe of suffiaient nilitarJ pereonnel, oivillm
personuel can be eubatituted with little loss in efficiency for most
%DE8 Of Work.
b. Bo? comon labor, United States Ssrvioe troops are gonerally
less efficient than enemy prisoners of war and Bhe averege Civilim
laborers of most countrlee.
2. Historical Section, U.X. Base, "A HiBtOFJ of the ITnited Kingdom
Base to T5-Day.H
3. TVX WF+kGB7L, 10 June 1944.

CHAPTER 6
INSWTIOWS PO XETORT THE INVASION
SECPIOIT 18
DEPOT SYS'EEPEU
64. The Depot 'Progrem ,in the British Isles called for 17,300,000
square feet of covered, and 26,000,000aquare feet of open storage
space' with a completion target of 1 Maroh 1944.
This depot system, exclusive of POL end Air Force installstiona,
had a handling capacity in'and out of approximately p,OOO long tone per
eight-hour day: aDproximately 100.000 long tons per 24 hour day. This
gave a vary safe margin over expectancies. Arrproximately half of the
installations constituting tho 4opot:progrm were in existence when
the United States foroes enterett the United XingZon. Of the additional
requirements most were especially constructed by the Sr1ti.h. There
remained a number to be constructed by the U.S. Arqf Engineers, vhioh,
although a comparatively emall part of the overall program, repreeented
8 substantial underteklng for the limited number of United States per-
sonnel available.
65. D ot structure in the Srltish Isles is well described by an
as publi-Aicli says in pest*:
"Present plans call for the processirg of supplice in the U.X.
through three classes of installation6: Bese Depots, Advance Depots,
and Distri'outing Points. Chiefs of Services will be responsible for
locating Base Depots and Advanoe Depots. Dlatribution Points w ill be
set up on the basis, in general, oe one per Division, one per Corps
Troops and one or mora per Army Troops. The loc8tion of the Distributing
Points wilL be the rasponsibility of the reqmctive Base Section
Comanders in cooperationswith the benior Ground Force Cowander concermd.
30 attempt will be mnde to maintain balanced stocks at individual
Base Depots."
It wan further plarncd to divib BASSDepots into two groups:
0r.e group to hold rescrveu for the invaeion and to be located in the
vicinity of out-loedlng ports; the other group to hold ,the resemee for,
8Ad to supply throw Advance Depot@,'the troops in the United Kingdom.
In ~ctualpractice, donot locations vero detemined to a large
extent by the existence of facilities. %tile there vas 8 certain @IIOIult
Of ecgrcgation of operational supplies, in general each depot scrvod
tho troope nearest it and aotod in most respects AB both 9aae and M-
Vance Depot. Also, becaue'of incomplete documentation of Shipment. from
tho United States, almost cvcry depot received unsegregated supplies
directly from 6kip-aidc vliich forced it to act as a ?art sorting sKed.
avr?ileble to the SOS. This dcficiency in the depot etruoture wasI
however. inevitable as it was necessary to dovclop the depot uystem
around available storago facilities and available re11 CRpWitiee at
specific points.
1. Ltr. from iq so$ to co =6A, 6 J~na1943.
2. Kq SOS Sasio Planning Directive #l, Annex 5 to Section IX, 17 ihr 43.
H4-S-T-R-I-C-T4-D
-34 -

That General Depots were more efficient than Service Depots
ivas not neceasarilY proven by tho experience in the Britiah Isles.
General Depot was necessary when the size of a compact installation WBE
such that It could not be efficiently utilized by only one service. The
&nsral 3epot etivcture had the advantage of performing housekeqiw as
well as certain administrative functlone more economically than sepparate
Sorvice Depot8 located togetlier. On tha other hand, Service Secticne
of General Depots found it desirable to maintain staffe that to a sub
stantid extent duplicated the staffs of the General Depot Overhead.
!%e Service Sections could have operated as separate depots with only
aoainal increases in their staffs plus an equitable division of person-
nel being used in General Depot Overhead. But the principle objection
to General Depots was 1;ha.t the SOS Chiefs of Services, responsible for
their own supplies in the final analysis, had an eahelon of controi or
c0-d between them and tlmlr mpplles which in a fast-moving situation
frequently slowed and corqlicateb supply action.
With referenoe further to the desirability of General Dopots,
it is worthy to not that, had the exiatenae of facilities permitted the
establishement of a few large General Depots in the British Isles, the
resulting concentration of nail traffic could not in all probability
have baen handled by the British railway eystem.
66. Control of Depot Operations was a controversial matter never
quite Crystallized to the ~ptisfaction of hither the Base Section Comnandcrs,
the 50s chief6 of Services, or the Dppot Cormanders.
Problems of control brought about by the eslstonce of Gen -
cral Depots Were discuased in the previous paragrqih.
They were relatively insignificant as compared tc bhe problems
inherent in the joint control of depOt8 by the Base Section Commandere
and the SOS Chiefs of Supply Services. Evcn after the Experience of
depob operations in the Britiah Isles there remains a wide difference
Of opinion ae to the extent that Baeo Section Commders should control
depots.
Bese Section Commanders ueually feel that being responsible
for the supply of trocps in their area, they must control the means Of
Supplying these troops. They further point out that, being near aad in
oons'iant contact with the depots, they are in a more faVC"s1e position
to exercise praotioal oontrol. Aleo, by centralizing Control Of 811
labar, utilities, and othcr resourcee in their area Base Section Comman-
&ere are ablo Co Nfill d.1 requirononts more oconoaically and in tho
proper priority.
3.
Status of Depots on 1 JUG 1944 in the British Isler:
Guard Depots 18
Service Dqots k4
Chemical '!arfare 4
Engincer 1
Signal 3
Transportation
Medl cal t
Ordnsnco 17
brtcrmastcr 13
Other similar Installationa 27
Yehicls Parks 11
Aaununition Qumps 9
POL Dumpe 7

80s Chiefa of Supnly Services, on the other hand, point aut that
the great majority of depots contain portions of ihe Theater Reserves
which cannot be evenly dividcd among Base Section@; in many other ways,
dnoat every depot is an integral part of'the overall Nppiy system. They
consider it impoiitnnt to be able to exercisc complek operational control
vrlthout rosorting to the time-consuming process of using command channels
or obtaining concurrences of Base Seotion staffs. W s is especially
necessary in a new and rapidly changing eltuntion where semi-permanent
unifonn procedure# and polioiee are difficult to sstabllsh.
Therefore, although the Commanding General, SOS, van in accord4
wlth Army Regulations giving SO5 CUofs of Supply Services complete con-
trol over depots5 and had originally organlied the SOS rrirhh depcts aa
exempted stations, it was not feasible for him to continue rwh a system
of centralized control after depofa became more numerous and the overall
situation complex and fast-moving.
In May 1943, Bare Scction Comndcrs were made responsible for
bhs "internal msmgemcntu of depots, leaving technicd operations still
under direct contal of the Chiefs of Services concerned. This division
of responsibility was srtrcmemly difficult to interpret or apply.
Therefore, in August 1943, Base Section Comr~~andera were made
ltrc~ponaiblofor tho operation of all General and Branch Depots" and
the "recolpt, storsge, ntenance, sZlvage and lsiue an directed of
supplies and equlpmentn? The directives setting forlthe this division
of authority between the Base Section Commanders and the SOS Chiefs of
Services were somewhat ambigmar, perhapa intentionally, and the E&
hral division of authority wan evolved in dealing8 fetween the key
individuals conoerned. The solutiona reached were dependent bn an important
degree on tha persomlitics concerned. In the final endpis
the SO6 Chiefs of Supply Servioes, empeciaLly the Ohief Cpmterrrraster,
Nho was charged with staff supervision of General Depots, aatually Wercised
almost complete control over all importat aspects of depot:
operations. This control was exercised more or leas fnforrsally through
taohnioal channels which, although in many instances theoretically inoori-ect,
was a workable eolutlon to the problem.
Consequently the depot eystem worked smoothly with perhaps two
deficienokee worthy of apeoiel note:
a. Dcpots were hlndered in their operation by too many inspections,
by too m ~ people y from too many different eohelona of command.
lphcy were inapected by rspreaentatives of General and Spacial Staff 6.30tione
of Kcadquarters SOS and the appropriate Bsee Seofion, and even
by representatives of Headquarters E'N) and District Headquarters within
thc Base 6oction.
b. Depots vera required to submit too many reports to#Base
Scotion Headquarters and t o Headquarter. SOS. of those reports
were unnocassery, wore to so010 extent duplicates, or had mtlived their
usofulnesa .
67. The POL Denot PronRm was denigned to eo~omodato packaged
fuel requircmente, including o ils and lubricants, oaly for rupport Of
4. Ltr, Brig Gen. R. ti. Littlejohn, 11 Feb 43, Subj: %lationships
Between Base Section Commanders and h qly Installations." 90:
MnJ.Gan.John C.H. Lee with Gan. Leela note of 8yprov.d written
thereon 26 Beb 1943.
9. 88 700-10, 24 October 1942.
6. Hq 60s Circular a@, 24 August 1943.
R-E-8-T-R-I-0-9-E-D
- 36 -

BESTRICIED
operations on the Continent. The requirements, iacluding oils and lub
ricanta, only for BuI)port of operations on the Continent. The requirements
for vehicles operating in the United Kingdom irere SUppliOd from
common storage operated by the British.
The original program vimalized twenty depots, of which ten were
authoriaed for construction earl? in 1943. The construction of the re-
maining ten were to be authorized as tactical plans developed. By the
end of 1943, 14 depots had been complete& with a cepacity of 20,000 tons
of fusl plus 13,000 sq- feet of covered storwe for oils and lubricaats.
Ninety-five percent of the conbbmctlon we.8 done by the United
States.
This storage program was based on the assumption that two-third8
of the combat force would be engeged during the first 30 days and tho
entire force during the following 15 days, after vrhkch bulk deliveries
could be depended upon. Fuel consumption Vas baed on 1;75 gallons per
man par dkv foe combat operations. Lubricating oil8 as a percentage
of fie1 tonnage for combat operations were calculated at 45 with all
other ahlied products amounting t o less than *.
68. The Amunition Depot Proprm vrae designed to ctore four months
of Oround Force replrementn and eight months of Air Force requiregent6
for full combat operations.
The program called for space adequa€e to store 388,000 tons of
Ordnance iteme: 134 tons of Chcmical Uarfwe Items plus 8,OOO,OOO square
faet of hard standings mainly for spray tanks.
69. Conelusiozs.
a. The depot structure of bdvaice, Intermediate, and Base
Depots ae specified in 'far Department publications is not the most
dasirable under all circumstances. Rcquently the eatabliahmdj of d i
such a depot system is ettemely uneconomical in the use of trmsporta-
tlon and personnel. A depot structure should be worked out for cach
dtuation from a oomon sense point of view, based on the aost efficient
use of transportation and personnel.
b. Undcr overseas conditions vhere available rail and storage
facilities wre limitcb, QC.3QralDepot6 are usually lese desirable
than barvice Depots in supporting large oprcrtions involving substan-
tial tonnego.
c. The dcgree to which denots should 'oe exempted from Base
Seotion control is a mattor of evolution in a specific situation, but
in general Ohore should bo conplcto decontralfsaticn of operation rO1ponaibilitios
to the Basc Scction Comnandcrs, vlth the Headquarters
SOS staff concentrating on plans, pB1ici es and ooordination.
d. Staff Socfions shauld not bc pernittad to i6md dircctivcs
to installations oalling for recurring reports except an omroved
by a control section orgpnizcd on a General Staff level. Abuse of WCb
a oontrol, ospeoially undcr rcpidly changing conditions, will &most
, inevitably result in installations being burdoneb with bhc sUl"8sion
of unnecessarily largo numbers of r~ports,many of which dl.1 contain
idcntlcal Information.
e. I!& authority to impcct dcpot installations should be
specifically and strictly limited. All inspectdona and visits $0 installations
should roquire thc commrrence of eome Central WCncY.
R-E-S-T-%I-C-T-S-D
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SEGTIOW 19
SOBTIXG SHEDS
70. Sasis of Rcsuircncnt. As soon as substmtid quantities of
Uritcd Statcs SUpDlica began wriving in the Britisb Islea, the ~ lan
for gctting this ratcriel fron ship-aid0 to the proper depots was found
to be un.rorkabla.
me original plan had bccn for SOS Supply 5orvicss to designate
the deetinntions of e.11 aupclies on each ship prior to the arrival of
the dip.' The baais of this action was to be RZvance copies of the shipla
wonifeat, prcceded by loding cableo. However, lhipsl manifests and other
advicce vcrc found to be not in sufficient dotail to permit the pre-
dceignation of cargo to tho cxtont nccessary to make the plan workable.
A contributiig factor in thc failure of the plan was the inability,
espcciallp in 19k2 tud early 1943, of British dock workera, unfamiliar
with United Statza aupnlica and markings, to follow aamrrately
such detailed shipping instivctions BB could be given.
Another factor contributing to the coofusion was tho relatively
largo percentago a i contciners that were inadequately markod os to contents,
or were not marlecd e.$ all. An indication of tne extant of this
failing is the fact that in 1942 the New York Port viaa receiving for
ahiprant approximatdy 24,000 pieces of unmarlced cargo daily.
Thc remilt vas:the shipping of unaortcd mp9lics fron dooks to
such depots ea at thc tinc had capacity to reccive them. Those depots,
after eortine thc mp2lics And placing them in their inventoqj, were
frequently directed to ship large quantities of them to other depots
to.BeLa~~ stock6 or to mcet immediate requirements. Phis intsr-dapot
shipment of wpliae gray to bo a scrioua burden on the dapot and tramportation
systama which werc already working to capacity.
Thcre werc threc possible solutions to this problem, a31 of
whhiah wcrc cxploitcd: first, better documcntotlon by the Zone of the
Interior; second, iacrsasing the Gfficibnoy of cargo identification by
dock workers; thtrd, thc use of sorting ahode within the port area.
(mc uno of sorting sheds had not provioualy been coaptmplrrtad).
71: Function of Sortinn Sheds. Tliia vas described by SOS a@
roll.ow: IISorting ahcde at or ncar ports &e used to clessi?., identify
and Bort iiicoming supplies, particularly sizad ltcms of Clotking and
peckqcs which cannot -09 clcnrly idontificd from the manifsate. The
purpoec is to assurc groper dfatribution of supplica to inland dopots,
end to clininatc trannhipneit between depots, thcmby rodwin& thc nubcr
of rail wagons in uec.111
As indicctcd by thc c,borc 8te.tcmcr.t; sorting shods wcrc used
Ol!lY for such itcas as could not bc idcntiflcd and scgrogatod at Bhipaidc.
Never morn than 3$ of U.S. tonnago hpndlod monthly by British
railweye m a fron sorting sheds2.
The routing of aupplics through sortiw shcds involvcd a camplctc
edditiocd handling an oaupmed with supplice that could be dire+
1. SWr2rr:r cntitlcd t'dpprooiation of Installetions PrOgra", fWe 1943,
by Chicf of Servicc, SOS. Smary publiahcd in 50s ET0 lf0verall
Plan", dated x) June 1943.
2. krious (monthly) Progcese Reports md Statistical SU"ariC8 published
by SOS, ETO.
- 36 -

R-E S- T-R- I-C-T -E-D
ted from ship-side to the proper dcpote, Consldcrations cf efficiacy
dictated that sorting sheds be used only when rehandling in the port
aea would eliminate the necessity of rehandling and rerouting by the
depot to which the su-lies would othertrise be sent.
Therefore, sprting sheds cam to be used principally by those
supply Services having a substantial number of depots md recei~nga
large number of Bifferent item of relatively mal1 bulk, such as
parts and sized items. The principal uBem of sonting sheds, in order
of inportance, were brtennaster, Air Force, Service Conriande, Or&lence
& dedical$
In neny respect6 8Orti1~g ehede performed tho functions +the.$
would have been perfomed by Sase Depots had it been fecsible to establish
and operete them as such.
72. The Prom-ement of Sortlw Sheds from the 3ritish was eccmp-
lished to the extent bf approximately & ~,ooOaquR1.e feet by early 1943.
mame sorting sheda, axistine in the imniedinte vicinity of every nqjor
port, had been used by the 9ritish only In sxceptioncl circunstesces
when necessary to clear the porti. Tuey hRd beski held mppty for use
in emergencies, such a8 e. breakdown $n the transportation system or
disruption of the supply system by bombing, T b British were d o u s to
continue antaining the sorting ahids for either dnericen or British
ues on thin basis. ?hey were inclined to ooneider as unwise the una of
the sheds aB an integral md nornal part of any supoly dietribution
uystem. The compromise reached includad the nravislon Lhet the U.S.
&my 8hOUld 00 operate most of the sheds turned over to theu that they
oould be evacuated within a very few day8 if necessary. This nscensity
fortunateLy never arose.
73. Conclusions,
a,. Sorting sheds ahould be provided to facilitate aorting of
@.Ippliae in tho Immediate vicinity of ports and to clear docks when in-
land transportation is not available.
b. Sorting sheds 8hpuld be used only to the mini” extent
nsceeeary to prevent exoesn interdegct ehipmeats reeulting from in-
proper sorting at ports, and to keep dooks clear. Their use for other
purposes is uneconomical in trsnaportation and mconer.