ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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BESl'BI CTED SEGTIOF i6 USE OF NON-rr/O msom . 59. "I T/O persome1 in large nuubers were required in fhs Sfltib Isles for headquerters nud for mny other activities, such 81 depot staffs and inspection tm" men after the War Dopartncnt began publishing .Q large variety of new T/o's and ce1lUe.r m/oia in '943, tbre were nany activitie8 that Could be staffed ncre efficiently by non- T/O personnel. Because of difficulties in control end edninistration of now ~/opersonne1,Hendquarters SOS Attenptad to kaq thcir nuher to a aidm. Whila this wag logical, it tended to develop a situation in it YBS easier for inetaJ.lat1ona and other amy egcmcias to obtain entire unit than the snnller nuiber of no=I/o pekeomel proper4 Wmeed between officers and enlisted aen that would have act the rapuire- nsnt equally RE well, or evcn bettef. !hilo this did not develop into 8 serious problem in Lhe Briticlh Isles, it bid afford e note of w d q egainst the excessive limitation of nong/O personnel. In Decenber 1942, SOS non-l/O personnel requirenenti were ee- thated 8t 1775 officers, l&warrant offlcers, and 6030 enlisted nen for the operktion of Headquarters, SOS and other organisetlons end instal latlona in the ET0 not providkd for by approved tables of organirstion. On 1 Narch 1943, the non-T/O erscnnel allotnent on the E O ~ Iapproosd I by the War DQpartnent for 222 officers, 185 warrmt officers, and 6775 enlisted mcn. Sub-nllotncnto to the SOS totalled 1905 officers, 149 warrant officers, and 5942 eritietixi men, and since this vas not a tentative allotment, promotions 09 nonq/O pereonnel were resuned for the first time in nearly nine months1. @. Conalusions. a. T ~ Quse of non3/0 peruonnel is, under WY cmmtenceu, far more sffioient than the use of T ~ Ounits or Y/O cclluler units. b. 'PO limit unduly the number of nond/O personnel available to a theater result8 in the inefficient substitution of T/O anits.
RESTRICTED although they vorked as an infegrtll part of Britiah industries and utilities1 Also, menY British CiVl1ianB were employed By Amsrican agencies other than the Army, such as the American Red Cross, which used 20,438 persons, of whom 9,221 were volunteers, Of those British laborers working direetly for the United States Forces, amy Were Of aa inefficient oategory, haviq been, of necessity, obtzined from among groups ineligible for the draft or eqloyment in easential indUStry. l!heir efficiency bras not much m0"e than half of a British or American military unit doing the sane work. This fact vas reeliaed by both the British Is& Office and the United States Lrmy authorities. Yet, without the help Of these civilians the SOS job in the United Kingdom would have been impoaaible. 62. Italian Service Labor. Some considerable relief of the labor shortage was provided by the introduction of Italian Service llnits into the United Kingdom in June 1944 There were 7629 auch personnel in the British Isles by September l9&*. These units had been OrganlBed by the >lediterranean Theater. Many types of SOS units in addition to labor companien were organized, each with its small c ake of United States Army personnel t o coumand and supervise. The Har bpartment declared that Italian Service units could be substituted far the s me type Amy service unit on a one-for-one basis with very little loss in efficiency, anh furthermore, it gave auth rity to inactive Brmy units at the 881116 rate they were thus relieved. 9 However, because of languege difficultice and because it was cousidered undesirable to have them Italian units performing a type Of vork that was higher than, or on the sane level with, that of baaic United States &my unite, nost Italian personnel vere utilized purely as labor: As labovers they proved to be more efficient than Uniited States soldiers arrd considerably more efficient tkm a comparabba number of the type of British civilian labooors mailable. In everyother reopect, however, their organizations were rated at half the capacity of omparable United States Army units, and were generally leas satisfaotory. 63. ~onalusions. a, In the absenoe of suffiaient nilitarJ pereonnel, oivillm personuel can be eubatituted with little loss in efficiency for most %DE8 Of Work. b. Bo? comon labor, United States Ssrvioe troops are gonerally less efficient than enemy prisoners of war and Bhe averege Civilim laborers of most countrlee. 2. Historical Section, U.X. Base, "A HiBtOFJ of the ITnited Kingdom Base to T5-Day.H 3. TVX WF+kGB7L, 10 June 1944.
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ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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