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ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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That General Depots were more efficient than Service Depots<br />

ivas not neceasarilY proven by tho experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Britiah <strong>Isles</strong>.<br />

General Depot was necessary when <strong>the</strong> size of a compact <strong>in</strong>stallation WBE<br />

such that It could not be efficiently utilized by only one service. The<br />

&nsral 3epot etivcture had <strong>the</strong> advantage of perform<strong>in</strong>g housekeqiw as<br />

well as certa<strong>in</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative functlone more economically than sepparate<br />

Sorvice Depot8 located togetlier. On tha o<strong>the</strong>r hand, Service Secticne<br />

of General Depots found it desirable to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> staffe that to a sub<br />

stantid extent duplicated <strong>the</strong> staffs of <strong>the</strong> General Depot Overhead.<br />

!%e Service Sections could have operated as separate depots with only<br />

aoa<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir staffs plus an equitable division of person-<br />

nel be<strong>in</strong>g used <strong>in</strong> General Depot Overhead. But <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple objection<br />

to General Depots was 1;ha.t <strong>the</strong> SOS Chiefs of Services, responsible for<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir own supplies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al analysis, had an eahelon of controi or<br />

c0-d between <strong>the</strong>m and tlmlr mpplles which <strong>in</strong> a fast-mov<strong>in</strong>g situation<br />

frequently slowed and corqlicateb supply action.<br />

With referenoe fur<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> desirability of General Dopots,<br />

it is worthy to not that, had <strong>the</strong> exiatenae of facilities permitted <strong>the</strong><br />

establishement of a few large General Depots <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Isles</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />

result<strong>in</strong>g concentration of nail traffic could not <strong>in</strong> all probability<br />

have baen handled by <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> railway eystem.<br />

66. Control of Depot Operations was a controversial matter never<br />

quite Crystallized to <strong>the</strong> ~ptisfaction of hi<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Base Section Comnandcrs,<br />

<strong>the</strong> 50s chief6 of Services, or <strong>the</strong> Dppot Cormanders.<br />

Problems of control brought about by <strong>the</strong> eslstonce of Gen -<br />

cral Depots Were discuased <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous paragrqih.<br />

They were relatively <strong>in</strong>significant as compared tc bhe problems<br />

<strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t control of depOt8 by <strong>the</strong> Base Section Commandere<br />

and <strong>the</strong> SOS Chiefs of Supply Services. Evcn after <strong>the</strong> Experience of<br />

depob operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Britiah <strong>Isles</strong> <strong>the</strong>re rema<strong>in</strong>s a wide difference<br />

Of op<strong>in</strong>ion ae to <strong>the</strong> extent that Baeo Section Commders should control<br />

depots.<br />

Bese Section Commanders ueually feel that be<strong>in</strong>g responsible<br />

for <strong>the</strong> supply of trocps <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir area, <strong>the</strong>y must control <strong>the</strong> means Of<br />

Supply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se troops. They fur<strong>the</strong>r po<strong>in</strong>t out that, be<strong>in</strong>g near aad <strong>in</strong><br />

oons'iant contact with <strong>the</strong> depots, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> a more faVC"s1e position<br />

to exercise praotioal oontrol. Aleo, by centraliz<strong>in</strong>g Control Of 811<br />

labar, utilities, and othcr resourcee <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir area Base Section Comman-<br />

&ere are ablo Co Nfill d.1 requirononts more oconoaically and <strong>in</strong> tho<br />

proper priority.<br />

3.<br />

Status of Depots on 1 JUG 1944 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> Isler:<br />

Guard Depots 18<br />

Service Dqots k4<br />

Chemical '!arfare 4<br />

Eng<strong>in</strong>cer 1<br />

Signal 3<br />

Transportation<br />

Medl cal t<br />

Ordnsnco 17<br />

brtcrmastcr 13<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r similar Installationa 27<br />

Yehicls Parks 11<br />

Aaununition Qumps 9<br />

POL Dumpe 7

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